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


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Opinions expressed herein are those of individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Latin American Studies Association or its officers.

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Edelberto Torres-Rivas

Recipient of the Kalman Silvert Award for 2010

Empecé tarde mi desempeño como sociólogo, a los 33 años (1964) cuando vivía en Chile. Antes fui militante político en Guatemala; desde los 17 años ingresé a las juventudes comunistas, época en que una generación joven se volcó a trabajar en la reforma agraria de Arbenz. Chile me cambió la vida, dejé la abogacía y la militancia. Profundamente preocupado por Centroamérica me dediqué a la comprensión de sus problemas desde entonces. En Santiago publiqué mi primer libro, *Procesos y Estructuras de una Sociedad Dependiente* (ed. PLA, 1970) que con modificaciones y otro nombre apareció en Costa Rica (Educa, 1972), como *Interpretación del Desarrollo Social Centroamericano*. Fue una propuesta comprensiva de la historia de la nación centroamericana, inspirada por Fernando Cardoso, con quien trabajé. El libro se convirtió en texto de estudio y se han publicado, a la fecha, unas 90.000 copias.


Viví en Costa Rica desde 1971, vecino a los países que se hundían en el vértigo de la guerra civil. Con ánimo de entender esa terrible crisis investigué y luego publiqué varios libros, de los que destaco *La Crisis Política en Centroamérica* (EDUCA, 1981) y *La Democracia Posible* (Educa, 1987). He fatigado mi vida entre la docencia, la investigación y la administración académica. En 1972 fundé con varios colegas el Programa Centroamericano para el Desarrollo de las Ciencias Sociales, de larga existencia y vinculado a las universidades de la región; y la Escuela Centroamericana de Ciencias Sociales. En 1975 fui electo secretario ejecutivo de la Asociación Latinoamericana de Sociología (ALAS), cuyos congresos contribuí a organizar en San José (1975) y Quito (1977). En 1985 fui nombrado Secretario General de FLACSO, por 9 años. Dirigí el Instituto Centroamericano de Documentación e Investigación Social (ICADIS, 1987) en San

José y coordiné la Misión de Internacional IDEA, en Guatemala (1998), que culminó con el libro *Democracia en Guatemala, la Misión de un Pueblo Entero*.

Fundé y dirigí dos revistas, cada una con 13 años de vida: *Estudios Sociales Centroamericanos* (1971/84) y *Polémica* (1984/97). Entre 1975 y 1995 publiqué unos 50 artículos y ensayos para libros, revistas, y recopilaciones. Destaco 3 de ellos que me parecen aceptable por su profundidad u originalidad. Ellos son *La Nación, problemas teóricos e históricos*; *Derrota Oligárquica, crisis burguesa, revolución popular, teoría de las dos crisis en Centroamérica*; y *Ocho Claves para comprender la Crisis Política en Centroamérica* (publicados en México, 1981, 1982 y 1986, respectivamente). Este último ensayo, a mi juicio, es el análisis mejor logrado de los muchos que hice sobre la guerra civil en América Central.

Quisiera destacar lo que para mi constituyó la realización de un sueño, la iniciativa, coordinación y redacción (de un tomo) del macro proyecto “*Historia y Sociedad en Centroamérica*”, que vinculó a 32 de los mejores especialistas de la región y otros países (1989-1992). Preparamos 6 tomos de la *Historia General de Centroamérica*, publicada en Madrid con el patrocinio de la Comisión Estatal del Quinto Centenario; fueron 5.000 ejemplares en la edición española y 3.000 copias en Costa Rica. No existe nada parecido hasta el momento.

De regreso a Guatemala (1996) di clases en varias universidades, dirigí varios programas de postgrado y publiqué varios libros, de los que destaco *Negociando el futuro: la paz en una sociedad violenta* (Guatemala, FLACSO, 1997) que me aproximó al tema de la democracia y la paz; *¿Porqué no votan los guatemaltecos?*, con Horacio Boneo (Guatemala, PNUD, 2000),



una crítica a la calidad democrática recién alcanzada por el país. Y *Encrucijadas e Incertezas en la izquierda centroamericana* (FLACSO, Guatemala, 1998) revisión de las tensiones entre las fuerzas comprometidas con el cambio revolucionario y luego su participación en el orden que habían combatido. Desde 2001 vinculado a FLACSO, contribuí a fundar y dirigí el Programa Centroamericano de Posgrado en Ciencias Sociales (2006/2008).

A partir de 1990 actúo como Asesor Académico del Programa Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano, inspirado en la visión filosófica de Amartya Sen. He participado en la preparación de 9 Informes Nacionales, dedicados a diversos problemas y a 3 Informes Regionales. A partir de esa fecha, he publicado varios libros de los que destaco dos: *La Piel de Centroamérica: introducción a 75 años de historia* (tres ediciones en FLACSO Costa Rica, El Salvador y Guatemala, 2006); este libro retoma la reflexión sobre los problemas del desarrollo y de la historia regional que aparecen en el primer libro que publiqué hace 40 años. Y *Percepción Ciudadana de la Democracia*, con F. Rodas (Pnud, Guatemala, 2008). De unos veinte ensayos, destaco tres: *¿Qué democracias emergen de la guerra civil?* en *La Democracia en América Latina*, un Barco a la Deriva, ed. Waldo Ansaldi, (Buenos Aires, FCE, 2007); *Metáfora de una Sociedad que se Castiga a sí misma*, (Revista de la Universidad, Guatemala, 2006); y *Guatemala, un Edificio de Cinco Pisos* (2005, publicado en varios sitios).

President's Report

by JOHN COATSWORTH | Columbia University | jhc2125@columbia.edu

KALMAN SILVERT AWARD *continued...*

Desde que llegué a Chile a mediados de los sesenta del siglo XX para obtener la Maestría en Sociología (FLACSO) y hasta el día de hoy, lo único que he intentado es ofrecer algunas respuestas a los muchos interrogantes que han planteado y siguen planteando nuestras sociedades centroamericanas.

La presentación del Profesor Torres-Rivas tendrá lugar el día viernes 8 de octubre a las 10:00 am en la sala Essex del hotel Sheraton Centre Toronto. ■

As LASA members have already learned from the Secretariat, LASA has succeeded in reducing room rates at the LASA2010 Congress hotels in Toronto from 205 Canadian dollars (US\$195) to 195 (US \$188) for single and double rooms. Members who have already reserved rooms will pay the new, lower rates. Rooms were still available at both of the Congress hotels as this issue of the *LASA Forum* went to press. For those who have not yet reserved space, rooms may be reserved on line at <http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/eng/congress/accommodations.asp>. The deadline for reserving at the new rates is September 11, 2010.

In other LASA news, our 2012 Congress will take us back to the United States for the first time since LASA2007 moved from Boston to Montreal. We will meet in San Francisco on May 24-26, 2012. LASA's Executive Council (EC) decided in 2007 to move LASA's Congresses outside the United States until U.S. visa policy changed. As I reported last year in this column, the United States resumed issuing visas to Cuban scholars and scientists shortly after the Obama administration took office. It has since continued to do so. Many Cuban colleagues were routinely denied U.S. visas starting in October 2004 when the Bush administration refused to grant visas to 64 Cuban scholars who had planned to attend the LASA Congress in Las Vegas.

It is good news that the policy of blanket denials has ended. Since at least *that* policy has changed, albeit without fanfare, LASA will resume meeting in the United States. Holding LASA2012 in San Francisco will allow us to welcome our Cuban colleagues back to the United States. The Association, of course, will continue to look for opportunities to hold its Congresses elsewhere, especially in Latin America—maybe even in Havana.



Another change in U.S. policy has also proved helpful to ensuring Cuban participation in LASA Congresses. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Treasury Department issued licenses to LASA that allowed the Association to provide travel grants for Cubans to attend each of the last two LASA Congresses (in Montreal and Rio de Janeiro).

By the time this *LASA Forum* is mailed in August, other changes in U.S. policy toward Cuba may also be underway. Since Washington welcomed the release of Cuban prisoners in July, ending restrictions on travel to Cuba and easing restrictions on trade should now be in prospect—assuming, of course, that U.S. policymakers and members of Congress actually mean what they say. ■

The Chilean Earthquake of 2010

Three Perspectives on One Disaster

by STEVEN S. VOLK | Oberlin College | steven.volk@oberlin.edu

In 1755, Lisbon was shattered by a massive earthquake, three tsunamis, and dozens of raging fires. For the city's Jesuit leaders, destruction by earth, water, and fire was proof that God intended Lisbon's destruction and that prayer was the only path forward. Lisbon's secular leaders reasoned differently. As Prime Minister Sebastião de Melo, the future Marquis de Pombal, simply recommended: "Bury the dead and heal the living." The Lisbon earthquake, with its stark views of cause and effect, has defined the boundary between pre-modern and modern for many philosophers.¹

Chile's February 27, 2010 earthquake, by all estimates, was stronger than the Lisbon *temblor*, measuring 8.8 on the Richter scale, although the physical destruction it caused has been more tempered. The latest estimates are that 521 people died in the quake, which destroyed or seriously damaged as many as 300,000 residential units. Authorities place total damage at US\$30 billion, approximately 18 percent of Chile's GNP.² Still, like the Lisbon quake, a natural disaster of this enormity has led Chilean leaders to ponder larger questions as they consider what happened and how to move on. Not unlike Hurricane Katrina or the Haitian quake that struck six weeks earlier, the Chilean earthquake exposed a series of preexisting political and economic fault lines while also ramping up persistent anxieties, more so as it struck just two weeks before the first elected conservative president in fifty years was due to take office.

Examining the Chilean quake on the basis of press reports and a short trip to Chile in mid-April, I will evaluate the disaster through three distinct, if overlapping, sets of narratives. The first, emerging closest to the quake itself and largely generated by reports of looting, questioned what Chile "had become" and what (who?) was to blame for

such appalling behavior. Within a few weeks, that discussion shifted to one centered on the challenges of reconstruction: not just how it would be financed and organized, but what kind of society would rise from the rubble. A final narrative, woven through each of the first two, was more existential and questioned how the disaster would impact Chile's quest to reach the status of a "developed" nation, to become, as it were, a "Portugal" (although that doesn't seem quite as attractive now as it was three months ago).

The Immediate Impact: A Dark Night of the Soul?

