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I write this message at the midpoint of my presidential term, in the wake of a stimulating New Year’s Day tertulia hosted by Susan Meiselas and Julia Preston, two longtime observers of Latin American politics and cultures. A hundred of us celebrated in SoHo, a bohemian quarter of the great multicultural metropolis where, in a few months’ time, LASA will convene its historic 50th anniversary Congress. LASA will be returning to New York for the first time since it held its inaugural meeting in 1966, when its membership numbered only a few hundred, mostly North American scholars. Now LASA is an organization of 12 thousand members, nearly half of whom reside in Latin America. Not only does “LASA at 50” promise to be the largest Congress the association has ever sponsored, in terms of the number of panels and participants; it will also be the most international in character, with a bit more than 60 percent of the accepted papers from participants residing outside the United States. With well over a thousand panels, workshops, roundtables, and receptions, we had to add an extra day to the conference, and even so, limitations of space meant we could accommodate only about 75 percent of those who submitted proposals. (For the rigorous procedure that was undertaken for selection, please see Program Chairs Ariel Armony and Amy Chazkel’s report, elsewhere in this issue.)

LASA’s return to New York is particularly fortuitous for reasons far more profound than historical symmetry. Over the course of LASA’s first half century, New York has become an important part of “the field” itself, a critical crossroads for the study of Latin America in its rich transnational and multilayered contexts. It is therefore fitting that two of “LASA at 50”’s 39 program tracks privilege Latino/a studies, and many of our panels promise a continuing discussion of how specialists in that field might better communicate with those who work on what is traditionally regarded to be Latin America. A variety of panels engage Latino New York, and one highlighted session organized by transnational historian and documentary filmmaker Seth Fein links Cold War–era New York City and Latin America. Fein will also premiere an interdisciplinary, multimedia installation that interrogates conventional notions of North-South encounters, imperial core and periphery, and spatial concepts of “interborough” and “outerborough.” One of the Congress’s presidential panels will feature a timely interview, six months before the U.S. presidential election, with a major figure in President Obama’s administration. The interview, to be conducted by New York Times national immigration correspondent Julia Preston, will focus on the dilemmas posed by international migration and border security, and the prospects for comprehensive immigration reform. Another presidential panel will feature a high-profile dialogue among leading Cuban and U.S. diplomats and policy makers behind the normalization of relations between the two nations. In addition to the diplomatic challenges the two nations will continue to confront, the dialogue will also engage the flow of people, goods, and ideas between the two nations as normalization proceeds. Yet another presidential panel, “Latin American Transformations,” will bring some of the most distinguished interdisciplinary thinkers in our field, including John Coatsworth, Alejandro Portes, Maria Herminia Tavares de Almeida, Florencia Mallon, and Steve J. Stern, to assess changes over the past 50 years. The panelists will focus on U.S. power and hegemony, migration and demographic trends, democracy and dictatorship, economic paradigms and policies, and new grassroots constituencies—and speculate on what the decades ahead will bring. A companion presidential roundtable, on 50 years of journalistic coverage of Latin America, will include some of the hemisphere’s most renowned reporters and photojournalists, all of whom seek to promote a deeper exchange with academic scholars.

In these and a myriad of other ways, “LASA at 50” will afford us the opportunity to take stock of Latin American studies and chart new directions for our dynamic interdisciplinary enterprise. In keeping with our goal of promoting a more diverse, engaged, and relevant association, the 50th Congress will provide a meeting place for continuing efforts to enhance the participation and better represent the interests of LASA’s student members, who make up roughly one-fifth of the association. In the same spirit, “LASA at 50” will foster the relaunch of Otros Saberes, thereby paving the way for continuity with the Lima 2017 Congress theme “Diálogo de Saberes.” Otros Saberes has recently organized a LASA section and a new website, and the 50th Congress will feature a presidential session dedicated to the role of hip-hop artists and activists in diverse political, social, ethnic, racial, gender, sexual, and linguistic movements of the global South (which also includes the immigrant imaginaries in the global North). The vitality of Otros Saberes among LASA’s membership—and the opportunity it affords to consolidate collaborations between academic scholars and intellectuals and knowledge producers at the grass roots—constitutes one of our organization’s
most promising renovating strategies as we begin our next half century.

The program of “LASA at 50” graphically underscores that LASA remains fully committed to its “big tent” philosophy. As Ariel Armony and Amy Chazkel point out in their report, the sessions that have been organized by our diverse tracks and sections equally represent the social sciences and the humanities and seek to honor classical fields of study as well as emerging fields and coverage of the pressing issues of the day. In this spirit we take particular pride in the presidential panel that will feature a dialogue on the achievement and prospects for democracy in the hemisphere between two of Latin America’s most enduring statesmen and thinkers, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Ricardo Lagos; a presidential roundtable on political and economic development that will showcase Costa Rican president Luis Guillermo Solís; and a blue-ribbon panel that will commemorate Guillermo O’Donnell’s classic work on democratic transitions.

Congresses in New York City as ambitious as this one incur gargantuan expenses; it is not for nothing that LASA has not met in the Big Apple since its modest inaugural event! In order to accommodate as many participants as possible, we have been obliged to rent space at New York prices for an extra day of sessions. At the same time, we only turn 50 once! The special circumstances of the 50th require an appropriate celebration and also afford a unique opportunity for LASA to raise funds to realize its abiding commitment to become a more diverse and inclusive institution for its expanding membership. The 50th challenges us to bolster LASA’s endowment, which above all underwrites travel and research opportunities for Latin America–based members.

As I began my presidential year I was charged by LASA’s Executive Council and Secretariat with coordinating a fund-raising effort around the 50th anniversary in collaboration with LASA’s executive director and Development Committee. I have taken this charge very seriously. For the past six months, Milagros Pereyra and I have been reaching out to foundations, LASA life members and past presidents, New York metro area universities, and Latin American studies centers across the country and internationally to organize a celebratory fund-raising dinner to raise as much money as possible for the association. LASA has never been in the business of galas and—full disclosure—I haven’t worn a tuxedo since my senior prom (happily for me, our fund-raising dinner will be short on pomp, and black tie will be optional!). The idea behind the dinner is not to target individuals who can afford to pay and thereby create an elite group of partygoers. The exception will be life members and past presidents, who will be subsidized at cost to honor them at the dinner, along with LASA’s supporting foundations, for standing with us these past 50 years. Rather than individuals, the appeal has been focused on foundations, universities, institutions, and centers, in an effort to raise as much money as we can on a one-time basis. We have been extremely heartened by those institutions and centers that have answered our challenge and also by those who continue to consider participation in our fund-raising drive either as individual centers or as part of creative inter-institutional collaborations. We realize this is a difficult moment for Latin American studies centers’ operating budgets, and that they have to make difficult requests of their university administrations. We realize, too, that every institution has its own valid set of priorities. Still, we have been gratified with the interim results of our drive and will keep working in the months ahead to be able to deliver some encouraging news to the membership in a future issue of the Forum. Finally, let me emphasize that, outside of the context of the dinner, we would greatly welcome any contribution to the broader anniversary fund-raising effort, and we encourage all LASA members to contribute “50 for 50”—50 dollars for 50 years.

Meantime, rest assured that, in addition to the celebratory dinner, the 50th will have its full complement of regular events, including a welcoming ceremony and festive reception on opening night and our accustomed, pulsating Gran Baile on the night before the final day of sessions. This is in addition to a program whose intellectual agenda will be unprecedented in both size and scope.

These are exciting times for the Latin American Studies Association and for me as president. LASA has just appointed a new editor in chief of the Latin American Research Review, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, a renowned political scientist at the University of Pittsburgh, who will bring further technological innovations to the journal and has appointed an interdisciplinary editorial team that will include several distinguished scholars from Latin America. He is committed to disciplinary excellence, to synoptic articles that engage developments in Latin American and global studies across disciplines, and to greater balance in LARR’s articles between the social sciences and the humanities (which in recent years have been underrepresented). It is a distinct privilege to welcome aboard Aníbal Pérez and his team, who will formally commence their editorship at the beginning of 2017. At the same time, LASA also acknowledges a decade of dedicated and pioneering service by outgoing editor in chief Phil
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Discurso de recepción del Premio Kalman Silvert, LASA, Puerto Rico, 29 Mayo 2015

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Oxhorn of McGill University. During Phil’s editorship, LARR is transitioning to publication in electronic form and will become the first completely open-access journal of its stature in the field. Phil also played a key role in LASA’s decision to create an open-access press for publishing book-length monographs, thereby facilitating a single hemispheric market for the dissemination of academic books. He will continue working with the new Latin American Research Commons Press after his editorship of LARR ends this coming December.

Finally, in recent months LASA has been engaging in a strategic-planning initiative to brainstorm ways to make the association more efficient, more transparent, and more alive to the needs of its greatly expanded and more diverse membership, at a dynamic historical moment for Latin America and those who study it. I will have more to say on the strategic-planning initiative in the Spring issue of the Forum. In the meantime, let me encourage you to finalize your reservations for “LASA at 50” in New York City in late May. Not only will it be a historic meeting, but we also need your ideas and energy as we begin to debate and plan the next half century of Latin American studies!

Autoridades de LASA, miembros del Jurado, queridas amigas y amigos,

Agradezco muy emocionadamente en primer lugar a LASA, su Comité Ejecutivo y su Jurado del premio Kalman Silvert, su equipo administrativo. Parte importante de mi trabajo ha estado presente en LASA, he asistido a 18 Congresos y he sido miembro del Comité Ejecutivo. Recuerdo en este momento a otros Premios Kalman Silvert, a quien conoci cuando se jugaba por la ayuda a los académicos y centros que habían sido víctimas de las intervenciones militares en las universidades en Chile, otorgados a amigos y colegas como Richard Fagen, Alain Touraine, Julio Corlet, Guillermo O’Donnell, Osvaldo Sunkel, Edelberto Torres Rivas, Jean Franco, Peter Smith, por nombrar los más cercanos, y al recordarlos me produce un enorme honor el agregarme a esa lista. Agradezco a Merilee Grindle y a mis amigos Sofia Donoso, Juan Pablo Luna y Ken Roberts por sus magníficas intervenciones en este panel. Gracias a todos Uds. por su presencia aquí y por su afecto. Para mi es conmover y será inmorable en mi memoria. Un abrazo estrecho para todos.

Siempre he pensado que los premios a la trayectoria de vida en algún ámbito, junto a con celebrar a alguna persona individualmente son también un reconocimiento a su entorno, en este caso, intelectual y generacional. Así recibo este Premio, como parte de una generación.

Esta generación nació a la vida pública y académica en los sesenta de la mano de las ciencias sociales, especialmente de la sociología que de alguna manera incluía a la ciencia política en América Latina. Desde nuestros inicios fuimos descubriendo que junto a una profesión y una disciplina había un objeto de estudio, la sociedad histórica, en mi caso la sociedad chilena, y para todos, la sociedad latinoamericana. Esta sociedad se definía por una problemática histórica que era elaborada por las ciencias sociales y era a la vez un tipo ideal en el sentido weberiano y una utopía que se buscaba alcanzar. En aquella época dicha problemática era la cuestión del desarrollo que las ciencias sociales tematizaban como modernización, lo que tan bien formularan, entre otros, José Medina Echavarría y Gino Germani, desde ángulos distintos. Pero, más allá de las voces del desarrollo o la modernización, aparecían voces alternativas y críticas que se harán predominantes a partir de mediados de los sesenta, reflejando en el campo intelectual el impacto de la revolución cubana. Si en la realidad histórica, la cuestión de la revolución reemplazaba a la del desarrollo, en términos intelectuales, lo que se llamó la teoría de la dependencia y la hegemonía del pensamiento marxista en las ciencias sociales reemplazaban los enfoques de la modernización. A veces eso se hizo con críticas injustas de las visiones precedentes como las de la CEPAL.

En todo caso, lo que trato de mostrar es que nuestro nacimiento a la vida académica e intelectual está marcado por un doble significado: debíamos a la vez descubrir una profesión y una disciplina y un objeto de estudio, la sociedad latinoamericana y, como parte de ella, la sociedad chilena. Ello no habría sido posible sin una tradición de pensamiento en esta materia, pero sobre todo sin algunos que siendo un poco mayores en ciertos momentos nos confundíamos en una misma generación1.

Concebíamos nuestras vidas y carreras académicas y profesionales en una triple dimensión, como lo intuyera Medina Echavarría: científica, intelectual crítica y profesional. Y eso lo vivimos como una tensión a veces insoportable y que nos
hacía trampas al concentrarnos en una u otra y abandonar las restantes. Pero no sólo esa tensión marcó nuestra generación y a mí personalmente, sino que ella era atravesada por aquella a la que se refería Wright Mills, biografías e historia colectiva, estructura y trayectoria personal. De alguna manera todos los vivimos y de distintas maneras. La tentación era olvidar la tensión y que un polo devorara al otro. Había que buscar formas de resolver estas tensiones que no dejaran perderse ninguna de las dimensiones. Ello significaba la presencia y distancia entre ellas, significaba necesariamente el desgarro.

La pérdida de la distancia señalada entre las dimensiones y tensión constitutiva de nuestras vocación, en definitiva, su fusión, fue especialmente significativa para mi generación en Chile en el período que culmina con la a Unidad Popular. La identificación con los proyectos histórico políticos, nuestro deseo de historia como diría Touraine, nos llevó muchas veces ser testigos que sistematizaban o conceptualizaban tales procesos, que defendían posiciones, pero sin escucharlos con distancia para poder entender y señalar sus problemas y mostrar lo que vendría planteando visiones alternativas. La solidaridad con tales proyectos y actores sociales, nuestra identificación como intelectuales con ellos, nos imponía una indispensable soledad para analizar y plantear alternativas. Y con eso no cumplíamos aquella dimensión insoslayable de esta vocación que es la de ser críticos con los propios proyectos políticos con los que nos identificamos y con los actores sociales y políticos con los que nos consideramos sus aliados e interlocutores. Miro hacia atrás ese período y creo que tenemos una deuda al respecto.

Deuda que quizás en parte saldamos en la época de las dictaduras. Ello en un doble sentido. Por un lado, la revisión de las categorías conceptuales y prácticas profesionales con que habíamos pensado los procesos desarrollistas, populistas o revolucionarios que terminaron tan trágicamente, para proponer nuevos horizontes de liberación para nuestras sociedades. Pero sería una profunda equivocación pensar que el desenlace de tales procesos se debió a los errores de quienes nos identificábamos con ellos y no a la acción de los sectores poderosos de la sociedad y fuera de ella que querían terminar con el proyecto de desarrollo y transformación a sangre y fuego para recomponer a través de los militares capitalismos autoritarios engarzados con las tendencias predominantes del capitalismo a nivel mundial. Y ello da el sentido de nuestra segunda tarea en aquella época: a la vez que luchábamos por sobrevivir y por enfrentar desde nuestros propios y escasos medios contra la dominación autoritaria, tratábamos de comprender y analizar y desarrollar una masa crítica a la vez institucional y humana, comprometida y autónoma. Y ello coincidió con una nueva latinoamericanización de las temáticas de nuestro trabajo. Junto a las nuevas formas de comunicación entre los diversos núcleos e instituciones que se establecieron gracias a la solidaridad entre nuestros países, se imponía una nueva problemática con un nuevo horizonte a la vez objeto de estudio y principio normativo que era la democracia. Y en este proceso de latinoamericanización jugaron un rol fundamental las redes tanto a nivel de la región, como con la ayuda europea, y con la academia de los Estados Unidos, esta vez no para enfrentarnos como en los sesenta sino para enfrentar juntos la tarea de análisis científico, comprensión crítica y proyección desde nuestro lugar a las luchas de la sociedad contra las dictaduras. En mi caso particular, soy un gran beneficiado de todas esas redes y grupos que constituimos sin los cuales mi trabajo no habría existido.

Hay que recordar los debates que se dieron en aquella época sobre la naturaleza de las dictaduras y autoritarismos, y las salidas a ellas a través de los procesos de democratización. Buscábamos desarrollar conceptos, análisis científicos, reemplazando a las universidades en docencia e investigación, proveyendo a la vez elementos útiles para las luchas de los actores sociales. Quizás nunca, en un ambiente sin embargo hostil al trabajo intelectual, fuimos más fieles a todas nuestras vocaciones y dimensiones sin abandonar ninguna.

La instalación de regímenes democráticos en prácticamente todos nuestros países, realidad inédita en nuestra historia, planteó nuevos desafíos tanto respecto de la recuperación de espacios universitarios, como, sobre todo, respecto de contestar una pregunta pendiente en las transiciones: más allá de la democracia como régimen de respuesta a las dictaduras, cuál era el sentido de ellas en nuestras sociedades. Quizás el movimiento social que mejor expresa esta cuestión es el de Chiapas, pese a su pérdida de importancia posterior, porque ahí se daban todas las dimensiones de una nueva problemática socio-histórica: étnica, regional, extra institucional pero democrática, anti globalización y anti neoliberal, inclusión e igualdad, nuevo papel del Estado. Más adelante fue lo que se llamó el giro a la izquierda de los gobiernos, desde la política, el que recogió esta nueva problemática socio-histórica. Desde las ciencias sociales, se abordó esta nueva época, por un lado, a través de la interdisciplinariedad, la creciente importancia del debate metodológico en relación a las dimensiones cuantitativa y cualitativa y, sobre todo, con el debate
entre las voces más clásicas de desarrollo científico y las que se planteaban como superación de lo que se califica como el pensamiento colonial, síntesis aún pendiente. Por otro lado, los estudios sobre calidad, tipos y transformación de la democracia, las nuevas formas de acción colectiva, la emergencia de actores identitarios y las luchas por derechos, las nuevas formas de convivencia afectadas por los cambios en las tecnologías de información y comunicación, las nuevas relaciones entre subjetividad y política y entre Estado y sociedad, reformularon esta problemática socio-histórica. El concepto límite, objeto de estudio y principio normativo, que ocupaba el lugar que antes tenían la igualdad, como lo hicieron otros a través de asambleas constituyentes o el Estado, que la formación disciplinaria es insustituible por ejemplo en el pregrado.

Por otro lado, mi mejor experiencia docente, y ello tiene de algún modo que ver con la diversidad disciplinaria y de mundos intelectuales de una institución como LASA que hay que preservar, ha sido la introducción de material externo a las ciencias sociales como novelas, series de televisión y para estudiar fenómenos sociológicos. Quizá porque ahí, como en el caso del cine italiano de Visconti o Scola, o en las novelas latinoamericanas como Conversación en la Catedral o La Guerra de Galío, o en alguna telenovela brasilerita, por nombrar solo algunos ejemplos, se encuentra mejor que en ningún lado la relación entre biografía e historia a lo que aludíamos al inicio o porque al tratar de entender a Melquíades o Amaranta en Cien años de soledad, los estudiantes agreguen otro tipo de acción a la clasificación weberiana. Me temo que en los excesos de profesionalización, criterios de empleabilidad y obsesiones metodológicas, el papel de la docencia para comprender nuestras sociedades pierda esta dimensión disruptiva y formativa en aras de una estandarización curricular para alcanzar determinados niveles de competencia y acreditación.

He planteado en diversos trabajos que tanto los países que enfrentaron esta nueva problemática como aquellos que no lo hicieron, enfrentan hoy, con escasas excepciones, una crisis de sus modelos. Chile fue uno de los países que no intentó dar el salto a nuevas relaciones entre Estado y sociedad teniendo como horizonte la igualdad, como lo hicieron otros a través de asambleas constituyentes o el mencionado giro a la izquierda. Y hoy pagamos ese precio, tanto los actores políticos como los científicos sociales, lo que nos muestra nuestro horizonte en los próximos años.

En esta visión apretada y personal de lo que ha sido nuestra trayectoria como generación, resaltan tres grandes instrumentos de la vocación de conocer y comprender, que han sido inseparables. Por un lado la docencia, que ejercimos incluso en los tiempos de proscripción. Se tiende a ver este ejercicio como una expresión de generosidad hacia los otros, especialmente los estudiantes. En mi caso, son otros los que podrían juzgarlo. Yo lo veo también como un acto de egoísmo necesario. Porque los que no tenemos el don de pensar escribiendo, pensamos a través de la expresión oral, aprendemos a saber lo que pensamos a través de la exposición. Enseñar y exponer es una necesidad de nuestro papel como intelectuales. Y en ese oficio nuestra preocupación por desarrollar lo que pensamos debe siempre apartarse de la búsqueda de discípulos. Como se recordaba en esta mesa, creo fundamental que los estudiantes pasen en sus vidas universitarias por muy diferencias experiencias de formación, una de las cuales, no la única ni quizás la más importante pero sí indispensable es la clase magistral. Pero hay que reconocer que en el debate sobre las transformaciones de contemporáneas de la educación superior y las cuestiones de nuevas tecnologías de comunicación este problema no ha sido resuelto. A veces también los debates sobre disciplinariedad e interdisciplinariedad tampoco toman en cuenta la naturaleza de la experiencia formativa, puesto que no es una cuestión dicotómica que se resuelva al nivel del puro conocimiento o de temas epistemológicos. Uno puede decir que toda investigación en ciencias sociales es interdisciplinaria, pero hay un momento en que la formación disciplinaria es insustituible por ejemplo en el pregrado. El segundo instrumento ha sido la investigación. Confieso también un cierto egoísmo. En general sólo he estudiado lo que he vivido como acontecimientos históricos o experiencias intelectuales: había que explicarse y explicar lo que pasaba. Y mi preocupación ha sido menos la de un teórico o de un investigador empírico tareas indispensables y medulares en nuestra profesión, la que da de quien busca desarrollar conceptos, marcos analíticos, relatos, orientaciones, para comprender los fenómenos que vivimos. Si pienso, por ejemplo, en el desarrollo del marco analítico de la matriz socio-política, en la cual han sido parte esencial los colegas Cavarozzi, Hartlyn y Cleaves, recuerdo que todo surgió a partir de la pregunta por qué en Argentina hubo huelga temprana en dictadura y en Chile no la hubo, y de esa pregunta empírica salió el concepto de columna vertebral y luego de matriz socio-política para explicar cómo se constituyen en cada sociedad los sujetos y actores sociales. Pero también en los estudios de transición y democratización, casi siempre conceptualicé a partir de las experiencias que se vivían. Y desde otro ángulo, cuando quise saber qué pensaba yo...
de la cuestión de modernidad, la mejor inspiración la tuve de los ensayos de novelistas y poetas como Kundera u Octavio Paz.

En este campo también hay una amenaza hoy día al trabajo de investigación en nuestras disciplinas, en tanto se somete dicho trabajo a sistemas de medición, competitividad, rankings y estandarización que arriesgan convertirlas en irrelevantes para nuestras sociedades. Mi impresión es que redefinir la evaluación de nuestro quehacer obliga a una inmensa tarea por parte de comunidades e instituciones académicas a nivel latinoamericano para enfrentar los poderosos intereses trasnacionales a nivel de la ciencia y el trabajo intelectual.

En efecto, el tercer instrumento de la generación a que pertenezco para cumplir nuestra vocación ha sido la de participar en el debate público, sufriendo el desgarro entre el discurso científico y el anhelo de historia. Más que la defensa de posiciones propias o grupalas tomadas de antemano, nuestro esfuerzo iba dirigido a ayudar a comprender los fenómenos y procesos y desde nuestra propia especificidad, participar en ellos. Se trata no sólo los debates en torno a las dictaduras, las transiciones o los nuevos sentidos de la democracia o de la acción colectiva, que tienen su propia particularidad en las ciencias sociales, sino de aquellos que nacen fuera de éstas y que obligan a una respuesta con los instrumentos que tenemos que no fueron desarrollados para enfrentar esos problemas. En el caso chileno, los debates sobre la renovación socialista en los años ochenta o sobre el proceso constituyente son ilustraciones pertinentes. El gran riesgo aquí radica en las tentaciones del mundo mediático y la farándula, el abandono del desgarro y el uso indebido que podamos hacer de nuestra autoridad en el dominio de las ciencias sociales cuando sólo emitimos simples opiniones en medios de comunicación, redes o asesorías. El uso de encuestas o estudios cualitativos para apoyar una determinada posición sin cuestionar los componentes conceptuales que hay detrás, usando por ejemplo conceptos como confianza o felicidad, son una de las tantas ilustraciones de lo que quiero decir. No debemos olvidar nunca que nuestra tarea se ubica en la misma línea de lo que señalaba Neruda para sus poemas: panes útiles y necesarios, en este caso, para ayudar a todos analizar y comprender.

