DEBATES

Inequality and Violence in Latin America

EGUIZÁBAL *y* BIDEGAÍN *continued*

pero de manera aislada. Necesitamos una narrativa más integradora que al tiempo que explique la heterogeneidad de la región y la complejidad de sus procesos sociales incluyendo aquellos que la vinculan con Estados Unidos, dé cuenta de la gran importancia de la relación para ambas partes. El resurgimiento de los estudios latinoamericanos en Estados Unidos dependerá de su capacidad de renovarse. Solo así superaremos las crisis, económica y epistémica, por las que atravesamos. ■

Repensando os elos entre violência e desigualdade

por **Antonio Sérgio Alfredo Guimarães (USP)**

Esta secção de Debates do *LASA Forum*, que antecede o Congresso do Rio de Janeiro, voltado para "Repensar as Desigualdades", é dedicada a discutir a relação entre desigualdades e violência na América Latina. O tema não poderia ser mais oportuno diante do aumento crescente de formas brutais, extra-estatais e ilegais de violência que se institucionalizam em espaços controlados pelo narcotráfico em países como México, Colômbia e Brasil; enquanto práticas policiais inconstitucionais continuam fora do controle judicial em quase todos os países do continente. Que relação tem tais formas de violência com as desigualdades sociais do continente? A relação não é simples, e os especialistas que convidamos para debatê-la nos esclarecem sobre muitos dos seus aspectos conhecidos e lançam novas luzes sobre ela.

Abrindo o debate, Rosemary Thorp e Mariza Paredes fazem um balanço das teorias de etnicidade e de movimentos sociais para pensar a relação entre Desigualdades, Etnicidade e Violência Política. Ainda que empiricamente ancoradas em dados obtidos em alguns países da América Latina, especialmente o Peru, elas ampliam teoricamente estes resultados ao colocá-los em perspectiva mundial.

Continuando o exame empírico de casos, Sérgio Adorno e Nancy Cárdia reconhecem os inegáveis avanços democráticos em países como o Brasil, em que grupos de direitos humanos tem presença efetiva no campo político, a imprensa é livre, mas, a despeito disso, o Estado de Direito funciona de modo precário em grandes áreas do território nacional e em que práticas de tortura e assassinatos de oprimidos e oponentes continuam a ser empregadas contra a população pobre ou os infratores da lei, tal como definidos por potentados locais aparelhados nas polícias ou em outras esferas do estado. Esta forma violenta de estado, edificado para a opressão dos conquistados e para o desmantelamento de qualquer resistência à metrópole, sobreviveu à Independência e passou a conviver com as formas republicanas liberais das novas nações latino-americanas. O que há de novo, nos convencem Adorno e Cárdia, é o espraiamento de tal violência para a sociedade civil. Assim, o período atual, de maior de democratização da sociedade brasileira, é acompanhado de acréscimo sem precedentes de crimes violentos, tortura e corrupção. Até que ponto a manutenção das desigualdades de acesso à renda econômica e aos direitos sociais alimenta e generaliza os atentados à segurança individual e o desrespeito à vida?

É justamente a mudança da forma tradicional de policiamento, baseada em hierarquias militarizadas, para outra mais flexível, voltada para a prevenção, sob controle dos cidadãos, o objeto da análise de Mark Ungar. Por que os estados latino-americanos estão presos em impasses, reproduzindo as formas coloniais do passado, sem conseguir implantar, ou fazer com que as reformas realmente funcionem em direção virtuosa e democrática? A resposta de Ungar é clara: a pressão da sociedade por resultados de curto prazo, tanto quanto as deficiências de gestão, auditoria e investigação das instituições de justiça criminal fazem com que as reformas de longo prazo acabem por ficar nas intenções e nas leis, sem romper o círculo vicioso onde germinam as desigualdades sociais e a insegurança pública. A formação de grupos de interesses de funcionários, ao se generalizar pelos aparelhos do estado, acaba por usurpar os poderes que deveriam

ser públicos e exercidos no sentido de dotar os cidadãos de maior controle sobre a aplicação da justiça e das garantias de segurança. Esses agrupamentos de interesses não apenas dificultam a implementação de reformas como servem de condutos para a corrupção do aparelho estatal pelo crime organizado. Do mesmo modo, politicas que dão resultados de curto prazo, como a de tolerância zero, acabam por desviar os esforços policiais para a prevenção dos pequenos crimes, deixando intactos os nichos de corrupção, de aplicação desigual da lei e de insegurança que se abrigam no próprio estado.

Francisco Gutierrez focaliza o nexo teórico entre violência e desigualdade na América Latina e nos faz sugestões interessantes. Até que ponto é possível aprender, por analogia, da experiência histórica dos "rebeldes primitivos", estudados por Hobsbawn, para entender a onda de violência criminal da atualidade nos grandes centros urbanos do nosso continente? Jovens sem perspectivas sociais são elementos necessários mas não suficientes para que a violência recrute seus agentes, mas idéias, redes e estruturas organizacionais são outras condições igualmente requeridas. A concomitância de desigualdades persistentes e a possibilidade de grande mobilidade social através de atividades ilegais aplaina o caminho para a organização da violência, nos sugere Gutierrez, examinando o caso da Colômbia.

Fechando o debate de modo muito pouco convencional, Kimberly Theidon busca desvendar o modo pelo qual as masculinidades tradicionais são mobilizadas e desmobilizadas em meio à guerra civil colombiana. Ao analisar o programa de Desarmamento, Desmobilização e Reintegração (DDR) de combatentes de guerra, Theidon está à procura dos nexos entre militarismo e masculinidade—ou violência e masculinidade. Ou seja, há uma cultura que nutre e é nutrida pela violência; cultura que pode às vezes ficar constrita a comportamentos e práticas cotidianas que consagram o guerreiro, o bandido e o desviante, explicando como e porque os jovens são recrutados. Mas há também formas mais artísticas desta cultura, que podem levar à sublimação das experiências mais dolorosas de humilhação, discriminação e preterimento. Theidon, nesta intervenção, enfoca apenas as formas violentas de masculinidade que nutriram o conflito e que são reconvertidas para os tempo de paz, deixando inalteradas os fundamentos culturais da violência. Sua ambição política, entretanto, é maior: não haveria meios de desarmar culturalmente a masculinidade violenta? Assim fazendo, não estaríamos construindo a paz, a civilidade e a cidadania sobre bases mais sólidas?

Deixo aos leitores estas indagações. Sei que uma ciência social só se legitima para receber verbas públicas à medida que pode ser aplicada à solução de problemas sociais. Sei que as políticas sociais não se fazem sem uma linguagem que seja entendida por todos. Paradoxalmente, as ciências sociais que desafiam o senso comum em sua busca de novas explicações precisam estabelecer um novo senso comum para demonstrar as suas descobertas. É neste estreito círculo entre o passado e o futuro, em busca de inteligibilidade, que nos movemos. ■

Inequality, Ethnicity and Political Violence
A Perspective from Peru

by **Rosemary Thorp**
Oxford University
rsmrythorp@aol.com

and **Maritza Paredes**
Oxford University
Maritza.paredesgonzales@qeh.ox.ac.uk

Over the past few decades, the realities of inequality, ethnicity and political violence have repeatedly presented themselves for reflection in Latin America. This essay reports on a research project seeking to identify the interfaces and interactions among the three. The geographical reach of the just-concluding research is quite broad, covering countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. As participating authors of the Peruvian case study, we shall focus on that country.[1]

The framework of the research stems from the inspiration of the overall project director, Professor Frances Stewart, who insists on the analytic importance of groups. This insistence swims against the tide of two centuries of economists' writing, which persists in treating groups—firms, households and communities, for example—as if they were individuals (Stewart 2008, Ch. 1). Professor Stewart has promoted the concept of "horizontal," or group, inequalities, as opposed to "vertical," or individual inequalities, which has been the focus of most economic analysis of inequality. In our work, the identity basis of the group has usually been ethnic or religious, but it may be culture, region or class and/or gender. It is an important aspect of the project that inequality is not defined only in terms of economic indicators. We explore political, cultural and social indicators as well. Groups are thus defined as appropriate for the specific context of

analysis. The project conducted a survey of attitudes and perceptions to evaluate the key elements of identity in each country under study.

The overall project uses a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods to explore the hypothesized significant relation between horizontal inequalities and political violence, and finds that political violence is more likely when both political and socio-economic group inequalities are high, and especially when both are worsening. We find the relation between inequalities and violence to be especially significant when groups are defined principally in ethnic terms (Ostby 2008). On the other hand, many countries do display quite severe horizontal inequalities without political violence, and indeed are relatively peaceful for long periods, even centuries.

Why use groups as a framework? Our previous discussion begins to clarify the answer, and we see it as one of the challenges of the project to make it even clearer. In the case of Peru, groups help us to think about the persistence of inequality for three principal reasons. First, discrimination and prejudice always occur in relation to groups. Such attitudes shape institutions over time, shape the ways identities are perceived and used, and affect distribution through factor markets and through politics at every level and in many forms. All these elements are important components of our analysis.

Second, thinking in terms of groups draws attention to space. Groups often have a spatial dimension. In Peru this is crucial since the indigenous population has historically been centered in the highlands, while the white-mestizo population has lived on the coast. The interplay among groups, geography, and the policies that reinforce and build geographical inequality, is crucial to an explanation of how inequality is embedded. Space matters because of the distribution and concentration of natural and political resources. In Peru, migration changes the spatial aspect with time, but it is a central part of our argument that the interaction between migration and discrimination/prejudice gradually shapes new forms of ethnic identity that are highly significant for the durability of inequality.

Third, groups are central to political behavior. People typically mobilize or are mobilized in groups. Whether or not a group finds a way to defend its interests, and what instruments get chosen for that defense, will have a great deal to do with the evolution of political horizontal inequalities, and thus of inequality over time. In Peru the absence of vigorous indigenous politics appears to be part of the explanation of the persistence of inequality. The weakness of indigenous politics is the outcome of the historical development of interactions between economics and politics. In this, the evolution of institutional patterns leading to clientism and *caudillismo*, and practices of discrimination and prejudice, have played roles reinforcing negative outcomes for indigenous people as a group. The most negative outcome has probably been the group's mobilization to violence (by non-indigenous actors), leading to repression, further weakening the group.

Group, or Horizontal Inequalities and Political Violence: Latin America and the Wider Project

In the case of Latin America, ethnic and cultural inequalities overlap extensively with class inequality in a manner that makes the embedding of inequality very deep and the analysis complex (see Paredes 2007; Canepa 2008). Second, the concept of ethnicity itself is context and time dependent, and varies among the Latin American cases studied in this project—Peru, Guatemala and Bolivia.[2] Specifically in Peru, the case we are reporting here, ethnicity is often suppressed, *en proceso*, unspoken and internalized to varying degrees with varying consequences. The subtlety and ambiguity surrounding ethnicity make it difficult to measure such inequalities—a requirement of the overall project. However, we attempt this and report the findings (Figueroa and Barron 2005; Figueroa 2008; Sulmont 2009). In Peru, for example, indigenous people have significantly fewer years of schooling on average than the non-indigenous (Caumartin, Gray-Molina and Thorp, 2008).

