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The LASA Forum is published four times a year. It is the official vehicle for conveying news about the Latin American Studies Association to its members. Articles appearing in the On the Profession and Debates sections of the Forum are commissioned by the Editorial Committee and deal with selected themes. The Committee welcomes responses to any material published in the Forum.

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Global Latin(o) Americanos: Transoceanic Diasporas and Regional Migrations

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Human mobility is a defining characteristic of our world today. Migrants make up one billion of the globe’s seven billion people—with approximately 214 million international migrants and 740 million internal migrants. Historic flows from the Global South to the North have been met in equal volume by South-to-South movement. Migration directly impacts and shapes the lives of individuals, communities, businesses, and local and national economies, creating systems of socioeconomic interdependence. In particular, migrant remittances make a fundamental contribution to many developing countries’ GDPs.

Latin America and the Caribbean have long been important regions of global migration and have recently transformed themselves from their origins as locations of immigration to ones of emigration. After four and a half centuries of immigration to Latin America and the Caribbean, starting with the arrival of Europeans, Africans, and Asians to the Americas throughout the colonial period, the flow of migrants changed direction. In the decades following World War II, economic growth and liberalized immigration policies in Europe and Asia and demographic expansion and repressive regimes in Latin America and the Caribbean contributed to a period of intensified migration. Internal migration developed from rural to urban areas and especially to the capitals and metropolises of Latin America. In the 1970s migration flows started between countries in the region and from those countries to the United States and Canada. Further impacted by increasingly muscular U.S. state security and border militarization following September 11, 2001, emigration flows back to Europe and Asia began toward the end of the twentieth century.

By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century the contribution of Latin America and the Caribbean to international migration amounted to over 32 million people, or 15 percent of the world’s international migrants. Although most have headed north of the Rio Grande or Rio Bravo and Miami, in the past decade Latin American and Caribbean migrants have traveled to new destinations—both within the hemisphere and to countries in Europe and Asia—at greater rates than to the United States.

The diversity of these origins and destinations has not received balanced treatment. Studies of U.S.-bound migration have dominated the literature, reinforcing the sense of dependence, domination, and attraction exercised by the United States over the whole region. Although significant research has been conducted examining the flow of transnational capital, the growing globalization of Latin American migration to non-U.S. destinations requires a comprehensive overview. Emerging from our forthcoming volume, Global Latin(o) Americanos: Transoceanic Diasporas and Regional Migrations (Oxford University Press), the articles in this edition of the LASA Forum help to shift the analytical lens away from U.S.-dominant interpretations and document and examine the growing flow between and within destinations in the Global South and across the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. By demonstrating the ways in which people in the Global South participate in and negotiate globalization, these articles foster a decentered, hemispheric, and transoceanic approach that enriches and broadens our theoretical conversations and substantive knowledge about Latin American and Caribbean migration.

Our use of the term “Global Latin(o) Americanos” places people of Latin American and Caribbean origin in comparative, transnational, and global perspectives with particular emphasis on migrants moving to and living in non-U.S. destinations. Like its stem words, Global Latin(o) Americanos is an ambiguous term with no specific national, ethnic, or racial signification. Yet by combining the terms Latina/o (traditionally, people of Latin American and Caribbean origin in the United States) and Latin American in a bilingual fusion we aim to disrupt national conventions and underscore the processual, dynamic, and transborder nature of migration. The hybrid term also signals the importance of bringing together different transnational case studies of Latin American migrants in a comparative analysis. In stark contrast with other host countries, Latinos in the United States are predominantly of Mexican origin and highly vulnerable to criminalization and deportation.

As the sociologist Douglas Massey points out in the forthcoming volume, “this contrast alone cautions against generalizing about Latino identity and Latino integration from the experience of the United States.” Placing this Forum’s case studies into conversation with one another allows for a deeper and more nuanced understanding of Latin American migrations.

While most members of the Latin American diaspora in the region identify themselves by their national affiliation (e.g., Peruvian, Haitian, Guatemalan), Latin Americans living outside Latin America refer to additional identifiers depending on the particular local context. There are self-proclaimed “Latinas/os” in Canada, Israel, Spain, and elsewhere. The Japanese government calls Brazilian immigrants of Japanese descent living in Japan nikkeijin. The existence of Latinas/os in the non-U.S.-
based Latin American diaspora challenges the assertion by Marcelo Suárez-Orozco and Mariela Pérez that “the very term Latino has meaning only in reference to the U.S. experience. Outside the United States, we don’t speak of Latinos; we speak of Mexicans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and so forth. Latinos are made in the USA” (Suárez-Orozco and Pérez 2008, 4).

These original, interdisciplinary studies provide a critical examination of Latin American and Caribbean migrations to non-U.S. destinations. In their brief overviews, authors in this “Debates” section focus on two broad migratory circuits originating in Latin America and the Caribbean: intraregional and transoceanic. Intraregional migration examines migratory trajectories within Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition to the relocation of workers from one country to another within the region (Nicaraguan workers to Costa Rica and Bolivian agriculturalists to Argentina), this Forum explores the experiences of migrants finding their way as minorities in the bilingual and bicultural context of Canada. The studies of transoceanic migration analyze transatlantic flows to Israel and transpacific flows to Japan. Factors determining transoceanic migration include colonial ties and proactive immigration policies that privilege historical ethnic relations to Latin American descendants.

These studies draw on the work of scholars such as Walter Mignolo and José Saldivar, who call for a “remapping” of American studies through a discourse of “border thinking” that challenges us “to re-imagine the nation as a site within many ‘cognitive maps’ in which the nation-state is not congruent with cultural identity” (Saldivar 1997, ix; Mignolo 2000). Expanding on this critique, these articles help us to reorient Latina/o studies outside of a (North) American locus and Latin America, and Caribbean studies beyond the hemisphere, integrating and centering traditional ethnic and area studies approaches.

The selections in this issue of the Forum address and reframe a central problem of our time, seeing it not so much as the challenge of incorporating immigrants into Western societies and economies (which too often frames immigrants as “the problem”) but rather the challenge of redefining citizenship in an era of globalization, which positions immigrants as uniquely poised to teach us about what this means. How Latin(o) American immigrants respond and exercise agency under familiar and unfamiliar global conditions is of critical importance on a number of fronts, not least of which is the health of democratic societies and the diverse expressions of citizenship across the Latin American diaspora. “Global Latin(o) Americanos” and their new destinations provide important contexts for studying these issues.

Notes

1 For a review of current scholarship on global migrant flows see Peró and Solomos (2011).
2 “International remittance flows through official channels to developing countries in 2012 reached approximately USD 401 billion, three times the amount of total aid flows from OECD donors in 2011” (IOM 2015). See also United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013).
4 We are responding to the call by scholars such as Marcelo Suárez-Orozco (2006), who writes, “While there is a general consensus that migration from Latin America is changing the Americas and the world beyond, there is little systematic empirical, conceptual, and theoretical work examining the Exodo in an interdisciplinary, comparative, and regional framework.”
5 In addition to including people from the Caribbean, we use “Global Latin(o) Americanos” as a shorthand meant to encompass Latina/o/x people of all subject positions; racial, ethnic, and gender groups; and sexual orientations. Furthermore, we recognize that the term “Latin America” is itself a fiction, concocted in the nineteenth century either by European elites to impose colonial dominance on the New World (Mignolo 2009) or by Latin American elites to resist U.S. and European imperialism (Gobat 2013).
6 Although the majority of Latinas/os in the United States are of Mexican origin (64 percent in 2012), the U.S. Latina/o population in general is of diverse national and regional origins and is dispersed throughout the country. In 2012, other major groups included people of Puerto Rican (9.4 percent), Salvadoran (3.8 percent), Cuban (3.7 percent), Dominican (3.1 percent), and Guatemalan (2.3 percent) backgrounds (United States Census 2014). For additional details, see Overmyer-Velázquez (2008).
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Several times a week a Tam Airlines flight leaves from São Paulo for Tokyo’s Narita Airport. Beginning in the early 1990s each 28-hour flight brought a new contingent of *dekasseguis*, Brazilians of Japanese descent, to Japan to seek economic opportunities in the land of their ancestors. The term *dekassegu* refers to Brazilian immigrants of Japanese descent living in Japan. It is a combination of the Japanese verbs “to leave” and “to earn” and has the general meaning of leaving one’s hometown to seek work elsewhere.

When and how did Japanese Brazilians leave the country for their ancestral homeland? By the late 1980s a deep and prolonged economic crisis in Brazil, combined with an economic boom in Japan—the so-called Japanese miracle—together with an innovative government policy drew many Japanese Brazilians to Japan, the vast majority of whom belonged to the second and third generation. This migration was part of a larger phenomenon in which, because of the economic crisis in Brazil, several hundred thousand middle-class and lower middle-class Brazilians left their homeland for the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and several countries in Europe in search of improved economic opportunities (Margolis 1994, 2004, 2013).

In 1990 the Japanese government passed a law that attempted to ameliorate the labor shortage in those industrial jobs that the Japanese themselves shunned. These were the so-called three K jobs, the *kitasui* (arduous), *kitanai* (dirty), and *kiken* (dangerous) jobs. This legal reform permitted Brazilians (and Peruvians) of Japanese descent, that is, *nikkeijin*—Japanese people who emigrated from Japan and their descendants—to work legally in Japan (Sasaki 2010; Yamanaka 1993, 1996b). The value of the nikkeijin was twofold: as a large pool of relatively cheap, docile labor they would help solve Japan’s labor shortage and at the same time they would not disturb what was perceived as the nation’s racial and social homogeneity. Because most Japanese pride themselves on belonging to a single, cohesive ethnic group, nikkeijin were preferred over other foreign workers because it was thought that their “race,” regardless of nationality, would allow them to absorb Japanese customs with ease (Yamanaka 1993).

The year 1991 marked the high point of Brazilian emigration to Japan when some 96,000 nikkeijin entered the country. By the mid-1990s rising unemployment in Japan led to the gradual decline of this immigrant flow. Nevertheless by that date the nikkeijin population was significant, with some 160,000 living in Japan, representing over 10 percent of Brazil’s population of Japanese ancestry. In less than a decade this immigration stream was not much smaller than the nearly 190,000 Japanese who had emigrated to Brazil in the 42-year period that ended right before World War II. Even more remarkable is that by the mid-2000s close to 20 percent of the population of Japanese Brazilians in Brazil were now living in Japan (Yamanaka 1996a; Koyama 1998; Tsuda 2004).

Most nikkeijin had traveled to Japan envisioning immigration as a temporary journey to take advantage of an opportunity that would improve their lives in Brazil. For most, at least initially, there was no doubt that Brazil was their homeland, where their real lives were lived. Japan was no more than a way station, a temporary workplace to acquire the means to better their lives upon the return home. Most nikkeijin went to Japan planning to stay from about one to three years and return to Brazil to build a house, start a business, pay for their education, buy a car, or have a comfortable retirement. While many did return to Brazil within the time frame planned, others extended their stay (Yamanaka 1996b, 1997).

