On the Profession

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by Katherine Hite

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With LASA’s 2009 Congress having taken place June 11-14 in Rio de Janeiro, the Secretariat already is moving full speed ahead with planning for the October 6-9, 2010 Congress in Toronto. Every effort is being made to learn from experience in Rio, and we are surveying both those who attended and the broader membership in order to elicit as much feedback as possible. Pending results of that inquiry, what follows are some preliminary reflections of my own assessing our first ever Congress in South America, which was also the first in decades to have been held on a university campus rather than in conference hotels.

The intellectual dynamism of diverse currents of scholarship across fields of Latin American Studies was evident throughout the meeting. Panels, workshops and featured speakers covered a remarkable range of topics, and several sessions that I attended stood out as timely, innovative and attentive to nuance. I was particularly gratified by the sophistication with which many panels grappled with the conference theme of “Rethinking Inequalities,” and by the degree to which the topic seemed to resonate among students of the humanities as well the social sciences, and among scholars who study the past as well as the present.

The Rio meeting was by far the most international in LASA’s history, with roughly half of all participants hailing from Latin America. The Congress thus afforded an unprecedented occasion for the Association to highlight research being undertaken in the region. Not surprisingly, Brazilian scholarship was especially prominent, but researchers from the Southern Cone were also much better represented than is usually the case. Unfortunately, just as the cost of meeting in North America prevents many Latin American researchers from attending Congresses in the United States or Canada, the number of North Americans taking part in the 2009 meeting declined in comparison with the record levels of 2006 and 2007. Most strikingly, the rate of cancellations was unprecedented: 5,100 people had pre-registered for the conference, leading us to anticipate a record number of participants. Yet only 4,066 of those who had prepaid for registration actually showed up at the Congress (an additional 421 registered onsite with 192 of those being new registrants, for a total number of 4,487.

While the frequency of cancellations may in part reflect the exceptional economic circumstances that have occasioned sharp cutbacks in university travel budgets, the expense of traveling to Brazil and the inconvenience of such a long journey surely were contributing factors. Clearly, decisions about where to hold future Congresses must take into account both the cost and the ease of travel to potential locations. It will also be important to ensure that the Congress is held in a location where it will be possible to set up the book exhibit. As I indicated in comments published in earlier issues of the Forum, our inability to organize a book exhibit at the Rio Congress constitutes the greatest disappointment of my LASA Presidency.

Holding the Congress on a university campus was a calculated risk, and overall I think that the experience was positive. Feedback that I received both during and after the conference has been overwhelmingly in favor of the decision, with dozens of participants telling me that the academic venue was preferable to the standard hotel complexes and with only two people, so far, opining differently. There were glitches, of course, ranging from the long lines to pick up registration materials to the inability to provide a supply of water for participants in quite a few sessions, but these were relatively minor, and other potentially problematic aspects of the enterprise worked out nicely. In particular, transportation from hotels to the university campus, which had me quite worried, seemed to function smoothly.

One additional conclusion that I have taken from the experience in Rio is that LASA should endeavor to return to its traditional format of three-day Congresses, rather than the four-day schedules we introduced for the 2006 and 2007 meetings and the three and a half days that we allocated for activities in Rio. Consistently, the final day’s sessions are less well-attended than others, and extending the Congress beyond three days adds to the cost of participation and the administrative burden of managing the event. Although a restoration of the three-day format may require the conference organizers to be even more selective in evaluating proposals for panels and papers, I believe that this is a price worth paying for a more streamlined program.
From the Incoming President

by John Coatsworth | Columbia University | jhc2125@columbia.edu

Most LASA Congresses have themes. The Rio Congress in June confronted inequality in all its dimensions. The October 2010 Congress in Toronto will look at “The Crisis: Impact, Response, and Recovery.” I hope that by the time LASA returns to the United States in the spring of 2012, our next president, Maria Hermínia de Tavares de Almeida (LASA’s first Latin American president working in Latin America) will find a world so transformed (or at least recovered) that she can choose a more cheerful theme.

At Toronto, then, there will be presidential panels focusing on the crisis. One will probably focus on the economic causes, magnitude, policy responses, duration and lasting impact of the crisis. Another will probably examine the impact of the crisis on social and political life, on social movements and support for political parties and democratic regimes. Yet a third may examine cultural expressions of the crisis in literature, the arts, theater, or film. Suggestions for specific topics and participants for these panels would be gratefully received.

Painful as the global economic crisis has proved to be, LASA should not miss an opportunity to take note of three significant anniversaries in 2010: the 40th year of our opportunity to take note of three significant anniversaries in 2010: the 40th year of our membership in the American Anthropological Association, the 100th anniversary of the Mexican Revolution; and the bicentennial of the outbreak of independence movements throughout Spanish America. Again, suggestions on these panels would be most welcome.

The LASA Congress in Rio broke nearly every record for proposals, panels, and attendance. Over the past three LASA Congresses, the number of proposals for individual papers or panels has nearly doubled, from 2,160 for the 2006 to 2,858 in 2007 and then to 4,176 for 2009 in Rio. Though rejection rates for paper and panel proposals have increased, the number of panels, meetings, and other events has risen nonetheless from 1,107 in 2006 to 1,260 in 2007 to 1,552 at Rio.

These figures pose a double dilemma for LASA. On the one hand, LASA’s membership is increasing and the members value an opportunity to present their work and participate. LASA needs to find a way to respond to this demand. On the other hand, LASA members prefer a three-day meeting without Sunday sessions that often are poorly attended. At Rio, the PUC made 70 rooms available to LASA (up from 40 in 2006), but even so many sessions had to be scheduled on Sunday morning. At Toronto, LASA will have only 52 rooms.

The LASA Executive Council discussed this dilemma when it met at Rio and made two decisions. The first decision was painful, but inevitable. LASA will have to become more selective in accepting paper and panel proposals for the Toronto meeting. The acceptance rate for panel proposals will fall from 77.8 percent for Rio to 66.7 percent (two out of three) for Toronto, a relatively modest change.

The increased selectivity will mainly affect proposals for individual papers. At Rio, the program chairs accepted 74.2 percent of the 3,202 individual papers proposed and cobbled together a total of 401 panels for their authors, in addition to assigning a large number to panels that were already complete. For Toronto, the track chairs will accept only one out of three individual papers, create panels for all they have accepted, and will not assign any such papers to accepted panels.

To help individuals construct panel proposals by locating other scholars with related interests, LASA has created a special place on its web site where individuals may register a topic or theme and search for others to team up with. The URL for this service is: <http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/eng/congress/paperrequests.asp>.

While the first decision taken by Executive Council was to increase selectivity, the second was to commission a study by the LASA staff of the feasibility of changing from LASA’s current 18-month to an annual meeting, perhaps in late spring. Such a change would have the effect of increasing opportunities for participation (more sessions in any time period) without limiting LASA Congresses to logistically difficult university settings or the tiny number of cities that have convention centers large enough to accommodate 70 or more simultaneous sessions. If it is feasible, the switch to annual meetings would occur after the spring 2012 Congress.

A final note on the Toronto meeting. The dates are October 6-9, 2010, but the deadline for paper and panel proposals for the Toronto meeting is September 15 of this year, 2009. Since only LASA members are eligible to participate in LASA Congresses, please be sure to renew your membership to avoid having your proposal rejected for purely bureaucratic reasons.

Members renewing this year will be pleased to learn that the LASA Executive Council decided at its Rio meeting not to raise LASA’s dues or registration fees (with a small exception noted below). LASA has the
I begin by thanking the Kalman Silvert Award selection committee, and all of you here, for the award which I will treasure for the rest of my life. I also thank you for forgiving my sojourns in Poland, India, and Indonesia and still treating me as a Latin Americanist. In my heart, I never defected, I simply tried to carry out LASA style research, and stress LASA type values, around the world. In a short recounting of some aspects of my career, I will attempt to develop this assertion.

**My Latin American Beginnings**

How did I start with Latin America? My real introduction to Latin America came as a “special correspondent” for *The Economist* in South America. My first degree was from Notre Dame as an English Major, and my second was a Politics, Philosophy, Economics (PPE) degree from Balliol College, Oxford. After Oxford, I did my draft military service as a Marine officer and witnessed at first hand much of the Cuban Missile crisis which revealed to me the dangerous, historically grounded gulf, between the United States and Latin America.

The Cuban experience led me to contemplate an academic career to help me gain a better understanding of Latin America. However, first things first. I managed to convince Nancy Leys to marry me. Nancy, as a British citizen who had come to the United States on a Fulbright, could not reenter the United States until September 1964. High journalism in London is dotted with PPE generalists, much the better if they went to Balliol College. Armed with this conceit I managed to talk *The Economist* into trying me out.

Incredibly, Nancy and I arrived in Rio on March 13, 1964, after I had written a story on Ghana. Reading the newspapers on the beach that very day convinced me that something major was afoot. On the flight from Recife to Rio, a young steward and I had struck up a conversation when he noticed I was reading a book by Celso Furtado. When I told him I might write something on Brazil for *The Economist*, he said Brazil was on the brink of a popular revolution. When I left the airplane he handed me his telephone number. After finishing the newspapers on the beach I phoned him immediately. He came and collected us, bundled us with partial blindfolds into a car, and took us somewhere to meet a small group of leftwing activists that night. With my *Economist* connection, I then rapidly phoned some excellent Brazilian journalists, such as Fernando Pedreira, the political editor of *Journal do Brazil*, who quickly wrote the best early book on the coup, *Marco 31: Civis e Militares no Processo da Crise* (1964), and was always generous to me with his sources and reflections.

Within ten days I filed a story called “Mend or End in Brazil,” more or less predicting that Goulart would not win the struggle, but that the events flowing from this crisis, would unfortunately usher in military rule. *The Economist* did not publish it. But, after the March 31 coup a week later, *The Economist* featured it without changing a word. In the next six months I published articles for *The Economist* on Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru and Venezuela. In Chile I interviewed Allende over a three-day campaign tour and Frei on his campaign tour.

But the experience in Brazil structured much of my early career and important parts of my life to this day. My son, Adam, a documentary film maker, lives in Brazil, is married to a Brazilian, and I have two lovely Brazilian granddaughters.
My experience in Brazil led to an overlapping conceptual and political concern with military, authoritarian and democratic institutions. Always building on my base in Latin America, I have steadily expanded my comparative interests to many other areas of the world, but only if a question was there that I felt was extremely important, and that for some reason I personally could address.

Virtually before my arrival at Columbia for my PhD work, I knew that I should, and could, write about the questions concerning the military and authoritarianism in Brazil.

I was amazingly fortunate to have at Columbia as a professor the German born, Spanish citizen, Juan J. Linz. He insisted that he was an “outsider,” but he had an interest in, and many original insights into, Latin America. He was then emerging as a great scholar of comparative authoritarianism and democracy. I was also fortunate to take classes with two major Brazilianists, the anthropologist, Charles Wagley, and the historian, Stanley Stein. Albert Hirschman had just left Columbia for Harvard, but he kept his Upper West Side apartment and his intellectual and moral presence was felt.

I was just as lucky to have a brilliant and intense interdisciplinary cohort of PhD students to endlessly philosophize with, such as Ralph della Cava, Judith Tendler, and Kenneth Erickson, all of whom went on to become great “Brazilianists,” as well other distinguished Latin Americanists, Margaret Crahan, Arturo Valenzuela, Peter Smith, and Alex Wilde. All seven of these members of my cohort are bedrock intellectual and personal friends to this day. My wife, Nancy Leys Stepan, was taking classes at Yale and beginning work on her first book, *Beginnings of Brazilian Science: Oswaldo Cruz, Medical Research and Policy, 1890-1910*. The last LASA Congress, in Montreal, devoted a panel to her work. So we were a tight community of young scholars working on topics we felt passionately about, supported by mentors who encouraged us.

My dissertation book was *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton University Press, 1971) which was fortunate to be published in paperback and in Spanish, Korean and Indonesian translations. Ironically, the book’s career in Portuguese, (censored’ uncensored and best seller list for a short period, and then rapidly re-censored) ensured a wide, sometimes underground, readership in Brazil as long as the military stayed in power.

My original teaching appointment was at Yale, starting in January 1970. My first act as Chair of our new Title VI Latin American Center was to convene a conversation on Brazil in April 1972, at the height of political repression and the “economic miracle.” Fernando Henrique Cardoso surprised us by focusing on overlooked contradictions that, from his perspective as a structural-historical analyst, he saw as creating opportunities for new oppositional alliances. Juan Linz gave a luncheon talk with no notes in which he explored, and systematically dismissed, all possible models for the institutionalization of the Brazilian military regime. Years later, my colleague and friend, Elio Gaspari, Brazil’s great journalist, editor of *Veja* in this period, and author of a classic multi-volume analysis of military rule, gave me a photocopy of Linz’s draft article by a major author of the 1964 coup and eventually of the 1974 abertura, General Golberi do Couto e Silva. After each of Linz’s arguments, Golberi, *before* the abertura, wrote in his hand, “correct.” Albert Hirschman attended this meeting and contributed his “possibilistic” presence. The results of this conference were published in a volume I edited, *Authoritarian Brazil* (Yale University Press 1973). It was to be almost a dozen years later before many of us could gather again, joined now by excellent younger scholars, such as Scott Mainwaring and Sonia Alvarez, to write *Democratizing Brazil* (Rio: Paz e Terra, 1988; New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

Early in the 1970s it became dangerous for some of my friends for me to do extensive research in Brazil, so I choose a new country, Peru, and a new theme, the role of the state, which I felt was deeply under-theorized in mainstream political science research; this research eventually led to *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton 1978).

While doing research for the Peru book, Juan Linz and I, then both teaching at Yale, resumed a long standing conversation. One of the first questions Juan had asked me at Columbia was “whether the breakdown of democracy in Brazil was inevitable.” I said absolutely not. We continued that discussion intensely for eight years and edited the four-volume work with the general title of *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Johns Hopkins 1978). The project covered twelve major cases of breakdowns of democracy in the twentieth century, including Germany, Italy, Spain, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. A central conclusion was that “the independent contributions made to breakdowns by political incumbents emerges in almost all the cases.” In the penultimate paragraph to the preface to the Breakdown book we wrote that “high priority along these lines should now be given to the analysis of the conditions that lead to the breakdown of authoritarian regimes, to the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes, and especially to the political dynamics of the consolidation of post-authoritarian regimes.” As soon as we
penmed these words we knew we had to do this work—an effort that was to take us eighteen years before Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Johns Hopkins 1996) was published. Linz and I are particularly happy with the fact that the book is available, and we are in regular contact with activists associated with translations of the book into Iranian, Chinese, and Indonesian.

Teaching as Fundamental to My Life

At all stages of my academic life I have been blessed with brilliant life-affirming, paradigm-reshaping, students. I have served on about forty Ph.D. dissertation committees, well more than half related to Latin America. At least twenty-five of these dissertations have been published as books. When I cite their names you will immediately know how fortunate I have been. Each of them made original observations, opened my eyes, quickened my sensitivities, and helped restructure my, and the field’s, thinking. Some of the Latin Americanist students that have enriched my life and taught me so much are, in rough chronological order; at Yale: Guillermo O’Donnell (who was in my very first seminar), Kenneth Sharpe, Samuel Fitch, Daniel Levine, Nancy Bermeo, Evelyn Huber, Brian Smith, Jonathan Hartlyn, Scott Mainwaring (BA and MA), Sonia Alvarez, Charles Gillespie, Luis Gonzalez, and Robert Fishman; at Columbia: Margaret Keck, Kathryn Sikkink, Edward Gibson, Enrique Ochoa, Hector Shamis, Paulo Mesquita, Katherine Hite, Jo-Marie Burt, Marc Ungar, and Miguel Carter; at Oxford: Cindy Skach.

As a comparativist, I favor a double advisor system whenever possible. Some of the great colleagues who were a part of the advising process at Yale were, of course, Juan Linz, but also three luminous Brazilianists, Albert Fishlow, Richard Morse, and Emilia Viotti da Costa, as well as Carlos Díaz Alejandro, Sidney Mintz, and three major comparativists who actually taught themselves Spanish or Portuguese to enable their research in Latin America, Robert Dahl, David Apter, and Joseph La Palombara.

At Columbia University, Douglas Chalmers was a legendary mentor, Charles Tilly would help me on any dissertation on social movements, Fishlow created a Brazilian Center (as Leslie Bethell did when I was at Oxford), and our generous and distinguished “extended faculty family” at Columbia of Margaret Crohan, Peter Winn, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, Kenneth Maxwell, Robert Kaufman, Ralph della Cava, Atilio Borón, and Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza (“Carmuche”) helped us all. At Oxford I was fortunate to run a seminar on democratization with Laurence Whitehead and to work closely with Leslie Bethell and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro.

The Comparative Excellence and Dynamism of Latin American Studies

In my judgment, one of the reasons why the field of Latin America studies became more dynamic than any other regional field in the United States is that the quality of scholarship by Latin Americans is very high, and the relations between U.S., European, and Latin American scholars with each other are much deeper, organic, and problem-centered than in any other area. Many of the leading democratization theorists in the world were from Latin America or were working on Latin America. Works coming out of the Latin American context played a foundational role and were imported throughout much of the rest of the world. It was from this context that many of the concepts and debates that reinvigorated comparative social science emerged, such as the realities of “societal corporatism,” the dangers of “delegative democracy,” the “un-rule of law,” the need for “useable states,” the necessity for a democratic governments and social movements to think about, and to monitor, appropriate and inappropriate privatization, and the problematique of “deepening” democracy.

So did a number of new ways of collective action among research and public policy communities. The first SSRC/ACLS Joint Committee to have scholars from the region it was studying was the Joint Committee on Latin America. The first branch of the Human Rights Watch to have members from the area of the world it was monitoring for human rights violations was the Americas Watch. Our excellent LASA incoming president, Maria Herminia Tavares de Almeida, sets another important precedent, she is our first President from Latin America, and based in Latin America.

LASA of course has been crucial not only to field development but also to the formation of numerous invisible colleges and collective activities. Let me give one example. In the late 1980s a group of us decided to try to do a ten-hour prime time television series on national television in the United States and to make this available to hundreds of colleges and universities. LASA luminaries, many here today, were critical to all stages of this development. The Ford and Carnegie Foundations would not agree to support us, nor would Boston’s WGBH agree to make the series, until Peter Smith and Tom Skidmore committed to writing a new basic textbook, Modern Latin America, to accompany the series. It is now in its seventh edition. Peter Winn’s companion volume, Americas, is now in its third edition. Mark Rosenberg and Florida International University took responsibility for developing
both a pedagogical teaching packet and a valuable anthology. We also wrote a state-of-the-art essay for each of the prime time shows to help instructors. Today some of the key authors are here: Helen Safa (the last recipient of the Kalman Silvert award) wrote an article on “Production, Reproduction and the Policy;” Marysa Navarro wrote on “The Construction of Latin American Feminist Ideology,” and Meg Crahan wrote on “Reconstructing Church and Pursuing Change.” The series had an average audience of over 8-11 million viewers, and won three prizes. As you can imagine, this was not a “no Drama O’Bama” affair, but a “muito Drama LASA” projeto.

From Latin America to Central and Eastern Europe and Beyond: Why?

In retrospect, I believe that one of the reasons I was sought out to be the founding Rector and first President of Central European University in Budapest, Prague and Warsaw was to help recreate in Central Europe some of the intellectual and political environment we had all developed in Latin American Studies. Many of the members of the informal selection committee, like Janos Kis (who managed to get hold of me by phone when I was in Paraguay to ask me to take the job), and Laszlo Brusz, were democratic activists from Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia and had attended some of our meetings. So was the man they convinced to help support the new University, George Soros himself, who I had managed to get to join Americas Watch. All of them had followed our Latin American debates on the problems of “democratic deepening,” and saw our mutually respectful transnational research exchanges. When I became Rector, Guillermo O’Donnell, Adam Przeworski, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, David Collier and many more activists and theorists concerned with Latin America visited and helped. We created some of the first courses in the area on laws for accountability, comparative democratic transitions, democratic and non-democratic privatization, and against great opposition, we created the first MA degree in the region on Feminist Studies. The influence continues: George Soros, drawing on the implications of “market failures,” has just created a new research project at CEU on “democratic failures.” The co-chairs are Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter.