Para terminar, digamos que en los últimos tiempos hemos visto como las tensiones analizadas en nuestro quehacer de estudiosos de América Latina, se han expresado, en una cierta disociación, ya mencionada escuetamente, entre las voces más ligadas a formas clásicas de trabajo y aquéllas que plantean innovaciones radicales. El riesgo es que se consoliden dos mundos cerrados en sí mismos o que busquen imponerse el uno al otro. No se trata de la cuestión insoslayable de izquierda y derecha, que remite a posiciones ideológico culturales distintas y legítimas, sino de la ilegitimización mutua de las formas de saber. LASA ha sido una gran expresión de la coexistencia de diversas visiones y mundos. ¿No será hora de ir más allá de la sola coexistencia y pensar en procesos de hibridación? Al recibir este Premio que honra a toda una generación, pienso que es una de las grandes tareas de las nuevas generaciones de quienes dediquen sus vidas al estudio de América Latina.

Notas
1 Pienso, y nombro sólo a los que conozco o conoci personalmente, en Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Pablo González Casanova, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Octavio Ianni, José Nun, Aníbal Quijano, Julio Cotler, Domingo Rivarola, Edelberto Torres Rivas, Edgardo Lander y los hermanos Silva Michelena, Jorge Graciarena, Ruy Mauro Marini, y entre los chilenos, Eduardo Hamuy, Aníbal Pinto, Osvaldo Sunkel y mis profesores Raúl Urzúa, José Subrandt, Gabriel Gyarmati, Roger Vekemans, Luis Scherz, Armand Mattelart y Franz Hinkelammert, entre muchos otros. Mezcla de colegas y maestro Enzo Falletto y Guillermo O’Donnell. Y, sobre todo, para mí la sociología y las ciencias sociales, así como la comprensión desde ellas de la sociedad latinoamericana, están marcadas por la presencia e influencia de Alain Touraine.
2 Como prueba de ello, recordemos sólo algunas muestras. El apoyo de instituciones y redes como LASA, FLACSO, ALAS, CLACSO, Joint Committee on Latin American Studies del Social Science Research Council (SSRC). Fundaciones como IDRC, el papel jugado por la Fundación Ford y un especial recuerdo al mismo Kalman Silvert, Nita Manitzas, Peter Bell, Peter Hakim, Alex Wilde. Como ayuda europea, el World University Service, SAREC o la Fundación Friedrich Eber. Entro los centros, el Wilson Center de Washington con Abe Lowenthal a la cabeza y el Kellogg Institute de Notre Dame University con un rol preponderante de Guillermo O’Donnell. Y en América Latina recuerdo los grups de trabajo de CLACSO con Francisco Delich sobre coyuntura a partir del cual escribimos los primeros trabajos de análisis crítico del período de la UP y de análisis de los golpes militares, el grupo sobre autoritarismo y democratización en el Wilson Center, el del medio del SSRC, creado por O’Donnell y continuado por mí junto a Patricia Fagen y Juan Corradi, el de cultura y autoritarismo coordinado por Saif SOSnowski, el de aprendizaje político en los procesos de democratización con Jennifer McCoy y Marcelo Cavarozzi, el de partidos políticos en América Latina con CLACSO y el SSRC con Marcelo Cavarozzi, el de la matriz socio-política con Peter Cleave, Marcelo Cavarozzi, Jonathan Hartlyn y Gary Gereffi. Más
Since the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011, an estimated nine million Syrians have left their homes to seek refuge outside their country’s borders, and just this past November, a record three thousand Syrians were granted asylum in Brazil, in one of the largest and least bureaucratically complicated refugee acceptances in the Americas. Two months earlier, President Dilma Rousseff authored an editorial in an outlet of the *Huffington Post* arguing that since over ten million Brazilians could claim Syrian-Lebanese heritage, it was Brazil’s duty to welcome and support these new migrants with “open arms” (2015). Beyond humanitarian concerns, she argued, connections between these two regions are significant and long-standing.

The punctuality of a political or economic disaster, such as this most recent moment, reminds scholars and policy makers of these ties and their greater human or geopolitical import. However, the nature of crisis often highlights the limitations and failures of sporadic attention to such relations. While fresh urgency attends awareness of the impact of long-term intervention and population displacement in the Middle East, it is not a nuanced perspective that reveals the alliances and complicities forged from shared suffering at the hand of empire or resulting from the contest of Cold War superpowers. For over a century, migration, cooperation, and exchange between these two regions has been without significant pause, and from the middle of the twentieth century, an emerging consciousness of belonging to a community of the global South has come to mark these relations.

Middle Eastern migrants were a part of the first voyages of exploration and European conquest; merchants of the Mediterranean world conducted trade between the metropole and its outposts; and fugitives of scarcity and oppression often made the voyage across the great Atlantic divide. Since the late nineteenth century, however, new flows of peoples gave rise to larger immigrant communities, from within which many successful businessmen, politicians, and families utilized transregional networks to forge powerful alliances between the two regions (Lesser and Klich 1998; Alfaro-Velcamp 2009). However, until recently, most scholarship of Middle East–Latin American exchange has focused rather exclusively either on migrant communities or on international diplomacy as a minor addendum to reflections on U.S. and Soviet intervention.

Economists have raised the point that we have very little understanding of how these regions interact, even on the most basic level. Trade scholars have just begun to investigate exchange and investment relations, uncovering an estimated $40.6 billion in annual trade, making the Middle East a significant contributor to economies of the region, particularly in South America. Some have suggested that the Middle East could promise Latin America an alternative development strategy to that of the Bretton Woods system, importantly with greater autonomy from North American market forces (Ellis, Baeza, and Porras Eraso 2014). The proliferation of organizations such as the Council on Arab Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, the Federation of Arab–South American Chambers of Commerce, and the Consejo Para las Relaciones Entre el Mundo Árabe y América Latina y el Caribe (CARLAC), alongside the expansion of the Arab–Latin American Summits, suggest that expanding economic ties are only a part of a transregional strategy to promote greater economic cooperation.

From another perspective, foreign-policy scholars have pointed to relations like those
between Venezuela and Syria, sometimes grounded in anti-American impulses, as having contributed to the rise of new global powers such as Brazil and China. South-South strategies of global security, human rights protection, and climate change prevention have taken on a greater role in international negotiations and have resulted in greater multipolarity (Hopewell 2013). Even at the local level, as John Tofik Karam illustrates, in “everyday geopolitics,” the social practices of Middle Eastern and Latin American counterparts have had important impacts. Tofik Karam offers as a case in point the tri-border area of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina, and how these habits on a local level have helped to define boundaries and flows of goods and people, including the building of a major hydroelectric dam (2013).

Paul Silverstein argues that diasporic affiliations, “worlds not left behind,” also account for the reverberations of conflict in the Middle East within communities in Latin America and vice versa (2015, 282). My own research, for instance, has uncovered the role of Palestinian conflict with the Israeli state in helping to shape the agenda of the New Left in Argentina. I argue that reflections on and solidarity with “distant but significant others” in the Middle East came to structure notions of citizenship rights and political priorities through a series of successful campaigns (Stites Mor 2014). Other scholars have revealed rich histories of interconnectedness through labor relations and working-class political organizing (Winn 1991; Elsey 2012); and recently, studies of Islam have connected the cultural and spiritual paths of these regions (Logroño Narbona, Pinto, and Tofik Karam 2015). Advocating for national or communitarian goals, migrants and their networks have been able to intermittently shape state-level diplomacy and influence humanitarian responses to conflict.

This issue of *LASA Forum* features work by scholars who collectively have called for a more sustained intellectual engagement with the relations between Latin America and the Middle East, not only as part of a better understanding of these regions but also as foundational to our ability to understand present geopolitical realities. Contributors to this special issue have taken on a range of topics from intellectual currents to mutual aid societies. Lily Balloffet examines the most recent responses of Latin American countries to the refugee crisis in contrast with historical patterns of aid and assistance to refugees. She calls for a broadening of data collection and questions why Latin America was not subject to the same extreme varieties of racism seen in their counterparts in the North in response to flows of migrants. Jorge Araneda Tapia pushes the boundaries of study of diasporic communities, asking questions about the identitarian politics of these communities as they struggled to assert themselves within the ranks of the upper-middle classes.

Fernando Camacho Padilla examines the relationship between Chile and Iran, a frustrated but significant diplomatic experiment, calling into question the influence of Latin American responses to the Iranian Revolution. Specifically, he points to the relevance of connections between the Pinochet regime and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to each other’s domestic and international agendas. In this issue, John Tofik Karam compares Brazil’s early stance vis-à-vis the Non-Aligned Movement to the Lula administration’s approach to the region. He argues that the Brasilia Declaration puts in focus the relationship of political continuities to questions of labor, trade, and sovereignty.

From a critical distance, Anna Bernard examines literary triangulations of Middle Eastern and Latin American subjects in the writings of Edward Said and Salman Rushdie that point to greater intellectual and symbolic interconnectedness between these regions. In similar fashion, David Sheinin reflects on the assassination of Alberto Nisman, arguing that domestic issues in Argentina are inextricably tied to broader policy decisions regarding the Middle East.

The issue concludes with a note on the profession, an interview with David Grantham, which speaks to the challenges of sustained scholarly attention to the region, academic and other forms of preparation, and the matter of sources.

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Syrian Refugees in Latin America: Diaspora Communities as Interlocutors

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In the wake of the tragic mid-November bombings in Paris, there has been a staggeringly rapid response from politicians in the United States regarding U.S. immigration policy toward Syrian refugees. Within a matter of days, dozens of governors made public statements intended to roll back months of progress toward legislation that would grant asylum to thousands of Syrian refugees. In contrast, Latin American leaders’ expressions of sympathy and solidarity with France have not been accompanied by a reactionary wave of anti-immigration discourse. As is typical of sensationalistic press coverage, the international media has largely ignored a century of Syrian migration to the Western Hemisphere. This article provides historical context, as well as a discussion of current policy initiatives targeting Syrian refugees in Latin America. We must understand how the global Arab diaspora has shaped current immigration policies and nongovernmental support networks for refugees. I will also discuss future directions for research that will improve our ability to speak in an informed manner about diasporic Middle Eastern communities in the Americas.

Press coverage and social media bombard us with conflicting messages about Latin America’s role in receiving Syrian refugees during the current “migration crisis.” Grandiose statements from national leaders are dramatized, yet Latin American asylum data almost unilaterally fails to appear in reports on where displaced peoples end up landing. It is indeed true that, so far, the total number of officially documented cases of asylum and special visas granted by Latin American host countries is minuscule in comparison to displacement figures within the Middle East and arrivals to Southeastern Europe (fewer than ten thousand have come to Latin America, in contrast to the more than six million displaced people in the Middle East and Southern Europe). Nevertheless, if we are truly invested in understanding the mechanics of the growing transatlantic flow of displaced people, we must assume a transregional analysis of how newly arrived refugees are becoming incorporated into host societies in the Americas.

Since September 2015 alone, multiple Latin American leaders have come forward to propose, and in some cases enact, new policy initiatives affecting refugees. The most dramatic gesture was, by far, Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro’s statement to his cabinet that he would like to invite 20 thousand Syrian refugees to make their home in his country. This follows Venezuela’s expulsion of thousands of Colombians living on Venezuelan soil, and since September Maduro’s gesture toward Syrian-oriented refugee policy remains just that—a gesture, not formalized policy. In other cases, Latin American leaders have more nebulously professed “open arms” to Syrian refugees, as was the case with Chilean president Michelle Bachelet and former Argentine president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. In marked contrast, Brazil has issued more humanitarian visas than the rest of Latin America and the United States combined (over two thousand as of September), and the government estimates that some four thousand have come to Latin America, in contrast to the more than six million displaced people in the Middle East and Southern Europe). Nevertheless, if we are truly invested in understanding the mechanics of the growing transatlantic flow of displaced people, we must assume a transregional analysis of how newly arrived refugees are becoming incorporated into host societies in the Americas.

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Contemporary Migrant Flows

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However, what happens to Syrian and other Middle Eastern refugees upon their arrival to the Americas depends heavily on what sort of federally funded support systems are in place, and what kind of nongovernmental networks and actors have tried to fill the gaps when these systems are lacking. Attention to these questions has been, so far, oblique and much less publicized than sweeping proclamations made by heads of state, some of whom find themselves treading water amid public outcry, or the tenuous party politics of campaign seasons. Or both. This discourse must be situated within the much longer history of Syrians who have been coming to settle in Latin America for well over one hundred years now.

Syrian Migration in Historical Perspective

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, more than a quarter of a million people from the current geographic territory of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine began to emigrate from the crumbling Ottoman Empire to Latin America. Driven primarily by the lure of opportunity, and even prosperity, that American horizons offered, these waves of immigrants were not refugees as is the case today. Exact numbers are difficult to pinpoint, but by 1940 some three hundred thousand Arabic speakers from the Eastern Mediterranean had arrived in Latin America, from Northern Mexico to the Patagonian territory. The communities and networks that these individuals proceeded to build more than a century ago persist today. They have also placed this heritage community in the spotlight as potential interlocutors at another moment of mass migration from (and within) the Middle East.

In nations such as Brazil and Argentina, Middle Eastern immigrants represented a part of much larger immigration booms of the mid to late nineteenth century, and they generally entered through major clearinghouse ports such as Buenos Aires and Santos. In the case of landlocked areas such as the Gran Chaco, smaller groups of Levantine Arabic speakers made their way overland to remote outposts, and many set up shop as purveyors of dry goods and other materials that would sustain the inhabitants of rural frontier spaces. This first wave of arrivals did not often leave behind abundant documentation as to how they made their way from their port of arrival to their final destination. Nevertheless, we can track this ethnic community’s steady expansion across Latin American territory by other means, such as mapping the societies and institutions that this first generation established.

Throughout North and South America, hometown clubs, mutual aid societies, intellectual circles, business bureaus, and religious institutions pertaining to these Middle Eastern immigrant communities began to appear in the first decades of the twentieth century. These voluntary associations acted as essential conduits in linking together members of the larger Arab diaspora, or mahjar, who looked to effect political, intellectual, or economic change back in the Middle East. Events such as the 1925 Syrian Revolt, or World Wars I and II, were met with a flurry of philanthropic campaigns, political activism, and debates in vibrant diasporic print media. This culture of long-distance involvement, characterized by a circulation of resources and ideas, is indicative of the existence of a “transnational public sphere” that connected Arab Latin Americans to both their Middle Eastern homelands and diaspora communities across the globe (Fahrenthold 2014; Bailony 2013; Amar 2014).

Voluntary associations such as São Paulo’s Homs Club, the Club Sirio Libanés of Buenos Aires, or Club Libanés Sirio Palestino of Santiago, performed a variety of services for their Arab Latin American members. These were sites of medical care, informal banking, and conscious preservation of the Arabic language, among other things. These types of associations appeared, predictably, in ethnically diverse urban centers with large immigrant populations but also in rural towns and villages throughout Latin America.

Despite an increasing number of studies of Arab diaspora communities focusing on core urban migration areas such as New York, Cairo, São Paulo, or Buenos Aires, we still know relatively little about how these central migratory hubs related to vast networks of rural, provincial diasporic nodes. In Argentina, the Latin American nation that received the most Levantine immigrants prior to 1940, we can clearly see the proliferation of Syrian and Lebanese heritage societies along the burgeoning Argentine railway system of the early 1900s that carried Middle Eastern immigrants deep into Argentina’s interior (see figure 1).

The steady “transnational turn” in methodological approaches to understanding history has illuminated the importance of recognizing the transnational exchanges of people, politics, money, and cultural production that exist between diaspora communities and their homelands—in this case Latin America and the Arab world. New historiography in the field of migration studies has consistently pushed us to conceive of transnational networks as our base unit of analysis, rather than neatly defined geopolitical packages. However, as a result, few studies of the Arab diaspora, especially of its Latin American region, have considered the actual mechanics by which these immigrant
of cultural production, this network also fostered Arab Argentine artistic, literary, and cinematic innovation that benefited from a network of funding generated by a web of Levantine immigrants across South America. Through periods of economic depression and state violence and other difficult times, these associations helped to sustain Arab diaspora communities economically, culturally, and socially.

The case of Argentina’s Syrian-Lebanese Hospital is an illustrative example of how the Arab Argentine diasporic network collectively executed major institutional projects. In 1917, a group of elite Arab Argentine women came together to form a secular association by the name of Sociedad de Obras de Misericordia, later renaming themselves the Asociación de Beneficencia Pro Hospital Sirio Libanés in 1923, when they turned their focus entirely to the task of building a clinic that would cater to their ethnic community (for example, it would have a bilingual Arabic-Spanish medical team). Only a decade later, they had raised enough money to purchase the property for the Syrian-Lebanese Hospital and immediately began the construction of additional medical facilities. It was a momentous feat of fund-raising, and even then president of Argentina, General Agustín P. Justo, was in attendance at the hospital’s groundbreaking ceremony.

The funds that they raised for this project came from all over the country—from provincial capitals to tiny villages on the Bolivian border and down into the Patagonian territory. The women who managed the execution of this project actually referred to the provinces as their “Pillars of Gold.” They created a structure of “Official and Honorary Delegates,” whom they charged with spreading the word about their project and who would organize fund-raising campaigns across the nation. I concluded that it was this network of diasporic nodes that ranged from tiny rural communities to the federal capitals throughout the Southern Cone which enabled the execution of large-scale projects that took place in Buenos Aires. These projects included construction of the Syrian-Lebanese Hospital and Syrian-Lebanese Bank, and international philanthropic campaigns that aided natural disaster victims, for example, in Japan, Russia, or Jerusalem. From the perspective communities formed the local networks that enabled large-scale transnational flows of culture and capital. What has been missed, in pursuing analyses of these global networks, in regard to the local networks that underpinned them?

In my own research in national archives and local heritage associations in six Argentine provinces, I discovered evidence of a vibrant network of Arab Argentine institutions that spanned the nation. I communities formed the local networks that enabled large-scale transnational flows of culture and capital. What has been missed, in pursuing analyses of these global networks, in regard to the local networks that underpinned them?

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country, and even across the Southern Cone more widely. Regional heritage organizations in the provinces acted as conduits for these fund-raising efforts, and individuals associated with these groups served as guides for fund-raisers from the capital, who ventured far out into rural areas to drum up donations. The successful efforts of this campaign to build the hospital resulted in the Syrian-Lebanese Hospital becoming a powerful and well-endowed institution within the wider Arab Argentine community. It also provided an institutional platform from which its board of directors could make decisions about engaging in transnational philanthropy in the form of remitting funds to the Middle East in times of crisis and natural disaster.

Looking at organizations like the Syrian-Lebanese Hospital allows us to decenter our vision of the Arab diaspora in Argentina by looking beyond urban hubs and major immigration ports and examining the role of “peripheral” diasporic nodes in the formation of local networks, institution building, and philanthropy. As we see with the hospital, and indeed many other organizations, the periphery was in fact instrumental in the construction of international networks of diasporic Arabs across Latin America, and also in terms of the transnational connections that these diasporic communities cultivated with the Middle East/North Africa region. For many of these Arab Argentine organizations, these transnational charitable campaigns persist today. This raises the question: is it possible for Arab Latin American heritage organizations to play the role of interlocutor between Latin American governments and Levantine refugees who wish to attempt a new life on Latin American soil today?

Heritage Associations and Local Networks

Media coverage of Latin American responses to the Syrian refugee situation provides evidence that some of these organizations actively entered debates on visa and asylum policy. In Argentina, for example, the Islamic Cultural Center of Argentina, the Federation of Argentine Arab Entities, and the Orthodox Church have sent representatives to work with Argentine policy makers on that government’s emergency humanitarian visa program known as “Programa Siria.” In Brazil, organizations such as the Liga da Juventude Islâmica Beneficente do Brasil and the Do Pari mosque of São Paulo offer Portuguese language classes to newly arrived immigrants and provide services to aid new arrivals in the navigation of Brazilian bureaucratic systems. In Mexico City, some five hundred Mexicans of Arab heritage participated in a September 2015 protest outside the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, in which they called upon their government to expedite policy initiatives that would provide asylum for Syrian refugees.

Beyond federal capitals and major cities such as São Paulo, provincial associations such as Argentina’s Centro Sirio Libanés of Gualeguaychú, in the northeastern province of Entre Ríos, have also come forward to announce their intention to house Syrian refugees. The Centro recently publicized to the national press that it had organized the necessary resources to take eight to ten Syrian families into its community. The Syrian-Lebanese community of the rural town of Oberá, in the Argentine province of Misiones, has also been meeting with provincial administrators to push through paperwork that would allow the relatives of misioneros of Arab descent to bring family members from Syria to Oberá.

In the case of the Argentine Programa Siria visa policy, the importance of kinship ties between Argentines and Arabs is built into the legislation. Applicants for emergency visas through this program must demonstrate a bond of kinship with an Argentine who will then act as their sponsor. One young Syrian refugee recently described to the Argentine press how her uncle in Buenos Aires, whom she had never met before, was nevertheless able to act as her sponsor under Programa Siria. In this case, her great-uncle’s local Arab Argentine heritage organization, Asociación Kalaat Yandal, was able to help facilitate the process. Founded in the 1930s by the first group of Syrian immigrants hailing from the village of Qal’at Jandal, the association was founded with the aim of creating a space where Syrian immigrants could gather, speak their language, eat typical Syrian food, and keep in contact with others who immigrated to Argentina from the Middle East. More than seventy years later, heritage associations such as Asociación Kalaat Yandal are looking to once again assert this mission.

Groups that advocate increased Syrian migration to Latin American host countries have also employed rhetoric that harkens back to nineteenth-century discourses on immigration and colonization. A November 13 letter from eight Arab Argentine associations directed to former president Fernández de Kirchner went so far as to suggest the positive benefits of resettling Syrian refugees in Argentina’s sparsely populated regions such as Patagonia. In this case, we witness an eerie echo of nineteenth-century gobernar es poblar ideology. Simultaneously, it is also an interesting subversion of an era of positivist logic, which insisted that to populate a nation with immigrant stock was indeed the best course of action, but with the strict
Middle Easterners that would be presented desire to sanitize and police the image of what they saw as elite Arab Argentines’ Argentina. The accusing newspaper decried accused one of Buenos Aires’ most historic Lebanese heritage association. The exposé uncover the abuses of a powerful Syrian—Arab Argentine newspaper attempted to scandal broke out in the early 1940s when In one dramatic case in Argentina, a fractures present among the first and Libanés also recalls controversies and such as Gualeguaychú’s Centro Sirio Numi and the response of organizations The gulf between the anxieties expressed by Numi, director of the Syrian Charitable Society in Chile, is quoted as recently saying in a public interview: “We want to bring Syrian refugees to Chile, and we don’t want to discriminate by religion, but we want the Syrian community in Chile to remain Christian in its majority” (Baeza 2015).

The gulf between the anxieties expressed by Numi and the response of organizations such as Gualeguaychú’s Centro Sirio Libanés also recalls controversies and fractures present among the first and second generation of Arab Latin Americans. In one dramatic case in Argentina, a scandal broke out in the early 1940s when an Arab Argentine newspaper attempted to uncover the abuses of a powerful Syrian—Lebanese heritage association. The exposé accused one of Buenos Aires’ most historic mutual aid societies of forcibly “repatriating” destitute Syrians living in Argentina. The accusing newspaper decried what they saw as elite Arab Argentines’ desire to sanitize and police the image of Middle Easterners that would be presented to Argentine society at large. It is clear that at mid-century, as in 2015, anxiety over preserving a certain image of Arab diaspora communities in Latin America—be that an image based on socioeconomic status, politics, or religion—plays into diasporic responses to “open arms” policies for Syrian migrants.

Achieving Accurate Demographics

Beyond the need to historically contextualize current polemics regarding refugee policy in Latin America, media coverage of these events also serves as a blatant reminder that we are currently operating from a place of acute uncertainty when it comes to reliable demographic data regarding Latin Americans of Middle Eastern heritage. A century after the initial waves of Levantine immigrants brought some three hundred thousand people from the greater Syrian region of the Ottoman Empire, estimates of how many “Arab” Latin Americans live today in nations such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Argentina have exploded. Unsubstantiated claims that there are currently upwards of 10 million, or even 25 million Latin Americans of Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian heritage appear repeatedly and anecdotally in journalistic renderings of Latin America—Middle East relations. How did we arrive at these numbers? Who are we imagining these numbers to represent? At the root of this problem (perhaps one of many roots), is the lack of any formal consensus in terms of what it means to identify as, or be identified as, Arab Latin American.