Over time, somewhat enhanced job opportunities also tied some nikkeijin more closely to Japan. In the last few years several Japanese Brazilians found themselves no longer limited to unskilled jobs in factories. They moved into a variety of jobs catering to the ethnic market, a result of the local growth of the Brazilian community. Such new opportunities also changed the outlook of some. Rather than saving money for the return home, many began investing in Japan. Nevertheless, there was and still is a definite limit to their social mobility as immigrants. “Becoming upwardly mobile in Japanese society seems almost impossible,” noted Angelo Ishi, a nikkeijin journalist who has lived in Japan for over a decade. “They lack the language fluency, and Japanese companies seem reluctant to accept foreigners into skilled jobs: lawyers, doctors, or engineers in Brazil have little chance of working in their own profession in Japan,” he concluded. This is one of the reasons they are anxious to earn as much money as possible for the return to Brazil. “Our life in Japan, is not our real life” (Ishi 2004; 2003, 81).

Just who are these nikkeijin traveling to an unknown land, albeit the land of their forebears? At the start of the emigration surge in 1990, most emigrants were young, second- and third-generation Japanese descendants. Moreover, most had middle- or lower middle-class backgrounds with fairly high levels of education by Brazilian standards; over half had at least a high school education. They contrasted with earlier Japanese immigrants from Brazil who were mainly *issei*, first-generation nikkeijin who retained their native
language and culture. The newer arrivals were born and raised as cultural Brazilians and they spoke little or no Japanese (Sasaki 1995; Koyama 1998).

This linguistic and cultural ignorance did not sit well with the Japanese. As a result, the arrival of nikkeijin set the stage for many well-documented examples of cultural misunderstanding and cultural conflict. Estimates suggest that some 20 to 30 percent of nikkeijin can communicate in Japanese at least to some extent, but only about 5 percent actually study the language. But it is not their lack of language proficiency alone that leads to friction between nikkeijin and their Japanese hosts. Cultural clashes with Japanese—the fact that Brazilians often play loud music, barbecue on their balconies, do not keep appointments on time or recycle properly—have abated in many locations as Japanese disturbed by such behavior have moved away from large housing complexes like those in Toyota City where Japanese Brazilians make up half of all residents. In short, the Japanese take on all of this can be best summarized as follows: “They look like us, but they certainly don’t act like us!” Or, as Angelo Ishi, the Japanese Brazilian journalist cited above, put it: “Our hardware is Japanese, but our software is Brazilian” (Tsuda 2001; Onishi 2008; quoted in Wehrfritz and Takayama 2000, 29).

The Japanese media pay a great deal of attention to Japanese Brazilians, who are exoticized as “amusing anomalies.” At first nikkeijin were portrayed mostly in a favorable light; because of their physical appearance, they were expected to absorb Japanese culture easily. But when they failed to do so they were derided as “inadequate” Japanese. In contrast, North Americans and Europeans are generally treated with more respect as gaijin (foreigners) than are Japanese Brazilians. The former are praised even when they speak broken Japanese, because Europeans and Americans are expected to be incompetent in Japanese ways. Nevertheless, they are still admired because they come from “modern” first-world nations. But when expectations of Japanese Brazilian’s “Japaneseness” are contradicted by their behavior, they may be verbally abused and called “uncivilized people from a backward country.” Says one researcher about the Japanese view of the nikkeijin, “their Brazilianness is at best a mystery, at worst a sad third-world affliction” (Linger 2001b, 6; see also Tsuda 2001; Yamanaka 1997).

The generally negative reception that nikkeijin receive in Japan leads to shifts in their ethnic identity. In Brazil they are perceived—and in many instances see themselves—as Japanese rather than as Brazilians, but in Japan they are viewed as Brazilians. Having grown up as japonês in Brazil, the unexpectedly cool reception they receive in their ancestral homeland undermines their sense of cultural identity. When they emigrate to Japan their ethnic pride plummets as they realize they are regarded and are treated as inferior to “real” Japanese. To escape this stigmatized image, they eventually come to define themselves as foreigners—as Brazilians rather than as nikkeijin (Ishi 2003; Tsuda 2003; Yamanaka 1997).

Many nikkeijin have strong feelings of empathy for Brazil as a multicultural and multiracial society where the majority have prospered at least to some degree. At the same time they hold a sentimental regard for Japan, since most nikkeijin were raised in families that highlighted their distinctive Japanese ancestry and valued things Japanese. Although most had never visited Japan before emigrating there, they still maintained a Japanese sense of themselves through the food they ate, the traditional festivals they celebrated, and, for some, the Japanese language classes they attended (Linger 2001a).

In spite of these cultural and ancestral roots, after the move to Japan the Japanese identity that most nikkeijin enjoyed while living in Brazil gradually begins to fade. Instead of becoming more Japanese, they become more Brazilian, that is, they begin to have a far stronger sense of their own Brazilian pedigree in Japan than they had in Brazil. The longer nikkeijin reside in Japan, the more they come to think of themselves as a distinct Brazilian minority living there. Because they have few social relationships with Japanese and remain isolated from many spheres of Japanese life, they begin to emphasize and celebrate markers of Brazilian identity such as the samba, to which most were indifferent in Brazil. They wear colorful Brazilian clothes, dance in carnival parades, and speak Portuguese loudly in public. They spend most of their leisure time in Brazilian spaces including bars, dance halls, shops, and restaurants. Given life’s difficulties for nikkeijin in Japan, Brazilian restaurants and similar ethnic locales are appreciated for their casual, relaxed style, which Japanese Brazilians contrast with the strained formality of Japanese venues. In such places nikkeijin can feel comfortable acting like Brazilians (Roth 2002; Tsuda 2003).

In short, many nikkeijin are deeply distressed by the irony of being regarded as Japanese in Brazil, and then once in Japan discovering the profound differences between themselves and native-born Japanese. But their anguish also stems from other shifts in status: after being regarded positively in Brazil because of their Japanese heritage, they become unwelcome in Japan because of their Brazilian roots;
from being middle-class and white-collar in Brazil, they turn into a derided underclass holding low-level blue-collar jobs in Japan (Rocha 2009).

But what of the future? Are Japanese Brazilians still arriving in Japan, and are some remaining there? Are others returning home to Brazil? The picture is mixed. A number are “yo-yo migrants,” that is, immigrants who have re-migrated to Japan although they had purportedly returned home to Brazil “for good.” Some have traveled back and forth between Japan and Brazil, unsure as to where they should settle. Others have returned to Brazil permanently, while still others have begun settling in Japan even as they maintain their identification with all things Brazilian. The few figures we have are as follows: Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates that since the economic recession began in 2008, resulting in growing unemployment, 25 percent of Brazilians in Japan have returned home. The flights from Japan to Brazil are said to be full with a large increase in the sale of one-way tickets. However, only a few years earlier an additional 10,000 Brazilians annually were establishing permanent residence in Japan. By about 2010 an estimated 110,000 Brazilians in Japan were legal permanent residents, and by 2013 there were over 181,000 Brazilians living in Japan, making them the second largest foreign population in the country (Yamanaka 1997; Roth 2002; Globo On-Line 2012; Sasaki 2010)

Still, are nikkeijin actually limited to only two options in terms of their futures: To stay in Japan for the long term, trying to assimilate to Japanese culture and make the best of being confined to low-prestige jobs, as most still are? Or to leave for home and resume their lives as Brazilians? It is perhaps too soon to tell which path most Japanese Brazilians will take.

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Nicaraguan Immigration to Costa Rica: Tendencies, Policies, and Politics

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Like migration from Haiti, Bolivia, and Guatemala to the Dominican Republic, Argentina, and Mexico, respectively, Nicaraguan migration to Costa Rica is a major case of South-to-South migration in Latin America. It takes place in Central America, a region where migration—both intraregional and extraregional—is a structural dimension of everyday life. Demographers estimate that between 12 and 14 percent of Central Americans live in a country different from their country of birth. Military conflicts, economic inequalities, and, more recently, violence are among the main factors that expel Central Americans from their countries of birth (Sandoval 2015).

Although the 2011 census confirms that Nicaraguan migration to Costa Rica shows a slow decrease (about 6 percent of the total Costa Rican population), discrimination continues to be an everyday experience for Nicaraguans in Costa Rica (Bonilla and Sandoval 2014). Imagery of immigration, most of them derogatory, are evident in conversations, emails, and digital social networks, and expressions such as “No sea nica” (Don’t be nica) or “Parecés de La Carpio” (You seem to come from La Carpio—an impoverished and criminalized community where about half of the population is from Nicaragua) inscribe hostility in everyday life.

Paradoxically, although Nicaraguans are seen as threatening “others,” they are indispensable to neoliberal economic development. The agriculture-based economy that produces new commodities like watermelons, oranges, melons, and mangoes, as well as the traditional coffee and bananas, depends on Nicaraguan men and women. Production and processing of the traditional and new tropical fruits that Costa Rica exports to the world are in the hands of migrants. The case of the construction sector is similar, since Nicaraguans have become indispensable for building the infrastructure that has made the tourist boom possible, especially in the Pacific coastal region.

The popular representation of Nicaraguans as violent and lawless conflicts with the roles some of them play in tempering the insecurity that is often considered Costa Rica’s main social problem. Private security companies often recruit Nicaraguan guards to protect property, and Nicaraguan women perform a great deal of (badly) paid domestic work, in particular caring for Costa Rica’s middle-class children and elderly people. Nicaraguan domestic workers, construction workers, and private security guards generally live in highly criminalized neighborhoods or shantytowns. Ironically, those who live in such settings are responsible for the production and reproduction of life in the respected neighborhoods, which include gated communities.

Unfortunately, neither academic research nor NGOs have been able to estimate the economic contribution of Nicaraguans in terms, for example, of the Gross Internal Product. The erasure of migrants’ economic contributions might be due to their absence from the media and everyday conversations. Lack of recognition of the Nicaraguan community renders migrants invisible and erases their economic contributions from the public imagination. Instead, the media frame most discussions in terms of the economic costs of migrants. Prevailing discourses denote Nicaraguan immigration as a “cost” and a drain upon resources, paying scant attention to its contribution in a number of key economic activities. In short, as Sousa Santos (2009) notes, absences, such as Nicaraguans’ contribution to the Costa Rica economy, make it even more difficult to acknowledge
how much Costa Rican society depends on the migrant labor force.

Immigration Law Produces Irregularity

In July 2009, Costa Rica’s Legislative Assembly passed the current General Law of Migration and Alien Affairs (No. 8,764), which went into effect in March 2010 (Asamblea Legislativa de la República 2009). In general, this law eliminates a good part of the vocabulary linked to security that abounded in the earlier law, replacing it with the discourse of human rights and alluding to multiple international agreements ratified and in effect in Costa Rica. The human rights frame bestowed important legitimacy upon the new law. The new law combines this framing with specific provisions that make the regularization of the migratory process even more cumbersome and grants powers—such as to extend detentions for more than 24 hours—to the executive branch that, according to the Constitution, properly belong to the judicial branch.

Participation in the public social security system is one of the new requirements for a migrant beginning the regularization process (articles 7.7, 78.3, and 97). A consequence of this new requirement is that the responsibility for securing insurance falls on the workers, not their employers. The law also establishes a series of payments to extend or otherwise change migratory status. For example, persons categorized as tourists must pay US$100 to prolong their stay in the country (article 90). Those wishing to change their migratory category must, in addition to meeting the requirements to obtain the new status, pay US$200 (articles 96 and 125) unless they leave the country to reenter on a visa, in which case they must begin residency proceedings again, which costs US$30.