Extending My Research from Latin America to New Parts of the World

Many of my students came from the former Yugoslavia to attend the CEU. In the style of the problem-oriented research I had come to embrace in my early work on Latin America I began to think about what social policies toward different communities, in conditions of “deep cultural diversity,” were most, and what least, compatible with social peace and democracy. Linz and I early on came to the conclusion that one of the most dangerous ideas of French-influenced thought was that “every nation should be a state and every state should be a nation.” We eventually joined forces with a brilliant young Indian scholar, Yogendra Yadav based in Delhi, India, with its sixteen official languages, and with the second largest Muslim population in the world (140 million people) living with the world’s largest Hindu population, never could be a French style, late nineteenth century, “nation state” with one culture, but it could be, and is, what we have termed a democratic “state nation,” in which many citizens from strikingly different cultures, can and do, identify with a shared “political community,” and have “multiple and complementary identities.” This research became our forthcoming book, called Democracy in Multinational Societies: India and Other Polities, John Hopkins University Press. The other polities of course include, not surprisingly Spain, and rather surprisingly, long discussions of Sri Lanka, where newly adopted “nation-state” policies in the 1950s, such as shifting from three official languages to one, turned once peaceful, multicultural Sri Lanka into a killing field, and Indonesia, where “state nation” policies such as what we call a “federacy” helped end the civil war in Aceh. I rather hope that some specialists here, on societies with territorially based, deep cultural diversity, might look at the possible appropriateness of such “state nation” policies, possibly even federacies, for countries such as Bolivia.

Let me conclude with a few words on my current research projects on religion, tolerance and democracy in the world. In my work on Latin America I read many historical works implying the incompatibility of Catholicism and democracy. But the shift from Vatican I to Vatican II and to Medellin, showed the potential “multi-vocality” of Catholicism. My Latin Americanists’ and comparatists’ understanding of the potential “multivocality” and “political contextuality” of religion has made me a somewhat revisionist thinker about Islam and democracy.

Much of Middle Eastern studies is mired in traditional area studies of the Arab world, often conflating this Arab world, with the entire Muslim world. Thus many specialists, as well as journalists and policy makers, often fall in essence into a simple argument: all Arab counties have Muslim majorities (correct), no Arab countries are currently, or for the last thirty years have been, democratic and relatively peaceful (correct), thus (they conclude), Muslim countries are incompatible with democracy (completely incorrect).
In fact, when I did an exercise for a *Journal of Democracy* article, I took the entire universe of the 47 Muslim majority countries in the world, to see whether any of them, for at least three consecutive years, had recently met three necessary, but not of course sufficient, conditions for democratic rule: 1) relatively free and fair elections; 2) these elections are for the most politically important positions in the country; and 3) the winning candidates or coalitions are able to form a government and rule peacefully. I documented that eleven Muslim majority countries had done so.

But, when I broke the 47 Muslim majority countries into Arab majority countries, and non-Arab majority countries, I documented that of the eleven countries in the “electorally competitive” subset, not one was Arab.

The comparative difference between Arab and non-Arab Muslim majority states becomes even more striking when we analyze socio-economic factors. If we call a country an “electoral under-achiever” if it has a per capita income of over $5,500 dollars, and is not electorally competitive, we note that seven of the 16 Arab countries fall into this category, but none of the non-Arab Muslim majority countries do so. This is not Arab essentialism, but a new phenomenon: from the ninth to the fourteenth century, the most tolerant area of the world in terms of relations between Muslims, Christians, and Jews was Andalucia in Spain, built upon Arab foundations.

I will not attempt here to explain recent Arab politics, but simply to stress that the Arabs—who constitute only about 20 percent of the world’s Muslims—must never be conflated with all Muslims. They must be analyzed in all their specificity (such as the implications of the Arab-Israel conflict, and U.S. policy toward the Arab world). We also must also recognize that, of the approximately 800 million people who live in non-Arab Muslim majority states, well more than half of them live in electorally competitive polities.

Many thinkers are concerned that in countries like India, the increasing intensity of religious practice will lead, among Muslims and Hindus alike, to less support for democracy. To test this hypothesis Linz, Yadav and I recently constructed a five-part index for intensity of religious practice, and a five-part index on intensity of support for democracy. We piggy-backed this onto Yadav’s census-based, 27,000 respondent survey. Our findings were, for Hindus, that the greater the intensity of religious practice, the greater the intensity of support for democracy. For Muslims? A virtually identical finding. When we did a Pearson’s chi square test the odds against these results occurring by chance are one in a thousand. We then did a regression analysis holding other possible variables constant and the results were confirmed quite strongly: for every unit of increase of intensity of religious practice in India, there is a 0.138 increase in support for democracy.

We also did a survey with 10,000 respondents for each of the four South Asian countries; India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The great “political contextuality” of religion again emerges from these comparative findings.

Since Islam was founded in the seventh century, the Muslims now living in India and Pakistan have shared, for more than 95 percent of their histories, roughly the same doctrines and practices concerning Islam per se, roughly the same socioeconomic conditions, and roughly the same geo-political-colonial space, but Muslims in India support democracy more than twice as much as do Muslims in Pakistan.

Another cautionary finding about the great political “contextuality” and “multivocality” of religion emerges from these surveys. In our four-country survey, we had large samples of Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Muslims, and Christians. In these four countries, the highest score for support for democracy by any religion in any country, and the lowest support by any religion in any country, comes from the same religion; the highest, Muslims in Sri Lanka, and the lowest, Muslims in Pakistan.

I am currently carrying out extensive field research in the three highest ranked democracies in the world with large Muslim populations; Indonesia, Senegal, and India. It appears that all three of them have created a new form of secularism and democracy that I call “respect all religions, financially support all religions, and keep a principled distance from all religions.” No Arab country has a model in any way approaching this. They could.

Once again, thank you!
Introduction

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Universities across North America are feeling the impact of the economic crisis that has affected the world as of 2008, and as all readers of the Forum will be aware, Latin American Studies Programs are not immune from the fiscal pressures that are spawning hiring freezes, increased teaching and administrative loads, and cutbacks in discretionary spending. Pessimism and uncertainty abound, but evidence suggests that the situation varies across different types of institutions. As a general rule, campuses that are highly dependent on endowment income are cutting back on expenditures as their investment portfolios sink in tandem with stock markets, whereas more tuition-driven schools are experiencing less drastic pressures on budgets. Most affected by the current economic turmoil are universities and colleges that depend heavily on funding from state governments, whose coffers are suffering from declining tax revenues at the same time that they face growing demands to fund social programs that become ever more necessary with the dramatic expansion in unemployment, hunger and homelessness. Federal government support for education is slated to expand significantly during the coming years, to be sure, but little of this investment will reach Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at the tertiary level. Tough times are likely to endure for several years to come.

In this context, we thought it would be timely to share with the membership the perspectives of colleagues who direct Latin American Studies Centers in various North American institutions. Thus, *On the Profession* in this issue features brief essays by Latin Americanists at two of the leading programs in U.S. public universities, one from a liberal arts college, and another from a mid-sized state school. The experiences of this small sample are not necessarily typical, but they testify to the degree to which financial pressures are impacting centers in distinct settings. While we were able to include essays only from the United States, I might add that the impact of public sector budget cuts is being felt strongly in Canada as well. In my own program, in Vancouver, cuts in the Provincial budget have forced a hiring freeze that has prevented us from replacing retiring faculty. Funds are not even sufficient to cover the gaps in teaching created by unanticipated medical and parental leaves. Graduate student funding is being protected, and as a strategic priority of the University ours is among the few units on campus that have been exempted from cuts in operating and program budgets. Whether we are able to remain in such a privileged position during 2010 and beyond will depend in large measure on the fortunes of the Provincial economy.
What Might the Economic Crisis Mean for Latin American and Latino/a Studies?

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The grim and seemingly worsening economic picture has certainly stunned the faculty on my campus, a small, elite liberal arts college, not far from jittery New York City. The first effects on the Vassar College faculty came through the announcement of adjunct and short-term non-tenure track job cuts. This produced an outcry from the departments and programs most dependent upon them, which did not include the Program in Latin American and Latino/a Studies (LALS).

While we anticipate more cuts to come, the immediate effects of the crisis on LALS programming have been minor. We have no faculty appointments of our own and depend primarily on the good will of tenure track and tenured faculty in the traditional disciplines to represent our multidisciplinarity, to teach our courses (which as LALS stand-alone courses are minimal in number), and to provide a collegial epistemic community. LALS represents a kind of haven away from the confines of disciplinary departments. Through LALS we share our work, sponsor faculty and student conversations and public events, and in recent years, we have been re-conceptualizing our program to incorporate Latino/a Studies not simply as an add-on, but as a space that mirrors both profound and important shifts in the academy as well as in our community and the world. For retooling, rethinking the field, we have relied heavily upon early career tenure track faculty.

This all sounds pretty comfortable and parlor-like compared to the very real losses and precariousness outside our college gates, and it is clear that so far Vassar staff and administrators are feeling the cuts in greater numbers than our faculty. Yet there are signs that like programs and departments in campuses across the country, LALS is vulnerable. Despite how obvious it is to us that scholarship and teaching from a LALS lens are central to our institution’s claimed mission, institutionally we are a weak link, as we have no endowment, few student majors, and a tiny budget. We are becoming defensive, readying ourselves to assert that maintaining the program costs the college very little—not a great leg to stand on.

Based on conversations with directors and colleagues at other institutions, including both public and private research universities, a shared looming concern is the potential for a disjuncture between our stated missions on the one hand, and the actual cuts that will affect the (realized and as yet unrealized) globality and diversity of our faculty, students, scholarship and curriculum, on the other. These days most university institutions have mission statements that include language similar to Vassar’s, including (these taken from Vassar’s first, second, fourth, and final of seven stated goals, respectively): “To develop a well-qualified, diverse student body which, in the aggregate, reflects cultural pluralism, and to foster in those students a respect for difference and a commitment to common purposes.” “[T]hrough curricular offerings to promote gender and racial equality and a global perspective.” “To maintain and support a distinguished and diverse faculty.” And finally, “To continue to be a significant source of national and international leadership, producing graduates who will be distinguished both in their professional careers and in service to their communities and the world.” While the mission represents a twenty-first century outlook (though is a bit too missionary in the end), most will agree that the mission requires the expertise of faculty who are newer to the academy and an admissions policy that includes generous financial aid.

Edna Acosta-Belén is the Director of the Center for Latino, Latin American, and Caribbean Studies (CELAC) and a former Chair of the Department of Latin American, Caribbean, and U.S. Latino Studies at SUNY-Albany, a department with eight core faculty, six additional faculty with joint appointments, and several affiliated faculty. As a member of a strong department with a history of securing outside grants, including FLAS funding, Acosta-Belén anticipates some level of budget reductions in replacing faculty or in graduate assistantships, since reductions are affecting all university units. Acosta-Belén emphasizes that the challenge will be to protect interdisciplinary university programs that “emerged in more recent decades from specific social struggles and curriculum transformation processes… programs that initially emerged because of political pressures to have more inclusive curricula, workforces, and student bodies, such as U.S. Latino Studies, Africana Studies, or women’s/gender studies, as well as older area studies programs.” In other words, we must neither tolerate nor afford reductions that shrink from the imperatives of a global agenda that recognizes the structural realities of our societies and economies rather than the insularities on our campuses that too many establishments tend to reproduce.

For Department of Education Title VI National Resource Centers, Latin American area studies institutes enjoy some measure of assurance, though perennially the grantees worry that federal education restructuring might end area studies funding. While directors of Title VI area studies centers lament the boundaries and exclusions that continue to be Cold War-defined, Title VI funding grants institutional authority. In any case, budget cutbacks in both external funding and internal institutional support threaten cross-regional scholarly exchange, fieldwork research, and study away and abroad. While many Latin America programs and institutes remain vibrant,
universities are reducing their support, even by increasing the fringe line items on program grants. Pablo Piccato, director of the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) at Columbia University, notes that while in recent years Latin America and Latino/a scholarship has grown across the campus, Columbia graduate students and newly minted PhDs have been hit hard by faculty searches around the country that have been postponed.

The overall picture suggests a dampening on scholarship broadly, at a time when multidisciplinary research on the local-global nexus may be more important than ever. Current debates on the economic crisis and migration on the U.S.-Mexico border, for example, are bringing together policy analysts, advocates, and scholars from several disciplines to assess such varied and related issues as: the effects of arms flows from and drugs to the United States on security broadly conceptualized on both sides of the border; the quite dramatic impact of U.S. crackdowns and deportations on family breakups according to citizenship status; the question of whether the Mexican economic crisis in relation to the U.S. economic crisis, coupled with U.S. crackdowns, is triggering an actual de-migration from Mexico to the United States. These arenas of Mexico-U.S. scholarship represent a small fraction of the ways that urgent concerns necessarily contribute to reconfiguring area studies as well as disciplinarity.

Such issues also have direct implications for Vassar’s home of Poughkeepsie, New York, an economically struggling city of 30,000, where just under half the population is black and latino/Latin American (including a sizeable population from Oaxaca, Mexico). Through research, fieldwork, teaching, and some community organizing in the tradition of a Latino/a Studies genealogy, LALS faculty and students have taken advantage of Vassar’s situatedness. In addition, in line with SUNY and New York state legislation, as well as that of several other states across the country that grant admission to undocumented students who have been in high school for two-three years or more in the United States, Vassar has adopted an admissions policy that recognizes undocumented student applicants as equal to all other applicants.

This short piece is necessarily premature and speculative, as the impact of the economic crisis on our colleges and universities remains difficult to assess. At this very moment it is virtually impossible to know how many students who have been accepted will indeed enroll next year, as well as what levels of financial need will be required to meet Vassar’s policy of need-blind admissions. Vassar’s endowment represents approximately one-third of the budget, while tuition revenues represent approximately another half. What is clear is that debates have become tense regarding core curriculum, faculty development funding, and what, exactly, is necessary to sustain and build on a commitment to multidisciplinary scholarship and training.
Latin American Studies and the Financial Crisis

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We are now becoming aware of the effects of the current financial crisis on U.S. universities, many of which will challenge Latin American Studies programs much as they do other areas of teaching and research. Universities have seen endowments and state funding allotments decline, while students face increasing financial aid needs. The immediate consequences of the crisis for faculty and instructional programs are apparent: hiring freezes, salary cuts, reduction of non-tenure track personnel, and declines in professional development and operating funds. While faculty and students in all fields will feel these pressures, Latin American Studies programs and Latin Americanist scholars will face specific challenges related to the nature of our work and our institutional contexts, as I detail below. I focus on the U.S. and Latin American settings I know best; other contributors to this section can address other kinds of institutional context.

Latin American Studies programs (and other area studies fields) are today in a particularly vulnerable position. As is well known, area studies emerged as a major presence on American campuses in the late 1950s as part of the U.S. foreign policy response to the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite. This policy’s most enduring legacy was the creation of the U.S. Dept. of Education Title VI National Resource Center/Foreign Language and Area Studies program that funds instructional and outreach activities as well as the study of less commonly taught languages (principally, in the case of Latin American Studies, Portuguese and indigenous languages). Even before the current crisis (beginning about a decade or so ago), competition for these awards increased between institutions, and some universities that had received funding during several cycles lost out to newcomers. While the Obama administration’s proposed budget has pledged to increase education funding, it is unlikely that Congress will pass the budget in its current form, and there is no guarantee that funding will be steered toward higher education programs like Title VI. Furthermore, with tax revenues declining as a consequence of increased unemployment, home foreclosures, and commercial bankruptcies, it is reasonable to expect that Title VI funds will decline while competition for funding grows. Furthermore, because universities must commit matching funds to compete for Title VI grants, institutions in dire financial straits will be eliminated because they are unable to “pony up” these funds. In concrete terms, this likely reduction in funds will make it more difficult for LAS programs to attract new graduate students with FLAS grants, provide K-12 teachers with assistance incorporating Latin America-related materials into curricula, and to provide students, faculty, and community members with a rich array of invited speakers on Latin American topics.

Similarly, PhD students and faculty rely on traditional Fulbright and Fulbright-Hayes funds to carry out field research in the region. Since these two programs also rely on public funding, we can expect either the value of stipends or the number of awards to decline, thus impacting the quantity and quality of new research on Latin America. (Faculty who finance shorter trips to the region through university-based funds will likely feel the pinch as well.) Fulbright also funds Latin American students to complete MA or PhD degrees at U.S. institutions. These grants will likely be curtailed as well, making it more difficult for Latin American scholars to pursue graduate degrees abroad and then apply their knowledge to teaching, research, or employment in the public or non-profit sectors in their countries of origin.

Institutions and individual scholars in the United States and Latin America also look to private foundations for the funding of research, scholarly exchanges, and other collaborations. Because foundations such as Ford, Mellon, SSRC, Guggenheim and Tinker that have traditionally funded research, teaching, and scholarly exchanges on Latin America draw on endowments that are invested on the stock market, these organizations are likely to face steep reductions in staff and available grants. In addition to reducing the possibilities for individual research in or on Latin America, these cuts will likely have negative effects on North-South scholarly collaborations made possible through specialized conferences, workshops, exchanges and team-based research projects, such as those funded by SSRC or Mellon and/or organized by several U.S.-based Latin American Studies programs.

However, the private and public funding that is available is likely to be directed toward emerging topics and concerns in the region. Poverty and inequality have been long-term concerns in the field, particularly since Latin America is the most unequal region in the world in terms of incomes. Agencies are likely to fund research focused on growing unemployment, food and health insecurity, the social and economic effects of declining migrant remittances from the United States and the return of many migrants to Latin America, crime and violence resulting from economic insecurity, and the potentially explosive political effects of the crisis on Latin America. If the consequences of the Great Depression are any indication of what we the current crisis portends, we are likely to see significant social and political upheaval in the region.

In addition to these effects of the crisis that reflect purely economic phenomena, we should also consider the institutional
position of Latin American Studies both in terms of the political weight of LAS programs in relation to other departments as well as the system of incentives within disciplines. Impressions based on my experience teaching in the Latin American Studies program at the University of Arizona and directing the LAS program at Grand Valley State University is that area studies programs often (though not always) need to compete for resources with departments whose members question the value of interdisciplinary teaching and research, and face administrations that may not understand the importance of area studies and international inquiry. I suspect that Latin American Studies programs will now be placed even more on the defensive as administrators and students feel pressure to pursue or support the most “pragmatic” fields of study—those with clear career paths. In this context, while a BA in Spanish might make sense for an individual who seeks a career in K-12 teaching, a major, minor, or MA in Latin American Studies might be harder to justify because it has less institutionalized links to the labor market. Furthermore, financially strapped students will likely be unable to study abroad in Latin America, traditionally a key draw of many Latin American Studies programs. Thus, LAS programs will need to struggle even harder than in the past for faculty positions, operating funds, and professional development funds, and to attract students.

In addition to the scramble for scarce resources within universities, more subtle pressures emanating from the disciplines will likely affect individual faculty, and in turn, associations like LASA. Most Latin American Studies scholars received PhDs in traditional disciplines in the humanities, social sciences, and the natural sciences, or professional degrees in fields such as law, planning, or medicine. Faced with reductions in professional development funds, faculty that normally attend two or more conferences per year (e.g. a conference in their discipline and the LASA Congress) will likely need to attend only one conference as funds for conference attendance dwindle. Most faculty will opt to attend their discipline’s conference because it serves as a means to more palpable professional rewards (publications in more prestigious journals, highly respected awards, and broader employment opportunities) than does attendance at an interdisciplinary conference.

With all of this bad news, is there any hope? What strategies might Latin American Studies programs pursue to continue their important teaching, research, and exchange activities? I suspect that with the Obama administration’s commitment to reduce U.S. military activities in Iraq, serious interest in reducing climate change, and tentative political opening toward Cuba, U.S. foreign policy will have a growing focus on Latin America after George W. Bush largely ignored the region during his two administrations. This increased focus might lead congressional leaders to exempt Title VI and Fulbright programs from the most severe cuts, and could potentially open avenues for Latin Americanist scholars to produce and disseminate policy-relevant research. Furthermore, the importance of the “Latino vote” to Obama’s victory may lead to more significant public engagement with and funding directed toward programs serving Latinos in the United States and educating other members of the population about this group. Finally, students’ path toward vocational training is a further incentive for LAS programs to expand their incipient moves toward collaboration with professional programs such as nursing, education, social work, law, and journalism.