Scholars need to do the demographic grunt work that will finally allow us to achieve a more accurate portrait of Middle Eastern immigration to Latin America, from the first generation on. We should begin by mining the data sets that we do have available to us, such as national census and immigration records, on a country by country basis. From there, we can start to build a sharper picture of where Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian immigrants to the Americas settled, and in what numbers, over the course of the past hundred years. Ideally, these demographic maps of the Arab diaspora in Latin America will even hold the potential for us to track whether or not refugees from the Middle East today gravitate toward historically populous Arab Latin American diasporic nodes when they make their transatlantic journeys. Here at North Carolina State University’s Moise A. Khayrallah Center for Lebanese Diaspora Studies, a team of historians has already begun this work and is making great strides in the task of digitally mapping North American Arab communities. In an effort to extend these maps into the Southern Hemisphere, scholars in the field of Middle East migration studies have already compiled the archival material necessary to expand this digital mapping project to encompass Central and South American Arab diaspora communities, and it is only a matter of time before the numbers start to become clearer.

In addition to crunching numbers and dispelling overblown (yet rarely questioned) estimates of the population of Arab Latin Americans, this type of data mining can also lead us to revise long-standing cultural myths. For example, a recent demographic analysis of first-generation Syrians and Lebanese in the United States has effectively dispelled the myth that the first wave of immigrants was almost entirely comprised of single men. In fact, records show that more than 40 percent of early twentieth century Levantine arrivals were women (Vartanian and Khater 2015). This raises the question: What other populations, besides women, have been edited out of many generations of mahjar
historiography? How sturdy is the foundation upon which we have constructed our understanding of the migratory flows that have long connected these two world regions?

There of course remains much work to be done before we achieve a more complete demographic picture of the distribution and mechanics of the Latin American region of the global Arab diaspora. In the meantime, there remains the urgency of finding solutions to the burgeoning population of stateless people passing through the Mediterranean border region. As these individuals fan out across the globe, we will doubtless continue to periodically turn our attention to the role that Latin American nations propose to play in the migration crisis. When doing this, scholars should keep in mind the force that historic diasporic networks can potentially bring to bear on the experience that awaits those refugees who do navigate their way to Latin American shores.

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La conectividad global existente en muchas comunidades del Bilad as-Sham que actualmente constituyen los países del Líbano, Siria y Palestina son el resultado de una larga historia de emigraciones, que comenzaron a mediados del siglo XIX y que no han dado señal de detenerse. Es más, dichos procesos migratorios estuvieron marcados por la constante búsqueda de nuevos horizontes en América del Norte y del Sur, para después virar hacia África, Australia, y más tarde hacia los países vecinos productores de petróleo y, por último, a Europa siempre en la búsqueda de nuevas y mejores horizontes de oportunidades (Hourani 1992, 5; Labaki 1992, 605; Tabar, Noble y Poynting 2010).

Asimismo, a lo largo del siglo XX nuevas estructuras transnacionales y una continua participación desde la lejanía en las diversas realidades ahora locales en Latinoamérica, fueron dando como resultado un intercambio constante de realidades y relatos inmigratorios en las diversas sociedades receptoras. Dichas redes globales que se unen a las distintas comunidades estuvieron en constante vinculación con nuevas conexiones basadas en la confluencia de posiciones políticas, económicas y culturales.


Este tipo de comunidades que comparte lazos globales ha sido analizada en varias publicaciones sobre la migración árabe en el caso de América Latina (Hourani and Shedadi 1992; Klich and Lesser 1998); para el caso Norteamericano (Naïf 1993); para Australia (Hage 2002); en África occidental (Peleikis 2003); y tanto como para diversos países europeos (Ghadban 2000; Abdulkarim 1996). La amplia gama de investigaciones sobre el campo de la migración árabe levantina podría ser vista como la ilustración de diferentes dimensiones de un mismo tema: la construcción, la negociación y la recreación de las identidades por los inmigrantes árabe en el contexto de local, nacional y transnacional.

Es por lo anterior, que la emigración árabe en todo el mundo ofrece una gran variedad de contextos nacionales y locales dentro de la cual continuamente se construyen, negocian y recrean nuevas identidades, mientras que a la par, estos sujetos han tratado de mantener una identidad original, definiéndose como libaneses, palestinos o sirios en la diáspora negociado sus identidades dentro diferentes relatos nacional en disputa.

Nuevos desafíos teóricos investigativos

A lo largo de Latinoamérica, el peyorativo “Turco” fue el término que se utilizó para definir a los inmigrantes palestinos, siyos y libaneses, seguido por el término “sirio”. En diferentes espacios latinoamericanos, los inmigrantes levantinos fueron sometidos a un camino de perforatividad identitaria nacional. Incluso, en algunos casos los inmigrantes intentaron volver a recrear sus identidades y enfatizar su “blancura” y respetabilidad que llevó a expresiones de lealtad hacia sus comunidades receptoras y actos de civismo público como medio de lograr la aceptación de las comunidades locales.

Igualmente de importante fue en países como México, Brasil o Chile, por ejemplo, que algunos miembros de las comunidades árabes levantinas fuesen capaces de reclamar una posición de élite en el extranjero, que junto con sus conexiones familiares, recursos económicos, alto nivel educacional y participación en el aparato estatal, pudieran consolidar un estatus elevado en sus países de llegada. Sin embargo, este grupo de élite fue siempre pequeño en comparación con la clase obrera y no “exitosa” mucho mayor de inmigrantes en estas sociedades.

Paralelamente, los inmigrantes árabes de primera generación y los descendientes de aquella tuvieron que volcar sus tradiciones y expresiones culturales hacia la familia o hacia las colectividades árabes a lo largo del siglo XX. Sumado, que al ser Latinoamérica un espacio alejado geográficamente del Bilad as-Sham sólo conocían sus antiguas comunidades de origen por fotografía o relatos de viajeros infrecuentes siendo sus únicas fuentes de mantener el contacto. Sin embargo, durante las últimas tres décadas, la identidad de los descendientes árabes ha sido enormemente influenciada por su acceso a los contextos transnacionales de más fácil y más rápida conectividad, sumado, a viajes más baratos, así como su uso generalizado de televisión por cable o Internet.

Estas múltiples y dinámicas complejidades se han manifestado en los nuevos investigadores latinoamericanos del fenómeno de la migración árabe a Latinoamérica, mucho más ligados a los estudios antropológicos que a los históricos...
o económicos, y que han puesto en duda las mitológicas o relatos hegemónicos que en mayor o menor medida habían sido transmitidas por las primeras investigaciones relacionadas al área.

Tales como: es posible medir el peso demográfico específico de la migración levantina a Latinoamérica; la migración levantina es sólo posible de estudiar bajo el binomio migración/diáspora; como desvelar las narrativas migrantes dominadas por una intelectualidad cristiana ortodoxa o católica; sería fructífero realizar estudios de género frente a los relatos de las comunidades árabes dominadas por grandes hombres exitosos; como dar cuenta de las comunidades o relatos quedaron fuera de las narrativas migratorias; cómo comprender las múltiples afinidades con las narrativas posteriores a la Nakba y la diáspora de 1967; o, finalmente, el reencuentro con su etnicidad perdida gracias a las nuevas conectividad en las redes sociales, entre otras varías.

Lo anterior, ayudado por todo un nuevo repertorio de conceptos teóricos posible de describir y analizar las experiencias árabe levantina en el mundo, han vuelto a poner en relieve las disputas sobre cómo volver a conceptualizar la diáspora (Tabar 2005), las comunidades y espacios étnicos (Boos 2013), los campos e identidades étnicas (Tabar, Noble y Poynting 2010), el habitus étnico (Noble and Tabar 2014) o las transculturalidades, comunidades étnicas y redes étnicas (Escher 2006).


**Trasponiendo lo particular; construcción de tópicos identitarios**

Es por lo anterior, que se presentaron en esa línea algunas conclusiones finales en la investigación desarrollada en Chile (Araneda Tapia 2015, 2014). La que pretendieron dar cuenta de un esfuerzo por indagar en la creación de una identidad modelo, dentro de la esfera de los períodos árabes levantinos entre 1912 a 1948 en la capital de Chile. La cual, dio como resultado que el estudio identitario de los árabes levantinos en los periódicos editados confirmara que éste proceso fue multivariable visiblemente negociado entre las líneas editoriales y los lectores, sumado a que no se restringió sólo al devenir en las sociedades de llegada. Es más, si no se despliegan las circunstancias históricas, económicas y políticas que desencadenan los procesos migratorios en las sociedades de origen, no sería posible reconstruir los detalles específicos que la identidad en su proceso de consolidación reactualiza.

Asimismo, fue necesario penetrar en las configuraciones de las sociedades de origen en donde se origina esta negociación identitaria. Y así, determinar las causas de las inmigraciones de población árabe levantina a lo largo del período estudiado y determinar cuáles fueron los puntos centrales que intervenían en la vida cotidiana de estas sociedades dentro de la esfera del Imperio otomano.

El espacio de disputa y donde se centró la investigación serán los múltiples periódicos editados en Santiago por la colectividad árabe, no sólo como respuesta a los prejuicios y a la turcofobia, sino como parte constitutiva de cómo era la organización en sus sociedades de origen. Vale decir, tanto la prensa como las instituciones son reflejo en respuesta hacia la sociedad de llegada y de la activación de una cotidianidad reconstruida que proviene de las sociedades de origen. Es por esto, que tiene suma importancia la caracterización y el estudio de los periódicos de origen árabe, considerando su número, tipo, duración y fundación, y su vinculación con las organizaciones de la colectividad árabe.

En resumen, los periódicos levantinos, editados en Santiago de Chile, crearon un sentido comunitario común que sobrepasó lo regional otomano (as-Sham) hacia lo regional levantino (arabidad) y que colindó con lo local nacionalista, apostando siempre a una identidad árabe compartida con sus lectores.

La primera estrategia que resulta evidente en dicho análisis es el hecho del uso constante de formas lingüísticas de la lengua árabe. Los periódicos levantinos intentaron usar la lengua árabe en sus publicaciones, pero en los procesos de negociación los formulismos árabes quedaron bajo el espectro de la lengua española. La lengua así negociada desempeñará un papel en la construcción y el mantenimiento de la identidad levantina, consolidando ella misma un complejo
importación comunicativa.

función simbólica es paralela a la lexicales repetitivas tiene tanta importancia puede sostener que el uso de fórmulas. También los resultados evidencian que se perciben como parte de su cultura, es decir, se sienten cómodos y la consideran apropiada para ciertos usos en la vida cotidiana.

Dicho lo anterior, esta investigación no sólo se enfocó en el estudio de construcción lingüística de la identidad árabe en los periódicos, sino también en cómo los periódicos se acercan hacia la conceptualización de lo que es ser árabe y lo que significa serlo en los espacios públicos y privados.

El uso de las deixis sociales enmarcando el uso de léxicos levantinos, lo que en definitiva erigen, hasta cierto punto, una identidad lingüística que simultáneamente incluye a todos los lectores levantinos y excluye de manera bastante clara a los que no lo son o no reconocen el léxico árabe. Esto implica un intrincado proceso de negociación con sus lectores en cuanto a lo que esa identidad árabe debe ser, y con qué proximidad la lengua puede evocarlo. También los resultados evidencian que se puede sostener que el uso de fórmulas lexicales repetitivas tiene tanta importancia como el uso de las mismas, ya que su función simbólica es paralela a la importación comunicativa.

En definitiva, el uso de léxicos propiamente levantinos que se usan como parte de una expresión fija tiene un significado bastante diferente del léxico de árabe que está solo. Es decir, existe una apuesta ideológica detrás del uso de léxicos árabes que en lo absoluto pasa por una decisión estilística. Dicha apuesta permite consolidar tótems lingüísticos, como un acto simbólico de identidad que debe ser consolidada y mantenida a la vez que la repetición apuesta a que sea aceptada.

En consecuencia, se observa que en el período que va desde 1912–1935, la identidad levantina se conforma desde un lector ideal masculino adulto, más que juvenil. Más aún, sólo posterior a la fundación de las primeras asociaciones juveniles en 1920 y sus constructos discursivos en la prensa se producirá un cambio y una presencia en las instituciones y sus espacios públicos. Esta creciente juventud árabe consolidó una identidad expresada en el sentimiento nacional y en la defensa hacia la causa nacional, sobre todo Palestina. Esto se manifiesta en los comunicados que las instituciones entregaban a la prensa árabe de la época en Chile, que mostraban una constante preocupación y una avanzada capacidad de análisis de la realidad que Palestina poseía en dicha fecha.

Para fines de la década de 1935 ya es posible hablar de una constancia en la conformación identitaria en la totalidad de los nódulos normados bajo el sistema de discursos heteronormativos, caracterizados por la institucionalización piramidal marcada por el dominio, valorización y subsunción de un nódulo sobre otro dentro del sistema de conglomerados. En otras palabras, la identidad expresada y construida en el entrecruz del lector ideal activo, moderno, civilizado y siempre masculino del nódulo dominante deberá encajar con los otros nódulos, los que se verán afectados al tener que adecuarse a dicho conglomerado. Así, los nódulos menores fueron traspasados por una identidad fundamental con características particulares, aunque siempre negociables, que se expresaron presionando hacia el lector ideal, a saber: patriota, nacionalista, árabe, pro-palestino y masculino.

Dichos conglomerados discursivos y las frecuencias discursivas se moverán dentro de ejes sistémicos ideológicos marcados por micro poderes, donde se establecerá por regla la réplica del sistema en menor escala. Particularmente efectivo en el nódulo de la familia/sociedad, el que dentro de estas jerarquías corresponde al microsistema por excelencia y al lugar de negociación fundamental a la vez que protegido y enmarcado por un espacio esencial donde valores y comportamientos son desplegados con fuerza. El nódulo familia/sociedad fue entonces legitimado a través de una identidad diacrónica (por ejemplo los lazos de consanguinidad) y sincrónicas (por ejemplo el éxito de los grandes industriales y sus familias), reproducido por el sistema de discurso presente en los periódicos árabes descritos.

En segundo lugar, cabe hacer notar que el nódulo de la familia/sociedad estará a lo largo del estudio siempre bajo la presión jerárquica del nódulo de política internacional y la política nacional, afectando su desenvolvimiento discursivo y su apuesta identitaria. Lo que en definitiva termina por negociar un discurso heteronormativo en la familia en donde se disputa las definiciones de género y la estructura de dominio. En su mayoría se apuesta por que el padre pasa a ser más que responsable del cuidado de los hijos, el guardian y el responsable de la reproducción identitaria levantina.
Esta apuesta identitaria se encarna claramente en los discursos sobre la familia como el lugar de origen de las referencias binarias, lineales, como también de lucha y conflicto permanente. En este espacios de relación, los periódicos se transformaron en un lugar político fundamental, donde se construyen y materializan los valores. Será el lugar que informó y elaboró conocimiento para la colectividad, registrando lógicas diferenciadas entre hombres y mujeres.

Las identidades masculinas (que decantan en el lector ideal) se legitiman sobre lo femenino al provenir de una experiencia histórica especialmente diferenciada. Mientras lo masculino proviene de una experiencia de poder, con una historia escrita y relatada a lo largo de los nódulos de historia árabe/islámica. Un dato no menor es que la historia de las instituciones masculinas, ocupan más espacio por cm2 dentro del discurso periodístico que las instituciones femeninas.

Es más, los diferentes periódicos con sus respectivas diferencias ideológicas dan por sentido la construcción identitaria bajo variables diacrónicas que son expresadas desde la idea de consanguinidad (que establece como hecho constitutivo la marca inamovible de la sangre o del hanule), aunque ésta no garantiza los lazos entre las personas, ni el entendimiento entre los individuos, lo que produce tal entendimiento corresponde más bien a lazos electivos de un orden valórico compartido. Se puede afirmar que la consanguinidad funciona como un eje ideológico que responde a un sistema de valores construido, donde la sangre se establece como concepto de igualdad y de diferenciación, al mismo tiempo que constituye un gesto esencialista.

Existe un repertorio de características identitarias donde el encuadre masculino se presenta con una uniformidad que, según la norma de la alta clase social dominante santiaguina de la década de 1930 se presenta en esplendor. Son escasísimas las prácticas discursivas que atentan contra esta ideología. El hombre encarna en su discurso lo moderno y progresista, identificándose rápidamente con las modas de la burguesía chilena. No está más decir que este aparatoso y costoso discurso material es sólo exclusivo de los congéneres con mayores recursos económicos, que ha integrado el espacio de capital mercantil y manufacturero dentro de Chile. Serán, los “señores” y las “señoras” de la alta clase inmigrante las que serán el sujeto identitaria al que aspirarían los periódicos. Ejemplo de aquello son los múltiples artículos sobre las reuniones institucionales donde dichos “representantes” de la colectividad se citan, se encuentran entre sí, se reconocen y se dejan admirar por una multitud que, a pie desde las aceras, presencia el paso ceremonioso y elegante de los cocheros y los atuendos. Es un espectáculo de la burguesía inmigrante para el pueblo, como para la colectividad.

**Conclusiones**

Para concluir, dentro de las diferentes reflexiones y análisis, al describir el material utilizado no es posible acotar sobre una serie de artículos de escaso número pero con un sentido central dentro de la investigación que fue el espacio del ocio y esparcimiento a fines del decenio de 1930, el que comienza a tomar fuerza en las secciones de sociedad dentro de la colectividad. Paralelamente, irrumpen en la escena social una clase media inmigrante que dispone de tiempo libre por la reducción de su jornada laboral, que disfruta de vacaciones y que cada vez más se encuentra con la libre disposición del domingo. En consecuencia, nacen los Clubs Deportivos de la colectividad, los que se insertaron como una condición social restringida sólo a aquellos que disfrutaban del tiempo del ocio, entendido como un consumo materialmente selecto del tiempo libre. Esto reforzaba a dar el mensaje de que sólo aquellos que dispensaran de un generoso tiempo libre, aquellos que no tuvieran necesidad de trabajar para vivir, podrían participar.

Desde el decenio de 1930 comienzan paulatinamente a difundirse comentarios y artículos que parecen haber abandonado toda preocupación por la identidad femenina, relegándola exclusivamente al espectro del matrimonio e incidir así en reflexiones que atañen directamente a la naturaleza, función y rango de la mujer árabe en el seno de la colectividad.

Comienza en esta década la promoción de una mujer tan moderna como efectiva madre en el seno del hogar. El creciente grado de instrucción y educación de las mujeres de la colectividad levantina fue un suceso común a todas las colonias de América, integrándose en el mercado laboral mujeres tituladas y, por lo mismo, capacitadas para ejercer profesiones tradicionalmente privativas de los varones.

Esta situación daba lugar a una competencia laboral evidente en el seno de las colectividades árabes y, sobre todo, en los medios urbanos, circunstancia que contribuía a la preocupación de los padres por el futuro profesional y laboral de sus hijos. En este caso, la preferencia laboral se otorgaba al varón en detrimento de la mujer y, como justificación, podía recurrirse a toda suerte de argumentos que, en muchos casos, contradecían a los que
sustentaban, en un mismo periódico, la promoción laboral de la mujer en el mismo rango de igualdad con el hombre.

Ahora bien, en los últimos años del decenio de 1930, resultaba evidente que la mujer árabe ya no era sólo una inmigrada que residía en su hogar, sino una mujer de origen árabe que fundaba colectividades y se integraba partidos políticos. Los matrimonios endogámicos se continuaban celebrando y de ello son buena muestra la abundante cantidad de noticias con fotografías de enlaces matrimoniales que el periódico incluye en cada uno de sus números: era un hecho que muchas mujeres ya estaban saliendo del marco tradicional.

La instrucción educativa, la libertad de costumbres y el progreso social junto con la emancipación femenina podrían resultar beneficioso siempre que no se perdieran las identidades: el progreso y la renovación, tal como se escribía en los periódicos árabes del momento, debían ser vividos en el seno de la continuidad de las tradiciones levantinas. De esta forma, aquellos adelantos no constituyen una ruptura con la cultura árabe, sino que permiten profundizar en ella. Al remitirnos al material recogido, un ejemplo clave es el discurso en el ámbito de las instituciones femeninas, donde se entremezcla un discurso que halaga dichos esfuerzo en relación con el espacio público, a pesar de que se plantean dentro de un discurso con una connotación maternal.

A la luz de estas opiniones, el periódico árabe entra en un punto crítico al tener que presentar dos lectores ideales, uno masculino y uno femenino. Esto queda ejemplificado en los artículos que tímidamente son partidarios de que la mujer participe en las actividades sociales de la comunidad. El dilema, sin embargo, y tal vez por la fuerza de los hechos, vendrá a solucionarse en las páginas del periódico por medio de la adopción paulatina pero firme de la figura de una mujer árabe “moderna” y con plenos derechos sociales.

En conclusión, los periódicos levantinos a menudo usaban una variedad de reconocibles formulismos árabes como un método para construir y mantener un sentido de la identidad levantina. Además, el uso del contenido constante de fórmulas discursivas (como, por ejemplo, la repetición lexical) parece formar parte importante de la construcción y negociación de rasgos identitarios compartidos por todos los periodicos. Pero esa identidad levantina nacional, sugieren los datos es, hasta cierto punto, mediada por las clases sociales clase las identidades regionales y la de género y, de ahí se desprende su carácter multifacético.

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Montenegro, Silvia
El régimen militar chileno e Irán: De las relaciones con el Sha Mohammad Reza Pahlaví a los negocios de la guerra Irán-Irak, 1974–1986

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La fuerte represión aplicada por la junta militar chilena a partir del golpe de Estado del 11 de septiembre de 1973 hizo reaccionar a la comunidad internacional. De manera inmediata, la mayor parte de las democracias occidentales y de los países de la órbita soviética optaron por condenar y aislar a la dictadura de Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990). Bajo este escenario, fue necesario encontrar nuevos aliados en regiones en las que hasta entonces Chile no había estado presente. El Sha Mohammad Reza Pahlaví se convirtió en un gran referente, especialmente por la naturaleza de su gobierno y también por la similitud del desarrollo político que se vivía en ese momento en Irán. Por esta razón, en 1974 Chile abrió una embajada en Teherán con el objetivo de intensificar las relaciones políticas y comerciales, y, además, con la esperanza de que Irán hiciera entender a Occidente que la experiencia chilena en la cruzada contra el comunismo y de modernización económica, era similar a la suya. Sin embargo, la revolución islámica de 1979 y la ruptura de las relaciones al año siguiente hicieron sucumbir de las pretensiones del dictador. Una vez que estalló la guerra Irán-Irak, Pinochet, al igual que otros mandatarios occidentales, decidió sacarle la máxima rentabilidad, para lo cual decidió suministrar armamento clandestinamente a ambos ejércitos.

En este artículo se presenta a grandes rasgos el desarrollo de las relaciones entre Chile e Irán, partiendo desde la apertura de la embajada de Chile en Teherán hasta mediados de la guerra Irán-Irak.

Una relación bilateral singular

Santiago y Teherán mantienen relaciones diplomáticas formales desde la salida del poder de Pinochet. Sin embargo, hasta la fecha no se ha publicado trabajo alguno sobre la historia de sus relaciones, lo cual limita su comprensión y conocimiento. Esta característica llama la atención porque existe una tradición de estudios sobre la presencia del islam en Latinoamérica, especialmente en lo que se refiere la experiencia de la emigración de los habitantes de Palestina, Líbano y Siria a la región (Akmir 2009).

Durante las dos últimas décadas, la república islámica ha expresado su interés en fortalecer sus vínculos con el país sudamericano, pues se inserta dentro de su estrategia de conseguir apoyos en Latinoamérica, territorio en el que ya se encuentra una parte importante de sus aliados en el planeta, como lo son Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua y Ecuador (Caro y Rodríguez 2009; Moreno 2010; Kourliandsky 2013). Por esta razón,
desde hace varios años existe una embajada en Santiago de Chile encabezada por un embajador y varios secretarios, la cual, a su vez, se ha destacado por fortalecer sus vínculos económicos, culturales y sociales. Con el fin de lograrlo han hecho esfuerzos en organizar actividades y exposiciones sobre distintos temas. Por el contrario, Chile no ha tenido la misma intención y hasta ahora ha carecido de un recinto diplomático en territorio persa. Durante varios años la sede concurrente se encontraba en Ankara y en este momento lo es su misión ante las Naciones Unidas. El alineamiento que ha mantenido Chile en su política exterior no ha contemplado a Irán dentro de su lista de prioridades.

