On the Profession

A Short, Sad History of Cuban-American Academic Collaboration Since 1997
by Stanley N. Katz

Cuba and the United States: New Opportunities for Academic Diplomacy
by Milagros Martínez Reinoso

Debates

Cocaine’s Blowback North: A Pre-History of Mexican Drug Violence
by Paul Gootenberg

Drug Control Policy: What the United States Can Learn from Latin America
by Coletta A. Youngers

Some Comments on Drug-Fueled Violence in Latin America
by Mark Ungar
**Table of Contents**

1 From the President | *by Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida*

### ON THE PROFESSION

2 A Short, Sad History of Cuban-American Academic Collaboration Since 1997 | *by Stanley N. Katz*

4 Cuba and the United States: New Opportunities for Academic Diplomacy | *by Milagros Martínez Reinoso*

### DEBATES

7 Cocaine’s Blowback North: A Pre-History of Mexican Drug Violence | *by Paul Geotenberg*

11 Drug Control Policy: What the United States Can Learn from Latin America | *by Coletta A. Youngers*

14 Some Comments on Drug-Fueled Violence in Latin America | *by Mark Ungar*

### ON LASA 2012

17 Reservation Form for the LASA 2012 Exhibit

18 Film Festival and Exhibit LASA 2012

### CALLING ALL MEMBERS

19 Nominations Invited: Bryce Wood Book Award; Premio Iberoamericano Book Award; LASA Media Award; LASA/Oxfam America Martin Diskin Memorial Lectureship; LASA/Oxfam America Martin Diskin Dissertation Award; Call for Luciano Tomassini Latin American International Relations Book Award Nominations

### NEWS FROM LASA

23 Membership Report 2010

### LETTER TO THE EDITOR

24 The Obama Initiative | *by Ronald H. Chilcote*
President's Report

by María Hermínia Tavares de Almeida | Universidade de São Paulo | mhbtdalm@usp.br

El problema de la producción y comercio de las drogas ilícitas, así como la violencia, el desgarramiento social y el desorden político que suelen ser su corolario, se ha transformado en una cuestión pública de gran relieve en América Latina. Es el tema de “Debates” en este número de LASA Forum.

Es importante recordar que en la región se produce toda la cocaína consumida en el mundo, una cantidad elevada de marihuana y, en mucho menor escala, algunas de las nuevas drogas sintéticas. Son muchos los países afectados por el circuito de las drogas, como productores, como rutas de tránsito hacia los mercados mundiales y de manera creciente, como mercados consumidores.

No es necesario, por demasiado sabido, subrayar los efectos devastadores que la economía de las drogas ilícitas viene produciendo en América Latina. La violencia interpersonal o promovida por los gobiernos no es un fenómeno nuevo en muchos de nuestros países. Pero es indudable que esa violencia ha cambiado de escala gracias a la expansión del tráfico y del consumo de drogas. La corrupción, privada o política, tampoco es un hecho novedoso en la región. Pero es indudable el efecto corruptor y desagregador de la economía de las drogas sobre la sociedad y el sistema político.

La violencia directa o indirectamente asociada a la producción y comercio de las drogas ilícitas ocupa hoy una de las primeras, cuando no la primera, posición en ranking de problemas que más preocupan los ciudadanos de muchos países latinoamericanos. Tan tímidas y limitadas han sido las respuestas de los gobiernos democráticos de la región y tan fracasadas han sido las políticas promovidas por los sucesivos gobiernos de Estados Unidos, que surge hoy una demanda ciudadana por políticas públicas que enfrenten eficazmente la cuestión de la violencia.

Tan pesado y complejo es el tema —la economía política de las drogas es un fenómeno transnacional— que un debate importante y auspicioso viene ganando cuerpo en los fora domésticos e internacionales. Las propuestas de la Comisión Zedillo son tan solo un ejemplo de esa búsqueda de soluciones eficientes a la vez compatibles con las prácticas democráticas y el respeto a los derechos ciudadanos.

En la presente edición, quisieramos hacer eco de ese debate: Paul Gootenberg, Coletta Youngers y Mark Ungar discuten el tema desde distintos ángulos.

En torno a la sección “On the Profession”, se trata de las relaciones académicas entre Estados Unidos y Cuba. Stanley Katz, que refleja sobre su experiencia cuando era presidente del American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) y Milagros Martínez, desde La Habana, discuten las nuevas oportunidades y limitaciones para el intercambio entre académicos de los dos países.

Finalmente, todo parece indicar que LASA Forum en versión electrónica es una experiencia exitosa. Entre 28 de marzo y 19 de abril 2011 su sitio web fue visitado 3,320 veces. 79% de las visitas fueron de Estados Unidos y Canadá y 21% de América Latina. Sin duda es una noticia excelente.
As some readers of LASA Forum will know, I am a North American historian, hardly an expert on Cuba. But as my tenure as President of the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) was winding down in the mid-1990s, I began to wonder what we in the United States could do to promote greater academic and intellectual exchange with Cuba. For some years ACLS had an informal brief as the principal U.S. manager of academic relations with the socialist world, most especially in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China. In the late 1980s we made contact with the People’s Republic of Mongolia, and in early 1990s we began to engage seriously in Viet Nam. A few years later it occurred to me that ACLS should see what we could do in Cuba, which seemed so close to the United States in ways that transcended geography.

Joining forces with Ken Prewitt, then the President of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), and taking advantage of the good offices of the Vietnamese ambassador to the UN, I arranged a visit to Havana for Ken, myself, and a prominent University of North Carolina chemist in the spring of 1997. We were introduced to various ministers, visited the Universities of Havana and Santa Clara, and were generally given the Cook’s Tour of western Cuba. At the end of our brief trip we were introduced to Ismael Clark and Sergio Pastrana, the president and foreign secretary of the Cuban Academy of Sciences, which was at the time being revived and reorganized (it celebrates its centennial this year). At the time, of course, a number of individual U.S. scholars, universities, and institutions (notably the Smithsonian), had well-developed contacts with the Cubans. My hope was therefore to establish national-level contacts with the aim of raising the level of intellectual trust between the two countries.

We were later told that the Academia de Ciencias de Cuba would be our partner organization on the island, and I set about raising funds to begin a program of cooperation with the Cubans. From the start (as had been the case with my work in Viet Nam), our principal funder was a small New York organization, the Christopher Reynolds Foundation, led by its formidable executive director, Andrea Panaritis. There were not many U.S. foundations willing to make grants for Cuban activities (a situation that has, alas, changed very little to this day), but at the time the MacArthur Foundation was interested and had a strong program officer for Cuba, Kim Stanton, and they too offered us support. Ken and I organized a joint ACLS-SSRC group, which we called the Working Group (WG) on Cuba in order to proceed. I was (and remain) the chairman, and we recruited other U.S. nationals to serve from time to time. Louis Perez, the distinguished historian of Cuba from UNC, Chapel Hill, was one of the original (and most crucial) early members, but we also took on board scholars with other relevant interests, such as the noted tropical health physician (then from the Yale Medical School), Michele Barry. The Cubans appointed three members representing the full range of academic interests (including an immunologist from the Instituto Pedro Kouri), and we solidified the WG with the Mexican political scientist, Luis Rubio. The very able and energetic Eric Hershberg, then the SSRC Latin American staffer (and now the Director of the Latin American Studies Program at American University) was for many years the executive officer of the WG—and he is now a full member of the group.

Our original plan was to constitute the WG as a re-granting agency, passing along the funds provided by Reynolds and MacArthur (and other, smaller, funders) to groups and individuals in both Cuba and the United States on a competitive basis. Although I don’t think we ever had more than about $150,000 to distribute per annum (including our administrative costs, which we tried to keep very low), we developed a modestly ambitious range of programs. We provided support for Cuban cultural infrastructure projects (libraries, archives and museums), for joint research projects (between groups of scholars in the two countries), for the translation of Cuban academic writing into English, for the support of travel for Cuban scientists to international scholarly meetings, for the travel of Cuban scholars to the United States, for the purchase of U.S. scholarly books for Cuba and for seminars by prominent U.S. scholars in Cuba. The grants were made by the WG twice a year, and these meetings (one in each of the countries—Havana for the winter meetings!) were lessons in what sorts of scholarly activities each country was prepared to support. Each of these projects was exceedingly modest in terms of grant size, and the range of actual scholarly collaboration was fairly narrow—usually based upon already-existing Cuban-American relationships in fields such as public health. But for a brief period of time it seemed as if we might be at the starting point of what might become a normal pattern of scholarly interchange. When I say “normal,” however, you will have to remember that I had been involved primarily in scholarly exchanges with socialist countries for a decade, so that even though the Wall had fallen in most other parts of the world, I knew what it was like to take the scholarly Wall for granted.

But of course by the mid-1990s conditions for scholarly exchange between Cuba and the United States, which had never been good, began to deteriorate rapidly. The most obvious precipitant of change was the shoot-down of the Hermanos al Rescate planes in February, 1996 and the subsequent
(March, 1996) passage of Helms-Burton bill, which in effect removed control of the Cuban embargo from the White House to the Hill, and made Cuban policy even more a political football. The most notable impacts for academics were increased restrictions on Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Treasury licenses, the tightening of regulations on U.S. travel to Cuba, a clamping down on the issuance of U.S. visas to Cuban visitors to this country—along with reciprocal constrictions by Cubans. For reasons that had everything to do with politics and nothing to do with the life of the mind, newly restrictive administrative regimes in both countries narrowed the range of the possible for the WG. There were really two problems: one was that the new regulations placed most of the activities we had funded outside the line of what was permissible; the other was that even fewer U.S. funders were interested in the mission of the WG, apparently intimidated by the deteriorating state of the bi-national relationship. Our problem was that it was not clear which types of activities were politically sustainable.

Luckily, the Ford Foundation began to work in Cuba in 2000, and we were able to work out with them a program to do (politically acceptable) cultural heritage work with Cuban libraries and archives. We set up an international Standing Committee on Libraries and Archives in 2001, and began cooperating with the Archivo Nacional, the Biblioteca Nacional and several major scholarly libraries in Cuba, including those at the Instituto de la Historia de Cuba and the Instituto de Literatura y Lingúisticas. The principal U.S. participants in this libraries-and-archives project (which continues still) have been Anne Kenney (now the Director of the Cornell University Libraries) and Dan Hazen of Harvard (formerly the Latin American bibliographer and currently the head of collections at Harvard). The Standing Committee has worked to assist in the training of Cuban specialists in conservation and preservation, and helped to mount an important, island-wide initiative on disaster planning. These Ford-funded library activities have made a real difference in Cuba, I think, but it has been frustrating to realize that they have been almost the only sorts of joint projects still politically feasible. Apart from them, the WG has been able to sustain a series of cultural forums in partnership with Luisa Campuazano of the Casa de las Americas (one of the Cuban members of the WG), and we hope to resume workshops by prominent U.S. scholars in Cuba this year. Additionally, for several years we also worked on a very satisfying project to digitize the manuscripts left in Cuba after the departure and death of Ernest Hemingway. These are now held at the Museo Hemingway (housed in his Finca Vigia in Havana), with microfilm copies at the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston.