High costs impede regularization of status. In fact, one of the grounds for canceling a person’s permanent residency is failure to renew documentation within three months of its expiry date (article 129.10). To this must be added that for every month of irregular status in Costa Rican territory, one must pay a US$100 fine or, “by default, the person’s entry will be prohibited for a period equivalent to triple the time of his/her irregular residence” (article 33.3). The insurance requirement, added to the severity of the fines, has increased undocumented migration. A report on regularization requests presented to the General Direction of Migration and Alien Affairs (DGME) reveals that there was a decrease of almost 50 percent in new permanent visa applications between 2010 and 2011 (Press Conference 2012). In other words, the law’s promise of regularization is far from being fulfilled.

In 2013, the government agreed to postpone the application of the fine of US$100 for each month that a person failed to renew her resident visa. A year later, however, the likelihood of these fines was again a matter of concern. Advocacy efforts took place in a new political context because, for the first time in modern Costa Rican history, a nontraditional political party, Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC), won the presidential election. It was a major surprise because, a year before, no one had envisioned such a possibility.

The PAC began its term with huge electoral support and a wide variety of expectations, including the possibility of changing migration policies. However, no major changes took place during the first months of the new government. The director of the DGME remains the same, and the fines, postponed by the last government, went into effect in August 2014.

When Retaining Rights Is a Challenge

An estimation based mainly on community work might suggest that about one-third of Nicaraguan migrants do not have regular status in Costa Rica. Most of them, about two-thirds, have the requirements for applying for a residence, which are to have a child born in Costa Rica or being the partner of a resident or a Costa Rican. However, most migrants with irregular status do not have the money for all the paperwork in the application process. Those with irregular migrant status are primarily women and children. Men are most often the first within families to seek to regularize their migrant status because they must look for jobs. Women heads of households who are responsible for children usually cannot afford the payment for the residency application.

Children without residency may study in state education institutions, and they have access to health care, but they need to show a valid identification document, either a passport or an identity card provided by the Nicaraguan consulate. Women face more restrictions. If they are in an irregular status, they cannot access health care, including essential preventive tests such as cervical cancer screening. Additionally, they do not have access to contraception, which means they usually give birth to more children than they wished to have.

In 2013, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS) drafted a mandatory resolution stating that pregnant women with irregular migration status would not have routine access to health care. The document stated, “Pregnant women with an irregular migratory status only may
access health care in case of emergencies” (CCSS 2012). In effect, undocumented migrant women would not have access to pre- and postnatal care. Such a decision had been under consideration for a number of months, but it was available soon before it was going to be made public. The ombudsman of that time, Ms. Ofelia Taitelbaum, agreed to meet with representatives of universities, NGOs, and religious networks to discuss the matter. She was familiar with details of the issue and quoted correspondence (Defensoría de los Habitantes 2013a) in which the ombudsman requested criteria from the CCSS’s Legal Department.

Two mid-level authorities at the CCSS—the State Coverage Department and the Legal Department—had different views. Correspondence written by the Legal Department quotes references from 1999 confirming that access to health care by women with an irregular migratory status has been highly contested. While the State Coverage Department aimed to stop their access to health care, the Legal Department insisted that providing service was compulsory. After summarizing a number of mandatory resolutions regarding access to care, the main conclusion from CCSS’s Legal Department was that pregnant women (Costa Ricans or not) must receive prenatal and postnatal health services. The recommendation also established that the Costa Rican State must bear the costs (CCSS 2013a; CCSS 2013b). Once they give birth, however, women with irregular migratory status are unable to use the public health system for health services, and the risk of having more unwanted children returns. To my knowledge, this is the most radical decision limiting migrants’ access to public health services.

The association Merienda y Zapatos (Snacks and Shoes), of which I am cofounder, works with children and youth who run the risk of being expelled from formal education. The association’s experience makes clear that migrant children’s access to technical education is also a contested issue.

The Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje (INA) is an autonomous public institution that provides free applied technical education with the goal of increasing the possibilities of getting paid, formal work. For many years, the INA accepted applicants who did not have regular migratory status, but its entry requirements changed to disqualify youths with irregular migratory status. According to INA’s official position, the change reflected the guidelines provided by the DGME toward the end of the 1990s. The deputy technical president of INA explained in a letter why youths without residency could not gain entry to the institution. The letter cites “legal security,” which was understood to require following immigration legislation, which cannot be transgressed (INA 2012). It means that foreign youths must hold legal residency before they may obtain a place at INA. In another letter, signed in 2013, the technical director (INA 2013) appeals to the “principle of legality,” which signifies the mandatory rule to follow positive law.

The ombudsman agreed that rejecting migrants’ access to both health care and technical education infringed upon fundamental rights, and urged the staff at the Ombudsman’s Office to speed up the procedures in order to protect these fundamental rights. This was especially relevant because the director of childhood at the Ombudsman’s Office knew of the INA case and had scarcely advanced a single initiative. The ombudsman arranged a meeting that brought together INAs executive president, the director of the DGME, and members of grassroots organizations who have been promoting the case (DH 2013b). The call from the ombudsman received media attention from La Nación, the newspaper of record in Costa Rica, which demanded attention by INA authorities (Ross A. 2013).

In response, INA established a working committee to draft a resolution on the problem, which was signed by the ombudsman, the director of DGME, and INA’s executive president at the beginning of May 2014. This case confirms how reactive institutions are when it comes to recognizing rights in practical terms. The establishment of formal rights, in this case spelled out in the Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia, does not guarantee their application. INA did not develop a strategy to make the change in admission policies visible among the migrant community policies.

Overall, advocacy related to the CCSS and INA uses possibilities made available by the state to reclaim rights that state institutions do not recognize as such. Advocates face the challenge of criticizing existing institutional procedures while they use the very same procedures to argue for recognition of migrants’ rights. Note that these cases do not aim to gain new rights but to preserve existing ones. In this context, the liberal state, often criticized for its identification with the views and interests of the powerful classes, must now justify policies that attempt to erode rights that have never been universal.
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Press Conference

Ross A., Amy

Sandoval, Carlos
The Making and Unmaking of a Community of Latino Labor Migrants in Israel

by Adriana Kemp | Tel-Aviv University | akemp@post.tau.ac.il
and Rebeca Raiman | University of Haifa | raiman@soc.haifa.ac.il

In the mid-1990s about 15,000 Latin American labor migrants resided in Israel without a legal permit, comprising 15 percent of the estimated population of the country’s undocumented migrants (Central Bureau of Statistics, July 30, 1998, Press Release 159). By 2010 their numbers had fallen drastically. What factors drove thousands of non-Jewish migrants from Latin American countries—mainly Ecuador and Colombia—to move through unofficial venues to the Jewish state with which they had no apparent previous connection? And what factors enabled the dismantling and dispersal of a vibrant community that in the course of a decade seemed to have had become an integral part of Tel Aviv’s metropolitan ethnoscape?

Based on extensive case study analysis of “Latinos” (as they were usually labelled) in Israel during 1997–2005, our research raises interesting insights into the dynamics of recent migrations from Latin America in less traditional immigration contexts than the North American and Western European, and more generally into undocumented migrations worldwide. First, whereas much of the literature highlights the significance of socioeconomic factors pushing and pulling migratory flows, the Latino experience in Israel highlights the multiple forms in which religion—as practice, institution, and identity marker—intersects with migration-related phenomena, influencing the choice of destination and the making of identity in migrant communities.

Second, much literature has dealt with processes leading to the establishment of migrant communities and their survival strategies in an adversarial context. Our case also underscores the political interventions that bring about the dismantling of existing communities and the unmaking of migratory flows, showing that migration control policies form an inextricable part of the remaking of national boundaries.

Finally, our case points at the dynamics of global labor migrations in ethnonational states that actively encourage the migration of ethnic migrants and discourage the migration and settlement of nonethnic migrants. The immigration of Jews of Latin American origin has been perceived throughout the years as part of the ongoing nation-building project of the “ingathering of exiles.” Upon arrival through the Law of Return they become incorporated in the social, economic, and political life of the nation as full citizens. Conversely, Latin American nonethnic migrants arrived through informal channels, they were channeled to social positions that set them clearly apart from the Jewish Latin American immigrants, and their presence is perceived as a threat to the predominantly Jewish identity of the state and society. Thus the Israeli context shows how difference in ethnoreligious definitions of nationality, and not only legal status and class positions, create distinctions and structured relations between immigrants from the same countries of origin.

Latinos in Israel: Between the Push of Latin America and the Pull of the Holy Land

Undocumented Latino labor migration to Israel can be explained in terms of three intersecting dynamics: push, pull, and mediating factors.

Push Factors

The structural and political conditions that affected most Latin American countries since the early 1980s provide the general context for understanding Latin American migrants’ motivation to emigrate. The transition to democracy in this period was not necessarily accompanied by deep socioeconomic reforms and stability, leading instead to austerity plans dictated by the International Monetary Fund, economic stagnation, and growing socioeconomic inequality. These generated powerful pressures for emigration among skilled blue-collar workers and the educated urban middle classes (Lijphart and Waisman 1996).

The impact of structural push factors resurfaces in our empirical data on pre-migration characteristics of labor migrants and the reasons they adduced for migrating.

Table 1 summarizes the sociodemographic characteristics of the Latino labor migrants and their human capital attributes prior to migration. Half the respondents in our sample came from Colombia. Approximately a quarter migrated from Ecuador, and the rest from Bolivia, Peru, Chile, and Venezuela. The bulk of Latinos arrived between 1993 and 1995, a period when Israel began officially recruiting overseas labor migrants (albeit not from Latin American countries), and the length of their stay in Israel averaged four years.

Migrants, men and women, were concentrated in the central labor-force ages (34 years on average), and displayed gendered differences in pattern of migration by family situation. More male migrants were single and came independently. Yet 25 percent of the women migrated alone (compared to 3 percent among men), leaving their children in the home country and suggesting that the role of income provider impels men and women alike to look for migration as an alternative to local employment.
Over a quarter of all respondents reported having children residing with them in Israel. Fifty percent of these children were between the ages of six and twelve and attended primary schools at the time of the interview. The explicit no-family policies for nonethnic migrants of the Israeli migration regime exerted a great pressure on families raising children under the constant shadow of deportability. At the same time, having children also enlarged the circles of association and interaction of Latino migrants with Israelis beyond the worksite to teachers, volunteers, and parents in schools in South Tel Aviv, where most undocumented migrants lived. Albeit partial and segmented, these forms of social integration accorded Latino families a social personhood anchored in everyday cooperation and interpersonal networks of solidarity, which proved crucial during the antideportation campaigns that led to the naturalization of children and their families in 2005 and 2010 (Kemp and Kfir, forthcoming).