Keeping these possible changes in mind, faculty and university administrations might explore how they can best take advantage of existing funding for teaching and research on Latinos and Latin America or advocate for the creation of new ones. A planned commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of Title VI this year at Michigan State University seems a most opportune moment to impress upon government employees and lawmakers the continuing importance of Latin American Studies to U.S. higher education and policy communities.

Across the Rio Grande, Latin American universities and governments have become increasingly interested in enhancing connections with their U.S. counterparts. First, Latin American universities have sought to improve their international stature and the research capabilities of their faculty by increasing the number of individuals with PhDs they employ, particularly those who earned their degrees abroad. In turn, increasing numbers of Latin Americans are pursuing PhDs in the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Australia with the support of government or international funds. While Fulbright funding will likely become scarce, Latin American governments may endeavor to replace some of these funds because of the economic and technological returns of a highly educated workforce. Second, Latin American universities are increasingly turning to U.S. and European models of curriculum development, accreditation, and institutional architecture. Finally, Latin American scholars and governments will make forceful efforts to influence U.S. and global policy toward the region as the effects of the crisis are felt in the region. Thus, we can expect continued interaction between U.S. and Latin American scholars as Latin American universities position themselves on the international stage.
The most immediate impacts of the economic crisis on Latin American Studies at the University of Texas at Austin have been the withdrawal of potential endowments and greater difficulty in getting Foundation funding for research projects and student support in Latin America. Other possible negative impacts, such as a decline in endowment income, less faculty hiring in Latin American Studies and a decline in University support for Latin American Studies are not yet apparent and we do not expect them to be severe. In its current capital campaign, the University is giving priority to matching the endowment of the Teresa Lozano Long Institute of Latin America Studies (LLILAS), but it is clear that it will not be easy in the current economic climate. LLILAS continues to be protected by its reasonably high endowment income, state/university funding of staff positions, as well as Title VI support. The College and University administrations have long been supportive of Latin American Studies for both geographical and institutional reasons such as the visibility of the Benson Latin American Collection, the Blanton Museum’s Latin American Art Collection, and the long history of the Institute, which dates to 1940 and to 1962 as one of the first five Title VI National Resource Centers. Unlike many area studies centers, LLILAS did not begin as a language center and draws much of its strength from faculty and students in a broad range of disciplines throughout the University. A University policy to develop collaborative scholarly relations with different Latin American countries, which began last year with a weeklong series of seminars with Mexico City universities, continues, albeit in a more modest form, with meetings in Brazil to coincide with the 2009 LASA Congress.

The impact of the crisis cannot be disassociated from new and old challenges to Latin American studies and to area studies more generally. The possibilities of collaborating with Latin American universities, research institutes, governmental and non-governmental organizations are now considerable and the vitality of Latin American Studies depends on our developing more teaching and research programs with our colleagues in Latin America. The model of the isolated researcher carrying out studies in Latin America with relatively little collaboration with local institutions and researchers is disappearing, but to replace it with a more effective peer collaboration is costly. One way forward is to develop a coordinated program of student exchanges, joint virtual teaching with universities and colleges in Latin America, collaborative research projects and faculty exchange. These are all developments that we are trying to advance at LLILAS with partner universities and research centers in Latin America, and they usually require not only funding to send our students, researchers and teachers to Latin America, but to help bring their counterparts from Latin America. We would like, for instance, to bring Mexican students in a virtual seminar that we are organizing in the fall of 2009 to Austin for a short period and send our students to Mexico. In the best of times, these developments are difficult to finance, but now there is a clear danger that they will have a much lower priority than the need to sustain existing programs in face of funding shortages.

Other challenges are curriculum changes that threaten to dilute Latin American Studies by reducing our ability to provide a coherent interdisciplinary curriculum. At Austin, this is represented, ironically, by two very positive initiatives: one to internationalize the curriculum and the other to provide a more diverse and intense experience for all undergraduates through a school of undergraduate studies and its core curriculum. The threat is basically to our command over teaching resources. We have a considerable number of Latin American specialists in a broad range of departments, but we have little control over teaching and thus over the planning of a coherent and interesting Latin American Studies curriculum. The teaching obligations of Latin American specialists at Austin are primarily to their departments. The demands to contribute to the new core curriculum in undergraduate studies and its signature courses, which are financially rewarding to departments, have become new pressures that take away teaching that otherwise would have contributed to the Latin American Studies curriculum. Despite the size of the university and the numbers and breadth of interest of our Latin Americanist faculty, we are finding it difficult to provide an attractive and coherent set of undergraduate courses in Latin American Studies that can satisfy the undergraduate demand for the major. Solutions to this challenge, which involve LLILAS providing some financial incentives to departments and teachers, are made more difficult by financial constraints on the Institute and the University.

I fear that an international studies curriculum may become an even more insidious threat to the integrity of area studies. International studies are attractive for their comparative focus. They can be developed relatively quickly through team teaching of area specialists as well as through the contribution of those disciplines that feel less constrained by the need to understand cultures and language. They can make use of virtual teaching and make contact with students and teachers throughout the world, using inexpensive modes of communication, such as Skype and operating with English as the language of communication. They can be provided cheaply and don’t even necessitate studying or travelling abroad. There is the danger
that they provide a cheap substitute for area programs, such as Latin American Studies, that provide an interdisciplinary, in-depth knowledge of an area, its languages, culture, politics and socio-economics. Latin American Studies when practiced properly is expensive. At Austin, we would like to ensure that all Latin American Studies students at both graduate and undergraduate level spend part of their time in Latin America, learning and/or perfecting a language, taking disciplinary courses in local universities, undertaking small-scale research projects and engaging in service oriented internships. Tuition and living costs may not be substantially higher than those at Austin, but cannot be offset, as they are here, by various forms of part and full-time employment. This is becoming a substantial deterrent to study abroad as the economic crisis reduces savings and limits parental contributions.

To end on a positive note, we are experiencing an increase in applications for Latin American Studies graduate work and the climate for collaboration both on our University’s side and on that of our colleagues in Latin America is as good as its ever been in my twenty odd years of being attached to UT at Austin.

When the universities estadounidenses incorporaron a los estudios de área en sus planes de estudio, los estudios latinoamericanos constituían las joyas de la corona. Los países de América Latina eran todavía lugares exóticos, relativamente poco conocidos, pero al mismo tiempo suficientemente cerca desde el punto de vista geográfico para ser accesibles en un día de viaje a más tardar. Para rematar, tanto el español como el portugués eran fáciles de aprender. Treinta años más tarde, los “latinos” hemos dejado de ser exóticos para convertirnos en una “minoría” que está presente en todos los estados de la Unión y posiblemente solo en los lugares más remotos de Hawai’i haya todavía estadounidenses que no hayan tenido nunca interacciones con latinos—porque hasta en Alaska la migración latina ha estado creciendo. Dos millones de ciudadanos norteamericanos viven en México y cientos de miles de turistas originarios de este país visitan la región al año. En el mundo, solo México tiene un mayor númberro de hispanohablantes que Estados Unidos.

Como todos sabemos, los estudios de área fueron establecidos por el gobierno federal de Estados Unidos con el fin de construir una base intelectual a la proyección global del país después de la segunda guerra mundial. La necesidad de alimentar a la inteligencia militar en plena guerra fría llevó al Congreso a votar en 1958 la ley de Educación para la Defensa Nacional que creaba los donativos de apoyo federal a los programas universitarios de idiomas extranjeros y estudios de área. En un principio fueron administrados por el departamento de defensa. Con el desarrollo del interés por los estudios internacionales, la administración de los programas internacionales pasó a ser responsabilidad del departamento de educación bajo el Título VI de la Ley de Educación Superior de 1965. Pese a su corte liberal, las fundaciones privadas Mellon, MacArthur y Ford fueron también importantes financiadores de los estudios de área paralelamente a los estudios internacionales que ayudaron a establecer en varios lugares del mundo, no solo en Estados Unidos.

Cuando el presidente Reagan intentó hacer desaparecer al departamento de educación, fue Caspar Weinberger, a la sazón ministro de defensa, quien salió en defensa de los programas Título VI con el argumento de que los militares los necesitaban. El apoyo federal a los estudios de área se mantuvo, aunque se redujo considerablemente.

El fin de la guerra fría y la que parecía ser una marcha inexorable hacia la globalización puso, una vez más, en entredicho a los estudios de área. No solo eso: en la medida en que los programas de estudios de área se multiplicaban en las universidades, surgieron rivalidades presupuestarias con los departamentos y desacuerdos teóricos y metodológicos con las ciencias sociales que siguen considerando a los estudios de área poco rigurosos. Por otra parte la bandera de la multidisciplinariedad e interdisciplinariedad que la concentración en áreas geográficas y culturales favorecía y que los especialistas de área habían enarbolado con gusto ahora la compartían con otras áreas multidisciplinarias tales como estudios culturales, transnacionales, étnicos y de género.

Los atentados del 11 de septiembre demostraron que la historia no había llegado a su fin, que el capitalismo y la democracia liberal tenían poderosos enemigos y que el terrorismo y la guerra iban a ponerle severos límites a la globalización. La vinculación entre inteligencia/defensa y estudios de área volvió a hacerse patente sobre todo con respecto a la necesidad de conocer mejor al mundo islámico.
En lo que se refiere a los estudios latinoamericanos en Estados Unidos, la existencia de un régimen marxista en Cuba y el peligro de que se estableciera un segundo explican en gran medida sus treinta años de auge (1960-1990). ¿Por qué el declive, posiblemente el más drástico de todos los estudios de área? Porque durante ese período las vinculaciones entre Estados Unidos y América Latina cambiaron radicalmente: el comercio y la migración transformaron los patrones de relacionamiento entre las sociedades “latinas” sobre todo mexicana, centroamericana y caribeña y la estadounidense. Los cambios en las relaciones intersocietales se vieron reflejados en las relaciones intergubernamentales, pero paradójicamente, las prioridades de política exterior de la gran potencia no hicieron eco de la creciente densidad de la relación. Al contrario, poco a poco la región en su conjunto pasó a segundo plano: México, Centroamérica, el Caribe y la región andina porque dejaron de ser interlocutores de política exterior para convertirse en “problemas” de política interna (desempleo, migración, drogas, bilingüismo, minorías étnicas, etc.); Brasil y los países del cono Sur, porque como aliados confiables—aunque de segunda categoría—no merecían la atención de los líderes. La región ha ido desapareciendo de la narrativa de política exterior. Basta referirse a los discursos del presidente Obama, de la Secretaría de Estado Clinton, a las columnas de Thomas Friedman o de Fareed Zakaria o a las revistas especializadas como Foreign Affairs y Foreign Policy.

El problema en no ser prioridad de política exterior no es solo que en el Departamento de Estado, el Pentágono o el Consejo de Seguridad Nacional las decisiones que nos conciernen sean tomadas por burócratas de segunda nivel a menudo sin experiencia política (aunque sí con mucha en política burocrática). El problema es que la baja prioridad se refleja en otras dimensiones tales como ayuda externa, cobertura noticiosa, financiamientos federales para la educación superior, interés profesional y hasta estudiantil.

La crisis económica ha obligado tanto a las universidades públicas como a las privadas a recortar gastos drásticamente. Todavía no sabemos cuán mermados se verán los presupuestos para investigación y para estudios de área que tanto dependen de los fondos federales y de las fundaciones privadas. Para los estudios latinoamericanos que de por sí vienen de capa caída desde el final de la guerra fría, la crisis económica por la que atravesamos posiblemente acelerará la tendencia. La única manera de revertir ese proceso es crear una nueva narrativa para referirse a la región, que de hecho ha empezado a manifestarse.

Los temas centrados en el estado nación continuarán siendo básicos para los estudios de área, pero paulatinamente los estudios de casos nacionales—tradicionalmente mucho más relacionados con temas relativos al sistema político, los partidos políticos y la seguridad—que solían ser el pilar de los estudios latinoamericanos en Estados Unidos deberán dar espacio a nuevos temas transversales, interdisciplinarios, comparativos, con propuestas teóricas y metodológicas que superen los nacionalismos metodológicos.

Los mismos procesos históricos tienden a desbordar los marcos nacionales y la confrontación de complejos transnacionales—y supranacionales—se han acelerado. En la región, a pesar de las dificultades, Mercosur se mantiene—y auspiciados por Brasil los estudios comparados y los intercambios académicos se fortalecen en el Cono Sur. Centroamérica se reconfigura de manera ampliada e incorpora poco a poco a Belice, a Panamá y hasta a la República Dominicana.

La Cuenca del Caribe, la otra subregión angloparlante del continente, es su corazón estratégico, un espacio de diversidad y de confluencia de subregiones. El Pacto Andino es espejo por un lado de la convulsa realidad política de la subregión y por el otro de los estrechos vínculos comerciales, sociales y culturales entre los países que la componen.

Los estudios sobre las mujeres y de género, los medioambientales, así como los de las religiones y de las migraciones, esencialmente interdisciplinarios, han ampliado las perspectivas de comprensión de la realidad social, cultural y política al poner sobre el tapete problemas otrora considerados marginales que en América Latina tienen una relevancia regional y una existencia transnacional. Los estudios étnicos sobre los pueblos originarios y la diáspora africana proporcionan nuevos elementos para la búsqueda de modelos políticos y económicos multiculturales, por definición menos excluyentes.

La relación de los pueblos latinoamericanos con el mundo ibérico es otro objeto de estudio que exige un cambio de enfoque que abandone la exclusiva concentración en el mundo ibérico colonial y dé cuenta de la contemporaneidad y del flujo creciente de intercambios múltiples. Asimismo se impone una nueva comprensión de la presencia “hispana-latina-caribeña” en la formación de Estados Unidos que definitivamente la reconozca e integre en su narrativa histórica y como componente de su identidad. Es el punto de encuentro entre la historia, los estudios étnicos (latinos) y los de migración.

Todas estas dinámicas que impactan a la región y que la redenfren requieren cada día de nuevas aproximaciones. No es que los estudiosos latinoamericanos y los académicos latinoamericanistas no abarquemos todos estos temas, lo hacemos...
pero de manera aislada. Necesitamos una narrativa más integradora que al tiempo que explique la heterogeneidad de la región y la complejidad de sus procesos sociales incluyendo aquellos que la vinculan con Estados Unidos, de cuenta de la gran importancia de la relación para ambas partes. El resurgimiento de los estudios latinoamericanos en Estados Unidos dependerá de su capacidad de renovarse. Solo así superaremos las crisis, económica y epistémica, por las que atravesamos. 

**Repensando os elos entre violência e desigualdade**

*por ANTONIO SÉRGIO ALFREDO GUIMARÃES (USP)*

Esta sección de Debates del *LASA Forum*, que antecede el Congreso del Río de Janeiro, voltado para “Repensar las Desigualdades”, es dedicada a discutir la relación entre desigualdades y violencia en América Latina. El tema no podría ser más oportuno diante del aumento creciente de formas brutales, extra-estatales e ilegales de violencia que se institucionalizan en espacios controlados por el narcotráfico en países como México, Colombia y Brasil; mientras prácticas policiales inconstitucionales continúan fuera del control judicial en quase todos los países del continente. Que relación tiene esa violencia con las desigualdades socioeconómicas del continente? La relación no es simple, y los especialistas que convidamos para debatirla nos esclarecerán sobre los muchos de sus aspectos conocidos y lanzarán nuevas luces sobre ella.

Abrindo el debate, Rosemary Thorp y Mariza Paredes hacen un balance de las teorías de etnicidad y de movimientos sociales para pensar la relación entre Desigualdades, Etnicidad y Violencia Política. Añade que empíricamente ancladas en datos obtenidos en algunos países de América Latina, especialmente el Perú, las amplían teóricamente estos resultados al colocarlos en perspectiva mundial.

Continuando el examen empírico de casos, Sérgio Adorno y Nancy Cárdenas reconocen los iniequales avances democráticos en países como el Brasil, en que grupos de derechos humanos tienen presencia efectiva en el campo político, y la empresa es libre, mas, a despeito disso, el Estado de Derecho funciona de modo precario en grandes áreas del territorio nacional y en que prácticas de tortura e assassinatos de oprimidos y oponentes continúan a ser empregadas contra a población pobre ou os infratores da lei, tal como definidos por potenciales locais aparelhados nas policías ou em outras esferas del estado. Esta forma violenta del estado, edificado para la opresión de los conquistados y para el desmantelamiento de cualquier resistencia a la metrópole, sobrevive al independencia y pasó a convivir con las formas republicanas liberales de las nuevas nações latino-americanas. O que há de novo, nos convencem Adorno y Cárdenas, és el espraiamiento de tal violencia para la sociedad civil. Assim, el período actual, de mayor de democratización de la sociedad brasileira, é acompanhado de acréscimo sem precedentes de crimes violentos, tortura e corrupción. Até que ponto a manutenção das desigualdades de acceso à renda e aos direitos sociais alimenta e generaliza os atentados à segurança individual e o desrespeito à vida?

É justamente a mudança da forma tradicional de policiamento, baseada en hierarquías militarizadas, para otra más flexível, voltada para la prevención, sob controle dos cidadãos, el objeto de análisis de Mark Ungar. Por que los estados latino-americanos están presos en impasses, reproduzindo as formas coloniais do passado, sem conseguir implantar, ou fazer com que las reformas realmente funcionem en direção virtuosa e democrática? A resposta de Ungar é clara: a pressão da sociedade por resultados de curto prazo, tanto quanto las deficiencias de gestão, auditoria e investigação das instituições de justiça criminal fazem com que las reformas de longo prazo acabem por ficar nas intenções e nas leis, sem romper el círculo vicioso onde germinan las desigualdades sociales e la inseguridad pública. A formação de grupos de intereses de funcionarios, ao se generalizar pelos aparelhos do estado, acaba por usurpar los poderes que deberiam...
ser públicos e exercidos no sentido de dotar os cidadãos de maior controle sobre a aplicação da justiça e das garantias de segurança. Esses agrupamentos de interesses não apenas dificultam a implementação de reformas como servem de condutos para a corrupção do aparelho estatal pelo crime organizado. Do mesmo modo, políticas que dão resultados de curto prazo, como a de tolerância zero, acabam por desviar os esforços policiais para a prevenção dos pequenos crimes, deixando intactos os nichos de corrupção, de aplicação desigual da lei e de insegurança que se abrigam no próprio estado.

Francisco Gutierrez focaliza o nexo teórico entre violência e desigualdade na América Latina e nos faz sugestões interessantes. Até que ponto é possível aprender, por analogia, da experiência histórica dos “rebeldes primitivos”, estudados por Hobsbawn, para entender a onda de violência criminal da atualidade nos grandes centros urbanos do nosso continente? Jovens sem perspectivas sociais são elementos necessários mas não suficientes para que a violência recrute seus agentes, mas ideias, redes e estruturas organizacionais são outras condições igualmente requeridas. A concomitância de desigualdades persistentes e a possibilidade de grande mobilidade social através de atividades ilegais aplaina o caminho para a organização da violência, nos sugere Gutierrez, examinando o caso da Colômbia.

Fechando o debate de modo muito pouco convencional, Kimberly Theidon busca desvendar o modo pelo qual as masculinidades tradicionais são mobilizadas e desmobilizadas em meio à guerra civil colombiana. Ao analisar o programa de Desarmamento, Desmobilização e Reintegração (DDR) de combatentes de guerra, Theidon está à procura dos nexos entre militarismo e masculinidade—ou violência e masculinidade. Ou seja, há uma cultura que nutre e é nutrida pela violência; cultura que pode às vezes ficar constrita a comportamentos e práticas cotidianas que consagram o guerreiro, o bandido e o desviante, explicando como e porque os jovens são recrutados. Mas há também formas mais artísticas desta cultura, que podem levar à sublimação das experiências mais dolorosas de humilhação, discriminação e preterimento. Theidon, nesta intervenção, enfoca apenas as formas violentas de masculinidade que nutriam o conflito e que são reconstruídas para os tempo de paz, deixando inalterados os fundamentos culturais da violência. Sua ambição política, entretanto, é maior: não haveria meios de desarmar culturalmente a violência? Assim fazendo, não estariamos construindo a paz, a civilidade e a cidadania sobre bases mais sólidas?