Esta situación se diferencia drásticamente de las relaciones que se mantuvieron durante los primeros años del régimen militar de Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990). A causa del aislamiento internacional que sufría la dictadura por una buena parte de las potencias occidentales, y de la totalidad de los países de la órbita soviética, se buscaron nuevas alianzas con quienes hasta entonces no las había tenido, ya fuera por no tratarse de países con los que existían vínculos históricos o bien porque tuvieran un intercambio comercial significativo. Por lo cual, de los 55 países con los que se tenían relaciones en el momento del golpe, para el año 1984 se pasó a 107 (Muñoz, 1986). En su totalidad se trató de Estados africanos, asiáticos o caribeños de poco peso en la escena internacional, que no habían expresado críticas abiertas contra la junta militar por los crímenes de lesa humanidad cometidos tras el golpe, lo que pudo deberse a tener una posición favorable a la política exterior de los Estados Unidos, o bien por estar dirigidos por figuras con características ideológicas similares a la del propio Pinochet. El Irán del Sha Mohammad Reza Pahlaví fue una de las apuestas más significativas que se hicieron por parte de la diplomacia chilena a mediados de la década de los años setenta.

Por su carácter autoritario, Chile e Irán pasaban por una coyuntura similar en varios aspectos durante esta etapa. Ambos países eran respaldados políticamente y militarmente por los Estados Unidos, si bien los altos ingresos que generaba el petróleo permitían que Irán tuviera mayor soltura económica y posibilidad de abastecerse de armamento de última tecnología, como lo fueron los 80 cazabombarderos F-14 Tomcat adquiridos por el Sha entre los años 1974 y 1975. Asimismo, la oposición a los respectivos regímenes buscaba su derrocamiento. La heterogeneidad de los grupos marxistas era amplia en los dos casos, y tanto en Chile como en Irán, los líderes religiosos eran voces importantes que condenaban públicamente a los mandatarios por su carácter totalitario, las violaciones a los derechos humanos, y en el caso iraní, por entregar el país a los intereses extranjeros.

El Sha contaba con un mayor respaldo internacional que Pinochet, en buena medida por la dependencia de Occidente en petróleo iraní y por ser un aliado incondicional en el Golfo Pérsico, zona de alto valor geoestratégico, tanto por los recursos naturales como por la cercanía de la Unión Soviética (Keddie, 2006). En Europa Occidental y los Estados Unidos también existían colectivos que condenaban firmemente su régimen, especialmente por los crímenes cometidos por la policía secreta iraní, la denominada Organización de Inteligencia y Seguridad Nacional (Szazman-e Ettela’at va Amniyat-e Keshvar, SAVAK) cuyas rutinas consistían detenciones legales e ilegales, secuestros, torturas, violaciones sexuales, asesinatos y desapariciones (Abrahamian, 1999). Es decir, las mismas técnicas empleadas por la Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia (DINA), el principal aparato represor de la dictadura chilena hasta 1977 y, hasta 1990, por la Central Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI) (Policzer, 2014). Miembros de estos cuerpos habían recibido formación y entrenamiento por funcionarios estadounidenses de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA), con la cual mantenían una colaboración cercana.

A diferencia de lo que ocurre en la actualidad, en la década de los años sesenta y setenta, América Latina no era una zona prioritaria para la diplomacia iraní, lo cual quedaba comprobado en las escasas representaciones que tenía en la región. Tampoco lo sería en la década de los ochenta, a excepción de los países con los que se establecieron fuertes vínculos, como la Cuba castrista y la Nicaragua sandinista por su posición antiimperialista.

La representación de Pinochet en Irán

Al poco tiempo del golpe militar, en el año 1974, el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile decidió abrir una embajada en Teherán, la primera desde que se formalizaran las relaciones entre ambos países. A finales de octubre se hizo oficial la presencia chilena en Teherán y el embajador Arturo Yovane Zuñiga, general de Carabineros que había ocupado el cargo de Ministro de Minería tras el golpe, hizo entrega de sus credenciales al Sha el día 2 de noviembre en un encuentro que duró 40 minutos. Unos días más tarde, mantuvo un encuentro privado para conversar sobre política exterior sobre el que se redactó un informe de gran valor. El mandatario mostró interés por la situación del país latinoamericano, concretamente por su aislamiento internacional. Expresó su simpatía y sus esperanzas de que pronto se reinvirtiera la situación. Sin embargo, a
ojos de los diplomáticos chilenos, el Sha fue un hombre contradictorio, fundamentalmente por sus relaciones cordiales con la Unión Soviética y países satélites, y, asimismo, lo definieron como una persona egoísta e interesada en ensalzar su figura al máximo. Así, la valoración general del embajador Yovane sobre él no fue favorable. Desde su llegada mantuvo varios encuentros con la cancillería con la esperanza de que Irán abriera una representación diplomática en Santiago, cosa que nunca ocurrió a pesar de recibir constantes respuestas de existir una posibilidad. A pesar de que su embajada en Argentina era concurrente en Chile, es decir, a una distancia no demasiado lejana, en escasas ocasiones sus funcionarios viajaron a Chile y menos aún, se preocuparon de organizar algún tipo de evento de interés.

El cuerpo diplomático chileno residente en Teherán hizo un gran esfuerzo en fortalecer los lazos con el Sha pero los logros fueron limitados. La política exterior persa parecía más habilidosa que la de Pinochet, pues públicamente no deseaba mostrar sus nexos con un régimen sumamente desprestigiado internacionalmente por la ilegitimidad en la que se había establecido y, asimismo, por cometer crímenes de lesa humanidad. Una amistad con la junta militar podía acarrear al Sha una crítica más fuerte por parte de Occidente e, igualmente, por la propia oposición interna. Chile invitó al Sha a visitar el país en reiteradas ocasiones, cosa que finalmente nunca pasó. También se ofrecieron becas a oficiales del ejército para que realizaran cursos de geopolítica, las que sí fueron aprovechadas. En ocasiones ambos hicieron esfuerzos en conseguir que sus candidatos a ocupar altos cargos de organismos internacionales fueran respaldados por el otro, lo cual ocurrió con frecuencia.

Algunas misiones económicas chilenas llegaron a Irán y viceversa, pero sin tener grandes repercusiones. Chile evaluó la posibilidad de exportar productos industriales a Irán, como zapatos, pescado congelado y conservas. Los representantes chilenos observaron que los países latinoamericanos con los que Irán tenían vínculos más fuertes eran fundamentalmente productores de petróleo, como Venezuela y México, aunque Argentina y Brasil también ocupaban una posición privilegiada a causa de sus vínculos históricos y por tener un intercambio comercial más significativo.

Una colaboración fallida en las prácticas represivas

Uno de los episodios más singulares fue la visita de Manuel Contreras, jefe de la DINA, quien visitó Teherán en el mes de abril de 1976. La misión estuvo compuesta también por otras figuras ligadas a la represión y al contrabando de armas, entre quienes se encontraban el ex oficial nazi Gerhard Mertins, tres altos cargos de la DINA, Sergio Arredondo González, Vianel Valdivieso y el mayor Alejandro Burgos de Beer, y un oficial brasileño cuyo nombre se desconoce. El viaje tenía el objetivo de ofrecer los servicios de la DINA al Sha para asesinar a una de las personas más activas críticas con su régimen, Ilich Ramírez, “Carlos, El Chacal”, quien circulaba con varios de los principales grupos revolucionarios latinoamericanos, especialmente del Cono Sur. Después de la espectacular acción en Viena el 21 de diciembre de 1975, en la que Carlos secuestró a todos los representantes de los países miembros de la Organización de Países Exportadores de Petróleo (OPEP) durante una reunión, y en la que colaboraron integrantes del Frente Popular para la Liberación de Palestina (FPLP) y de la Fracción del Ejército Rojo, se demostró que era un nexo importante entre extremistas latinoamericanos, europeos y palestinos.

Con este viaje, Contreras esperaba encontrar el respaldo económico del Sha y de su principal aparato represor, la SAVAK, para poder consolidar sus operaciones más allá de Latinoamérica. Sin embargo, las autoridades iraníes no prestaron demasiada atención a la oferta del director de la DINA y tuvo que regresar a Chile sin lograr su objetivo.

Asuntos cotidianos de la labor diplomática chilena

Entre las responsabilidades de la Embajada de Chile estaban las funciones consulares. La presencia de chilenos en Irán y de iraníes en Chile fue insignificante. En el país asiático se habían instalado numerosas empresas extranjeras, las cuales contaban con un alto número de trabajadores cualificados de distintos países. Por esa razón, residía una pequeña colonia chilena, la cual se marchó prácticamente por completo tras producirse la revolución islámica en 1979 a excepción de algunas mujeres que previamente habían contraído matrimonio con hombres iraníes.

Por los pocos años que duraron las relaciones entre los dos gobiernos, únicamente alcanzaron a estar dos embajadores de Chile en Teherán. En el año 1976 llegó Felipe Geiger Stahr, coronel del ejército que había participado en el derrocamiento de Allende y, además, tenía vínculos con la DINA. A final de su misión tuvo que viajar con frecuencia a Santiago para realizarse varios exámenes médicos a causa de un cáncer. Para el momento de la ruptura de las relaciones no se encontraba en la capital iraní, siendo el primer
secretario y cónsul, José Cataldo Avilés, el responsable de cerrar la sede.

Las relaciones comerciales fueron mínimas. El único aspecto importante a señalar fue la dependencia chilena del crudo persa. Para el momento en el que Irán decidió romper relaciones, alrededor del 40 por ciento del petróleo importado por Chile era suministrado por Irán. Con la expulsión de los diplomáticos chilenos también dejó de venderse los barriles, lo cual significó un grave problema para el régimen de Pinochet que en cuestión de poco tiempo tuvo que buscar nuevos socios.

La revolución islámica y la ruptura de las relaciones oficiales

Con el triunfo de la revolución islámica aumentaron las voces críticas contra Pinochet, tanto por la experiencia del golpe como por las violaciones a los derechos humanos cometidas. También se denunciaron sus vínculos con los Estados Unidos. A partir de ahora, con más periodicidad se escribieron artículos de prensa y se mostraron documentales en televisión sobre la dictadura chilena. También aumentó la hostilidad contra la embajada y la residencia del embajador, donde se pueden mencionar los robos e intentos de asalto por parte de la guardia revolucionaria. En ocasiones los funcionarios fueron intimidados. El caos y la falta de organización reinante en el país, según el nuevo ejecutivo, era la causa de ello. Los representantes chilenos exigieron protección policial pero nunca fue concedida tras el triunfo de la revolución.

Sin embargo, la diplomacia chilena tampoco fue lo suficientemente cuidadosa con las nuevas autoridades. A causa de la ocupación de la Embajada de los Estados Unidos y la toma de 52 rehenes durante 444 días, desde el 4 de noviembre de 1979 hasta el 20 de enero de 1981, los representantes diplomáticos de distintos países residentes en la capital redactaron varios documentos condenando la acción. Entre ellos se encontraban los funcionarios chilenos, un suceso casi sorprendente por el hecho de que la propia junta militar dificultó el trabajo de las sedes diplomáticas de los países que decidieron proteger a los perseguidos políticos tras el derrocamiento de la Unidad Popular (Camacho 2006). Por defender a los 52 estadounidenses retenidos, los sentimientos contrarios a Pinochet aumentaron y empezaron los rumores de que el nuevo ejecutivo estaba barajando la posibilidad de romper relaciones diplomáticas. Los empleados de la embajada hicieron todos los esfuerzos para comprobar si la información era verídica. En un primer momento fue negada por los empleados del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores pero, finalmente, el líder supremo decidió finiquitarlas el 16 de agosto de 1980 “por la existencia de profundas diferencias en los principios que inspiran ambos gobiernos”.

Lo mismo sucedió con aquellos regímenes que no respetaban los derechos humanos y eran respaldados por los Estados Unidos. Por ende, Teherán también suspendió sus relaciones con Sudáfrica, Israel y Egipto. Con este último por el malestar que ocasionaron los acuerdos de Camp David de 1978 en el que se firmó la paz con Israel. La embajada chilena se cerró apresuradamente a comienzos de septiembre de 1980 puesto que únicamente se concedió un plazo de quince días para desmontarla.

Los detalles y episodios de la relación Sha-Pinochet son numerosos e interesantes. Los informes redactados por los representantes del dictador en Teherán sobre la evolución política y social del país, la salida del Sha y la revolución islámica, son de gran relevancia para conocer los propios acontecimientos vividos en Irán, y, además, las posiciones ideológicas del cuerpo diplomático chileno. No son pocos los fracasos de la política exterior del régimen militar, como fueron la ruptura de relaciones con varios países tras el golpe militar, el retiro de embajadores, el regreso prematuro de Pinochet a Chile durante el funeral del General Francisco Franco en Madrid en 1975 por presión de las autoridades españolas, o el fiasco del viaje a Filipinas de marzo de 1980 en donde se iba a encontrar con su homólogo asiático, Ferdinand Marcos, quien, sin embargo, no autorizó su entrada en el país cuando su avión estaba a punto de aterrizar. Sin tener la sonoridad de esos momentos, la misión diplomática chilena en Irán acabó siendo un fracaso, no sólo por su expulsión, sino también por no obtener resultados significativos durante el mandato del Sha, razón por la cual este episodio no fue difundido públicamente en su momento, ni tampoco recogido por los trabajos académicos publicados hasta la fecha sobre la temática.

Los intereses de Pinochet en la guerra Irán-Irak

Durante la guerra Irán-Irak, la cual se inició tras la decisión de Sadam Husein de invadir los territorios occidentales de Irán, el régimen de Pinochet prestó servicios el líder iraquí a través del empresario Carlos Cardoen, fundamentalmente suministrando bombas de racimo y otro tipo de armamento. El negocio fue excelente, y para sacarlo más partido al conflicto, en 1986 las autoridades militares chilenas decidieron ofrecer a Irán los mismos productos pero con el fin de realizar la operación de manera encubierta, iban a ser distribuidos por otra entidad, la Fábrica y...
Maestranza del Ejército (FAMAE). Sin embargo, la operación fue un fracaso pues las bombas habían sido mal adaptadas a los aviones de la fuerza aérea iraní. Durante todos los ensayos realizados en las proximidades del golfo pérsico, ninguna de las armas funcionó y en la última ocasión, una bomba defectuosa llegó a ocasionar un accidente a un caza F-4, el cual ocurrió, además, en una etapa en el que Irán no podía comprar aparatos de este tipo como consecuencia del bloqueo al que estaba sometido.

Las autoridades iraníes exigieron una compensación por ello, iniciándose así un complejo entramado de nuevas ofertas y negociaciones que acabaron siendo uno de los intentos mayores de estaña a nivel internacional de la dictadura chilena, que se conoció con los apelativos de “Pinochetgate” o “Caso Irán-Corfo”, y que fue desentramada gracias a la investigación publicada en el diario español El Mundo en 1990 por periodista John Müller. Década y medio más tarde, en el año 2004, este reportaje resultó ser fundamental para seguir el rastro de las cuentas secretas bancarias que tenía Pinochet clandestinamente en el Riggs Bank los Estados Unidos.

A pesar de lo que se podía imaginar, las relaciones Chile-Irán durante la dictadura militar es un tema de investigación poco conocido que puede dar lugar a nuevos hallazgos sorprendentes.

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Beside Bandung: Brazil’s Relations toward the Arab World

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In 2005, Brazil hosted the first-ever summit of South American and Arab countries, called the Cúpula da América do Sul-Países Árabes, or ASPA in Portuguese. President Luís Inácio “Lula” da Silva inaugurated the summit by declaring that Arab and South American states would together forge “a new international . . . economic geography” and “a world of peace . . . and social justice.” Lula used the keywords from the 1955 Bandung conference of African and Asian leaders, which gave rise to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a group of states that claimed to eschew power blocs since the Cold War. But as recently as 2006, Brazil upheld its status as an “observer,” and not member, of the Non-Aligned Movement. Why did Brazil use the language of Bandung in ASPA when it avoided aligning with nonaligned states?

Brazil’s seemingly paradoxical role in ASPA and NAM makes sense in relation to its “independent foreign policy” initiated in the early 1960s. Since that moment, the Brazilian state cultivated political and commercial ties with nonaligned states in the Arab world at the same time that it maintained a distant formal adherence to nonalignment. Brazil’s rapprochement toward nonaligned Arab countries and its measured distance from official membership in the Non-Aligned Movement can be most critically understood in three periods: the brief mandate of Jânio Quadros (in 1961), the military dictatorship (from 1964 to 1985), and Lula’s two terms (from 2003 to 2010). During these periods, the Brazilian state adopted the rhetoric of, but remained separate from, nonalignment in founding the South America–Arab Countries Summit, revealing the overlapping, and competing, agendas of what is today called the global South.

Third World Solidarity and Brazilian Detachment, 1955–1972

In April 1955, 29 Arab, Asian, and African state representatives convened in the Indonesian capital of Bandung and condemned “colonialism in all of its manifestations.” They released a ten-point declaration that called for noninterference in the internal affairs of African, Arab, and Asian countries. Latin American states were officially absent from this meeting, but historian Jerry Dávila noted that the Brazilian president, Café Filho, sent an “unofficial diplomatic observer” to Bandung while he officially visited Portugal (Dávila 2010a, 142). Although the Brazilian president, speaking in Lisbon, alleged, “We stand by the Portuguese in any part of the world,” his observer at Bandung later reflected that “Brazil had the possibility of becoming one of the great world powers if it could relate well with the new countries of Asia and Africa” (Dávila 2010a, 143). The Brazilian state sided with the former colonial master on international matters but could at least momentarily see in Bandung a future opportunity.

In 1961, the states that attended Bandung as well as others came together to protest or moderate the Cold War in what they denominated the “Non-Aligned Movement” (NAM). Jânio Quadros, Brazil’s president, sent observers, not delegates, to the preparatory meeting in Cairo and the inaugural summit in Belgrade. Influenced by Third World leaders, and particularly fond of Egypt’s Gamal Abd el Nasser, Quadros had declared what he called Brazil’s Política Externa Independente (PEI, Independent Foreign Policy). This meant that Quadros not only steered Brazil clear of allying with the United States and USSR but also retained observer status for Brazil in the nonaligned summit. The diplomats that formulated this foreign policy, however, were distanced from the Brazilian foreign ministry after the military overthrew the successor of Quadros in 1964 and seized control of the state for the next 21 years.

As military rulers sought to realign the country toward Portugal and the United States during the 1960s, Brazil’s relations with the Middle East were limited to purchasing petroleum in exchange for coffee. In order to make up for the lopsided balance of payments, two Brazilian business associations headed a 1966 trade mission to Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the United Arab Republic, all of which had adhered to nonalignment. These missions, however, came up short. Only five years later did Petrobrás, Brazil’s state-owned oil company, “sign an agreement with Iraq’s state oil company to purchase Iraqi oil with Brazilian manufactured goods.” Despite this agreement at this time, however, the Brazilian foreign ministry, called Itamaraty, lacked “serious studies of the economies and commercial structures” of most Arab states (Selcher 1974).

Some six months after the coup d’état, Brazilian military rulers sent an observer to the second nonaligned summit held in Cairo, despite their ostensible break from the foreign policy of their predecessor. Brazil’s observer probably heard Nasser’s inaugural speech, which juxtaposed Cold War tensions and a divide between “rich and poor nations.” Though it observed this NAM summit, Brazil and other South American states were negotiating a courtship sparked by the U.S. “Alliance for Progress,” which thinly veiled corporate and anticommunist interests. The point is that the post-1964 Brazilian military regime dovetailed with U.S. foreign policy against communism, and against Cuba, at the same time that it maintained a distant
tie with nonaligned and seemingly socialist-leaning countries in and beyond the Arab world.

Close to the United States and Portugal in world affairs, this Brazilian regime began to rethink its stance toward the Middle East. Take for instance Brazil’s minister of foreign relations, José Magalhães Pinto. Though he supported Brazil’s abstention in a vote on an unsuccessful proposal to condemn Israel after the June 1967 war, Magalhães Pinto took the podium at a Special Emergency Session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. He began his speech by stating that Brazil is “a country linked to Arabs and Jews by ties of blood, friendship and culture” and called for “a peaceful solution to the crisis which has brought suffering and anguish to thousands and thousands of Brazilian homes of Jewish and Arab descent.” Apparently connected to two peoples at war, Brazil’s foreign minister outlined steps for Israeli and Arab states to achieve a “peaceful solution,” not unlike other moderate UN positions. What was different about the minister’s public stance was that it referenced the myth of Brazil as a model of ethnic diversity in order to exercise what another official later called “equidistance” in Middle East affairs. By 1972, this alleged equidistance was again used by Itamaraty to renew commercial relations with Iraq, a nonaligned member state, despite the boycott of multinational oil companies after the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company (Vizentini 2004, 337).

Brazilian Rapprochement toward Africans and Arabs, 1973–1989

With annual growth rates above 10 percent in the early 1970s, Itamaraty sought to open Africa for the exportation of Brazilian manufacturers and to solidify ties with Arab countries that supplied oil for industrial expansion at home, as insightfully argued by Dávila. Serving as foreign minister during the term of Emílio Médici (1969–1974), Mário Gibson Barboza was charged with advancing such interests (Dávila 2010b, 141–168). After visits to West and East Africa, the Brazilian foreign minister traveled to separately meet with Anwar Sadat and Golda Meir in early 1973. The newsweekly Veja represented Gibson Barboza as receiving “goodwill” on both “Arab and Israeli sides,” advancing deals between Petrobrás and the Egyptian state as well as agreeing to agricultural and military technology exchanges with Israel. Later that same year, though, Brazil’s novel rapprochement toward Africans and Arabs would be tested.

In September 1973, Brazil again sent an observer to the Fourth Summit of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Algiers. This meeting marked a “growing Arab-African alliance,” which was felt after the October 1973 War between Israeli and Arab states. At this time, “numerous African states . . . broke off relations with Israel,” and not long after they joined the oil embargo declared by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). Subsequently, African leaders petitioned OAPEC to adhere to their boycott of Portugal due to its continued possession of colonies on the continent. According to Dávila, Gibson Barboza feared that “African states” would ask Arab “oil producers to extend the boycott . . . to include countries they believe have supported the government in Lisbon, either directly or indirectly” (Dávila 2010b, 169). Although Brazil “narrowly escaped the embargo,” its foreign policy began to take seriously such pressures exerted by nonaligned African and Arab powers (Dávila 2010b, 37). During the early 1970s, this change was palpable in Itamaraty’s distancing Brazil from Portugal and in stances that apparently diverged from “equidistance” toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

One of the most striking moments of this shift is Brazil’s support of the UN Resolution 3379, “Zionism is racism,” in 1975. The proposal was approved with 72 votes in favor, most coming from states linked to the Non-Aligned Movement. Jeffrey Lesser and Jerry Dávila (2012) demonstrated that Brazilian statesmen supported this position not because of their country’s oil interests, as widely assumed by pundits and scholars today, but rather due to Brazil’s mythic self-image as a racial democracy and self-proclaimed leadership role for Africa. Indeed, in later UN legislation and voting, Brazil could hardly be called pro-Palestinian, not only refusing to cast a vote regarding the proposal that would grant status to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) at the UN, but also being absent during the unsuccessful vote to create a Palestinian state. Accordingly, Brazil’s support of UN Resolution 3379, which discredited Israel in 1975, must be viewed in terms of its own plan for ever-widening global clout through closer ties with not only the Arab world but also African states, which were connected in a growing Non-Alignment Movement.