The fact that President Bush had, in the end, been elected by Cuban-American votes in Florida in 2000 had led both to a tightening of the already restrictive regulations of the Clinton administration, and had seriously escalated the anti-Castro rhetoric of U.S. policy. I can speak only for myself, but I found it quite disappointing that the new Obama administration did not reverse Bush’s highly restrictive Cuba regulations in 2001. My hope had been that the WG would be able to return to the modestly broad programs it had developed in our first years in Cuba, but President Obama did not see fit to loosen the regulations until a few months ago. The result is that there is now considerably more flexibility as of spring 2011 (as I write), but the truth is that we have not yet gotten back to where we were prior to Helms-Burton.

Meanwhile, of course, a good deal has changed in Cuba. To mention only the most obvious facts, Fidel Castro has been replaced by his brother, Raúl, who has begun what may turn out to be a significant change in the structure of the Cuban economy. But it is not yet clear where the new privatization policies are headed, or to what extent they will succeed. Nor is it at all clear what impact, if any, the political changes on both sides of the Florida Straits will have on academic and cultural relations between the two countries.

I have been writing about the activities of the WG for the past decade, but of course much more has been going on than comes under our purview. SSRC itself, largely due to the efforts of our magnificent staffer, Sara Doty, and the indefatigable Eric Hershberg, has been working with Cuban economists in an effort to look ahead to possible economic futures for the island. Several universities, including my own, have begun undergraduate programs at the University of Havana. Both universities and groups of U.S. scholars have been able to work with Cuban counterparts on projects of common interest. I am not sure that anyone knows what the full range of these projects might be, for there certainly is no central point for recording what they do. Individual scholars, both faculty and graduate students, have continued to travel to Cuba and to work there very successfully in a number of fields. So clearly there is a working connection between the intellectual lives of the two countries, and there is always a danger of underestimating what cannot be counted accurately.

But I have to say that my impression is that Cuban-American academic and intellectual relations have mostly gone downhill since 1997, and it is hard for me to be optimistic that they will dramatically reverse course anytime soon. These are hard times in Cuba, economically and politically (when were they not?), and it is clearly a difficult
The easing of the U.S.-Cuba travel ban announced by the Obama administration this past January 14, has generated expectations of a new era of academic collaboration between the United States and Cuba. Academic communities in both countries are now preparing for the revival of the scholarly exchanges that were virtually frozen during the eight years of the Bush administration.

The new travel regulations constitute a small but positive change in U.S. policy towards Cuba. A first reading indicates that they may elevate the frequency, diversity and intensity of contacts to the levels recorded in the final years of the Clinton administration. The new measures correspond to the campaign discourse of President Obama, the implementation of which has been very slow to materialize under a process plagued by fears of the reaction of the U.S. extreme right wing.

A large number of U.S. academics were gratified by the recent announcement since, in some ways, the new regulations resulted from the pressure brought to bear by U.S. scholars and, to a lesser degree, by their Cuban counterparts. And beyond academic exchanges, many value the new regulations as an important sign of political flexibility that might reduce the tensions between the two countries.

In Cuba, many academics and intellectuals feel that the new regulations have weakened the reactionary influence of the extreme right wing in the United States, strengthened after the midterm elections. On the other hand, they recognize that the measures, in line with the views expressed by the Cuban government, do not constitute substantive changes in U.S. policy toward Cuba. Analysts recognize that the measures, as explained in U.S. government documents, are meant to re-launch the “people to people” contacts that the administration hopes will bring about a “democratic opening” in Cuba.

Such recognition suggests the possible negative impacts of these new measures. While many prominent Cuban intellectuals have expressed their support for academic and cultural exchange with the United States, there are conflicting positions within Cuba regarding academic collaboration. These positions cover a broad spectrum, ranging from the least enthusiastic—those suspicious of the exchange who argue (not without reason) that, once again, Cuba faces a situation conducive to the promotion of the internal counterrevolution as expressed in the White House document—to those who recognize that academic exchange offers multiple opportunities for the country and for the strengthening of the Revolution, related risks notwithstanding.

The truth is that we are facing an extremely complex scenario and cannot ignore the changes in Cuban government circles responsible for setting policies and making decisions on the island. In Cuba, new actors have emerged who may not have an historical memory of the development of exchange, especially during the so-called “golden years” between 1993 and 2001. Let us mention a few numbers illustrating the effects of the Clinton policy called Track II, and the intensity of the links at that time. In 2003, Cuba occupied fourteenth place on the list of preference of U.S. students for exchange trips. A total of 760 universities in the northern nation had requested licenses from the Treasury Department to carry out various academic activities in Cuba. At the same time, on average, thirty to forty faculty members and researchers from Havana University travelled to the United States each month.
In this context, the fundamental task of those who favor collaborative efforts should be the planning and implementation of orderly and coherent activities designed and enacted by prestigious institutions that serve to guarantee academic standards. Undoubtedly, these collaborative efforts will have the noble collateral effect of defusing the hostility that has prevailed for more than a half a century between the governments of the two nations.

These considerations are crucial to prevent the academic collaboration between Cuba and the United States from becoming bogged down in an atmosphere of mistrust that weakens and distorts it. The academic and cultural exchange between Cuba and the United States has its own life and is part of the histories and identities of both countries. It will continue and will grow with the support and the implementation of new communication and information technologies. It is the responsibility of academics from both sides to keep it going.

The situation at the beginning of 2011 marks a real possibility of stimulating Cuba-based research on the United States, and, even more so, U.S. scholarship on Cuba. With regard to the latter, we expect the continuity of prior lines of research as well as the appearance of new ones. We would expect, as before, the emergence of joint research projects in the fields of social and natural sciences, as well as the opening of new programs and research centers focused on Cuba. Particular attention from researchers will surely be devoted to such subjects as the updating of the Cuban economic model and its related social impacts; the dynamics of race relations in Cuba; the presence of women and youth in political, economic and social development; and the mutual knowledge of legal systems, urban problems and social development. In the natural sciences, attention will be paid to environmental issues and climate change, policies of extreme-event management, marine biology, nanotechnology, biomedical research, traditional herbal medicine, theoretical physics and chemistry, among other matters of interest to U.S. researchers. At the same time, Cuban professors and researchers will travel to the United States more frequently for research and graduate study or to offer lectures and courses in U.S. universities.

The results of such collaborations appear to be very promising. They could trigger an avalanche of publications, academic events co-sponsored by Cuban and U.S. institutions, joint panels at LASA Congresses, Caribbean Studies Association (CSA) and the National Association of Foreign Studies Abroad (NAFSA) meetings, and much more. One might even consider another visit to Cuba by the American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU), similar to the one organized in September 2003, which marked the first meeting of university presidents of the two nations. A meeting of officials of major institutions of higher education in the United States and Cuba could also be promoted. The meeting could take place coincident with the biannual congress that gathers professionals interested in issues of higher education. These congresses, organized by Cuba’s Ministry of Higher Education, are held in Cuba with significant local and foreign participation.

The current situation offers, moreover, a rare opportunity whose life seems safe only in the period leading up to the beginning of the next U.S. presidential term in January 2013. The opportunity should not be lost. Should the Republicans win the presidential election in 2012, relations between Cuba and the United States could enter extremely difficult times. This is not an extraordinary prediction. We might consider that nowadays—beyond the explicit consciousness and determination to take advantage of the current opening—the effort to promote academic exchange is not an easy task. The new Republican majority in the House of Representatives apparently stands ready to dismantle, as soon as possible, the little built by the current U.S. administration.

The XXX Congress of LASA is to be held in San Francisco from May 23 through May 26, 2012. LASA has played a crucial role in promoting academic exchanges between Cuba and the United States, and, as the Congress returns to a U.S. venue, the occasion will be a time of celebration and reflection. The celebration is justified by the lifting of travel restrictions imposed in August 2004 and by the commemoration of thirty-five years of the Cuban presence in LASA. The reflection prevails because, necessarily, we should think about the future of academic exchange.

We are already working in this direction. We are organizing a special workshop of the LASA Cuba Section. The agenda will contain, among its most important points, discussion of the proposal to create an independent organization, based in the United States, to promote academic exchange and Cuban studies. This is a worthy project that faces obstacles arising from practical issues, including those related to funding, the definition of the core areas of interest, membership, and many others. It requires further analysis and design and cannot be undertaken in haste or with improvisation.

Such an entity could be used to collect and disseminate information useful to all those interested in Cuban studies (including the U.S. students who have attended semester programs operating in Cuba). Such a database would allow the spread of
educational and cultural exchanges between the two countries. In turn, that entity could make recommendations and suggest measures to boost ties between the academic communities of the two countries and help to spread good academic practices. Among its tasks surely will be the provision of advisory services to institutions and organizations interested in establishing curricula and organizing academic and cultural events, activities still affected by rules and regulations that require applying for licenses and obtaining permission to conduct research.

In short, we dare to say that intellectuals and academics, Cubans and Americans, should work together to help remove the obstacles to collaboration. We should work to take advantage of the currently open window of opportunity, and to become, once again, de facto ambassadors—main actors in a sort of academic diplomacy that promotes a better understanding between our two countries. That must be our modest but decisive collaboration. And also, we should demonstrate, again, the infinite force of reason, knowledge, dialogue, and cooperation.

Endnotes

1 The author is grateful to Rafael Hernández and Jorge Domínguez who extended an invitation to join the TEMAS-Harvard University working group, which met in February 2010 in Havana, Cuba. The meeting resulted in the publication of two articles useful to this discussion, one by Sheryl Lutjens, “Corrientes académicas y culturales Cuba-Estados Unidos: temas y actores,” TEMAS, 62-63 (Havana, Cuba), April-September 2010: 124-135, and one by Milagros Martínez Reinosa, “La diplomacia académica: los intercambios culturales entre Cuba y Estados Unidos” TEMAS, 62-63, April-September 2010: 136-148).

2 For a comprehensive study of the limitations on academic exchanges between Cuba and the United States during the administration of George W. Bush, see: Kimberley Stanton, comp, Retreat from Reason: U.S.-Cuban Academic Relations and the Bush Administration, Latin America Working Group Education Fund (LAWG), Washington, DC, 2006.


6 Milagros Martínez, notes taken from discussions at the meeting of Cuban academics, to discuss the measures of January 14, 2011. Vice-Rector for International Relations at Havana University, Cuba, February 2, 2011.


10 Kimberley Stanton, comp, Retreat from Reason, op. cit.

11 Interview with Carmen Castillo, International Relations specialist from the University of Havana. Havana, Cuba, January 25, 2011.