### Reasons for Migration

The reasons migrants gave for their move reflect the grim economic situation in their home countries. The majority gave economic reasons for leaving their countries of origin, adducing mainly lack of opportunities for upward socioeconomic mobility. The levels of human capital and socioeconomic attainment of Latino migrants prior to arrival, presented in Table 1, show that their average educational attainment was relatively high; half of them had worked in white-collar occupations before migration and many of them were self-employed. Respondents reported they earned US$378 on average, yet women reported earning 50 percent of men’s income. These low income levels contrast

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**Table 1. Sociodemographic characteristics of Latino migrant workers in Israel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALES</th>
<th>FEMALES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>32.7 (7.9)</td>
<td>34.3 (8.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marital status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married/living together</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced/separated</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year of arrival (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–1995</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996–1998</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patterns of migration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family migration</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family migration (single parent)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both spouses, leaving children</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single parent, leaving children</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One spouse, leaving spouse + children</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent migration</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation in country of origin</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional and technical</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks and sales</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services/craft</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of formal education</td>
<td>12.9 (3.6)</td>
<td>11.0 (3.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% holding academic degree</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income in country of origin ($)</td>
<td>415.0 (240.1)</td>
<td>256.3 (195.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation in Israel</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic work</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light industry</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Standard errors in parentheses.*
with their expected earnings in Israel—between US$1,000 to $1,500 per month.

Second to economic reasons, the existence of social networks in Israel was also singled out as one of the determinant reasons for migration. Many of our respondents told us that they originally thought of emigrating to Europe and Australia but finally came to Israel because they had someone there to help them upon arrival. Before their departure, almost half our interviewees had family members or friends residing in Israel, and almost two-thirds had at least one family member living there during their stay in Israel.

Religious motivations were the third reason reported for choosing Israel as a destination. One fifth of our respondents claimed that as the Holy Land, Israel has a unique attraction for Christians worldwide who aspire to visit the country as pilgrims. Religious motivations were translated into action through the creation of religious organizations that formed the backbone of the emerging Latino community.

Pull Factors

Whatever the migrants’ motivation, immigrants would not have gone to Israel in the absence of a propitious political economic opportunity structure for their reception. The segmented and dual structure of the Israeli labor market is crucial for understanding the demand for their labor mainly in the domestic and services sectors. Israeli demand for a low-skilled labor force was met in the past by Jewish immigrants from Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa region, and later by Palestinian cross-border workers from the occupied territories in West Bank and Gaza. However, following the deterioration of the security situation in 1991 and the signing of the Oslo agreements, Israel enacted closure policies that prevented the entry of Palestinian workers, opening the gates to the official recruitment of labor migrants from overseas (Kemp and Raijman 2008). At the time of our fieldwork, there were some 169,000 labor migrants in Israel, which is 10.6 percent of the total labor force; only 40 percent of them had work permits.

As in other countries, the official recruitment of labor migration brought about an influx of undocumented migrants hailing mainly from Eastern Europe, South Asia, Africa, and South America. Most entered the country on tourist visas that forbade them to work and became undocumented by overstaying them.

Patterns of recruitment of Latin American migrants were informal and proceeded through the direct recruitment by Latin American Jewish families living in Israel; invitations from friends and family already living and working in Israel; and through private entrepreneurs, such as travel agencies in the home countries that spread the image of Israel as a land of opportunity. These commonly offered prospective migrants religious pilgrimage packages to the Holy Places as the first venue for gaining acquaintance with Israeli society and as an easy way to enter the country.

As undocumented labor migrants, Latinos had a limited range of economic alternatives available in the Israeli labor market regardless of their skills (see bottom panel of Table 1). The great majority of Latino women and 41 percent of men were employed as domestic workers or nikyoneros (cleaning guys)—a hybrid of Spanish and Hebrew. Latino men also worked in construction and in service and light industries. For some of our respondents, their downward occupational mobility in Israel was traumatic even though they saw their stay in Israel as a transitional experience (Raijman, Schammah, and Kemp 2003).

Mediating Networks and Community Institutions

During the 1990s, independent social networks and institutional frameworks developed among Latinos in Israel (Schammah et al. 2000). As elsewhere, these connected present and prospective migrants, reducing the uncertainties of migrating to a new place, offering their members social capital, and filling the void left by the absence of traditional frameworks that could satisfy their social, cultural, and economic needs.

Religion-based networks also served as a social space for interaction, mutual aid, and the formation of community life (Kemp and Raijman 2003). Throughout the 1990s Latino migrants in Israel created a wide array of educational, political, and recreational associations. Yet religious organizations were the most prominent, and interviewees often offered moral classifications of the members of the community according to their degree of participation in religious life.

Latinos attended two kinds of religious organizations: the Catholic Church in Jaffa, which congregated once a week for Latino gatherings around the Mass offered in Spanish; and independent religious organizations, mostly evangelist, established by and for migrant workers. By the early 2000s, nearly ten Latino evangelical churches operated in south Tel Aviv. Evangelical communities comprised more than a thousand congregants, about half of them regular attendees. Arguably,
then, about 7 percent of the Latino migrants were active in evangelical churches. Churches served simultaneously as spiritual center, bank, school, employment bureau, and a shelter from the vicissitudes of everyday life.

The churches’ public nature stood in contrast to the desperate attempts by undocumented migrants to disguise their presence in times of deportation campaigns. As religious places were protected from police intervention, they often offered congregants a physical as well as spiritual sanctuary. A less obvious way in which religion was linked to migration was in the use that migrants made of religious claims to support their inclusion in the host society. Such was the case with Evangelist churches, where members usually translated their interpretation of Christian theology into a claim of belonging, in line with hegemonic definitions of belonging and membership in Israel. For example, in our conversations with pastors and congregants and in the collective prayers, they often emphasized their desire to “work for Israel” as Christians. “Working for Israel” acquired a double meaning in the context of migrants, who during the day worked at domestic chores for Israelis and feared deportation, and in the church articulated their desire to support the Jewish state and help solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (perceived in religious terms) as their raison d’être in the Holy Land.

The Unmaking of the Latino Community

Usually theories that describe the emergence of new ethnic communities do not deal with the mechanisms that may dismantle the formal and informal associations created through the migrants’ own initiatives.

Israeli state policy on undocumented migration took a dramatic turn in 2002 with the creation of the immigration police. After years of turning a blind eye to immigrants, since the establishment of the police, 118,105 people have left Israel, 40,000 of them as deportees. Recognizing the central role played by community networks and organizations in the lives of undocumented migrants, the police directed their activity at dismantling entire communities. Extensive policing and intelligence work was dedicated to locating and deporting community leaders and raiding places where labor migrants held community gatherings and spent their leisure time (Kamp and Raijman 2008).

Since the establishment of the immigration police, Latino migrants felt under siege. Being “illegal” became a permanent burden affecting migrants’ everyday lives, and it constituted a recurrent theme in community gatherings (Raijman, Schammah, and Kemp 2003). The official portrayal of undocumented migrants as a threat to the Jewish character of the state, internal security, and the socioeconomic well-being of the native population runs counter to the positive image that Latinos had accrued in Israeli society for over a decade. This image relied, among other things, on the ability of Latinos to “go unnoticed” and pass as Israelis. Attempts at creating a union called the Organización de Trabajadores Latinoamericanos (OTL) in 1998, which would function as a channel for interaction with Israeli authorities, were nipped in the bud when police raided the homes of some community leaders. From interviews with Latino leaders, we learned that members of the community believed that the escalation in the arrest and deportation policy was a direct reaction to the community’s organizational activities.

Deportation campaigns were particularly hard on families. As many families realized that they were not immune to deportation and that integration into Israeli society was not a viable option for non-Jewish migrants, parents began thinking about the moment of returning home to their countries of origin. In 1999 preparing children for return led to the creation of La Escuelita, a Sunday-school-like framework operated by migrants and Israeli volunteers (Kemp and Raijman 2008).

In the relatively short history of La Escuelita two distinct periods can be identified: the first from its foundation until the wave of deportations in 2005, the second from 2005 to the present. La Escuelita was the initiative of a Colombian migrant worker who operated an “underground” kindergarten for undocumented Latino children together with a municipal organization. Operated by volunteers from the Latino and the South American Jewish community, its main objective was to preserve the cultural heritage of Latinos’ children until they returned to their (parents’) countries and to facilitate the children’s return to those countries.

In 2005 La Escuelita changed its principal objective. The deportation campaigns targeted families but in fact deported mainly men. Many of the women who had resolved to remain in Israel with their children were eventually naturalized as a result of two government decisions in 2005 and 2010 that granted legal status to children and their families (Kemp 2007). The determination to stay and the legalization campaigns reshaped the focus of La Escuelita’s activities: it became a center for helping children and adults to assimilate in Israeli culture and society and meet the needs of those that remained. Today the target groups of educational
activities are mainly female migrant workers, aged 25 to over 50, originating from five countries: Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Puerto Rico (Lerner 2014). With respect to children, the emphasis is not on Spanish language but on offering tutoring as a complement to the regular school’s educational agenda. Whereas arrest and deportation policies resulted in the dismantling of most of the other community institutions, La Escuelita exemplifies how migrants’ associations and initiatives change and adapt to new political constellations.

Conclusions

Detention and deportation strategies implemented in Israel since the mid-1990s, and most harshly in the 2000s, made a forcible impact on the precarious organization of the Latino community. Deportations and the mass exodus of Latino labor migrants exerted a devastating effect on the social organizations that during the 1990s promoted a Latino sense of community. The social spaces that were run by and for Latinos and that provided the basis for the community were crushed, and friendship and kin networks formed around these informal social organizations were decisively truncated. When community leaders, church pastors, and Latino migrants were detained and deported by the state, social and religious activities ceased and the community finally collapsed. Detention and deportation are some of the more visible forms of internal enforcement prevalent not only in Israel but in other host countries such as the United States and countries in the European Union. The practice of deportation is another way for states to reaffirm the contours and importance of national citizenship and sovereignty in the global context (Menjivar 2014). As our case study has shown, policing of immigrants and enforcement controls through detention and deportation shape the everyday lives of immigrants and their families and communities in major receiving countries, and intensify their socioeconomic vulnerabilities.

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Schammah, Silvina, Rebeca Raijman, Adriana Kemp, and Julia Resnik
Bolivians in Buenos Aires: Human Rights, Immigration, and Democratic Participation

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Argentina’s population increased mainly through European and Arab immigration between 1850 and 1950 (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States of America, and Uruguay are also included in this group). However, over the past 60 years, people coming from neighboring countries have taken the lead. Some of them have mixed with the local population, a few have become rich, but not one has been recognized as equal by the Argentinian society, unless they have adopted the lifestyle of the Argentinian elite.1

This is especially the case of Bolivian immigrants living in the country for the last 50 years. They often experience upward social and economic mobility, but they get no recognition. Some of those who work in horticulture in suburban areas have gained social acknowledgment in the communes (comunas) where they live, but their compatriots working in the apparel industry in the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires (AMBA in Spanish), get no public recognition. Most of the people working in this sector are brutally exploited, and they are mostly ignored in the public sphere.2 However, because discrimination limits the development of citizenship, my main concern here will be to clarify why Bolivian immigrants in the AMBA do not gain social and political acknowledgment (Brubaker 1989; Herrera Carassou 2006; Koopmans 2003; Koopmans, and Statham 2000; López Sala 2006; Massey et al. 2008; and Zapata Barrero 2001).3

In international migration research there exists a broad discussion about the conditions for the access of immigrant communities to active citizenship. Some European studies and my own research underline the role of “intercultural mediators,” those persons and/or groups who can “translate” the necessities and demands of subaltern peoples into the codes of the dominant culture with the aim of negotiating for them (Manjuk, Manolcheva and Vior 2004a, and 2004b; Vior and Bosse 2005; Vior 2006, and 2012; and Dreidemie and Vior 2011). This focalization pays special attention to the “contact zones” (Pratt 2011) between both cultures, where intercultural mediators act.