Deixo aos leitores estas indagações. Sei que uma ciência social só se legitima para receber verbas públicas à medida que pode ser aplicada à solução de problemas sociais. Sei que as políticas sociais não se fazem sem uma linguagem que seja entendida por todos. Paradoxalmente, as ciências sociais que desafiam o senso comum em sua busca de novas explicações precisam estabelecer um novo senso comum para demonstrar as suas descobertas. É neste estreito círculo entre o passado e o futuro, em busca de inteligibilidade, que nos movemos.

Inequality, Ethnicity and Political Violence
A Perspective from Peru

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Over the past few decades, the realities of inequality, ethnicity and political violence have repeatedly presented themselves for reflection in Latin America. This essay reports on a research project seeking to identify the interfaces and interactions among the three. The geographical reach of the just-concluding research is quite broad, covering countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. As participating authors of the Peruvian case study, we shall focus on that country.¹

The framework of the research stems from the inspiration of the overall project director, Professor Frances Stewart, who insists on the analytic importance of groups. This insistence swims against the tide of two centuries of economists’ writing, which persists in treating groups—firms, households and communities, for example—as if they were individuals (Stewart 2008, Ch. 1). Professor Stewart has promoted the concept of “horizontal,” or group, inequalities, as opposed to “vertical,” or individual inequalities, which has been the focus of most economic analysis of inequality. In our work, the identity basis of the group has usually been ethnic or religious, but it may be culture, region or class and/or gender. It is an important aspect of the project that inequality is not defined only in terms of economic indicators. We explore political, cultural and social indicators as well. Groups are thus defined as appropriate for the specific context of
analysis. The project conducted a survey of attitudes and perceptions to evaluate the key elements of identity in each country under study.

The overall project uses a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods to explore the hypothesized significant relation between horizontal inequalities and political violence, and finds that political violence is more likely when both political and socio-economic group inequalities are high, and especially when both are worsening. We find the relation between inequalities and violence to be especially significant when groups are defined principally in ethnic terms (Osby 2008). On the other hand, many countries do display quite severe horizontal inequalities without political violence, and indeed are relatively peaceful for long periods, even centuries.

Why use groups as a framework? Our previous discussion begins to clarify the answer, and we see it as one of the challenges of the project to make it even clearer. In the case of Peru, groups help us to think about the persistence of inequality for three principal reasons. First, discrimination and prejudice always occur in relation to groups. Such attitudes shape institutions over time, shape the ways identities are perceived and used, and affect distribution through factor markets and through politics at every level and in many forms. All these elements are important components of our analysis.

Second, thinking in terms of groups draws attention to space. Groups often have a spatial dimension. In Peru this is crucial since the indigenous population has historically been centered in the highlands, while the white-mestizo population has lived on the coast. The interplay among groups, geography, and the policies that reinforce and build geographical inequality, is crucial to an explanation of how inequality is embedded. Space matters because of the distribution and concentration of natural and political resources. In Peru, migration changes the spatial aspect with time, but it is a central part of our argument that the interaction between migration and discrimination/prejudice gradually shapes new forms of ethnic identity that are highly significant for the durability of inequality.

Third, groups are central to political behavior. People typically mobilize or are mobilized in groups. Whether or not a group finds a way to defend its interests, and what instruments get chosen for that defense, will have a great deal to do with the evolution of political horizontal inequalities, and thus of inequality over time. In Peru the absence of vigorous indigenous politics appears to be part of the explanation of the persistence of inequality. The weakness of indigenous politics is the outcome of the historical development of interactions between economics and politics. In this, the evolution of institutional patterns leading to clientism and cunditismo, and practices of discrimination and prejudice, have played roles reinforcing negative outcomes for indigenous people as a group. The most negative outcome has probably been the group’s mobilization to violence (by non-indigenous actors), leading to repression, further weakening the group.

In Latin America, also, the relationship to mobilization, or further, to violence has its own specificities. The cataclysmic wars that did eventually occur in Peru and Guatemala incorporated excluded ethnic groups in the absence of formal ethnic political organization. In our third case, Bolivia, where collective action was repeated and vigorous, major violence has been avoided. Thus ethnicity was not a central feature in the Guatemalan or Peruvian conflicts, either in terms of claims or in the discourse (Caumartin, Gray-Molina and Thorp, 2008), but events were to take a terrible and violent turn for indigenous people.

The Guatemalan Truth Commission estimated the overall number of dead during the thirty-six-year conflict to be around 200,000, of whom 85 percent were indigenous. The death toll in Peru, while large, was still significantly lower than in Guatemala. The Peruvian Truth Commission estimated the overall number of victims during the fifteen-year conflict to be 70,000, of whom 75 percent were indigenous. A key difference in the experience of violence in the two cases is that in Peru the Maoist extremist group,
Shining Path, is acknowledged as one of the main perpetrators of violent acts, whereas in Guatemala the state and its allies were responsible for the great majority of the acts of violence. This outbreak of violence interacting with, and decimating large numbers of indigenous people seems to be what we need to explain, as much as the lack of recourse to mass indigenous mobilization to challenge this violence and severe degrees of horizontal inequalities over decades, if not centuries. To explain violence and the absence of indigenous mobilization, and the interfaces with inequality, we needed to look closely at both the phenomenon of ethnicity in our cases and the phenomenon of social movements in Latin America.

Interpreting Ethnicity: The Literature

Social scientists have differed sharply on how to approach ethnicity. Traditionally, the debate has been between “primordialists” on the one hand and “instrumentalists” on the other. The primordialist approach has been much discussed (Geertz 1973; Isaacs 1989; Van De Berghe 1981). Although Geertz and Isaacs acknowledge some transformation and fluidity of ethnic identity, they were surprised by the power and resilience of ethnic “endowments” received through birth and childhood. The “overpowering coerciveness” of the group (Geertz 1973, 259) or the “genuine security” offered by endowed characteristics, and the “urge to belong” of the individual psyche (Isaacs 1975, 35) are offered as explanations. Most of these approaches were developed in the 1970s. Without doubt primary bonds are powerful and deeply felt, but these approaches do not help us understand why some bonds have become more powerful than others, why new identities are created and bonds reproduced, and how people face these changes. For example, in many regions of the Andes new mestizo and cholo identities have been created, but these identities are likely to have different meanings in, for instance, Peru and Bolivia (see De La Cadena 2000 for a brilliant analysis and documentation of the Peruvian case, and Quijano 1980, who has been a visionary in regard to this process).

Instrumentalists, in contrast, affirm that ethnic identities are strategically chosen and manipulated, and even re-constructed by individuals and ethnic entrepreneurs on the basis of self-interest (Brass 1997, 26), and generally in order to obtain desired patronage goods from the state: land, jobs, or markets (Bates 1971, 1998). But while these approaches are sometimes useful to explain how ethnic groups mobilize and sustain their campaigns (Laitin 1986; Cohen 1985), they do not answer questions such as why some ethnic ties become more important than others, and how they become the basis for political action at one time rather than another, or why people occasionally act in ways that appear detrimental to their material interests.

An intermediate perspective, and the approach we have found most useful, is that of social constructivism. This view does not deny that there is a need for some felt differences in conduct, customs, ideology or religion to make it possible to raise ethnic or other consciousness. In contrast to the extreme instrumentalist view, the fundamental emphasis is on the making and remaking of ethnic boundaries (Anderson 1983). Some scholars have put more emphasis on processes that have reframed the identity of people, such as modernization processes (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983) or the development of significant framing institutions such as the colonial state, authoritarian corporatist regimes or neo-liberalism in Latin America. Mallon 1995, Yashar 2005 and Van Cott 2000, 2005 are substantial and comprehensive examples of these types of studies for Latin America, and we have drawn heavily on these sources.

Ethnicity in Peru

In Peru racial and ethnic mixing has occurred on a significant scale since colonial times, and a majority of the population in certain regions, mainly on the coast, is of mixed ethnicity. However, the idea that migration, access to education, and the learning of Spanish have created a homogenous mestizo culture, particularly in the cities, where the only significant differences are those of region and class, is an erroneous one. This idea is usually associated with the equally misguided notion that indigenous groups only exist in small and dispersed numbers in the hinterlands of the sierra or in the Amazon, “frozen in time.” Van Cott (1994) convincingly argues that this vision is false. No indigenous people live exactly as their ancestors did; nor do they have their multiple cultures stayed static in time and place. Indigenous people in Peru have transformed themselves according to the opportunities and constraints they have met, incorporating customs, technologies and ideas from a white/mestizo-dominated society.

There is an idea that when indigenous people enter into contact with “civilization” they are no longer indigenous. We argue against this idea and, in fact, believe that it is at the heart of the discrimination that has created the cultural and psychological barriers preventing indigenous people from organizing politically along ethnic lines. This prejudice is a mechanism that has been historically constructed, reproduced and consolidated in Peru over the years by the institutions built around it. “Indigenous” is a community identity in the highlands, but
has changed in the cities, just as people from all cultures change. In line with a strong vein of writing in Peruvian social science, we understand the formation of identity as a social construction, which happens in time and space, and therefore has a history (De La Cadena 2000; García 2005). In understanding that history we have been able to draw on a rich historical literature on Peru; Flores Galindo 1986, 1985, 1976; Larson 2004, Stern 1998, 1993, 1987; Manrique 2002, 1988, 1981; Mallon 1995, 1992, 1983; Montoya 1998, 1992, 1989; Deere 1990; Degregori 1990, among others.

Social Movements and the Politicization of Ethnicity

The abundant literature on social movements has contributed to a better understanding of the politicization of ethnic boundaries. There is an increasing consensus that neither long-lasting ethnic cleavages, nor the emergence of ethnic entrepreneurs able to manipulate these deep feelings, are enough to explain the mobilization of ethnic groups. Favorable changes in the structure of political opportunities that arise from socio-economic and political transformations in society are generally required to facilitate mobilization (McAdam 1982, 2001; Tarrow 1983; Tilly 1978). Further, the construction of networks and grassroots organizations that can generate and sustain collective action has been identified by the literature on social movements in Europe and the United States (McAdam 1982; McCarty and Zald 1977), and more recently also in the literature on indigenous movements in Latin America (Yashar 2005; Van Cott 2000, 2005). Mobilization resources promote an “interlocking network of groups” that provides the stimulus for the movement and for collective action (Tarrow 1994).

Yet identity, and particularly ethnic identity, can be transformed and sharpened during the process of mobilization and as a consequence of it. This endogenous character of ethnic identity and its politicization and mobilization have given researchers a complex task. Often the literature on ethnic conflict assumes ethnic cleavages and groups as exogenous and prior to ethnic conflict, and the formation of the group stays unexplained. But understanding mobilization triggered by ethnic identity requires attention to collective processes of interpretation and the framing and reframing of identity and agendas that occur during the process. We also need to consider when this framing becomes appealing to others (Bedford and Snow 2000; Gamson 1992). The search for a better understanding of the process of identity formation and framing in the literature of social movements, together with the strategic behavior that makes mobilization possible, is of great help in this debate.

Inequality, Ethnicity and Political Violence in Latin America

In conclusion, then, we argue that the notion of horizontal inequalities offers a powerful explanation of the severe degree of overall inequality observable in Latin America. This is particularly in the case in Peru, where our analysis of two centuries shows how political, cultural and economic forces play out over many decades to embed group inequalities. Geography also plays a reinforcing role, interacting with both the economic model and the evolution of political strengths and interests. We trace a series of vicious circles, the heart of the embedding process, through to the close of the Fujimori era, when the mutually reinforcing forces of exclusion appear to reach a climax. These vicious circles incorporate and explain political violence. Ethnic identities may or may not be politically salient; they may be kept in the sphere of “private” life, but with few or no repercussions in the public arena in terms of patterns of collective action, organization, political choice and mobilization. However, ethnic violence may still not be prevented.

From our comparative work we see that of the five Latin American countries with substantial indigenous populations (Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala and Mexico), armed conflict and a disproportionate number of casualties with people of indigenous origin have occurred in the three countries with the least politicized ethnic identities: Peru, Guatemala and Mexico. In Peru, despite the lack of salience of ethnicity in political terms, poor and deprived indigenous populations, facing exclusion, a lack of economic alternatives and a weak political movement expressing their interests, were vulnerable to Sendero’s discourse and could be successfully mobilized for violent ends. Political violence led to repression, which was the more severe because of the ethnic dimension and the culture of prejudice. Political violence reinforced discrimination and prejudice, and weakened social movements (Degregori, 1990; Comisión de la Verdad 2004). These are all elements of the vicious circles around the success and subsequent repression of Sendero Luminoso. While Sendero’s discourse was never ethnic, indigenous people were vulnerable because of group inequalities, and the repression was the more violent because of prejudice and discrimination.
Endnotes

1 The research project as a whole has been based at the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) at Oxford University. The Peruvian research has been conducted in a partnership between the Catholic University, Lima and Oxford University. Working papers are on the CRISE web site (www.crise.ox.ac.uk). Preliminary results of the Peru study are on the web and a full working paper will soon be presented.

2 The lead authors on Bolivia and Guatemala respectively are George Gray-Molina and Corinne Caumartin.

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Democracy, Violence and Human Rights in Contemporary Brazil

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Two decades after democratization, what kind of democracy is in place in Brazil? An incomplete “delegative” democracy with weak forms of accountability (horizontal and vertical), derived from “a severe incompleteness of the state, especially its legal dimension” (O’Donnell, 2004 p.41) in which un-rule of law (Pinheiro & others, 2000) prevails, is one of the answers. More recently this question has been reframed from a broader perspective: democracies have to be evaluated in terms of their quality. In this approach the question is how good is the present Brazilian democracy in terms of “a stable institutional structure that realizes the liberty and equality of citizens through the legitimate and correct functioning of its institutions and mechanisms?” (Morlino, 2004; p.12.)

Democracies, in general, can be evaluated in terms of results (the level of legitimacy they have vis-a-vis citizens), in terms of content (the amount of freedom and liberty citizens, communities and organizations enjoy), and in terms of procedures (the extent to which citizens can check and evaluate the application of laws). Democracies can also be assessed by how far they implement the rule of law; accountability, responsiveness to civil society and citizens’ demands, the full respect for rights, and political, social and economic equality.

Though all aspects are relevant, the capacity of authorities to enforce laws that are “non-retroactive, and in public knowledge universal, stable, predictable and non-ambiguous,” is considered a prerequisite for all the other dimensions. Still, even if the rule of law is respected, the “critical features” for a good democracy refer to how universally and independently laws are applied: the integral application of the legal system, also at the supranational level, guaranteeing the rights and equality of citizens; the absence of areas dominated by organized crime and corruption in the political, administrative, and judicial branches; the existence of a local and centralized civil bureaucracy that competently and universally applies the law and assumes responsibility in the event of error; the existence of an efficient police force that respects the rights and freedoms guaranteed by law; equal, unhindered access of citizens to the legal system in the case of lawsuits either between private citizens or between private citizens and public institutions—this also implies that citizens know their rights and can obtain representation; reasonably swift resolution of criminal inquiries and of civil and administrative lawsuits; the complete independence of the judiciary from any political influence. (Morlino, 2004)

What changes with democracy and what does not change? Do changes brought by transitional democracy lead to the preconditions for the “good” democracy or do they produce more mixed results? These preconditions have been studied either from the perspective of the analysis of transitional democracies or of the expansion of human rights—but not from the perspective of how laws actually operate, or of changes in values and beliefs of those in charge of implementing the laws.

At first sight the Brazilian case provides support to the conclusion that “the adoption of some democratic elements will not automatically decrease repressive activity, something implied within the majority of research within this area.” (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004). The fulfillment of a minimalist definition of democracy may not be enough to ensure that human rights violations will decrease, because this is not sufficient to ensure a democratic rule of law. A higher level of democracy requires more responsiveness by authorities to societal demands. Without accountability there is no responsiveness. Thus stronger democracy, in the sense of more controls over authorities, may be necessary for human rights abuses to be reduced (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004).

The present experience with democracy in Brazil is unique historically in duration, in the extension of political competition, in the universality of suffrage, in the access to information (freedom of the press), in the freedom to protest (mass demonstrations), in the greater urbanization of the country, and in the number of organizations that play watchdog roles, but these attributes coexist with violent crimes and gross human rights violations. Institution-building enjoys a high profile in public opinion, in particular with the creation of a Special Secretariat for Human Rights attached to the Presidency of the Republic and Police Ombudsperson offices to attend to civilian complaints about police behavior, but these entities are more or less successful depending on who is in charge, signaling that institutions are still not strong enough to resist external pressures.

It would appear that greater changes have taken place in the field of social rights than in the arena of political and civil rights. Conservative forces maintain a strong presence in the political sphere, and the rule of law continues to be applied precariously in most areas of Brazil. Crime is rampant and some types of violence have worsened. Brazil still struggles with seemingly intractable
problems: abusive use of lethal force by the police forces, extrajudicial killings, lynching, torture, and abominable prison conditions. Moreover corruption in the criminal justice system persists and, though there are indicators that the corruption is systemic, successive administrations have avoided confronting this problem: when measures have been adopted to prohibit torture and abusive use of lethal force by the police, for example, they have not been effective.

Violent criminal offenses have increased in Brazil since the beginning of the 1980s, mainly in metropolitan areas such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Vitória, and Recife. Deaths caused by homicide, rising since the mid-1970s, accelerated in the 1980s: while the overall mortality rate grew by 20 percent, homicides increased by 60 percent. Victims were, and still are, mostly young and adolescent males (Peres, Cardia and Santos, 2004), living in the poorest districts of large cities with multiple deprivations and very poor access to rights (Cardia, Adorno and Poleto, 2003). This kind of growth has more than justified the public’s fears and feelings of insecurity.

Homicides in the country as a whole began to decrease in 2003, but the rates continue to be very high (26/100,000 residents) when compared to other countries, and the total number of cases per year remain close to a staggering 50,000.

There is no single explanation for the decrease in homicides. Since there were no concerted efforts at different levels of government to reduce homicides both in terms of preventive measures, or of public security polices, to deter violence, it is likely that this drop is the result of multiple factors: a) improvement in the economy, with more formal jobs available; b) more private and public investment in high homicide areas; c) greater presence of organized civil society in high risk areas; c) changes in the demographic profile of the population (aging population means fewer youth at risk); d) changes in the type of drugs used, crack cocaine in particular; e) improved police work and more effective punishment of criminals; f) higher rates of imprisonment—in the state of São Paulo the prison population tripled in eight years; g) the implementation of laws that created numerous obstacles to the possession of firearms; h) innovations in investigation and prevention adopted by police forces; i) changes in policing practices; and j) changes in police training.

The fall in the homicide rate was not followed by a reduction in other forms of violent crime: aggravated assault, armed robberies, kidnapping and offenses associated with drug use and trafficking continued to grow. If crime statistics are still cause for concern, so are political scandals involving tax evasion, money laundering, fraud and corruption that multiply without significant abatement.

Worse still is that new forms of violence have emerged in the last two decades, many of which are attributable to organized crime.

There now are complex social and institutional networks connecting violent delinquents, lawyers, politicians, entrepreneurs, public servants and citizens. Such networks nourish corruption and impact collective beliefs about the efficacy of democratic institutions to guarantee law and order. The disruptive impact of organized crime on democratic institutions and processes is becoming all too clear.

What helps to explain the increase in organized crime in Brazil—and in a host of other countries as well? Democracy has not produced immediate gains in the reduction of inequality. If crime and violence are not the result of poverty and inequality alone, these conditions weaken citizens’ access to rights and to the institutions that mediate such access as well as their capacity to act collectively to pressure authorities to deliver rights, so far secured only in law. In Brazil, the first decade after the return to democracy was a very difficult economic period. Income inequality increased while the state faced severe economic limitations in its attempts to design and implement social safety policies. By the time the economy stabilized, the gap between the needs of the majority of the population and the capacity of the state to provide for those needs was very large.

