lowest dues and fees of any U.S.-based area studies association, a distinction I am sure LASA's members approve. The next issue of the *Forum* will look at this question in detail. The Executive Council did take note, however, that the current dues structure provides a disproportionate and unintended subsidy to higher-income Latin American members and decided to create a new higher income dues category for Latin American members. ■

Alfred C. Stepan

Recipient of Kalman Silvert Award for 2009

I begin by thanking the Kalman Silvert Award selection committee, and all of you here, for the award which I will treasure for the rest of my life. I also thank you for forgiving my sojourns in Poland, India, and Indonesia and still treating me as a Latin Americanist. In my heart, I never defected, I simply tried to carry out LASA style research, and stress LASA type values, around the world. In a short recounting of some aspects of my career, I will attempt to develop this assertion.

My Latin American Beginnings

How did I start with Latin America? My real introduction to Latin America came as a "special correspondent" for *The Economist* in South America. My first degree was from Notre Dame as an English Major, and my second was a Politics, Philosophy, Economics (PPE) degree from Balliol College, Oxford. After Oxford, I did my draft military service as a Marine officer and witnessed at first hand much of the Cuban Missile crisis which revealed to me the dangerous, historically grounded gulf, between the United States and Latin America.

The Cuban experience led me to contemplate an academic career to help me gain a better understanding of Latin America. However, first things first. I managed to convince Nancy Leys to marry me. Nancy, as a British citizen who had come to the United States on a Fulbright, could not reenter the United States until September 1964. High journalism in London is dotted with PPE generalists, much the better if they went to Balliol College. Armed with this conceit I managed to talk *The Economist* into trying me out.

Incredibly, Nancy and I arrived in Rio on March 13, 1964, after I had written a story on Ghana. Reading the newspapers on the beach that very day convinced me that something major was afoot. On the flight from Recife to Rio, a young steward and I had struck up a conversation when he noticed I was reading a book by Celso Furtado. When I told him I might write something on Brazil for *The Economist*, he said Brazil was on the brink of a popular revolution. When I left the airplane he handed me his telephone number. After finishing the newspapers on the beach I phoned him immediately. He came and collected us, bundled us with partial blindfolds into a car, and took us somewhere to meet a small group of leftwing activists that night. With my *Economist* connection, I then rapidly phoned some excellent Brazilian journalists, such as Fernando Pedreira, the political editor of *Journal do Brazil,* who quickly wrote the best early book on the coup, *Marco 31: Civis e Militares no Processo da Crise* (1964), and was always generous to me with his sources and reflections.

Within ten days I filed a story called "Mend or End in Brazil," more or less predicting that Goulart would not win the struggle, but that the events flowing from this crisis, would *unfortunately* usher in military rule. *The Economist* did not publish it. But, after the March 31 coup a week later, *The Economist* featured it without changing a word. In the next six months I published articles for *The Economist* on Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru and Venezuela. In Chile I interviewed Allende over a three-day campaign tour and Frei on his campaign tour.

But the experience in Brazil structured much of my early career and important parts of my life to this day. My son, Adam, a documentary film maker, lives in Brazil, is married to a Brazilian, and I have two lovely Brazilian granddaughters.

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My experience in Brazil led to an overlapping conceptual and political concern with military, authoritarian and democratic institutions. Always building on my base in Latin America, I have steadily expanded my comparative interests to many other areas of the world, but only if a question was there that I felt was extremely important, and that for some reason I personally could address.

Virtually before my arrival at Columbia for my PhD work, I knew that I should, and could, write about the questions concerning the military and authoritarianism in Brazil.

I was amazingly fortunate to have at Columbia as a professor the German born, Spanish citizen, Juan J. Linz. He insisted that he was an "outsider," but he had an interest in, and many original insights into, Latin America. He was then emerging as a great scholar of comparative authoritarianism and democracy. I was also fortunate to take classes with two major Brazilianists, the anthropologist, Charles Wagley, and the historian, Stanley Stein. Albert Hirschman had just left Columbia for Harvard, but he kept his Upper West Side apartment and his intellectual and moral presence was felt.