In Latin America, also, the relationship to mobilization, or further, to violence has its own specificities. The cataclysmic wars that did eventually occur in Peru and Guatemala incorporated excluded ethnic groups in the absence of formal ethnic political organization. In our third case, Bolivia, where collective action was repeated and vigorous, major violence has been avoided. Thus ethnicity was not a central feature in the Guatemalan or Peruvian conflicts, either in terms of claims or in the discourse (Caumartin, Gray-Molina and Thorp 2008), but events were to take a terrible and violent turn for indigenous people.

The Guatemalan Truth Commission estimated the overall number of dead during the thirty-six-year conflict to be around 200,000, of whom 85 percent were indigenous. The death toll in Peru, while large, was still significantly lower than in Guatemala. The Peruvian Truth Commission estimated the overall number of victims during the fifteen-year conflict to be 70,000, of whom 75 percent were indigenous. A key difference in the experience of violence in the two cases is that in Peru the Maoist extremist group,

Shining Path, is acknowledged as one of the main perpetrators of violent acts, whereas in Guatemala the state and its allies were responsible for the great majority of the acts of violence. This outbreak of violence interacting with, and decimating large numbers of indigenous people seems to be what we need to explain, as much as the lack of recourse to mass indigenous mobilization to challenge this violence and severe degrees of horizontal inequalities over decades, if not centuries. To explain violence and the absence of indigenous mobilization, and the interfaces with inequality, we needed to look closely at both the phenomenon of ethnicity in our cases and the phenomenon of social movements in Latin America.

Interpreting Ethnicity: The Literature

Social scientists have differed sharply on how to approach ethnicity. Traditionally, the debate has been between "primordialists" on the one hand and "instrumentalists" on the other. The primordialist approach has been much discussed (Geertz 1973; Isaacs 1989; Van De Berghe 1981). Although Geertz and Isaacs acknowledge some transformation and fluidity of ethnic identity, they were surprised by the power and resilience of ethnic "endowments" received through birth and childhood. The "overpowering coerciveness" of the group (Geertz 1973, 259) or the "genuine security" offered by endowed characteristics, and the "urge to belong" of the individual psyche (Isaacs 1975, 35) are offered as explanations. Most of these approaches were developed in the 1970s. Without doubt primary bonds are powerful and deeply felt, but these approaches do not help us understand why some bonds have become more powerful than others, why new identities are created and bonds reproduced, and how people face these changes. For example, in many regions of the Andes new mestizo and *cholo* identities have been created, but these identities are likely to have different meanings in, for instance, Peru and Bolivia (see De La Cadena 2000 for a brilliant analysis and documentation of the Peruvian case, and Quijano 1980, who has been a visionary in regard to this process).

Instrumentalists, in contrast, affirm that ethnic identities are strategically chosen and manipulated, and even re-constructed by individuals and ethnic entrepreneurs on the basis of self-interest (Brass1997, 26), and generally in order to obtain desired patronage goods from the state: land, jobs, or markets (Bates 1971, 1998). But while these approaches are sometimes useful to explain how ethnic groups mobilize and sustain their campaigns (Laitin 1986; Cohen 1985), they do not answer questions such as why some ethnic ties become more important than others, and how they become the basis for political action at one time rather than another, or why people occasionally act in ways that appear detrimental to their material interests.

An intermediate perspective, and the approach we have found most useful, is that of social constructivism. This view does not deny that there is a need for some felt differences in conduct, customs, ideology or religion to make it possible to raise ethnic or other consciousness. In contrast to the extreme instrumentalist view, the fundamental emphasis is on the making and remaking of ethnic boundaries (Anderson 1983). Some scholars have put more emphasis on processes that have reframed the identity of people, such as modernization processes (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983) or the development of significant framing institutions such as the colonial state, authoritarian corporatist regimes or neo-liberalism in Latin America. Mallon 1995, Yashar 2005 and Van Cott 2000, 2005 are substantial and comprehensive examples of these types of studies for Latin America, and we have drawn heavily on these sources.

Ethnicity in Peru

In Peru racial and ethnic mixing has occurred on a significant scale since colonial times, and a majority of the population in certain regions, mainly on the coast, is of mixed ethnicity. However, the idea that migration, access to education, and the learning of Spanish have created a homogenous mestizo culture, particularly in the cities, where the only significant differences are those of region and class, is an erroneous one. This idea is usually associated with the equally misguided notion that indigenous groups only exist in small and dispersed numbers in the hinterlands of the sierra or in the Amazon, "frozen in time." Van Cott (1994) convincingly argues that this vision is false. No indigenous people live exactly as their ancestors did; nor have their multiple cultures stayed static in time and place. Indigenous people in Peru have transformed themselves according to the opportunities and constraints they have met, incorporating customs, technologies and ideas from a white/mestizo-dominated society.

There is an idea that when indigenous people enter into contact with "civilization" they are no longer indigenous. We argue against this idea and, in fact, believe that it is at the heart of the discrimination that has created the cultural and psychological barriers preventing indigenous people from organizing politically along ethnic lines. This prejudice is a mechanism that has been historically constructed, reproduced and consolidated in Peru over the years by the institutions built around it. "Indigenous" is a community identity in the highlands, but

has changed in the cities, just as people from all cultures change. In line with a strong vein of writing in Peruvian social science, we understand the formation of identity as a social construction, which happens in time and space, and therefore has a history (De La Cadena 2000; Garcia 2005). In understanding that history we have been able to draw on a rich historical literature on Peru: Flores Galindo 1986, 1985, 1976; Larson 2004, Stern 1998, 1993, 1987; Manrique 2002, 1988, 1981; Mallon 1995, 1992,1983; Montoya 1998, 1992,1989; Deere 1990; Degregori 1990, among others.

Social Movements and the Politicization of Ethnicity

The abundant literature on social movements has contributed to a better understanding of the politicization of ethnic boundaries. There is an increasing consensus that neither long-lasting ethnic cleavages, nor the emergence of ethnic entrepreneurs able to manipulate these deep feelings, are enough to explain the mobilization of ethnic groups. Favorable changes in the structure of political opportunities that arise from socio-economic and political transformations in society are generally required to facilitate mobilization (McAdam 1982, 2001; Tarrow 1983; Tilly 1978). Further, the construction of networks and grassroots organizations that can generate and sustain collective action has been identified by the literature on social movements in Europe and the United States (McAdam 1982; McCarty and Zald 1977), and more recently also in the literature on indigenous movements in Latin America (Yashar 2005; Van Cott 2000, 2005). Mobilization resources promote an "interlocking network of groups" that provides the stimulus for the movement and for collective action (Tarrow 1994).

Yet identity, and particularly ethnic identity, can be transformed and sharpened during the process of mobilization and as a consequence of it. This endogenous character of ethnic identity and its politicization and mobilization have given researchers a complex task. Often the literature on ethnic conflict assumes ethnic cleavages and groups as exogenous and prior to ethnic conflict, and the formation of the group stays unexplained. But understanding mobilization triggered by ethnic identity requires attention to collective processes of interpretation and the framing and reframing of identity and agendas that occur during the process. We also need to consider when this framing becomes appealing to others (Bedford and Snow 2000; Gamson 1992). The search for a better understanding of the process of identity formation and framing in the literature of social movements, together with the strategic behavior that makes mobilization possible, is of great help in this debate.

Inequality, Ethnicity and Political Violence in Latin America

In conclusion, then, we argue that the notion of horizontal inequalities offers a powerful explanation of the severe degree of overall inequality observable in Latin America. This is particularly in the case in Peru, where our analysis of two centuries shows how political, cultural and economic forces play out over many decades to embed group inequalities. Geography also plays a reinforcing role, interacting with both the economic model and the evolution of political strengths and interests. We trace a series of vicious circles, the heart of the embedding process, through to the close of the Fujimori era, when the mutually reinforcing forces of exclusion appear to reach a climax. These vicious circles incorporate and explain political violence. Ethnic identities may or may not be politically salient; they may be kept in the sphere of "private" life, but with few or no repercussions in the public arena in terms of patterns of collective action, organization, political choice and mobilization. However, ethnic violence may still not be prevented.

From our comparative work we see that of the five Latin American countries with substantial indigenous populations (Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala and Mexico), armed conflict and a disproportionate number of casualties with people of indigenous origin have occurred in the three countries with the least politicized ethnic identities: Peru, Guatemala and Mexico. In Peru, despite the lack of salience of ethnicity in political terms, poor and deprived indigenous populations, facing exclusion, a lack of economic alternatives and a weak political movement expressing their interests, were vulnerable to Sendero's discourse and could be successfully mobilized for violent ends. Political violence led to repression, which was the more severe because of the ethnic dimension and the culture of prejudice. Political violence reinforced discrimination and prejudice, and weakened social movements (Degregori, 1990; Comisión de la Verdad 2004). These are all elements of the vicious circles around the success and subsequent repression of Sendero Luminoso. While Sendero's discourse was never ethnic, indigenous people were vulnerable because of group inequalities, and the repression was the more violent because of prejudice and discrimination.

Endnotes

[1] The research project as a whole has been based at the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) at Oxford University. The Peruvian research has been conducted in a partnership between the Catholic University, Lima and Oxford University. Working papers are on the CRISE web site (www.crise.ox.ac.uk). Preliminary results of the Peru study are on the web and a full working paper will soon be presented.

[2] The lead authors on Bolivia and Guatemala respectively are George Gray-Molina and Corinne Caumartin.

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Democracy, Violence and Human Rights in Contemporary Brazil

by Sérgio Adorno
Universidade de São Paulo
Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
UNESCO
sadorno@usp.br

and Nancy Cardia
Universidade de São Paulo
ngcardia@gmail.com

Two decades after democratization, what kind of democracy is in place in Brazil? An incomplete "delegative" democracy with weak forms of accountability (horizontal and vertical), derived from "a severe incompleteness of the state, especially its legal dimension" (O'Donnell, 2004 p.41) in which un-rule of law (Pinheiro & others, 2000) prevails, is one of the answers. More recently this question has been reframed from a broader perspective: democracies have to be evaluated in terms of their quality. In this approach the question is how good is the present Brazilian democracy in terms of providing "a stable institutional structure that realizes the liberty and equality of citizens through the legitimate and correct functioning of its institutions and mechanisms?" (Morlino, 2004; p.12.)

Democracies, in general, can be evaluated in terms of results (the level of legitimacy they have vis-a-vis citizens), in terms of content (the amount of freedom and liberty citizens, communities and organizations enjoy), and in terms of procedures (the extent to which citizens can check and evaluate the application of laws). Democracies can also be assessed by how far they implement the rule of law, accountability, responsiveness to civil society and citizens' demands, the full respect for rights, and political, social and economic equality.

Though all aspects are relevant, the capacity of authorities to enforce laws that are "non-retroactive, and in public knowledge universal, stable, predictable and non-ambiguous," is considered a prerequisite for all the other dimensions. Still, even if the rule of law is respected, the "critical features" for a good democracy refer to how universally and independently laws are applied: the integral application of the legal system, also at the supranational level, guaranteeing the rights and equality of citizens; the absence of areas dominated by organized crime and of corruption in the political, administrative, and judicial branches; the existence of a local and centralized civil bureaucracy that competently and universally applies the law and assumes responsibility in the event of error; the existence of an efficient police force that respects the rights and freedoms guaranteed by law; equal, unhindered access of citizens to the legal system in the case of lawsuits either between private citizens or between private citizens and public institutions—this also implies that citizens know their rights and can obtain representation; reasonably swift resolution of criminal inquiries and of civil and administrative lawsuits; the complete independence of the judiciary from any political influence. (Morlino, 2004)

What changes with democracy and what does not change? Do changes brought by transitional democracy lead to the preconditions for the "good" democracy or do they produce more mixed results? These preconditions have been studied either from the perspective of the analysis of transitional democracies or of the expansion of human rights—but not from the perspective of how laws actually operate, or of changes in values and beliefs of those in charge of implementing the laws.