The earthquake, which jolted sleepers awake at 3:34 am, was centered on the coast between Concepción and Talca. While damage was considerable in Santiago, 200 miles to the north, cities closer to the epicenter were devastated, and entire coastal villages in the VII and VIII Regions were swallowed up by the trailing tsunami. Reporting on the physical damage caused by the quake—most often featuring images of a modern, fifteen-story apartment building in Concepción resting on its side like a pile of Legos knocked over by an angry three-year old—was soon replaced by stories of "widespread" looting. The U.S. press gave ample coverage to the dramatic plea of Concepción's *gremialista* mayor, Jacqueline van Rysselberghe, to Santiago: "Fear is everywhere. Armed men with pistols are attacking residential homes...Send the largest number of troops possible."³

There is considerable evidence that these reports, with video loops of the same stores being ransacked again and again, were exaggerated, but they provided an immensely troubling narrative for a political class uniformly horrified by the highly unflattering comparisons to Haiti they

engendered.⁴ For the ultra-conservative UDI senator, Jovino Novoa, the earthquake exposed the "dark part of the national soul," while Jorge Insunza, his ideological antonym, was moved, like a latter-day Sarmiento, to consider "what separates barbarism and civilization."⁵ That both right and left in Santiago were quick to accept the worst about their fellow citizens speaks volumes about Chile's political leadership. Still, each had an explanation for such behavior. For Novoa, the fault lay in a twenty-year history (i.e., the span of center-left—*Concertación*—governments since Pinochet's departure) that "protected delinquents," stressed "rights at the expense of responsibilities," and led to a "deterioration" of the family and the "social decomposition" of Chile.⁶ For Insunza, the looting was rooted in a forty-year history (i.e., Pinochet's dictatorship and the neoliberal economic model it cemented in place) that privileged the "exaltation of greed, and [the promotion] of individualism which has cultivated a cynical nihilism and the primacy of the law of the strongest over cooperation and solidarity."⁷ In Chile the past is never far from the present.

Thus it was the past, beyond doubt, that influenced President Bachelet's highly unpopular decision to delay sending troops into Concepción.⁸ True, Bachelet would leave office only days later with approval ratings to make President Obama, if not Kim Jong-il, weep with envy.⁹ But even after two decades of civilian rule and the emergence of a post-Pinochet military, Bachelet, a Socialist, found it bitterly painful to return the military to the streets. The past is also present in how the earthquake affected Chileans. It is hardly original to observe that natural disasters pound the poor more than the rich: the Chilean earthquake, which was 500 times more powerful than the Haitian, resulted in almost 500 times fewer deaths than in the much poorer country.

VOLK *continued...*

But the Chilean quake revealed the vulnerabilities of *both* poor *and* middle classes in a state that had been shaped by a “unanimous belief by right and left in [maintaining] the primacy of economic growth and free markets” over all else.¹⁰

The quake’s impact on the poor could most easily be seen as one headed south from Santiago. Talca, the capital of the VII Region (Maule), a city of nearly 200,000 people, had been bypassed by Santiago’s building boom. And so, when the quake hit, it turned the old city center, home to a largely poor population, to rubble.¹¹ Poor fishing villages like Dichato and Coliumo were pulverized by the tsunami. A week after the wave hit, houses still floated in the sea and a fishing boat rested in the forest, five kilometers from the water.¹²

Yet this was not a natural disaster that sought out only the poor; perhaps it was the first neoliberal earthquake. Many of the buildings that collapsed in Santiago were older structures, but among the most seriously damaged were twenty-three upscale apartment towers built after 1995.¹³ There is mounting evidence that these buildings, projects of Chile’s largest construction firms, suffered from flaws in architectural design, soil mechanics and construction materials. The municipalities charged with assuring compliance with building codes had long since been stripped of their regulatory oversight. As Francis Psenninger, an architect at the University of Chile, observed, “The only way the success of a project is measured is through its profitability,” and corners were cut as engineering firms were hired to supervise their own work.¹⁴ Marco Enríquez-Ominami, an unsuccessful leftist candidate in the recent presidential elections, argued that it only took one earthquake to reveal that Chile’s “economic miracle stands on feet of clay.”¹⁵ But it seems unlikely that the

quake will change Chile’s deregulatory mania, particularly with Sebastián Piñera of the conservative *Coalición por el Cambio*, an entrepreneur with substantial ties to a number of construction firms, recently installed in the Moneda.¹⁶

The Middle-Term Outlook: What Kind of Reconstruction?

With the dead located and buried, and a new president installed, attention turned to reconstruction, specifically how the rebuilding would be financed, who would undertake the largest projects, and what would replace the rubble. The government estimates a public sector responsibility of US\$8-10 billion in a total reconstruction bill of \$30 billion.¹⁷ To the surprise of supporters and detractors alike, Piñera’s reconstruction financing plans include a 3 percent (temporary) rise in the income taxes paid by large corporations and a hike in the royalties paid by Chile’s mining companies (voluntary, but hard to refuse), as well as a bond issue, the withdrawal of a modest amount from Chile’s sovereign wealth fund, built up during years of strong copper prices, a higher tobacco tax, and the sale of two state-owned firms, including Aguas Andinas.¹⁸ Enríquez-Ominami Twittered his quick approval; Senator Alejandro Navarro, who broke with the Socialist Party in 2008 to form the Movimiento Amplio Social, slyly called Piñera’s first speech to Congress in which the plans were laid out, the “best speech of the *Concertación*.”¹⁹ But winning approval for the reconstruction package in the Senate (where Piñera’s coalition is a minority) and the lower house (where he has to rely on three members of a small centrist party), could prove challenging.

While debate continues on specific aspects of the President’s plan—the *Concertación*

wants to make corporate tax hikes permanent—the reconstruction proposal provides a way to divine Piñera’s long term goals. In the first place, while it should be no surprise to any who have followed his career, Piñera has long been more pragmatist than *gremialista* ideologue. He supported corporate tax hikes in 1990 and 2001, and his decision to throw a tax rise into the mix is both a deliberate challenge to his UDI partners, already marginalized in his cabinet, and an indication of his likely desire to fashion a stable centrist coalition.²⁰

Secondly, while the debate over the macroeconomic implications of reconstruction continues in Congress, actions on the ground move forward quickly. To see this, we return to Talca. Nearly two months after the quake, more than 2,500 families remained homeless, more than 90 percent from the old city center. The vacuum left by the destruction of their homes has been filled by dozens of real estate agents, investors, and builders, all looking to construct a modern city center in Talca—and offering home owners less than half of what their property is worth. Many, with no other resources, are accepting.²¹ One can already see the consequences of the reconstruction that is taking place: in the move to “modernize” the post-quake environment, the poor are absorbing the greatest costs, both directly in the affected areas and nationally, to the extent that public investment in social services will be negatively impacted by a shift into private sector construction projects.²²

Finally, Piñera’s reconstruction plans have not only reopened ideological fault lines between his *Renovación Nacional* (RN) party and *gremialismo* (UDI), but between the largest Chilean corporations, where his own roots—and investments—lie, and the “pymes” (*pequeñas y medianas empresas*). Although the president, in his May 21

address to Congress, spoke of his respect for the role of small and medium-sized enterprise in Chile, his first reconstruction project (“Manos a la Obra”) transferred \$15 million to 239 municipal governments, allowing them to buy construction materials, but only from one of the country’s three largest hardware firms.²³

The Long-Run: To Be Developed

Much fun was made of Chile’s contribution to the 1992 Seville world’s fair: an iceberg towed across the Atlantic. While the gesture was intended to mobilize a piece of nature to launch a narrative about Chilean progress, it inevitably produced competing narratives. So it is with Chile’s 2010 earthquake: an act of nature has produced different perspectives on Chile’s future. While it is unlikely that the February disaster will alter the fundamental economic agreements that have governed Chile for thirty-five years, the earthquake did illuminate a central anxiety shared by much of the elite political class: what will this do to Chile’s quest to be “developed,” a goal that will be met, Piñera reassures, by 2018. Chilean elites have dreamed of joining the ranks of the “developed” for decades, if not centuries. For those who inhabit Santiago’s trendy neighborhoods and frequent its posh restaurants, what that dream implies has already been achieved. And yet they worry that it could all disappear in the blink of an eye. As UDI Senator Víctor Pérez put it, “in one minute 45 seconds, we went back decades in infrastructure and advancements...”²⁴ Maybe that anxiety comes wrapped in the DNA of those who live in a country with an unforgiving history of earthquakes. Or perhaps, since in Chile the past is never far from the present, the anxiety is linked to a different history, one in which the high-rise dreams of the elites almost tumbled into the hands of the poor.

What is certain is that for those left with nothing but a pile of rubble in Talca, the question to be posed to Senator Pérez is: what do you mean “we”?

Endnotes

- ¹ See Susan Neiman, *Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Modern Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2002.
- ² <www.elmostrador.cl>, May 15, 2010, and Fernando Gualdoni, “No hay razón para que la región no pueda derrotar al subdesarrollo,” *El País* [Madrid], May 18, 2010.
- ³ Jonathan Franklin, “Chile Struggles to Contain Chaos,” *Washington Post*, March 2, 2010. *Gremialismo* refers to the aggressively conservative movement based on professional and business organizations which organized in opposition to Salvador Allende’s government, provided Pinochet’s ideological orientation, and institutionalized as the Unión Democrático Independiente (UDI), one of the two largest conservative parties, with the return to civilian rule in 1990. It was part of the conservative coalition headed by Sebastián Piñera that won election earlier this year.
- ⁴ Benjamin Witte and Sara Miller Llana, “Chile Earthquake: ‘Looters Run Wild’? Not Quite,” *Christian Science Monitor*, March 1, 2010.
- ⁵ Jovino Novoa, “Lado oscuro del alma nacional,” and Jorge Insunza, “Barbarie y civilización,” both in *El Mercurio*, March 7, 2010.
- ⁶ Novoa, “Lado oscuro.”
- ⁷ Insunza, “Barbarie.”
- ⁸ “Gobierno reprueba por actuación frente al terremoto,” *El Mercurio*, March 7, 2010.
- ⁹ More than 84 percent of those polled voiced a positive opinion of Bachelet’s government <www.elmostrador.cl>, March 14, 2010 [“El 73% de chilenos cree que Piñera lo hará igual o mejor que Bachelet.”]
- ¹⁰ Editorial <www.elmostrador.cl>, May 5, 2010.

¹¹ <http://ciperchile.cl>, April 27, 2010.

¹² <http://ciperchile.cl>, March 5, 2010.

¹³ <http://ciperchile.cl>, March 15, 2010.

¹⁴ Pascale Bonnefoy, “Why Were Chile’s Newest Buildings Prone to Destruction?” <globalpost.com/dispatch/chile/100315/building-codes-earthquake>, March 17, 2010.

¹⁵ *El Mercurio*, April 10, 2010, A2.

¹⁶ <http://ciperchile.cl>, March 18, 2010.

¹⁷ *El Mercurio*, April 9, 2010, B2.

¹⁸ *La Nación*, April 17, 2010, 4.

¹⁹ <http://elmostrador.cl>, May 21, 2010.

²⁰ For more on the president, see Manuel Salazar, *Sebastián Piñera* (Santiago: Momentum), 2009.

²¹ “Nuevo terremoto en Talca” <http://ciperchile.cl>, April 27, 2010.

²² “Chile’s Reconstruction after Earthquake Will Slow Economic Recovery,” Euromonitor Global Market Research Blog, April 14, 2010 <http://blog.euromonitor.com/2010/04/chiles-reconstruction-after-earthquake-will-slow-economic-recovery.html>.

²³ Pascale Bonnefoy, “Who Is Profiting from Rebuilding Chile?” globalpost.com, April 14, 2010 <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/chile/100412/earthquake-reconstruction-pinera>.