According to the latest National Population Census (2010), 345,272 Bolivians live in Argentina. However, considering those community members who have taken Argentinian citizenship, others who were not counted, and the children of Bolivian origin born in Argentina (who according to law are Argentinians), the census estimates the actual size of this community to be 1.3 million people.

Just over 55 percent of the Bolivian population in Argentina lives in the AMBA (Castillo and Gurrrieri 2012, 22), but the better part of it is concentrated in a small territorial strip that originates in the neighboring district of La Matanza, in the west, which enters Buenos Aires City through the west and southwest communes and ends in the west quarters of Flores and Floresta, where Argentina’s garment wholesaler trade is concentrated. The population of Bolivian origin living in the city can be thus estimated at around 150,000 (Halperín Weisburd 2012).

Hyperexploitation (including self-exploitation) and slave labor emerged in Argentina’s garment industry at the end of the twentieth century under the influence of cheap Chinese imports. The closure of many production facilities caused by these imports forced the transition to “nonvertical” production methods. In 2002, after the collapse of the Argentinian economy, the peso was devalued and spontaneous market protection arose, which allowed the reindustrialization of the country. The dominant garment enterprises, however, have retained control over design, marketing, image, patterns, and tailoring, while they outsource garment-making, ironing, and finishing to workshops and facilitators; these, in turn, subcontract to home workers or to other workshops (Adúriz 2009). Workshop owners, distributors, and wholesalers keep 80 percent of the sector’s entire earnings (Lieutier 2010, 49). Given this context, the workers accept their exploitation, hoping to open their own sweatshop sometime in the future. In the City of Buenos Aires there are approximately 5,000 garment workshops, of which only 20 percent are licensed (Adúriz 2009).4 This production system relies on a network built by the city government, traffickers, the police, and the numerous small radio stations regularly heard in the workshops and which contribute very decisively to the isolation of the community.

In the last ten years the Bolivian community in the City of Buenos Aires has become considerably politicized. But this general political mobilization has not resulted in better community articulation or greater or more effective participation of the community in Argentinian politics (Caggiano 2014; Cantor 2013; Goldberg 2013; Modolo 2014; and Pizarro 2009). The patronage characteristics of the Argentinian political system and the limitations of the migration policy are the main causes for this shortcoming on the state’s side. They include, the irregular status of many immigrants, the rivalry between community leaders, and an “obstructive” communitarian leadership hinder the organization of the community.

The Federation of Bolivian Civic Associations in Argentina (FACBOL in
Spanish), founded in 1995, claims to represent the community as a whole, but the intertwining of its leaders with the sweatshop owners has led in recent years to harsh clashes among them over money.6 FACBOL is also the link between the Bolivian community and the PRO (Propuesta Republicana) party led by the conservative city mayor Mauricio Macri.7 FACBOL’s president is Alfredo Ayala, who uses his connections in politics, business, and policy for controlling the community’s representation.8 He and his group aim to achieve a downward adjustment of the standards and norms for the operation of industrial premises, and to prevent the workers from organizing themselves in unions.

After having studied Alfredo Ayala and his group, I modified somewhat my perception of the role that intercultural mediators play in the contact zone between host societies and immigrant communities (Dreidemie and Vior 2011). Two types of intercultural mediator can be proposed. “Enabling mediators” (individuals or a group) mostly belong to the subaltern community and include its demands for rights and interests in a coherent discourse that translates them into the language and codes of the mainstream society, aiming to negotiate their implementation. “Obstructive mediators,” in contrast, are persons or groups that monopolize the relations between the host society and the immigrant minority. Presenting the immigrant group as opposed to the majority of the host country, these people block the communication channels between both sides in order to confuse their own interests with the community’s and to serve some groups in the host community interested in keeping the immigrants outside. This second type of mediation currently prevails within the Bolivian community in the City of Buenos Aires, helping both the city elite and the community leadership to avoid political and economic competition in their respective arenas.

Theoretical and empirical studies of the political participation of immigrant communities distinguish three types of political mobilization and/or participation (Koopmans 2003; Koopmans and Statham 2000):

1. Through individual ascent and assimilation to the patterns of the host country’s political culture. This path is only open for middle classes, and it does not benefit the community as a whole.

2. Through communitarian mobilization for concrete demands. This type of mobilization is only possible in political systems with strong cultural cleavages.

3. Through the introduction of the cleavages of the home country in the host nation. This type of mobilization and participation responds mostly to regime crises in the home countries, but this type of political participation loses importance as soon as democracy is stabilized back home. Thereafter, the remaining immigrant communities often tend to adopt ghetto representations and conduct.

There are no intercultural political systems in Europe or North America, but some successful local experiences suggest that it is possible to move beyond the limits of the nation-state. If regional integration processes convert nation-states into pluricentric confederations based on the human right to free movement, immigrants will no longer need to assimilate themselves to national values, norms, and symbols in order to become recognized citizens. This can then open the way to an emerging intercultural citizenship.

Notes

1 “Recognition” was first introduced in the social sciences by Charles Taylor (Taylor and Gutmann 1994) as a key category for the study of intercultural relations in pluricultural societies.

2 Due to the precarious working conditions in some sweatshops in the garment industry, there are often accidents. Most remain unnoticed by the media, but some particularly serious incidents attract public interest, like the 2006 fire in Luis Viale Street in the City of Buenos Aires, where eight people died, and, more recently (April 27, 2015) in Páez Street, where two children lost their lives in a basement fire. The way in which the media cover such events, however, is extremely sensationalist, treating the workers in the garment industry exclusively as “victims” and not as real people who have needs and demands and who are involved in the complex social and cultural framework of the immigrant enclave.

3 “Citizenship” here refers to the economic, social, and political conditions that influence the ability of immigrants to participate in politics and government, as well as the ideological and psychological dispositions of immigrant people that determine their capacity to organize themselves and to put their demands before the state.

4 José Zambrano Torrico, president of the recently founded Confederation of Small and Mid-size Bolivian Enterprises in Argentina (Conamype Bol-Ar), in an interview with El Visor Boliviano (August first fortnight, 2014, 11), estimated that in Argentina there are 100,000 Bolivian workshops in the garment industry, and that almost 3.7 million people are directly or indirectly employed in the sector. As he did not show the data sources he used for his statement, it seems greatly exaggerated.
In 2004, at the very beginning of Néstor Kirchner’s presidential term, the new Migration Law 25.871-04 was enacted. Article 4 of this law recognizes the human right to migrate. Since then, Argentinian migration policy has considerably simplified the entrance and settlement of migrants (mainly South American) in Argentina, but the authorities have done very little to organize the coexistence of the immigrant communities with mainstream Argentinian society.

6 I confirmed this scenario through interviews with members of the Alameda Foundation, a deputy inspector of the Trafficking Squad of the Argentinian Federal Police, and H. Zunini, technical advisor at the Centro Demostrativo de la Indumentaria (CDI, Experimental Center for Clothing), in June 2013; and a long conversation in March 2015 with Juan Carlos Estrada Vásquez (a Bolivian immigrant who worked years ago in illegal workshops, and who now edits the biweekly newspaper El Visor Boliviano).

7 Propuesta Republicana (Republican Proposal) is a center-right political party in Argentina. It is usually referred to as PRO. PRO was formed as an electoral alliance in 2005 but was transformed into a unitary party on June 3, 2010. Since 2007 it has ruled the City of Buenos Aires. From 2007 to 2015 the city mayor has been the Pro party president, Mauricio Macri. Recently Macri’s chief of staff, Horacio Rodríguez Larreta, won the election, and on December 10, 2015, he will succeed Macri as city mayor.

8 By strengthening the ties within this entrepreneurial elite, and between its members and their business partners, the city government plays an important symbolic role in the patronage of the morenadas, the dance blocs that are ubiquitous in the La Paz (Bolivia) Carnival. Moreno means brown-skinned, and the morenadas mimic the dances of African slaves during colonial times. According to Vásquez, however, participating in the current morenadas in Buenos Aires costs each dancer almost US$20,000. Only the children of garment entrepreneurs can, therefore, hope to take part in these prestigious performances. Even more important than the bajadas (the annual morenadas parade at the central Mayo Avenue) are the prior recepciones (receptions), i.e., luxury parties in closed halls, to which the organizers invite their business and political contacts.

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Pizarro, Cynthia


Pratt, Mary Louise


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Vior, Eduardo J., and Daniel Bosse


Zapata Barrero, Ricardo

The case of Latin American Canadians offers an exceptional opportunity to examine and compare how minorities are constructed and transformed in different host societies. Minorities are shaped differently by their societal context, and Canada is especially relevant in that regard because of the existence of two main dominant cultural environments—grounded on political and territorial configurations—within the same country: an English-language Canadian majority at the national level and a French-language Québécois majority in Canada’s second most-populated province. Indeed, Canada’s Latin Americans can provide unique insights into diasporic citizenship, as this rapidly growing population settles and grows as part and parcel of a multiethnic immigrant society, one with a highly decentralized state and a constitutionally enshrined bilingual character, and marked by the presence of a large number of indigenous communities whose self-determination claims are recognized on the basis of their own distinctive culture. Not surprisingly, compared to most other countries, Canada projects a weaker core identity, and its collective life is framed, to a large extent, by the phenomenon of “nations within a nation.” Furthermore, given the increased linkages across the Americas, Canada holds a very particular and often overlooked position as a major country that is not contained in the United States–Latin America oppositional system, which underlies how the hemispheric reality is commonly understood. That is why Canadian Latin Americans can help us think about the Latino diaspora formation in ways that are not necessarily tied to a single, strong nation-state or subject to a sole hegemonic cultural framework.

Latin Americans in Canada have settled over several decades, not gradually but rather through several waves. Between the 1970s and the 1990s, most immigrants from Latin America came to Canada for political reasons (i.e., fleeing military dictatorships in South America and civil wars in Central America). However, since the 1990s, and even more clearly during the following decades, most Latin Americans in Canada have been admitted under the “economic category”: 70 percent in 2012. This means, in general terms, that they have been granted permanent residency on account of their prospective employability as skilled workers in Canada, a condition evaluated on the basis of their level of education, demonstrable work experience in eligible occupations, and sufficient knowledge of official languages, among other factors. However, Latino Canadians’ more middle-class origins do not necessarily translate into a higher socioeconomic status once they settle in the host society. Latin Americans show a higher prevalence of low income than other immigrant groups (except black and Arab Canadians) and, interestingly, this gap is much wider in Québec. As a minority group, Canadian Latinos show one of the lowest average employment incomes: $26,241 (in 2006 Canadian dollars), compared to $28,231 among black Canadians, $29,441 among Arab Canadians, and $31,102 among South Asian Canadians. However, unemployment rates are lower among Latin Americans (9 percent) than among blacks (10.6 percent) and Arabs (13 percent), a fact that seems to confirm qualitative evidence suggesting that Latin Americans in Canada may be more prone to accept lower wage (and sometimes undeclared) jobs. This pattern also appears among highly educated Latin Americans (with university diplomas): their average income is $42,636 ($32,836 in Québec), while the average income for all minority workers with a university diploma is $47,113 ($39,582 in Québec).