At first sight the Brazilian case provides support to the conclusion that "the adoption of some democratic elements will not automatically decrease repressive activity, something implied within the majority of research within this area." (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004). The fulfillment of a minimalist definition of democracy may not be enough to ensure that human rights violations will decrease, because this is not sufficient to ensure a democratic rule of law. A higher level of democracy requires more responsiveness by authorities to societal demands. Without accountability there is no responsiveness. Thus stronger democracy, in the sense of more controls over authorities, may be necessary for human rights abuses to be reduced (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004).

The present experience with democracy in Brazil is unique historically in duration, in the extension of political competition, in the universality of suffrage, in the access to information (freedom of the press), in the freedom to protest (mass demonstrations), in the greater urbanization of the country, and in the number of organizations that play watchdog roles, but these attributes coexist with violent crimes and gross human rights violations. Institution-building enjoys a high profile in public opinion, in particular with the creation of a Special Secretariat for Human Rights attached to the Presidency of the Republic and Police Ombudsperson offices to attend to civilian complaints about police behavior, but these entities are more or less successful depending on who is in charge, signaling that institutions are still not strong enough to resist external pressures.

It would appear that greater changes have taken place in the field of social rights than in the arena of political and civil rights. Conservative forces maintain a strong presence in the political sphere, and the rule of law continues to be applied precariously in most areas of Brazil. Crime is rampant and some types of violence have worsened. Brazil still struggles with seemingly intractable

problems: abusive use of lethal force by the police forces, extrajudicial killings, lynching, torture, and abominable prison conditions. Moreover corruption in the criminal justice system persists and, though there are indicators that the corruption is systemic, successive administrations have avoided confronting this problem: when measures have been adopted to prohibit torture and abusive use of lethal force by the police, for example, they have not been effective.

Violent criminal offenses have increased in Brazil since the beginning of the 1980s, mainly in metropolitan areas such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Vitória, and Recife. Deaths caused by homicide, rising since the mid-1970s, accelerated in the 1980s: while the overall mortality rate grew by 20 percent, homicides increased by 60 percent. Victims were, and still are, mostly young and adolescent males (Peres, Cardia e Santos, 2004)[1], living in the poorest districts of large cities with multiple deprivations and very poor access to rights (Cardia, Adorno and Poleto, 2003). This kind of growth has more than justified the public's fears and feelings of insecurity.

Homicides in the country as a whole began to decrease in 2003, but the rates continue to be very high (26/100,000 residents) when compared to other countries, and the total number of cases per year remain close to a staggering 50,000.

There is no single explanation for the decrease in homicides. Since there were no concerted efforts at different levels of government to reduce homicides both in terms of preventive measures, or of public security polices, to deter violence, it is likely that this drop is the result of multiple factors: a) improvement in the economy, with more formal jobs available; b) more private and public investment in high homicide areas; c) greater presence of organized civil society in high risk areas; c) changes in the demographic profile of the population (aging population means fewer youth at risk); d) changes in the type of drugs used, crack cocaine in particular; e) improved police work and more effective punishment of criminals; f) higher rates of imprisonment—in the state of São Paulo the prison population tripled in eight years; g) the implementation of laws that created numerous obstacles to the possession of firearms; h) innovations in investigation and prevention adopted by police forces; i) changes in policing practices; and j) changes in police training.

The fall in the homicide rate was not followed by a reduction in other forms of violent crime: aggravated assault, armed robberies, kidnapping and offenses associated with drug use and trafficking continued to grow. If crime statistics are still cause for concern, so are political scandals involving tax evasion, money laundering, fraud and corruption that multiply without significant abatement.

Worse still is that new forms of violence have emerged in the last two decades, many of which are attributable to organized crime. There now are complex social and institutional networks connecting violent delinquents, lawyers, politicians, entrepreneurs, public servants and citizens. Such networks nourish corruption and impact collective beliefs about the efficacy of democratic institutions to guarantee law and order. The disruptive impact of organized crime on democratic institutions and processes is becoming all too clear.

What helps to explain the increase in organized crime in Brazil—and in a host of other countries as well? Democracy has not produced immediate gains in the reduction of inequality. If crime and violence are not the result of poverty and inequality alone, these conditions weaken citizens' access to rights and to the institutions that mediate such access as well as their capacity to act collectively to pressure authorities to deliver rights, so far secured only in law. In Brazil, the first decade after the return to democracy was a very difficult economic period. Income inequality increased while the state faced severe economic limitations in its attempts to design and implement social safety policies. By the time the economy stabilized, the gap between the needs of the majority of the population and the capacity of the state to provide for those needs was very large.

The state also had too few resources to contain crime: investments in modernizing the criminal justice system and the police were too meager to stem the growth in violent criminal behavior. As a result impunity increased markedly. This, coupled with new opportunities found by organized crime groups (in particular the substantial profits in dealing internationally in drugs and arms), resulted in real threats to the integrity of the justice system and in the trust the people have in the system: under the circumstances, the police and the judiciary are not well considered by most Brazilians.

In recent years, however, one police force has succeeded in rebuilding its image vis-à-vis the public: the Federal Police has been quite effective in investigating federal and international crimes and in bringing to justice the alleged perpetrators. Though the Federal Police receive much support from Federal Prosecutors, their high profile cases still take years to reach the courts and, when they do, may linger on for many years. This is most evident in cases involving politicians, who are granted special privileges and can be tried only by the Supreme Court. The backlog of cases seems insurmountable.

At the state and local level, the challenge of lawful control of crime is still to be met. Local police forces generally have not succeeded in meeting democratic standards of policing and law enforcement. Nor have they

succeeded in improving their public image. Institutional performance in law enforcement is seriously jeopardized by imbalances in pay scales, unattractive career structures, lack of accountability and external forms of oversight. Police units still tend to operate militarily, and their actions often produce casualties among law-abiding people, especially in poor neighborhoods or *favelas*. Such casualties of lethal force are generally considered necessary and acceptable, especially among elected officials of all ranks The involvement of policemen with crime, their role in death squads, their involvement with the torture of suspects, or their participation in private security enterprises have, at best, received mixed attention and at worst, no attention.

Brazilian states have not been very successful in reforming the prison system to bring it in line with what is expected in a democracy. Though the prison population grew from 30 prisoners per 100,000 residents in 1969 to 215 per 100,000 residents in 2006, the number of agents was not increased proportionately, nor were sufficient investments made in promoting the re-education or re-socialization of inmates. Crowded prisons, with no educational, work, sport or leisure activities for prisoners, have had the perverse effect of encouraging prisoners to organize and extend their criminal activities to the outside world. Organized crime from within the prisons represents a new form of risk for society at large.

As mentioned earlier, violations of civil rights still represent a challenge for democracy in Brazil. The public perceives that suspects of crimes are not entitled to protection including defense against torture, and that force may be justified to contain crime at any cost. This is one of the indicators that Brazil has not succeeded in establishing a human rights culture to date. Public support for the rule of law provides a powerful obstacle to the return of repressive measures. The capacity of authorities to enforce laws that are "non-retroactive, and in public knowledge universal, stable, predictable and non-ambiguous" is a pre-requisite for peaceful society.

A human rights culture is one in which people value such rights, are willing to protect them from intrusions, and are unwilling to sacrifice them under normal circumstances. Democracy and human rights regimes are intrinsically connected. For democracy to prosper, human rights must be implemented, citizens must feel protected not only from arbitrary behavior by powerful groups in society (right to physical integrity) but must also share in the wealth that is generated in the society (social, economic and cultural rights). This perspective demands that we assess the development of a transitional democracy while also assessing access to human rights.

Democracy demands popular control and political equality. Translated into rights it means the ability to express opinions, to be informed, to freely associate, to freely move inside and among countries. Moreover, these rights can be exercised only if persons feel free and secure, and if due process prevails. Access to economic, social and cultural rights are being increasingly interpreted as key elements for the exercise of democratic rights since if persons lack access to health and education and to secure livelihoods they cannot enjoy their civil and political rights, as pointed out in the political and sociological literature. In contemporary Brazil, these are the major challenges to the democratic control of violence in the context of a human rights culture.

Endnote

[1] The homicide rate for male youth between 15 and 19 years old in São Paulo jumped from 10 per 100,000 persons to 188 per 100,000 in thirty-five years (1960-1995).

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Inequality and Citizen Security in Latin America

by Mark Ungar
City University of New York/
Brooklyn College
mungar@brooklyn.cuny.edu

Inequality and insecurity have helped turn each other into two of Latin America's most stubborn problems. With a regional homicide rate of over three times the global average since 2000, accounting for over forty percent of the world's murders each year,[1] crime has been one of the top concerns of Latin Americans since the mid-1990s.[2] In response, governments have been enacting an extensive range of reforms, including the restructuring of police forces, more professional support for officers, stronger accountability, judicial reforms, and community policing. Together, such change is gradually moving the region from a traditional form of policing, based on militarized hierarchies and reactive responses, to a problem-oriented policing based on prevention and flexibility. An expanding literature on citizen security in Latin America, such as the edited volumes by Bobea (2003), Tulchin and Ruthenburg (2006), and Alda and Beliz (2007), discuss the development of these policies in different countries. Such efforts, though, have gotten mired in the region's profound social, geographic, legal, and economic inequalities. The demand for short-term results leads governments to supplant or water down these long-term reforms as they buckle under pressure by panicked societies and by criminal justice institutions that impede change not just through direct resistance but through their deficient and unequal practices of oversight, investigation, due process, and management. Taming crime is so difficult, that is, because hurdles spring from the same kinds of inequalities that help cause it. They have trapped Latin America in an impasse between the centralized repressive policing of the past and a more accountable citizen-based policing of the future.

An initial and most visible area of citizen security reform has been to restructure police forces by breaking them up into geographically- and functionally-based units. But since such change often occurs in haste amid discord among political parties and a lack of preparation by provincial and municipal governments, it often multiplies rather than minimizes inefficiencies. Throughout the region, decentralization has also widened inequalities between rich and poor districts.[3] In Venezuela, for example, where the number of police forces has jumped 363 percent since the 1989 Decentralization Law, the wealthy eastern half of the Federal Capital has ten times more police officers than the poor western half, which has over 70 percent of the area's residents and crime. Since citizen security goes beyond policing, furthermore, the proportionately greater scarcity in rural and poor urban areas of agencies such as NGOs diminishes the civil rights component of security even more.

The other form of restructuring is internal, such as reducing the number of ranks, merging the separate hierarchies for officials and sub-officials, and creating special units on issues such as human rights. To make such change more palatable to police, it is often accompanied by salary increases, health and housing subsidies, career laws with fairer rules on promotion, and new technology like crime-mapping software. Although such long-needed changes help reduce internal inequalities, they often do little to address the administrative practices that foment them. Even amid growing budgets, most local stations lack basic supplies and equipment, and their officers are shifted around based on ad hoc operations and poor human resource management. Corruption at the top, particularly among specific agencies, thwarts rational and equitable distribution of funds and officers. Despite the weakness of criminal investigation, in addition, no judicial police gets more than five to ten percent of the security budget, and only between two and ten percent of officers work on investigation. Creation of new units to deal with issues like human rights are often seen as complementary additions and sometimes created as a way to marginalize these areas while appearing, for public relations, to prioritize them. As with police academy training, new focuses have little impact unless they are made integral to the job.