12 Milagros Martínez, interview with Luis René Fernández Tabio, Deputy Director of the Center for Hemispheric Studies and the United States, at the University of Havana, February 3, 2011, Havana, Cuba.


14 The first group of Cuban scholars who travelled to the United States to participate in an academic activity, did so in October 1977.


16 Discussion of the idea of creating a special group to promote academic exchanges between Cuba and the United States began in 2004 when the author and five others participated in a study of Bush administration policy that produced the Retreat from Reason report.
Behind the sensational headlines, national security panic, and grim statistics from four years of horrific drug violence along the Mexican-U.S. border, lies a blowback-swept history of U.S. drug policy entanglements across the hemisphere.

Under rising U.S. pressures, cocaine, once a benign legal commodity from a distant corner of the Andes, became illicit by the 1950s. This fueled the dramatic rise of the Colombian "cartels" of the 1980s. By the mid-1990s, further U.S. pressures pushed the drug's profitable wholesaling north to Mexico, prelude to the showdown between drug lords and the Mexican state.

Half of world usage of recreational cocaine is still in the United States, where outlays for the pricey drug make for half the annual $80 billion U.S. consumers spend on illegal drugs. Given the ten-fold growth in the drug's supply during the 1980s boom, as smugglers outwitted the rising risks of interdiction, it is hardly surprising that cocaine's retail price has plummeted almost continuously since the 1970s. This fall contradicts the stated aim of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), to drive drug prices up and out of the range of the U.S. consumers.

Legal to Illicit Trade

The Andean cocaine boom of the late twentieth century was founded on the vestiges of a legal economy of cocaine, which bequeathed the techniques and first illicit networks. Andean cocaine production, for anesthesia and other medicinal uses, passed through two phases: its construction as an export commodity (1885-1910), and its steep contraction from 1910-48, due to Asian colonial competition, shrinking medicinal usage, and the impact of initial U.S. and League of Nation drives to restrict "narcotics." But until the 1940s, despite rising informal sway in the Andean region, the United States, which had turned radically against the drug, was not able to convince or cajole producer nations of the evils of cocaine. The Peruvian industry (processing coca leaf into crude cocaine, akin to Pasta Básica de Cocaina, PBC) shrank to an east-central Andean regional hub in Huánuco near the Upper Huallaga valley.

Legal cocaine was a largely peaceful enterprise. Legal cocaine economies like Peru's did not spawn a black market or border-crossing contraband networks, even though the recreational pleasures of "coke" were widely known. A multi-polar cocaine world prevailed between 1910-45, when some nations like the United States banned and dried up non-medicinal cocaine use, and others openly produced or tolerated the drug.

Following the war, the United States emerged as the unchallenged power in world drug affairs, its eradication ideals magnified through new UN drug agencies such as the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Helped by a wave of compliant cold-war regimes in Latin America, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) and State Department were finally able to achieve their long-standing goal of criminalizing cocaine (and on paper, even Andean coca leaf): in Peru by 1948 and Bolivia by 1961.

The immediate effect of cocaine's total criminalization—and a secret FBN campaign against Andean cocaine launched in 1947—was the birth and dispersion of an illicit circuit of cocaine. Instead of "cartels," modest "chemists," smugglers, and club owners linked up from diverse social worlds to establish a web of new drug scenes and way-stations across South America and the Caribbean. By the early 1960s, these ever-more elusive and experienced smugglers were joined by a hardly new social class of peasants entrenched in illicit coca growing.

Highland campesinos, marginalized during the U.S.-sponsored "development decade" of the 1960s, began migrating en masse to lowland Bolivia and Peru, lured by the mirage of Amazonian road and modernization projects. Combining a smuggling class with a class of peasant suppliers led to cocaine's uncontained expansion in decades ahead.

Cold-war politics stamped the emergence of illicit cocaine. It was born in 1948-49 in the Huallaga of eastern Peru, as a rightist pro-U.S. military regime cracked down on the country's last factories, jailing manufacturers (branded as subversives) and sending others into clandestine outlets. The technique that passed into illicit hands was jungle "crude cocaine," which peasants easily adopted with cheap developmental chemicals like kerosene and cement. By the early 1950s, smugglers ferried PBC out to refiners of powder cocaine (HC1) along two main transshipment chains: a Caribbean passage via Havana, and a route through northern Chile, where Valparaíso clans moved coke up the west coast via Panama and Mexican hideouts. Meanwhile, the U.S.-backed cocaine crackdown in Peru, and the weak U.S. sway in the chaos of revolutionary Bolivia, meant that PBC swiftly spread to Bolivia, the drug's key incubation site during the 1950s, in dozens of small, scattered "labs." By the early 1960s, coke was found throughout the hemisphere, with thriving scenes and routes across Argentina and Brazil, and even distant new users in New York. Two cold-war events consolidated the trade. First, in 1959, Cuba's revolutionary government expelled Havana's traffickers, who took their skills and connections with them to South America, Mexico, and Miami. These exiles formed the first professional cocaine trafficking class. Second, by 1961, U.S. efforts to gain control over the shaky MNR in Bolivia led to a joint anti-narcotics campaign that drove thousands of peasants into remote coca frontiers in lowland Chapare, Santa Cruz, and Beni.
Meanwhile, worried U.S. authorities sponsored a slew of secret hemispheric policing summits, UN drug missions, and INTERPOL cocaine raids. All such repressive measures further dispersed the drug and hardened smugglers. By the late 1960s, however, the rise of U.S.-backed "bureaucratic authoritarian" regimes in nations like Brazil and Argentina drove long-distance cocaine routing through one site: the continent’s most vibrant democracy, Chile. Here, the breakup of the 1950s clans gave rise to many competing exporters linked to ample supplies of Bolivian, and once again, Peruvian coca paste.

Rise and Demise of Colombian Cartels, 1973-95

Before the 1970s, Colombia played no systematic role in the South American cocaine trade, though the country had a tradition of entrepreneurs, regional smugglers, marijuana exports from the Caribbean coast, and a legacy of everyday violence from the 1950s. Cocaine’s politics-driven shift to Colombians came during the Nixon era (1969-74). Two more cold-war events propelled cocaine’s geography north. The first, related to Nixon’s anticommunism, was Augusto Pinochet’s September 1973 military coup in Chile. Pinochet, to win favor with Washington and the newly formed DEA, launched a late 1973 campaign against Chilean traffickers, jailing or expelling most of them. The impact—by 1970 low-level Colombians were serving as mules for Chileans—was to swiftly push the routing of peasant coca paste from the Huallaga and Bolivia north to Colombia. Pioneering Medellín smugglers like Pablo Escobar and the Ochoa brothers restructured the trade and dramatically expanded its scale and reach. The second political event was Nixon’s 1969 declaration of war against drugs, aimed primarily against marijuana (linked to the anti-war youth culture), and heroin (feared among Vietnam vets and linked to the “black” crime wave sweeping U.S. cities). Crackdowns on these drugs created a perfect market opening for Andean cocaine, which hit 1970s U.S. culture as a glamorous, pricey “soft-drug.” Cocaine was more lucrative, safer, and easier to conceal; weed suppliers from Colombia to Mexico quickly switched product lines.

Once propelled to Colombia, cocaine thrived in places like Medellín, the nation’s declining entrepreneurial city. Empresarios like Escobar, Ochoa, and Carlos Ledher took advantage of Caribbean island-hopping wholesale transport routes, Colombian workers in places like Miami, and Queens, and the 1970s lag in DEA attention. In 1975, the Colombian trade passed the four-tons mark and by 1980 some 100 tons of cocaine from Colombia annually entered the United States. Exporters congregated in three regional groups: Medellín, Central (Bogotá), and Cali (del Valle), the latter a bustling new city near the Pacific port of Buenaventura, promoted by clans like the Rodriguez-Orejuela’s and Herrera’s. However until the early 1990s, Medellin, under Escobar’s charismatic lead, handled some 80 percent of the trade, mostly from coca paste made in Peru’s Huallaga.

By the mid-1980s, cocaine had some twenty-two million U.S. users. Sliding prices and racially tagged discount markets (such as “crack”), and the drug’s growing aura of violence, transformed cocaine into the principal drug evil of U.S. drug warriors. Under Republicans Reagan and Bush I, this long drug hysteria around cocaine led to a sharp militarization of the overseas campaign against the Andean coca bush. Reliable state allies were difficult to find in the tolerant regimes of Peru, Colombia, and flagrantly in early 1980s Bolivia. The 1980s escalation of hemispheric interdiction efforts in Peru (direct military aid, Huallaga adviser bases), in Bolivia (Operation Blast Furnace, U.S-trained UMOPAR forces), Colombia (a late 1980s forced extradition pact), and Panama (climaxing in the 1989 invasion to oust ex-ally Manuel Noriega), failed to slow cocaine. Just the opposite: U.S. pressures led to enhanced trafficker concealment and business expertise, to a doubling of Amazonian coca between 1982-86 (as crop insurance against captured lots), and a nosedive in the drug’s wholesale price from $60,000 to $15,000 per kilo across the decade as a whole.

As competition and monetary stakes rose to millions of dollars per shipment, Colombians drew on strategic violence, in contrast to precursor trades. Colombians deployed hit men against remnant Cuban rivals, and early 1980s Miami was beset by gang turf battles among various "cocaine cowboys." In Colombia, violence remained a defensive impunity tool against the police and informers, though bribes usually sufficed. The business-like trafficker class at first sought broader legitimacy: running for office (Escobar briefly a Liberal senator), financing elections, offering truces and support to the state and local services. But a mix of U.S. pressure and Colombian anxieties about narco “infiltration” of the state led to a breakdown in the mid-1980s. After 1984, the impunity of drug traffickers faded (starting with Justice Minister Lara Bonilla’s ouster of the politician Escobar) and traffickers retaliated with a barrage of symbolic and real attacks against the state: terror bombings, kidnappings, assassinations of judges, candidates, journalists, including the audacious killing of Lara Bonilla himself. Between 1980 and 1990, Medellín homicides spiked from 730 to 5,300 yearly, foreshadowing Mexico’s tragedy of Ciudad Juárez.

If any lesson exists for Mexico today, it’s that the early 1990s war against the Medellín...
cartel did not really work. It mainly shifted cocaine’s center of gravity from Medellín to Cali; many observers read the campaign as a tacit alliance between the Colombian state and rival Cali’s low-key dealers against the riskier Escobar. As shown by criminologist Michael Kenney, U.S. intervention in 1990s Colombia ultimately led to more effective drug trafficking organizations. Colombia now hosts some 600 camouflaged export webs, and so-called cellular “boutique” cartelitos, which have diversified with global sales strategies (Brazil, Africa, Europe), branched into complementary drugs, and gone high-tech in counter-intelligence and genetically altered coca.