If we take the narrowest definition possible and consider a Latin American to be any person born in a Latin American country (that is, a first-generation immigrant), we see that this group represents just about 6 percent of all immigrants in Canada. However, its growth rate is roughly three times higher than that of the overall immigrant population (32 vs. 10 percent between 1996 and 2001; 47 vs. 12.7 percent between 2001 and 2006; 49 vs. 12.9 percent between 2006 and 2011), due to the increasing share of Latin American newcomers, most of them having arrived from Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and El Salvador during the last decade and a half. Interestingly, Latin Americans represent almost 11 percent of all immigrants in Québec, proportionally twice the size of this community at the national level. Given such inflow, the Latino population in Canada with respect to national origins reflects a much wider diversity than what we see in the United States, where 63 percent of Hispanics declare Mexican origin, 9.3 percent Puerto Rican origin, and 3.5 percent Cuban origin. In Canada, the three main nationalities—Mexican, Colombian, and Salvadorian—only represent, respectively, 17.8, 14.2, and 11.9 percent of the total Latino population. Let us also consider that seven out of ten Colombians (the predominant origin among first-generation Latino Canadians) immigrated after 2001, making it a markedly “young” community. In a larger time frame, the growth rate of the Latino population in Canada is even more striking: for example, between 1971 and 2011, the number of individuals with Spanish as their mother tongue grew more than tenfold both in Toronto (7,155 and 75,305 respectively) and in Montreal (8,210 and 82,935). In brief, Latino Canadians are a relatively newly settled, still coalescing group, very diverse in terms of national origins, and rapidly growing,
even more so in the French-speaking province of Québec.

Data from the 2006 census show that two-thirds of individuals who indicated a Latin American ethnic origin (in a question about ancestry) also identified themselves as members of the Latin American community (in a question about so-called visible, that is, nonwhite, minorities). The other third was distributed as follows (under categories defined by Statistics Canada): 29 percent “not a visible minority,” 2 percent “Black,” 1 percent “Aboriginal,” and 2 percent “multiple visible minority.” But these proportions vary quite widely when national origins are taken into account. Immigrants who declared a Central American national origin (Salvadorians, Nicaraguans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans) are more prone to see themselves as members of the Latin American minority (80 percent or more), while those from the Southern Cone (Paraguayans, Brazilians, Argentinians, and Uruguayans) generally do not identify themselves as such (43 percent or less). Venezuelans and Mexicans are somewhat in the middle (51 percent to 53 percent). Another difference emerges from the comparison between first-generation Latin Americans (foreign born) and their offspring (the second generation): while 83 percent of Latin American immigrants declare themselves minority members, only 56 percent of second-generation Latin Americans identify as such. It goes without saying that these results are impossible to compare to data from the United States. The concepts and social representation (of “race”, “Latino”, etc.) are extremely different, as are the policy and methodological approaches to ethnic diversity deployed by government agencies in each country. But the contrast may still be useful as a way of exploring the diverging forms of “Latino-ness” developing in the North American context. On the other hand, it is also possible to speculate that the Latino reality in the United States is so massively important—and becoming more so in the near future—that Canadian Latinos will eventually gravitate toward the U.S. model of pan-ethnicity. If Anglo-American multiculturalism and even the racial-relations perspective gains ground in English-speaking Canada, what will happen with Québec’s Latinos? Will they follow the continental trend, will they assimilate into Québécois society, or will they create a different mode of diasporic identity? Could language proximity play a role in those cultural and political affinities?

Survey data on Latin Americans in Canada show that the relative weight of those who declare Spanish as their mother tongue is affected by the place of residence: almost a third (32.1 percent) of Canadians who have Spanish as their “first language learned at home in childhood and still understood by the individual” (as defined by Statistics Canada) live in Québec, but the proportion of immigrants born in Latin America in that province is 28.5 percent (if we exclude Portuguese-speaking Brazilians). The 5-percentage-point gap could be evidence of a higher rate of first-language retention of Spanish among Latin Americans in Québec. The French-speaking Québécois show, on their part, a predilection for Spanish when they chose to learn a second language. On the other hand, an intriguing phenomenon transpires when we take into account the self-perception of Latin Americans in Québec as members of a visible minority: immigrants who were born in a Latin American country and live in Québec represent 27.8 percent of the total Latin American immigrant population nationwide, but they account for 30.8 percent of all first-generation “ethnic” Latin Americans in the country, as measured by Statistics Canada. This 3-percentage-point difference may point to a stronger sense of belonging to a minority within the French-language province. In other words, the sense of community is affected by the way in which the host society conceives in-group and out-group relations. Cultural and language proximity does not necessarily translate into an erosion of intergroup boundaries.

Data drawn from focus groups show that Latin American immigrants in Québec are generally aware of the idea of a “cultural affinity” between them and Francophone society. Sometimes they see it as real (e.g., language proximity, Catholic background, etc.), and sometimes they discard it as a myth (the Québécois would be as “cold,” “superficial,” “materialistic,” and “individualistic” as other North Americans, as opposed to Latin Americans). Ironically, when Québec is considered as culturally and politically close to Latin America, some Latin American immigrants express a preference for the “Anglo” world because of its more dynamic economy, broader individual freedoms, and pragmatic outlook (while Québec would be more like Latin America: corrupt, bureaucracy laden, ideologically driven, etc.). In their view, Anglos would be more open to others than “Francos” are, and would offer more opportunities to minorities and immigrants. Latin Americans are also keen on noticing that community ghettos—too much multiculturalism—are not socially acceptable in Québec, and integration (including language learning) is considered a civic duty. The reality of trilingualism (Spanish as mother tongue, plus English and French as both necessary for employment) is sometimes seen as a burden, but many consider it an advantage, particularly for their children. Even if they criticize Québec’s shortcomings, Latin
Americans still see value in their cultural affinity with Quebeckers: the French-language population usually holds positive stereotypes about Latinos, whom they recognize as reliable, hard-working, law-abiding citizens (especially when compared to other, less favorably perceived groups).

In conclusion, if a North American perspective needs to take into account a two-country reality (U.S./Canada), it can be argued that, in fact, there are actually three host societies to consider. Canada has had a national multicultural policy in effect since the 1970s, while Québec has established an official “intercultural” policy (closer to assimilationist/secularist European models), linked to a more collectivist, state-centered public culture. Canada has a federal immigration policy based on a points system, open to all applicants, with an emphasis on economic factors, while Québec handles the selection of its own “skilled workers” (70 percent of all immigrants) with a similar system but with different weighing given to language skills (giving preference to the French language) and other priorities (such as the provincial labor market needs). Overall in Canada, the top country sources of immigration in 2012 were China, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, and the United States, while in Québec the top sources were China, France, Haiti, Algeria, and Morocco. Naturally, given these national origins, the largest minorities in English Canada are South Asian and Chinese, whereas in Québec the largest are black, Arab, and Latin American. The most-spoken unofficial languages in English Canada are Cantonese, Punjabi, and Mandarin, while in Québec the most-spoken unofficial languages are Arabic and Spanish. In short, on the basis of current immigration trends, even putting aside language and institutional differences, Québec’s very social fabric sets this province apart from all others, and Latinos may well play a significant role in its future evolution.

Note
The survey results cited in this article were obtained through a research project funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Standard Research Grant 410-2010-2120, held by the author in 2010–2013). The focus group data were collected in collaboration with Sébastien Arcand (HEC Montréal), with support from the Latin American Chamber of Commerce of Québec through a grant from the Québec Ministry of Employment and Social Solidarity.
As we sit down to write this, with the September 8 submission deadline for those wishing to participate in the 2016 LASA Congress a few short weeks away, quite literally thousands of scholars, students, public intellectuals, and activists throughout the world with an interest in Latin America are planning their contributions to what promises to be the association's largest conference yet. By the time this issue of the Forum appears, this myriad of proposals will be in the hands of the 80 track co-chairs, pairs of specialists in each of the 39 thematic tracks into which the Congress is divided and which form the foundation on which the Congress program is built. These track chairs, for the most part working in teams of two, will read carefully through scores of individual and panel proposals, and by the end of October their decisions concerning the content of their respective program tracks—the panels, roundtables, and workshops falling within their thematic area—will shape the program that will fill four days in May 2016. Track chairs have also taken up our suggestion that they not only vet submitted papers and panels but also take the initiative to propose special panels of their own that bring to light the most interesting and cutting-edge thinking in their subarea of study, which will be highlighted in the conference program. They have been in touch with LASA’s Sections, which in turn have been working on the organization of panels and workshops, a number of them emphasizing the “LASA at 50” theme of the Congress.

Along with the hundreds of panels that will come out of the thematic tracks, we, as program co-chairs, have been working with LASA president Gil Joseph to include a limited number of special high-profile activities: panel discussions, talks, and public conversations among those whose voices are today and have been formative over the past 50 years of Latin America studies.

Together, these two broad categories of activities will fill the four days in May of our “LASA at 50” Congress. While still leaving room for the conference to take shape according to the interests of LASA’s membership and to reflect the vast diversity of Latin American studies today, we have taken seriously our mission as program chairs in working with Gil Joseph in identifying certain strains of thought and critical approaches that we believe are especially important to emphasize in the program. We would like to highlight the emergence of new categories of knowledge, which we had in mind when reddefining the thematic tracks. Where, for example, does Latin America fit in to the now ubiquitous concept of the Global South? In what ways should we rethink the organization of knowledge about Latin America in the context of new transregional interactions? What has been the evolution of thought, over the last 50 years, in the field that we call Latin American studies?

The conference program will also acknowledge and allow participants to explore emerging developments in the region, for instance the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba, and will engage with debates on fundamental issues that shape hemispheric politics and societies such as democracy and immigration. We are also struck by and would like to address certain persistent challenges to the study of Latin America, particularly in the U.S. academy; the inexplicably persistent gap between Latino and Latin American studies, for instance, appears to have become even wider in contemporary academic life in the United States as ethnic studies has taken shape. We are also committed to continue the wonderful work of our colleagues who chaired the LASA2015 Congress in San Juan, Puerto Rico, thus deepening conversations on “Otros Saberes” and the valuable goal of promoting collaboration between knowledge producers within and outside academia.

Finally, we consider New York City, the conference venue and the site of the first LASA International Congress in 1968, as a Latin American city. For us, designating New York City as part of Latin America, broadly construed, emphatically does not mean subsuming Latin America into the United States. Instead, we hope to that the conference will stimulate discussions about diasporic communities, the study of migration and immigrant communities and justice, and transnational approaches to study in the humanities and social sciences. Although for compelling logistical reasons we must concentrate the vast bulk of the conference events in a several-block radius of midtown Manhattan, we are keenly aware that New York City’s Latin American / Latin@ life is spread throughout its five boroughs. Conference participants will have the opportunity take part in off-site activities connected to presentations on the actual conference site.