To increase legal, fiscal, and public transparency over criminal justice agencies, accountability mechanisms—from national ombudsmen (the *Defensoría del Pueblo*) to internal affairs offices within the police—have been established or revamped throughout the region. But many of these agencies are weaker than those they try to hold accountable. They are often politicized, deprived of cooperation, and inundated with minor complaints that prevent investigation of serious ones. Citizens do not trust them, since they are often located within a police station and because judgments can be vetoed by higher-ups, while police officers often see them as a tool to find scapegoats. In Bolivia, where the police hierarchy reflects deep ethnic and class divisions, the vast majority of cases handled by the internal disciplinary system have been for desertion among the lower ranks. Meanwhile, abuse by the top ranks continues to be endemic. In a 2006 United Nations poll of officers, 87 percent report being subject to verbal abuse and 77 percent of being unjustifiably arrested, sanctioned without recourse, or chronically over-worked.

Latin America's many judicial reforms, from alternative sentencing to neighborhood judges of the peace, have been more attuned to inequalities and so work to make criminal justice more efficient, unbiased, and accessible. The most sweeping of these changes are the overhauls of penal process codes that most countries have undertaken to speed up trials and strengthen due process by replacing glacial written procedures with oral trials, transferring investigative authorities from the police to prosecutors (*fiscales*), and creating courts at the investigative and sentencing phases. But despite impressive results, particularly in their first few years,[4] these codes have been starved of needed state funds, professional training, and institutional backing. Many police—chafing against stricter controls on evidence and detention—often cooperate less with prosecutors and judges, who struggle with their new investigative and other responsibilities. Resulting tensions are heightened by limited personnel. Throughout Latin America, in particular, public defenders carry double the recommended load of 150 cases, and, in juvenile justice, sometimes triple. As the new penal process codes become less an instrument for change than a convenient target of blame for fostering crime and impunity, chronic problems such as court backlogs, botched investigations, and low conviction rates (of under ten percent) continue.

Also continuing is unequal treatment of citizens caught up in the criminal justice system. Amid pressure to crack down, due process abuses such as poor legal access persist while prison populations have risen by over 50 percent since the mid-1990s, stuffing many facilities to over four times their capacity (mainly with detainees awaiting trial beyond the mandated time limit). Victims of crime, particularly those from less powerful sectors or regions, are also treated unequally. Rates of homicide resolution are as much as two-thirds lower in rural than in urban areas, for example, while crimes against women chronically are under-investigated. In Costa Rica, 80 percent of rape reports do not get to trial although victims must describe the attacks at seven different stages,[5] while just five of 1,897 killings of women in Guatemala between 2001 and 2005 were resolved in court.[6]

Combined with the intent to demonstrate quick results, the difficulty of uprooting such entrenched practices has increased the appeal of "zero tolerance" policy to give police greater authority to detain or question people, which is supposed to stop potential criminals from committing serious offenses while divulging illegal arms, possessions or activities that would otherwise go unchecked. To be both effective against crime and respectful of civil rights, though, such an approach requires better legal training for all officers, coordination with social services, functioning courts to process detainees, and external oversight. But instead of such supports or controls, "zero tolerance" is often bolstered by measures that turn it into a *mano dura* (iron fist). Such measures include "social control" laws; edicts that allow arrest for subjectively defined attributes such as "vagrancy" to "criminal intent;" long-standing detention powers, such as for checking identification or police record; and provisions in temporary police operations, such as curfews and *razzias* (roundups), that often continue beyond the operation itself.

As they take up a large percentage of officers' time—four of five detentions in countries like Guatemala are for misdemeanors for instance—such tactics distract from serious crime, distend judicial backlogs, raise tensions with citizens, and complicate reform. They also come down heaviest on sectors associated with crime. In Honduras, for example, the 2002 Law of Police and Social Co-Existence is often used to detain people with HIV, youth of African descent, "suspected homosexuals" and other marginalized individuals.[7] While such tactics often have popular backing, they do not necessarily lead the way to greater attention to the causes of crime. In poor areas of Buenos Aires, for example, residents say that the government has not responded as youth addiction to the smokeable form of cocaine known as *paco* skyrocketed over the past seven years. So, many of them have banded together to get addicts and victims to social services, and to attack or expel dealers.[8] In many areas, the combination of weak state presence and harsh state rhetoric has spread the appeal of vigilante justice, which kills up to 6,000 people in Latin America each year.[9] "We just know how to deal with these problems a lot better," said a member of a community justice council in the Bolivia city of El Alto. "How can we trust a police that just comes to break up our demonstrations? Where are they at other times?"[10]

The impacts of such unequal law enforcement fall hardest on young people. Violence killed 80,000 Latin America youth in 2006, a rate 36 times higher than wealthy countries and nearly double the rate in Africa. Nearly a third of those murdered in the region are between 10 and 19 years old. But youth are more often seen as perpetrators than victims, with a majority in many polls identifying groups of youth in the street as the main cause of insecurity. And as police in nearly every country report more arrests of individuals under 18, there have been increasing demands to stiffen penalties against them and to lower the age of legal responsibility to fourteen.[11] But while controlling youth thus becomes a priority for officers, the skills they need to do so are those they and their superiors most lack. Even though youth gangs have become the centerpiece of criminal policy throughout

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Latin America, in particular, usually lacking are social services for at-risk youth, studies of gang activity across time and geographic jurisdictions, reliable statistics, and even a coherent definition of a gang. In Honduras, for example, which has the highest per capita number of members of the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, and where about 40 youth are killed each month, varying definitions and categorizations within the government cause official estimates of gang members to fluctuate between 30,000 and 140,000.

Such patterns are reflected in and fueled by the use of public space, which high levels of family and socio-economic instability make particularly heavy for youth in Latin America. Along with public policy and popular opinion, though, private security is narrowing and de-legitimizing that space for marginalized sectors, as discussed in studies such as Lozada (1998). Since the 1980s, the number of private security firms has grown in every Latin American country, leading to a current total of about 1.6 million registered and an additional two million informal employees in the region[12]—easily outnumbering their public counterparts in many cities. They not only harm policing quality by relieving the state of some upper and middle classes pressure, but add to inequality as rich municipalities hire them for security services. More broadly, security privatization has re-conceptualized and redefined the legitimate use of public space in which the excluded majority—youth, immigrants, and other groups—are confined to a minority of space bounded by consumerist exclusivity, zero tolerance strictures on anti-social behavior, and long-standing social prejudices.

Such deeply rooted practices, though, can begin to be reversed by community-oriented policing, which breaks from the state-centered nature of other security reforms through citizen-based prevention. As discussed in a growing proportion of the literature, such as Frühling (2003) and Fridell and Wycoff (2004), this approach has led to innovative projects to address the causes of criminality, from joint citizen-police councils to services such as youth centers and street lighting. Despite being Latin America's most popular and fastest growing security reform, however, community policing is also susceptible to its political, societal, and institutional inequalities. Within the police, community policing is often marginalized, with its officers derided as "police nurses" or "empty holster agents" who are burdened with extra work without extra compensation. Since many neighborhoods lack strong participatory organizations to partner with police, many programs are co-opted by sectors of a community, especially those allied with *mano dura* police or who incite vigilantism. Most residents do not want to get involved anyway, fearful of being targeted as collaborators or concluding that the new approach will not alter underlying practices such as an excessive use of force.

But when fortified with elements of other reforms, community-oriented policing is the most effective way to reduce insecurity and inequality. Agency restructuring, first of all, must give neighborhood police commissioners more autonomy to implement policy and give street officers more time to work with residents. Social services, such as in education and health, should be brought in to provide wider institutional support with more holistic responses to local socioeconomic conditions. Internal affairs offices should be supplemented by an early identification process to suspend officials exhibiting patterns of abuse and inefficiency, and an auditor, who uses these patterns to recommend structural changes. Fuller and more reliable criminal statistics can be provided by autonomous Violence Observatories, such as those in Central America, or inter-institutional agencies that compile reports from disparate sources, as in Ecuador. Many countries have based community policing on such institutional reforms. Chile's *Plan Cuadrante*, which created neighborhood-level police units, continually measures the supply and demand of police services in order to shift resources to meet changing needs. Uruguay's Citizen Security Program is supported by resource and logistics centers, mayor's offices, as well as Neighborhood Councils in the capital of Montevideo and a National Rehabilitation Center with comprehensive services for youth offenders.

Community-oriented policing must also be grounded in broad-based participation, of course, from identification of problems to evaluation of policy. Even under financial, logistical and political limitations, innovative steps taken around the region to create and sustain such involvement range from general surveys to anti-violence training. In Bolivia, La Paz's "Neighborhoods of Truth Program" includes a competition for citizen-based proposals, which residents in low-income areas have used to address long-standing problems, from illegal sales of alcohol to pollution by local factories.[13] In Venezuela, where homicides have more than doubled since 2000, San Francisco municipality in the city of Maracaibo adopted an Autonomous Police Institute and a Community Affairs section, which have generated initiatives—such as better use-of-force discretion, more citizen channels for complaints—that have helped abate both criminal and police violence.[14] The popularity of Costa Rica's community policing program comes from its *charlas*, covering subjects from domestic violence to criminal law, in which residents identify causes of insecurity and then implement their own policy responses to them.[15]

To move past the crossroads between traditional and community-oriented policing, in short, reforms need to address imbalances within both society and the state's security systems. Crackdowns can work in the short run, but efforts to build up trust, prevention, and cooperation are needed for the long term. Halting criminal violence depends on recognizing that it not simply a problem that afflicts democracies, but is produced by them as well.

Endnotes

[1] Interpol International Crime Statistics, Pan-American Health Organization; United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute.

[2] Crime more than doubling between 2001 and 2007 as a response to the question of what respondents consider the most important problem in their country.

[3] In Medellín, Colombia, the poor Zone 1 has 101 murders per 100,000 people while the rate in wealthier Zone 5 is just 27 (RCMP 2006).

[4] In Nicaragua, citizen crime reports rose four percent and police detention dropped 30 percent in the 2004 code's first year. Venezuela's new code helped reduce the prison population nearly 40 percent in its first year. As criminal justice officials took advantage of alternative sentencing to reduce backlogs, similar results were seen in other countries.

[5] Arguedas, Carlos, "80 por ciento de denuncias por el delito de violación no llegan a juicio", *La Nación*, July 3, 2005, p. 16A.

[6] "Impunity Rules," *The Economist*, 18 November 2006, p. 40-41.

[7] Author Interviews: Project Hope, San Pedro Sula, February 2004; Organización De Desarrollo Étnico Comunitario (Odeco), La Ceiba, June 2003; Comunidad Gay Sampedra, San Pedro Sula, February 2004; and Colectiva Violeta and Ku Kulcan, Tegucigalpa, July 2005.

[8] Author meetings with neighborhood groups in the Illia district and the villa Ciudad Oculta, Federal Capital, 20-23 May 2004 and 18-20 July 2007.

[9] Johnson, Scott, "Vigilante Justice," *Newsweek International Edition*, pages 22-23, December 20, 2004.

[10] Community Justice Council, El Alto, July 28, 2007.

[11] The chief of the Chilean Carabineros, for example, reports that arrests in this age range in Chile rose five times between 1986 and 2003. Blanco and Bernales, forthcoming.