Begun by Ernesto Geisel (1974–1979) and renewed by João Figueiredo (1979–1985), Brazil’s political opening led to the return of civilian rule in 1985 and presidential elections in 1989. But “the main line of Brazilian foreign policy,” writes Shiguenoli Miyamoto (2000, 125), “was marked by a continuity with the developmentalist policy that characterized the last two military leaders.” This continuity can be seen in Brazil’s ties with two nonaligned Arab
powers, Iraq and Palestine. First announced by Brazilian military authorities during the visit of an Iraqi official in late 1979, the opening of a PLO office in Brasília came to fruition on the eve of the return to civilian rule. The intermediary that convinced then military rulers in Brasília to approve of a PLO office, the Iraq National Oil Company, was alleged to have only renewed the contract with Brazil’s state-owned oil company in exchange for its support of Arab world causes (Vizentini 2004, 333–334). Without major breaks, the first civilian president, José Sarney (1985–1989), continued to recognize the PLO as a legitimate actor at the same time his administration carried out “systematic planning” for Brazil to operate in the Iraqi market (Fares 2007).

As they engaged Arab states, military and civilian leaders renewed Brazil’s status as an “observer” in nonaligned summits in Havana (1979), Delhi (1983), Harare (1986), and Belgrade (1989). In the 1980s, nonaligned members criticized the structures that saddled them with foreign debts. Growing since the last decade of the military regime, Brazil’s indebtedness, which led to a moratorium declared by civilian leaders in 1987, could have been reason to officially adhere to nonalignment. But Brazil remained an observer, a decision endorsed by Marcos de Azambuja, who served as the military government’s observer at the 1983 Delhi summit and general secretary of Itamaraty after the first presidential election. Lula declared that Brazil should not in, the Non-Aligned Movement.

Brazilian Domestic Politics and the Birth of ASPA, 1989–2011

In 1989, Lula unsuccessfully ran against Fernando Collor de Mello (1989–1992) in the second round of the Brazilian presidential election. Lula’s political trajectory was marked by private and public acts of solidarity with Arab world causes, namely, the Palestinian national struggle. In 1982, the Workers’ Party (PT) published Lula’s own letter to Yasser Arafat in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon that same year. In writing to the PLO leader, Lula expressed “indignation” and his “desire to transmit to you, in my name and in the name of the Workers’ Party, our total and unwavering solidarity,” concluding that he was “ready to go to Beirut now to be a witness” of the atrocities against “the Arab peoples in Lebanon.” In the lead-up to the 1989 elections, Lula’s position diverged from Collor’s, who voiced his opposition to a Palestinian state and the PLO office in Brazil. Though the question of Palestine was not a major issue, this contrast between Lula and Collor show that the PT was committed to Arab liberationist movements even before the dawn of democratic rule in Brazil.

Again in 1993, Lula unsuccessfully ran for the presidency against Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC, 1994–2002). During Yasser Arafat’s first and only visit to Brazil shortly thereafter, FHC carefully spoke about “collaborating” with Palestinians in agricultural, health, and sewage matters, while Lula declared that Brazil should officially recognize the state of Palestine, even before a settlement with Israel (Simões and Fontenelle 1995). FHC’s moderate posture toward Arafat was repeated in the 1995 nonaligned summit in Cartagena de Indias. FHC sent his vice president, Marco Maciel (1995, 191–194), who praised the movement’s “nonsubordination” to world powers, defended an “open, multilateral commercial system,” and concluded that “Brazil feels privileged in being able to participate as an Observer Country in one more nonaligned conference.” Arafat also traveled to the Colombian port city, after his visit to Brazil, where he was congratulated for the Oslo accords. Brazil’s vice president echoed this moderate embrace, stating that “lasting peace” is the “fundamental condition” for “Palestinian self-determination.” Like his military and civilian predecessors, FHC continued to observe the nonaligned movement and carry out its own bilateral interests with Israel and Palestinians, respectively.

In the 2002 Brazilian elections, Lula ran for the presidency, and in this fourth consecutive attempt, he won. Amid growing criticisms of his complicity with FHC’s liberal economics, in late 2003, Lula departed on a nine-day diplomatic and business mission to Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates, all members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Accompanied by 56 government officials and some 150 CEOs, Lula voiced criticisms of Israeli and U.S. occupations of Palestine, the Golan Heights, and Iraq; made declarations of the Palestinian, Syrian, and Iraqi peoples’ right to sovereignty; and called for the continued importance of the United Nations. Similar to the Non-Aligned Movement, Lula declared to a few hundred businessmen in Lebanon: “It’s about time for us to change the commercial geography of the world, . . . to make the rich countries bend their rules, so that we can compete in equal conditions” (Rodrigues and Marques 2003). Lula’s minister of foreign relations, Celso Amorim (2010), repeated these trade
logic in Valor Econômico on the first day of their mission abroad. One Brazilian critic astutely observed, “This visit [to the Arab world] has a domestic gain for Lula,” because it gratified the PT “electorate in such a way that he can’t do here” (Motomura and Arbranches 2003).

Adhering to liberal economic policies at home, Lula’s mission drew interest from Brazil’s corporate elites and shored up the support of the PT voters with long-standing sentiments of solidarity toward the Arab world.

During his respective meetings with Arab world leaders, Lula proposed the idea of an interregional bloc between América do Sul and Países Árabes (ASPA). In May 2005, the Brazilian president’s project came to fruition in the inaugural summit in Brasília. It brought together representatives from 12 South American countries and 22 Arab countries. Brazil’s foreign relations minister Amorim declared that the bloc’s aim “to create . . . a new world economic geography” meant that “to go from Brazil to Cairo, you won’t need to pass through Washington and Paris” (Cantanhêde 2005).

Framing ASPA in a manner similar to the Non-Aligned Movement that began a half century earlier, Lula referred to the summit’s political significance: “What moves the leaders here today is the necessity to strengthen a political space for the construction of a world of peace, democracy, and social justice.” The first ASPA summit culminated in the “Brasília Declaration,” which gained most attention for affirming “the right of states and peoples to resist foreign occupation.” The inaugural South America–Arab countries summit demonstrated that the regions’ strongest commonality lay in their historic subordination to Europe and the United States, most evident in the questions of Malvinas and Palestine.

Although ASPA is an interregional bloc of 34 South American and Arab states, Brazil possesses greater influence and interest than fellow member states. Brazilian officials hosted or copresided over most of the ministerial-level meetings held by these committees between 2005 and 2009. In an early encounter among cultural ministers, the Brazilian cohost stated, “It is very important that we copresided over the first meeting of the Ministers of Culture of the South America–Arab Countries Summit. . . . Brazil has a singular role in the world. Its cultural and ecological diversity serves as a support base.” More tellingly, between 2005 and 2009, Brazil accounted for more than 75 percent of the annual trade between South America and the Arab world, which surpassed $19 billion in 2009. In its first half-decade or so, Brazilian political and economic interests have been far more evident in ASPA. This is to say, asymmetries emerge alongside the solidarities in the so-called global South.

Politically and economically strengthening its relationship to the Arab world, Brazil again retained its official observer status in the 14th Summit of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cuba in September 2006. Brazil’s observer at the meeting and an architect of ASPA, Celso Amorim, had been a career diplomat who rose through the ranks, first serving as minister of foreign relations during Itamar Franco’s mandate (1993–1995). In a nod to Brazil’s Independent Foreign Policy, Amorim praised “nonalignment” as “an indispensable force for upholding multilateralism,” concluding that Brazil “will continue to work closely with the Non-Aligned Movement to transform this shared vision into reality.” Having used the rhetoric of nonalignment the previous year when he made the somewhat daring statement that ASPA would bypass U.S. and French interests in cultivating Arab–South American exchanges, Amorim now emphasized Brazil’s position beside, and not in, the Non-Aligned Movement.

Avoiding formal adherence to nonalignment, Lula’s administration was a key player and beneficiary in the second ASPA summit in March 2009, hosted by Qatar. Weeks previously, a Brazilian official remarked that “it was a good time to be a Middle East specialist at Itamaraty, as the region is gaining bureaucratic clout within the ministry,” namely, two Middle East divisions as well as two special envoy positions for ASPA and other matters. Their main achievement was the signing of the not yet fulfilled trade accord between Mercosur (the Common Market of the South) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the economic bloc of Arabian Gulf countries. Two years later, in 2011, the total trade between South America and Arab countries increased by more than 40 percent to $27.5 billion, three-quarters of which was made up of Brazilian imports and exports. By founding and maintaining ASPA, the Brazilian state ensured its own expansion in the southern and northern reaches of the world economy.

To Be Continued

ASPA, at least in its first years of existence, is more critically understood not as an alliance among equals with equitable benefits but rather as a Brazilian state project that attracts both South American and Arab states in a world increasingly made up of regional blocs and supranational organizations. ASPA owes as much to the historical solidarity that Lula and the PT have felt toward Arab world struggles as it does to their maintenance of FHC’s liberal economic policies that increased Brazilian exports to so-called
nontraditional markets such as the Middle East. But the larger point is that ASPA needs to be grasped not in relation to any single leader or recent political-economic platform, but rather in terms of the Brazilian state’s more than half-century-long strategy to remain beside—neither in nor against—Non-Aligned Summits. Since participating as an observer at the 1955 Bandung meeting, the Brazilian state learned the keywords of nonalignment that it eventually used to frame its own increasingly closer ties with the Middle East, crowned by the América do Sul–Países Árabes Summit. Whether or not this bloc will expand its clout in the world remains to be seen, but what can be said with greater certainty is that Brazil’s reach will continue across the global South.

Notes

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Not Afraid to Make Connections: Edward Said and Salman Rushdie’s Latin American Solidarity

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At the start of an essay on the relationship between Latin American literature and comparative literary studies, the Cuban-American scholar Roberto González Echevarría accuses comparative literature of willful ignorance. Among other eminent figures (Tsvetan Todorov, Julia Kristeva, Jonathan Culler, and Fredric Jameson), he implicates Edward Said:

Said can go so far as to write things like “Central and Latin America,” which on the pages of a State Department communiqué would cause wrath as well as mirth, yet feel that he has the authority to criticize Borges and Mario Vargas Llosa. . . . It seems to me that boldness of this kind, which I am sure my truly admired friends Ed and Fred would not dare display when dealing with the French or English, reveals an overseer mentality that is much more of the colonizer than of the would-be decolonizer. (2004, 91–92, citing Said 1989, 215)

While his tone might suggest otherwise, González Echevarría’s real targets, it turns out, are other critics—especially Marxist and Third-Worldist critics—of Latin American literature who draw on Said and Jameson’s work despite those thinkers’ apparent lack of interest in the region (2004, 92–93). Leaving aside the question of whether it is fair to criticize Said for a copyediting error, or indeed for reading Borges and Vargas Llosa in translation, González Echevarría’s indignation prompts me to consider how and why Said does invoke Latin America, in the region’s admittedly rare appearances in his work, and what it has to do with his far more frequent commentary on Middle East politics and the question of Palestine. Rather than dismissing Said’s engagements with Latin America out of hand, it seems more useful to examine the region’s significance for Said, as a site that shares with the Middle East a history of U.S. imperial control as well as a capacity for resistance.

Said mentions Latin America only twice in Orientalism, in passing, as part of a list of regions that are subject to U.S. intervention as a matter of policy (2014, 46, 348). But in two essays published in the late 1980s, Latin America’s relationship to U.S. neoimperialism is a more central point of reference. These essays appeared at a time when the Iran-Contra affair had made the links between U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and Latin America impossible to ignore. In 1987, Said published an essay pointedly titled “Irangate” in the London Review of Books (LRB, notably, a non-American publication). The piece is ostensibly a review of Salman Rushdie’s Jaguar Smile (1987), which recounts three weeks Rushdie spent with the Sandinistas, and Noam Chomsky’s Turning the Tide: U.S. Intervention in Latin America and the Struggle for Peace (1985). However, Said spends only the last 1,000 words of an 8,500-word article on these texts. The rest of the essay is an impassioned polemic against the violent and clandestine American interventions that Iran-Contra had exposed, and against the false information about these regions that is regularly conveyed to the American public. Said is particularly scathing of U.S. media representation of the Sandinistas: “To listen to the rhetoric about the dangers of Sandinista government is to have visions of Spanish-speaking terrorists parachuting into Seattle or Atlanta . . . so obscuring of other peoples is the fog of self-confirming cultural power” (1987, para. 26).

Said’s aim, however, is not only to describe the structural connections and continuities of U.S. intervention in the two regions. It is also, in his position as the English-speaking

Selcher, Wayne


Simões, Rogério, and André Fontenelle

1995 “FHC promete a Arafat ajudar palestinos.” Folha de S. Paulo, October 18.

Vizentini, Paulo

world’s best-known Palestinian spokesperson (a role that at that time he had occupied for less than a decade), to call attention to the relatively high level of domestic opposition to U.S. policy in Central America, in comparison to the critique of its actions in the Middle East:

In relation to Central America and Southern Africa—to name two regions where American policy is prominent and controversial—there is an oppositional constituency in the United States. There has been no one, in the press or on television talk-shows, to represent an Islamic or Arab viewpoint, no one to testify to a reality out there that was independent of American policy. . . . Debate has occurred in the one case, but hardly at all in the other. (1987, para. 13, 35)

Said’s goal, then, is not to further public debate about Central America, since it already had a level of visibility among the American left of which the Palestinian movement could only dream. Instead, Said uses the region as a tool of persuasion: if his readers are opposed to U.S. support for the Contras, they should also be opposed to U.S. support for Israel. He would repeat this strategy several years later in a more famous LRB piece in which he challenges the liberal consensus of the period by calling the Oslo Accords a “Palestinian Versailles.” Here, he invokes the Sandinistas’ 1991 electoral defeat, along with the fates of Vietnam, El Salvador, and Haiti, to illustrate the consequences of the PLO’s capitulation to American and Israeli demands: “To throw oneself, as Arafat has done, on the tender mercies of the US is almost certainly to suffer the fate the US has meted out to rebellious or ‘terrorist’ peoples it has had to deal with in the Third World after they have promised not to resist the US anymore” (1993, para. 14).

The triangular trade route of Iran-Contra thus provides Said with a triangular model for political solidarity. It indicates a basis for common struggle among Palestinians, Nicaraguans, and their American (and British) supporters, in their shared opposition to U.S. foreign policy. This claim might seem obvious today, but Said was writing at a time of widespread left-wing disillusionment: during the Reagan and Thatcher administrations; in the wake of the decline of anticolonial, Third-Worldist revolutionary energies in the 1970s; and before the growth of the transnational antiglobalization and anti-neoliberalization movements in the late 1990s. It was an especially bleak time for the Palestinians, as is evident in Said’s better-known work from the period (Said 1986): the PLO leadership had been in exile in Tunis since 1982, and the first intifada would not begin until the end of 1987. American activists and intellectuals who were already opposed to U.S. intervention in Central America might very well have seemed the most likely domestic constituency, apart from Arab-Americans, to be persuaded to oppose U.S. intervention in Israel/Palestine.

Said may not have been a specialist in Latin America, and he may have gotten some things wrong, but he kept thinking about its place in the imperial past and present. The year after “Irangate,” Said published a short piece on Joseph Conrad’s 1904 novel Nostromo in Harper’s magazine. Nostromo, the only novel that Conrad set in Latin America, is a grim account of the struggle for control of a silver mine in a country that Conrad calls Costaguana. It ends with the triumph of the mine’s British and American owners in collaboration with local oligarchs. Said’s discussion advances an early version of the argument that he would go on to develop in Culture and Imperialism (1993) about the “contrapuntal” relationship between European novels of empire and classic works of anticolonial thought. His emphasis here, however, is on the egregious continuation of Conrad’s inability to imagine an end to Western imperial domination in contemporary English literature: “Whereas Conrad may be forgiven—he wrote Nostromo during a period in Europe of largely uncontested imperialist enthusiasms—contemporary novelists (and filmmakers), who have learned his ironies so well, have no excuse for their blindness. They have done their work after decolonization; after the massive intellectual, moral, and imaginative overhaul and deconstruction of Western representation of the non-Western world” (1988, 72).

Said names Graham Greene and V. S. Naipaul as two writers who are particularly guilty of lamenting the violent delusions of Western empires while being unable to imagine that their colonies have their own lives and histories that are separate from colonial domination.

As in the “Irangate” essay, although Said spends most of his time on critique, the trajectory of his argument is toward the necessity and actuality of resistance to imperialist modes of representation. He identifies Rushdie as one of a group of world novelists, including Gabriel García Márquez, whose work gives writers like Greene and Naipaul no excuse for their condescension toward the global South. In the earlier essay, in the three paragraphs Said devotes to The Jaguar Smile, he emphasizes the book’s challenge to hegemonic American views of the Sandinistas: it is written by a “sympathetic non-expert non-American,” it represents the Sandinistas as “interesting and attractive,” and it advances a “guarded optimism” (1987, para. 52). Said does
make a rather embarrassing error in Spanish in his discussion of the book—he refers to Rushdie as l’escritor hindu (1987, para. 52)—but the error underscores his larger point that neither he nor Rushdie is an expert in Latin American history or politics. Instead, Said, suggests, they are taking on the “political responsibility” to “formulate solutions, ideas, and even utopian hopes” (1987, para. 54) across multiple sites, to imagine the world anew.

Rushdie evidently thought of Palestine and Nicaragua in connection with one another, as he recounts in his lightly fictionalized memoir Joseph Anton (2013). Recalling the New York literary scene in the mid-1980s, Rushdie (through the voice of his alter ego Joseph Anton) describes parties attended by, among others, Said, Mahmoud Darwish, Omar Cabezas, and Rosario Murillo. These figures, he says, “articulate[d] views not often heard on American platforms.” At one party, Murillo, standing next to the Temple of Dendur in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, invited “the young Indian writer (and member of the British Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign) to come and see the contra war for himself” (2013, 77). Rushdie points out transnational connections that are both coincidental—the relocated Egyptian temple—and deliberate: the Indian writer, resident in London, visiting New York, who chooses a political affiliation with Managua.

The result of that visit was The Jaguar Smile, a book that Rushdie reports having written in a “frenzy” in three weeks (2013, 78). The book makes no mention of Palestine, but Rushdie repeatedly compares Nicaragua under the Sandinistas to postindependence India, in both negative and positive terms: he notes the crowded buses, the poverty, and the Sandinistas’ censorship of the press, but also the Nicaraguans’ love of poetry and their appreciation for Gandhi and Tagore. Every time that Rushdie seeks to situate himself in relation to what he sees in Nicaragua, he does so as an Indian. He writes in the prologue, “I was myself the child of a successful revolt against a great power,” and suggests that he shares with the Nicaraguans “some awareness of the view from underneath, and of how it felt to be there, looking up at the descending heel” (2007, 4).

The triangular relationship that Said and Rushdie sketch out—Said in political and structural terms, Rushdie from a more identitarian perspective—does not stop, then, with the critique of U.S. neocolonialism in the 1980s. It also demonstrates how transnational alliances might be forged, from connections across the global South that could then be extended to the global North. Said and Rushdie had American and British citizenship, respectively, but they identified as Palestinian and Indian nationals in the first instance. The forms of solidarity that they promote—the “energy to comprehend and engage other societies, traditions, histories” (Said 1988, 72)—is aimed at a metropolitan Anglophone readership, to be sure, but both writers set an example of how to practice this solidarity by showcasing their own affiliation with Nicaraguans and with other victims of U.S. global hegemony. They thus position themselves as the third point in a triangle, linking the global North to the global South, from their positions as perhaps the most visible “Third World” contributors to mainstream English-language media at that time. Rushdie’s politics have since shifted significantly to the right (Rushdie 2002); this is evident from his introduction to the tenth anniversary edition of The Jaguar Smile, in which he suggests that the book is naïve, and that “romance has given way to . . . the irresistible power of superpower itself” (2007, 2). Yet this later Rushdie should not, as Tim Brennan has argued, overshadow the Rushdie of the early and mid-1980s, who has been “lost in the uproar [over the Satanic Verses affair] and [is] in need of recovery” (2006, 82). This Rushdie both influenced and was influenced by Said (Rushdie 2010, 166–186), and like him played a major role in depicting the regions of the global South as places with their own histories, cultures, and ideas.

These figures matter for our understanding of the relationship between Middle Eastern and Latin American studies, then, because of the specific historical links that they made between the two regions, and because of their insistence on the importance of comparison as a form of oppositional political work. Said wrote of Chomsky, in “Irangate”: “Chomsky’s distinction is that he is not afraid to make connections” (1987, para. 50). This was Said’s and the early Rushdie’s distinction too, and it remains a suggestive model for scholars today, even, or perhaps especially, if such connections fall outside our expertise and experience.
The Death of Alberto Nisman, the Argentine Presidency Unhinged, and the Secret History of Shared United States–Argentine Strategy in the Middle East

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In January 2015, Alberto Nisman’s body turned up with a bullet to the head. In the necropolitical tradition of entrepreneur/organized crime figure Alfredo Yabrán, who died of a self-inflicted gunshot to the face in 1998, and the still-unsolved severing of Juan Perón’s skeletal hands from his corpse in 1987, Nisman’s death became immediate fodder for a national whodunit. Often guided by the fiercely divisive binary of current Argentine politics, fingers pointed at a range of possible killers from the government of Iran to disgruntled Argentine intelligence agents to angry drug dealers to the president herself, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Iran emerged at the vortex of conflicting interpretations and accusations. In 2006, as a federally appointed special prosecutor, Nisman had indicted eight prominent Iranian government officials in connection with the 1994 bombing of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) headquarters in Buenos Aires that had killed 85.

International arrest warrants had followed for five of the eight. Almost ten years later, Nisman’s death came on the eve of his scheduled appearance before an Argentine congressional committee to present evidence of a purported plot by Fernández de Kirchner and Argentine foreign minister Héctor Timerman, in conjunction with Iranian authorities, to nix the Argentine prosecution of the bombers.

The killing is unsolved. Nisman’s allegations against the president and foreign minister remain tantalizing but undemonstrated, as do many of the charges and countercharges that have been levelled through 2015. Even so, Argentina’s multiple readings of Nisman’s death suggest four keys to both Argentina’s Iran policy over the past 20 years, and policy in the Middle East more broadly. First, the case tells us what Argentina’s policy is not. Since the late 1940s, Argentine Middle East policy has been framed in Argentine scholarly literatures as an “equidistant” approach to the region, balancing measured support for Israel with its equivalent toward the Arab world. Save as a public diplomatic stance, the equidistance model has never made much sense. It leaves Iran, a non-Arab state, and non-Arab social and political actors, such as the Kurds, entirely out of the mix. It suggests a decades-long policy stasis in the face of evident shifts. And it fails to distinguish between ranging and diverse Arab, Muslim, and other interests in the region, across national boundaries (Klich 1996; Cisneros and Escudé 2009). In addition, the equidistance model belies a rich archival document trove for the years through 1975 in the Archive of the Foreign Relations Ministry.

Second, while the Middle East is a foreign policy tinderbox in many countries, in Argentina it has left leaders open to wild accusations of wrongdoing and irrational behavior, sensationalized by international and domestic media too willing to present arguments without evidence. Third, sensationalized media coverage underlines that Middle East policy has often been founded on domestic policies, strategies, and political circumstances with little specific relevance to Iran or to other countries in the region. Fourth, and perhaps most important, the sensational is a misreading of policy making as erratic and quickly changing. Argentina’s policies in Iran and the Middle East have evolved slowly, with careful calculation, and often (though not always) in alignment with U.S. strategic priorities.

The U.S. journalist Dexter Filkins traced Nisman’s death to what many in Argentina saw as a dramatic policy shift in 2013. After a decade of tense Argentine-Iranian relations over the AMIA bombing, Argentina announced a deal struck with...
Iran that would lead to a bilateral truth commission to identify and help convict alleged Iranian authors of the AMIA bombing. In explaining the policy shift toward Iran that would animate Nisman’s proposals, Filkins echoed many in the Argentine media by hinting at a slightly unhinged President Fernández de Kirchner, tagged as “erratic” and “ruthless” (Filkins 2015). Stated otherwise, for an Argentine president to court Iran, the argument went, they would have to be imbalanced. In 2004, in keeping with a new emphasis on human rights in national domestic policy that included a renewed series of prosecutions of dictatorship-era killers and a revival of the investigation into the AMIA bombing, then-president Néstor Kirchner had given Nisman the task of reopening the AMIA investigation. Edgier relations with Iran followed, highlighting a central element of Argentina’s ties to the Middle East over the last half century. Decisions on major policy matters have frequently been determined on the basis of domestic policy priorities only tangentially as a function of developments in the Middle East. In this case, Kirchner’s Iran policy was linked to a central domestic program on the vindication of human rights and memory. In 2013, it seemed to most, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner had done an about-face on Iran by jump-starting diplomatic and commercial initiatives with Iran while pledging to work with Iranians to find those responsible for the AMIA bombing (Wikileaks 2006).