The intensely busy process of organizing the Congress has brought LASA’s president Gil Joseph and the program co-chairs together with New York City stakeholders with an abiding interest in the study of Latin America—cultural organizations, universities and research centers, foundations, politicians, community leaders, and others. We are delighted and humbled by the extraordinary response that we have received from these groups. As you will learn soon, their ideas and contributions will add fascinating dimensions to LASA2016.
In sum, the content of LASA’s 50th anniversary Congress is quickly taking shape. Thanks to the work of an immense number of individuals and especially the conference track chairs and the staff at the LASA Secretariat, ideas are becoming realities. We hope that we have whetted your curiosity. By the time of our next communication in this Forum, the details of LASA2016 will be very much defined. It will be an unforgettable meeting.

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Assistant/Associate Professor of History, Modern Latin America (since 1800)

The Pennsylvania State University Department of History invites applications for a tenure-track position in the history of Modern Latin America (since 1800). The appointment will be made at the rank of Assistant or Associate Professor, depending upon qualifications, and will begin in August 2016. The successful applicant should be able to enhance the graduate concentration in Latin American history, demonstrate an active research agenda, be able to contribute immediately to both graduate and undergraduate teaching in the department, and be ready to participate in the Latin American Studies program. Candidate must have a Ph.D. in hand at date of application. Prospective candidates should submit a curriculum vitae, a letter of application that describes current and future research, and evidence of teaching effectiveness at https://psu.jobs/job/58906. Applications may also include up to three offprints or unpublished papers or chapters. Please request three letters of reference be sent to Search Committee, Modern Latin America, Department of History, The Pennsylvania State University, 108 Weaver Building, University Park, PA 16802. Review of applications will begin on October 15, 2015, and continue until the position is filled.

CAMPUS SECURITY CRIME STATISTICS: For more about safety at Penn State, and to review the Annual Security Report which contains information about crime statistics and other safety and security matters, please go to http://www.police.psu.edu/clery/, which will also provide you with detail on how to request a hard copy of the Annual Security Report.

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## LASA2016 RESERVATION FORM

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Combined booth: One book $100 ☐ Additional $75 ☐ More than five please contact msc49@pitt.edu “Take one” display $168 ☐

### ADVERTISING

#### Deadlines
- Reservations: March 31, 2016
- Materials: April 15, 2016

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### Cancellations

If an exhibitor is forced to withdraw from participation by January 5, 2016, all sums paid by the exhibitor less a $350 service fee will be refunded. No refunds will be issued after January 5, 2016. Cancellations are not effective until received in writing by LASA. No refund will be made if an exhibitor fails to occupy the space. No refund on late or no arrival of materials.

### Payment

A minimum deposit of 50% of the total booth rental fee is required. Booths will not be assigned without the 50% deposit. Failure to remit total payment for the booth rental by January 5, 2016 constitutes cancellation of the contract, and the space will be subject to resale without refund.

As the authorized contact for the above organization, I agree to comply with, and be bound by, the terms of LASA’s Rules and Regulations (F).

Printed Name: __________________________
Signature: __________________________
Film and video materials that are **not** integrated into a panel, workshop, or other regular Congress session may be featured at LASA2016 Film Festival.

Selection criteria are: artistic, technical, and cinematographic excellence; uniqueness of contribution to the visual presentation of materials on Latin America; and relevance to disciplinary, geographic, and thematic interests of LASA members, as evidenced by topics proposed for panels, workshops, and special sessions at recent Congresses.

These films and videos will be screened free of charge in the LASA2016 Film Festival, and compete for the juried designation of LASA2016 Award of Merit in Film, which is given for “excellence in the visual presentation of educational and artistic materials on Latin America.” Films and videos released after January 2015 and those that premiere at the LASA Congress will be given special consideration, if they also meet the above criteria. LASA membership is not required to participate in the festival.

Films must be received no earlier than **September 1**, and no later than **December 1, 2015**. Selection will be announced by April 15, 2016. Entries constitute acceptance of the rules and regulations of the LASA Film Festival. Film screeners will not be returned and will be deposited in the festival archives.

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**To participate in the LASA2016 Film Festival:**

1 – Fill out the entry form and send it via email to: cferman@richmond.edu
2 – Send the DVD screeners to:

**Claudia Ferman** / Director  
LASA2016 Film Festival  
University of Richmond – 28 Westhampton Way  
LALIS – CWIC 334 -- Richmond VA 23173 – USA

It is recommended to send the DVD screener through express services (i.e., UPS, DHL, FedEx). Clearly indicate on the envelope: **“No commercial value – Cultural Material.”** Screeners should be accompanied by a copy of the completed submission form. A DVD is required for consideration, even when the submission form includes a link to the movie. **DVDs that do not include a submission form will not be considered.**
**LASA2016 FILM FESTIVAL – SUBMISSION FORM**

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**CONTACT: (To whom direct every information and or notification regarding the selection and coordination of screeners, in case of selection)**

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New LASA Sections Approved for Membership Year 2016

Two new Sections have been approved by the Executive Council for the 2016 membership year: Nineteenth Century, and Otros Saberes.

The Nineteenth Century Section brings together a cross-disciplinary and transnational group of scholars to promote new methodological approaches to politics, affects, powers, challenges, transformations, and cultural production during the nineteenth century. It shares in the discovery and debate of sources and methods to better understand this time period in Latin American history.

The Otros Saberes Section promotes collaborative, transformative research and exchange between academics and civil society knowledge producers to further social justice. This Section welcomes members with commitments to: (1) research practice and dissemination that is collaborative between academy-based and civil society–based knowledge producers; (2) knowledge production that is both theoretically generative and substantively oriented to advance action on pressing social problems of our times; (3) scholarship that is social justice oriented, in explicit alignment with those who suffer directly from the enduring inequities of our societies, and in alignment with protagonists of efforts to transform those conditions; and (4) recognition of multiple knowledge systems, with an interest in putting them in conversation. These overarching themes make for an inclusive field, with ample room for debate and innovation, and for a wide range of topical emphases.
Announcing the Guillermo O’Donnell Democracy Award

by Gabriela Ippolito-O’Donnell | University of Notre Dame | gabriela.ippolito.2@alumni.nd.edu
and Kevin J. Middlebrook | University College London | kevinmiddlebrook@aol.com

LASA’s Executive Council has unanimously approved the creation of an award and lectureship honoring the distinguished academic career and pioneering intellectual leadership of the late Guillermo O’Donnell.

The Guillermo O’Donnell Democracy Award will be an annual, Association-wide award and lectureship that recognizes either outstanding scholarship in the field of democracy studies or particularly meritorious public service that promotes democracy and democratic values in Latin America and the Caribbean. Each recipient will be invited to give a keynote lecture at the LASA Congress at which the award is made.

Rationale for the Award

Guillermo O’Donnell (1936–2011) was for nearly four decades one of the most influential social scientists studying contemporary Latin America. At the time of his death in his native Buenos Aires, he was Emeritus Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow at the Kellogg Institute for International Affairs at the University of Notre Dame. He had previously served as the Helen Kellogg Professor of Government and International Studies (1982–2005) and founding Academic Director of the Kellogg Institute (1982–1997) at the University of Notre Dame, and Director of the Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (1976–1979) in Argentina. He received his L.L.B. from the Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires in 1958 and his M.Phil. and Ph.D. degrees in political science from Yale University in 1971 and 1988, respectively. Among many distinguished positions, Guillermo served as president (1988–1991) and vice president (1982–1985, 1985–1988) of the International Political Science Association and vice president of the American Political Science Association (1999–2000). He was visiting fellow or visiting professor at (in chronological order) Princeton University, the University of Michigan—Ann Arbor, the University of California–Berkeley, the Instituto Juan March (Madrid), Stanford University, the University of Cambridge, and the University of Oxford, and he held doctor honoris causa degrees from universities in Argentina (two), Chile, Germany, and Peru. He was named a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1995. In 2003 LASA awarded him its highest honor, the Kalman Silvert Award for lifetime achievement.

Guillermo O’Donnell was a highly original scholar whose deep insights into Latin American politics and social change set the agenda for research on authoritarianism and democracy in the region over the course of several decades. For example, his Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (1972) examined the origins of the harsh military dictatorships that ruled several Latin American countries from the mid-1960s through the 1980s. He was also among the first to identify pressures for political change within these regimes, concerns that gave rise to the pathbreaking Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (co-edited, 1986, 4 volumes) and the study of democratic regime transitions that was to reshape the broader field of comparative politics. In subsequent years, Guillermo wrote with passion and commitment about key issues in democratic theory and the dilemmas of democratic consolidation in contemporary Latin America, focusing especially on citizenship, inequality, and the rule of law.

Funding the O’Donnell Award Endowment

Over the next year we hope to raise at least US$100,000 to endow this award. An endowment fund of this size will be necessary to support both a modest cash prize for the award recipient and the travel and accommodation expenses associated with bringing the recipient to the LASA Congress at which he or she receives the award and delivers a keynote lecture.

We hope that all LASA members who knew Guillermo personally or who have been influenced by his pioneering work in the field of democracy studies will consider contributing to the endowment fund. We certainly recognize that our financial circumstances vary considerably, but we hope that senior colleagues (those who received their PhD ten or more years ago, or who have equivalent professional seniority) will consider making a donation of at least US$1,000.

Because LASA is a nonprofit organization, a contribution to the O’Donnell endowment will qualify as a charitable donation for anyone who files a U.S. tax return. Donors may make their contributions by check, bank transfer, or credit card. The names of all donors to the endowment will be published (ordered by the amount of their donations) in a future issue of LASA Forum.

If you have any questions concerning the O’Donnell Award or how to make your contribution to the endowment fund, please contact either of us at gabriela.ippolito.2@alumni.nd.edu or kevinmiddlebrook@aol.com.

We look forward to working with you to make the O’Donnell Award an integral part of LASA’s professional activities.
LASA2015 Survey Report

by Pilar Rodriguez, LASA Congress Coordinator | pir5@pitt.edu

As with previous LASA International Congresses, participants were asked to complete an online survey that collected demographic information and respondents’ preferences on certain topics and measured the overall experience during the last Congress in Puerto Rico. Seven-hundred and ninety-eight participants responded, representing 16 percent of all LASA2015 participants (an 11 percent increase over 2014).

The three survey categories were demographics, LASA2015, and future Congresses.

Demographics

A little more than half of the respondents were from the United States and Canada, while 39 percent were from Latin America. A majority was involved in research (55 percent) and education (37 percent) or a mix of both. Regarding Congress attendance, 36 percent of the respondents were first timers to the Congress (3 percent higher than last year). Thank you for joining us! On the other hand, 25 percent of the respondents have been to more than five LASA Congresses; thank you for your loyalty! Most participants attended between four and seven sessions during the Congress; this can be due to requiring a lunch break, having an overload of sessions, or being turned away from some very popular sessions due to space, as captured in our feedback. We apologize if this was the case for you. In the spirit of inclusiveness, the hotel opened additional meeting rooms for us (the same as in 2006), but some of these spaces turned out to be not ideal. Thank you for your patience with this, and we will seek to correct this problem in the future.