[12] Constant turnover and off-the-books accounting hiring leads to varying estimates of firms in many countries. In Guatemala, estimates of the number of officers range from 80,000 to 200,000, while in Mexico, it ranges from 140,000 to 450,000, with an estimated 600,000 unregistered ones. *The Economist*, 27 January 2007, p. 33.

[13] Author Interview, residents, La Paz areas of Pura Pura, Villa Victoria, and La Portada, July 2007.

[14] Author Interview, Pedro Luis Tang Urdaneta, Policía de San Francisco, November 29, 2005.

[15] Author Interview, Ana Durán Salvatierra, Vice-Minister of Governance and Police; Alberto Li Chan, director of community policing, and citizen workshops in San José, June 2006.

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Violence and Social Inequalities

by Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín
Universidad Nacional de Colombia
fgutiers@hotmail.com

Latin America is the most unequal region in the world. It is also the most violent. This state of affairs compels us to ask whether there is some kind of association and, if so, what kind, between these two phenomena. Does inequality beget violence? Does violence exacerbate or solidify inequality? Is there some sort of vicious spiral in which violence and inequality reinforce one another, or is the relationship simply circumstantial? In this essay I will briefly reflect on these issues. To anticipate my principal conclusions, I find that there is, indeed, a relationship between violence and inequality, but I will pose several reservations and caveats. As to the role of violence exacerbating inequality or poverty, I will argue that we still cannot provide a good answer, and that the question itself may well have to be reformulated. There do exist some "conflict traps" (Collier et al. 2003), in which violence and inequality reinforce one another, but the existence of these traps creates neither the only, nor necessarily the most interesting situation for Latin Americans. Using Colombian examples, I intend to discuss—in somewhat more general terms—some ideas that are quite common in public opinion and academic debates, without going into details, and without referring to specific arguments. Because of space limitations, I will omit some of the usual caveats and reservations that are common in academic discussions.

Does Inequality Breed Violence?

Naturally, the first response to such a question should be to ask for further specification. What kind of inequality? What kind of violence?

Since 1991, civil wars have become the most prevalent form of mass violence in the world. Until the 1990s there was a substantial thread of literature, supported by several quantitative studies (see for example Muller, 1995; Muller et. al., 1989), that asserted that there existed a strong association between various types of inequality and armed civil conflict. Toward the end of the last century, Paul Collier and other students of civil wars (see, for example, Hirshleifer 2001) rebelled against this conventional wisdom, claiming that the main determinant of the onset and persistence of civil wars was greed and not grievance. Insurgency, for this school of thought, was a form of criminality (Collier 2000). This point of view, hailed in its moment as genuinely revolutionary, had a huge impact on the policy world, and at least in some countries, on broad sectors of technocratic and public opinion. I believe, however, that we can now say that we are past Collier's "revolution," his main theses having been falsified along several dimensions of criticism (for an exemplary critique, see Cramer 2006). In very general terms, both his conceptualization of the key questions and the way he transformed his concepts into measurable variables are deeply problematic. In addition, his analysis is based on faulty assumptions about the microfoundations of violent conflict (the traits of fighters and belligerent groups); as soon as these are submitted to empirical scrutiny, even in the most favorable of conditions, they fall apart (Gutiérrez 2004). Most egregiously, the hidden assumption of the mechanical importation of neoclassical econometrics to the study of violent conflict is that all non-state groups can be collapsed into a single category. This is simply incorrect (Gutiérrez 2008). In general, when econometrics is not preceded by a serious taxonomical effort, it can produce seriously flawed results. Last, Collier's proposed alternative—violence is explained not by inequality but by the "natural resources curse"—rapidly becomes more problematic than the original proposition it was supposed to replace.[1]

Presently, however, the main concern of Latin America is not civil war, but criminal violence. The latter has been strongly fueled by the global U.S. war against drugs (and here the type of inequality we are speaking about is asymmetry between states). Does social inequality play any role in this ordeal? Indeed, it does. Millions of destitute youngsters, with few, if any, legal alternatives, get involved in extensive transnational networks of criminality and informal provision of security. If, as Eric Hobsbawm has claimed (1988), big cities are environments hostile to working-class political radicalism, they might in contrast be ideal niches for the propagation of these flexible patterns of criminal-societal articulation. Observers have read into these violent structures some political overtones, and to continue in a Hobsbawmian vein, I wonder if we are not witnessing an urban, twenty-first century version of "social banditry." A large-scale process of social change has created broad subordinate sectors without a viable voice, and this may well be associated with the emergence of several modalities of "primitive rebellion." In fact, all along the political and theoretical spectrum, from Hobsbawm to Collier, the articulation of politics and criminality is a common and relevant motive. This, however, should be a warning to us. Inequality may be a necessary condition in explaining the persistence of violence, but it is hardly sufficient. Agency and politics must be brought into the discussion, as must state and transnational policies, along with strategies, ideas, networks and

organizational structures. The question of course is how to do this, and when.

Certainly, together with the challenge of urban crime, Latin America has witnessed a wave of mass mobilization that, to my knowledge, has not yet been adequately explained or understood in a comparative context. Millions of Latin Americans have marched in the streets, protested, and voted, in the hope that their activism would be able to produce greater prosperity and more equitable distribution of wealth. This "turn to the left," though pacific, has experienced several episodes of violence (for example in Bolivia and Venezuela), and the ritualized threat of its use. It remains true that, when inequality is above a given threshold, and politics is activated along what Frances Stewart (see for example 2008) has termed "horizontal inequalities,"[2] the danger of intractable polarization looms large.

Does Violence Breed Inequality? Poverty?

In general, I am rather skeptical about the journalistic and academic theses that violence freezes—or exacerbates—inequality and poverty; we actually know very little about the issue. Indeed, one of the most under-analyzed dimensions of contemporary Latin American societies is the multiplicity of forms in which violence changes society. My point of departure is that inequality above a certain threshold may increase the probability of the emergence of polarized politics and, as the outcomes of the latter are highly uncertain, so is their ultimate impact over macro patterns of distribution. But there is much more. Mass violence changes, in a quite patchy and contingent way, the map of inequalities and poverties. A few examples may be pertinent to this argument. If one were to try to answer the question of how narcotrafficking and war have changed Colombia, the growth of inequality would be one of the main and obvious effects. The wave of violence that started in the early 1980s triggered an enormous inverse agrarian reform, enabling old and new elites to expropriate—using a combination of coercion and strategic use of the law—the lands of hundreds of thousands of peasants. The traditionally most vulnerable sectors of the population were also those who felt the brunt of the conflict. This is well known, and has been documented beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, narcotrafficking and war have also stimulated—and I think substantially (although of course this can hardly be quantified)—upward social mobility. Colombian society, in which social mobility had been quite blocked—at least according to necessarily inexact mainstream accounts—suddenly offered a whole new set of prizes to individuals who had the skills and the resources to get involved in illegal activities. As a female fighter claims in an already classic book, "in Colombia one has to be rich or one has to be violent" (Salazar 1993). For example, a headcount of the paramilitary leadership in a key region of the country reveals that, together with the old elites, we find a substantial representation of soldiers (especially corporals and sergeants), policemen, and manual workers (Gutiérrez and Barón 2005).

Seldom have both factors, the sharp increases in inequality and in social mobility, been put together to try to understand contemporary Colombia. However, I believe that their simultaneous presence goes a long way toward explaining many of the principal political and social dynamics of the country. Standard arguments relating growing inequality to the rising costs of conflict are, first, that the state has to deflect resources from health and education to war, and second, that the elites become more reactionary and opposed to change. These propositions sound plausible, but they have to be tested empirically, with an adequate methodology. In the Latin American context it is not evident that they hold. Colombia, the only country in the continent at war over the past few years, has not lagged behind its neighbors in the funding and efficacy of many of its social programs (Abel and Lloyd Sherlock 2000). The country has suffered a strong conservative backlash in the last decade, but only after two decades of uninterrupted conflict and instability. In this period we have witnessed a combination of conservatism with remedial social policies, a combination that could take some interesting forms in the coming period.

Violence is a very powerful force that produces winners and losers. Indeed, it is lopsided, generally favoring the rich over the poor, though it can crush some rich and reward some poor. It also has complex territorial effects, forcefully articulating some regions into global markets, while marginalizing others. These processes can dramatically change the processes of social mobility and the patterns of social and political interaction. In short, violence is capable of unhinging traditional social and institutional accords, thus weakening the proposition that, with respect to social distribution, it is simply a stabilizer of the status quo.

Traps?

The "traps" that international agency bureaucrats are fond of analyzing are, at first blush, credible: violence generates poverty; poverty (or inequality) is a catalyst of violence. I am not convinced, however, that these traps are easy to find at the national level in Latin America, though this pattern may be operational at the sub-national level in several countries. There are many other scenarios, however, that are much more relevant for Latin America. The first one is political democracy without social

democracy—the type of polity that Latin America experimented with in the 1990s, which unraveled precisely because of its inability to adequately address social issues. The point here is not that inequality produces violence in an unmediated manner, but that it breeds a type of instability that is difficult to cope with institutionally. The second scenario is what may be called criminalized stabilization (Gutiérrez and Barón 2008). Criminal actors can establish dominance over a certain territory, establish a set of rules that are preferable (for the local population) to pure arbitrariness, and produce very backward and poverty-generating forms of governance. Experience has shown that pacts emerging from criminalized stability need some special conditions because they involve solving serious collective action problems, though when they take root they can be very long-lasting. This produces a sort of "peace trap." Frequently the state's intent to break these pacts produces flares of extreme confrontation (a good early analysis of this is found in Resa, 2002). If, on the other hand, the state looks the other way, "business as usual" is likely to guarantee substantial inequality along with a low cost, low profile, and very nasty solution to the problem of governance.

In conclusion, inequalities and violent dynamics interact in many complex ways. In general, it is necessary to identify threshold effects because the rather naïve hunch that there is some sort of monotonous association (more inequality, more violence) obviously does not hold. Inequality is only the beginning of an explanation of violence, but I think it is a factor that cannot be ignored. Looking in the other direction, we know very little about the macro impacts of different forms of violence over patterns of inequality. In both cases, the specification of mechanisms and modalities/patterns of agency should go into any research agenda.

Endnotes

[1] On the complexities of the natural resources curse, take a look at Michael Ross's Web page: <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/>.

[2] The concept of "horizontal inequalities" is central to the work of the Oxford-based Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE). See CRISE's web page: <http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/>.

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Reconstrucción de la masculinidad y reintegración de excombatientes en Colombia[1]

por **Kimberly Theidon**
Universidad de Harvard
ktheidon@AOL.com

"Siempre soñaba en agarrar un arma. Quería saber cómo se sentía, [saber] cómo se sentiría tenerla en mis manos. Sentirme hombre".

— Óscar, 25 años, excombatiente del ELN, Casa de Paz en Bogotá.

"A la hora de explicar las atrocidades, con frecuencia se ha ignorado una forma en particular de identidad social, la masculinidad"[2].