Two other repressive measures moved cocaine’s trail. First, during the early-mid 1980s, alarmed by the intensity of trafficking, money laundering, and gang violence in Dade County, Florida—the main U.S. entry-point for Colombian cocaine—the DEA and feds focused interdiction on South Florida coasts. The military-style Joint Florida Task Force and offensives like “Operation Swordfish” integrated more than 2,000 agents under the nominal command of vice-president Bush. By the late 1980s, Colombians were actively withdrawing from the Caribbean corridor, and turning to alternative transshipment via Panama, Central America, and soon northern Mexico. Caribbean drugs trickled only through Haiti, the closest “failed state” to U.S. borders, handled by a surviving Duvalier-era military and 1980s inroads against Florida’s Colombian cocaine lent a powerful blowback boost to nascent Mexican drug lords.

The second shift of the late 1990s came with Pyrrhic successes against peasants and middlemen in eastern Peru and Bolivia: coca’s move to Colombia. During the mid-1990s, U.S. pressures, and compliant regimes finally led to visible reductions in Andean coca. In Peru, the authoritarian Fujimori regime, alarmed by the lucrative alliance of Sendero Luminoso guerrillas with harassed Huallaga cocaleros, embraced militarist suppression, including a shoot-down policy that cut cocaine’s air bridge north. In Bolivia, U.S.-funded Plan Dignidad finally slashed coca paste exports, leaving in its wake, however, the militant peasant movement that would propel, as political blowback, the coca nationalist Evo Morales to the presidency in 2005. Yet these temporary victories simply drove coca cropping to Colombia, a country with little native coca tradition, concentrating a vertically integrated agro-industrial cocaine industry in Colombia by the late 1990s.

Mexican Opportunities Seized, 1985-2000

Since the mid-1990s, the hottest profit site of cocaine’s trail to the United States has snaked a thousand kilometers north: to the U.S. borderlands of Mexico, adjacent to the U.S. market.

Drug smuggling activities in border towns like Tijuana, Nogales, and Juárez date to the early twentieth century—patent drugs, alcohol, later opiates and then marijuana. By the 1970s, the city of Culiacán, Sinaloa, was the storied capital of the Mexican drug trade, and narcotraficantes still originate in northern rustic under-classes, if aligned and tutored under decades of PRI rule with regional entrepreneurs and politicians. By 1989 a third of the cocaine for the U.S. market entered via Mexico. By 1992, that figure reached half, and by the late 1990s, 75-85 percent. In the mid-1990s, income generated by drug exports in Mexico, held by this cocaine surge, ranged from $10 billion a year (according to U.S. officials) to $30 billion (Mexican figures)—surpassing the annual take from Mexico’s largest legal commodity export, oil ($7.4 billion). This move to Mexico was blowback from the clampdown on the 1980s Medellín cartel by interdiction against Florida air and sea corridors. Cali took the lead, soon traversing Central America in search of partnerships with Pacific Mexican traffickers, who fenced goods across the U.S.-Mexico border on a fee-per-kilo basis. Tough-minded Mexicans, like Sinaloa’s pioneer Félix Gallardo, soon won leverage against beleaguered Colombians, including shares in kind, which increased profits five- to ten-fold, as did tapping Mexican gangs as retailers in the United States. By the early 1990s, according to the DEA, the Sinaloan cartel exceeded Medellín’s peak profit, and after 2000, moved to fully outflank the Colombians, with direct purchases from faraway peasants in Peru’s Huallaga and sales in Argentina. Other forces magnified cocaine’s role: Mexico’s 1980s “lost decade” economic meltdown, the long death-throws of the PRI, the transformation of frontier towns like Juárez and Tijuana into sprawling metropolises of misery, and the boom of border commerce with the 1994 NAFTA treaty.

After the 1985 “Camerera affair,” Sinaloan smugglers dispersed, splintering into a series of regional “cartels” fueled by cocaine super-profits. This geographic proliferation of drug organizations crossed northern Mexico: from Sinaloa to bases in Tijuana, Juárez, Reynosa, and Matamoros, and transit points everywhere. As in Colombia, successive anti-drug sweeps since the 1970s have worked to strengthen innovative firms, insofar as they weeded out weaker and less efficient operators and favored protective vertical structures. The transition to the Juárez cartel (founded by real estate moguls and federal police) began in the mid-1980s with Pablo Acosta’s cocaine transshipment base in Ojinaga, Chihuahua, which ferried cargo planes to and from Colombia, amplified by Amado Carrillo Fuentes, who later became Mexico’s richest and iconic trafficker of the
1990s Salinas era. As in Colombia and Cali, Juárez groups exploited the government’s post-1985 drive against the Sinaloans, moving to the top of the trafficking pyramid. Félix Gallardo dispersed men throughout the northwest, until jailed in 1989, and rival organizations grew out of regional partners who expanded or split from Sinaloa, such as Tijuana’s Arrellano Félix brothers. The Matamoros or “Gulf” cartel gained as the Mexican state escalated the conflict and later targeted Juárez, and in a stunning case of blowback, recruited “los Zetas,” ruthless former members of elite U.S.-trained anti-drug forces, who branched out on their own across Mexico after 2003.

By the 1990s, the spectacular risky billions in cocaine money revealed and undermined the Mexican state’s traditional political collusion with regional drug traders. Dating to the aftermath of the Revolution, this compact consolidated after 1940 into a profit-sharing management of violence and competition between the state and Sinaloan mafia. After the fraudulent 1988 elections, the United States revised support of Mexico’s authoritarian order to include drug suppression as well as trade opening. The neoliberal regime of Carlos Salinas (1988-94) reflected the double-edged politics of drugs. On the one hand, Salinas, seeking to refurbish Mexico’s image for NAFTA, embraced a major national role in U.S.-led drug wars, creating inter-agency policing institutions on the model of the DEA. Mexico’s Attorney General office (PGR) became a well-funded anti-drug force. The focus also hardened on the U.S. side of the border, militarized as a “High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Region” within the 1990s South-West Border Initiative. Gone were the easy days of patrolling the Florida seas. On the other hand, most pretense of Mexican “drug control” was undercut by the involvement of Salinas appointees and family in the burgeoning trades and drug-related political assassinations. Cocaine interdiction and its evasion multiplied opportunities for graft. Total trafficker bribes rose from $1.5-3.2 million in 1983 to some $460 million in 1993, larger than the entire PGR budget, and thousands of federal agents jumped into the drug trade. Cocaine destabilization went public during the 1994-2000 Zedillo sexenio, when breaking custom, the new president openly condemned Salinas-era corruption. Epitomizing this exposure, in 1997, was the discovery that the military chief of Mexico’s “DEA,” Gen. Gutiérrez Rebollo, was in with the Juárez cartel, an incident sampled in the Hollywood drama “Traffick.” The blowback of the long U.S. war against cocaine, begun in the 1940s, had come home to roost.

Endnotes

1 This section is from my Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008).
3 Michael Massing, The Fix (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998) claims Nixon’s policies were working: indeed, they worked over the long term to spawn the later U.S. cocaine boom.
Drug Control Policy: What the United States Can Learn from Latin America

by COLETTA A. YOUNGERS | Washington Office on Latin America | coletta.youngers@gmail.com

Since the 1912 signing of the Hague Opium Convention—the agreement that formally established narcotics control within international law—the United States has established itself as the dominant actor in determining drug control policies around the world. A chief architect of the international drug control regime, Washington has done its best to ensure that all subsequent international conventions obligate countries to adapt their domestic legislation to criminalize virtually all acts related to the illicit market in controlled substances, with the important exception of drug consumption. The predominant focus on prohibition and criminalization has been exported to Latin America, where the vast majority of the cocaine and heroin consumed in the United States originates. (While the heroin consumed in the United States comes from Colombia, Afghanistan supplies 90 percent of the opium poppy for heroin consumption in the rest of the world.)

Since the launching of the Andean Initiative in 1989, the United States has used its political and economic muscle to help ensure regional compliance with repressive drug control policies. Those countries that cooperate have been rewarded handsomely with economic assistance and trade benefits, while those that do not have faced sanctions and potentially the stigma of being labeled international pariahs. Countries across the region have thus been quick to comply with international human rights standards. Across the hemisphere, frustration is growing with the failure of present policies to contain the drug trade, especially as those same policies exact an exorbitantly high social cost, including rising rates of drug consumption, overcrowded prisons, and burgeoning organized crime and related violence.

A recent report by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and the Transnational Institute (TNI) documents the impact of harsh drug laws on judicial and penitentiary systems. The emphasis placed on criminal sanctions has created overwhelming caseloads in the courts, the study found, and has contributed significantly to the region’s prison overcrowding crisis. Harsh sanctions have led to the imprisonment of tens of thousands of people—mostly from the most disadvantaged and marginal sectors of society—for disproportionately long periods of time for small-scale drug offenses or simple possession. Yet their confinement has proven to be ineffective in controlling the drug trade, as low-level offenders are those most easily replaced. Paradoxically, many enter jail with no direct connections to drug organizations but eventually leave as part of organized criminal networks. The study revealed that even in Colombia—put forward by Washington as the model country for drug control—only two percent of those deprived of liberty for drug offenses appear to be major participants in drug trafficking networks.

The election of President Obama raised hopes that Washington would recognize the failure of present drug-control policies and the tremendous damage they have caused, and change those policies accordingly. Those expectations, unfortunately, have not been met. After two years in office, the Obama administration has softened the drug war rhetoric, but the change in discourse has had little impact in the actual implementation of programs and policies. In short, for all practical purposes, the U.S. “war on drugs” is alive and well.

Shortly after being named to the post, Obama’s chief drug policy official, Gil Kerlikowske, head of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), announced that he would not use the term “drug war” since a government should not wage war on its own people. Kerlikowske, formerly a police official, regularly emphasizes the need to treat drug consumption as a public health issue. In a welcome change, administration officials now talk about the need for greater emphasis on the problem of demand and problematic drug use. However, when it comes to budget allocations, the administration has yet to put its money where its mouth is. Maintaining long-standing spending ratios, approximately three-fifths of federal drug-control spending continues to go to supply-side programs, including domestic law enforcement, and only two-fifths to demand-related programs such as prevention and treatment.

Some necessary but modest changes have taken place with respect to domestic drug policy. On the campaign trail, Obama promised to undertake three initiatives related to drug policy: seek to remove the disparity in federal sentencing for crack and powder cocaine; reverse the federal government’s tough stance on state medical marijuana laws; and end the ban on federal funding for needle exchange. He has met those promises to varying degrees. Of particular significance, the Fair Sentencing Act was signed into law in August 2010, reducing the sentencing disparity between...
crack and powder cocaine users from one hundred to one to eighteen to one. The law, however, represents only a first tentative step towards desperately needed sentencing reforms. Broader drug policy reforms at the domestic level remain elusive.