The depiction of Argentine policy toward Iran and to Arab nations as ludicrous, corrupt, or both goes back two decades. Media assertions have been premised on the recklessness assumption that nobody in their right mind would pursue relations with undemocratic, human-rights-abusing regimes labeled pariahs by others. After the Nisman killing, media in Brazil and Argentina accused Fernández de Kirchner of having accepted millions of dollars from Iran during the 2007 presidential election campaign. In return, she allegedly offered Argentine nuclear secrets and amnesty for the AMIA bombers. Never mind that, despite ebbs and flows in the transfer of materials and knowledge, Argentina had an ongoing exchange of nuclear technology with Iran since the 1970s, always registered with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran-Argentina nuclear exchanges were in keeping with a long-standing Argentine developmentalist modernizing project to provide poorer nations with non-bellicose nuclear means. The testimony of the three sources for the campaign funding accusation—exiled, disaffected members of President Hugo Chávez’s government—could not be independently corroborated (La Nación 2012).

The labeling of President Fernández de Kirchner as erratic and corrupt on foreign policy formulation is reminiscent of similar accusations faced by Argentine president Carlos Menem 20 years ago. The Argentine-born son of Syrian-Argentine immigrants, Menem was accused falsely in the Argentine media of fostering close ties in the 1990s with Syria as a function of his supposed (and to some, duplicitous) dual ethnic or national loyalties. As a basis for policy making, this made as much sense as Filkins’s imaginings about Fernández de Kirchner’s purported emotional ups and downs as a policy driver. In Menem’s case, a U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) informant told the New York Times and other media that the Iranian government’s motivation for the 1994 bombing was Argentina’s decision to abrogate an arms deal with Damascus and a nuclear accord with Syria’s ally in Tehran. The failure to prosecute the AMIA bombers during Menem’s five subsequent years of presidency came as a result not of any pro-Iran or pro-Hezbollah leanings but, rather, after Menem was allegedly paid a $10 million bribe by the Iranian government. Anything is possible, but there have been no independent, reliable confirmations for any of it (Turner 2015; Rohter 2002).

Peeling aside claims of presidential histrionics, suspicious Arab allegiances, and corruption in Menem’s canceling the arms deal and the nuclear accord and Fernández de Kirchner’s 2013 policy shift, we get closer to the most significant factors in the shaping of Argentine Middle East policy over the past half century. In each of those cases, as it had during the 1973 Yom Kippur War (Sheinin 2012), the Middle East functioned for Argentina as a regional forum where specific Argentine interests are limited, but where the Argentine government identified a strategic base from which it might exercise larger, global initiatives. In Menem’s case, the cancellations drew on an important policy shift toward closer ties with the United States; Washington had pressured the Argentine government to back away from the agreements with Syria and Iran. In 2013, the public face of President Fernández de Kirchner’s move to end Argentina’s existing antagonisms with Iran had almost nothing to do with Iran itself. On both foreign and domestic policies, she had moved her administration to the left in the aftermath of Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez’s death. Her public rapprochement with Iran marked a global realignment of Argentine positions to reflect that larger shift, and to distance Argentina from Brazil and Chile, which were veering from left to center on foreign and domestic policies. In addition, Fernández de Kirchner was moving to deemphasize the human rights–related politics of her predecessor in office and
hoped to expand trade opportunities with Iran, as she did with other developing nations (Restivo 2012).

Where human rights and other identifiably specific social, cultural, or political problems in the Middle East have informed Argentine policy making, they have rarely done so in a way that has placed Argentina in a unique leadership role in the international community. This has long suggested diplomatic caution rather than equidistance. Argentine diplomats and policy makers have been keen observers of social crisis. In the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War, the Argentine ambassador in Israel, Rodolfo Baltiérrez, urged that Argentina take a prominent stand on Palestinian refugees in the West Bank who faced hunger, anguish, and malnutrition. Baltiérrez was fiercely critical of the inaction of the United Nations (UN) Refugee Agency, and the positions of the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian governments, likely to exploit and conceal larger goals. Over the past 15 years two potentially explosive and on first glance, contradictory strategic objectives have guided Argentine Middle East positions. On the Middle East, as elsewhere, Argentina has publicly distanced itself from the United States. At the same time, through the 2013 Argentine announcement on the joint Iran-Argentina commission, during Alberto Nisman’s almost decade-long efforts to prosecute the AMIA bombers, and in Argentine-Iranian relations from 2006 forward, Argentina worked in close cooperation with a purported antagonist, the United States.

Just as the media frenzy around Nisman seemed to have reached impossible levels of hyperbole through mid-2015, that ceiling was broken by the journalist Facundo Pastor, who recently published a book accusing the special prosecutor of having been an FBI agent. Nisman, according to Pastor, was the “top contact for the FBI in the entire region,” reporting all his legal moves to the FBI through the U.S. embassy [in Argentina], before even informing his own legal superiors. “Did he spend ten years dedicating himself to exposing a terrorist attack,” Pastor went on, “or did he follow the script that the Americans had passed on to him before they cut him loose?” (Pastor 2015). Nisman, of course, was no stooge of the United States. Pastor’s accusations come from a gross misreading of a handful of secret documents that turned up on Wikileaks. The documents show, in fact, that Nisman was in ongoing contact with the FBI and the U.S. State Department. Implausible as they are, Pastor’s accusation draws on a fallacious view shared by many Argentines. Most cannot accept that high-ranking Argentine officials worked cooperatively with the United States on Iran policy. More important, most Argentines would have great difficulty accepting what the Wikileaks documents show. Neither the administration of Néstor Kirchner nor that of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner appears as an antagonist of Washington. On the contrary, what the U.S. State Department documentation demonstrates is that, despite that Argentine governments since 2002 have presented their polices as inimical to the interests of the United States, and that many Argentines view kirchenismo as synonymous with anti-imperialism, on Middle East policy the two countries have collaborated extensively and in secret to meet common strategic ends.

In February 2008, Arab and South American government ministers met to promote stronger commercial and diplomatic ties. Argentina announced it would open a diplomatic mission in Ramallah and signed on to several multinational statements adopted by attendees that were inimical to U.S. interests. These included a reform of the UN Security Council to end the preeminence of the great powers, the right of peoples to refuse foreign occupation and for states and individuals to resist such foreign presences, a withdrawal of Israel to pre-1967 borders, the opening of Israel-Gaza and Israel-West Bank border crossings, and a criticism of U.S. sanctions against the Syrian government. At the same time, and as on other occasions after 2002, Argentine officials secretly consulted with and assured the U.S. government that it was working behind the scenes to minimize criticism of Israel and the United States—an assurance that U.S. officials took at face value. Argentine authorities have long
found ways to assert a public position at odds with U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East while, at the same time, working privately with Washington to advance common positions reflecting a more favorable position toward the United States than public Argentine postures might have suggested (Wikileaks 2008).

This was true of what the international media characterized as the 2013 Argentine about-face toward Iran on the AMIA case. While most Argentines may not have known it, because diplomatic negotiation had been private, there was nothing new in Argentine policy or the role of the United States in promoting Argentine-Iranian conversations on AMIA. As early as 2007, immediately after Fernández de Kirchner’s election as president, and throughout the years that followed, there had been ongoing, though sometimes tense, diplomatic interactions between Argentina and Iran on the subject of Iranian cooperation in the AMIA investigation. This had come with the support and knowledge of U.S. officials, who had encouraged Argentina in this regard, toward a resolution of the AMIA bombing. The philosophy behind Argentina’s diplomatic initiative in 2013 also dovetailed with President Néstor Kirchner’s post-2002 human rights–focused agenda. In this case, the objective was to bring closure to an ugly case of mass murder for the family members and others affected by the AMIA killings.

In 2007, the Argentine government worked closely with U.S. officials in trying to convince Interpol to issue arrest warrants for Iranians accused of the AMIA bombing. In preparation for a November Interpol General Assembly where a decision on the matter was anticipated, the diplomat Guillermo González, described by U.S. ambassador in Argentina Tony Wayne as Argentina’s “point man on AMIA issues” (Wikileaks 2007a), lobbied Washington for help in convincing several countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Asia to support Argentina’s request. Moreover, by 2007, the idea of a joint Iranian-Argentine commission to investigate the AMIA bombing had already been floated—by Iran. Argentina hesitated in the hope of winning Interpol capture notices for the accused Iranians. Perhaps more important, the U.S.-Argentine secret conversations reflected a rapprochement with Washington, and new tensions between Argentina and some Latin American governments. On the eve of the Interpol General Assembly, González told American officials that he didn’t know how Venezuela, an international supporter of Iran, would vote at the Interpol meeting. Argentina had conveyed the message that if Venezuela could not support the Argentine position, it hoped that Caracas would stay silent on the matter. Failing that, if Venezuela planned to back Iran, the Argentine Foreign Ministry had asked Caracas for that information beforehand, so Argentina would not be “stabbed in the back” by Venezuela (Wikileaks 2007b). Argentina negotiated its international position on Iran in part through a confidential relationship with the FBI in which Nisman was a minor player. Before the November 2007 Interpol gathering, González asked U.S. diplomats to tell Assistant FBI Director Tom Fuentes that European Union countries and the South African Interpol Committee would be “looking for Fuentes’ active participation in the EC [European Community] against any Iranian efforts to derail the process” (Wikileaks 2007b). Among those who accompanied González to the Interpol meeting, but played a minor role there, was Alberto Nisman. After the meeting, González “laughingly explained” to American diplomats in Buenos Aires that at the General Assembly meetings, he saw Iranians trying to lobby U.S. officials at a reception hosted by the U.S. government. They were unsuccessful (Wikileaks 2007c).

Unless Wikileaks releases a new batch of documents, we may have to wait some time to understand the nuance of Argentine–United States relations through President Fernández de Kirchner’s 2013 policy “shift” on Iran. As late as 2009, the two countries were cooperating fully on terrorism investigations in Argentina, including the FBI’s perceived Hezbollah threat in the Argentine northeast. They shared a position on Iran as a pariah state. It is possible that Argentina’s decision to accept Iran’s offer of a truth commission was driven in part by tensions in U.S.-Argentine relations over the effort by NML Capital, a New York–based vulture fund, to exact debt payments through court action in the United States. Beyond that severe point of contention, little had changed in U.S.-Argentine relations with respect to the Middle East. After eight years at the negotiating table, the commission now for the first time seemed to Timerman and others in Argentine government as the only way that, after 20 years, any real progress could be made on the AMIA case. In that the Barack Obama administration embarked at the same time on a diplomatic opening toward Iran that would lead in 2015 to a long-sought nuclear regulatory agreement for Iran, it is unlikely that the Argentine overture toward Iran generated much concern in Washington except perhaps in Republican congressional quarters.

In the end, the alarm Nisman seemed to have felt in January 2015 on the eve of his congressional committee testimony may not have been over the Argentine decision to work with Iran on an AMIA solution, a
policy position that he would have known had evolved over years of Iran-Argentina negotiations. He may have been concerned that the price of that truth commission could turn out to be almost a decade of his work—the abandoned prosecutions of the perpetrators. In late 2015, all eyes were on Argentine president-elect Mauricio Macri, who announced more than two weeks before his swearing-in ceremony in December, and a day before naming Argentina's new foreign minister, Susana Malcorra, that he would abrogate the 2013 deal with Iran. Whether he does so or not, Macri has illustrated one more time how domestic politics—in this case the antagonism of his recently crafted political movement, Cambiemos, toward the outgoing president and vice versa—can shape Middle East policy. At the same time, that decision is more relevant to Macri's stated intention to reshape Argentina's relations with Brazil, Venezuela, and other South American nations than to Iran. Moreover, it is unlikely in and of itself to change much about Argentina's behind-the-scenes diplomatic, commercial, and technical ties with Iran. Perhaps more important, whether or not a prosecutor picks up where Nisman left off in mounting a legal case against the AMIA killers, without a reasonably cooperative relationship on the matter with Iran, after more than 20 years, all of these developments may have eliminated the last best chance to indict those responsible for the bombing.

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Interview with David Grantham

by Jessica Stites Mor | University of British Columbia, Okanagan | jessica.stites-mor@ubc.ca

One of the most significant challenges facing would-be scholars of Middle East–Latin American exchange is the lack of formal programs of study. Those that enter this field sometimes are equipped with a unique personal background that allows them to bridge this gap, but others have been exceptionally creative to find ways to work from within more traditional programs. Both of these are the case of David Grantham, a recent PhD graduate of Texas Christian University’s program in history. This interview illustrates the challenges of this kind of work and offers some personal insights into strategies for success.

Stites Mor: Could you tell us a bit about your background, David?

Grantham: I grew up in Tampa, Florida, my mother is from the Caribbean and my father is from Florida, so I had something of a multicultural upbringing. I had extended family from outside Florida, as well, so had a bit of regional diversity, different perspectives. I went to a small Christian school my entire life. My mother was a Spanish teacher at the school. It was very small, on the outskirts of downtown Tampa, my graduating class was about 35 students, a handful of whom had been there since their first days in preschool. I felt like part of the furniture there by the time I graduated. It was a fantastic school, culturally was very Dominican. She never really felt at home in the U.S. when she first moved there for college, always missed home. She had lived through the civil war in the DR, my grandfather had refused to leave, and had many memories of interacting with American soldiers. Growing up hearing about the politics of the DR and Trujillo, I took an interest in the region. We were a very politically minded family, we always discussed politics at the dinner table, and that’s where I became familiar with these topics. My grandfather’s and my mother’s stories really fueled my curiosity about the larger histories of the region, not only to understand my own background, but also to understand what was happening there.

Stites Mor: How did you become interested in Latin America?

Grantham: I grew up on Cuban food, my grandfather was from Cuba and my grandmother was from the states, but they were both missionaries in the Dominican Republic, where my mother was raised. We joke with my mother that she was Cuban-American, but grew up in the DR and culturally was very Dominican. She never really felt at home in the U.S. when she first moved there for college, always missed home. She had lived through the civil war in the DR, my grandfather had refused to leave, and had many memories of interacting with American soldiers. Growing up hearing about the politics of the DR and Trujillo, I took an interest in the region. We were a very politically minded family, we always discussed politics at the dinner table, and that’s where I became familiar with these topics. My grandfather’s and my mother’s stories really fueled my curiosity about the larger histories of the region, not only to understand my own background, but also to understand what was happening there.

Stites Mor: After you were done with school, you joined the service. Did that influence your thinking, as well?

Grantham: I commissioned from the Air Force ROTC out of the University of South Florida in 2004, and when I graduated and got commissioned, I was stationed in South Dakota. I had seen snow once in my life, and when I got there, all I had was a windbreaker. Within my first week there, my boss literally had to show me how to zip up a snow coat. When I was graduating from high school, I thought that I wanted to grow personally and challenge myself to work toward something greater than myself. My parents had both done something with a bigger purpose, a teacher and a minister, and I thought I should do something like that myself. I also played sports and wanted to do something where I could be physical and stay active. I also really wanted to travel and see the world, experience new cultures, and South Dakota was certainly that. I wanted to challenge my assumptions and my thoughts. After September 11th, it was more complicated, you have these ideas about what you want to see and do, but after that point you had a good idea where you would end up. Or at least you knew you would be spending some time in the Middle East. I signed up for Reserve Officer Training Corps, which means I’d come out a second lieutenant and receive better professional instruction. After I served in South Dakota, I deployed twice, to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait in 2006, and in 2008 I served in Baghdad. In 2007, I moved to Texas, where the AFOSI [Air Force Office of Special Investigations] gave me a special assignment to work on technology protection in support of Department of Defense contractors in the Dallas area. My specialty was international issues and intelligence, so they sent me to protect our critical technology from being compromised. But at the end of my required term, I got an email about the post-9/11 GI Bill. It is different from the earlier GI Bill, and it seemed almost too good to be true. It provided more extensively for servicemen that have served after 9/11 and included such things as a living stipend if you are in school full time. It was state-based, so it is tied in a way to the state where you reside, but in Texas that meant it also would pay majority of your public school tuition and a set amount for private school, and cover your textbooks. In particular, the Yellow Ribbon program, which said that if your costs go over a certain amount, the government would match any amount that the school would pay over that base amount. This was
a huge incentive to attend school locally, and Texas Christian University was a Yellow Ribbon participant, so it seemed like a great option. When I decided to go back to school, I ended up not having to pay a dime to study.

**Stites Mor:** What did you study at TCU?

**Grantham:** I had a master’s in international relations, and I had thought about going back into that kind of work. I wanted something that complemented my master’s, so I choose TCU because they had a wide selection of modern history courses. When I first started it was a bit more exploratory and broad. TCU didn’t have a primary field for the Middle East, but they did have one in Latin America. Peter Szok, who is their modern Latin Americanist, was very generous in his ability to work with me in conjunction with the Middle East professor, and the board at TCU approved me to have a field in Latin America and a minor in Middle East. I was the first student to be able to do this. When I went in, I was ambitious and wanted to do many things, and was lucky that I was able to pull together a committee that was willing to follow me down this path, even though it wasn’t in anyone’s specific area. I was able to be a bit more creative, for example taking specialized directed reading classes that allowed me to connect those disparate fields. By the time I got to the stage of my dissertation, I’d already been able to elaborate a fairly robust bibliography on the topic.

**Stites Mor:** How did you come to begin your work on Latin America–Middle East exchange?

**Grantham:** I wanted to study Middle Eastern history because of my experience in the military, and I wanted to study Latin American history because of my family background, and I thought that perhaps there was a way in which they interacted that could allow me to pursue both. I found that American Cold War history sometimes was too focused just on U.S. foreign policy, so I was inspired to try to push the boundaries, to think about what Latin American and Middle Eastern countries experienced during the Cold War. All of those ideas intersected, and I decided to ask how these countries interacted outside of U.S. influence. I was particularly interested in the Arab world, and I didn’t know what I’d find, it was more of a blind leap. My first stop was Cuba, and it turned out there was plenty of connection to be found, but my access to documents was really very limited in Havana. So I explored further into Central America and finally looked into Argentina, because there was quite a bit of material and a fairly important and rich history of Arab interactions there, particularly under Juan Perón. Once I found that, I realized I wasn’t just up a blind alley, I knew I was onto something.

**Stites Mor:** How would you describe your PhD research?

**Grantham:** So, I wrote on the Cold War, looking beyond the Soviet-U.S. binary, or in more basic terms, the Cold War through the eyes of Latin America and Middle East interaction, the experience outside of the competition between superpowers. I started by finding out that Argentina had a relationship with the Middle East through international organizations like the UN and the Non-Aligned Movement, but then as I moved forward I realized that there was a much deeper connection, particularly between Argentina and the Levant. I came to argue that Argentina was the “Latin American Front” in the Israel-Palestine conflict. I uncovered that Juan Perón had significant and complicated relations with Saudi Arabia, Syria, and other countries in the region. I also realized that there is a huge influence of Arabs on Argentina’s labor history, among other things. There is quite a bit of cultural history still left to be uncovered. The recent assassination of Alberto Nisman, a prosecutor that was set to testify that Iran was involved in the bombings of the Israeli Embassy and a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires in the early 1990s, is a good example of just how important the Arab-Israeli conflict was experienced in Argentina.

**Stites Mor:** What skills or special training did your research require to conduct your research?

**Grantham:** History as a discipline requires a really in-depth and intimate understanding of its subjects. Despite the fact that we study the past, history is rarely ever settled. The challenge of conducting research across two regions of the world is that you need to be able to get to a point of being able to understand controversial matters in multiple languages and sites. There are big gaps and misunderstandings that need to be addressed. I was able to take an Arabic course at the University of Texas at Austin, and there is a large Arabic repository of newspapers at the UT Austin library. I trained in order to access government and Arab League documents but I found the availability to be limited. In fact, I had a contact in Egypt that visited the Arab League archives on my behalf. He was told that he could review documents but could not write anything down, could not make copies, and could not photograph any papers. So short of him trying to recall what he read after leaving the archives, there was no way to properly review the
documents. I can now read Arabic, though I do rely on dictionaries and sometimes translators. I found, though, that having a base-level understanding of the language was really fundamental to knowing how to use those supports effectively.

**Stites Mor:** What challenges did you face working on this subject?

**Grantham:** One thing that I faced was that there were so many levels of the topic I had chosen, that I had to significantly reduce the scope to a much more specific topic. I also got really hammered by my early readers because I was trying to draw conclusions without being as well versed in each of the two areas as were experts in those fields. That is one reason why I focused on just Argentina within Latin America and the Levant, Israel, and Egypt in the Middle East, because it allowed me to find a more workable level of familiarity. Another big challenge is the cost of traveling to more than one research site, particularly across more than one region. Many external funding programs demand that you stay in residence in the field for long periods of time, which was also a challenge to manage with a family and related expenses. I also found that a lot of programs were fairly restrictive in terms of topics that were eligible. Many required that you follow a very specific kind of topic, such as American foreign policy during the Cold War, so it was more difficult to fit my topic to those programs. Funding at TCU was excellent for graduate students, so I really lived on those internal grants. I also found that in publishing my findings, sometimes it was more difficult, simply because readers and editors didn’t know quite what to do with this kind of research.

**Stites Mor:** Did your background influence how you approached your sources?

**Grantham:** People are always curious about my background in the armed forces or going to school at a Christian institution. I have interacted with a lot of officials during my time in the military, so I was able to bring a certain kind of skepticism to the documents than I might not have had otherwise. I was able to be more critical of my sources from that perspective. Having been in intelligence, I often spoke to people after they made their public announcements, so I would always have a different interpretation than that which would appear in printed sources. It allowed me to know what kind of things to look at that went beyond public statements, such as patterns of behavior and the treatment of Arab immigrants to Argentina. I’m proud to have served, but am not blind to the tendency to pick winners and losers or to view things as good versus bad; I recognize that these issues are far more complex. I realized that my objective wasn’t just to criticize a foreign government’s policy or a particular U.S. administration, but rather to uncover the enormous complexity these past events. Veterans sometimes come home a bit disillusioned, because they lose that sense, they experience how much more complicated the world is, how much more intellectually and emotionally rigorous it is to understand conflict than they thought it would be. I’d say my military background was a really important influence on how I dealt with my sources.

**Stites Mor:** And your religious upbringing?

**Grantham:** While the military offered me a sense of skepticism, my religious upbringing allowed me to maintain an optimism, a sense of forgiveness and unwarranted compassion. So, I was able to read things differently, such as a document I found about a Palestinian that had been quite hostile to Israel, but I found that by thinking about how that Palestinian had been informed, what constituted his knowledge, I could be more sympathetic and at least understand on a certain level what determined his perspective. The same was true for stories I read about European Jews escaping persecution to what would become Israel and their participation in the forming the country. I developed a sense of compassion for how peoples’ experience informed them, how they saw their lives and events, rather than simply judging them based on my own understandings. It also helped me to understand what things being documented were really true. Biblical scripture teaches themes that many times run counter to our instincts, that ask you to engage in behavior that is counter to your impulses. With that in mind, in those moments when I might have been distancing myself from something or cutting myself off from understanding another perspective, I was able to put my instincts aside to explore further. I think that encouraged me to think more deeply and understand or debate more rigorously.

**Stites Mor:** What have you done since completion of your PhD?

**Grantham:** I am currently a Senior Fellow at the National Center for Policy Analysis in Dallas, which is a think tank that looks at primarily free market approaches to economic challenges. I was brought on based on my background in history and my national security and economics background. I primarily work on research that offers policy recommendations on how a free market can improve economic relations and how it can support democratic processes. We look at how the
From the LASA2016 Congress Program Co-Chairs

by Ariel C. Armony, co-chair | University of Pittsburgh | armony@pitt.edu
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LASA’s 50th anniversary Congress promises to be the biggest in the association’s history. As compared to recent Congresses, the number of submissions has increased considerably. For example, while last year’s Congress had 1,732 panels and 917 individual papers submitted, there were 2,307 panels and 1,341 individual papers submitted for LASA2016. Increased participation led to the decision to extend the Congress to four days.