Introducción

El desarme, desmovilización y reincorporación (DDR) de excombatientes es un componente clave de los procesos de paz y de la reconstrucción en el postconflicto. Los programas de DDR implican múltiples transiciones: desde excombatientes que deponen las armas, a gobiernos que buscan terminar el conflicto armado y comunidades que reciben o rechazan a los desmovilizados[3]. En cada nivel, estas transiciones incluyen una ecuación dinámica y compleja entre las demandas de paz y de justicia. Sin embargo, los enfoques tradicionales de DDR se han concentrado casi exclusivamente en los objetivos militares y de seguridad. Esto ha tenido como resultado que dichos programas se hayan creado en un relativo aislamiento del creciente debate sobre justicia transicional y de preguntas sobre el esclarecimiento histórico, la justicia, la reparación y la reconciliación. Al reducir el DDR a un "desmantelamiento de la maquinaria de guerra", estos programas no han considerado de forma adecuada cómo ir más allá de la desmovilización y facilitar la reconstrucción y la coexistencia sociales[4].

Con base en mi investigación con excombatientes en Colombia, estoy convencida de que una reincorporación exitosa no solamente requiere que los procesos y metas de desarme, desmovilización y reincorporación se fusionen con las medidas de la justicia transicional, sino que tanto el DDR como la justicia transicional necesitan de un análisis de género que incluya un examen de los vínculos entre armas, formas de masculinidad y violencia en contextos históricos específicos. La construcción de ciertas formas de masculinidad no es un aspecto accidental del militarismo, sino que es esencial para su mantenimiento. El militarismo requiere de una continua ideología de género tanto como requiere de armas y municiones[5].

Pero, ¿cómo se ha entendido la incorporación del género en los programas de DDR? Tratando de responder esta pregunta fui a la página *web* del Banco Mundial, en donde encontré una lista de publicaciones sobre "Género y DDR". A medida que exploraba la lista de archivos, me enteré de que existe un "déficit de género" en los programas de DDR. Por esta razón, se incentiva a los responsables de formular políticas y programas a incluir una "dimensión de género" en sus actividades para garantizar que "se identifiquen y aborden las necesidades específicas femeninas" (Banco Mundial: 2007).

Días más tarde me llamó la atención un artículo sobre "Las implicaciones de género de una teoría de justicia específicamente 'transicional'"[6]. En este artículo, Bell y O'Rourke formulan una pregunta triple: ¿Dónde se encuentran las mujeres? ¿Y dónde el género? y ¿Dónde está el feminismo en la justicia transicional?[7] Recuerdan a los lectores que el "hacer la guerra y negociar acuerdos de paz son predominantemente asuntos de hombres" y que "las cuestiones que abordan los problemas subyacentes de discriminación, dominio y mejoras en la seguridad física, social y legal con respecto al género en particular, generalmente se abordan de forma secundaria, o simplemente no se abordan"[8]. Notan así que los esfuerzos más importantes realizados para "incorporar el género" a la justicia transicional están relacionados con el tratamiento legal de la violencia sexual durante el conflicto; logro que se ha alcanzado en parte tras convocar a mujeres a "Audiencias de género" y al establecer "Unidades de género" dentro de los procesos de la justicia transicional[9].

Desde las audiencias y unidades de género, hasta las comisiones de la verdad "sensibles" a aspectos de género, "incluir el género" usualmente se entiende como "agregar a las mujeres". Entender "género" como sinónimo de "mujer" limita las importantes contribuciones que los estudios sobre género pueden aportar a nuestra interpretación teórica y práctica sobre la guerra, la paz y la reconstrucción en el postconflicto.

¿Cómo incorporar una dimensión de género a los procesos de DDR y de justicia transicional, incluyendo a los hombres y las formas de masculinidad, de forma que dichas identidades se perciban claramente y se conviertan en el enfoque de investigación e intervención? Mi investigación en Colombia ha sido motivada por el deseo de entender cómo las formas violentas de la masculinidad se forman y sostienen y cómo los programas de DDR pueden "desarmar la masculinidad" en el postconflicto. Estoy interesada en la "masculinidad militarizada"—esa fusión de ciertas prácticas

e imágenes de la virilidad con el uso de armas, el ejercicio de la violencia y el desempeño de una masculinidad agresiva y con frecuencia, misógina. Aunque no niego la diversidad que existe dentro del grupo de excombatientes con los que he trabajado, no puedo asimismo negar la masculinidad hegemónica que estos hombres comparten.

Connell se ha aproximado al concepto de masculinidades como "una configuración de las prácticas dentro de un sistema de relaciones de género"[10]. Este enfoque sobre las prácticas permite que el investigador capture la forma en que los individuos practican una política de inclusión de la masculinidad que recurre a un diverso repertorio cultural de conducta masculina, y que a su vez se compone de rasgos de clase, etnia, raza, religión y otras identidades. Connell resalta el campo desigual de poder en el que todos los géneros se constituyen, notando que en cualquier contexto existe una "masculinidad hegemónica"—"la masculinidad que ocupa la posición hegemónica en un patrón dado de relaciones de género, una posición que es siempre discutible"[11]. Este tipo de masculinidad oculta las alternativas—no sólo las formas de masculinidad alternativas que existen en cualquier contexto cultural dado, sino también las que existen en cualquier hombre a nivel individual.

¿Cómo podemos enriquecer tanto la teoría como la práctica al explorar las maneras como se producen los hombres militarizados y se pone en práctica la masculinidad militarizada? ¿Cómo podemos incluir estrategias diseñadas para reconstruir activamente lo que significa ser hombre? Si deseamos promover más eficazmente las metas de los procesos de DDR y de justicia transicional, es necesario explorar las conexiones entre los hombres, las armas y el uso de la violencia, y diseñar estrategias para modificar la configuración de las prácticas que le dan sentido no sólo a lo que es "ser hombre" sino lo que significa "ser hombre a cabalidad"[12].

En este breve texto, me concentro en la economía cultural y política de la masculinidad militarizada, y el acceso reducido que los excombatientes tienen a los símbolos del prestigio masculino de la sociedad civil. Analizo las "técnicas del cuerpo" que producen tanto el cuerpo como el porte de un soldado entre hombres cuyo único capital suele ser su cuerpo. Exploro el papel tanto de los hombres como de las mujeres en la construcción de las prácticas utilizadas para producir formas de masculinidad violentas, resaltando los aspectos relacionales de todas las identidades de género. Concluyo considerando cómo se podría incorporar el género al programa de DDR como un paso importante hacia la reincorporación exitosa, la construcción de paz y el cambio social sostenible.

Métodos

Desde enero de 2005 vengo realizando una investigación antropológica sobre los programas de desmovilización a nivel colectivo e individual en Colombia[13]. A la fecha, mi asistente de investigación y yo hemos entrevistado 156 hombres y 39 mujeres excombatientes de las AUC, FARC y el ELN.

En busca del respeto[14]

Las motivaciones complejas que estos hombres tienen para unirse a los grupos armados es uno de los componentes de la economía política y cultural de las formas violentas de masculinidad. Las fuerzas armadas colombianas venden la idea del reclutamiento como una oportunidad para ascender socialmente y, como en muchos países, la vida militar se vincula al concepto de ciudadanía[15]. Aunque los excombatientes con los que trabajo eran miembros de un grupo armado ilegal, la movilidad social era un factor que los motivaba. La mayoría de estos hombres provienen de familias humildes y para algunos de ellos unirse a la guerrilla significaba tener alimentación, un arma y un uniforme. Y para los que se unieron a los paramilitares, no sólo implicaba eso, sino que también un salario mensual. En el complejo escenario de violencia que caracteriza a Colombia, pasar por el ciclo de pertenecer a un grupo armado es un ritual para muchos jóvenes[16]. En un contexto de violencia generalizada, la proliferación de redes criminales, un mercado laboral legal limitado y una economía cultural que fusiona las armas, la masculinidad y el poder, el hecho de sostener un arma no es necesariamente una aberración.

En las conversaciones que sostuvimos con los desmovilizados, siempre preguntábamos por qué se habían unido a estos grupos. Si combinamos las respuestas "vivían en una zona controlada por un grupo armado" e "ingresó por una persona conocida" vemos que estos jóvenes crecieron en contextos en los que las alternativas a la guerra eran prácticamente invisibles[17]. Utilizo el término *jóvenes* en forma deliberada, puesto que el 65% de estos excombatientes se unieron a un grupo armado cuando aún eran menores de edad. Por ejemplo, Ramón estuvo cuatro años con las AUC en Montería. Cuando le preguntamos la razón por la cual se unió a ese grupo armado, respondió, "*Aburrimiento. Pero más que todo porque donde crecí, ellos tenían armas y todos los respetaban. Pagaban muy bien. Hasta uno podía tomar vacaciones. No es como en la guerrilla donde uno se muere de hambre y no lo dejan visitar a la mamá. Además donde crecí, el Estado no existe. Montería es puro paraco*".

Vale la pena mencionar que estos excombatientes viven con imágenes de una *masculinidad militarizada*—tanto los hombres como las mujeres. Esto es especialmente cierto con respecto a los ex paramilitares que explican que unirse a las AUC les permitió sentirse "como un gran hombre en las calles y barrios", "poder salir con las mujeres más bonitas" y "vestirse bien". Todo esto no se lo hubieran podido permitir, insisten, sin portar un arma[18]. En Medellín, J.M. resumió la razón por la que se había unido a los paramilitares: "*En este país el hombre que porta un arma es un hombre con poder*". Una de las metas del proceso del DDR debe ser el de "desmilitarizar" los modelos de masculinidad que estos hombres y mujeres tienen, en particular cuando estos hombres tienen tan poco acceso a los símbolos civiles de prestigio masculino, tales como educación, ingresos legales o una vivienda decente[19]. Hago énfasis en tanto los hombres como las mujeres porque dicha masculinidad militarizada es parte de una representación: el público no solamente está compuesto de otros hombres con los que luchan por un lugar dentro de la jerarquía del grupo armado, sino también está compuesto por las jóvenes mujeres que buscan a estos grandes hombres porque son parejas deseables en una economía de guerra.

Asignarle género a la seguridad

No soy la primera investigadora en sostener que la justicia y la seguridad son "bienes privados" en Colombia; es obvio que el Estado ha fallado estrepitosamente en ambas áreas. Sin embargo, además de la privatización de la seguridad, quisiera tener en cuenta la manera en que a la seguridad misma se le ha asignado un género y cuáles son las consecuencias de esto. Los aspectos de la seguridad a los que se les ha asignado un género fueron claros para mí en Ayacucho (Perú) cuando trabajaba con comunidades que habían sido severamente afectadas por el conflicto armado interno en ese país [20]. Bajo la amenaza de ataques guerrilleros, las autoridades en varias comunidades solicitaron la instalación de bases militares para su "protección". Como me enteraría, el nivel de violencia sexual en esas comunidades era asombroso. Empecé a cuestionarme sobre ¿la seguridad "de quien" y a qué precio?[21] Los acuerdos comunales involucraban ciertos acuerdos sexuales y la seguridad era un producto al que se le asignaba un género. Los hombres en esas comunidades construían las bases militares que se multiplicaron por todo Ayacucho durante la violencia y las mujeres y niñas "le prestaban servicios" a las tropas. En algunas de las comunidades con las que trabajé, el sexo se volvió una mercancía cuando las mujeres empezaron a venderlo. Sin embargo, las violaciones eran mucho más comunes. La "seguridad" comunal funcionaba de manera contradictoria.

Aunque los detalles pueden ser diferentes en las regiones colombianas, sin duda las dinámicas de género son inquietantemente similares. Las armas—y los hombres que las usan—son al mismo tiempo, una amenaza y una fuente de seguridad en un ambiente en extremo violento[22].