I was just as lucky to have a brilliant and intense interdisciplinary cohort of PhD students to endlessly philosophize with, such as Ralph della Cava, Judith Tendler, and Kenneth Erickson, all of whom went on to become great "Brazilianists," as well other distinguished Latin Americanists, Margaret Crahan, Arturo Valenzuela, Peter Smith, and Alex Wilde. All seven of these members of my cohort are bedrock intellectual and personal friends to this day. My wife, Nancy Leys Stepan, was taking classes at Yale and beginning work on her first book, *Beginnings of Brazilian Science: Oswaldo Cruz, Medical Research and Policy, 1890-1910*. The last LASA Congress, in Montreal, devoted a panel to her work. So we were a tight community of young scholars working on topics we felt passionately about, supported by mentors who encouraged us.

My dissertation book was *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton University Press, 1971) which was fortunate to be published in paperback and in Spanish, Korean and Indonesian translations. Ironically, the book's career in Portuguese, (censored¯uncensored and best seller list for a short period, and then rapidly re-censored) ensured a wide, sometimes underground, readership in Brazil as long as the military stayed in power.

My original teaching appointment was at Yale, starting in January 1970. My first act as Chair of our new Title VI Latin American Center was to convene a conversation on Brazil in April 1972, at the height of political repression and the "economic miracle." Fernando Henrique Cardoso surprised us by focusing on overlooked contradictions that, from his perspective as a structural-historical analyst, he saw as creating opportunities for new oppositional alliances. Juan Linz gave a luncheon talk with no notes in which he explored, and systematically dismissed, all possible models for the institutionalization of the Brazilian military regime. Years later, my colleague and friend, Elio Gaspari, Brazil's great journalist, editor of *Veja* in this period, and author of a classic multi-volume analysis of military rule, gave me a photocopy of the handwritten comments on Linz's draft article by a major author of the 1964 coup and eventually of the 1974 abertura, General Golberi do Couto e Silva. After each of Linz's arguments, Golberi, *before* the abertura, wrote in his hand, "correct." Albert Hirschman attended this meeting and contributed his "possibilistic" presence. The results of this conference were published in a volume I edited, *Authoritarian Brazil* (Yale University Press 1973). It was to be almost a dozen years later before many of us could gather again, joined now by excellent younger scholars, such as Scott Mainwaring and Sonia Alvarez, to write *Democratizing Brazil* (Rio: Paz e Terra, 1988; New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

Early in the 1970s it became dangerous for some of my friends for me to do extensive research in Brazil, so I choose a new country, Peru, and a new theme, the role of the state, which I felt was deeply under-theorized in mainline political science research; this research eventually led to *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton 1978).

While doing research for the Peru book, Juan Linz and I, then both teaching at Yale, resumed a long standing conversation. One of the first questions Juan had asked me at Columbia was "whether the breakdown of democracy in Brazil was inevitable." I said absolutely not. We continued that discussion intensely for eight years and edited the four-volume work with the general title of *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Johns Hopkins 1978). The project covered twelve major cases of breakdowns of democracy in the twentieth century, including Germany, Italy, Spain, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. A central conclusion was that "the independent contributions made to breakdowns by political incumbents emerges in almost all the cases." In the penultimate paragraph to the preface to the Breakdown book we wrote that "high priority along these lines should now be given to the analysis of the conditions that lead to the breakdown of authoritarian regimes, to the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes, and especially to the political dynamics of the consolidation of post-authoritarian regimes." As soon as we

penned these words we knew we had to do this work—an effort that was to take us eighteen years before *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Johns Hopkins 1996) was published. Linz and I are particularly happy with the fact that the book is available, and we are in regular contact with activists associated with translations of the book into Iranian, Chinese, and Indonesian.