Even less progress is evident with regard to international drug-control programs. In Latin America, the Obama administration has continued to prioritize forced eradication of coca and poppy crops, including herbicide spraying, or fumigation. Plan Colombia is touted as a major success story, although the drug trade continues to flourish there despite the tremendous cost inflicted particularly on small farmers. Funding for that initiative is now winding down, as attention shifts to Mexico and Central America. Drug-related violence within Mexico and, most significantly, along the U.S. border ensures continued funding for the primary U.S. aid program, Plan Merida. It also ensures that U.S. drug policy towards that country will continue to be a hot button political issue. As Central America has emerged as a growing drug transit hub, and drug-related violence has escalated, particularly in Guatemala, the Obama administration has steadily increased anti-drug aid for the isthmus through the Central American Regional Security Initiative. In a visit to several Central American countries in early February 2011, U.S. Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, William Brownfield, stated that the Obama administration is considering an anti-drug aid program exclusively for the region—as Peruvian author Mario Vargas Llosa. Perhaps nowhere is the continuity of a wrong-headed policy more evident than in Bolivia, which is implementing an independent coca-control policy, while maintaining cocaine interdiction efforts. The Obama administration has continued down the path set by the Bush administration, issuing a “determination” in September 2009 that Bolivia had “failed demonstrably to make sufficient efforts to meet its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements.” Later that year, the administration refused to renew trade benefits suspended in 2008 in retaliation for the Bolivian government’s decision to expel the U.S. Ambassador who was perceived to be meddling in the country’s internal affairs. The administration has continued to “decertify” Bolivia every year since, and trade benefits remain suspended. For fiscal year 2012, the administration has proposed a 30 percent cut in anti-drug aid, to a mere $10 million.

U.S. officials have also led the resistance to a Bolivian proposal to remove from the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs a ban on the centuries-old indigenous practice of chewing coca leaves. In 2009, the President of Bolivia sent a letter to UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, requesting the removal from the Single Convention of its requirement that “coca leaf chewing must be abolished within a 25 year period”—a period that ended in 1989. The inclusion of the ban on coca leaf chewing in the Single Convention was based on a racist report that failed to take into account the rights of indigenous cultures. Nonetheless, the U.S. government—fearful that any modifications to the conventions could open a Pandora’s box—rallied seventeen other countries to its side in opposing the Bolivian proposal. Its future now rests in the hands of the UN Economic and Social Council.

With Republicans now in control of the U.S. House of Representatives, the Obama administration will likely be under increasing pressure to maintain the drug war status quo. Key Republicans are calling for more military and police aid to fight drug production and transshipment, and to further militarize the U.S. border with Mexico. While the Republicans may not be able to deliver much more funding given their commitment to slash federal spending, they will no doubt continue to be wedded to present policy, increasing even further the growing disconnect between the region and Washington.

While debate in Washington on alternative approaches to the so-called “war on drugs” is at best incipient (though that is not necessarily true at the state level), debate across Latin America is beginning to flourish. A turning point came with the 2009 release of the report by the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, led by former presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Brazil), César Gaviria (Colombia) and Ernesto Zedillo (Mexico). The report criticizes the taboo on public discussion of the drug issue, and calls for an opening of the debate and the recognition of the failure of present policies and their consequences. Sparking the most discussion were its recommendations to treat drug use as a public health issue and to evaluate the decriminalization of cannabis possession for personal use. Former president Gaviria recently stated, “the idea that total prohibition to resolve the problem of drug consumption has proven to be, over the last hundred years, a failure in all of the world.”

Since the release of the commission’s report, former Mexican president Vicente Fox has come out publicly in favor of outright legalization, as have noted dignitaries such as Peruvian author Mario Vargas Llosa. Perhaps most significantly, when asked his opinion on legalization, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos stated: “On that issue I am not a fundamentalist. If the world considers that legalization is a
While the Obama administration has kept U.S. drug control policy towards Latin America on auto-pilot, some countries in the region are charting a different course, seeking to implement policies that are both more effective and in line with international due process and human rights standards. Indeed, there is much that the Obama administration could learn from its neighbors to the south when it comes to drug control policies.

Incarcerated on drug charges. Now widely accepted within the country, the new approach has facilitated the social reintegration of former problematic drug users. Portuguese officials also point out that the new strategy has allowed police to focus law enforcement efforts on drug trafficking organizations, rather than low-level offenders.

Some Latin American countries are also addressing the issue of excessive sentences established in national drug laws, which in most cases fail to distinguish adequately between low level offenders and major traffickers (all are subject to harsh mandatory minimums). In 2010, Brazil’s Supreme Federal Tribunal ruled that the application of alternatives to incarceration should be allowed for low-level drug offenders noting that judges should have the right to determine sanctions based on the conditions in individual cases.

Bolivia is also rewriting its notorious Law 1008, making penalties proportionate to the crime committed. And Ecuador is also drafting new legislation to replace its drug law, which is one of the harshest in the hemisphere. Presently, drug trafficking convictions result in a sentence of twelve to twenty-five years, even though the maximum penalty for murder is sixteen years. As the law fails to distinguish between levels of involvement in the drug trade (as is the case in Bolivia), a small-time dealer could end up with a longer sentence than a person convicted of murder. The Ecuadorian Ministry of Justice and Human Rights initially drafted what could become model drug legislation; however, it has run into political roadblocks and discouragingly, an about face in support from President Rafael Correa.

Increasingly, citizens in the western hemisphere are saying no to the war on drugs.
Some Comments on Drug-Fueled Violence in Latin America

by Mark Ungar | Brooklyn College | M.Ungar@brooklyn.cuny.edu

The underestimation of drug-fueled crime and violence is often as revealing as its exaggeration. The blood that drugs have spilled throughout Latin America has seeped so thoroughly into the region’s states and societies that it cannot always be seen.

Drug capitalism and its attendant violence is vertical as well as horizontal: a nearly seamless sliding scale characterizes availability to Latin America’s long tail of socio-economic sectors. Economic and political violence show drugs’ horizontal reach across social classes, regions and countries, while other forms of violence reveal a vertical dimension of the phenomenon. The psycho-pharmacological link between narcotics and violence, for instance, helps account for the particular depravity of many drug-fueled crimes like public bus massacres and ritualized decapitations—psychic forms of violence that are ends in themselves (see Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004).

As with most consumer markets, youth and the middle class are the biggest growth sectors on the demand side of the drug trade. “Fusion” drugs tearing through schools around the region include jarra loca, a mixture of hard liquors like vodka with pharmaceuticals; merla, the combination of cocaine or crack with cannabis; and heroin doctored with the animal tranquilizer Xylazine, which supposedly protracts heroin’s effects. The drugs are most destructive at the lowest income rung. Glue remains the cheapest and most physiologically damaging drug among the poor, along with pasta básica, made at cut-rate prices with a highly toxic and addictive recipe of caffeine, cocaine alkaloids, amphetamines and bicarbonate of soda.

Alcohol is a drug of choice for all social sectors, of course, from upscale whiskerías/ brothels on city outskirts to binge drinking in the inner cities. Although not new—warnings about alcohol were a staple of eighteenth-century gazettes—social workers in many countries remark on its increasing tendency to be consumed in anti-social or aggressive contexts. When part of the recruitment for gangs and vigilante groups, alcohol and drugs directly incite violent acts such as initiation rites to a member’s first killings. Anthropological studies of alcohol consumption (see Heath 1994) also note significantly different results of drinking’s context: when part of social rituals, it leads to far less alcoholism than when done in isolation or through peer pressure.

Part of the difficulty of curbing drug-related crime and violence comes from the difficulty of quantifying it. Some of the most comprehensive statistical studies of regional crime—compiled by agencies like the Justice Studies Center of the Americas (CEJA) and the Latin American Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (ILANUD)—find evidence for correlations between drug use and crime, but cannot definitively conclude how much criminal activity is caused directly by drug consumption itself. A great deal is also caused by the decay brought about by drugs (such as abandoned properties used as shooting galleries) or to externalities (such as other forms of violence used by traffickers — seeLederman, Loayza and Fajnzylber 2002). Uncertainty, as a result, characterizes nationally reported rates of drug crime.

According to crime reports compiled by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, there has been a gradual but persistent upward trend in drug-related crimes over the past decade. With the exceptions of Peru and Paraguay, every country in Latin America has reported increases from 2000 through 2008. But definitions, methodology, and collection of drug-related statistics vary too greatly, and reports are provided too sporadically to create meaningful long-term regional comparisons.

The creation of violence observatories in several Latin American countries has been an important step toward an understanding of the links among drug abuse, certain kinds of crime, and violence. The Central American <www.oacvi.com>, Honduran <www.iudpas.org>, and Venezuelan <www.observatoriodeviolencia.org.ve> violence observatories do an invaluable job of specifying the role of drugs in violence and criminal justice, from fear of drug dealers to incarceration rates for possession. Their documentation of suicide, manslaughter, and other forms of violence also helps capture the broader but often unseen social destruction of drug abuse. But statistically replicable correlation tests of drugs with specific crimes are more limited unless carried out preemptively as part of the criminal justice process. Based on one such study In Chile, for example, that country’s chief of police could verify that an “increase in drug use among criminals” is one of the “primary problems” of law enforcement, citing the fact that, in 2006, 73.3 percent of criminal detainees “had high levels of drugs in their urine” at the time of detention. “Of them, 86.9 percent had cocaine or pasta básica, 55.1 percent had marijuana, and 5.5 percent had opiates, methamphetamine, or amphetaamines.” (Blanco and Bernales, 5)

But the way crime is reported in most countries shows why most numbers are inherently indeterminate. Though countries such as El Salvador have unified institutional crime reporting, in many countries the numbers vary among prosecutors, police, morgue, and the judiciary. At the morgue in San Pedro Sula, an epicenter of gang activity in Honduras, medical technicians and police detectives complain about a lack of biological or toxicology equipment, which often prevents them from determining corpses’ drug levels. With bodies strewn about—or six are brought in on an average night, some of them mutilated beyond recognition—not
much beyond external bullet wounds makes it into autopsy reports.

Then, there is significant drug use within the criminal justice system itself. In one of Honduras’s rare police-wide drug tests, for example, in 2006 a fifth of the force tested positive. For street officers at the front line, giving in to drugs often has less to do with fear and corruption than with simple self-medication: many take the easily available drugs to ease the mind-numbing tasks, professional pressures, and physical endurance of their jobs. One police officer in Mexico City told me that his most violent abuse, as well as his most generous acts—which he considered to be equally high points of his work—happened when he was high. In Bolivia, the Support and Citizen Cooperation Patrol (PAC: Patrulla de Auxilio y Cooperación Ciudadana) was formed to improve handling of youth delinquency and drug addiction, but, often with the collusion of other units, has been accused of abusing those it is sent out to help. Security agency psychologists, among the most under-appreciated officials in Latin America, attribute most of these drug-related abuses, violent acts, and disciplinary infractions to work-induced mental disorder.