The state also had too few resources to contain crime: investments in modernizing the criminal justice system and the police were too meager to stem the growth in violent criminal behavior. As a result impunity increased markedly. This, coupled with new opportunities found by organized crime groups (in particular the substantial profits in dealing internationally in drugs and arms), resulted in real threats to the integrity of the justice system and in the trust the people have in the system: under the circumstances, the police and the judiciary are not well considered by most Brazilians.

In recent years, however, one police force has succeeded in rebuilding its image vis-à-vis the public: the Federal Police has been quite effective in investigating federal and international crimes and in bringing to justice the alleged perpetrators. Though the Federal Police receive much support from Federal Prosecutors, their high profile cases still take years to reach the courts and, when they do, may linger on for many years. This is most evident in cases involving politicians, who are granted special privileges and can be tried only by the Supreme Court. The backlog of cases seems insurmountable.

At the state and local level, the challenge of lawful control of crime is still to be met. Local police forces generally have not succeeded in meeting democratic standards of policing and law enforcement. Nor have they
succeeded in improving their public image. Institutional performance in law enforcement is seriously jeopardized by imbalances in pay scales, unattractive career structures, lack of accountability and external forms of oversight. Police units still tend to operate militarily, and their actions often produce casualties among law-abiding people, especially in poor neighborhoods or *favelas*. Such casualties of lethal force are generally considered necessary and acceptable, especially among elected officials of all ranks. The involvement of policemen with crime, their role in death squads, their involvement with the torture of suspects, or their participation in private security enterprises have, at best, received mixed attention and at worst, no attention.

Brazilian states have not been very successful in reforming the prison system to bring it in line with what is expected in a democracy. Though the prison population grew from 30 prisoners per 100,000 residents in 1969 to 215 per 100,000 residents in 2006, the number of agents was not increased proportionately, nor were sufficient investments made in promoting the re-education or re-socialization of inmates. Crowded prisons, with no educational, work, sport or leisure activities for prisoners, have had the perverse effect of encouraging prisoners to organize and extend their criminal activities to the outside world. Organized crime from within the prisons represents a new form of risk for society at large.

As mentioned earlier, violations of civil rights still represent a challenge for democracy in Brazil. The public perceives that suspects of crimes are not entitled to protection including defense against torture, and that force may be justified to contain crime at any cost. This is one of the indicators that Brazil has not succeeded in establishing a human rights culture to date. Public support for the rule of law provides a powerful obstacle to the return of repressive measures. The capacity of authorities to enforce laws that are “non-retroactive, and in public knowledge universal, stable, predictable and non-ambiguous” is a pre-requisite for peaceful society.

A human rights culture is one in which people value such rights, are willing to protect them from intrusions, and are unwilling to sacrifice them under normal circumstances. Democracy and human rights regimes are intrinsically connected. For democracy to prosper, human rights must be implemented, citizens must feel protected not only from arbitrary behavior by powerful groups in society (right to physical integrity) but must also share in the wealth that is generated in the society (social, economic and cultural rights). This perspective demands that we assess the development of a transitional democracy while also assessing access to human rights.

Democracy demands popular control and political equality. Translated into rights it means the ability to express opinions, to be informed, to freely associate, to freely move inside and among countries. Moreover, these rights can be exercised only if persons feel free and secure, and if due process prevails. Access to economic, social and cultural rights are being increasingly interpreted as key elements for the exercise of democratic rights since if persons lack access to health and education and to secure livelihoods they cannot enjoy their civil and political rights, as pointed out in the political and sociological literature. In contemporary Brazil, these are the major challenges to the democratic control of violence in the context of a human rights culture.

**Endnote**

1 The homicide rate for male youth between 15 and 19 years old in São Paulo jumped from 10 per 100,000 persons to 188 per 100,000 in thirty-five years (1960-1995).

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Inequality and Citizen Security in Latin America

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Inequality and insecurity have helped turn each other into two of Latin America’s most stubborn problems. With a regional homicide rate of over three times the global average since 2000, accounting for over forty percent of the world’s murders each year, crime has been one of the top concerns of Latin Americans since the mid-1990s. In response, governments have been enacting an extensive range of reforms, including the restructuring of police forces, more professional support for officers, stronger accountability, judicial reforms, and community policing. Together, such change is gradually moving the region from a traditional form of policing, based on militarized hierarchies and reactive responses, to a problem-oriented policing based on prevention and flexibility. An expanding literature on citizen security in Latin America, such as the edited volumes by Bobea (2003), Tulchin and Ruthenburg (2006), and Alda and Beliz (2007), discuss the development of these policies in different countries. Such efforts, though, have gotten mired in the region’s profound social, geographic, legal, and economic inequalities. The demand for short-term results leads governments to supplant or water down these long-term reforms as they buckle under pressure by panicked societies and by criminal justice institutions that impede change not just through direct resistance but through their deficient and unequal practices of oversight, investigation, due process, and management. Taming crime is so difficult, that is, because hurdles spring from the same kinds of inequalities that help cause it. They have trapped Latin America in an impasse between the centralized repressive policing of the past and a more accountable citizen-based policing of the future.

An initial and most visible area of citizen security reform has been to restructure police forces by breaking them up into geographically- and functionally-based units. But since such change often occurs in haste amid discord among political parties and a lack of preparation by provincial and municipal governments, it often multiplies rather than minimizes inefficiencies. Throughout the region, decentralization has also widened inequalities between rich and poor districts. In Venezuela, for example, where the number of police forces has jumped 363 percent since the 1989 Decentralization Law, the wealthy eastern half of the Federal Capital has ten times more police officers than the poor western half, which has over 70 percent of the area’s residents and crime. Since citizen security goes beyond policing, furthermore, the proportionately greater scarcity in rural and poor urban areas of agencies such as NGOs diminishes the civil rights component of security even more.

The other form of restructuring is internal, such as reducing the number of ranks, merging the separate hierarchies for officials and sub-officials, and creating special units on issues such as human rights. To make such change more palatable to police, it is often accompanied by salary increases, health and housing subsidies, career laws with fairer rules on promotion, and new technology like crime-mapping software. Although such long-needed changes help reduce internal inequalities, they often do little to address the administrative practices that foment them. Even amid growing budgets, most local stations lack basic supplies and equipment, and their officers are shifted around based on ad hoc operations and poor human resource management. Corruption at the top, particularly among specific agencies, thwarts rational and equitable distribution of funds and officers. Despite the weakness of criminal investigation, in addition, no judicial police gets more than five to ten percent of the security budget, and only between two and ten percent of officers work on investigation. Creation of new units to deal with issues like human rights are often seen as complementary additions and sometimes created as a way to marginalize these areas while appealing, for public relations, to prioritize them. As with police academy training, new focuses have little impact unless they are made integral to the job.

To increase legal, fiscal, and public transparency over criminal justice agencies, accountability mechanisms—from national ombudsmen (the Defensoría del Pueblo) to internal affairs offices within the police—have been established or revamped throughout the region. But many of these agencies are weaker than those they try to hold accountable. They are often politicized, deprived of cooperation, and inundated with minor complaints that prevent investigation of serious ones. Citizens do not trust them, since they are often located within a police station and because judgments can be vetoed by higher-ups, while police officers often see them as a tool to find scapegoats. In Bolivia, where the police hierarchy reflects deep ethnic and class divisions, the vast majority of cases handled by the internal disciplinary system have been for desertion among the lower ranks. Meanwhile, abuse by the top ranks continues to be endemic. In a 2006 United Nations poll of officers, 87 percent report being subject to verbal abuse and 77 percent of being unjustifiably arrested, sanctioned without recourse, or chronically over-worked.
Latin America’s many judicial reforms, from alternative sentencing to neighborhood judges of the peace, have been more attuned to inequalities and so work to make criminal justice more efficient, unbiased, and accessible. The most sweeping of these changes are the overhauls of penal process codes that most countries have undertaken to speed up trials and strengthen due process by replacing glacial written procedures with oral trials, transferring investigative authorities from the police to prosecutors (fiscales), and creating courts at the investigative and sentencing phases. But despite impressive results, particularly in their first few years,2 these codes have been starved of needed state funds, professional training, and institutional backing. Many police—chafing against stricter controls on evidence and detention—often cooperate less with prosecutors and judges, who struggle with their new investigative and other responsibilities. Resulting tensions are heightened by limited personnel. Throughout Latin America, in particular, public defenders carry double the recommended load of 150 cases, and, in juvenile justice, sometimes triple. As the new penal process codes become less an instrument for change than a convenient target of blame for fostering crime and impunity, chronic problems such as court backlogs, botched investigations, and low conviction rates (of under ten percent) continue.

Also continuing is unequal treatment of citizens caught up in the criminal justice system. Amid pressure to crack down, due process abuses such as poor legal access persist while prison populations have risen by over 50 percent since the mid-1990s, stuffing many facilities to over four times their capacity (mainly with detainees awaiting trial beyond the mandated time limit). Victims of crime, particularly those from less powerful sectors or regions, are also treated unequally. Rates of homicide resolution are as much as two-thirds lower in rural than in urban areas, for example, while crimes against women chronically are under-investigated. In Costa Rica, 80 percent of rape reports do not get to trial although victims must describe the attacks at seven different stages,3 while just five of 1,897 killings of women in Guatemala between 2001 and 2005 were resolved in court.4

Combined with the intent to demonstrate quick results, the difficulty of uprooting such entrenched practices has increased the appeal of “zero tolerance” policy to give police greater authority to detain or question people, which is supposed to stop potential criminals from committing serious offenses while divulging illegal arms, possessions or activities that would otherwise go unchecked. To be both effective against crime and respectful of civil rights, though, such an approach requires better legal training for all officers, coordination with social services, functioning courts to process detainees, and external oversight. But instead of such supports or controls, “zero tolerance” is often bolstered by measures that turn it into a mano dura (iron fist). Such measures include “social control” laws; edicts that allow arrest for subjectively defined attributes such as “vagrancy” to “criminal intent”; long-standing detention powers, such as for checking identification or police record; and provisions in temporary police operations, such as curfews and razzias (roundups), that often continue beyond the operation itself.

As they take up a large percentage of officers’ time—four of five detentions in countries like Guatemala are for misdemeanors for instance—such tactics distract from serious crime, distend judicial backlogs, raise tensions with citizens, and complicate reform. They also come down heaviest on sectors associated with crime. In Honduras, for example, the 2002 Law of Police and Social Co-Existence is often used to detain people with HIV, youth of African descent, “suspected homosexuals” and other marginalized individuals.5 While such tactics often have popular backing, they do not necessarily lead the way to greater attention to the causes of crime. In poor areas of Buenos Aires, for example, residents say that the government has not responded as youth addiction to the smokeable form of cocaine known as paco skyrocketed over the past seven years. So, many of them have banded together to get addicts and victims to social services, and to attack or expel dealers.6 In many areas, the combination of weak state presence and harsh state rhetoric has spread the appeal of vigilante justice, which kills up to 6,000 people in Latin America each year.7 “We just know how to deal with these problems a lot better,” said a member of a community justice council in the Bolivia city of El Alto. “How can we trust a police that just comes to break up our demonstrations? Where are they at other times?”8

The impacts of such unequal law enforcement fall hardest on young people. Violence killed 80,000 Latin America youth in 2006, a rate 36 times higher than wealthy countries and nearly double the rate in Africa. Nearly a third of those murdered in the region are between 10 and 19 years old. But youth are more often seen as perpetrators than victims, with a majority in many polls identifying groups of youth in the street as the main cause of insecurity. And as police in nearly every country report more arrests of individuals under 18, there have been increasing demands to stiffen penalties against them and to lower the age of legal responsibility to fourteen.9 But while controlling youth thus becomes a priority for officers, the skills they need to do so are those they and their superiors most lack. Even though youth gangs have become the centerpiece of criminal policy throughout

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Latin America, in particular, usually lacking are social services for at-risk youth, studies of gang activity across time and geographic jurisdictions, reliable statistics, and even a coherent definition of a gang. In Honduras, for example, which has the highest per capita number of members of the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, and where about 40 youth are killed each month, varying definitions and categorizations within the government cause official estimates of gang members to fluctuate between 30,000 and 140,000.

Such patterns are reflected in and fueled by the use of public space, which high levels of family and socio-economic instability make particularly heavy for youth in Latin America. Along with public policy and popular opinion, though, private security is narrowing and de-legitimizing that space for marginalized sectors, as discussed in studies such as Lozada (1998). Since the 1980s, the number of private security firms has grown such as Lozada (1998). Since the 1980s, the number of private security firms has grown, with about 40 per capita number of members of the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, and where about 1.6 million members to fluctuate between 30,000 and 140,000.

Such deeply rooted practices, though, can begin to be reversed by community-oriented policing, which breaks from the state-centered nature of other security reforms through citizen-based prevention. As discussed in a growing proportion of the literature, such as Frühling (2003) and Fridell and Wycoff (2004), this approach has led to innovative projects to address the causes of criminality, from joint citizen-police councils to services such as youth centers and street lighting. Despite being Latin America’s most popular and fastest growing security reform, however, community policing is also susceptible to its political, societal, and institutional inequalities. Within the police, community policing is often marginalized, with its officers derided as “police nurses” or “empty holster agents” who are burdened with extra work without extra compensation. Since many neighborhoods lack strong participatory organizations to partner with police, many programs are co-opted by sectors of a community, especially those allied with mano dura police or who incite vigilantism. Most residents do not want to get involved anyway, fearful of being targeted as collaborators or concluding that the new approach will not alter underlying practices such as an excessive use of force.

But when fortified with elements of other reforms, community-oriented policing is the most effective way to reduce insecurity and inequality. Agency restructuring, first of all, must give neighborhood police commissioners more autonomy to implement policy and give street officers more time to work with residents. Social services, such as in education and health, should be brought in to provide wider institutional support with more holistic responses to local socioeconomic conditions. Internal affairs offices should be supplemented by an early identification process to suspend officials exhibiting patterns of abuse and inefficiency, and an auditor, who uses these patterns to recommend structural changes. Fuller and more reliable criminal statistics can be provided by autonomous Violence Observatories, such as those in Central America, or inter-institutional agencies that compile reports from disparate sources, as in Ecuador. Many countries have based community policing on such institutional reforms. Chile’s Plan Cuadrante, which created neighborhood-level police units, continually measures the supply and demand of police services in order to shift resources to meet changing needs. Uruguay’s Citizen Security Program is supported by resource and logistics centers, mayor’s offices, as well as Neighborhood Councils in the capital of Montevideo and a National Rehabilitation Center with comprehensive services for youth offenders.

Community-oriented policing must also be grounded in broad-based participation, of course, from identification of problems to evaluation of policy. Even under financial, logistical and political limitations, innovative steps taken around the region to create and sustain such involvement range from general surveys to anti-violence training. In Bolivia, La Paz’s “Neighborhoods of Truth Program” includes a competition for citizen-based proposals, which residents in low-income areas have used to address longstanding problems, from illegal sales of alcohol to pollution by local factories. In Venezuela, where homicides have more than doubled since 2000, San Francisco municipality in the city of Maracaibo adopted an Autonomous Police Institute and a Community Affairs section, which have generated initiatives—such as better use-of-force discretion, more citizen channels for complaints—that have helped abate both criminal and police violence. The popularity of Costa Rica’s community policing program comes from its charlas, covering subjects from domestic violence to criminal law, in which residents identify causes of insecurity and then implement their own policy responses to them.
To move past the crossroads between traditional and community-oriented policing, in short, reforms need to address imbalances within both society and the state’s security systems. Crackdowns can work in the short run, but efforts to build up trust, prevention, and cooperation are needed for the long term. Halting criminal violence depends on recognizing that it not simply a problem that afflicts democracies, but is produced by them as well.

Endnotes


2 Crime more than doubling between 2001 and 2007 as a response to the question of what respondents consider the most important problem in their country.

3 In Medellín, Colombia, the poor Zone 1 has 101 murders per 100,000 people while the rate in wealthier Zone 5 is just 27 (RCMP 2006).

4 In Nicaragua, citizen crime reports rose four percent and police detention dropped 30 percent in the 2004 code’s first year. Venezuela’s new code helped reduce the prison population nearly 40 percent in its first year. As criminal justice officials took advantage of alternative sentencing to reduce backlogs, similar results were seen in other countries.

5 Arguedas, Carlos, “80 por ciento de denuncias por el delito de violación no llegan a juicio”, La Nación, July 3, 2005, p. 16A.


11 The chief of the Chilean Carabineros, for example, reports that arrests in this age range in Chile rose five times between 1986 and 2003. Blanco and Bernales, forthcoming.

12 Constant turnover and off-the-books accounting hiring leads to varying estimates of firms in many countries. In Guatemala, estimates of the number of officers range from 80,000 to 200,000, while in Mexico, it ranges from 140,000 to 450,000, with an estimated 600,000 unregistered ones. The Economist, 27 January 2007, p. 33.

13 Author Interview, residents, La Paz areas of Pura Pura, Villa Victoria, and La Portada, July 2007.

14 Author Interview, Pedro Luis Tang Urdaneta, Policía de San Francisco, November 29, 2005.

15 Author Interview, Ana Durán Salvatierra, Vice-Minister of Governance and Police; Alberto Li Chan, director of community policing, and citizen workshops in San José, June 2006.

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Violence and Social Inequalities

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Latin America is the most unequal region in the world. It is also the most violent. This state of affairs compels us to ask whether there is some kind of association and, if so, what kind, between these two phenomena. Does inequality beget violence? Does violence exacerbate or solidify inequality? Is there some sort of vicious spiral in which violence and inequality reinforce one another, or is the relationship simply circumstantial? In this essay I will briefly reflect on these issues. To anticipate my principal conclusions, I find that there is, indeed, a relationship between violence and inequality, but I will pose several reservations and caveats. As to the role of violence exacerbateing inequality or poverty, I will argue that we still cannot provide a good answer, and that the question itself may well have to be reformulated. There do exist some “conflict traps” (Collier et al. 2003), in which violence and inequality reinforce one another, but the existence of these traps creates neither the only, nor necessarily the most interesting situation for Latin Americans. Using Colombian examples, I intend to discuss—in somewhat more general terms—some ideas that are quite common in public opinion and academic debates, without going into details, and without referring to specific arguments. Because of space limitations, I will omit some of the usual caveats and reservations that are common in academic discussions.

Does Inequality Breed Violence?

Naturally, the first response to such a question should be to ask for further specification. What kind of inequality? What kind of violence?

Since 1991, civil wars have become the most prevalent form of mass violence in the world. Until the 1990s there was a substantial thread of literature, supported by several quantitative studies (see for example Müller, 1995; Muller et. al., 1989), that asserted that there existed a strong association between various types of inequality and armed civil conflict. Toward the end of the last century, Paul Collier and other students of civil wars (see, for example, Hirschleifer 2001) rebelled against this conventional wisdom, claiming that the main determinant of the onset and persistence of civil wars was greed and not grievance. Insurgency, for this school of thought, was a form of criminality (Collier 2000). This point of view, hailed in its moment as genuinely revolutionary, had a huge impact on the policy world, and at least in some countries, on broad sectors of technocratic and public opinion. I believe, however, that we can now say that we are past Collier’s “revolution,” his main theses having been falsified along several dimensions of criticism (for an exemplary critique, see Cramer 2006). In very general terms, both his conceptualization of the key questions and the way he transformed his concepts into measurable variables are deeply problematic. In addition, his analysis is based on faulty assumptions about the microfoundations of violent conflict (the traits of fighters and belligerent groups); as soon as these are submitted to empirical scrutiny, even in the most favorable of conditions, they fall apart (Gutiérrez 2004). Most egregiously, the hidden assumption of the mechanical importation of neoclassical econometrics to the study of violent conflict is that all non-state groups can be collapsed into a single category. This is simply incorrect (Gutiérrez 2008). In general, when econometrics is not preceded by a serious taxonomical effort, it can produce seriously flawed results. Last, Collier’s proposed alternative—violence is explained not by inequality but by the “natural resources curse”—rapidly becomes more problematic than the original proposition it was supposed to replace.1

Presently, however, the main concern of Latin America is not civil war, but criminal violence. The latter has been strongly fueled by the global U.S. war against drugs (and here the type of inequality we are speaking about is asymmetry between states). Does social inequality play any role in this ordeal? Indeed, it does. Millions of destitute youngsters, with few, if any, legal alternatives, get involved in extensive transnational networks of criminality and informal provision of security. If, as Eric Hobsbawm has claimed (1988), big cities are environments hostile to working-class political radicalism, they might in contrast be ideal niches for the propagation of these flexible patterns of criminal-societal articulation. Observers have read into these violent structures some political overtones, and to continue in a Hobsbawmian vein, I wonder if we are not witnessing an urban, twenty-first century version of “social banditry.” A large-scale process of social change has created broad subordinate sectors without a viable voice, and this may well be associated with the emergence of several modalities of “primitive rebellion.” In fact, all along the political and theoretical spectrum, from Hobsbawm to Collier, the articulation of politics and criminality is a common and relevant motive. This, however, should be a warning to us. Inequality may be a necessary condition in explaining the persistence of violence, but it is hardly sufficient. Agency and politics must be brought into the discussion, as must state and transnational policies, along with strategies, ideas, networks and
organizational structures. The question of course is how to do this, and when.