²⁴ “UDI respalda plan para financiar la reconstrucción del país” <http://www.elmostrador.cl>, March 13, 2010. ■

“Small Earthquake in Chile: Not Many Dead”

by PATRICIO NAVIA | New York University | pdn200@nyu.edu

To fully comprehend the effects of Chile’s recent earthquake, we must also analyze two other events that resulted from the 8.8, nineteen-second quake that struck central Chile at 3.34 AM on the summer night of February 27, 2010. In addition to the *terremoto* itself, the tsunami that hit coastal areas less than an hour later and the looting that took place a day after in Concepción, Talcahuano and other towns are now inseparable elements of the strongest earthquake to hit Chile in fifty years. The three combined have redefined politics and offer an opportunity for Chile to learn from its mistakes and shortcomings.

The Quake

The earthquake itself should not have made as much news. Chile suffers from earthquakes. Wikipedia counts thirty-two reported tremors of magnitude six or higher since 1575. Because Wikipedia is much better at recording recent events, nine of those reported events have occurred this year alone. *Revista Enfoque*, published in the area most heavily hit, listed, in its April 2010 issue, twenty tsunami-causing earthquakes since the Spaniards arrived. The Spaniards arrived in Chile in 1536, built their first settlement in 1541 and a fortress in Penco, near Concepción, in 1550. Twelve years later, Spanish *conquistadores* experienced their first *terremoto* on October 28, 1562, in Concepción. Ten years later, in 1572, *conquistadores* in Concepción reported—exaggerating—that the sea retreated ten kilometers before the tsunami hit. During colonial years, recordkeeping was not the most accurate. Thus, it probably did not last the reported fifteen minutes, but the May 13, 1647 earthquake that hit Santiago is still considered the most devastating during the colonial period.

The list of earthquakes of magnitude seven or higher is long: Valparaíso in 1730, Concepción in 1751, Concepción in 1835, Arica in 1868, Valparaíso in 1906, and Vallenar in 1922. None seems to have left as lasting an impression as that of Chillán in 1939 (magnitude 7.8) and Valdivia in 1960 (magnitude 9.5, the strongest on record in the history of the world). The Chillán earthquake killed some 30,000 people. The cities of Concepción and Chillán suffered major damage, including the destruction of the Catholic cathedrals. The center-left Popular Front government of Pedro Aguirre Cerda—with his young health minister, Salvador Allende—spent heavily to rebuild the region. But with its sleek modernist Catholic Cathedral, Chillán (*nuevo*, as opposed to the destroyed and rebuilt Chillán Viejo) is a living testimony to the destructive power of quakes.

Though the Valdivia earthquake and tsunami of May 22, 1960 took place before Chile’s television era, and in a less densely populated area, the memories of that quake—which jeopardized Chile’s bid to host the 1962 World Cup tournament—are a constant feature in Chile. The 1991 film *La Frontera*, directed by Ricardo Larraín, is about a teacher who was relegated to Southern Chile for his opposition to the Pinochet dictatorship. In the town of Puerto Saavedra, he meets friends and foes whose lives were marked by the 1960 earthquake and tsunami. The film ends not with the end of the dictatorship but with another earthquake/tsunami. During the dictatorship years, *canto nuevo* music duo Schwenke y Nilo combined their protest songs with nostalgic accounts of the city of Valdivia before and after the devastating earthquake and tsunami. In a country of earthquakes, only one big earthquake can begin to erase the memory of previous ones. Perhaps that is why “Small Earthquake in Chile: Not Many Dead,” a phrase attributed to British

journalist Francis Claud Cockburn (1904–1981), is supposed to have been coined as an example of a highly accurate and highly boring newspaper heading, reflecting the undeniable truth that Chile and earthquakes are inevitably bound and will be so forever.

The 2010 earthquake was felt in most of Chile, but different parts of the 4,000-kilometer long country felt it with different intensity. The most heavily hit areas were the O’Higgins, Maule and Bio-Bio regions, which account for 23 percent of the nation’s population. The earthquake also caused some damage in the Santiago metropolitan area, which contains 41 percent of the population. The government estimated that the cost would mount to US\$30 billion (19 percent of GDP), though some private estimates put the figure at a much lower US\$10 billion (still a sizable 6 percent of GDP).

Chile is a sparsely populated country. With its 22.6 inhabitants per square kilometer, it ranks 192nd in the world. In contrast, Haiti ranks 31th, with a density of 361.5. Yet, even in a sparsely populated country, strong quakes kill people. Given that the death toll in Chile only reached 521, the earthquake was not a devastating tragedy—certainly not when compared with the Haitian earthquake of January 12, with its 300,000 deaths. In fact, the Chilean earthquake was among the strongest earthquakes with the lowest number of casualties in recent years.

Given the strength of the quake, the cost in lives and infrastructure was limited. This is because Chile had learned from past experience. Building and construction codes are strict and, for the most part, enforced. The scandals generated by occasional faulty construction—some apartment buildings in Santiago, Concepción and other cities, and overpasses on recently built highways in Santiago—and reckless construction

companies is evidence that, for the most part, Chile was well prepared for such a strong magnitude quake.

Countries can minimize the costs in lives and infrastructure by preparing for earthquakes. The limited number of deaths caused by the earthquake is a powerful testimony to a well-designed and well-implemented regulatory framework. Because there is state regulatory capacity and successive governments have designed and implemented sound policies to cope with earthquakes, Chile resisted fairly well what would have been a devastating earthquake elsewhere. The earthquake itself was not the news.

The Tsunami

The immediate state response to the quake showed gigantic limitations in state capacity. After the quake, the state emergency protocols failed to work. Coordination between the National Emergency Office (ONEMI) and the Navy Oceanographic Services (SHOA) was clearly insufficient. SHOA faxed —yes, faxed!—a tsunami warning to ONEMI with vague information. ONEMI failed to issue a public warning before the tsunami. Even if it had issued a warning, it had no protocol in place to evacuate populations at risk. The destructive power of the tsunami cost more lives than the earthquake itself. The coastal towns of Constitución, where eighty-seven people died, Pelluhue (thirty-two deaths) and Talcahuano were devastated by the tsunami.

Little can be done to prepare for a tsunami. Refraining from building near the ocean is not an option for coastal towns whose livelihoods depend on fishing, tourism or, in the case of Talcahuano, naval operations and port activities. An earthquake with an epicenter in the ocean will irremediably

destroy infrastructure and housing in nearby coastal cities, but deaths caused by tsunamis are preventable. The absence of an appropriate emergency protocol to inform the population and evacuate before a tsunami reflects a deadly shortcoming of the Chilean state. Lack of preparation, insufficient funding, and inability to coordinate are responsible for most of the tsunami-related deaths. An ongoing investigation in the Chamber of Deputies will assign political responsibility for the ineffective immediate response by the government. Right-wing legislators, however, seem more interested in putting the blame on former President Michelle Bachelet, a likely contender for the presidency in 2013, than in accepting that there was insufficient and inadequate state capacity to prepare and deal with a natural disaster of such magnitude.

True, there is political responsibility as well. The Navy failed to do its job properly. The National Emergency Office was not in control, nor did it have all the information easily available on the Internet. The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center, an Internet site that belongs to the U.S. government, was offering more information than Chilean authorities. In fact, a couple of hours after the earthquake, President Bachelet herself and other government officials discarded the possibility of a tsunami, not knowing that one had already devastated a few coastal towns. Lack of communication seriously impeded the government's ability to react adequately in the first hours after the quake. Lack of planning made the government excessively dependent on cell phone communication and electrically operated equipment. When electricity and cell phone networks went down, the government was left blind and deaf, incommunicado with its regional offices in the hardest hit areas and an official government warning would have helped little.

Fortunately, most people in at-risk areas fled to high areas immediately after the earthquake, thus reducing the number of fatalities. But the insufficient state capacity to provide information and an immediate response after the earthquake shows the limitations of an economic model that relies too heavily on private initiative and restricts the state to a regulatory function. The regulations themselves worked well. But governments need a well-functioning, strong and agile state apparatus to fulfill their public-safety obligations and to lead a rapid, effective and efficient response immediately after a natural disaster.

The Looting

The third component of the earthquake experience was the most surprising, graphic, and politically charged. Less than one day after the earthquake, in the city of Concepción, the second largest in the country, and other smaller towns, people went into supermarkets and stores—which had remained closed due to lack of electricity, running water, gas and telecommunications—to get food, water and other supplies. Rather than delivering those goods in an orderly fashion, government officials and the police were confronted by mobs of people moving into supermarkets. Soon, the need to access potable water and food turned into looting. People walked out of mega supermarkets with high definition televisions, clothing, jewelry and electronics. The *carabineros* were outnumbered. Media crews were covering the story and the earthquake aftershocks soon turned into lawlessness.

The earthquake came at a most inconvenient political moment. President-elect Sebastián Piñera was due to take office on March 11. He had already appointed his cabinet, but the transition was not going smoothly.

NAVIA *continued...*

Many officials in the outgoing Bachelet administration had already stepped down; others were on vacation. After all, most Chileans vacation in February. As the six-day, highly popular Festival de la Canción de Viña del Mar was about to end the night of February 27, many politicians were also on vacation. There is little political news in the summer—none when the Festival de Viña del Mar is on. Despite clamors to send the Army onto the street to help guarantee order, President Bachelet hesitated. According to some, she did not want to leave power with the troops patrolling the streets. Most likely, she did not know how devastating the earthquake and tsunami had been in many towns. More than fear of the military, Bachelet's indecision was caused by lack of awareness. Both are problematic, but fear of the military reflects an unfinished transition and unconsolidated democracy, while lack of awareness reflects an ill-functioning state.

Eventually, Bachelet sent the army out to patrol the streets. People in Concepción cheered the tanks and the troops. In a well-functioning democracy, that is normal. It is not nostalgia for military rule. With the army on the streets, looting stopped and emergency aid began to arrive to the hardest hit areas. But the damage was done. The earthquake and tsunami were inescapably associated with the subsequent looting.

The Aftershocks

When he was inaugurated on March 11, twelve days later, President Piñera became Chile's first right-wing president since Pinochet—and the first democratically elected conservative in fifty-two years. His own inauguration was almost interrupted minutes before it began by a 6.9 aftershock. The images of highly troubled—if not openly scared—foreign leaders circled the

world. Spanish Prince Felipe joked, saying that one should only be concerned with earthquakes when Chileans get scared. The February 27 earthquake gave Chileans reasons to not be scared but to be concerned. On the positive side, the infrastructure resisted well, and few lives were lost. On the negative, the insufficient capacity of the state to provide immediate response, including an adequate tsunami-warning protocol, to secure order and to provide basic needs to those most affected by the disaster highlights the limitations of the Chilean model. In its most basic and oversimplifying form, while the regulatory state worked well, the hands-on and immediate response state failed. As Chileans learn lessons, they should take note. A strong and effective regulatory state is not sufficient. Earthquakes and other natural and social emergencies do happen. If the state is not sufficiently prepared and strong enough to deal with them, the end cost can be very high. ■

Earthquake in Chile Poverty and Social Diagnoses

by CLARA HAN | Johns Hopkins University | clarahan@jhu.edu

Chile's February 27 earthquake occurred in the midst of an historical turning point in the country's politics. In eleven days, President Michelle Bachelet of the Concertación—the coalition of center-left parties that had governed the country since the end of the dictatorship—would leave office and the millionaire businessman, Sebastián Piñera, would become the country's first democratically elected right-wing president in fifty years. The earthquake not only marked this political transition in the present and established material conditions that have shaped and will continue to shape the incoming president's tenure, but also, in the wake of institutional failures, it inspired diagnoses of present politics and society, shadowed by specific regions of the past.