Teaching as Fundamental to My Life

At all stages of my academic life I have been blessed with brilliant life-affirming, paradigm-reshaping, students. I have served on about forty Ph.D. dissertation committees, well more than half related to Latin America. At least twenty-five of these dissertations have been published as books. When I cite their names you will immediately know how fortunate I have been. Each of them made original observations, opened my eyes, quickened my sensitivities, and helped restructure my, and the field's, thinking. Some of the Latin Americanist students that have enriched my life and taught me so much are, in rough chronological order; at Yale: Guillermo O'Donnell (who was in my very first seminar), Kenneth Sharpe, Samuel Fitch, Daniel Levine, Nancy Bermeo, Evelyn Huber, Brian Smith, Jonathan Hartlyn, Scott Mainwaring [BA and MA], Sonia Alvarez, Charles Gillespie, Luis Gonzalez, and Robert Fishman; at Columbia: Margaret Keck, Kathryn Sikkink, Edward Gibson, Enrique Ochoa, Hector Shamis, Paulo Mesquita, Katherine Hite, Jo-Marie Burt, Marc Ungar, and Miguel Carter; at Oxford: Cindy Skach.

As a comparativist, I favor a double advisor system whenever possible. Some of the great colleagues who were a part of the advising process at Yale were, of course, Juan Linz, but also three luminous Brazilianists, Albert Fishlow, Richard Morse, and Emilia Viotti da Costa, as well as Carlos Díaz Alejandro, Sidney Mintz, and three major comparativists who actually taught themselves Spanish or Portuguese to enable their research in Latin America, Robert Dahl, David Apter, and Joseph La Palombara.

At Columbia University, Douglas Chalmers was a legendary mentor, Charles Tilly would help me on any dissertation on social movements, Fishlow created a Brazilian Center (as Leslie Bethell did when I was at Oxford), and our generous and distinguished "extended faculty family" at Columbia of Margaret Crahan, Peter Winn, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, Kenneth Maxwell, Robert Kaufman, Ralph della Cava, Atilio Borón, and Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza ("Carmuche") helped us all. At Oxford I was fortunate to run a seminar on democratization with Laurence Whitehead and to work closely with Leslie Bethell and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro.

The Comparative Excellence and Dynamism of Latin American Studies

In my judgment, one of the reasons why the field of Latin America studies became more dynamic than any other regional field in the United States is that the quality of scholarship by Latin Americans is very high, and the relations between U.S., European, and Latin American scholars with each other are much deeper, organic, and *problem-centered* than in any other area. Many of the leading democratization theorists in the world were from Latin America or were working on Latin America. Works coming out of the Latin American context played a foundational role and were imported throughout much of the rest of the world. It was from this context that many of the concepts and debates that reinvigorated comparative social science emerged, such as the realities of "societal corporatism," the dangers of "delegative democracy," the "un-rule of law," the need for "useable states," the necessity for a democratic governments and social movements to think about, and to monitor, appropriate and inappropriate privatization, and the *problematique* of "deepening" democracy.

So did a number of new ways of collective action among research and public policy communities. The first SSRC/ACLS Joint Committee to have scholars from the region it was studying was the Joint Committee on Latin America. The first branch of the Human Rights Watch to have members from the area of the world it was monitoring for human rights violations was the Americas Watch. Our excellent LASA incoming president, Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, sets another important precedent, she is our first President *from* Latin America, and *based* in Latin America.