Regarding the number of simultaneous sessions, with the 50th anniversary of LASA around the corner, we may not have a decrease in sessions due to an increasing number of proposals and our desire to allow more participation at LASA Congresses. However, we hope you continue to find the Congresses rewarding regardless of the size.

LASA2015

Besides the complications of the small meeting rooms, participants were very satisfied with the Congress’s sessions. As in previous years, it was noted that panels on similar topics occurred at the same times. Although a review is completed to correct overlaps before closing the final schedule, it is nearly impossible to resolve all conflicts, especially with the limited amount of space available. LASA does ensure that there is no overlap in presenters’ participations. We will continue to attempt to correct all these issues in LASA2016. We are happy to confirm, based on responses, that LASA’s Congresses still provide an opportunity to learn about recent work in Latin America, to present ideas, to learn about recent work in other fields, and to network with colleagues.

Overall, 81 percent of the participants were satisfied with LASA2015, 9 percent were neutral, and 10 percent were dissatisfied. This was an increase of 5 percent over last year’s satisfaction rate. This year, like last year, we collected feedback on the registration process and the LASA application; 61 percent of our respondents used the LASA2015 application on their phones/tablets (a 12 percent increase over last year). The most recommended improvement on the application is the need for better maps, which we will work with the hotels to obtain. Regarding registration, we were delighted to see that many members were satisfied with the fast process, and we apologize for the lack of materials at hand. One of the main...
challenges we experienced, with the Congress being on an island, was that the boat with our materials went missing. We will continue to seek local materials to avoid this in the future.

We at LASA are very grateful to our faithful sponsors and to the endowment fund, which continue year after year to provide partial travel grants to our participants. We were able to sponsor over 500 participants this year, and we were also happy to see that at least 65 percent of the survey respondents were wholly reimbursed by their institutions or other funding to attend the LASA Congress.

Future Congresses

Around 56 percent of the survey respondents are planning to attend LASA2016 in New York, New York. We are definitely excited about our upcoming Congress, themed “LASA at 50.” LASA2016 will be held in the Hilton Midtown Manhattan Hotel, very near Central Park, Times Square, and the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA). We also consider alliances with local universities (which is the second most popular venue), in each host city and may be able to secure this alternative for LASA2017.

In response to our request for suggestions, we received 192 comments, which mostly centered on Congress location, high costs, problems with meeting spaces, and absenteeism.

- **Congress location and high costs:** Suggestions were made to alternate between Latin American countries and the United States, and to host the events in a central area where food and hotel options are many and thus more affordable (unlike the Caribe Hilton). The Hilton Midtown Manhattan will provide many alternative food locations nearby, and we continue to negotiate with hotels in the area to keep lodging affordable (considering NYC rates). For 2017 we are finalizing our contract with a Latin American venue and we will post this information as soon as it is available.

- **Discontent with the sessions’ locations and absenteeism.** Some of the meeting rooms in the Caribe Hilton were not ideal for the panels, and for this we apologize. We will continue to ensure that we have enough space of the quality required. Regarding participants not attending the Congress without cancelling their participation, we have tried to control this by requiring preregistration from everyone attending to ensure their commitment and to avoid sessions being cancelled at the last minute and/or participants being unable to present. We have also encouraged participants who have registered to notify LASA if they are unable to attend the Congress, so that we can accommodate their colleagues in other panels, if possible, to permit them to present. LASA is only as good as the knowledge we have, so we implore everyone to please honor your colleagues with the seriousness of your commitment to the Congress and make sure you do not leave them stranded. Working together we can all make sure that this association continues to provide the opportunities that scholars in the Latin American field need and deserve.

We thank all those who took the time to complete the survey. Your feedback helps us improve by acknowledging situations that we may have not been aware of, and thus allows us to focus on our members and their needs. Please feel free to contact us with any questions or further suggestions. We hope to see you at LASA2016!
LASA Membership Report 2014

In 2014 the Association set a new membership record of 9,690 individual members. The charts that follow show the growth in membership in the last few years along with a breakdown by member type, new versus renewed/lapsed members, residency, and discipline. The last chart shows institutional membership.

Individual Membership

As figure 1 shows, individual membership has grown in recent years.

Student representation is at its highest in the past 15 years (figure 2), and it has more than doubled since 2006.

Figure 3 shows that almost half of the members in 2014 had been members the previous year, and almost 20 percent of members were renewed lapsed members.

Fewer than half of the members in 2014 resided in the United States (compared to 69 percent in 2006), with most of the increase in membership seen in Latin American residents (figure 4).

Figure 5 shows that 60 percent of the membership was divided into six more prominent disciplines—literature, history, political science, sociology, anthropology, and Latin American studies—while 40 percent represented others including economics, international relations, and cultural studies.

Institutional Membership

As Figure 6 shows, LASA institutional membership continues to decline. There were 319 institutional members in 2014. Of institution members, 68 percent were located in the United State, 8 percent in Latin America, and 24 percent in other countries. Most institutional members were renewals, with only 10 percent being new members and 2 percent renewing after a lapse in membership. ■
Figure 1. Individual members

Figure 2. 2014 member composition

Figure 3. 2014 individual members

Figure 4. 2014 member residency

Figure 5. 2014 members by discipline

Figure 6. Institutional members
The generous support of members, foundations, and friends continues to be critical in advancing LASA’s mission by extending substantial opportunities for scholars to participate in the Association’s international congresses through LASA travel grants. For the LASA2015 Congress 517 participants received some level of grant support.

Support for the LASA Endowment derives from many sources including the major portion of each LASA Life Membership. LASA currently has 110 Life Members, 11 of whom are recipients of Kalman Silvert Awards and therefore entitled to honorary Life Memberships. The Association would like to thank its newest Life Members. They are: Debra Castillo (Cornell University), Jan Flora (Kansas State University), Mneesha Gellman (Emerson College), Gilbert Joseph (Yale University), Enrique Mu (Carlow University), Patricia Murrieta Cummings (Universidad de Guadalajara), Rachel O’Toole (University of California/Irvine), Timothy Power (University of Oxford), Joanne Rappaport (Georgetown University), Strom Thacker (Boston University), Gwynn Thomas (SUNY/Buffalo), Lorrin Thomas (Rutgers University), Sinclair Thomason (New York University), Kevin Young (Rutgers University), and Manuel Antonio Garretón (Universidad de Chile), the 2015 recipient of the Kalman Silvert Award.

We gratefully acknowledge the following donors, who have contributed to LASA funds since our previous report in the winter 2015 issue of the LASA Forum (many individuals donate to more than one fund but names are listed just once):

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Memoirs of a Revolutionary Priest

FERNANDO CARDENAL, S.J.  Foreword by Peter Marchetti

The Nicaraguan revolution of the 1980s was unusual for the wide participation of Christians, and the inclusion of priests in the Sandinista government became a source of bitter controversy with the Vatican. When Jesuit Fernando Cardenal, who served as Minister of Education, declined to resign his government post, he was suspended from the priesthood and expelled from the Society of Jesus. This moving memoir—which concludes with Cardenal's unprecedented re-admission to the Jesuits—relates the life journey of a man of faith who consistently followed his conscience to serve the poor.

978-1-62698-142-3  288pp  pbk  $29

The Gospel in Solentiname

Forty years ago the people of an island in Nicaragua gathered to reflect together on the Sunday gospel reading. Transcribed from recordings it resulted in this extraordinary document of faith in the context of struggle against dictatorship.

978-1-57075-902-4  684pp  pbk  $30.00
LASA acknowledges all who provided the financial support essential to the success of the 33rd International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, which took place May 27–30, 2015, in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Our thanks go out to the Tinker Foundation, the Open Society Foundations, the Inter-American Foundation, and the Consortium of Latin American Studies Programs (CLASP), to the AVINA Foundation for its generous grant for the Kalman Silvert Award Life Memberships, and to Oxfam America’s contribution to the Martin Diskin Lectureship. As always, we are grateful to the Ford Foundation for its support of the LASA Endowment, as well as to the many members and friends who continue to provide endowment support. Proceeds from the endowment are used every year to support hundreds of Latin American scholars with travel grants.

We are also thankful to the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University for its contribution to the Student Fund, and to colleagues at the Universidad de Puerto Rico–Rio Piedras for their help recruiting volunteers and affordable housing for travel grantees. We greatly appreciate the contributions of all the individuals who contributed to the LASA Travel Fund, the Student Fund, and the Indigenous and Afro-Descendant Travel Fund.

Critical events would not have been able to occur at the Congress without the support of the Teresa Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies (LLILAS) at the University of Texas, CIESAS, Meet Puerto Rico, and the Compañía de Turismo de Puerto Rico. Thank you!

Milagros Pereyra-Rojas
Executive Director, Latin American Studies Association
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The Mark Claster Mamolen Dissertation Workshop on Afro-Latin American Studies

The Afro-Latin American Research Institute at the Hutchins Center for African and African American Research, Harvard University, invites graduate students working on dissertations related to Afro-Latin American studies to submit a proposal to the annual Mark Claster Mamolen Dissertation Workshop on Afro-Latin American Studies. Doctoral students at universities anywhere in the world, who are at the dissertation writing stage, from any discipline, are invited to submit an application. The only condition is that their dissertations deal with Afro-Latin American topics broadly defined, covering any time period, from colonial times to the present. Proposals can be submitted in English, Spanish, or Portuguese.

Interested students should submit a three-page proposal (double space) summarizing their dissertation topic and one letter of support from their academic adviser. Materials should be sent electronically to ALARI@fas.harvard.edu (please write “Dissertation Workshop” in the subject) by January 15, 2016. Up to ten students will be selected to participate in the workshop. They will be notified by February 26. Selected students will be asked to submit a dissertation chapter (up to 50 pages, double space, in English, Spanish, or Portuguese) by March 11. Chapters will be circulated among workshop participants. The Workshop will meet at Harvard on May 6-7, 2016.

The Afro-Latin American Research Institute will cover lodging and living expenses for all participants and will provide support for travel expenses for students who cannot get funding from their institutions. Please indicate in your proposal whether you require travel support.

This initiative is generously funded by a bequest from Mark Claster Mamolen (1946-2013), a childhood friend of Professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and a former Advisory Board member of the Hutchins Center, and by the Ford Foundation.
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ABSTRACTS WITH TITLE OF PAPER, PRESENTER’S NAME, HOME AND INSTITUTION/ORGANIZATION ADDRESS AND E-MAIL SHOULD BE POSTMARKED BY: Saturday, November 7, 2015.

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The Latin American Studies Association (LASA) is the largest professional association in the world for individuals and institutions engaged in the study of Latin America. With over 9,500 members, 45 percent of whom reside outside the United States, LASA is the one association that brings together experts on Latin America from all disciplines and diverse occupational endeavors across the globe. LASA’s mission is to foster intellectual discussion, research, and teaching on Latin America, the Caribbean, and its people throughout the Americas, promote the interests of its diverse membership, and encourage civic engagement through network building and public debate.