As has been well documented, the vast majority of drug arrests are for low-level couriers and dealers (see Youngers in this issue of LASA Forum). Nearly half of Argentina’s federal court docket is filled with low-level drug charges, for example, almost all of which are less serious than unresolved cases of corruption (Rodríguez and Sued 2005). Caught up in the criminal justice system’s slow grind, many of those detainees languish in prisons, where a combination of human indignity and state inefficiency create a welcoming environment for drug abuse and trafficking. In many prisons, the areas that tend to be less rife with drugs are the women’s sections, even though most detainees have been couriers. In the Barrio Inglés prison on Honduras’s Caribbean coast, one women prisoner remarked to me resignedly that she had no idea who was taking care of her three pre-teen sons. In her predicament, as with countless others, drug abuse brings concepts of cultural, social, and economic violence into stark relief.

While most people recognize the personal impact of drug violence, blame is usually directed elsewhere. Residents in the largely middle-class San José District of Zapote in Costa Rica, for example, told me that their streets “were calm for decades” until intrusion by drug users from other neighborhoods. In Bolivia, officials across the board blame drug gangs from Peru. In Argentina, provincial officials criticize the national government for not staunching the flow of drugs into their jurisdictions. Other people, other neighborhoods, other provinces, and other countries: a nearly universal view of narcotics as an alien invasion encourages “zero tolerance” crackdowns and sweeps that, without adequate social services or judicial reforms, often only accelerate the cycle of violence.

Much of the blame and much of the violence is directed toward youth. Over 80,000 Latin American minors are killed violently each year, and murder is the second cause of death for the 15-to-25-year age group. All of the stresses of urban living, employment, income, and family that many studies highlight are only amplified for youth as they see those tensions stretch out into the future ahead of them (see Obot and Saxena 2005). In Nuevo Horizonte and other desolate fringes of Venezuela’s Federal District, teenagers commend drugs for helping stave off both isolation and each other. Even those with watchful parents talk about getting either paranoid or gregarious, usually on bazuko (pasta básica), which, they say, is better than the usual state of boredom. At a 2009 community security meeting in Bogotá’s low-income Ciudad Bolívar municipality, several teenagers discussed the appeal of easily available marijuana and other drugs to smooth out life’s rough edges. Such consumption is often ignored when it is individual and self-destructive, but when done as a group it often becomes a point of obsession for police, who regularly estimate that nine out of ten gang members consume marijuana and cocaine. Such estimates are seldom tested, however, and there is little consensus of what constitutes a gang.

If drugs shatter Latin America’s most vulnerable sectors through violence, then those are the pieces that need to be picked up first. Traditional laws and reactions seem only to disperse drugs through space and time: bicycle glue is easily bought downtown when it is banned in residential areas, for example, and people stock up early on alcohol when nighttime sales are limited. Often prodded by international organizations from above and grassroots groups from below, though, such official responses are giving way to more proactive and holistic ones. Many are based on prevention, such as identifying at-risk youth; citizen action, such as the creation of community justice fora; and smarter law enforcement, such as the mapping of drug-dealing “hot spots.”

Coordination of criminal justice, social, and other services has been another priority. Many cities are placing social workers in schools, for example, and new drug treatment courts help monitor long-term treatment. In Argentina, provinces such as Buenos Aires and La Rioja combine school attendance, parent support, and employment training into single anti-drug youth programs. Most new initiatives also focus on the local level. In Chile, delegates of the police-backed Drug Use and Sales Dealing Prevention group confront neighborhood level drug use and sales.
The Inter-American Development Bank is forming a regional anti-violence network to support and replicate promising local initiatives, while the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of American States funds the EU-LAC Drug Treatment City Partnership, which helps municipal governments in Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean coordinate policy and experience. Following epidemiological public health models, other programs address violence as an epidemic through the work of on-site activists—such as ex-gang members—who become “violence interrupters,” intervening in violent turf battles and cycles of vengeance. Other anti-violence public-health initiatives include Salud y Vida en las Américas (SAVIA), which provides seed money for community, youth-oriented prevention programs in seven Latin American countries.

All such efforts face formidable challenges, such as getting criminal justice and social service agencies to really work together, or saving pilot programs from being swallowed up by dysfunctional state structures. But as they start to show concrete results, these programs are gradually acquiring institutional roots and external support. Adam Blackwell, CICAD’s Secretary for Multidimensional Security, told me in a phone interview this past February that one of the biggest successes of regional anti-drug efforts has been the “greater political acceptance that there needs to be a new approach.” Tapping into community energy and growing commitments, such new approaches are the best way to help pull citizens out of a drug stupor that has numbed them and their democracies.

References

Blanco S., Javiera and José Alejandro Bernales R. ND “Public Safety and Police Modernization in Chile: The Experience of the Carabinero Police.” Unpublished manuscript.

Heath, Dwight B.

Lederman, Daniel, Norman Loayza and Pablo Fajnzylber

Obot, I. S., and S. Saxena

Rodríguez N., Paz, and Gabriel Sued

Schepers-Hughes, Nancy and Philippe Bourgois, eds.
# RESERVATION FORM FOR THE LASA2012 EXHIBIT

Organization Name  
Address  
City  
State  
Zip  
Submitted by  
Title of submitter  
Phone (office)  
Fax  
Email  
Internet site  
Payment  
Enclosed Check in the amount of  

## FULL EXHIBIT SPACE (10" x 8")

- $795 Commercial / University Press  
- $695 Charitable Organization (no items for sale)  
- $695 each additional commercial  
- $595 each additional charitable  

## DISPLAY YOUR BOOK

- $75 First Title  
- $55 each additional title  

One display copy of each book listed is also required as part of the exhibit fee. One order form is also required as part of the exhibit fee. If you have more than 5 titles you may contact lasa@pitt.edu or (412) 648-7929

## TAKE-ONE LITERATURE DISPLAY (one page)

- $90 (letter size / legal size) 1 page  
- $25 each additional  

For two pages or more please contact lasa@pitt.edu

## LASA2012 PROGRAM BOOKLET ADVERTISING

- $500 Full page (7.5" w x 10.5" h)  
- $300 Half page (7.5" w x 4 3/4 h)  

## TERMS OF PAYMENT/CANCELLATION

**Cancellations**
If an exhibitor is forced to withdraw from participation by February 15, 2012, all sums paid by the exhibitor less a $250 service fee will be refunded. No refunds will be issued after February 16, 2012. Cancellations are not effective until received in writing by LASA. No refund will be made if an exhibitor fails to occupy the space. No refund on late or no arrival materials.

**Payment**
A minimum deposit of 50% of the total booth rental fee is required. Booths will not be assigned without the 50% deposit. Failure to remit payment for the booth rental by January 15, 2012 constitutes cancellation of the contract, and the space will be subject to resale without refund.

---

**Return form to:**
LASA Book Exhibit  
416 Bellefield Hall  
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh PA 15260.  
Telephone: 412-648-7929  
Email: lasa@pitt.edu
Film and video materials that are not integrated into a panel, workshop, or other regular Congress session may be featured at LASA2012 in two separate venues:

I. LASA2012 FILM FESTIVAL

You may submit a film or video for selection to participate in the LASA Film Festival & Exhibit. Selection criteria are: artistic, technical, and cinematographic excellence; uniqueness of contribution to the visual presentation of materials on Latin America; and relevance to disciplinary, geographic, and thematic interests of LASA members, as evidenced by topics proposed for panels, workshops, and special sessions at recent Congresses.

These films and videos will be screened free of charge in the LASA2012 Film Festival, and compete for the juried designation of LASA2012 Award of Merit in Film, which is given for “excellence in the visual presentation of educational and artistic materials on Latin America.”

Films and videos released after January 2011 and those that premiere at the LASA Congress will be given special consideration, if they also meet the above criteria. LASA membership is not required to compete. Films must be received no earlier than October 1, 2011, and no later than February 1, 2012. Selection will be announced by April 1, 2012. Entries constitute acceptance of the rules and regulations of the LASA Film Festival and Exhibit. Film screeners will not be returned and will be deposited in the festival archives.

II. LASA2012 FILM EXHIBIT

Films entered or not entered for the Festival competition, may be screened in the LASA2012 Film Exhibit, for a fee of $100 for the first 30 minutes of screening time, and $2.00 per minute thereafter. Exhibit film screenings are part of the Film Festival program, and take place in the same auditorium during Festival hours.

To submit films directly to the LASA2012 Film Exhibit, fill out the submission form and check only the category "Film Exhibit.” Exhibit time is limited—film selection will be contingent upon quality of the film submitted and the amount of time available. A confirmation and invoice for the cost of this commercial screening will be issued by April 1, 2012.

---

**LASA2012 FILM FESTIVAL AND EXHIBIT SUBMISSION FORM**

Submissions for the Film Festival and Film Exhibit will be received only from October 1, 2011 through February 1, 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. LASA2012 Film Festival</th>
<th>II. LASA2012 Film Exhibit</th>
<th>III. Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Title of work enclosed**

**Director**

**Producer**

**Year of release**

**Format**

**Running Time**

**Languages / subtitles**

**Distributor**

**Email**

**Phone / Fax**

**Address**

---

**If your film/video is not selected for the LASA2012 Film Festival, do you want it included in the LASA Film Exhibit for the fees stated above?**

YES ____ NO ____

---

**To enter the competition for the LASA2012 Film Festival or Film Exhibit**

Mail the completed submission form, along with a DVD copy of your film to the Festival director. To ensure consideration, all submissions should be mailed through express services (i.e., UPS, DHL, FedEx). Please, keep your tracking number to guarantee delivery. Films without a submission form will not be considered.

Claudia Ferman / Director, LASA2012 Film Festival

LAIS – CWIC 334 -- University of Richmond -- 28 Westhampton Way – Richmond VA 23173 – USA

Email: cferman@richmond.edu
Call for Bryce Wood Book Award Nominations

Deadline: July 15, 2011

At each International Congress, the Latin American Studies Association presents the Bryce Wood Book Award to the outstanding book on Latin America in the social sciences and humanities published in English. Eligible books for the 2012 LASA International Congress will be those published between January 1, 2010 and June 30, 2011. Although no book may compete more than once, translations may be considered. Anthologies of selections by several authors or re-editions of works published previously normally are not in contention for the award. Books will be judged on the quality of the research, analysis, and writing, and the significance of their contribution to Latin American studies. Books may be nominated by authors, LASA members, or publishers. Persons who nominate books are responsible for confirming the publication date and for forwarding one copy directly to each member of the Award Committee, at the expense of the authors or publishers.

All books nominated must reach each member of the Award Committee by July 15, 2011. By February 1, 2012, the committee will select a winning book. It may also name an honorable mention. The award will be announced at the Award Ceremony of the LASA2012 business meeting, and the awardee will be publicly honored. LASA membership is not a requirement to receive the award.