La seguridad es una de las razones por la que las mujeres buscan a este tipo de hombres[23]. En 2007, durante una de mis visitas a las comunas de Medellín, conversamos con un grupo de excombatientes, sus madres y novias[24]. A medida que entrábamos y salíamos de sus casas, varias personas nos señalaron los agujeros de bala en las paredes y recordaron a los amigos a quienes habían amortajado vistiendo su mejor ropa.

Pude hablar con algunos de los muchachos a solas. Les pregunté si se sentían seguros y yo sabía que esta pregunta causaría risas y gritos.

"*¿Entonces, qué hacen ahora?*—pregunté — *Me preocupan por ustedes, sus familias*".

Un muchacho respondió a nombre del grupo. "*Tenemos protección en nuestras casas. Mantenemos algún tipo de protección, en caso de que algo suceda*".

Armas en sus casas como medio de protección. Esta ironía merece más comentarios. La familia es una de las razones primordiales por las que estos excombatientes se desmovilizaron. La familia los atrae aunque también puede convertirse en el otro lugar donde impera la violencia.

Ser un "buen hombre" incluye proteger a la familia y ser un buen proveedor; así que deponer las armas puede ser castrante en varios sentidos[25]. Las muchachas se sienten atraídas a estos "grandes hombres" que tienen poder adquisitivo y la capacidad para proporcionar seguridad en un contexto público violento. Por eso se esconden las armas en las casas, "por si acaso".

No obstante, la fantasía de la familia con frecuencia entra en conflicto con la realidad de regresar con su pareja e hijos. Un efecto duradero de la militarización de la vida cotidiana y de la formación de la masculinidad militarizada es el aumento en la violencia doméstica, un fenómeno que se encuentra en muchos contextos pos conflicto[26]. La seguridad que estos hombres proporcionan frente a los actos públicos de violencia pueden forzar a las mujeres a tolerar un intenso abuso en sus vidas personales. En efecto, en mis entrevistas con el personal de los Centros de Paz del proceso de DDR que albergan núcleos

THEIDON *continued*

familiares, una de las preocupaciones permanentes es cómo abordar el alto nivel de violencia intrafamiliar que caracteriza a estas parejas[27].

El capital corporal: ¿Cómo se militariza la masculinidad?

"*De todos los lugares donde las masculinidades se construyen, reproducen y despliegan, aquéllas asociadas con la guerra y los militares son algunas de las más directas*"[28].

Estos excombatientes han crecido en un contexto de privaciones de clase, con escaso acceso a recursos económicos o culturales. Algunos se criaron en zonas rurales, otros en los barrios pobres que rodean las ciudades colombianas. Aunque existen diferencias importantes entre los hombres jóvenes y los grupos en los que lucharon, lo que quisiera enfatizar son los antecedentes de esa clase social compartida[29]. La masculinidad militarizada que ejercen es el resultado del entrenamiento de combate que incluye tanto el adoctrinamiento corporal como emocional; asimismo refleja una dinámica de clase más amplia que me ha llevado a efectuar un análisis en términos de una economía política de la masculinidad.

Estos excombatientes son en parte producto de opciones de vida limitadas y violencia generalizada. Varios se unieron a un grupo armado con la esperanza de alcanzar movilidad social pero cualquiera que sea la movilidad que puedan alcanzar no necesariamente se transfiere a otros campos sociales. Su capital corporal y la extrema importancia que se asigna a la fuerza física y destreza con las armas puede ser todo lo que tienen para ofrecer en el mercado laboral. Sin embargo, cuando estos "empresarios del capital corporal" intentan hacer la transición de combatientes a civiles, sus cuerpos son un obstáculo. Cuando analizamos cómo los ambientes sociales específicos invierten, forman y despliegan el cuerpo humano—y las prácticas concretas de incorporación que se explotan para este fin—vemos que estos hombres personifican sus pasados violentos de manera inconsciente y duradera[30].

Además de portar un arma y de pavonearse como un "gran hombre", la masculinidad militarizada tiene otros componentes importantes. Con muy pocas excepciones, cada entrevista comienza con la "máscara de guerra"—o como un administrador del CRO de Turbo lo describió: "*te miran con su 'cara paraca*'". Es un rostro que busca de forma explícita inspirar terror en los otros y es un firme vestigio de su participación en un grupo armado aunque esta máscara de guerra no se limita solamente a los paramilitares. Como me dijo un ex guerrillero de las FARC, "*Los malencarados—ahí es cuando el ritmo de la guerra te agarra. Es una expresión de machismo. Esto te lo enseñan en el grupo, durante el entrenamiento. Con esa expresión en el rostro uno cree que está por encima de los demás—casi como si fueras el comandante. Cuando asesinábamos, cambiábamos nuestros rostros. Uno era malencarado—puro machismo. Cuando uno se ve así se siente más hombre*".

En su influyente teoría del manejo de las impresiones, Goffman llama la atención sobre el complejo simbolismo y la actuación que hacen parte de la interacción social[31]. Su énfasis en los aspectos dramatúrgicos de la presentación de uno mismo en contextos sociales tiene mucha resonancia si se considera que el porte cuidadosamente cultivado de combatiente puede sin duda significar la diferencia entre la vida y la muerte. En un clima de interacción agresiva y de extrema desconfianza—acentuadas por sangrientos episodios de combate—saber conducirse como "un malencarado" es un componente importante de la armadura corporal del combatiente. Han aprendido a ser duros e impenetrables tanto física como emocionalmente. Sin embargo, lo útil que esto les ha sido como combatientes no necesariamente se repite en la vida civil. Los muchachos me comentan que la gente los ve como "bichos raros" o como una "raza nueva". Además, al militarizarse, han intentado también limitar la gama de emociones a aquellas que son las más adecuadas a las zonas de combate: a las emociones también por supuesto, se les ha asignado un género y ganar acceso a una gama más amplia de éstas es, asimismo, un componente para desmilitarizar a estos hombres

«Agregar el género» al DDR: ¿Cómo reconstruir la masculinidad?

"¿Y cómo puede recrearse la virilidad luego de períodos de violencia?"[32]

La necesidad de efectuar reformas estructurales en Colombia es clara y se reconoce que dichas reformas van más allá del mandato de un programa de DDR o de la justicia transicional en su pretensión limitada de "transición hacia la democracia liberal." No obstante, esto no significa que nada pueda hacerse ni que lo material siempre supere lo cultural e ideológico, usualmente mal entendidos como esferas separadas.

La familia es uno de los temas clave. El deseo de vengar la muerte de un familiar puede haber hecho que el individuo se haya unido a un grupo armado; en otros casos, es algo así como una tradición familiar irse a la guerra sea con la guerrilla o con los paramilitares; en ocasiones unirse a estos grupos era un escape a la vida miserable que llevaban en sus casas. Sin embargo, a pesar de la imagen contradictoria y conflictiva,

esta imagen (quizás idealizada) de la familia es un poderoso tema en nuestras entrevistas. Esto podría ser un punto de partida de la discusión sobre nuevas maneras de cuidar, proveer con lo necesario y proteger a sus seres queridos. Estar presente para participar en la crianza de los hijos y verlos crecer son incentivos poderosos. La familia es un incentivo para permanecer como civil, pero debe ser el lugar donde el programa de reintegración intervenga para escribir un libreto con nuevas posibilidades.

Desafortunadamente, me ha impresionado la manera cómo se perpetúan los estereotipos sexistas en este programa de reintegración. Donde hay "núcleos familiares", he observado las rutinas diarias. El programa refuerza el núcleo familiar patriarcal con una marcada división del trabajo entre los sexos.

Por otra parte, nadie ha enseñado a estos hombres cómo ser padres o parejas cariñosas. Un número de ellos me comentaron que es difícil encontrarse de repente viviendo con sus parejas e hijos, con bebés que lloran y mujeres que quieren ser más que la "socia". La imagen idealizada de la familia contrasta profundamente con la realidad de vivir juntos, y las tensiones que esto provoca pueden con frecuencia tornarse en violencia. Asimismo, y como en la mayoría de los países, la violencia de género existió antes del conflicto armado y puede exacerbarse en ciertas esferas del período de posguerra. Estos hombres y sus familias se podrían beneficiar de una terapia familiar que examine los patrones violentos de interacción que ellos han aprendido y que sitúe esa conducta violenta dentro de estructuras más amplias de desigualdad que incluyen clase, etnia y raza.

Lo anterior requeriría capacitación adicional para el personal del programa de reintegración. Algunos miembros del personal de este programa comparten antecedentes similares con los hombres y mujeres vinculados al proceso de reintegración. Aunque dichos antecedentes permiten establecer credibilidad con los excombatientes, pueden asimismo compartir los dobles estándares de género, que es uno de los problemas que debe abordarse. Trabajar con "asuntos de género" requiere de una mayor conciencia sobre cómo las relaciones de género involucran diferenciales de poder que no cambian simplemente porque los hombres desmovilizados deponen las armas. El uso de la violencia para solucionar conflictos como la norma dentro de los grupos armados en los que estos hombres operaban—norma que en el caso de muchos de ellos era la misma en el entorno familiar y comunitario donde crecieron.[33]

Abrir espacios para las formas de masculinidad alternativas es algo que el programa de reintegración podría efectuar. Al abordar las actitudes y conductas que los excombatientes han aprendido el programa podría diseñar posibilidades sociales alternativas. Por ejemplo, muchos de estos hombres me cuentan que están cansados de la guerra y de las matanzas. Además, muchos de ellos se sienten engañados por sus experiencias, afirmando que son ellos los que combatieron y arriesgaron sus vidas mientras que los comandantes fueron los que se enriquecieron. Este engaño puede convertirse en un recurso si el programa hace más explícito lo que estos hombres ganan al pasar de combatiente a civil. Esto también significaría trabajar más eficazmente con los barrios de los alrededores y las comunidades en donde viven estos hombres y mujeres, de tal manera que se aborde y minimice el miedo mutuo. Apropiarse del espacio para ser civil y actuar como tal es crucial y por supuesto requeriría que el Estado colombiano garantizara cierto nivel de seguridad.

Adicionalmente ¿dónde están los jóvenes que no están involucrados en la violencia? Ellos son invisibles. Sin embargo, practican una forma de masculinidad alternativa y sería importante saber cómo lo han hecho. En un interesante artículo sobre Sri Lanka, Jonathan Spencer describe la vida de un joven que no aceptó los argumentos morales de ninguno de los grupos armados en el conflicto y se rehusó a participar. Spencer insiste sobre la necesidad de entender cómo se agencian tanto la violencia como la no violencia por medio de la pregunta: "¿Bajo qué circunstancias se abre un espacio para el que no participa?"[34] ¿Dónde se encuentran espacios sociales en los que la violencia no es un componente central en la creación de la hombría? ¿Qué podría hacer el programa de reintegración para que estos jóvenes y sus opciones no violentas sean más visibles, valorados y deseables?

Esto me lleva a los medios de comunicación en Colombia y a la glorificación de los hombres, las armas y la violencia. El ejército colombiano cuenta con una estación de televisión las 24 horas del día que no es más que una campaña de publicidad permanente sobre los hombres, los uniformes, las armas y el poder. Las estaciones de radio tocan los narcorridos que elevan a los narcotraficantes y matones a un estado prácticamente mitológico. Los medios podrían convertirse en un arma poderosa y presentar otras imágenes acerca de qué es ser hombre y hacerlo, además, de tal forma que sea deseable.