Track chairs, who volunteer their time and expertise to evaluate submissions to each thematic track into which the Congress is divided, assumed their role with a wonderful sense of responsibility and professionalism, working hard to rank numerous submissions. The average number of sessions that each set of track chairs had to evaluate was 94. Track chairs carried out their work in the context of both this higher than usual number of submissions and the limited space in the New York City venue. To evaluate the submissions, they applied such criteria as significance and appeal for the field, coherence, and clarity. The LASA Secretariat, for its part, calculated the percentage of submissions that could be accepted to the Congress based on the number of available slots, and then established the cut-off for each track based on a common acceptance rate. Anyone has access to the full list of selection criteria that track chairs were advised to apply, and a detailed description of the several steps of the selection process and criteria, which is available here: http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/eng/congress/selectionpaper.asp.

A quick look at the nature of the submissions reveals their diversity and some current trends in the interests of LASA’s membership. Consider, for instance, the five thematic tracks that received the largest number of submissions (including individual submissions and papers that are part of panels): Genders, Feminisms and Sexualities; Literary Studies; Contemporary; Migration, Borders and Diasporas; Political Institutions and Processes; and Mass Media and Popular Culture. The appeal of these themes suggests that LASA continues to be a highly diverse association in terms of disciplinary interests and one that responds to contemporary issues and emerging fields of inquiry even while it continues to honor classical fields of study. The social sciences and humanities are equally represented in the research interests of members. It is also clear that LASA’s membership is deeply and meaningfully engaged in interdisciplinary work. In this regard, the Program Committee is particularly pleased with the way in which this Congress is shaping up.

It is also gratifying to see that more than 60 percent of all proposals for LASA2016 came from Latin America and other non-U.S. regions. Roughly the same percentage of accepted papers, a little over 60 percent, are from outside the United States. This reaffirms the trend that LASA is a truly international organization with a strong presence throughout Latin America.

LASA Sections have done a terrific job of organizing first-rate panels and workshops. Track chairs took to heart the task to propose special panels that bring to light the most interesting and cutting-edge thinking in their subarea of study. Particularly interesting has been the excitement about the “LASA at 50” theme. We expect a wide range of conversations highlighting some of the most important trends, debates, and controversies that have marked Latin American studies in the last five decades. The proposed sessions not only take account of the past but also reflect upon the future of our field of study.
It is important to mention that the combination of a large number of submissions and space limitations in the New York City venues posed an unusually difficult situation for the LASA Secretariat. Nearly a quarter of submissions could not be accommodated in the program. Whereas space limitations dictated how many submissions could be included in the program, the final decision was the result of a rigorous selection process conducted by experts in each subfield who generously gave their time to conduct such a complex task. While LASA strives for inclusiveness, the harsh reality of a popular Congress and limited space led to a situation in which a number of submissions could not be included in the program. As program co-chairs, we are deeply thankful to our colleagues, who read carefully through scores of individual and panel proposals and evaluated them with an eye toward producing a conference of the highest quality. We are also thankful to the thousands of members who either collaborated on wonderful, creative panels or who sent in their individual paper proposals, which will form the basis for four days of intellectual inquiry, artistic expression, political debate, and collegial exchange.

In organizing the Congress, much attention has been paid to New York City as the Congress site, a city that is inexorably connected with—and indeed arguably part of—Latin America through migrations, politics, cultural exchanges, and shared histories. Many especially interesting features of the LASA2016 program will be the result of collaborations between the association and local universities, cultural organizations, artists, consulates, NGOs, and foundations. The Congress will feature an art installation and accompanying panel that explicitly links midcentury New York City with Latin America, and a rich variety of offerings on Latino New York, among other sessions and events.

The Congress in New York City will feature some unique gems as well. A conversation between Noam Chomsky and Greg Grandin will celebrate the 50th anniversary of LASA and NACLA and the 30th anniversary of Chomsky’s Managua Lectures. Top diplomats and policy makers from Cuba and the United States who are presiding over normalization of relations between the two countries will discuss this historic process. A panel of leading scholars will reflect upon 50 years of intellectual transformation in the study of Latin America and the Caribbean. Prestigious journalists will examine how their profession has contributed to shaping our understanding of political, social, cultural, and economic issues in the hemisphere. Two former presidents will consider the past and present state of democracy in the region, and a sitting president will talk about his country’s international insertion in a changing global landscape. These are only a few examples of the high-profile panel discussions, talks, and public conversations that will add a distinctive touch to the upcoming Congress.

Plurality, diversity, interdisciplinary strength, critical approaches, hot contemporary issues, and evolution of thought are the key elements defining the “LASA at 50” Congress. We will continue working on this one-of-a-kind conference and will get back in touch with you soon with more updates.
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<tr>
<td>$675 On-site list (commercial)</td>
<td>$540 On-site list (nonprofit)</td>
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### Payment Information

- **Check**
- **Credit Card**
- **Wire Transfer**

**Amount (check must be payable to LASA)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
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<tr>
<td>American Express</td>
<td>Visa</td>
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<td>MasterCard</td>
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**PLEASE INDICATE YOUR BOOTH PREFERENCES:**

- Card #
- Exp. Date
- CVV #
- DATE

### Cancellations

If an exhibitor is forced to withdraw from participation by January 5, 2016, all sums paid by the exhibitor less a $350 service fee will be refunded. No refunds will be issued after January 5, 2016. Cancellations are not effective until received in writing by LASA. No refund will be made if an exhibitor fails to occupy the space. No refund on late or no arrival of materials.

### Payment

A minimum deposit of 50% of the total booth rental fee is required. Booths will not be assigned without the 50% deposit. Failure to remit total payment for the booth rental by January 5, 2016 constitutes cancellation of the contract, and the space will be subject to resale without refund.

As the authorized contact for the above organization, I agree to comply with, and be bound by, the terms of LASA’s Rules and Regulations (F).

**Printed Name:**

**Signature:**

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**Return form to:**

LASA Book Exhibit  
416 Bellefield Hall  
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh PA 15260.  
Telephone: 412-648-7929 Fax: 412-624-7145  
Email: lasa@pitt.edu / lasaexhb@pitt.edu
Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Ecuador, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, México, Perú y Uruguay.


Además de su trabajo de enseñanza y responsabilidades administrativas, Raúl ha...
supervisado o co-supervisado 15 disertaciones de doctorado en U.T. Austin, y se ha desempeñado como miembro de otro 35 comités de doctorado. También ha supervisado 20 tesis de maestría y 17 de tesis de licenciatura. En 2012, ganó el primer premio anual de profesor sobresaliente otorgado por los estudiantes de postgrado del Departamento de Gobierno de la Universidad de Texas en Austin.

**Madrid Statement**

LASA es una gran asociación y en los últimos cincuenta años ha crecido en forma significativa. Sin embargo, podemos aún hacer mucho para mejorarla. En los próximos años LASA debe revitalizar sus congresos, aumentar sus recursos tecnológicos, ampliar y diversificar aún más su base de socios, y ofrecerles a éstos más oportunidades de desarrollo profesional.

Nuestros congresos son la función más importante de LASA y tenemos que asegurarnos que sigan siendo relevantes para académicos establecidos e investigadores que están comenzando sus carreras. Debemos esforzarnos para atraer a nuestros congresos a los intelectuales más prominentes de la región. Hay que incrementar las becas del viaje de modo que LASA pueda permanecer abierta a nuevas ideas y accesible a todos. Es necesario también promover paneles, talleres e iniciativas de investigación interdisciplinaria para que nuestros socios sean expuestos a ideas y metodologías fuera de sus disciplinas.

Es importante también expandir la membresía de LASA, acercándonos a académicos en disciplinas y áreas que únicamente no han estado bien representadas: por ejemplo, los estudios del Caribe, economía, lingüística, y las ciencias de la información. Pero la diversidad disciplinaria no basta si no logramos reafirmar y expandir los logros alcanzados hasta ahora para atraer investigadores de grupos sub-representados: estudiantes, académicos independientes y en posiciones sin permanencia, e intelectuales indígenas y afrolatinos.

LASA también debe tratar de aumentar sus miembros fuera de los Estados Unidos, especialmente en América Latina, pero también en Europa y Asia. Debemos continuar organizando algunos de nuestros congresos fuera de los Estados Unidos lo que nos ayuda a aumentar nuestra visibilidad y presencia en el extranjero y a afinar la composición internacional de nuestra membresía.

LASA también necesita expandir las actividades académicas que realiza entre congresos. Debemos robustecer y difundir mejor las actividades de las secciones de LASA y asignar recursos para las actividades que ellas patrocinan. Es necesario ampliar el uso de las redes sociales para mantener a nuestros miembros informados e interesados en las actividades de la asociación. A través de las redes, LASA puede llegar a ser un puente para una nueva generación de investigadores que trabaja en aislamiento de otras disciplinas y sin posibilidad de entablar colaboraciones internacionales.

LASA debiera también crear una base de datos con las áreas de especialización de sus socios que sea accesible a las fundaciones, centros de investigación, y medios de comunicación. Nuestros miembros constituyen la base del liderazgo intelectual de la región y LASA debe jugar un mayor rol promoviendo sus competencias académicas.

LASA también puede hacer más en términos del desarrollo profesional de sus afiliados. Podemos construir una base de datos para facilitar la búsqueda de puestos de trabajo y becas para nuestros miembros. Debemos ampliar el número de talleres sobre publicación e investigación que se ofrecen durante los congresos y se debe crear un programa de mentores para apoyar a los investigadores jóvenes. Por último, LASA también podría ampliar el número de opciones de publicación disponibles para los latinoamericanistas, patrocinando la creación de nuevas revistas electrónicas.

Obviamente, muchas de estas actividades cuestan dinero. Por ello, debemos seguir trabajando para expandir la dotación de LASA y obtener subvenciones especiales. También tenemos que buscar la manera de ser aún más eficientes. LASA tiene la suerte de contar con personal administrativo emprendedor e infatigable, quienes constantemente buscan formas de ahorrar recursos. Ejemplo claro de ello es la increíble App del programa que LASA ha diseñado para los últimos congresos. LASA también tiene la suerte de tener una membresía brillante y comprometida que está generando continuamente nuevas ideas para fortalecer nuestra misión. Trabajando juntos podemos construir una asociación aún más vibrante, inclusiva y productiva la que pueda ayudar a estimular el surgimiento de una generación futura de intelectuales, investigadores y activistas comprometidos con la región.
Aldo Panfichi Huamán

Aldo Panfichi Huamán is professor of sociology at the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP), and president of the 2017 Centennial Commission of that institution. He has a PhD in sociology from the New School for Social Research and an MA and BA in social sciences with concentration in sociology from the PUCP. He has lived for four years in Santiago de Chile and six years in the United States. He has been a visiting scholar at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University, a visiting professor at the Universidad del País Vasco, Program on International Migration, in Spain, and a guest lecturer at various universities in Latin America.

Dr. Panfichi’s research interests include urban politics and political representation, social movements and conflicts, and sports and society. He has published over 50 books, book chapters and articles in publications in Latin America, the United States, and Europe. He is active in various national and international academic networks, including FLACSO and CLACSO as well as LASA, and his work has often taken a regional perspective. He has participated in comparative research projects with colleagues at universities and academic centers in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela, the United States, Holland, and the United Kingdom.


Dr. Panfichi also has broad experience in teaching and university governance, having been chair of the Social Science Department, president of the Center for Research in Sociology, Economics, Politics and Anthropology (CISEPA), and coordinator of the Master’s Program in Political Science, all at the PUCP. He was also director of the Network for the Development of the Social Sciences in Peru, involving the Universidad del Pacífico, PUCP, and the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. In 2015 the Peruvian Ministry of Culture invited him to form part of the Jury for the prestigious Premio Nacional de Cultura. He appears frequently on Peruvian television, radio, and in print media, where he is called upon to give scholarly opinions on social, political, and cultural issues. In addition to his academic work and media presence, he has been a consultant to various foundations and development agencies, including the Latin American Program of the Open Society Foundation and the Andean and Southern Cone Office of the Ford Foundation.

He has been an active member of LASA since his graduate student days and has participated on panels and in round tables in at least ten international Congresses. Since 2003 he has served on a number of LASA committees, including being chair of the Martin Diskin Memorial Lectureship and Dissertation committees, co-chair of the selection committee for the Flora Tristan Book Prize (Peru Section), member of the Bryce Wood Award Committee for best book published on Latin America, and track chair for “Social Movements and Civil Society in Latin America.”

Panfichi Statement

I have been a member of LASA since my graduate student days in the early 1990s, and have participated actively in several commissions and sections as well as in most of the international Congresses since that time. In this period, I have witnessed not only the amazing growth and diversity in LASA membership but also the globalization of the study of Latin America and the Caribbean in universities and research centers that I have had the fortune to visit around the world.

As a Latin American, native of Peru and the Andes, it fills me with satisfaction to see this community grow so far beyond its origins 50 years ago, in U.S.-based area studies centers and exchange programs. It is exciting to see new generations of Latin Americans involved in collaborative research with colleagues from neighboring countries and from North America, but also from as far away as China and Japan.

While the expansion of LASA is seen most graphically in our now-annual Congresses,
behind that lies the hard work of many people all year round. LASA members from different generations, disciplines, and origins contribute to making this more than just a professional association and more of a community, with a shared identity despite our differences. Members of LASA have been my professors, study partners and coauthors, students, and former students. But beyond those LASA members who each of us personally know, I think we all consider ourselves colleagues in the ongoing effort to understand and contribute to this beautiful and complex region.

My vision of LASA in the years ahead is as an association that will continue to promote multidisciplinary, transnational, and multicultural exchanges. Given the challenges facing all of our countries today, I hope to see further involvement by colleagues in the natural sciences and environmentalism. Our region faces threats to its biodiversity, its land and water supplies, and to its many native and indigenous peoples whose ancestral lands and lifestyles are at risk. In many parts of our countries, human rights and civil liberties remain a challenge to guarantee for all. When I think of LASA, I think of people who are not only scholars but also progressives in the broadest sense, who speak out about injustices and work to change these societies.

Given my own vantage point, working in a Latin American university, I also believe that it is necessary for LASA to incorporate more colleagues from the different countries in South and Central America and the Caribbean, especially younger scholars and public university faculty who do not have the resources to travel to the United States or Europe with ease. This includes new generations of Cubans, who despite recent changes in their relations with the U.S. still find it difficult to travel for scholarly purposes. The universities in our region have many talented scholars and students eager to join an organization like ours as a way of sharing their own work and broadening their horizons. In order to make this possible, I believe it is essential to hold more LASA meetings in our region. I also consider it fundamental to expand participation in LASA book fairs to more Latin American university and professional presses, and to promote more regional and global distribution of our publications.

As LASA prepares to celebrate a half century of promoting academic and cultural exchange across the Americas and beyond, it would be an honor for me to help expand and deepen our membership and our commitment to progressive change in the years ahead.

Jo-Marie Burt

Jo-Marie Burt is associate professor of political science at George Mason University, where she has taught since 2000. For the past four years she has served as director of Latin American studies at GMU. Between 2010 and 2014, she was codirector of the Center for Global Studies, and between 2007 and 2009, she was associate chair for undergraduate studies at the Department of Public and International Affairs. She is also a Senior Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), where she engages in research-based advocacy about human rights and transitional justice in the region. She is currently serving a second term as co-chair of the Peru Section of LASA, and she is an individual member of the Latin American Transitional Justice Network.

Dr. Burt’s early research focused on state and insurgent violence in Peru, and civil society responses to violence and violent actors. This was the subject of her 2007 book Silencing Civil Society: Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru (Palgrave Macmillan), which received an Honorable Mention for the WOLA-Duke Book Award for Human Rights in Latin America, and which was published in Spanish as Violencia y autoritarismo en el Perú: Bajo la sombra de Sendero y la dictadura de Fujimori (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2009; 2nd expanded edition, 2011). She is also coeditor of Politics in the Andes: Identity, Conflict, Reform (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004).

Currently, Dr. Burt’s research focuses on human rights, transitional justice, and historical memory. She has been an international observer to the trials of former heads of state Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Efrain Rios Montt in Guatemala and has written extensively in scholarly and journalistic outlets about these proceedings and their significance locally and globally. Dr. Burt directs an ongoing research project monitoring domestic prosecutions of human rights violations in Peru, which was launched with support from the LASA Otros Saberes Initiative. She is also a consultant on a two-year project with the Due Process of Law Foundation working with practitioners of transitional justice in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Peru, and developing the research and advocacy capacity of civil society organizations engaged in strategic litigation for grave crimes cases. Dr. Burt is completing a manuscript entitled Guilty as Charged: The Fujimori Trial and Its Significance for Global Justice, and she is working on another manuscript that traces transitional justice efforts in Peru and Guatemala, exploring the conditions that made high-profile trials like the Fujimori and Rios Montt trials possible, as well as the
challenges of overcoming impunity in postconflict societies.

Dr. Burt has received grants and fellowships from Open Society Foundations, the United States Institute of Peace, the Aspen Institute, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Inter-American Foundation, the Latin American Studies Association Otros Saberes Initiative, the Tinker Foundation, the Institute for the Study of World Politics, and the Thomas J. Watson Foundation. In 1988–1989, she was an International Human Rights Fellow of the Institute for International Education/Ford Foundation and worked at the Servicio Paz y Justicia in Montevideo, Uruguay, where she collaborated with and documented the campaign to overturn the 1986 amnesty law. In 2006, she was a Fulbright scholar at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru (PUCP). In 2010, she returned to the PUCP as the Alberto Flores Galindo Visiting Professor at the Department of Social Sciences and taught a course on comparative transitional justice processes.

Dr. Burt has commented frequently on Latin American politics for various national and international news media, including BBC World News, CNN, the New York Times, Time, the Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, Al Jazeera, Democracy Now, El País, and Pacifica Radio, as well as print and electronic media in several Latin American countries. She has authored articles in the Nation, the Huffington Post, Truth-Out, Foreign Policy in Focus, Open Democracy, NACLA Report on the Americas, and in Peruvian newspapers such as La República, El Comercio, and Diario 16, among others.

Between 1995 and 2000, Dr. Burt was associated editor and then editor of the English-language magazine, NACLA Report on the Americas. In 2002 and 2003, she was a researcher for the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. She has been an expert witness for human rights cases before the Peruvian courts as well as the Inter-American Court for Human Rights. Dr. Burt is a member of the Advisory Board of the Peruvian Forensic Anthropology Team (EPAF) in Peru and the International Advisory Board of the Luz Ibarburu Observatory for Human Rights Investigations in Uruguay. In 2011, the Government of Peru recognized Dr. Burt with the Award in Merit, in the Grade of Grand Official, for Distinguished Service in Defense of Democracy, Rule of Law, and the Promotion of Human Rights in Peru. She holds a PhD in political science from Columbia University.

**Burt Statement**

I’m honored to have been invited to be a candidate for the LASA Executive Council. I have been a member of LASA since 1991, when I was a graduate student. LASA has been critical to my professional development, but not only as a space to present new research, to learn about the research of colleagues, and to network. It is all these things, but it is far more: LASA is an epistemic community that has helped me, and scholars and practitioners across the globe, connect to each other and maintain critical, vibrant dialogues about the field of Latin American studies, to think critically about our role as researchers and how we can make our research relevant in socially significant ways, and to develop collaborations that are productive and meaningful.

LASA is important to me because it actively promotes the production of research of consequence, research with real social significance, and it has done so by developing innovative initiatives that have benefited hundreds of its members, such as the Special Projects Funds, the Otros Saberes Initiative, and travel grants to facilitate broad participation in the annual Congress. In my case, I was the recipient of an Otros Saberes grant, which supported a collaborative research project I developed with the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos in Peru. We developed this project in response to a growing concern that despite some very important transitional justice successes—including the 2009 conviction of former president of Peru Alberto Fujimori for human rights violations—judicial efforts in other grave crimes cases were stumbling. No one was collecting systematic data about the status of these cases. The Human Rights Trials in Peru Project developed a database to track and monitor human rights prosecutions in order to document the scope of accountability efforts in postconflict Peru, detect trends, and identify problem areas around which advocacy could be focused. The project also monitors trials in specific cases, continues its advocacy work, and has published articles in numerous print and online media outlets in Peru and internationally.

As a member of the LASA Executive Council, I would seek to strengthen and expand initiatives such as Otros Saberes. Such programs provide unique opportunities for collaborative research and for building connections between scholars and activist and practitioner communities. Otros Saberes in particular is critical in recognizing, developing, and incorporating competencies and knowledges that exist beyond traditional academic settings, and creating opportunities for our members to produce actionable research and more integrated theoretical understandings of complex social realities.
As a member of the Executive Council, I would also endeavor to strengthen LASA’s existing partnerships, and develop new ones, with universities, think tanks, and academic associations based in Latin America. Such partnerships can generate new opportunities for meaningful research and collaboration. I would focus on reaching out to new constituencies, particularly the new generations of Latin American students. Sustaining such partnerships requires generating ways of interacting and engaging in intellectual exchanges beyond the annual meeting. Technology could be put to more effective use in this regard to construct meaningful networks and collaborations. For example, LASA could develop a series of thematic working groups that engage in more structured exchanges and research collaborations in an ongoing way throughout the year.

I am currently serving my second term as co-chair of the Peru section. I have expanded the use of new social media to generate new members and facilitate section communications, and steered fundraising efforts to fund travel of more young researchers and graduate students to attend the annual Congress. It would be an honor to continue serving LASA as a member of the Executive Council.

Eduardo Dargent Bocanegra


**Dargent Statement**

Descubrí la importancia de los estudios latinoamericanos en mis primeros años de estudio en la Pontificia universidad Católica del Perú donde muchos cursos situaban el caso peruano en un contexto regional más amplio. Luego, en la Comisión Andina de Juristas, ONG especializada en temas de justicia y derechos humanos, confirmé este interés en los estudios regionales. Situar el Perú en el contexto histórico, social y político de América Latina ha estado en el centro de mi trabajo desde entonces. Por ello, ser elegido miembro del Comité Ejecutivo de LASA, una institución que tiene por objetivo fomentar el estudio de la región y el diálogo interdisciplinario entre académicos y activistas, sería un honor que asumiría con gran responsabilidad.

Aposté por la Universidad de Texas en Austin para realizar mis estudios doctorales en ciencia política precisamente por la fortaleza de su programa en política comparada, su amplia comunidad de expertos en América Latina y sus recursos para el estudio de la región. Además de la dimensión académica, en esta universidad existe un amplio diálogo entre alumnos, profesores, activistas y en general cualquier interesado en la región, que resultó muy positivo en mi formación. LASA es un espacio central para promover este tipo de diálogo en forma mucho más amplia.

He tenido en estos años la suerte de conocer diversas comunidades de investigación en temas latinoamericanos y valoro lo que estas asociaciones aportan a nuestro trabajo y la sociedad. Además de LASA, soy miembro de la Asociación Latinoamericana de Ciencia Política y parte de su Comité Ejecutivo. Del mismo modo, participo desde su inicio en la Red para el Estudio de la Economía Política en América Latina (REPAL). Este rico diálogo
interdisciplinario, que evita los excesos y limitaciones de la especialización, es uno de los aspectos que más valoro en el trabajo académico y de mi pertenencia a LASA.

En mi propio trabajo he logrado realizar estudios a profundidad sobre mi país y Colombia. He desarrollado contactos y amistades con académicas y académicos de ese país y más recientemente también en Chile. Actualmente estoy realizando dos investigaciones comparadas, una sobre la universidad pública en la Región Andina y otra más acotada sobre el impacto diferenciado del boom de recursos en actividades ilegales en Bolivia y Perú. Asimismo, conozco de cerca el trabajo de ONG’s vinculadas al tema de la democracia y los derechos humanos, temas centrales para nuestra asociación.

Como miembro del comité organizador, pude contribuir al buen desarrollo de la Octava Conferencia de la Asociación Latinoamericana de Ciencia Política (ALACIP), llevado a cabo en la Pontificia Universidad Católica el año pasado. Uno de mis intereses de participar en el Comité Ejecutivo de LASA es colaborar con el éxito de LASA 2017 en Lima. Considero que nuestra asociación tiene mucho que ganar al profundizar su presencia en la región y realizar algunas de nuestras conferencias en universidades de América Latina es una forma de lograrlo.

Aspiro desde el Comité Ejecutivo de LASA a seguir contribuyendo a esta construcción de redes y diálogo amplio entre diversos actores de la región. Estaría feliz de apoyar en este esfuerzo.