Members of the 2012 committee are:
John French, Chair
History Department
Carr Building (East Campus)
Duke University
Durham, NC 27708-0719

Joanne Rappaport
4531 46th St NW
Washington, DC 20016

Mauricio Font
80 Park Ave, 12D
New York, NY 10016

Santa Arias
University of Kansas
Department of Spanish and Portuguese
1445 Jayhawk Blvd
Lawrence, KS 66045-7590

José Antonio Cheibub
3003 Weeping Cherry Dr
Champaign, IL 61822

Fiona Macaulay
University of Bradford
Dept of Peace Studies, Richmond Road
Bradford BD71DP West Yorkshire
UNITED KINGDOM

Claudio Fuentes
Grajales 1775, Tercer Piso
Santiago
CHILE

Joseph F. Tulchin
109 Coonamessett Circle
E Falmouth, MA 02536

Latin American Studies Association
Attn: Bryce Wood Book Award Nominations
University of Pittsburgh
315 South Bellefield Avenue
416 Bellefield Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
CALLING ALL MEMBERS continued…

Members of the 2012 committee are:

Evelina Dagnino, Chair
Depto Ciência Política - IFCH
Universidade Estadual de Campinas
R. Cora Coralina, s/n
Cidade Universitária
13083-896 Campinas, SP
BRAZIL.

Marianne Schmink
PO Box 115530
University of Florida
Gainesville, FL 32611-7305

Marta Núñez Sarmiento
Ave 35 N° 3011, Playa
La Habana
CUBA

Olivier Dabène
49 Place Charles de Gaulle
86000 Poitiers
FRANCE

Latin American Studies Association
Attn: Premio Iberoamericano Book Award Nominations
University of Pittsburgh
315 South Bellefield Avenue
416 Bellefield Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260

Call for LASA Media Award Nominations

Deadline: July 15, 2011

The Latin American Studies Association is pleased to announce its competition for the year 2012 LASA Media Awards for outstanding media coverage of Latin America. These awards are made at every LASA Congress to recognize long-term journalistic contributions to analysis and public debate about Latin America in the United States and in Latin America, as well as breakthrough journalism. Nominations are invited from LASA members and from journalists. Journalists from both the print and electronic media are eligible. The Committee will carefully review each nominee’s work and select an award recipient. The award will be announced at the Award Ceremony of the LASA2012 business meeting, and the awardee will be publicly honored. LASA may invite the awardee to submit materials for possible publication in the LASA Forum. Recent recipients of the awards include: Carlos Dada, El Faro (2010); Mario Osava, América Latina Inter Press Service (2009); Hollman Morris, Colombia (2007); María Ester Gilio (2006); Julio Scherer, journalist, Mexico (2004); Eduardo Anguita, freelance journalist, Buenos Aires (2003); Guillermo González Uribe de Número, Bogotá (2001); Patricia Verdugo Aguirre de Conama, Chile and Diario 16, Spain (2000); Gustavo Gorriti of Caretas, Lima, Peru (1998).

To make a nomination, please send one copy of the journalist’s portfolio of recent relevant work to LASA Executive Director Milagros Pereyra-Rojas <milagros@pitt.edu> by July 15, 2011.

Members of the Media Award committee are Peter Hakim, Inter-American Dialogue, Chair; Heloísa Buarque de Hollanda, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro; and Graciela Mochkofsky, Revista Digital El Puerco Espín.

LASA/Oxfam America
Martin Diskin Memorial Lectureship

Deadline: July 15, 2011

The Martin Diskin Memorial Lectureship is offered at each LASA International Congress to an outstanding individual who combines Professor Diskin’s commitment to both activism and scholarship.

This distinguished lectureship is made possible largely by a generous contribution from Oxfam America, an organization committed to grassroots work — and one with which Martin Diskin was closely associated. Ricardo Falla, S.J., was the 1998 Diskin Lecturer. Professor Gonzalo Sánchez Gómez of the Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, was the Lecturer in 2000. At LASA2001, Professor Elizabeth Lira Kornfeld, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Santiago, Chile, delivered the Memorial Lecture. In 2003, the Lectureship was shared by Rodolfo Stavenhagen, El Colegio de México, and Rosalva Aída Hernández Castillo, CIESAS, Mexico City. Professor Jonathan Fox, University of California/Santa Cruz was the 2004 Lecturer. Professor William Leogrande, American University, held the Lectureship in 2006; Dr. Orlando Fals Borda delivered the Lecture in 2007; Professor Terry Karl, Stanford University, was selected in 2009; and Dr. Carlos Ivan Degregori, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, in 2010.

Nominations, including self-nominations, are welcome. A nomination should include a statement justifying the nomination, the complete mailing address of the nominee, telephone and fax numbers, and e-mail address. To nominate a candidate, send these materials no later than July 15, 2011, to LASA Executive Director Milagros Pereyra-Rojas <milagros@pitt.edu>.
All application materials must be submitted electronically to <milagros@pitt.edu> and received by **July 15, 2011**. The Martin Diskin Dissertation Award recipient will receive a $1,000 stipend. Wide circulation of this call for nominations to faculty colleagues and students would be greatly appreciated.

The 2012 selection committee consists of Jeremy Adelman, Princeton University, Chair; Teresa Valdés, CEDEM; Antônio Sérgio Guimarães, Universidade de São Paulo; Cynthia Arnson, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; and Jonathan Fox, Oxfam America.

Members of the 2012 Martin Diskin Memorial Lectureship Committee are: Jeremy Adelman, Princeton University, Chair; Teresa Valdés, CEDEM; Antônio Sérgio Guimarães, Universidade de São Paulo; Cynthia Arnson, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; and Jonathan Fox, Oxfam America.

**LASA/Oxfam America**

**Martin Diskin Dissertation Award**

**Deadline: July 15, 2011**

The Martin Diskin Dissertation Award is made possible through the generosity of Oxfam America, LASA, and LASA members. This award is offered at each LASA International Congress to an outstanding junior scholar who combines Professor Diskin’s commitment to the creative combination of activism and scholarship. The award will be presented to an advanced doctoral student or recent Ph.D. All advanced Ph.D. candidates must demonstrate that they will complete their dissertation prior to the LASA International Congress. LASA limits recent Ph.D. recipients to those individuals who received their degrees after the LASA Congress prior to the one at which the award is to be received. LASA welcomes dissertations written in English, Spanish, and Portuguese. The Award Committee will employ three criteria in its evaluations: 1) Overall scholarly credentials, based upon the candidate’s curriculum vitae; 2) The quality of the dissertation writing, research, and analysis as determined by the dissertation outline and sample chapter submitted; 3) The primary advisor’s letter of recommendation. The definition of activist scholarship shall remain broad and pluralist, to be discussed and interpreted by each selection committee.

Applicants should submit a current curriculum vitae; a dissertation abstract of 250 words; the dissertation outline or table of contents; one sample chapter, which exemplifies the author’s approach to activist scholarship; and a letter of recommendation from the candidate’s primary advisor which focuses explicitly on the candidate’s qualifications for the Martin Diskin Dissertation Award.
CALLING ALL MEMBERS continued...

Charles A. Hale Fellowship for Mexican History
Deadline: July 15, 2011

This fellowship will reward excellence in historical research on Mexico at the dissertation level. It will be awarded at each LASA International Congress to a Mexican graduate student in the final phase of his or her doctoral research in Mexican history, broadly defined. Selection will be based on the scholarly merit, and on the candidate’s potential contribution to the advancement of humanist understanding between Mexico and its global neighbors.

Members of the 2012 selection committee are: Mauricio Tenorio, University of Chicago; Alan Knight, Oxford University; Pablo Piccato, Columbia University; Peter Guardino, Indiana University and Javier Garcia Diego, El Colegio de México.

A qualified applicant must hold Mexican citizenship and be in the final phase of her/his doctoral program, i.e. finished with coursework and exams, but not yet granted the Ph.D. Applications must be accompanied by 1) verification by the dissertation committee chair of the student’s good standing in the doctoral program; 2) one-page (single space) statement that summarizes the dissertation project, in either English or Spanish; 3) brief (two pages maximum) curriculum vitae.

To nominate a candidate, send these materials no later than July 15, 2011, to Milagros Pereyra-Rojas, LASA Executive Director <milagros@pitt.edu>.

Call for Luciano Tomassini Latin American International Relations Book Award Nominations
Deadline: September 1, 2011

The Latin American Studies Association is pleased to announce the establishment of the Luciano Tomassini Latin American International Relations Book Award to the author(s) of an outstanding book on Latin American Foreign Policies and International Relations published in English, Spanish, French or Portuguese in any country. Eligible books for the 2012 award must have been published between January 2008 and June 2011. Anthologies of selections by several authors are not eligible. Books will be judged on the originality of the research, the quality of the analysis and writing, and the significance of their contribution to the study of Latin America and the Caribbean. Books may be nominated by authors, LASA members, or publishers.

Persons who nominate books are responsible for confirming the publication date and for forwarding one copy directly to each member of the Award Committee, at the expense of the authors or publishers. A nomination packet should include a statement justifying the nomination, five copies of the nominated book (one for each member of the award committee), complete mailing address of the nominee, telephone and fax numbers, and e-mail address. Each packet should be sent directly to individual award committee members by September 1, 2011. By February 1, 2012, the committee will select a winning book. It may also name an honorable mention. The award will be announced at the Award Ceremony of the LASA2012 business meeting, and the awardee will be publicly honored. LASA membership is not a requirement to receive the award.

Members of the 2012 committee are:

- Jorge Heine, Chair
  CIGI
  57 Erb St West
  Waterloo, ON N2L 6C2
  CANADA

- Victor Bulmer-Thomas
  55 Maze Hill
  London SE10 8XQ
  UNITED KINGDOM

- Rafael Fernández de Castro
  Cataratas 60-2
  Colonia Ampliación las Águilas
  México DF 01710
  MÉXICO

- Monica Hirst
  Dept. Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales
  MEI-Seguridad Internacional
  Miñones 2177-Buenos Aires 1428
  ARGENTINA

- Julia E. Sweig
  1777 F Street NW
  Washington DC 20006

Latin American Studies Association
Attn: Luciano Tomassini Book Award Nominations
University of Pittsburgh
315 South Bellefield Avenue
416 Bellefield Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
Membership Report 2010

Individual Memberships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total memberships</td>
<td>5544</td>
<td>(10 percent decrease from 2009*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New members</td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>(30 percent of total memberships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewed from 2009</td>
<td>2707</td>
<td>(44 percent renewal rate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewed lapsed members</td>
<td>1193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Member type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th></th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional members</td>
<td>3829</td>
<td>(69 percent of individual memberships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student members</td>
<td>1281</td>
<td>(23 percent of individual memberships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Members</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>(77 paid and 11 honorary**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Memberships</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Member residency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th></th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. and Puerto Rico</td>
<td>2977</td>
<td>(54 percent of individual memberships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>1216</td>
<td>(22 percent of individual memberships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1351</td>
<td>(24 percent of individual memberships)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three-year memberships initiated in 2010: 65
Two year-memberships initiated in 2010: 52

Institutional Memberships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total memberships</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>(16 percent decrease from 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New members</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>(7 percent of institutional memberships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewed from 2009</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>(77 percent renewal rate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewed lapsed members</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Institution location**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th></th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>(72 percent of institutional memberships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>(6 percent of institutional memberships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>(21 percent of institutional memberships)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* LASA normally experiences a decline in membership in non-Congress years.