LASA of course has been crucial not only to field development but also to the formation of numerous invisible colleges and collective activities. Let me give one example. In the late 1980s a group of us decided to try to do a ten-hour prime time television series on national television in the United States and to make this available to hundreds of colleges and universities. LASA luminaries, many here today, were critical to all stages of this development. The Ford and Carnegie Foundations would not agree to support us, nor would Boston's WGBH agree to make the series, until Peter Smith and Tom Skidmore committed to writing a new basic textbook, *Modern Latin America,* to accompany the series. It is now in its seventh edition. Peter Winn's companion volume, *Americas,* is now in its third edition. Mark Rosenberg and Florida International University took responsibility for developing

both a pedagogical teaching packet and a valuable anthology. We also wrote a state-of-the-art essay for each of the prime time shows to help instructors. Today some of the key authors are here: Helen Safa (the last recipient of the Kalman Silvert award) wrote an article on "Production, Reproduction and the Polity;" Marysa Navarro wrote on "The Construction of Latin American Feminist Ideology," and Meg Crahan wrote on "Reconstructing Church and Pursuing Change." The series had an average audience of over 8-11 million viewers, and won three prizes. As you can imagine, this was not a "no Drama O'Bama" affair, but a "muito Drama LASA" projeto.

From Latin America to Central and Eastern Europe and Beyond: Why?

In retrospect, I believe that one of the reasons I was sought out to be the founding Rector and first President of Central European University in Budapest, Prague and Warsaw was to help recreate in Central Europe some of the intellectual and political environment we had all developed in Latin American Studies. Many of the members of the informal selection committee, like Janos Kis (who managed to get hold of me by phone when I was in Paraguay to ask me to take the job), and Laszlo Bruszt, were democratic activists from Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia and had attended some of our meetings. So was the man they convinced to help support the new University, George Soros himself, who I had managed to get to join Americas Watch. All of them had followed our Latin American debates on the problems of "democratic deepening," and saw our mutually respectful transnational research exchanges. When I became Rector, Guillermo O'Donnell, Adam Przeworski, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, David Collier and many more activists and theorists concerned with Latin America visited and helped. We created some of the first courses in the area on laws for accountability, comparative democratic transitions, democratic and non-democratic privatization, and against great opposition, we created the first MA degree in the region on Feminist Studies. The influence continues: George Soros, drawing on the implications of "market failures," has just created a new research project at CEU on "democratic failures." The co-chairs are Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter.

Extending My Research from Latin America to New Parts of the World

Many of my students came from the former Yugoslavia to attend the CEU. In the style of the problem-oriented research I had come to embrace in my early work on Latin America I began to think about what social policies toward different communities, in conditions of "deep cultural diversity," were most, and what least, compatible with social peace and democracy. Linz and I early on came to the conclusion that one of the most dangerous ideas of French-influenced thought was that "every nation should be a state and every state should be a nation." We eventually joined forces with a brilliant young Indian scholar, Yogendra Yadav based in Delhi. India, with its sixteen official languages, and with the second largest Muslim population in the world (140 million people) living with the world's largest Hindu population, never could be a French style, late nineteenth century, "nation state" with one culture, but it could be, and is, what we have termed a democratic "state nation," in which many citizens from strikingly different cultures, can and do, identify with a shared "political community," and have "multiple and complementary identities." This research became our forthcoming book, called *Democracy in Multinational Societies: India and Other Polities*, John Hopkins University Press. The other polities of course include, not surprisingly Spain, and rather surprisingly, long discussions of Sri Lanka, where newly adopted "nation-state" policies in the 1950s, such as shifting from three official languages to one, turned once peaceful, multicultural Sri Lanka into a killing field, and Indonesia, where "state nation" policies such as what we call a "federacy" helped end the civil war in Aceh. I rather hope that some specialists here, on societies with territorially based, deep cultural diversity, might look at the possible appropriateness of such "state nation" policies, possibly even federacies, for countries such as Bolivia.

Let me conclude with a few words on my current research projects on religion, tolerance and democracy in the world. In my work on Latin America I read many historical works implying the incompatibility of Catholicism and democracy. But the shift from Vatican I to Vatican II and to Medellín, showed the potential "multi-vocality" of Catholicism. My Latin Americanists' and comparatists' understanding of the potential "multivocality" and "political contextuality" of religion has made me a somewhat revisionist thinker about Islam and democracy.