Certainly, together with the challenge of urban crime, Latin America has witnessed a wave of mass mobilization that, to my knowledge, has not yet been adequately explained or understood in a comparative context. Millions of Latin Americans have marched in the streets, protested, and voted, in the hope that their activism would be able to produce greater prosperity and more equitable distribution of wealth. This “turn to the left,” though pacific, has experienced several episodes of violence (for example in Bolivia and Venezuela), and the ritualized threat of its use. It remains true that, when inequality is above a given threshold, and politics is activated along what Frances Stewart (see for example 2008) has termed “horizontal inequalities,” the danger of intractable polarization looms large.

Does Violence Breed Inequality? Poverty?

In general, I am rather skeptical about the journalistic and academic theses that violence freezes—or exacerbates—inequality and poverty; we actually know very little about the issue. Indeed, one of the most under-analyzed dimensions of contemporary Latin American societies is the multiplicity of forms in which violence changes society. My point of departure is that inequality above a certain threshold may increase the probability of the emergence of polarized politics and, as the outcomes of the latter are highly uncertain, so is their ultimate impact over macro patterns of distribution. But there is much more. Mass violence changes, in a quite patchy and contingent way, the map of inequalities and poverties. A few examples may be pertinent to this argument. If one were to try to answer the question of how narcotrafficking and war have changed Colombia, the growth of inequality would be one of the main and obvious effects. The wave of violence that started in the early 1980s triggered an enormous inverse agrarian reform, enabling old and new elites to expropriate—using a combination of coercion and strategic use of the law—the lands of hundreds of thousands of peasants. The traditionally most vulnerable sectors of the population were also those who felt the brunt of the conflict. This is well known, and has been documented beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, narcotrafficking and war have also stimulated—and I think substantially (although of course this can hardly be quantified)—upward social mobility. Colombian society, in which social mobility had been quite blocked—at least according to necessarily inexact mainstream accounts—suddenly offered a whole new set of prizes to individuals who had the skills and the resources to get involved in illegal activities. As a female fighter claims in an already classic book, “in Colombia one has to be rich or one has to be violent” (Salazar 1993). For example, a headcount of the paramilitary leadership in a key region of the country reveals that, together with the old elites, we find a substantial representation of soldiers (especially corporals and sergeants), policemen, and manual workers (Gutiérrez and Barón 2005).

Seldom have both factors, the sharp increases in inequality and in social mobility, been put together to try to understand contemporary Colombia. However, I believe that their simultaneous presence goes a long way toward explaining many of the principal political and social dynamics of the country. Standard arguments relating growing inequality to the rising costs of conflict are, first, that the state has to deflect resources from health and education to war, and second, that the elites become more reactionary and opposed to change. These propositions sound plausible, but they have to be tested empirically, with an adequate methodology. In the Latin American context it is not evident that they hold. Colombia, the only country in the continent at war over the past few years, has not lagged behind its neighbors in the funding and efficacy of many of its social programs (Abel and Lloyd Sherlock 2000). The country has suffered a strong conservative backlash in the last decade, but only after two decades of uninterrupted conflict and instability. In this period we have witnessed a combination of conservatism with remedial social policies, a combination that could take some interesting forms in the coming period.

Violence is a very powerful force that produces winners and losers. Indeed, it is lopsided, generally favoring the rich over the poor, though it can crush some rich and reward some poor. It also has complex territorial effects, forcefully articulating some regions into global markets, while marginalizing others. These processes can dramatically change the processes of social mobility and the patterns of social and political interaction. In short, violence is capable of unhinging traditional social and institutional accords, thus weakening the proposition that, with respect to social distribution, it is simply a stabilizer of the status quo.

Traps?

The “traps” that international agency bureaucrats are fond of analyzing are, at first blush, credible: violence generates poverty; poverty (or inequality) is a catalyst of violence. I am not convinced, however, that these traps are easy to find at the national level in Latin America, though this pattern may be operational at the sub-national level in several countries. There are many other scenarios, however, that are much more relevant for Latin America. The first one is political democracy without social
democracy—the type of polity that Latin America experimented with in the 1990s, which unraveled precisely because of its inability to adequately address social issues. The point here is not that inequality produces violence in an unmediated manner, but that it breeds a type of instability that is difficult to cope with institutionally. The second scenario is what may be called criminalized stabilization (Gutiérrez and Barón 2008). Criminal actors can establish dominance over a certain territory, establish a set of rules that are preferable (for the local population) to pure arbitrariness, and produce very backward and poverty-generating forms of governance. Experience has shown that pacts emerging from criminalized stabilization need some special conditions because they involve solving serious collective action problems, though when they take root they can be very long-lasting. This produces a sort of “peace trap.” Frequently the state’s intent to break these pacts produces flares of extreme confrontation (a good early analysis of this is found in Resa, 2002). If, on the other hand, the state looks the other way, “business as usual” is likely to guarantee substantial inequality along with a low cost, low profile, and very nasty solution to the problem of governance.

In conclusion, inequalities and violent dynamics interact in many complex ways. In general, it is necessary to identify threshold effects because the rather naïve hunch that there is some sort of monotonous association (more inequality, more violence) obviously does not hold. Inequality is only the beginning of an explanation of violence, but I think it is a factor that cannot be ignored. Looking in the other direction, we know very little about the macro impacts of different forms of violence over patterns of inequality. In both cases, the specification of mechanisms and modalities/patterns of agency should go into any research agenda.

Endnotes


2. The concept of “horizontal inequalities” is central to the work of the Oxford-based Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE). See CRISE’s web page: <http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/>.

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1993 Mujeres de fuego. Medellín, Colombia: Corporación Región

Stewart, Frances
Reconstrucción de la masculinidad
y reintegración de excombatientes
en Colombia

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“A siempre soñaba en agarrar un arma.
Quería saber cómo se sentía, [saber] cómo
se sentiría tenerla en mis manos. Sentirme
hombre”.

— Óscar, 25 años, excombatiente del ELN,
Casa de Paz en Bogotá.

“A la hora de explicar las atrocidades, con
frecuencia se ha ignorado una forma en
particular de identidad social, la
masculinidad”.

Introducción

El desarme, desmovilización y
reincorporación (DDR) de excombatientes
es un componente clave de los procesos de
paz y de la reconstrucción en el
postconflicto. Los programas de DDR
implican múltiples transiciones: desde
excombatientes que deponen las armas, a
gobiernos que buscan terminar el conflicto
armado y comunidades que reciben o
rechazan a los desmovilizados. En cada
nivel, estas transiciones incluyen una
ecuación dinámica y compleja entre las
demanda de paz y de justicia. Sin embargo,
los enfoques tradicionales de DDR se han
concentrado casi exclusivamente en los
objetivos militares y de seguridad. Esto ha
tenido como resultado que dichos programas
se hayan creado en un relativo aislamiento
del creciente debate sobre justicia
transicional y de preguntas sobre el
esclarecimiento histórico, la justicia, la
reparación y la reconciliación. Al reducir el
DDR a un “desmantelamiento de la
maquinaria de guerra”, estos programas no
han considerado de forma adecuada cómo ir
más allá de la desmovilización y facilitar la
reconstrucción y la coexistencia sociales.

Con base en mi investigación con
excombatientes en Colombia, estoy
convencida de que una reincorporación
exitosa no solamente requiere que los
procesos y metas de desarme,
desmovilización y reincorporación se
fusionen con las medidas de la justicia
transicional, sino que tanto el DDR como la
justicia transicional necesitan de un análisis
de género que incluya un examen de los
vínculos entre armas, formas de
masculinidad y violencia en contextos
históricos específicos. La construcción de
ciertas formas de masculinidad no es un
aspecto accidental del militarismo, sino que
es esencial para su mantenimiento. El
militarismo requiere de una continua
ideología de género tanto como requiere de
armas y municiones.

Pero, ¿cómo se ha entendido la
incorporación del género en los programas
de DDR? Tratando de responder esta
pregunta fui a la página web del Banco
Mundial, en donde encontré una lista de
publicaciones sobre “Género y DDR”. A
medida que exploraba la lista de archivos,
me enteré de que existe un “déficit de
género” en los programas de DDR. Por esta
razón, se incentiva a los responsables de
formular políticas y programas a incluir una
“dimensión de género” en sus actividades
para garantizar que “se identifiquen y
aborden las necesidades específicas
femeninas” (Banco Mundial: 2007).

Días más tarde me llamó la atención un
artículo sobre “Las implicaciones de género
de una teoría de justicia específicamente
‘transicional’”. En este artículo, Bell y
O’Rourke formulan una pregunta triple:

¿Dónde se encuentran las mujeres? ¿Y dónde
el género? y ¿Dónde está el feminismo en la
justicia transicional? Recuerdo a los
lectores que el “hacer la guerra y negociar
acuerdos de paz son predominantemente
asuntos de hombres” y que “las cuestiones
que abordan los problemas subyacentes
discriminación, dominio y mejoras en la
seguridad física, social y legal con respecto
to el género en particular, generalmente se
abordan de forma secundaria, o simplemente
no se abordan”. Notan así que los
esfuerzos más importantes realizados para
“incorporar el género” a la justicia
transicional están relacionados con el
tratamiento legal de la violencia sexual
durante el conflicto; logro que se ha
alcanzado en parte tras convocar a mujeres a
“Audiencias de género” y al establecer
“Unidades de género” dentro de los
procesos de la justicia transicional.

Desde las audiencias y unidades de género,
hasta las comisiones de la verdad “sensibles”
a aspectos de género, “incluir el género”
usualmente se entiende como “agregar a las
mujeres”. Entender “género” como
sinónimo de “mujer” limita las importantes
contribuciones que los estudios sobre género
creen aportar a nuestra interpretación
téorica y práctica sobre la guerra, la paz y la
reconstrucción en el postconflicto.

¿Cómo incorporar una dimensión de género
a los procesos de DDR y de justicia
transicional, incluyendo a los hombres y las
formas de masculinidad, de forma que
dichas identidades se perciban claramente
y se conviertan en el enfoque de investigación
e intervención? Mi investigación en
Colombia ha sido motivada por el deseo de
entender cómo las formas violentas de la
masculinidad se forman y sostienen y cómo
los programas de DDR pueden “desarmar la
masculinidad” en el postconflicto. Estoy
interesada en la “masculinidad
militarizada”—esa fusión de ciertas prácticas
Las motivaciones complejas que estos hombres tienen para unirse a los grupos armados es uno de los componentes de la economía política y cultural de las formas violentas de masculinidad. Las fuerzas armadas colombianas ven la idea del reclutamiento como una oportunidad para ascender socialmente y, como en muchos países, la vida militar se vincula al concepto de ciudadanía. Aunque los excombatientes con los que trabajé eran miembros de un grupo armado ilegal, la movilidad social era un factor que los motivaba. La mayoría de estos hombres provienen de familias humildes y para algunos de ellos unirse a la guerrilla significaba tener alimentación, un arma y un uniforme. Y para los que se unieron a los paramilitares, no sólo implicaba eso, sino que también un salario mensual. En el complejo escenario de violencia que caracteriza a Colombia, pasar por el ciclo de pertenecer a un grupo armado es un ritual para muchos jóvenes. En un contexto de violencia generalizada, la proliferación de redes criminales, un mercado laboral legal limitado y una economía cultural que fusiona las armas, la masculinidad y el poder, el hecho de sostener un arma no es necesariamente una aberración.

En las conversaciones que sostuvimos con los desmovilizados, siempre preguntábamos por qué se habían unido a estos grupos. Si combinamos las respuestas “vivían en una zona controlada por un grupo armado” e “ingresó por una persona conocida” vemos que estos jóvenes crecieron en contextos en los que las alternativas a la guerra eran prácticamente invisibles. Utilizó el término jóvenes en forma deliberada, puesto que el 65% de estos excombatientes se unieron a un grupo armado cuando aún eran menores de edad. Por ejemplo, Ramón estuvo cuatro años con las AUC en Montería. Cuando le preguntamos la razón por la cual se unió a ese grupo armado, respondió, “Aburrimiento. Pero más que todo porque donde crecí, ellos tenían armas y todos los respetaban. Pagaban muy bien. Hasta uno podía tomar vacaciones. No es como en la guerrilla donde uno se muere de hambre y no lo dejan visitar a la mamá. Además donde crecí, el Estado no existe. Montería es puro paraco.”

**Métodos**

Desde enero de 2005 vengo realizando una investigación antropológica sobre los programas de desmovilización a nivel colectivo e individual en Colombia. A la fecha, mis asistentes de investigación y yo hemos entrevistado 156 hombres y 39 mujeres excombatientes de las AUC, FARC y el ELN.

**En busca del respeto**

Las motivaciones complejas que estos hombres tienen para unirse a los grupos armados es uno de los componentes de la economía política y cultural de las formas violentas de masculinidad. Las fuerzas armadas colombianas ven la idea del reclutamiento como una oportunidad para ascender socialmente y, como en muchos países, la vida militar se vincula al concepto de ciudadanía. Aunque los excombatientes con los que trabajé eran miembros de un grupo armado ilegal, la movilidad social era un factor que los motivaba. La mayoría de estos hombres provienen de familias humildes y para algunos de ellos unirse a la guerrilla significaba tener alimentación, un arma y un uniforme. Y para los que se unieron a los paramilitares, no sólo implicaba eso, sino que también un salario mensual. En el complejo escenario de violencia que caracteriza a Colombia, pasar por el ciclo de pertenecer a un grupo armado es un ritual para muchos jóvenes. En un contexto de violencia generalizada, la proliferación de redes criminales, un mercado laboral legal limitado y una economía cultural que fusiona las armas, la masculinidad y el poder, el hecho de sostener un arma no es necesariamente una aberración.

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**THEIDON continued**
Vale la pena mencionar que estos excombatientes viven con imágenes de una masculinidad militarizada—tanto los hombres como las mujeres. Esto es especialmente cierto con respecto a los ex paramilitares que explican que unirse a las AUC les permitió sentirse “como un gran hombre en las calles y barrios”, “poder salir con las mujeres más bonitas” y “vestirse hombre en las calles y barrios”, “poder salir de bases militares para su “protección”. Como me enteraría, el nivel de violencia sexual en esas comunidades era asombroso. Empiecé a cuestionarme sobre la seguridad “de quien” y a qué precio.21 Los acuerdos comunales involucraban ciertos acuerdos sexuales y la seguridad era un producto al que se le asignaba un género. Los hombres en esas comunidades construían las bases militares que se multiplicaron por todo Ayacucho durante la violencia y las mujeres y niñas “le prestaban servicios” a las tropas. En algunas de las comunidades con las que trabajé, el sexo se volvió una mercancía cuando las mujeres empezaron a venderlo. Sin embargo, las violaciones eran mucho más comunes. La “seguridad” comunal funcionaba de manera contradictoria.

Aunque los detalles pueden ser diferentes en las regiones colombianas, sin duda las dinámicas de género son inquietantemente similares. Las armas—y los hombres que las usan—son al mismo tiempo, una amenaza y una fuente de seguridad en un ambiente de guerra.

Asignarle género a la seguridad

No soy la primera investigadora en sostener que la justicia y la seguridad son “bienes privados” en Colombia; es obvio que el Estado ha fallado estrepitosamente en ambas áreas. Sin embargo, además de la privatización de la seguridad, quisiera tener en cuenta la manera en que a la seguridad misma se le ha asignado un género y cuáles son las consecuencias de esto. Los aspectos de la seguridad a los que se les ha asignado un género fueron claros para mí en Ayacucho (Perú) cuando trabajaba con comunidades que habían sido severamente afectadas por el conflicto armado interno en ese país.20 Bajo la amenaza de ataques guerrilleros, las autoridades en varias comunidades solicitaron la instalación de bases militares para su “protección”. Como me enteraría, el nivel de violencia sexual en esas comunidades era asombroso. Empecé a cuestionarme sobre la seguridad “de quien” y a qué precio.21 Los acuerdos comunales involucraban ciertos acuerdos sexuales y la seguridad era un producto al que se le asignaba un género. Los hombres en esas comunidades construían las bases militares que se multiplicaron por todo Ayacucho durante la violencia y las mujeres y niñas “le prestaban servicios” a las tropas. En algunas de las comunidades con las que trabajé, el sexo se volvió una mercancía cuando las mujeres empezaron a venderlo. Sin embargo, las violaciones eran mucho más comunes. La “seguridad” comunal funcionaba de manera contradictoria.

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La seguridad es una de las razones por la que las mujeres buscan a este tipo de hombres.21 En 2007, durante una de mis visitas a las comunas de Medellín, conversamos con un grupo de excombatientes, sus madres y novias. A medida que entrábamos y salíamos de sus casas, varias personas nos señalaron los agujeros de bala en las paredes y recordaron a los amigos a quienes habían amortajado viendo su mejor ropa.

Pude hablar con algunos de los muchachos a solas. Les pregunté si se sentían seguros y yo sabía que esta pregunta causaría risas y gritos.

“¿Entonces, qué hacen ahora?—pregunté —Me preocupan por ustedes, sus familias”.

Un muchacho respondió a nombre del grupo. “Tenemos protección en nuestras casas. Mantenemos algún tipo de protección, en caso de que algo suceda”.

Armas en sus casas como medio de protección. Esta ironía merece más comentarios. La familia es una de las razones primordiales por las que estos excombatientes se desmovilizaron. La familia los atrae aunque también puede convertirse en el otro lugar donde impere la violencia.

Ser un “buen hombre” incluye proteger a la familia y ser un buen proveedor; así que deponer las armas puede ser castrante en varios sentidos. Las muchachas se sienten atraídas a estos “grandes hombres” que tienen poder adquisitivo y la capacidad para proporcionar seguridad en un contexto público violento. Por eso se esconden las armas en las casas, “por si acaso”.

No obstante, la fantasía de la familia con frecuencia entra en conflicto con la realidad de regresar con su pareja e hijos. Un efecto duradero de la militarización de la vida cotidiana y de la formación de la masculinidad militarizada es el aumento en la violencia doméstica, un fenómeno que se encuentra en muchos contextos pos conflicto. La seguridad que estos hombres proporcionan frente a los actos públicos de violencia pueden forzar a las mujeres a tolerar un intenso abuso en sus vidas personales. En efecto, en mis entrevistas con el personal de los Centros de Paz del proceso de DDR que albergan núcleos.
familiares, una de las preocupaciones permanentes es cómo abordar el alto nivel de violencia intrafamiliar que caracteriza a estas parejas27.

El capital corporal: ¿Cómo se militariza la masculinidad?

“De todos los lugares donde las masculinidades se construyen, reproducen y despliegan, aquéllas asociadas con la guerra y los militares son algunas de las más directas”28. Estos excombatientes han crecido en un contexto de privaciones de clase, con escaso acceso a recursos económicos o culturales. Algunos se criaron en zonas rurales, otros en los barrios pobres que rodean las ciudades colombianas. Aunque existen diferencias importantes entre los hombres jóvenes y los grupos en los que lucharon, lo que quisiera enfatizar son los antecedentes de esa clase social compartida29. La masculinidad militarizada que ejercen es el resultado del entrenamiento de combate que incluye tanto el adoctrinamiento corporal como emocional; asimismo refleja una dinámica de masculinidades se construyen, reproducen y despliegan, aquéllas asociadas con la guerra y los militares son algunas de las más directas”28.