In the first twenty-four hours, a complex situation emerged as Chile asserted its sovereignty in the face of the national disaster, delaying the acceptance of immediate offers of international aid. Without state backup systems, however, the provinces had effectively no communication with the capital, and the range and depth of devastation was both underestimated and, to a large extent, unknowable. In the midst of a confused state response, populations in the most affected areas of Concepción and El Maule experienced intensifying insecurity and desperation, and after forty-eight hours, scared, anguished, panic-stricken—and also angry—men and women broke into the supermarkets. Taken up and amplified by the media, such scenes of *los saqueos* projected a sense of social chaos.

In this commentary, I explore how images of “the poor” were projected in mainstream media and critical commentaries to diagnose the state of society. How were phrases such as “public order,” “social loyalty,” and “unrestrained consumerism” cast in relation

to the poor? What ideas of subjectivity and sociality underlay these social diagnoses?

“Social Earthquake”

As desperation grew on the second day of the earthquake, news of looting and pillaging was transmitted live across the country. A Televisión Nacional reporter interviewing men and women carrying packs of milk, bottled water, and foodstuffs, framed the question to them this way: “Is this robbery, is this vandalism, or is this necessity?” Seeing a group of youth carry off a refrigerator, this reporter exclaimed to them, “This is robbery! Did you know that?” Over television and Internet, video clips of men and women pushing up cargo loading doors of the large supermarket chains such as Líder in Concepción were shown as the moving image backdrop for updates on the unfolding crisis. These clips were posted on the daily newspaper *La Tercera's* website under the heading, “With neither God nor law.” In their repetition, the images generated an affective force, propelling judgment from state officials and media commentators. President Bachelet remarked, “Chile is indignant with the looters who seek to profit off the pain of the people” and that they would be subject to “all the rigor of the law.”

For several scholars, social critics, and social organizations, the looting demonstrated not only immediate institutional failures, but also failures of the model of development that has been followed, with important variations, since 1973 (Garcés, 2010; Brozvic et al, 2010; see also Winn, 2004; Ffrench-Davis and Stallings, 2001; Drake and Jaksic, 1999). This model has emphasized “decentralization” not in terms of resources, but rather in terms of local and individual responsibility, leaving provinces, families and individuals largely responsible

for themselves. Recently constructed apartment buildings collapsed due to lack of regulation. Fissured roads and collapsed bridges provided further evidence of the state's role as a broker between basic infrastructural development and private companies seeking contracts with little or no state oversight.

Such a picture of this state-market failure reverses and complicates the discussion of “disaster capitalism” and the ongoing emergency in post-Katrina New Orleans (see Adams et al., 2009; see also Klein, 2005). In the post-Katrina context, “The ‘state’ was erased as a functioning buffer for the poorest sectors of the socioeconomic hierarchy, and in its place a “free market” in private-sector development contracts emerged” (Adams, et al., 2009: 630). In Chile, the state is not posed against the “free market” or replaced by it; rather state and market “extend” each other. The state, through its active deregulation of building codes, work contracts, pensions and insurance, extends the market, while the market, through its securing of local development contracts, and partnership in social programs, extends the state.

For the poor and working class this synergistic extension has created local ecologies of poverty that depend upon the particular way in which state and market are hooked into each other at the municipal level, through social and health policies, employment, and local development schemes. Such local ecologies bear the institutional traces of Pinochet era reforms. While the post-dictatorship state has dramatically increased social spending, the frameworks within which social policies are actualized have important continuities with those established during the Pinochet regime. Decentralized social programs are targeted to those qualifying as “extremely poor.” At the same time, the state has engaged in an

HAN *continued...*

active deregulation of labor conditions, generating extreme precariousness for those qualifying as “extremely poor” and those who are simply “poor.”

For other social critics and public intellectuals, the looting affectively expressed the kind of society established and elaborated since the 1973 *golpe*, the “social earthquake.” Thus, the economic system has produced a “lack of social cohesion” as well as a culture of consumption and individualism, in which the protection of private property is valued above all else (see Dammert, 2010).

For example, Professor of Labor Law José Luis Ugarte, asks “..... *por qué nuestros pobres se transformaron tan rápido en nuestros bárbaros... ¿por qué en Chile apenas el orden se retira—cuando el brazo armado de la ley deja de atemorizar—los sectores pobres se sienten con el legítimo derecho de saquear y tomar aquello que de otro modo, los legales, no alcanzan? ¿Por qué tan poca lealtad con la sociedad... En sociedades altamente desiguales, en cambio, la cohesión y la lealtad social escasean y son sustituidas por la fuerza y el miedo—la mano dura como gusta decir tanto chileno.*” (Ugarte, 2010). For historian Gabriel Salazar, “profound frustration” and “*malestar interior*” is structurally produced through precarious labor, the consequent inability to form stable families, and lack of avenues for political expression: “*Todo esto explica que existe en Chile una masa social marginal que no puede consumir, vive en pobreza absoluta, que tiene frustraciones profundas y una potente inclinación a la delincuencia. Por eso, cualquier evento público tiende a terminar en vandalismo público*” (Salazar in *El Ciudadano*, April 29, 2010).

While such analyses point out underlying structural violence, I am concerned with the

way in which the poor seem to become transformed into a homogeneous mass in these commentaries—“our barbarians” or “the marginal social mass”—which exemplifies the effects of frustration and resentment of *society*, in which society is taken as a unified body that demands “social loyalty.” Yet, the specific ways in which the state and market extend each other have created particular local ecologies of poverty, that, in addition, are informed by their own local histories. How then can social analysis consider “communities of *ressentiment*” without losing their particularity, without transforming the poor into the mass, the dark side of the, perhaps transcendent, unity that is revealed in moments of crisis?

Densities of the Local: A Perspective

Perhaps such analysis requires a shift in perspective from commentary over an assumed society to the densities of the local, particularly amongst “the poor.” In my longitudinal work in La Pincoya, a *población* in the Northern Zone of Santiago, I have explored how neighborhood relations and complex family formations elaborate notions of reciprocity as well as tacit acknowledgements to secure an everyday characterized by extremely precarious labor and high levels of household debt. Such relations transfigure both the state’s attempt to pay the “social debt” of dictatorship to the poor through a variety of interventions on health and poverty as well as market mechanisms such as institutional credit and debt that have grown dramatically during the 1990s (Han, n-d). Over nine years, I have also been able to chart the small actions through which an everyday life is secured and made vulnerable among families and neighbors, in relation to each other, and also in relation to the state. It was upon this complex and dynamic ground that the earthquake occurred.

Let me chart the ensuing days of the earthquake in La Pincoya. I finally reached P by phone on the morning of February 28. In her mid-40s, over the past five years P has slowly entered into local social organizing, becoming *Presidenta de la Junta de Vecinos* and, along with her partner, and neighbors, organized a public protest against the expropriation of houses within the Municipality of Huechuraba. The earthquake had hit at the end of the month. For families in La Pincoya, the timing of the earthquake meant that either that they had not yet been paid or had just received their end-of-month pay. As P described to me, those who had received their end-of-month pay had spent much of that income towards buying bottled water for neighbors, family, and for themselves. The price of bread in some local stores had tripled or quadrupled over the weekend, and in the first twenty-four hours of the earthquake, all of the bottled water and soda in local corner stores had been sold. In the face of this momentary scarcity, P, her extended family, and neighbors on her street encouraged the children to consolidate all existing water into full bottles that could then be divided amongst them. Older children and adults began hauling water out of the canal to use for the toilets.

By Sunday afternoon, February 28, residents of La Pincoya still did not have water or electricity in their sector, even as neighboring wealthier sectors within the same municipality had their water and electricity restored. As scenes of looting continued to be amplified through the mainstream media, rumors of marauding La Pincoya gangs gained traction in a Twitter feed on Huechuraba: “*Turbas de La Pincoya vienen a saquear casas en Pedro Fontova.*” *La Tercera* ran an article on March 2 detailing how these communities had formed “*comités de vigilancia en cada microbarrio y con palos para repeler un posible ataque*” and

ending with the general of the Carabineros remarking that the police had received a series of false demands, waving off the rumors of public disturbance (Mendoza, 2010).

While fear and insecurity circulated amongst these wealthier sectors, a different sense of desperate insecurity mixed with local defiance grew within La Pincoya. Still waiting for water, and only able to get news from a few battery-powered radios, P related to me on the afternoon of March 1st that she walked down to the municipal offices to demand that water be trucked into the *población*. A water truck indeed arrived later that evening, accompanied by a few fistfights among neighbors spurred by those trying to jump the line. Nevertheless, the water truck was empty before it reached P's block. P asked the driver when he would come back, and the driver responded that he was not sure. His next responsibility was "to water the trees in Pedro Fontova." When describing the scene to me, P hesitated, saying that it hurt her to recount "such ugly little things," both the behavior of her neighbors and the truck driver's response. "I said to the driver, 'are you telling me that we are worth less than a plant?'" Such instances of insult and disappointment, paired together with receiving needed aid, form a complex of affects, stitching resentment, rage, impotence, and defiance together—forming one of many grounds upon which everyday life must flourish.

Other grounds include the small acts of sharing and caring that would not necessarily be called "solidarity" in ordinary language, seen in neighbors putting their kiddie pools into the middle of the street for the water truck, to fill for the whole block. "It was faster than filling individual bottles, and we could get more water to everyone that way," P told me.

While the earthquake could be seen as an extraordinary event that highlights the social inequalities and poverty lived by the majority of the Chilean population, illuminating the society's dark underbelly embodied in the "frustration" of the poor, a perspective from the local shows how this event is tethered into the everyday through multiple affective grounds, complicating any unified notion of the poor and the affects that "they" may express.

Solidarity and Individualism

In his essay, "Sociedad y política en el Chile del terremoto," sociologist Manuel Garretón compares "the distance between two epochs" from the 1960 earthquake that hit Valdivia and this year's earthquake, in terms of a certain loss or displacement of politics that has occurred as a result of the socio-economic model. Whereas fifty years earlier "*El país tuvo que enfrentar la gran tarea de reconstrucción y eso se proyectaría más adelante en los grandes proyectos de transformación social con convocatoria nacional, que vendrían del centro y la izquierda,*" today's society is characterized by "*la idea de país de oportunidades individuales, de sociedad como el ámbito de realización personal a lo que todo el resto queda subordinado... La política ha sido desplazada en su dimensión principal de construcción de una sociedad mejor*" (Garretón, 2010). Likewise, writer Ariel Dorfman compares the social values underlying responses to both earthquakes, as "*una lección en solidaridad*" in contrast with a society "*más egocéntrica e individualista donde, en vez de una visión de justicia social para todos, la ciudadanía se dedica en su mayoría, a consumir en forma desenfrenada, lo que acarrea, por lo demás, un estrés y deterioro psíquico considerable en la población*" (Dorfman, 2010).