Conclusiones

Comencé por sugerir que tanto los programas de DDR como las iniciativas de la justicia transicional podrían beneficiarse de una exploración de las maneras en las que se producen los hombres militarizados y se desempeñan las formas de masculinidad

THEIDON *continued*

militarizada. Esta exploración podría a su vez dar forma a las estrategias diseñadas a fin de reconstruir activamente lo que significa ser hombre en unos contextos históricos y sociales específicos. Según Butler, el género no solamente es un concepto social sino también una actuación—no es tanto un estado de ser sino más bien un proceso[35].

Abordar las formas violentas de masculinidad debe ser una de las inquietudes clave al incorporar el género a estas intervenciones. Concentrarse en ciertas formas violentas de masculinidad podría ayudar a enfocarnos en las formas de violencia cotidianas que van más allá del período limitado de la "transición". También serviría para ampliar nuestro foco de atención hacia aquellas formas de violencia que no caben dentro del restringido concepto de la "violencia política". Dichas formas cotidianas de daño se han ubicado "por fuera" del marco estandarizado de la justicia transicional. Y es bien probable que estas formas de violencia se intensifiquen de manera dramática inmediatamente después de la guerra. Así, el fracaso en desmantelar los sistemas de género que se forjaron en el contexto del conflicto haría que éstos permanezcan lamentablemente intactos durante los períodos de "paz". La seguridad misma es un bien al que se le asigna un género; para los millones de niñas y mujeres que reciben tan poco del proverbial "dividendo de la paz", la transformación de los niños y hombres podría ayudar a separar la violencia de la masculinidad, así como la seguridad del hecho de portar un arma o de buscar un hombre que la porte.

Una de las máximas en la antropología consiste en que las formas de masculinidad y femineidad son construidas culturalmente y además, son variables. Lo que se construye puede ser transformado. La transformación de las formas de masculinidad militarizadas que caracterizan a los excombatientes podría ayudar a fomentar las metas de los procesos de DDR y la justicia transicional. Al hacer esto, "el incorporar el género" puede contribuir a construir la paz tanto en el campo de batalla como en el hogar.

Notas

[1] Para leer una versión completa del texto, véase http://www.ideaspaz.org.

[2] Foster, Don. "What makes a perpetrator? An attempt to understand". En Looking back, reaching forward: reflections on the truth and reconciliation commission in South Africa (Charles Villa-Vicencio y Wilhelm Verwoerd editores, 2000). Foster nota que el Informe Final de la Comisión de Reconciliación y Verdad de Sudáfrica reconoció que la comisión no había estudiado la masculinidad y la violencia, que lo impulsan a hacerse una serie de preguntas interesantes: «¿Por qué la masculinidad bajo ciertas circunstancias proporciona una forma de identidad tan nociva?» «¿Cuáles son las circunstancias?» «Todo esto hay que investigarlo» (227).

[3] Theidon, Kimberly. "Transitional Subjects? The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia", *International Journal of Transitional Justice 66 (2007)*.

[4] Amnistía Internacional, The Paramilitaries in Medellín: ¿Demobilization or Legalization? AI INDEX: AMR 23/019/2005 2 (2005).

[5] Goldstein, Joshua S. *War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Viceversa.* Nueva York: Cambridge University Press, 2001; por otro lado, están las publicaciones de Cynthia Enloe sobre género y militarización.

[6] Bell, Christine y O'Rourke, Catherine. "Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice? An Introductory Essay," *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 23 (2007).

[7] *Íbid*, p. 24.

[8] *Íbid*, p. 25.

[9] *Íbid*, p. 26.

[10] Connell, R.W. *Masculinities*. Berkeley: University California Press, 2005, p. 84.

[11] *Íbíd*, p. 76.

[12] Herzfeld, Michael. *The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretan Mountain Village*. New Jersey: Princeton, 1985, Ver para un examen del «desempeño de la excelencia».

[13] Aunque los procesos de desmovilización colectivos e individuales varían en algunos detalles, he entrevistado a varios excombatientes en los dos programas porque estoy interesada en la fase de reincorporación y las experiencias tanto de estos combatientes como de sus familias y comunidades anfitrionas.

[14] Tomé este título del libro de Philippe Bourgois sobre la cultura de la calle, tráfico de drogas y la masculinidad en el este de Harlem. Ver Philippe Bourgois. *In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio*. Berkeley: UC Press, 1995.

[15] Agradezco a Marcelo Fabre por notar este aspecto de la estrategia de reclutamiento de las Fuerzas Armadas colombianas. Para un análisis de los vínculos entre la vida militar, la ciudadanía y clase y/o movilidad étnica en otros contextos latinoamericanos, ver Nelson, Diane M y Finger A. *In the Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala* (1999); Gill, Lesley. "Creating Citizens, Making Men: The Military and Masculinity in Bolivia", *Cultural Anthropology* 12 (1997); Canessa, Andrew. *Natives Making Nation, Gender, Indigenity and the State in the Andes* (2005); Theidon, Kimberly. Intimate Enemies: Violence and Reconciliation in Peru (próxima a publicarse, manuscrito en poder de la autora); y Wilson, Richard A. "Maya Resurgence in Guatemala: Q'Eqchi'", *Experiences* (1999).

[16] Para un examen fascinante del papel de la violencia en la creación de masculinidad, con la tortura como un importante ritual que confiere autoridad a los hombres jóvenes que la sobreviven, ver Peteet, Julie. "Male Gender and Rituals of Resistance in the Palestinian

Intifada: A cultural politics of violence," *American Ethnologist* 31 (1994).

[17] Me recuerda el documental *La Sierra*, que se filmó en las comunas pobres en las empinadas cuestas que están sobre Medellín. Los muchachos en la película pertenecen a los paramilitares, la guerrilla y a una variedad de pandillas o parches. Ellos, en forma consistente, siempre se refieren a la lucha entre sus grupos por el control de las comunas, como «la guerra». Durante mi investigación en Medellín en 2006 y 2007, me acostumbré a que un grupo de muchachos me escoltara a la otra esquina de la calle, y quienes una vez alcanzada la esquina, se marcharan porque no se atrevían a cruzar la calle y entrar al territorio de la otra pandilla. Aunque el proceso de DDR ha trasladado las armas de la calle a las casas, una cartografía criminal y complejo dictamina quien puede moverse y adonde.

[18] La militarización de la sociedad colombiana es impresionante. Recuerdo una propaganda el año pasado que apareció con frecuencia en la televisión, como componente de la iniciativa de Seguridad Democrática de Uribe: "Colombia, un país de 40 millones de soldados" que se refería a la promoción de una red de "informantes ciudadanos" como medio de extender la autoridad del estado a lo largo del territorio.

[19] Ver Ortner, Sherry y Whitehead, Harriet eds. *Sexual Meanings: The Cultural Construction of Gender and* Sexuality 14 (1981) para un examen del papel que juegan las mujeres en las estrategias de prestigio de los hombres. El prestigio según lo definen, incluye el dominio de ideas y recursos humanos, poder político, aptitudes personales y su conexión con los ricos, poderosos y talentosos.

[20] Ver Theidon, Kimberly. *Entre prójimos: el conflicto armado interno y la política de la reconciliación en el Perú*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2004*; Ibíd,* Theidon, Kimberly. *"Transitional Subjects? The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia";* y Theidon, Kimberly. "Gender in Transition: Common Sense, Women and War," *Journal of Human Rights* 453 (2007).

[21] Aquí cabe reflexionar sobre el efecto de la militarización y las nuevas formas de seguridad e inseguridad que implica una continua presencia militar. Para un interesante análisis sobre este punto, ver Enloe, Cynthia. *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarisation of Women's Lives* (1988) y Susie Jacobs y otros (editores). *States of Conflict: Gender, Violence and Resistance* (2000).

[22] Para una excelente narración histórica de la diversidad de formas de violencia en Colombia como también un vistazo a los procesos de reinserción previos y las limitaciones de negociar una paz parcelada, ver Sánchez, Gonzalo. "Guerra prolongada y negociaciones inciertas en Colombia". En *Violencias y estrategias en la región andina* (Sánchez, Gonzalo y Lair, Eric editores) Bogotá: Norma, 2004.

[23] Esto es cierto no solamente en los vecindarios violentos donde viven sino también para aquellas mujeres que estuvieron en los grupos armados, en particular las FARC y el ELN. En nuestras entrevistas con mujeres excombatientes, ellas han narrado que tener un hombre como pareja era la única manera de desviar la atención no deseada de otros combatientes hombres. Además, al formar pareja con un oficial de mayor rango (comandante) podían tener acceso a ciertos beneficios tales como comida, vestuario y otros privilegios.

[24] El rol de las madres y novias es un tema que vale la pena investigar más. Me acompañó una persona que había sido un miembro importante de las milicias urbanas y que en la actualidad trabaja con la alcaldía en el proceso de Paz y Reconciliación. Mi colega me aseguró que las mujeres juegan un papel muy importante en las decisiones sobre cuando debe haber instaurarse la violencia, contra quien y si deber ser letal o no.

[25] Para un fascinante y completo análisis psicoanalítico del desarme y la castración simbólica, ver Castro, Maria Clemencia y Diaz, Carmen Lucia. *Guerrilla reinserción y lazo social*. Bogotá: Almudena editores, 1997.

[26] Ver Rehn, Elisabeth y Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. *Women, War and Peace: The Independent Expert's Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Roles in Peace-building*. Nueva York: UNIFEM, 2002. Además, Catherine Lutz ofrece un importante análisis de la intersección entre género, raza y clase en su libro *Homefront: A Military City and the American 20th Century* (2001).

[27] En una encuesta realizada por la Universidad de Antioquia con fondos de UNIFEM, los investigadores determinaron que la violencia intrafamiliar tenía lugar en siete de diez hogares en los que el hombre era un combatiente desmovilizado. Paulina Angarita Meneses, *El Tiempo*, 31 de marzo de 2008, disponible en: <http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/2008-03-31>.

[28] Morgan, David H.J. "Theater of War: Combat, the Military, and Masculinities". En *Theorizing Masculinities* (Brod, Harry y Kaufman, Michael editores) Londres: Sage Publications, 1994. p. 165.

[29] Para un excelente estudio comparativo de los combatientes desmovilizados a nivel individual de las FARC, ELN y paramilitares, ver Cárdenas Sarrias, José Armando. *Los parias de la guerra: Análisis del proceso de desmovilización individual*.

[30] La fascinante investigación de Löic Wacquant sobre los boxeadores afro-estadounidenses en la parte sur de Chicago cobra una importante influencia en esta parte: Wacquant, Löic. "Pugs at Work: Bodily Capital and Bodily Labour Among Professional Boxers," *Body and Society* 1(1) (1995) 65-93; Wacquant, *Body and Soul: Notebooks of an Apprentice Boxer*. Nueva York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

[31] Goffman, Irving. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Nueva York: Anchor, 1959.

[32] Krog, Antje. "Locked into Loss and Silence: Testimonies of Gender and Violence at the South African Truth Comisión," En *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors?: Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence* (N. O. Moser, Caroline y Clark, Fiona editores). Londres: Zed Books.

THEIDON *continued*

[33] Ibíd, Wacquant, Löic. "Pugs at Work: Bodily Capital and Bodily Labour Among Professional Boxers."

[34] Spencer, Jonathan. "On Not Becoming a 'Terrorist': Problems of Memory, Agency and Community in the Sri Lankan Conflict" En *Violence and Subjectivity* (Das,Veena y otros, editores) Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. p. 120.

[35] Ibíd, Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. Nueva York: Routledge, 1990. ■

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