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Estos excombatientes son en parte producto de opciones de vida limitadas y violencia generalizada. Varios se unieron a un grupo armado con la esperanza de alcanzar movilidad social pero cualquiera que sea la movilidad que puedan alcanzar no necesariamente se transfiere a otros campos sociales. Su capital corporal y la extrema importancia que se asigna a la fuerza física y destreza con las armas puede ser todo lo que tienen para ofrecer en el mercado laboral. Sin embargo, cuando estos “empresarios del capital corporal” intentan hacer la transición de combatientes a civiles, sus cuerpos son un obstáculo. Cuando analizamos cómo los ambientes sociales específicos invierten, forman y despliegan el cuerpo humano—y las prácticas concretas de incorporación que se explotan para este fin—, vemos que estos hombres personifican sus pasados violentos de manera inconsciente y duradera30.

Además de portar un arma y de pavonearse como un “grand hombre”, la masculinidad militarizada tiene otros componentes importantes. Con muy pocas excepciones, cada entrevista comienza con la “máscara de guerra”—o como un administrador del CRO de Turbo lo describió: “te miran con su ‘cara paraca’”. Es un rostro que busca de forma explícita inspirar terror en los otros y es un firme vestigio de su participación en un grupo armado aunque esta máscara de guerra no se limite solamente a los paramilitares. Como me dijo un ex guerrillero de las FARC, “Los malencarados—abi es cuando el ritmo de la guerra te agarra. Es una expresión de machismo. Esto te lo enseñan en el grupo, durante el entrenamiento. Con esa expresión en el rostro uno cree que está por encima de los demás—casi como si fueras el comandante. Cuando asesinábamos, cambiábamos nuestros rostros. Uno era malencarado—puro machismo. Cuando uno se ve así se siente más hombre”.

En su influente teoría del manejo de las impresiones, Goffman llama la atención sobre el complejo simbolismo y la actuación que hacen parte de la interacción social31. Su énfasis en los aspectos dramatúrgicos de la presentación de uno mismo en contextos sociales tiene mucha resonancia si se considera que el porte cuidadosamente cultivado de combatiente puede sin duda significar la diferencia entre la vida y la muerte. En un clima de interacción agresiva y de extrema desconfinanza—acentuadas por sangrientos episodios de combate—saber conducirse como “un malencarado” es un componente importante de la armadura corporal del combatiente. Han aprendido a ser duros e impenetrables tanto física como emocionalmente. Sin embargo, lo útil que esto les ha sido como combatientes no necesariamente se repite en la vida civil. Los muchachos me comentan que la gente los ve como “bichos raros” o como una “raza nueva”. Además, al militarizarse, han intentado también limitar la gama de emociones a aquellas que son las más adecuadas a las zonas de combate: a las emociones también por supuesto, se les ha asignado un género y ganar acceso a una gama más amplia de éstas es, asimismo, un componente para desmilitarizar a estos hombres.

“Agregar el género” al DDR: ¿Cómo reconstruir la masculinidad?

“¿Y cómo puede recrearse la virilidad luego de períodos de violencia?”32

La necesidad de efectuar reformas estructurales en Colombia es clara y se reconoce que dichas reformas van más allá del mandato de un programa de DDR o de la justicia transicional en su pretensión limitada de “transición hacia la democracia liberal.” No obstante, esto no significa que nada pueda hacerse ni que lo material siempre supere lo cultural e ideológico, usualmente mal entendidos como esferas separadas.

La familia es uno de los temas clave. El deseo de vengar la muerte de un familiar puede haber hecho que el individuo se haya unido a un grupo armado; en otros casos, es algo así como una tradición familiar irse a la guerra sea con la guerrilla o con los paramilitares; en ocasiones unirse a estos grupos era un escape a la vida miserable que llevaban en sus casas. Sin embargo, a pesar de la imagen contradictoria y conflictiva,
esta imagen (quizás idealizada) de la familia es un poderoso tema en nuestras entrevistas. Esto podría ser un punto de partida de la discusión sobre nuevas maneras de cuidar, proveer con lo necesario y proteger a sus seres queridos. Estar presente para participar en la crianza de los hijos y verlos crecer son incentivos poderosos. La familia es un incentivo para permanecer como civil, pero debe ser el lugar donde el programa de reintegración intervenga para escribir un libreto con nuevas posibilidades.

Desafortunadamente, me ha impresionado la manera cómo se perpetúan los estereotipos sexistas en este programa de reintegración. Donde hay “núcleos familiares”, he observado las rutinas diarias. El programa refuerza el núcleo familiar patriarcal con una marcada división del trabajo entre los hombres y mujeres, de tal manera que se aborde y solucionen conflictos como la norma dentro de los grupos armados en los que estos hombres operaban—norma que en el caso de muchos de ellos era la misma en el entorno familiar y comunitario donde crecieron.

Abriendo espacios para las formas de masculinidad alternativas es algo que el programa de reintegración podría efectuar. Al abordar las actitudes y conductas que los excombatientes han aprendido el programa podría diseñar posibilidades sociales alternativas. Por ejemplo, muchos de estos hombres me cuentan que están cansados de la guerra y de las matanzas. Además, muchos de ellos se sienten engañados por sus experiencias, afirmando que son ellos los que combatieron y arriesgaron sus vidas mientras que los comandantes fueron los que se enriquecieron. Este engaño puede convertirse en un recurso si el programa hace más explícito lo que estos hombres ganan al pasar de combatiente a civil. Esto también significaría trabajar más eficazmente con los barrios de los alrededores y las comunidades en donde viven estos hombres y mujeres, de tal manera que se aborde y minimice el miedo mutuo. Apropiarse del espacio para ser civil y actuar como tal es crucial y por supuesto requeriría que el Estado colombiano garantizara cierto nivel de seguridad.

Adicionalmente ¿dónde están los jóvenes que no están involucrados en la violencia? Ellos son invisibles. Sin embargo, practican una forma de masculinidad alternativa que sería importante saber cómo lo han hecho. En un interesante artículo sobre Sri Lanka, Jonathan Spencer describe la vida de un joven que no aceptó los argumentos morales de ninguno de los grupos armados en el conflicto y se rehusó a participar. Spencer insiste sobre la necesidad de entender cómo se agencian tanto la violencia como la no violencia por medio de la pregunta: “¿Bajo qué circunstancias se abre un espacio para el que no participa?” ¿Dónde se encuentran espacios sociales en los que la violencia no es un componente central en la creación de la hombria? ¿Qué podría hacer el programa de reintegración para que estos jóvenes y sus opciones no violentas sean más visibles, valorados y deseables?

 Esto me lleva a los medios de comunicación en Colombia y a la glorificación de los hombres, las armas y la violencia. El ejército colombiano cuenta con una estación de televisión las 24 horas del día que no es más que una campaña de publicidad permanente sobre los hombres, los uniformes, las armas y el poder. Las estaciones de radio tocan los narcomúsica que elevan a los narcotraficantes y matones a un estado prácticamente mitológico. Los medios podrían convertirse en un arma poderosa y presentar otras imágenes acerca de qué es ser hombre y hacerlo, además, de tal forma que sea deseable.

Conclusiones

Comencé por sugerir que tanto los programas de DDR como las iniciativas de la justicia transicional podrían beneficiarse de una exploración de las maneras en las que se producen los hombres militarizados y se desempeñan las formas de masculinidad
militarizada. Esta exploración podría a su vez dar forma a las estrategias diseñadas a fin de reconstruir activamente lo que significa ser hombre en unos contextos históricos y sociales específicos. Según Butler, el género no solamente es un concepto social sino también una actuación —no es tanto un estado de ser sino más bien un proceso—.

Abordar las formas violentas de masculinidad debe ser una de las inquietudes clave al incorporar el género a estas intervenciones. Concentrarse en ciertas formas violentas de masculinidad podría ayudar a enfocarnos en las formas de violencia cotidianas que van más allá del periodo limitado de la “transición”. También serviría para ampliar nuestro foco de atención hacia aquellas formas de violencia que no caben dentro del restringido concepto de la “violencia política”. Dichas formas cotidianas de daño se han ubicado “por fuera” del marco estandarizado de la justicia transicional. Y es bien probable que estas formas de violencia se intensifiquen de manera dramática inmediatamente después de la guerra. Así, el fracaso en desmantelar estas formas violentas de masculinidad podría ayudar a enfocarnos en las formas de violencia cotidianas que van más allá del periodo limitado de la “transición”.

Notas
1 Para leer una versión completa del texto, véase http://www.ideaspaz.org.
2 Foster, Don. “What makes a perpetrator? An attempt to understand”. En Looking back, reaching forward: reflections on the truth and reconciliation commission in South Africa (Charles Villa-Vicencio y Wilhelm Verwoerd editores, 2000). Foster nota que el Informe Final de la Comisión de Reconciliación y Verdad de Sudáfrica reconoció que la comisión no había estudiado la masculinidad y la violencia, que lo impulsan a hacerse una serie de preguntas interesantes: ¿Por qué la masculinidad bajo ciertas circunstancias proporciona una forma de identidad tan nociva? ¿Cuáles son las circunstancias? “Todo esto hay que investigarlo” (227).
5 Goldstein, Joshua S. War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Viceversa. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press, 2001; por otro lado, están las publicaciones de Cynthia Enloe sobre género y militarización.
7 Ibid, p. 24.
8 Ibid, p. 25.
11 Ibid, p. 76.
13 Aunque los procesos de desmovilización colectivos e individuales varían en algunos detalles, he entrevistado a varios excombatientes en los dos programas porque estoy interesada en la fase de reincorporación y las experiencias tanto de estos combatientes como de sus familias y comunidades anfitrionas.
16 Para un examen fascinante del papel de la violencia en la creación de masculinidad, con la tortura como un importante ritual que confiere autoridad a los hombres jóvenes que la sobreviven, ver Peteet, Julie. “Male Gender and Rituals of Resistance in the Palestinian...
Intifada: A cultural politics of violence,”

17 Me recuerda el documental La Sierra, que se filmó en las comunas pobres en las empinadas cuestas que están sobre Medellín. Los muchachos en la película pertenecen a los paramilitares, la guerrilla y a una variedad de pandillas o parches. Ellos, en forma consistente, siempre se refieren a la lucha entre sus grupos por el control de las comunas, como «la guerra». Durante mi investigación en Medellín en 2006 y 2007, me acostumbré a que un grupo de muchachos me escoltara a la otra esquina de la calle, y quienes una vez alcanzada la esquina, se marcharan porque no se atrevían a cruzar la calle y entrar al territorio de la otra pandilla. Aunque el proceso de DDR ha trasladado las armas de la calle a las casas, una cartografía criminal y complejo dictamina quien puede moverse y adonde.

18 La militarización de la sociedad colombiana es impresionante. Recuerdo una propaganda del año pasado que apareció con frecuencia en la calle. “Colombia, un país de 40 millones de soldados” que se refería a la promoción de una red de “informantes ciudadanos” como medio de extender la autoridad del estado a lo largo del territorio.


22 Para una excelente narración histórica de la diversidad de formas de violencia en Colombia como también un vistazo a los procesos de reinserción previos y las limitaciones de negociar una paz parcelada, ver Sánchez, Gonzalo. “Guerra prolongada y negociaciones inciertas en Colombia.”. En Violencias y estrategias en la región andina (Sánchez, Gonzalo y Láz, Eric editores) Bogotá: Norma, 2004.

23 Esto es cierto no solamente en los vecindarios violentos donde viven sino también para aquellas mujeres que estuvieron en los grupos armados, en particular las FARC y el ELN. En nuestras entrevistas con mujeres excombatientes, ellas han narrado que tener un hombre como pareja era la única manera de desviar la atención no deseada de otros combatientes hombres. Además, al formar pareja con un oficial de mayor rango (comandante) podían tener acceso a ciertos beneficios tales como comida, vestuario y otros privilegios.

24 El rol de las madres y novias es un tema que vale la pena investigar más. Me acompañó una persona que había sido un miembro importante de las milicias urbanas y que en la actualidad trabaja con la alcaldía en el proceso de Paz y Reconciliación. Mi colega me aseguró que las mujeres juegan un papel muy importante en las decisiones sobre cuando debe haber instaurarse la violencia, contra quien y si debe ser letal o no.


29 Para un excelente estudio comparativo de los combatientes desmovilizados a nivel individual de las FARC, ELN y paramilitares, ver Cárdenas Sarrias, José Armando. Los parias de la guerra: Análisis del proceso de desmovilización individual.


THEIDON continued

53 Ibíd, Wacquant, Lōic. “Pugs at Work: Bodily Capital and Bodily Labour Among Professional Boxers.”


Nominations Invited for 2010 Slate

Deadline: October 2, 2009

LASA members are invited to suggest nominees for Vice President, Treasurer, and three members of the Executive Council, for terms beginning November 1, 2010. Criteria for nomination include professional credentials and previous service to LASA. Each candidate must have been a member of the Association in good standing for at least one year prior to nomination. Biographic data and the rationale for nomination must be sent by October 2, 2009, to: Milagros Pereyra-Rojas, LASA Executive Director, <milagros@pitt.edu>.

The winning candidate for Vice President will serve in that capacity until April 30, 2012, and then as President for an additional eighteen months. The Treasurer will serve until April 30, 2015 and Executive Council members will serve a three-year term from November 1, 2010, to October 31, 2013.

Please note that the LASA Executive Council, in its June 28, 2008, meeting, amended the LASA By-Laws to read:

The LASA By-Laws are amended to permit the write-in of candidates for both the Executive Council (EC) and the vice presidency. LASA members will receive two communications. The first will inform members of the change in the nominations procedure and indicate that the nominations process is open. Members will have six weeks in which to nominate candidates. A second communication will present the approved slate and encourage members to submit the names of write-in candidates. A minimum of 200 signatures will be required for each write-in. Members will then have six weeks to submit additional names. To be included on the ballot, the candidate must be a member in good standing and must meet the conditions of the By-laws. Members will have six weeks to respond to this second communication. The final ballot presented for vote will indicate which candidates were on the approved slate and which are write-ins.

Call For Silvert Award Nominations

Deadline: January 20, 2010

The Kalman Silvert Award Committee invites nominations of candidates for the year 2010 award. The Silvert Award recognizes senior members of the profession who have made distinguished lifetime contributions to the study of Latin America. The Award is given every 18 months. Past recipients of the Award were: John J. Johnson (1983); Federico Gil (1985); Albert O. Hirschman (1986); Charles Wagley (1988); Lewis Hanke (1989); Victor L. Urquidi (1991); George Kubler (1992); Osvaldo Sunkel (1994); Richard Fagen (1995); Alain Touraine (1997); Richard Adams (1998); Jean Franco (2000); Thomas Skidmore (2001); Guillermo O’Donnell (2003); June Nash (2004); Miguel León-Portilla (2006), Helen Safa (2007), and Alfred Stepan (2009).

The selection committee consists of Eric Hershberg (chair), LASA immediate past president; Charles R. Hale and Sonia E. Alvarez, past presidents, Philip Oxhorn, editor of the Latin American Research Review, and Alfred Stepan, 2009 Kalman Silvert awardee. Nominations should be sent to LASA Executive Director Milagros Pereyra-Rojas at the LASA Secretariat, 416 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh PA 15260. E-mail: lasa@pitt.edu by January 20, 2010. Please include biographic information and a rationale for each nomination.
Final Report from the Program Chairs

by EVELYNE HUBER | University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill | ehuber@unc.edu
and CYNTHIA STEELE | University of Washington-Seattle | cynthias@u.washington.edu

This was truly a “Congress of Firsts.” The first Congress in South America, the first in a very long time at a university, the first with more than 9,000 submissions, and the first with some 5,100 pre-registered participants, over half of them from Latin America. The stunning geographical setting of Rio and its fabulous musical, culinary and other cultural attractions added immensely to our enjoyment, as did the venue of the Pontifícia Universidade Católica. Despite Rio’s high prices, many Congressgoers found reasonably priced options in the local beach communities of Leblon, Ipanema and Copacabana, and the bus shuttle service functioned seamlessly. At the same time, the proximity of Rio’s favelas kept us mindful of the Congress theme, Inequalities.

Despite the formidable logistic challenges, which required no fewer than five organizing trips on the part of LASA’s Executive Director Milagros Pereyra-Rojas, the Congress itself went ahead beautifully. Yes, the lines for prereregistered participants to pick up their badges and program books on Thursday were very long, but we were able to prevent this from requiring not just more staff but also more computers and printers, which in turn would have driven up Congress costs and thus registration fees. On the whole, Milagros and her committed, efficient, and cheerful staff did simply an outstanding job.

As the list of 35 tracks demonstrates, the disciplines and fields of interest represented by participants were highly diverse. The only way for us to organize such a broad-ranging program was to delegate the evaluation of submissions of panels and individual papers to track chairs with expertise in these areas. Several tracks received such high numbers of submissions that we had to recruit co-chairs. We want to thank all of the scholars who were willing to take on the job of track chair for their excellent work in evaluating each submission.

It might be of interest to LASA members, particularly those whose proposals were turned down, to read how the process worked. Track chairs received instructions and spreadsheets from the Secretariat to assign points to each proposal, with a maximum of 16 points. Given the record number of submissions, we asked for no more than 70 percent of proposals with 12 or more points, which would qualify for automatic acceptance. Even though we extended the Congress to 3 ½ days, and even though we had 70 rooms available, we were eventually forced to reject 25 percent of the proposals. Since the actual percentage of proposals that were assigned 12 or more points varied from 39 percent to 100 percent depending on the track, we as program chairs had to adjust the threshold for acceptance across tracks, in order to be fair and have a roughly equal ratio of accepted to rejected proposals in each track.

Among the proposals were over 3,000 single papers. This required that the track chairs first rank them and then form new panels with these papers or place them in appropriate accepted panels with fewer than six papers. Sometimes they were not able to find a home for papers, and it fell to us to attempt to place them in the track of their second choice. Evaluating and placing the single paper proposals was a huge job for the track chairs and for us, and the Executive Council decided to discourage single paper submissions in the future. Instead, members will be encouraged to use the LASA website to contact other scholars and form panels before the deadline for submissions. Details will be available on the LASA website.

After the entire preliminary program was assembled and the preregistration deadline had passed, some 20 percent of accepted participants either cancelled or failed to preregister. This left quite a number of panels with only one or two papers clearly not a good state of affairs. We considered various alternatives, such as cancelling those panels and attempting to place the remaining papers on other panels, but time was getting short and we were afraid that people might have made their travel arrangements already and would be greatly inconvenienced by having the day of their panels changed. Again, the Executive Council accepted new procedures to deal with this problem in the future. These will also be explained in the next issue of the Forum.

Let us just comment briefly on a few highlights and in this connection thank the members of the local outreach committee: Karl Erik Schollhammer, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro; Augusto Cattoni, Prefeitura, Rio de Janeiro; Peter Fry, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro; Heloisa Buarque de Hollanda, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro; and Maria Alice Rezende de Carvalho, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro and ANPOCS President. The Opening Ceremony and Reception with the performance of the PUC’s Capoeira Group was wonderful—a feast for eyes and ears. The lecture by Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz was well attended and highly stimulating, and the Film Festival, which featured documentaries on Bolivia, the environment, and indigenous communication, and included Q & As by several Latin American directors, was impressive.

In sum, LASA2009 in Rio fully lived up to the high expectations of a Congress of Firsts. We hope that follow-up on the lessons learned will make LASA2010 in Toronto every bit as rewarding. It was a privilege for us to work with Outgoing and Incoming Presidents Eric Hershberg and Joan Coatsworth, Executive Director Milagros Pereyra-Rojas, and with Sandy Klinzing, Monica Davis, Melissa Raslevich, Israel Perlov and the rest of the wonderful LASA staff. ¡Nos vemos en Toronto!
Report of the LASA Business Meeting

XXVIII International Congress | Rio de Janeiro, Brazil | June 12, 2009

Presenting were President Eric Hershberg, President-elect John Coatsworth, Treasurer Kevin Middlebrook, LARR Editor Philip Oxhorn, LASA2009 Program Co-chair Evelyne Huber, and Executive Director Milagros Pereyra.