Such contrasts raise the question of how culture is inherited from one generation to the next and how a culture can evolve. Is culture to be understood as a set of rules that one follows blindly, as moral values that we come to embody? Or, is another picture of culture possible, as anthropologist Veena Das discussing Wittgenstein remarks, "To have a future in language, the child should have been enabled to say 'and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires'" (Das, 1998: 171).

Such a picture of culture, as one that can evolve and produce "newness" with the expression of desires, carries important methodological commitments that could inform a re-thinking of contemporary subjectivity in Chile, as well as our criteria for "the political." What senses of belonging would emerge if we displaced such bipolar abstractions of past solidarity and present individualism, if we were to shift perspective to the everyday, to a different temporal horizon in which small acts matter as much as "grand projects in social transformation"? While acknowledging the disappointment embedded within such contrasts, we might find that a turn to the everyday offers other viable social ties that ordinary people are sustaining and slowly stitching into a different kind of political and moral ground, in the midst and in the aftermath of the earthquake.

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After the Earthquake Recovery and Sovereignty in Haiti

by ALEX DUPUY | Wesleyan University | adupuy@wesleyan.edu

Testifying before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 10, 2010, former president Bill Clinton, who is now serving as Special Envoy to Haiti for the United Nations, said that the trade liberalization policies he pushed in the 1990s that compelled Haiti to remove tariffs on imported rice from the United States “may have been good for some of my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a mistake... I had to live everyday with the consequences of the loss of capacity to produce a rice crop in Haiti to feed those people because of what I did, nobody else.”¹ Two weeks later, Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive appeared in front of the Haitian Senate to present the government’s post-earthquake recovery plan known as the Action Plan for the Reconstruction and National Development of Haiti. The Action Plan called for the creation of an Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) charged with formulating and implementing the programs and projects for the reconstruction of Haiti for 18 months after its ratification by the Haitian Parliament. The idea of the IHRC, however, had been conceived earlier by the U.S. State Department, not the Haitian Government. The IHRC is comprised of seventeen voting members, ten of whom are representatives of the international community (one each from the main international financial institutions [IFIs]: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank; one each from the major donor countries: Brazil, Canada, France, and the United States; one from the CARICOM, and one each from other private donors). Former president Clinton, who will co-chair the Commission with Prime Minister Bellerive, is the tenth voting member. Seven members will be from Haiti (three nominated by the executive [Bellerive], judiciary, and local authorities; one each from the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, one from the business community, and one

from the trade unions). Haitian President René Préval retains veto power over its decisions.

When questioned by members of the Haitian Senate as to whether Haiti, in effect, had surrendered its sovereignty to the IHRC, Prime Minister Bellerive responded candidly, “I hope you sense the dependency in this document. If you don’t sense it, you should tear it up. I am optimistic that in 18 months... we will be autonomous in our decisions. But right now I have to assume, as prime minister, that we are not.”² Following a rancorous debate on April 15, the Senate voted narrowly to ratify the creation of the IHRC after the Chamber of Deputies had done so the week before by a larger majority.

These two rare admissions by high-ranking public officials representing the two sides of the international community-Haiti partnership express succinctly the dilemma that Haiti faces in rebuilding its shattered economy in the wake of the earthquake. Recent estimates put the number of dead at 300,000. Around 80 percent of the capital city of Port-au-Prince and surrounding towns and villages have been destroyed, and more than 1.2 million people have been left homeless. Reconstruction costs are estimated to reach \$11.5 billion.

As accurate as the prime minister’s statement is about Haiti’s dependence on and subordination to the international community, that state of affairs did not originate with the creation of the IHRC. Rather than recounting the long history of foreign domination in Haiti, we can consider the 1970s as having marked a major turning point in understanding the factors that created the conditions that existed on the eve of the earthquake and contributed to its devastating impact.

In return for military and economic aid from the United States and other core countries (notably Canada and France), the regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier—which succeeded that of his father (1957-1971)—turned over the formulation of economic policy for Haiti to the IFIs. These institutions henceforth pursued a twofold strategy that succeeded, on the one hand, in turning Haiti into a supplier of the cheapest labor in the Western Hemisphere—mostly for the export assembly industries established by both foreign and domestic investors—and, on the other hand, one of the largest importers of U.S.-produced food in the Caribbean Basin. These outcomes were achieved through a series of “structural adjustment” policies that maintained low wages, dismantled all obstacles to free trade, removed tariffs and quantitative restrictions on imports, offered tax incentives to the manufacturing industries on their profits and exports, privatized public enterprises, reduced public-sector employment, and curbed social spending to reduce fiscal deficits.

By the end of the 1980s and early 1990s however, the IFIs came to realize that the export assembly strategy they advocated, despite all the advantages it may have had, did not create the conditions for a more sustainable development of the Haitian economy.³ Even at the height of its operation in the mid-1980s, the assembly industry never employed more than seven percent of the total labor force and did not contribute significantly to the reduction of the underestimated 38 percent rate of unemployment of the active urban labor force. The industry had at best a neutral effect on income distribution, but a negative effect on the balance of trade because it encouraged more imports of consumer goods. The industry also contributed little to government revenues because of the tax exemptions on profits and other fiscal incentives, which, along with the subsidized

DUPUY *continued...*

costs of public services and utilities, represented a transfer of wealth to the foreign investors and the Haitian entrepreneurs who subcontracted with them for the operation of the assembly industries.

The other side of this strategy pushed by Washington and the IFIs was to dismantle Haiti's trade barriers and open its economy to food imports, principally from the United States. As we have seen, the Duvalier dictatorship embraced the assembly industry strategy based on Haiti's comparatively low labor costs. But it resisted demands to remove the 50 percent tariffs on food, especially rice imports, thereby enabling Haitian farmers to continue to produce all the rice consumed in Haiti and limiting other food imports to about 19 percent. All that changed after Jean-Claude Duvalier was overthrown in February 1986. To gain U.S. support, the military governments that succeeded the Duvalier regime reduced subsidies to domestic agriculture, liberalized trade, privatized public industries, and maintained low wages. The election of the left-of-center government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990 and again in 2000 did not change these policies.⁴

These policies had drastic consequences for the agricultural sector and for Haitian farmers. Whereas in the 1970s Haiti imported about 19 percent of its food needs, currently it imports 51 percent. It went from being self-sufficient in the production of rice, sugar, poultry, and pork to becoming the world's fourth-largest importer of subsidized U.S. rice and the largest Caribbean importer of foodstuffs from the United States. Eighty percent of all the rice consumed in Haiti is now imported. Trade liberalization, then, essentially meant transferring wealth from Haitian to U.S. rice farmers, and to those Haitian firms that resell rice—quite profitably—on the domestic market.

The trade liberalization policies that exacerbated the decline of agriculture and the dispossession of farmers, combined with the location of the assembly industries primarily in Port-au-Prince, propelled migration from the rural areas to the capital city and its spreading squalor. Port-au-Prince grew from a city of 150,000 inhabitants in 1950, to 732,000 in the early 1980s, and to approximately 3 million in 2008—nearly one-third of Haiti's population of 9.8 million. Those who could not find employment in the assembly industries swelled the ranks of the unemployed and the informal sector, which became the largest source of employment for the urban population. Since the 1970s, migration to the neighboring Dominican Republic, other Caribbean countries, and North America increased dramatically to the point that Haiti is now heavily dependent on remittances from its emigrants, which in 2008 represented 19 percent of Haiti's gross domestic product.

The development strategy devised by the IFIs exacerbated Haiti's underdevelopment and poverty as well as the disparities between the wealthy elites and the subordinate classes. Along with Bolivia, Haiti has the largest income inequality in the hemisphere. In 2007, the richest 10 percent of the population received 47 percent of national income, and 2 percent controlled 26 percent of the nation's wealth. By contrast, the poorest 20 percent received 1.1 percent of national income; 76 percent of the population lived on less than US\$2/day, and more than half lived on less than US\$1/day.

This, then, brings us back to Clinton's statement at the beginning of this essay. If the former president really believed that the neoliberal policies he forced on Haiti (and elsewhere) were wrong, then he would be advocating for their repeal and encouraging Haiti to reintroduce its protectionist policies

to rebuild its agriculture and achieve once again its self-sufficiency in the production of rice and other crops. Such is not the case, however. On the contrary, Clinton is now spearheading the very same failed strategies that have been repackaged in the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) document prepared by the Haitian government with the assistance of the IFIs. What's more, that repackaged strategy had been spelled out well before the earthquake in a report "Haiti: From Natural Catastrophe to Economic Security: A Report for the Secretary-General of the United Nations" (2009) written by Paul Collier, a former World Bank economist and now Professor of Economics at Oxford University.

Ignoring the evidence of the past four decades, the report lays out the same dual strategies advocated by the IFIs and Washington since the 1970s. The only difference is that it calls for expanding the export zones for garment production beyond the two that currently exist in Port-au-Prince and Ouanaminthe, located near the border with the Dominican Republic, and similar zones for the production and export of selected agricultural crops such as mangoes. For Collier the reason for this dual strategy is straightforward. To be competitive, he argues, Haiti needs to take advantage of the Haitian-Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2008 (HOPE II), enacted by the U.S. Congress in 2008, that grants Haiti and the Dominican Republic duty-free access to the U.S. market for up to 70 million square meter equivalents (SME) each of knit and woven apparel in addition to other goods such as brassieres, luggage, and sleepwear. The key to Haiti's competitiveness, of course, is its abundant and low-wage, but high-quality labor force, which rivals that of China.

Collier's report argues that the establishment of these zones of garment production, given the numerous jobs they would create, would reduce the percentage of the population that lives off the land. Haitian agriculture could then switch to more land intensive production amenable to more inputs and much greater output. In addition to increasing food production for the national market, the report argues, Haiti needs to establish zones for the production of export crops such as mangoes. Mangoes are important not only for their own sake, but because the trees are large enough to have a substantial root network that could decrease soil erosion and contribute to the process of reforestation.