**Claudia Ferman**

I hold a joint appointment at the Department of Latin American, Latino and Iberian Studies, and the Film Studies Interdisciplinary Program at the University of Richmond. I studied literature at the Universidad de Buenos Aires and have a doctorate degree in Latin American literature from Arizona State University. I have developed a career as a documentarian that combines my studies of literature and culture with the film medium. My research has mainly focused on Central American literature as well as on current trends in Latin American literature and cinema, especially documentary cinema. I have produced and directed documentaries examining the relations between print writing, digital culture, and film, which I call “videolits.” These films concern the writings of Ernesto Cardenal (Nicaragua), Rigoberta Menchú (Guatemala), Alberto Fuguet and Sergio Gómez (Chile), Marína Enríquez (Argentina), and Leonardo Padura and Pedro Juan Gutiérrez (Cuba). These documentaries, for which I have received several recognitions, have been shown at numerous venues: festivals, museums, congresses, classrooms, and special functions in Latin America and the United States. I am currently working on a film about Roberto Bolaño’s oeuvre. Among other distinctions, I have been awarded fellowships from Fulbright-Hays Program, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Virginia Foundation for the Humanities at different points in my career.

At the University of Richmond, I contributed to the creation of the Department of Latin American and Iberian Studies (formerly the Spanish Section of the Modern Languages and Literature Department), and I was its first chair. I was also instrumental in the creation of the Interdisciplinary Film Studies Program at the University of Richmond, which has experienced a continuous growth since its inception. I created, and directed for many years, a Summer Abroad Program in Cordoba City, Argentina, which is still an innovative and quite healthy program. I have taught courses and seminars on Latin American literature and film, some of which were coordinated with university and community-wide events. Among these are: “Political Action and Latin American Indigenous Film”; “Sex, Drugs, and Rock ‘n’ Roll: Contemporary Writing in Latin America”; “Constructions of Identity,” a National Endowment-sponsored seminar and lecture series; “Latin America Through Film”; “2001: Truth in the Lens,” an International Symposium and Film Festival; and “Latin American Film / Latin America as Subject of Film,” a seminar and film series sponsored by the Tucker-Boatwright Festival of the Arts and NEH.

As a LASA member, I was co-founder of the Film Studies Section (2002) and chaired the section twice. I have participated in this section up until the present. I have organized sessions and roundtables, presented papers and workshops at the LASA Congresses, served in the LASA Media Award Committee, and edited a dossier on Latin American film in the LASA Forum. Since 2003, I have been directing and programming the LASA Film Festival, which takes place concurrently with the Congress. Before becoming LASA Film Festival director, I was awarded the LASA Award for Merit in film three times for my documentary series “videolits.” My work organizing the LASA festival has been prompted by the conviction that the digital revolution has inaugurated forms of intellectual production, as well as means for its transmission and dissemination of great democratic potential and educational power. Since the first edition I organized (Las Vegas), the LASA Festival has been
oriented toward building bridges between Latin American audiovisual production, academic activity, and the university classroom. The festival has consistently shown the many social, environmental, ethical, cultural, and political complexities of the region through well-researched documentation and high-quality filmmaking, and has been able to present not only emergent social struggles and the new trends in the work of community organizations, but also the direct testimony of some of its protagonists. When possible, directors, community organizers, and protagonists have attended the festival in connection with the presentation of their productions. The LASA Film Festival has consistently grown in quality and relevance, and today it constitutes an integral part of LASA Congresses.

Ferman Statement

LASA has been the professional organization in which I have always felt represented and into which, almost exclusively, I have devoted my efforts and conducted my professional activity. LASA is a unique organization in many senses, since interdisciplinarity is not its enunciated ideal but an intrinsic part of its constitution. Congress participants are not only academics but also activists, indigenous organizations, film directors, community organizers, graduate students, musicians, librarians, artists, politicians, poets, writers, journalists, editors, representatives of academic and nonacademic presses and foundations, etc., coming from everywhere in the Americas as well as from Europe, and other parts of the world. These are realities and experiences of a very distinct nature that rub shoulders in every Congress, offering opportunities for dialogue that transcend disciplines, countries, interest groups, organizations, institutions, and individuals. I feel fully identified with this plurality of voices and experiences, both personally and professionally. In the context of this plurality I am interested in supporting strategies so that LASA, its Congresses, publications, and radius of action might be a more receptive and proactive space for virtual communities and networks to create, share, or exchange information. This would include initiatives such as digital and hybrid scholarship, participation in social media, and Open Access.

In each Congress, debates emerge on critical questions regarding Latin American reality, past and present. Such discussions in sessions, workshops, precongress sessions, roundtables, lectures, section meetings, ad hoc meetings, discussions in corridors and bars, continue to resound well after the end of the Congress throughout the length and breadth of our Americas. This breadth, flexibility, and richness that the LASA Congresses offer every year must be preserved, without a doubt, but we must also find ways of promoting and extending them from one Congress to another, and throughout the continent, reaching ambitious and peoples that do not participate in the Congress or that are not even aware of the existence of this institution and its Congresses.

LASA has enormous potential for promoting ideas, disseminating information collected in research of the highest academic level, establishing avenues of dialogue between different social actors, and energizing academic circles. These also have enormous educative potential, which can be broadened thanks to the new communicative forms offered by the digital era (platforms, social media, streaming, Open Access). I am interested in participating in the LASA Executive Council precisely in order to promote actions to multiply LASA’s communicative and educational capacity. My aspiration is to bring my experience in the field of audiovisual communication to contribute to the strengthening and energizing of LASA, extending the benefits that the institution and its Congress bring today to its membership to other people in the region, promoting greater democratization and access to the various saberes created in and about the region.

Jane Landers

Jane Landers is the Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Professor of History at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, where she served as associate dean of the College of Arts and Science, grants officer for the Vanderbilt International Office, and twice as director of the Center for Latin American Studies, a Title VI Center funded by the Department of Education (DOE). Landers also directed four multiyear DOE/Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education student exchange programs with Brazilian universities (USP, UFBa, UFRGS, UFPe), that exchanged over 50 students and produced two student-authored publications. Landers created a Brazilian studies minor at Vanderbilt and is now codirector of Vanderbilt’s recently awarded Abdias Nascimento project grant from the Brazilian government. Landers also created the Circum-Atlantic Studies Seminar at Vanderbilt and has directed it since its inception.

Raised in the Dominican Republic, Landers is an historian of colonial Latin America and the Atlantic world, specializing in the history of Africans and their descendants in those worlds. She directs the Ecclesiastical and Secular Sources for Slave Societies Database, which is preserving the oldest serial records for Africans and their
descendants in the Americas (http://www.vanderbilt.edu/esss/index.php). She and her teams have preserved records of more than one million Africans and their descendants in Brazil, Cuba, Colombia and Spanish Florida dating from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, which are now online for public use. She is the author of Atlantic Creoles in the Age of Revolutions (Harvard University Press, 2010) which was awarded the Rembert Patrick Book Award and honorary mention for the Conference on Latin American History’s 2011 Bolton Johnson Prize for the best English-language book on any aspect of Latin American history. Her first monograph Black Society in Spanish Florida (University of Illinois Press, 1999) was awarded the Frances B. Simkins Prize for Distinguished First Book in Southern History and was a CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title. Landers coauthored the college textbook The Atlantic World: A History, 1400–1888 (Harlan Davidson, 2007) and edited Colonial Plantations and Economy in Florida (University Press of Florida, 2000,) and Against the Odds: Free Blacks in the Slave Societies of the Americas (Frank Cass, 1996). She also coedited Slaves, Subjects and Subversives: Blacks in Colonial Latin America (University of New Mexico Press, 2006), and The African American Heritage of Florida (University Press of Florida, 1995), which won the Rembert Patrick Book Award and a commendation from the American Society for State and Local History. She is currently working on three monographs: “A View from the Other Side: The Saint Domingue Revolution through Spanish Sources,” which she delivered as the 2015 Nathan I. Huggins Lectures at Harvard University; “African Kingdoms, Black Republics and Free Black Towns in the Iberian Atlantic”; and “Atlantic Transformations: The Many Lives of Francisco Menéndez and his Free Black ‘Subjects’.” She has published essays in American Historical Review, Slavery and Abolition, New West Indian Guide, The Americas, Colonial Latin American Historical Review, Journal of African American History, and a variety of anthologies and edited volumes, including Cuban, Mexican, and Colombian publications. Her research has been supported by the Guggenheim Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and the British Library Endangered Archives Programme.

Landers has served as president of the Conference on Latin American History, the Forum on European Expansion and Global Interaction, and the Latin American and Caribbean Section of the Southern Historical Association. She has held other elected positions in those organizations and in the American Historical Association. She has served on the editorial boards of The Americas, Colonial Latin American Review, and Slavery and Abolition. She has also served as an historical consultant on archaeological investigations, museum exhibits, and documentary films on the African experience in the Americas, including most recently, the PBS documentary, “The African Americans: Many Rivers to Cross,” winner of the 2014 George Foster Peabody Award and 2014 Emmy, Outstanding Historical Program. She is on the advisory board of the Studies in the History of the African Diaspora African Biography Database, hosted at the Harriet Tubman Institute for Research on the Global Diaspora of African Peoples, York University, Toronto. In 2015 she was appointed to a three-year term as the U.S. member of UNESCO’s International Scientific Committee for the Slave Route Project, where she works with colleagues from Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, Paraguay, and Haiti to research and commemorate important cultural and historic sites of African history in the Americas.

**Landers Statement**

Having attended LASA meetings since graduate school days, I am deeply honored to be nominated for the Executive Committee of the largest and most internationally diverse organization devoted to Latin American studies. My interdisciplinary MA at the University of Miami and five years of social work in that city led me to the University of Florida, where my good fortune was to become the historian for an interdisciplinary investigation of Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose in Spanish Florida, the first free black town in what is today the United States. This project allowed me the chance to work with archaeologists of the Caribbean, museum curators, education specialists, schoolteachers, documentarians, government institutions, and the engaged public to bring the site’s story to life. This formative experience shaped my academic career and since then I have been dedicated not only to academic production but to public outreach and engagement, bringing the lesser-known history of Africans in Latin America into school curricula, museums, documentaries, and digital humanities, to reach the broadest audience possible. This work has allowed me to engage with scholars from Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Chile, and Argentina who also work on their country’s African heritage. Over the years I have also been deeply involved in administration, grant writing, program building, international student and faculty exchanges, digital humanities, and public outreach. I would use my experience to advance LASA’s goals and international visibility. I am, by nature, a collaborator, and I would welcome the opportunity to work on LASA’s international agenda to expand exchanges between Latin and
North Americans. Of particular interest to me is the Otros Saberes project, which I have supported to underwrite the participation of indigenous and black scholars and activists in LASA programming.

Diego Sánchez-Ancochea

Diego Sánchez-Ancochea is director of the Latin American Centre, associate professor in the political economy of Latin America at the University of Oxford, and member of St. Antony’s College. Before joining Oxford in 2008, he was lecturer and senior lecturer at the Institute for the Study of the Americas, University of London.


He has collaborated with many universities in Europe and Latin America. He has been visiting researcher or lecturer at FLACSO-Dominican Republic, the Universidad de Costa Rica, FLACSO-México, the University of Economics in Prague, the Universidad de Salamanca, and the program Desigualdades at Freie Universität Berlin.

Sánchez-Ancochea is currently coeditor of the Journal of Latin American Studies, where he has been a member of the Editorial Board since 2009, and associate editor of Oxford Development Studies. He was a member of the management committee of the Society of Latin American Studies (UK) between 2004 and 2008, coordinator of the Globalization and Socio-Economic Development network at the Society for the Advancement of Socioeconomics (SASE) between 2007 and 2013, and member of the Latin American Program Board at the Research Council of Norway between 2008 and 2012. At LASA, he was co-chair of the Economics and Politics Section between 2007 and 2010, as well as member of the program committee (for the economics track) on two occasions.

Sánchez-Ancochea’s research concentrates on income inequality, social policy, and economic transformation in Latin America. His PhD thesis focused on state-society relations and the impact of globalization in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic, and various chapters were published in the Journal of Latin American Studies, World Development, and several co-edited volumes. He was later involved in a Ford-LASA funded project on the middle-income trap, directed by Eva Paus. The project resulted in a special issue of Studies in Comparative International Development, which compares economic trajectories and policy responses in Ireland, Singapore, Chile, Jordan, and the Dominican Republic.

More recently he has explored with Juliana Martínez Franzoni (Universidad de Costa Rica) different dimensions of social policy in Latin America and beyond. Sánchez-Ancochea and Martínez Franzoni began their collaboration with the publication of a special issue on Latin American capitalism in Economy and Society in 2009. The special issue, which evaluated changes in social policy and economic models in the region since the 1990s, was also coedited by Maxine Molynieux. Sánchez-Ancochea and Martínez Franzoni have also published the monograph Good Jobs and Social Services: How Costa Rica Achieved the Elusive Double Incorporation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) as well as papers on social and market incorporation (in Development Policy Review) and universal social policy (in Latin American Politics and Society, Latin American Research Review, and Revista Uruguay de Ciencias Políticas). Their forthcoming book The Quest for Universal Social Policy in the South: Actors, Ideas and Architectures (Cambridge University Press, 2016) explores the political preconditions for the creation and expansion of universal social policies in Latin America and other parts of the developing world. Sánchez-Ancochea and Martínez Franzoni are now studying changes in social policy across the region and, together with Rossana Castiglioni, developing a Latin American research network of social policy with funding from a LASA-Ford grant as well as the Chilean government.


Sánchez-Ancochea Statement

LASA has been a central part of my academic development. Since first joining in Dallas in 2003 as a graduate student, I have participated in all conferences but one. For me, like for many other members, LASA has become a unique platform to discuss research projects, foster multidisciplinary collaborations, participate in policy debates, and meet friends. As a
heterodox economist who does a lot of qualitative research, LASA has also been a safe haven.

I am excited about the possibility of joining the Executive Council and cherish the opportunity to work with LASA’s fantastic administrative team and academic colleagues on several fronts. First, I would love to foster bridges between European institutions and those in the Americas. Latin American studies in some European countries are still in an infant stage and in others (like the United Kingdom) have suffered some blows in recent years. As a truly international association, LASA is in a unique position to support collaborations across the Atlantic and build ties with European partners like the Society of Latin American Studies. I would also be excited to contribute to the organization of the first LASA conference in Europe.

Second, I would work to strengthen the presence of young Latin American researchers at LASA. Thousands of research students have presented their findings for the first time at one of our conferences. We need to make sure that many others across the region can participate through fundraising and direct engagement. We should also devise new ways to support graduate students, particularly from Central America and the Caribbean, through LASA-sponsored seminars at the country level and a diversity of training sessions. For example, LASA could help them in the process of publishing in international journals through conference sessions, Web resources, and even country-level events.

Third, it is extremely important to preserve economics and political economy at our association. LASA conferences have always been a unique gathering place for economists and political economists from different perspectives and methodological inclinations. We have supported the work of heterodox economists and those—like me—working on economic issues through qualitative research. Yet the number of economists and political economists participating in our conferences has stagnated. We should find new ways to engage with them and, particularly, expand the presence of young economists and political economists. We should also promote more active conversations between Latin American economists working in the structuralist tradition and others. This will enhance multidisciplinary research and also promote richer economic debates across Latin America.

Finally, I would work to strengthen the links between the academic and the policy worlds. We should adapt our registration rules to facilitate the participation of policy makers and public servants from national and international institutions at LASA. In this way, we can expand our influence in policy debates, increase public engagement, and make our research more relevant.

Daniela Spenser

Daniela Spenser has been a researcher at the Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social in Mexico City since 1980. She joined CIESAS to participate in a group project dealing with the history of the German entrepreneurial community in Mexico since the nineteenth century, during the Second World War and the postwar years. That research led her to a long-standing interest in political history. Spenser has worked on the history of Mexican and Latin American communism and the study of the cold war. Her publications in Mexico and in the United States have become standard classroom assignments. Chief among them are El triángulo imposible: México, Rusia Soviética y Estados Unidos en los años veinte, foreword by Friedrich Katz (2008, second edition 2004; published in English as The Impossible Triangle (Duke University Press, 1999), based on research in the Soviet archives; Los primeros tropezos de la Internacional Comunista en México (1999), in English as Stumbling Its Way through Mexico (University of Alabama Press, 2011); editor of Espejos de la guerra fría: México, América Central y el Caribe (2004), and coeditor with Gilbert M. Joseph of In from the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounters with the Cold War (Duke University Press, 2008).

Spenser was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia. Following the Soviet-led military invasion in 1968, she left for England, studied Spanish and Latin American literature at King’s College, London, and anthropology at the London School of Economics and Political Science. In 1972 she immigrated to Mexico and lived and worked in Chiapas for a number of years, with Paolo Freire’s texts under her arm. Spenser earned her MA degree at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México in Latin American studies and a PhD in Latin American history at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, under the guidance of Gilbert Joseph.

Currently, Spenser is finishing a biography of the Mexican politician and labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano (1894–1968), a controversial figure in Mexico’s labor history. Through a study of the personal in multiple contexts, she seeks to narrate and analyze the many sides of Mexico’s twentieth-century political and social, domestic and transnational trajectory. Research for this book was underwritten by the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation.
embark on retrospective and prospective examinations of our region from the multidisciplinary perspectives that have characterized it in order to reexamine how we have come this far, examine critically where and why our analysis have misled us, and glean from them new pointers.

In the globalized world, I envisage LASA as making fruitful connections with other specialized associations, beyond the current sections, in order to complement our understanding of the world in which we live and examine in our work.

**Spenser Statement**
As we are entering the unpredictable year of 2016, Latin American Studies Association’s experience, at 50, provides a rich reservoir of ideas about the social, political, cultural, economic, and linguistic processes that have brought us to this coyuntura. At the same time, LASA’s collective spirit offers a unique opportunity to face the future with cautious and creative optimism.

LASA has always stimulated innovative research, teaching initiatives, and transnational networking, and it cannot do otherwise in the coming years. We face several unforeseen scenarios, stemming from a number of recent factors: (1) the presidential election in the United States, the result of which will affect two major areas: migrations policies to the United States and the initiated and unfinished normalization of diplomatic, commercial, political, and migration relations with Cuba; (2) recent elections in Argentina; (3) recent elections in Venezuela; (4) peace agreements between the FARC and the Colombian government; (5) the violation of human rights; (6) the “Guatemalan Spring”; (7) the security factor stemming from terrorism, holdover from old colonialisms and new shifts in local and international alignments; (8) rising economic debts; (9) rampant corruption; (10) rising poverty; (11) stagnant development, to name those areas that will shape the immediate social, political, cultural, and economic environment in the new year.

As an international association in a trouble-driven area, LASA has never shied away from confronting difficult issues intellectually and politically. This I hope will continue. In order to fulfill its mandates and the collective spirit that has motivated it so far, LASA will no doubt
Declaración de intelectuales, científicos y académicos hispanos contra xenofobia de Trump

Los abajo firmantes, hispanos que ocupamos puestos en la academia de los Estados Unidos, así como intelectuales, artistas y científicos de México, América Latina y España, nos negamos a guardar silencio frente a las alarmantes declaraciones del candidato a la Presidencia de los EEUU Donald Trump.

Desde el anuncio de su candidatura, ha acusado a los inmigrantes mexicanos de ser criminales, violadores y traficantes de drogas, ha prometido deportar a 11 millones de ellos y de construir un gran muro a todo lo largo de la frontera con México. Su discurso de odio apela a las más bajas pasiones, como la xenofobia, el machismo y la intolerancia política. Todo lo cual inevitablemente recuerda campañas que en el pasado se han dirigido contra otros grupos étnicos, y cuya consecuencia fue la muerte de millones de personas. De hecho, las agresiones físicas contra los hispanos y los llamados a prohibir el uso de español, han comenzado ya.

Los ataques verbales del Sr. Trump no se basan en hechos comprobados sino en su muy personal e infundada opinión. No sólo desdeña a los inmigrantes hispanos (después podrían seguir otros grupos étnicos) sino que exhibe una peligrosa actitud contra sus oponentes, a quienes tacha de estúpidos o débiles. A los entrevistadores, los ha acusado de tener motivos turbios y expulsó de una rueda de prensa a un prominente periodista hispano que le planteó una pregunta incómoda. Trump ha lanzado comentarios soeces sobre las mujeres. Sus guardaespaldas y seguidores atacan a manifestantes pacíficos.

La expulsión de los inmigrantes mexicanos sería catastrófica para estados como California, Arizona, Nuevo México y Texas, donde la mayor parte del trabajo manual es mexicano. En California, por ejemplo, esos inmigrantes cosechan 200 productos agrícolas, sirven en hoteles y restaurantes, recogen la basura, ejercen, en suma, oficios que los americanos locales se rehúsan a desempeñar. California es el principal fabricante de vino y de muchos productos agropecuarios en el país. Es también el primer destinatario de turismo. Estos sectores generan US$70,000 millones anuales, pero sin los trabajadores mexicanos la economía del estado se iría a la ruina. Algo similar ocurriría en el resto del país.

Muchos de los firmantes somos inmigrantes hispanos que hemos sido bien acogidos en esta gran nación y contribuido con nuestro trabajo, en diversos campos, al conocimiento, los avances de las ciencias, a la prosperidad, el entretenimiento y el bienestar de todos los habitantes de los Estados Unidos. La conducta del Sr. Trump es indigna de un candidato a la presidencia del país más poderoso del mundo. Condenamos esa actitud y esperamos que el pueblo estadounidense cese de tolerar sus absurdas posturas.

Statement from Hispanic Intellectuals, Scientists, and Scholars against Donald Trump’s Xenophobia

The undersigned, Hispanics that occupy academic positions in the United States, as well as intellectuals, artists and scientists from Mexico, other Latin American countries and Spain cannot remain silent against alarming statements from the candidate to the Presidency of the United States, Donald Trump. Since the announcement of his candidacy, Mr. Trump has accused Mexican immigrants of being criminals, rapists and drug traffickers; he promises to deport 11 million of them and build a big wall along the border with Mexico. Trump’s hate speech appeals to the worst emotions, such as xenophobia, sexism and political intolerance; it recalls campaigns in the past against other ethnic groups that led to millions of deaths. Physical attacks on Hispanics and public assertions that Spanish should not be spoken in public have already occurred.

Mr. Trump’s verbal assaults are not based on tested facts, but only on his personal, baseless opinion. Not only does he disdain Hispanic immigrants (later it could be other ethnic groups) but also exhibits a dangerous attitude against his opponents: He stigmatizes them as stupid or weak, launches insults at interviewers for murky reasons, has insulted and expelled a prominent Hispanic reporter from a press conference because the reporter asked him an uncomfortable question, and launches sexist comments about women, while his supporters and personal bodyguards have attacked peaceful demonstrators.

The expulsion of Mexican immigrants would be catastrophic for states such as California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas where most of the manual work is Mexican. For example, in California those immigrants harvest 200 agricultural products, serve in hotels and restaurants, and collect garbage, jobs that the locals don’t want to perform. California is the leading producer of wine in the country, in harvesting many agricultural products and the principal destination for tourism. These sectors generate $70 billion per year and, without Mexican workers, the state’s economy would go to ruin. Something similar would happen in the rest of the country.

Several of the signers are Hispanic immigrants that have been well-received by this great nation and contributed with their
work, in various fields, to knowledge, science progress, prosperity, entertainment and the well-being of all Americans. Mr. Trump’s conduct is not worthy of a candidate to the Presidency of the United States, the most powerful country in the world. All of us condemn his behavior and hope that the American people will no longer tolerate his absurdities.

Héctor Abad Faciolince
Manuel Alcántara
Arturo Álvarez-Buylla
Homero Aridjis
Ariel Armory
Roger Bartra
Demián Bichir
Silvia Bozutsky
Carmen Boulosa
Martín Caparrós
Jorge Castañeda
Jennifer Clement
Junot Díaz
Ramón Díaz Alejandro
Jorge Duany
Jorge Edwards
Sebastián Edwards
Joaquín Estefanía
Julio Frenk
Francisco Goldman
Francisco González Crussí
Teodoro González de León
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Eduardo Matos Moctezuma
Carmelo Mesa-Lago
Verónica Montecinos
Antonio Muñoz Molina
Moisés Naím
Enrique Norten
Silvia Pedraza
Elena Poniatowska
Alejandro Portes
Luis Prados
Rodrigo Rey Rosa
Rafael Rojas
Vicente Rojo
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