** Recipients of the Kalman Silvert Award receive an honorary LASA Life Membership provided by the Avina Foundation.
The Obama Initiative

by Ronald H. Chilcote | University of California, Riverside | ronald.chilcote@ucr.edu

During 2008–2009 the editors of Latin American Perspectives (LAP) organized three journal issues in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution (Issues 164, 165, and 166 [Volume 36, 1–3], January, March, and May 2009). A collective position paper evolved through that lengthy process and served to introduce our project. It was during this period that Barack Obama became U.S. president after a two-year campaign and a landslide election. In late 2009 the editors decided to focus on the first two years of his presidency and, in particular, his administration’s policies on Latin America.

Our purpose was to seek a means for expressing a positive and constructive position regarding present and future U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. A position paper evolved through five meetings of debate and discussion and through four drafts with the intent of carrying a position paper to the Latin American Studies Association meetings in Toronto (October 6–9, 2010). Our position paper (to be published in the July 2011 issue of LAP) served as a foundation for resolutions prepared for the 2010 Congress. As academics concerned about the role of the United States in Latin America, we wanted to present LASA members with an opportunity to express their views about U.S. policy in Latin America and to identify problems and suggest new policy directions with the hope of improving future relations between the United States and Latin America.

At LASA our Obama resolution was debated and improved through a LAP workshop attended by some thirty persons, who carefully reviewed it and made minor changes. Next, the position paper served as a departure point for a “Featured Panel” presided over by Ronald Chilcote and Sheryl Lutjens and attended by several hundred participants, with papers and presentations by Greg Grandin, Rafael Hernández, and Miguel Tinker-Salas. The paper and resolutions were also the focus of a LAP editors’ meeting in Toronto.

Thus, we took our endeavor seriously and opened our lengthy deliberations to the LASA membership. LASA President John Coatsworth cooperated with us, and the resolutions were presented with petitions signed by more than twice the number of required endorsers (thirty). The LAP Executive Council (EC) must approve the submission of a resolution to a vote of the membership. The resolution on Cuba submitted by the Cuba Section and the LAP Honduras resolution moved forward with minor changes, but our resolution on Obama’s policy for Latin America was, according to one EC member, voted down on the grounds that it was “factually inaccurate, lengthy, and ideological.” We wanted it to be accurate and constructive, and we would have been willing to revise it in a way that the executive committee could approve it and the membership could vote it up or down. The EC could have consulted us, but chose not to do so. We believe that a mail ballot would have resulted in a very large majority of LASA members supporting the resolution, as indeed they subsequently approved the Cuba and Honduras resolutions. After the LASA Congress we consulted past association presidents Arturo Arias, John Coatsworth, Carmen Diana Deere, Susan Eckstein, Marysa Navarro, and Helen Safa, and they supported sending the Obama resolution for a vote and agreed that the text should appear in the LASA Forum. We print the resolution below:

Resolution on the Obama Administration and Latin America

The Latin American Studies Association (LASA) is the largest professional association in the world for individuals and institutions engaged in the study of Latin America and the Caribbean. With over 6,000 members, 45 percent of whom reside outside the United States, LASA is the one Association that brings together experts on Latin America from all disciplines and diverse occupational endeavors, across the globe. For decades, LASA members have spoken in defense of democracy and human rights in the Western Hemisphere and in support of peaceful and respectful relations among states in the region.

Whereas: as a candidate, Barack Obama promised a new approach to Latin America that rejected unilateralism and recognized the importance of promoting social justice and reducing inequality; and

Whereas: in October 2008, leaders and members of LASA called on Senator Obama, if elected, to reject the U.S. role in imposing economic policies that concentrated wealth and undermined human welfare and to respond with friendship and respect to the movements of workers, peasants, women and indigenous communities for social change; and

Whereas: in April 2009 at the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad, President Obama recognized that “Every one of our nations has a right to follow its own path” and expressed his intention to engage the rest of the hemisphere on the basis of “mutual respect and equality”; and

Whereas: although some positive steps have been taken, such as the limited expansion of travel to Cuba, these initiatives have been relatively minor and are
outweighed by policies that continue and even expand the undesirable policies of the past; and

Whereas: the embargo of Cuba has not been lifted and the U.S. is the only nation in the Americas opposed to readmitting Cuba to the Organization of American States; and

Whereas: the militarism of Plan Colombia and Plan Mérida, the militarization of drug policy, and the deployment of the Fourth Fleet have been reinforced with plans to add military bases in Latin America and to increasingly militarize the U.S.-Mexico border; and

Whereas: the Obama administration has continued the George W. Bush administration’s divisive and counterproductive hostility toward progressive governments in Latin America, particularly toward Venezuela and Bolivia, but failed to defend democracy in Honduras, condoning the coup, and has deepened ties to Colombia with its appalling record of human rights abuses; and

Whereas: the Obama administration has failed to address the causes of undocumented immigration, including the role of U.S. trade and economic policies, and has disregarded the harmful consequences of deporting more undocumented immigrants than the Bush administration; now therefore let it be

Resolved:

1. The Latin American Studies Association urges President Obama to reduce, rather than increase, the U.S. military presence in Latin America and to reverse the militarization of U.S. regional and border policies;

2. The Latin American Studies Association urges President Obama to accept the Unión de Naciones Suramericanas’ (UNASUR’s) call to establish South America as a zone of peace;

3. The Latin American Studies Association urges President Obama to normalize relations with Cuba, including actively working to bring about the total lifting of the embargo by Congress;

4. The Latin American Studies Association urges President Obama to actively pursue friendly relations with Bolivia, including ending the ban on importing Bolivian textiles;

5. The Latin American Studies Association urges President Obama to actively pursue friendly relations with Venezuela and to end U.S. support for groups or entities that seek to destabilize the Venezuelan government;

6. The Latin American Studies Association urges President Obama to base U.S. policy toward Colombia on the reduction of human rights abuses and violence against the civilian population by the security and paramilitary forces;

7. The Latin American Studies Association urges President Obama to formulate new trade and development policies and programs that increase the opportunities for Latin Americans to live a dignified life in their own countries and that incorporate greater freedom of movement of labor in conditions that respect the rights of immigrant workers;

8. The Latin American Studies Association urges President Obama to cease deportation of undocumented immigrants who have no criminal charges against them until such time as comprehensive immigration reform is enacted and to fully support enactment of the DREAM act that facilitates higher education for young adults who arrived as undocumented children;

This resolution will be mailed to President Barack Obama, all members of the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo Valenzuela, the New York Times, Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times.

Presented to the Executive Council by seventy-two members of the Latin American Studies Association.

[Professor Chilcote is managing editor of the bimonthly journal Latin American Perspectives] ■
DOMINGOS ÁLVARES, AFRICAN HEALING, AND THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF THE ATLANTIC WORLD
JAMES H. SWEET
“This exceptionally creative, engaging, and provocative book is a tour de force of historical imagination and sensitivity and a hallmark of Atlantic history.”
—Joseph C. Miller, University of Virginia
320 pages  $37.50 cloth

BLOWOUT!
Sal Castro and the Chicano Struggle for Educational Justice
MARIO T. GARCÍA AND SAL CASTRO
“García’s oeuvre has mapped Mexican American history and allowed us to imagine a different kind of past—one filled with efforts to rectify social injustices. This book is no exception; it sheds much needed light on Sal Castro’s struggles to expand educational and civil rights and in so doing prods us to follow in his footsteps and build a more emancipatory future.”
—Ernesto Chávez, University of Texas at El Paso
384 pages  $34.95 cloth

THE TEJANO DIASPORA
Mexican Americanism and Ethnic Politics in Texas and Wisconsin
MARC SIMON RODRIGUEZ
“No extant work portrays and documents the links between the migrant phenomenon and political activism in Texas and the Midwest so thoroughly as The Tejano Diaspora. This original and important story is one of the finest scholarly studies to date of the Chicano movement.”
—Dionicio Valdés, Michigan State University
Published in association with the William P. Clements Center for Southwest Studies, Southern Methodist University
256 pages  $39.95 cloth

TERMS OF INCLUSION
Black Intellectuals in Twentieth-Century Brazil
PAULINA L. ALBERTO
“This well-organized and gracefully written book provides a much more complex, subtle, and nuanced picture of Afro-Brazilian activists and their movements than any previous work. A very welcome, important addition to research on race in Latin America.”
—George Reid Andrews, author of Blackness in the White Nation
408 pages  $69.95 cloth / $29.95 paper

FIGHTING THEIR OWN BATTLES
Mexican Americans, African Americans, and the Struggle for Civil Rights in Texas
BRIAN D. BEHNKEN
“This is the first major historical analysis to trace the roots of the generally separate, and often disparate, efforts of African Americans and Mexican Americans for equal rights under the law. A pioneering study in U.S. and Texas history . . . should spark debate and, hopefully, shed more light on this complex and significant subject.”
—Amilcar Shabazz, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
368 pages  $45.00 cloth

A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CUBA DURING THE U.S. OCCUPATION, 1898-1902
MARIAL IGLESIAS UTSET
Translated by Russ Davidson
“Graphically captures the turmoil of the important transitional period as Cuba moved from centuries of Spanish colonial rule to subordination under the United States after the critical war of 1895-1898. Davidson’s excellent translation matches the exceptionally elegant language of the original Spanish text.”
—Franklin W. Knight, Johns Hopkins University
232 pages  $69.95 cloth / $26.95 paper

NEW IN PAPERBACK
THAT INFERNAL LITTLE CUBAN REPUBLIC
The United States and the Cuban Revolution
LARS SCHOULTZ
760 pages  $29.95

HAVANA AND THE ATLANTIC IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
ALEJANDRO DE LA FUENTE
With the collaboration of César García del Pino and Bernardo Iglesias Delgado
304 pages  $24.95
The Latin American Studies Association (LASA) is the largest professional association in the world for individuals and institutions engaged in the study of Latin America. With over 5,500 members, thirty-five percent of whom reside outside the United States, LASA is the one association that brings together experts on Latin America from all disciplines and diverse occupational endeavors, across the globe.

LASA’s mission is to foster intellectual discussion, research, and teaching on Latin America, the Caribbean, and its people throughout the Americas, promote the interests of its diverse membership, and encourage civic engagement through network building and public debate.