As mentioned, former President Clinton fully endorses that strategy. In remarks he made after he and former President George W. Bush visited Haiti in March, Clinton said he would like to see the "ceiling [on textile and apparel exports] lifted [from 70 to 250 million SMEs] so that then we can get bigger investments here."⁵ On May 5, the U.S. House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly for the "Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act," and will send it to the Senate where approval is also certain, and then to President Obama for his signature. The bill waives tariffs on knit and woven fabrics imported from Haiti and raises the production quotas to 200 million SMEs each until 2020, 50 million SMEs less than what Clinton had hoped for. Moreover, responding to questions from reporters after the international donors conference in New York City on March 31, Clinton elaborated on the neoliberal policies he once championed and admitted that they had

failed everywhere [they have] been tried... [Y]ou just can't take the food chain out of production... and go straight into an industrial era. [I]t also undermines a lot of the culture, the fabric of life, the sense

of self-determination. And we made this devil's bargain on rice [but] it wasn't the right thing to do. We should have continued to... help them be self-sufficient in agriculture. And that's a lot of what we're doing now. We're thinking about how can we get the coffee production up, how we can get... the mango production up...the avocados, and lots of other things.⁶

It must be noted, however, that neither Clinton, the Collier Report, nor the Action Plan explain how Haiti is to regain self-sufficiency in rice or food production generally when none of them is calling for the repeal of the trade liberalization policies Clinton decried. Neither is it explained how the expectations of hundreds of thousands of jobs in the garment industry will pan out in Haiti when the combined share of the U.S. market for the garment export industry in the countries of the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement has declined from 13.3 percent in 2004 to 9.8 percent in 2008, causing the layoff of tens of thousand of workers. As David Wilson put it succinctly, the whole plan to expand the garment industry in Haiti is a "race to the bottom. [It] isn't really about creating jobs; it's about relocating them... [W]hen the professors and politicians say they will help Haitian workers by giving them jobs, what they really mean is that they plan to take the jobs away from Dominican, Mexican, and Central American workers—and pay the Haitians even less for doing the same work."⁷

Not surprisingly, popular and grassroots organizations in Haiti have fiercely resisted these plans. They propose prioritizing the rebuilding and expansion of Haiti's infrastructure, communication, transportation, public schools, public health, and public housing; promoting Haiti's food security and sovereignty by launching an

agrarian reform and subsidizing production for the local market as well as for export; subsidizing the development of industries that use domestic inputs to produce consumer and durable goods; and protecting the rights of workers to form trade unions and to strike, and providing a living wage to all workers, including those in the export assembly industries. It will be an uphill struggle, contingent on the election of a government capable of renegotiating Haiti's relations with the international community.

Endnotes

[A different version of this article appears in NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 43, No. 4, July/August, 2010.]

¹ Cited in Jonathan M. Katz, "With cheap food imports, Haiti can't feed itself," *The Associated Press*, March 20, 2010.

² Cited in Martin Kaste, "After Quake in Haiti, Who's the Boss?" National Public Radio Morning Edition, March 31, 2010.

³ For those interested in a fuller analysis of the effects of the policies of the IFIs on Haiti, see my "Globalization, the World Bank, and the Haitian Economy." In *Contemporary Caribbean Cultures and Societies in a Global Context*, ed. Franklin W. Knight and Teresita Martinez-Vergne (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 43-70.

⁴ Aristide was elected in November 1990 and assumed office in February 1991. The Haitian army toppled him in September 1991 and sent him into exile for three years in the United States. In October 1994, the United States, under President Clinton led a multinational force to remove the junta from power and return Aristide to office. Aristide then agreed to lower tariffs on imports, especially rice and other foodstuffs to 3 percent, and they have remained at that level since. Aristide won reelection in 2000, took office in February 2001 but was overthrown again in 2004 and sent into exile to South Africa where he still lives.

DEBATES

Earthquake, Humanitarianism and Intervention in Haiti

DUPUY *continued...*

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⁵ Quoted in Pascal Fletcher, "Improved U.S. terms for Haiti textile imports sought," *Reuters*, March 22, 2010.

⁶ Cited in Kim Ives, "International Donors' Conference at the UN: For \$10 Billion of Promises, Haiti Surrenders Its Sovereignty," *Haiti Liberté*, March 31-April 6, 2010, Vol. 3, No. 37.

⁷ David L. Wilson, "'Rebuilding Haiti'—the Sweatshop Hoax," *MRZine*, April 3, 2010 <mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/wilson040310.html>. ■

Haiti's January 12 earthquake, with its death toll of about 300,000 people, was one of the greatest humanitarian catastrophes the planet has ever known. It gave rise to an unprecedented mobilization of humanitarian aid, with countries, multilateral institutions, non-governmental organizations (there are more than 10,000 in Haiti), charitable institutions, evangelical missions, associations of every kind, celebrities from music, film, sports, and every stripe of what could be called "the charity business sector," all bustling about and rushing to the aid of the disaster victims. For everyone, there was but one certainty: nothing short of a massive humanitarian aid effort was necessary for Haiti.¹

President Obama dispatched an emblematic pair of ex-presidents, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, to emphasize the bipartisan nature of the U.S. rescue effort, and to remind us of this ethical imperative: aid should transcend everything today, including and especially political divisions. As they set off for Haiti, Clinton—who, since 2009, has been United Nations Special Envoy to Haiti—remarked that the cataclysm "reminds us of our common humanity. It reminds us that needs go beyond ephemeral discords," while Bush protested against those who sought to politicize the aid to Haiti and plead for an ad hoc apoliticism: "Now is not the time to concentrate on politics."

Let us suppose that we take them at their word: the fact remains that their humanist pronouncements were not meant to reassure the victims. Their intended audience was elsewhere. When Clinton pleaded the Haitian cause at the World Economic Forum in Davos last January, he did not skimp on his arguments to the heads of the planet's multinational companies. The Haitians are "workers and creators" he said, and the climate prevailing in the country was very favorable for business. Pressing the

businessmen not to miss this opportunity to do business under a government favorable to foreign investors, Clinton invited them to become part of the "adventure."

Whether or Haiti is a good investment for Davos attendees, and whether or not we ought to leave "politics" behind, there is one word whose lack of clear meaning is almost as striking as the world's generous reaction to January 12—"humanitarianism." To get to its essence in today's Haiti, and, indeed, in today's world one must avoid, *hic et nunc*, the pitfall of evidentiary truths, of sentiments that reassure, of received, convenient, acritical and non-subversive ideas in order to question, in all objectivity, certain current mystified and mystifying representations of reality.

To do so, all the semantic enchantment of the words like "solidarity," "charity," "rescue," "pity," and "aid," and the noble sentiments that they evoke, must also be left behind so that the concrete representations of humanitarianism in today's Haiti can be examined in the harsh light of day.

The "Social" Nature of the Humanitarian Disaster

The prevailing rescue sentiment and the underlying evocation of compassion for the victims are neither as neutral nor as innocent as the notion of humanitarianism might lead one to believe. On the contrary, the ideology related to the current representation of humanitarianism contributes to our disregard of the social nature of January's catastrophe. For in fact, the consequences of the natural disaster were exponentially amplified by a form of historically constituted social organization—neocolonialism—that incessantly generates and renews the domination, exploitation,

underdevelopment, misery and vulnerability of Haitian society.

Michel Forst, the French magistrate who is the UN's independent expert on Haiti's human rights situation, has noted that in order to understand what occurred, it is necessary to bear in mind the country's longstanding vulnerability and poverty. Indeed, *Vulnerability and Poverty in Haiti* is the title of the 2005 national report on human development published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).² Despite the limits of this document—since it involves a kind of partial balance sheet for liberalism done by liberals—it has the virtue of bringing these two variables into correlation: vulnerability and poverty. Looking at the issue through a human rights lens, the UNDP authors recognize that vulnerability “is a situation that tends to deteriorate, particularly in a society like Haiti. In the case [of this country], one cannot fail to mention three vulnerability factors that have led repeatedly in recent history to disasters: the political crisis (...), the economic crisis (...) and the environmental crisis....”³

Even the World Bank admits that Haiti “is one of the countries most vulnerable to natural disasters... as a result of extreme poverty” and other factors like a “degraded environment” and “a series of inefficient governments confronted by serious fiscal problems.”⁴

Thus there has clearly been a “socialization” of natural risks and disasters, and the differentiated impacts—between countries of the North and South—serves as an instrument for measuring the socio-economic inequality between those countries and regions.

Militarization and NGO-ization of Humanitarianism

Since the end of the Cold War, humanitarian action has become an important, and even essential, component of certain states' foreign policy playbook. Vulnerability has grown in the global South, and emergency situations have multiplied across the globe. Thus, with increasing frequency, we witness deployments of not only civil but also military aid in order to respond “effectively” to the complexities of the “emergency” situations.

Following the fiasco of the U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1993 and also the absence of a coordinated action among the different humanitarian aid protagonists (civil governmental, non-governmental and military) in Haiti in 1994, successive U.S. administrations have attempted to better coordinate their multidimensional responses to these emergency situations. More often than not, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been at the heart of these strategies.

As vice president, Al Gore advocated the insertion of NGOs into the global humanitarian aid system “in order to promote democracy and the development of a free market system.”⁵ The events of September 11, 2001, accelerated this process of the integration of humanitarian response with other components of governmental response—including diplomacy and military action. Colin Powell, with a hint of sincerity sufficiently rare at this level of responsibility to be worth noting, has acknowledged that, “we [the U.S. government] have excellent relations with the NGOs which can be a “force multiplier” and “an important part of our combat team.”⁶ The NGOs, that is, contribute to what has come to be called soft power.

Since the 1990s, there has been a general evolution of the practice of NGOs. They have moved away from the traditional and classical approach of volunteer humanitarianism based on the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence as proclaimed and defended, for example, by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). But this is a dangerous situation. The association of humanitarianism with militarism and politics can lead to the disappearance of authentic humanitarianism.

The confusion of genres is in itself perverse and in fact can lead to the violation of international humanitarian law and to its crisis, a situation that largely facilitates the establishment of a *modus vivendi* around what might be called “humanitarian neocolonialism,” in which the NGOs gradually find themselves assigned by governments to a compensatory function, secondary execution tasks or subcontracting. However honest many NGO activists might be, and whatever the sincerity of their humanitarian commitment, the implicit role of the overwhelming majority of the so-called “non-governmental” organizations—many of which receive large portions of their financing from state funds—is to reinforce existing systems of domination and exploitation.

A glance at the humanitarian reaction and apparatus in Haiti—with the early hegemonic U.S. military presence—offers a very concrete example of this paradigm shift. Early in the relief efforts, a photographic image made the rounds of the national and international media: U.S. soldiers are perched in an Army helicopter in full flight, tossing sacks of food overboard to earthquake victims, who, on the ground, come running from everywhere and fight amongst themselves to collect whatever they can.

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This image is highly symbolic. The degrading nature of the procedure—which shocked those of good conscience and sparked a veritable global outcry—makes clear the absolute incompatibility between, on the one hand, the security preoccupations of any army and, on the other hand, the respect for the dignity and the humanity of the beneficiaries of the aid rightfully called humanitarian.

The other forces on the Haitian scene are the ubiquitous “blue helmets”—the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), units of the French, Canadian, even Israeli armies. They number in the tens of thousands but are nothing in comparison to the impressive deployment (in personnel and equipment) of “Uncle Sam” during the first days after the catastrophe. Washington mobilized 22,000 people for initial emergency intervention. The United States had exclusive control of the strategic points (the airport and the seaport at Port-au-Prince among others) and designated itself as “principal agency” in Haiti, to a strategic regional military force, the United States Southern Command.

Other players, both official and private, complained about the complications of emergency action stemming directly from the centralization of the decisions by the U.S. authorities beyond any control of the Haitian administration. Not only did presidents of Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador and Nicaragua complain, but French president Nicolas Sarkozy also raised his voice against the notion of placing Haiti in trusteeship, defending the sovereignty of its people as well as its right to self-determination. The very conservative French newspaper *Le Figaro* even ran a headline on January 25, 2010 this way: “Haiti in a game of influence dominated by the United States.”