President's Report

President Hershberg greeted the audience and indicated that LASA2009 was a Congress of larger scale than any that had taken place previously. The long lines at registration the day before were one symptom of that. Hershberg was pleased that despite the economic difficulties in the United States more than $350,000 had been secured for travel grants for Latin Americans and for graduate students. The cancellation of the Book Exhibit had been a major disappointment; however he was confident that it would return for LASA2010 in Toronto. LASA's request for licenses for Cuban scholars to participate in LASA2009 had been approved just prior to the Congress. (The approval of licenses is required in order that LASA may provide funding to Cuban residents.) The granting of licenses bodes well not only for LASA but for other institutions that seek to fund Cuban travel to conferences.

Treasurer's Report

LASA Treasurer Kevin Middlebrook indicated that the annual audit and all financial management procedures were well up to par. Efficient management of finances by the Secretariat had meant that no funds had been drawn from the Endowment. During the economic downturn in the past year the Endowment had declined by a little less than a quarter, but as of June 2009 it was valued at $3.1 million. With cash reserves at $1.3 million, total assets at the end of the month will be $4.4 million. The Endowment is managed by Ways and Means, in association with a private sector-based investment advisory committee. The strong consensus over the past months had been to maintain a very conservative profile, with 40 percent in fixed income and 60 percent in equities (down from 80 percent in equities a year ago). LASA remains committed to moving further with socially responsible investing (SRI), and eventually SRI will represent approximately 40 percent of the Endowment.

LASA2009 Congress Program Chair Report

Congress Co-chair Evelyne Huber reported on what she and Co-chair Cynthia Steele had done in organizing the Congress. The co-chairs had reviewed the numbers of sessions from LASA2007 to redefine the tracks, collapsing some with fewer panels and subdividing a huge track on Democratization into three tracks. They then selected track chairs, who then assigned points to each panel and individual paper proposal. Submissions were up 43 percent over LASA2007, and despite extending the Congress to three and one-half days and having 72 rooms at PUC, track chairs were instructed to reject more proposals to accommodate the sessions, resulting in a 25 percent rejection rate for LASA2009. All the submissions had been received by the Secretariat and then sent to the track chairs, who then reported to the program chairs. The program co-chairs then assembled the program. In some situations where track chairs did not follow instructions and allowed for a 98 percent acceptance rate, the program co-chairs themselves had to reject more of those panels. After the program was compiled, acceptance notices were sent. Some accepted participants canceled and others failed to pre-register, resulting in about a 20 percent drop-off rate off for participants. Ultimately the program finished with some panels of only one or two papers. Believing that the damage would be too great if panels were cancelled at that point those panels were allowed to remain. For the next Congress, however, preventive measures will be taken.

LASA Executive Director Report

Executive Director Milagros Pereyra focused on two issues: the growth in membership associated with the Congress and the increase in the number of travel grants. During the past year membership had grown to a record 5,900 individual members. Of this number, 54 percent represented U.S. residents and 46 percent residents of other countries, the majority from Latin America. (Prior to 2009 approximately 25 percent of the membership had resided in Latin America.) Various foundations, individual donors, and LASA itself provided funding for travel grants, and ultimately 40 percent of panel participants requesting funding were provided grant support. (For LASA2007 approximately 28 percent of solicitations had been funded.) Congress pre-registrations numbered 5,100 — more than ever before. The longer lines at registration had resulted from the implementation of a new procedure to better determine who among the pre-registants did not attend the Congress. In previous years many individuals had pre-registered but did not travel to the Congress to participate in their sessions, resulting in a number of sessions with fewer participants and some cancelled sessions as well. The new procedure allows the Secretariat to determine who these individuals are and to take preventive measures as needed.

Latin American Research Review (LARR) Editor Report

LARR Editor Philip Oxhorn reported that since it is an established journal, there is not much change with LARR from year to year. The journal had received 120 submissions over the past 12 months, a record number of
submissions. Slightly fewer than 40 percent of the articles emanate from political science, and the rest are distributed over a variety of disciplines. Oxhorn expressed his desire to have more submissions from anthropologists and historians, who represent a large part of LASA. LARR is sponsoring five panels at LASA2009; three concern environmental issues, and these will be part of a special issue of LARR in two years. (LARR’s first special issue “Living in Actually Existing Democracies” will be out by the end of 2009.) A fourth Congress panel will feature editors discussing journal publication and a fifth will present editors from Spanish, Portuguese, and English journals talking about what constitutes a good article or manuscript.

President-elect Report

President-elect John Coatsworth reported on plans for the LASA2010 Congress. The theme will be “Crisis, Response and Recovery.” There will be a series of presidential panels devoted to the crisis as well as to particular anniversaries. Three panels will focus on the Congress theme: one on the debate among economists regarding the nature of the crisis; a second on the impact of the crisis on government and social movements; and the third will attempt to capture some aspect of the cultural expressions that have been inspired by events of the last year and the economic crisis. The anniversaries to be honored include the bicentennial of the Latin American independence movements, the centennial of the Mexican Revolution, and the 40th anniversary of The Canadian Association for Latin American and Caribbean Studies (CALACS).

Coatsworth continued with a discussion of the anticipated changes in the Congress program and how it will be constructed. It will be necessary to be more selective for LASA2010; there will be only 52 rooms available for sessions and there is a desire to limit the program to three days. The number of approved panels will need to be reduced; the new rate will be two of three approved, instead of the three of four approved for LASA2009. With the escalation in the number of individual proposals (3,000 for LASA2009), the LASA Executive Council (EC) approved announcing the acceptance of only one in three individual proposals. Members will be encouraged to construct and submit panels for a better chance of acceptance. The Secretariat will provide an electronic bulletin board to facilitate networking and the construction of panels. Measures also will be implemented to reduce the number of panels that are cancelled because of a lack of participation. Accepted participants will be notified of the deadline for pre-registration; after this date those who fail to register will be dropped from the Congress program. Panels with only one or two remaining participants will be recombined by the program chair into new panels. With these new procedures the program committee hopes to reduce the number of individual papers organized into panels to about 250, and also to reduce the overall number of panels.

Coatsworth introduced his third issue: abandoning the 18-month Congress cycle in favor on an annual meeting. This had been discussed by the EC, and they had recommended making no change before the 2012 Congress, which presumably will take place in the United States. However, after 2012 there is likely to be a switch to an annual meeting. LASA will survey the members to determine what time of year might be best for the Congress.

The EC did not raise membership or Congress registration fees. The fall issue of the LASSA Forum will present comparative data on the member fees of other area studies associations; LASA charges a smaller membership fee than all others with one exception. However the EC did vote to make one adjustment to the membership rate for Latin American members: a new income class was added for Latin American residents with annual incomes over $40,000 to $50,000.

Lastly, Coatsworth indicated that the Association is in “terrific hands.” He will do his best to “not fix anything that is not broken.”

An invitation came from the floor to hold the 2012 Congress in Salamanca, Spain, in honor of the 500th anniversary of the founding of the University of Salamanca. Hershberg indicated that the EC had recommended putting this on the agenda for later discussion. He himself found the idea very interesting.

A question was posed regarding which panels would be removed from the program. Coatsworth responded that only those panels where the majority of participants had not pre-registered would be removed. However, before this is done the track chairs would be asked to contact those on panels who had not pre-registered. Only after the deadline had passed and there had been no response would the individuals remaining be placed on a new panel.

Hershberg reported on the resolution on Cuba that had been presented to the EC. The EC had approved the resolution for submission to the membership. The originator of the resolution, Jean Weisman, then asked that the words “by students from the United States” be removed from the resolution before it goes forward. There was agreement that the words should be struck.

Hershberg called for any new business. There being none, the meeting was adjourned.
Photos from LASA2009

Committee Chair Alejandra Bronfman presents the Bryce Wood Book Award to Winifred Tate

Padre Jesus Hortal, Reitor of PUC/Rio, addresses Congress participants at the Welcoming Reception

Committee Member Frederick Moehn presents the Media Award to Mario Osava

Eric Hershberg presents the Premio Iberoamericano to Vicente Palermo
Photos from LASA2009

Pat and John Coatsworth with Marysa Navarro and Milagros Pereyra

Sonia Álvarez, Claudia de Lima Costa and friends enjoying the Welcoming Reception

Padre Jesus Hortal, Rosa Marina de Brito, Karl Eric Schollhammer, Eric Hershberg and the Capoeira Group of PUC

Presidential Plenary speaker Diego García Sayán addresses the audience
Presidential Plenary Speaker Joseph Stiglitz

Kalman Silvert Awardee Alfred Stepan with Evelyne Huber and Charlie Hale

Diskin Dissertation Fellowship Awardee Augusto dos Santos Sales with Eric Hershberg

credit: Julian Asenjo (University of Pittsburgh)
From Rio to Toronto: What to Expect for LASA2010

by Javier Corrales, Program Co-Chair | Amherst College | jcorrales@amherst.edu

and Nina Gerassi-Navarro, Program Co-Chair | Tufts University | Nina.Gerassi_Navarro@tufts.edu

Months before the Rio Congress took place in June 2009, the LASA Secretariat was already busy preparing for the next Congress, scheduled for October 2010 in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. LASA Congresses have become such a massive operation that it takes almost two years of full-time planning to ensure the success of those few days we meet. As program co-chairs for the LASA2010 congress, we would like to offer a preview of what to expect. While the program for LASA2010 remains a long way from being finalized, it is already clear that some things will change, while many others will stay the same.

In terms of changes, the meeting in Toronto will undergo some slight downsizing, but also some significant upscaling. If you can forgive the cliché, LASA is becoming the victim of its own success. The number of paper proposals for LASA has expanded dramatically, from 1,406 in 2004 to a record number 4,184 in 2009. Nothing speaks more about the resounding success of our organization than this expansion of interest in presenting papers at our meetings. But this growth poses challenges. The actual time devoted for the conference cannot exceed much beyond the three-to-four days we typically meet. In Toronto in particular, we will have 52 rooms per day, which is more than in years past, but far less than the 70 plus rooms per day we enjoyed in Rio. These time and space constraints will require some inevitable downsizing: unless the number of proposals drops sharply, it will simply be impossible to repeat the acceptance rate of the past.

Downscaling the acceptance rate will be a difficult challenge for the Association. LASA has been known for its commitment to a policy of opening doors to as many academic papers and artistic productions as possible even if that meant paying less attention to each paper’s stage of development. For 2010, even if we add an extra day to our meeting, structural factors together with expanded demand will simply not allow as many acceptances as in the past.

To help us navigate through this lower acceptance rate, we are introducing some changes that we hope will ensure fairness and clarity.

1) Most tracks will now have two and sometimes three co-chairs. Track chairs play a vital role. They are volunteer scholars responsible for ranking paper and panel proposals. They also make travel grant recommendations. We hope that the co-chair system will ensure more diversity in the ranking of proposals. By September, we hope to have the complete list of track co-chairs.

2) In recruiting chairs, we have adhered to the philosophy of our predecessors, Eylene Huber and Cynthia Steele, to choose not just reputable scholars but also open-minded, non-dogmatic thinkers who embrace LASA’s spirit of multidisciplinarity and plurality of methods.

3) We will also increase the number of tracks (a new track on Technology and Pedagogy has already been approved) and consolidate some of the tracks that in the past attracted less interest. This change should lessen the problem of double submissions.

4) Clearer guidelines will be posted to help presenters write better proposals.

5) A page on the LASA website will be created to allow authors of “orphan” papers to find other authors working on similar subjects. We hope that this new page, inspired on the already existing Roommates-Wanted list, will help authors find potential panels to form, and even discover co-authorship opportunities.

In short, acceptance downsizing will be accompanied by an upscaling of the fairness and clarity of the application process. And yet, the list of planned upscalings extends beyond the review process. Under the stewardship of LASA’s new president, John Coatsworth, the LASA Secretariat hopes to replicate the success achieved by our outgoing president, Eric Hershberg, in raising outside funding for our Congress. Our hope is to increase substantially the monies available to subsidize student travel (a very distinctive LASA feature), to finance the ever-richer LASA film festival (one of LASA’s most successful outreach activities), and to invite world-class speakers to our presidential panels. If successful, this fundraising effort will allow us to deliver a more enhanced program of activities while preserving LASA’s commitment to offering some of the most affordable registration fees among peer conferences.

We are also committed to restoring two old-time LASA favorites that were missing in Rio: the Gran Baile and the Book Exhibit. For all kinds of complicated logistical reasons, LASA2009 was unable to deliver these delights. We don’t expect those logistical challenges to exist at our Toronto site.

The 2010 Congress already has a theme: “Crisis, Response, and Recovery.” Having themes for meetings has proven to help prospective panel organizers consider new angles as they put their sessions together, as well as guide program chairs and LASA officers in the formation of presidential panels, plenaries, and special sessions. A solid and attractive theme can also help with fundraising. The 2010 theme appears timely
and appropriate as well as suitable for the kind of multidisciplinary debates that are the hallmark of every LASA meeting.

We may have one main theme, but LASA2010 will also focus on two academic themes of wide interest as well. In 2010 we will be commemorating the bicentennial of Latin America’s independence movements and the centennial of the Mexican Revolution. The Toronto Congress will offer an array of opportunities for both the scholar and the curious to learn more about these momentous events in the history of the Americas.

In short, LASA2010 will have its share of downscaling, upscaling, and restorations. But more importantly, we will have plenty of continuities. LASA2010 will remain committed to providing an affordable meeting place to see colleagues, exchange ideas, and learn from each other. While we won’t be able to replicate Rio’s beaches and vegetation, we hope nonetheless to make LASA’s XXIX International Congress equally worth our time.

CALL FOR BOOK CHAPTERS
Technology and Culture in Twentieth Century Mexico

While the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) disrupted both economic activity and everyday life, it coincided with the sustained introduction of a host of technological innovations. By the early 1920s, cars, buses, radios, planes, movie theaters and other such innovations transformed the urban world and much of the nation. Through the twentieth century, advancements in film production and the advent of television also provided new sites for the imagination of a national community. Alternatively, by the end of the century, the proliferation of gas-spewing machines turned Mexico City from the “most transparent region” into a haven for smog.

We invite scholars to submit abstracts to be considered for this interdisciplinary book which will examine the technological revolution over the twentieth century. Suggested topics include: TV, radio, transportation, and the relationship between technology and literature, art, music, and popular culture. Please send one page of each—all single-spaced: 1) proposal, 2) bibliography, and 3) biobibliography by October 30, 2009. Final 20-page chapter submissions by April 30, 2010.

Araceli Tinajero – CCNY-The Graduate Center, CUNY atinajero@ccny.cuny.edu

J. Brian Freeman – The Graduate Center, CUNY jfreeman1@gc.cuny.edu
The U.S. financial crisis of 2008 quickly became a global economic crisis. It destroyed jobs, increased poverty and disease, exacerbated social tensions, raised skepticism about the efficacy of democratic governance, led to policy experimentation, complicated efforts to deal with global problems multilaterally, and fueled civil and international conflict. The impact of the crisis in Latin America has varied from country to country, community to community, even neighborhood to neighborhood. In Latin America, the crisis was both reminiscent of previous crises but also different, in terms of transmission mechanisms, impact, and responses. Understanding the effects of the crisis, and the varied responses to it, calls for insights from multiple disciplines. Recovery, when it comes, will be shaped by the way citizens, governments, and international organizations understand the causes and consequences of the crisis itself.
You are invited to submit a paper or panel proposal addressing either the Congress theme or any topics related to the program tracks. LASA also invites requests for travel grants from proposers residing in Latin America or the Caribbean as well as from students. Visit the LASA website for eligibility criteria. All proposals for papers, panels, and travel grants must be submitted electronically to the LASA Secretariat by September 15, 2009.

The deadline to submit proposals is September 15, 2009.

Proposal forms and instructions are available on the LASA website: http://lasa.international.pitt.edu.

No submissions by regular mail will be accepted. The Secretariat will send confirmation of the receipt of the proposal via e-mail.

All participants will be required to pre-register for the Congress.

**PROGRAM TRACKS AND COMMITTEE MEMBERS**

Select the most appropriate track for your proposal from the following list and enter it in the designated place on the form. Names of Program Committee members are provided for information only. Direct your correspondence to the LASA Secretariat ONLY.

**Afro-Latin and Indigenous Peoples**  
Manuela Picq, Amherst College and Universidad de San Francisco, Ecuador

**Agrarian and Rural Issues**  
Rick A. López, Amherst College

**Biodiversity, Natural Resources and Environmental Policies**  
Carlos García, Universidad de los Andes, Venezuela and Harvard University

**Children, Youth and Youth Cultures**  
Bianca Premo, Florida International University

**Cities, Planning and Social Services**  
Al Montero, Carleton College

**Citizenship, Rights and Justice**  
Ariel Armony, Colby College

**Civil Society and Social Movements**  
Carlos de la Torre, FLACSO, Ecuador and Harvard University

**Crossborder Studies and Migration**  
Tamara Kay, Harvard University

**Culture, Power and Political Subjectivities**  
Michaëlle Bigenho, Hampshire College and Valentina Napolitano, University of Toronto

**Defense, Violence and (in)security**  
Mark Peceny, University of New Mexico and William Stanley, University of New Mexico

**Democratization**  
Kurt Weyland, University of Texas, Austin

**Economics and Development**  
Nora Lustig, George Washington University and Jaime Ros, University of Notre Dame

**Education, Pedagogy and Scholarly Resources**  
Daniel Schugurensky, University of Toronto

**Film Studies**  
Beatriz Urraca, Widener University and Laura Podalsky, Ohio State University

**Gender Studies**  
Mala Hunt, New School for Social Research

**Health, Medicine and Body Politics**  
Richard Parker, Columbia University

**Histories and Historiographies**  
Luis Ortega, Universidad de Santiago, Chile

**Human Rights and Memory**  
Catalina Smulovitz, Universidad Di Tella, Argentina

**International Relations**  
Carlos Romero, Universidad Central de Venezuela and David Mares, University of California, San Diego

**Labor Studies and Class Relations**  
Mark Anner, Penn State University

**Latino(as) in the United States and Canada**  
Michael Inno-Jiménez, University of Alabama and Mónica M. Rúa, Williams College

**Law, Jurisprudence and Society**  
Katharine Adams, Boston College/Brigham Young University

**Linguistics and Linguistic Pluralism**  
Ana María Bidegain, Florida International University

**Literary Studies: Colonial and 19th Century**  
Carolina Roche, Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville and Anne Rubenstein, York University

**Literary Studies: Contemporary**  
Ignacio Corona, Ohio State University and Fernando Rosenberg, Brandeis University

**Literature and Culture: Interdisciplinary Approaches**  
Lucia Suárez, Amherst College

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Mark Peceny and Bill Sanley, University of New Mexico
**Membership Report 2008**

**Individual Memberships**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total memberships</th>
<th>4501</th>
<th>(18 percent decrease from 2007)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New members</td>
<td>1356</td>
<td>(30 percent of total membership)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewed from 2007</td>
<td>2646</td>
<td>(59 percent of total membership) (48 percent renewal rate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewed lapsed members</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>(11 percent of total membership)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Member type**

- Traditional members: 3282 (73 percent of total membership)
- Student members: 979 (22 percent of total membership)
- Life members: 78 (68 paid and 10 honorary)
- Joint memberships: 162 (4 percent of total membership)

**Member residency**

- U.S. residents: 2838 (63 percent of total membership; includes 65 residents of Puerto Rico)
- Latin American residents: 1001 (22 percent of total membership)
- Other non-U.S. residents: 662 (15 percent of total membership)

**Three-year memberships initiated in 2008**

- 79

**Major disciplines represented**

- History: 694
- Literature: 658
- Political Science: 654
- Anthropology: 432
- Sociology: 320
- Latin American Studies: 229
- Economics: 123
- Cultural Studies: 117
- Education: 115
- International Relations: 105

**Institutional Memberships**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total memberships</th>
<th>659</th>
<th>(468 percent increase over 2007*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New members</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>(84 percent of total membership)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewed from 2007</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>(11 percent of total membership)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewed lapsed members</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>(5 percent of total membership)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Institution location**

- United States: 470 (71 percent of total membership)
- Latin America: 53 (8 percent of total membership)
- Other non-U.S.: 136 (21 percent of total membership)
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