Much of Middle Eastern studies is mired in traditional area studies of the Arab world, often conflating this Arab world, with the entire Muslim world. Thus many specialists, as well as journalists and policy makers, often fall in essence into a simple argument: all Arab counties have Muslim majorities (correct), no Arab countries are currently, or for the last thirty years have been, democratic and relatively peaceful (correct), thus (they conclude), Muslim countries are incompatible with democracy (completely incorrect).

In fact, when I did a exercise for a *Journal of Democracy* article, I took the entire universe of the 47 Muslim majority countries in the world, to see whether any of them, for at least three consecutive years, had recently met three necessary, but not of course sufficient, conditions for democratic rule: 1) relatively free and fair elections; 2) these elections are for the most politically important positions in the country; and 3) the winning candidates or coalitions are able to form a government and rule peacefully. I documented that eleven Muslim majority countries had done so.

But, when I broke the 47 Muslim majority countries into Arab majority countries, and non-Arab majority countries, I documented that of the eleven countries in the "electorally competitive" subset, *not one was Arab*.

The comparative difference between Arab and non-Arab Muslim majority states becomes even more striking when we analyze socio-economic factors. If we call a country an "electoral under- achiever" if it has a per capita income of over $5,500 dollars, and is not electorally competitive, we note that seven of the 16 Arab countries fall into this category, but *none* of the non-Arab Muslim majority countries do so. This is not Arab essentialism, but a new phenomenon: from the ninth to the fourteenth century, the most tolerant area of the world in terms of relations between Muslims, Christians, and Jews was Andalucia in Spain, built upon Arab foundations.

I will not attempt here to explain recent Arab politics, but simply to stress that the Arabs—who constitute only about 20 percent of the world's Muslims—must never be conflated with all Muslims. They must be analyzed in all their specificity (such as the implications of the Arab-Israel conflict, and U.S. policy toward the Arab world). We also must also recognize that, of the approximately 800 million people who live in non-Arab Muslim majority states, well more than half of them live in electorally competitive polities.

Many thinkers are concerned that in countries like India, the increasing intensity of religious practice will lead, among Muslims and Hindus alike, to less support for democracy. To test this hypothesis Linz, Yadav and I recently constructed a five-part index for intensity of religious practice, and a five-part index on intensity of support for democracy. We piggy-backed this onto Yadav's census-based, 27,000-respondent survey. Our findings were, for Hindus, that the greater the intensity of religious practice, the greater the intensity of support for democracy. For Muslims? A virtually identical finding. When we did a Pearson's chi square test the odds against these results occurring by chance are one in a thousand. We then did a regression analysis holding other possible variables constant and the results were confirmed quite strongly: for every unit of increase of intensity of religious practice in India, there is a 0.138 increase in support for democracy.

We also did a survey with 10,000 respondents for each of the four South Asian countries; India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The great "political contextuality" of religion again emerges from these comparative findings.

Since Islam was founded in the seventh century, the Muslims now living in India and Pakistan have shared, for more than *95 percent* of their histories, roughly the same doctrines and practices concerning Islam per se, roughly the same socioeconomic conditions, and roughly the same geo-political-colonial space, but Muslims in India support democracy more than twice as much as do Muslims in Pakistan.

Another cautionary finding about the great political "contextuality" and "multivocality" of religion emerges from these surveys. In our four-country survey, we had large samples of Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Muslims, and Christians. In these four countries, the highest score for support for democracy by any religion in any country, and the lowest support by any religion in any country, comes from the same religion; the highest, Muslims in Sri Lanka, and the lowest, Muslims in Pakistan.

I am currently carrying out extensive field research in the three highest ranked democracies in the world with large Muslim populations; Indonesia, Senegal, and India. It appears that all three of them have created a new form of secularism and democracy that I call "respect all religions, financially support all religions, and keep a principled distance from all religions." No Arab country has a model in any way approaching this. They could.

Once again, thank you! ■