The Instrumentalization of an Unnatural Disaster

The military-humanitarian intervention in January is not without precedent in Haiti. Indeed, a quick perusal of UN resolutions and the resulting “peacekeeping” missions shows the repeated instrumentalization of Haiti’s ongoing humanitarian crisis. In 1993 and 1994, with Resolutions 841 and 940, the UN Security Council justified a “multinational” intervention (it was comprised of some 20,000 U.S. troops and a few thousand soldiers from other countries) in order, in part, to respond to “the incidences of humanitarian crises.”

And today, in addition to the MINUSTAH soldiers and police, the U.S. Army doctors and engineers dispersed around the country, the “experts” and specialists from various multilateral institutions working with various Haitian government ministries and agencies, there is a new form of intervention and re-colonization. The Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission has a mandate of 18 months and is co-presided over by Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive and former U.S. President Bill Clinton. Its principal task is to plan and execute the country’s “reconstruction.”

The Haiti Action Plan for National Recovery and Development (PDNA), the commission’s guiding document, was prepared in haste, essentially by experts from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, etc. A few details from local experts were added, just for good measure.⁷ Numerous voices—inside and outside of Haiti—have been raised against the plan because of the lack of participation from Haitian sectors.

Today’s humanitarianism, or at least its representation in the current Haitian context, constitutes a veritable ideology in

the sense that it gives a false representation—a reverse, deformed and deforming image—to reality. This distortion of the real, which is not by chance, contributes to the global mystification endeavor that is necessary to implement the new humanitarian neocolonialism or, better, neocolonial humanitarianism. And the world’s interventionist powers, those who maintain and fund the world’s leading neocolonial humanitarian aid organizations, have figured out how to take full advantage of this doctrine.

Such is the case in Haiti where humanitarian-aid action, placed initially under the control of the military, and now subcontracted to the Clinton-led commission, and to bilateral and multilateral agencies and NGOs serves objectively as an instrument to reinforce the domination of the country by the U.S. superpower and the “international community,” which Washington utilizes, in this event, to its own ends.

But the recolonization is being strongly contested. Beyond provoking the discontent and irritation of numerous governments throughout the world, Haitians themselves are beginning to become aware of and mobilize against what appears to them to be an endeavor to dispossess them of their sovereignty—or what remains of it—and of their right to determine the reconstruction of their country. To the extent that humanitarian aid management, within the context of Haiti’s neocolonial system, shows its serious deficiencies, it will end up fueling the already simmering anger of the population that has lived through decades of slow-cooking disaster followed by the eruption of the January 12 catastrophe.

Neocolonial humanitarianism might deliver some tents and a few bags of rice, but its mode of delivery—with paternalism that can

Opportunity Amidst the Wreckage Rebuilding Haiti's University System

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even bleed into contempt—can produce more than “relief.”

Caveant consules!

Endnotes

- ¹ Conscious or not, some imply the humanitarian crisis stems from the January 12 earthquake. But a look at any of numerous reports from international organizations or NGOs—with their statistics concerning access to water, healthcare, sanitation, housing, etc.—make it clear that the Haitian population has been living in a “humanitarian crisis” for decades.
- ² PNUD, *Vulnérabilité et pauvreté en Haïti*, Rapport national sur le développement humain, 2005.
- ³ *Idem*, p.87.
- ⁴ Dilley, Maxx, et al., *Natural disaster hotspots*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005.
- ⁵ Robert Charvin, “Notes sur les dérives de l’humanitaire dans l’ordre international,” *Revue belge de droit international*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, pp. 468-485.
- ⁶ Conférence à Washington, 26 octobre 2005 cited by Rony Brauman “Mission civilisatrice, ingénierie humanitaire” in *Le Monde diplomatique* de septembre 2005.
- ⁷ On this subject, see *Le Nouvelliste* “Haïti : des experts vont accoucher du PDNA pour Haïti,” édition du 12 mars 2010, <www.lenouvelliste.com>. ■

After the earthquake of January 12, an international group of academics, including myself, formed a group called the International Committee for the Construction of a University Campus for l'Université d'Etat d'Haiti (UEH), Haiti's state university. The founding idea was to organize a group that would contribute to the design and implementation of a lasting and modern renewal of the country's academic institutions. The universal sentiment of the group's founders was that Haiti should not lose the opportunity created by the terrible tragedy of January 12.

Several schools of the UEH, located in various parts of the capital city, Port-au-Prince, were severely damaged as a result of the earthquake and some of these facilities are no longer functional. Given that the physical reconstruction of the university is an immediate necessity, it would be advantageous for the UEH to relocate all of its schools and departments in one place, not only to function more efficiently in economic terms, but also to facilitate a more collegial atmosphere among students, professors and researchers in all fields.

To achieve this goal, the UEH requires a considerable sum of money, more than the university or even the nation of Haiti has at its disposal at this time, given the destruction of the building that housed the taxing authority and all its documents, and the damage to ports through which activities that generate hard currency must pass. The beautiful word “solidarity” is now Haiti's password.

The Committee has as its principal objective the raising of a substantial part of the funds that the UEH needs to build a safe and modern campus, with buildings that will not be vulnerable to hurricanes and will have the latest anti-seismic technology. The Committee will send the money collected directly to the UEH, which will give official

notification of the receipt of the funds and will apply them exclusively to campus construction. The UEH will not, under any circumstance, be able to spend the money on any other activities.

Haitians must reconstruct their country in the context of solid development so that they can overcome, progressively and in the coming months, the terrible situation created by the earthquake of January 12 and, at the same time, create a development model that will allow the country to increase its standard of living over the coming years.

In that context, given the strong correlation between higher education and development, the country must be able to count on a solid university system. Haiti's national university can and should assume the role of educating future professionals and leaders in science, social science, and culture: agronomists, architects, engineers, doctors, professors and researchers, advanced technicians, etc.

Rebuilding the physical plant, therefore, is not enough. Rethinking the role of higher education in Haiti is also an imperative task at this time. In this context there are a number of urgent questions that must be confronted in order to reconstruct a Haitian university system worthy of the name.

The Functions of the University

One key question deals with the nature and function of the university itself. We now have the opportunity to ask ourselves whether we want the university to essentially be a place of prolonged secondary education—a complaint I lodged some time ago—or whether we would rather convert it into an authentic institution of higher learning, containing all of the instrumental apparatus required for the production and dissemination of knowledge in the contemporary world.

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I know that nothing can replace a great professor delivering a masterful course and imparting academic knowledge at the highest levels of human understanding. In Haiti, we still have professors who give master classes from memory, and require that students be able to repeat the text, without omitting even a comma, to satisfy the demands of medieval-type exams.

But there has always been a legitimate concern among those who supervise the formation of new professionals and intellectuals that there be some critical, practical work, supervised in the classroom, along with constant training and hands-on laboratory work whose importance is recognized in the diffusion of experimental method. At the depths of Haitian anxiety lies a genuine desire in favor of a renewed university that can form creative thinkers at the highest levels of the country's educational system. We ask our true friends for their help in this endeavor.

This does not mean that there is only one way to proceed. For the past century, for example, Haitian higher education has been the site of a debate between those who would emphasize classical speculation concerning fundamental knowledge and aesthetic preferences (the good?), and those who would emphasize a pragmatic concern with operational ends (the useful?). This is the familiar debate between the classical heritage of the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions on the one hand, and Anglo Saxon pragmatism on the other. I have explored the Haitian context for this debate in a study entitled "The Substitution of the New U.S. Hegemony over the Traditional French Influence in the Conjunction of 1910-1912."

Another set of questions focuses on the need to organize research in Haiti. Research is a component of higher education that implies a specialized expertise on the part of a university professor. In Haiti, research as

such is organized in institutions dedicated to scientific investigation. Research centers are springing up all over, as is cooperation on an international basis, and it is an appropriate moment for all this to be happening. The emergence of transnational research teams is a new sign of the recognized importance of the spirit of the technologies of human knowledge, of the emergence of a new humanism. This spirit should direct more and more scientific investigation toward collective research in Haiti.

Bringing us closer to the immediate problems of the country, we must consider not only the question of those who teach and what they teach, but also the question of who has the opportunity to be taught. The Haitian university system brings together some 50,000 students, half of whom attend the UEH, which is organized into thirteen separate faculties and schools. The needs of this small world are relatively enormous. The problem of scholarships, for example, cannot be resolved without taking into account the limited funds, questions of social justice and the priorities of the nation.

Toward a National University System

The lack of a central university campus is also a key problem. Most of Haiti's governing elites have been reluctant to concentrate a massive student population in an area "dangerous" to the public peace. This fear stems from the contagious "subversive" capacity of a volatile student world. Twice I have had the opportunity to work with colleagues within the academic community preparing a site for a central campus. Twice we had architects' models prepared by privately funded firms, and detailed conversations with faculty and students who would be most affected. Both times, the plans came to naught.

Today, the question has been raised in somewhat different terms with the emergence of private universities. The Adventist University has constructed a major campus in Diquini with ample multifunctional spaces and sports facilities. The Quisqueya University had just—a month before the earthquake—inaugurated new facilities for its Port-au-Prince campus, only to see it all destroyed on January 12. We will now have the opportunity to start anew in the planning of the location(s) and coordination of a national university system, including both public and private institutions.

This brings us to the question of the proliferation of new private universities, impelled by the massive numbers of eligible students seeking a higher education who cannot be accommodated by the UEH. These students are channeled into private universities, whose profiles range from serious academic institutions to low-quality, profit-making businesses. There are now some 150 private universities, with only forty or so recognized by the state. I should add that some of the serious private institutions have been, with foreign support, in the vanguard of certain specialized areas of study.

This trend has led to some serious competition with the state system. For example, the UEH School of Medicine admits a maximum of 200 students per year. Two of the more serious private universities, Notre Dame University and Quisqueya University, each admit double that number, though certain specialties can only be found at UEH. The required hours spent by private school graduates in internships and residencies at public hospitals are relatively few, but all titles and degrees must be approved by the state.

In another career track, some well-known, long-standing business schools that have

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previously operated at the secondary school level have been converted into technical schools at the university level. This has not improved the country's quality of higher education.

Finally, a new higher education law, still in gestation, will hopefully deal with the impact of the era of modernization and globalization on the reconstruction of academic institutions in Haiti. It is here that we must link the most important questions: What sort of academic and political practice is most appropriate for the strategic exploitation of the "human development index"? What is the relationship between the general culture and the specific formation of university administrative and technical personnel? How do we best make use of new technologies, like the use of the Internet in the schools? How do we plan for the use of school and university locations? How do we control the measure of the nation's rate of growth as compared with the human criteria at the base of every civilization?

International cooperation should reign in these areas of human intervention, and Haiti should take its bad fortune as something positive for the leaps forward based not on its "backwardness" (a word we should use no more), but on the archaic nature of its present stage of development.

[This article integrates portions of a longer essay, the author's "Breve esbozo histórico de la evolución de las instituciones universitarias en Haití," (unpublished manuscript, 2010), with the founding statement of the International Committee for the Construction of a University Campus for l'Université d'Etat d'Haiti (2010), the group the author chairs.] ■

In case you are still debating whether to attend this year's LASA Congress, here are 11 reasons not to miss our Toronto meeting this October 6-9:

• Pre-Congress Program

We are pleased to announce the first-ever Pre-Congress Program, to take place at 2:00PM on October 6, right before the official opening of the meeting. The program consists of *three academic seminars* on:

- 1) the political economy of the economic crisis in Latin America;
- 2) new scholarship on the Independence bicentennial; and
- 3) new trends in films and documentaries from Latin America.

In addition, we are offering a *symposium on publishing trends* in journals, books, and new media, starting at 4:30PM the same day. To learn more, visit: <<http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/eng/congress/pr>>.

• Presidential Panels

Prominent scholars, invited by the LASA president, will address topics such as Obama's foreign policy, disaster relief in Chile and Haiti, the bicentennial of Independence movements, and the region's response to the latest economic crisis.

• Cultural Dialogues

This is another new feature. It consists of three debates every evening by leading intellectuals. One debate will focus on the role of the humanities; another will deal with the role of the social sciences; and the final debate centers on the role of policy innovation in the Americas today.

• Sessions and Workshops

More than 880 sessions with panelists from 48 countries.

• Grant-writing

This new feature consists of a special workshop on writing successful research grant applications, led by representatives from the Fulbright Association and the Inter-American Foundation.

• Book Exhibit

LASA2010 will have the largest exhibit of books and instructional materials on Latin America and the Caribbean, and a chance to meet with editors.

• Film Festival

This award-winning festival of films and documentaries from Latin America provides opportunities to meet some prominent directors.

• The Gran Baile

A LASA favorite will return this year!

• Convenient Facilities

All sessions will take place in the meeting space of two hotels, the Sheraton Center and the Toronto Hilton, within a five-minute walk of each other. The hotels are connected by a network of underground tunnels filled with shops and places to eat for all budgets. The hotels are centrally located, with most downtown attractions within walking distance.

Session Highlights

CORRALES y
GERASSI-NAVARRO *continued...*

• Great City

Toronto has become one of North America's most economically powerful, culturally vibrant, ethnically diverse, and eco-friendly cities. With 45 percent of its population born outside of Canada and a low crime rate, Toronto is now one of North America's safest and most cosmopolitan cities.

• Professional Networking

LASA's International Congress is the largest meeting of Latin Americanists and Caribbeanists in the world, offering a rare chance to meet scholars interested in the region from a vast array of disciplines and professional backgrounds.

We have enjoyed working with LASA president John Coatsworth, the entire LASA Secretariat and Executive Council, the Track Chairs, Section Members, and the Toronto-based Local Arrangements Committee to organize this meeting. We hope to see you in Toronto! ■

Wednesday

Pre-Congress Workshop – Democracy, Economic Growth, and Equity after the Crisis

Organizer: Evelyne Huber, University of North Carolina and Robert R. Kaufman, Rutgers University/Columbia University

2:00 pm - 4:30 pm

Pre-Congress Workshop – Latin American Independence, a Bicentennial Perspective

Organizer: John Chasteen, University of North Carolina

2:00 pm - 4:00 pm

Pre-Congress Workshop – Recent Trends in Latin American Cinema

Organizer: Ernesto Livon-Grosman, Boston College and Ana M. López, Tulane University

2:00 pm - 5:00 pm

Pre-Congress Workshop – Exploring the Ins and Outs of Academic Publishing: An Insider's View

Organizer: Philip Oxhorn, McGill University and *Latin American Research Review*

4:30 pm - 7:30 pm

Gender and Feminist Studies Section Meeting, LASA Homage to Helen Safa

Book Presentation: Women's Activism in Latin America and the Caribbean: Engendering Social Justice, Democratizing Citizenship, by Elizabeth Maier and Nathalie Lebon

6:30 pm

Thursday

Featured Event – Inequality: Forms of Legitimation and Conflict in Latin American Societies

Organizer: Alejandra González Celis

8:30 am - 10:15 am

Presidential Session – Helping Haiti Transform Itself

Organizer: John Coatsworth

10:30 am - 12:15 pm

Presidential Session – Canada in the Americas: Regulating Canadian Extractive Industries in the Hemisphere

Organizer: John Coatsworth

12:30 pm - 2:15 pm

Featured Event – Canada's Strategy for the Americas

Organizer: Philip Oxhorn

2:30 pm - 4:15 pm

Featured Event – Subnational Democratization: Latin America, the United States, Russia and India in Comparative Perspective

Organizer: Jacqueline Behrend

2:30 pm - 4:15 pm

Featured Event – “Managed Migration:” A Comparison of Agricultural Contract Work in Canada, the United States, and Spain

Organizer: Judith Adler Hellman

4:30 pm - 6:15 pm

Presidential Session – The Bicentennial of the Independence Movements In Latin America

Organizer: John Coatsworth

4:30 pm - 6:15 pm

Cultural Dialogue I: America's Quarterly Magazine

Organizer: Javier Corrales and Chris Sabatini

6:30 pm - 8:15 pm followed by reception

Presidential Session – Democrats, Billionaires and Drug Lords. Has Mexican Democracy Failed?

Organizer: John Coatsworth

6:30 pm - 8:15 pm

Friday

Featured Event – Obama and Latin America

Organizer: Sheryl Lutjens
12:30 pm - 2:15 pm

Featured Event – The Role of the Private Sector in Development: Lessons Learned.

RedEAmerica, a Hemispheric Initiative, and Case Studies in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina
Organizer: Amy Kirschenbaum
12:30 pm - 2:15 pm

Presidential Session – The Centennial of the Mexican Revolution

Organizer: John Coatsworth
2:30 pm - 4:15 pm

Presidential Session – The Crisis and its Aftermath

Organizer: John Coatsworth
4:30 pm - 6:15 pm

Cultural Dialogue II: Cultural Dialogue on the Role of the Humanities and the Intellectual

Organizer: Nina Gerassi-Navarro
6:30 pm - 8:15 pm

Saturday

Featured Event – Writing a Successful Grant

Application: Tips from Fulbright and the Inter-American Foundation
Organizer: Javier Corrales
8:30 am - 10:15 am

Featured Event – Who Speaks for Latin America? Independence Through Another Lens I

Organizer: Philip Oxhorn
10:30 am - 12:15 pm

Presidential Session – Geological and Political Earthquakes in Chile

Organizer: John Coatsworth
10:30 am - 12:15 pm

Featured Event – Who Speaks for Latin America? Independence Through Another Lens II

Organizer: Philip Oxhorn
12:30 pm - 2:15 pm

Cultural Dialogue III: Producción de conocimiento social latinoamericano, paradigmas y praxis vigentes. Aportes y debates de los Congresos 2009-2010 LASA, ALAS, ALAST

Organizer: Javier Corrales
6:30 pm - 8:15 pm

Featured Event – Otros Saberes: investigación colaborativa y participativa en justicia y derechos

Organizer: Rachel Sieder
6:30 pm - 8:15 pm

Presidential Session – U.S. Foreign Policy in the Obama Era

Organizer: John Coatsworth
6:30 pm - 8:15 pm

Special Events

Essex Ballroom (Sheraton)

LASA Media Award Ceremony and Presentation

Thursday, October 7, 2:30 pm
Carlos Dada, El Faro

Kalman Silvert Award Session

Friday, October 8, 10:00 am
Edelberto Torres Rivas, UNDP, is the recipient of the Silvert Award for 2010

LASA/Oxfam America Martin Diskin Memorial Lectureship

Saturday, October 9, 2:30 pm
Lectures will be given by Carlos Iván Degregori, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, and Terry Karl, Stanford University

Bryce Wood Book Award

Saturday, October 9, 12:30 pm
Brian Delay, University of California, Berkeley

Premio Iberoamericano Book Award

Saturday, October 9, 12:30 pm
Guillermo Wilde, UNSAM, Argentina

LASA/Oxfam America Martin Diskin Dissertation Fellowship

Saturday, October 9, 12:30 pm
Louis Esparza, Stony Brook University

Charles A. Hale Fellowship for Mexican History

Saturday, October 9, 12:30 pm
Carlos Bravo Regidor, University of Chicago

Social Events

Grand Ballroom (Sheraton)

Welcoming Ceremony and Reception

Wednesday, October 6, 8:00 pm

Gran Baile

Friday, October 9, 10:30 pm

Visit the LASA website for information about LASA2010 local logistics and a complete list of exhibitors.

Announcing a new textbook about advertising...

What is ADText?

ADText is a set of readings about advertising in culture, society and history for use in college courses.

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How can I or my students access ADText?

ADText is available as an open access publication at www.adtextonline.org.

Who sponsors ADText?

ADText is a joint publishing venture of Project MUSE of The Johns Hopkins University Press and the Advertising Educational Foundation. The Foundation's goal in underwriting the costs of producing and distributing ADText is to encourage and enhance the study of advertising in the context of modern society and culture.

Which parts of ADText are of greatest interest to Latin American Studies?

Units on multicultural marketing, globalization, gender, and advertising in Brazil.

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by **William M. O'Barr**
Professor of Cultural Anthropology,
English, and Sociology
Duke University

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The Harvard Academy Scholars Program 2011-2012

The Academy Scholars Program identifies and supports outstanding scholars at the start of their careers whose work combines disciplinary excellence in the social sciences (including history and law) with a command of the language, history, or culture of non-Western countries or regions. Their scholarship may elucidate domestic, comparative, or transnational issues, past or present.

The Academy Scholars are a select community of individuals with resourcefulness, initiative, curiosity, and originality, whose work in non-Western cultures or regions shows promise as a foundation for exceptional careers in major universities or international institutions. Harvard Academy Scholarships are open only to recent Ph.D. (or comparable professional school degree) recipients and doctoral candidates. Those still pursuing a Ph.D. should have completed their routine training and be well along in the writing of their theses before applying to become Academy Scholars; those in possession of a Ph.D. longer than 3 years at the time of application are ineligible.

Academy Scholars are appointed for 2 years by the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies and are provided time, guidance, and access to Harvard facilities. They receive substantial financial and research assistance to undertake sustained projects of research and/or acquire accessory training in their chosen fields and areas. Some teaching is permitted but not required. The Senior Scholars, a distinguished group of senior Harvard faculty members, act as mentors to the Academy Scholars to help them achieve their intellectual potential.

Post-doctoral Academy Scholars will receive an annual stipend of \$48,000, and pre-doctoral Academy Scholars will receive an annual stipend of \$28,000. Applications for the 2011-2012 class of Academy Scholars are due by **October 1, 2010**. Finalist interviews will take place in Cambridge on **December 6**. Notification of Scholarships will be made in January, 2011. For complete information on how to apply visit: www.wcfia.harvard.edu/academy.

The Latin American Studies Association (LASA) is the largest professional association in the world for individuals and institutions engaged in the study of Latin America. With over 5,500 members, thirty-five percent of whom reside outside the United States, LASA is the one association that brings together experts on Latin America from all disciplines and diverse occupational endeavors, across the globe.

LASA's mission is to foster intellectual discussion, research, and teaching on Latin America, the Caribbean, and its people throughout the Americas, promote the interests of its diverse membership, and encourage civic engagement through network building and public debate.



LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION

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