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A Brazilian Approach to External Debt Negotiation

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The 1987 attempt to negotiate the Brazilian external debt, which began with the moratorium on interest payments announced at the beginning of the year, was guided by a basic question: Is the full payment of interest compatible with the national interest?

For the creditors, as well as for the nationals in each debtor country who tend to identify their interests with the creditors, this question was impertinent or menacing. They therefore refused to seriously consider it, and assumed that the debt could be paid if the debtor country adopted an adequate combination of finance and adjustment.

For the debtor, however, this question was crucial. If the answer was negative—if the payment of interest and the economic health of the country were not compatible—the debtor had no alternative but to change its strategy. Either the debtor obtained some kind of discount on its debt, or it became the victim of economic stagnation, further deteriorating its capacity to pay.

This paper discusses the question both theoretically and empirically, examining the case of Brazil. The first section describes in general terms the dominant strategy for the debt problem—the finance and adjustment approach, more recently dubbed the muddling-through approach—and evidence of its failure. The second section summarizes the problem in Brazil up to the point at which the country effectively lost its capacity to pay interest on the debt and still remain economically viable. The third section discusses the economics of the incompatibility between reasonable growth and debt. Finally, the last section briefly analyzes Brazilian strategy for the negotiation of its debt in 1987, during the period from April 29 to December 20 when I was Finance Minister of Brazil.

*The author, Professor of Economics at the Foundation, was Finance Minister of Brazil from April 29 to December 20, 1987. The following is an edited version of remarks Mr. Bresser Pereira delivered in a special session on the external debt of Third World countries, sponsored by the LASA Executive Council, at the XIV International Congress in New Orleans, March 18, 1988.

(Continued on page 3)

Report from the Program Committee XV International Congress

San Juan, Puerto Rico
September 21-23, 1988

The Program Committee for the LASA XV International Congress met November 11-13, 1988, at Florida International University (FIU). All members of the committee were present: Joan Dassin, Gary Gereffi, Sergio Miceli, Patricia Pessar, César Rey Hernández, Marcia Rivera, Steve Stein, and Mark Rosenberg, chair. FIU's María Baeza, Sandra Murado, and Douglas Kincaid also attended in an ex-officio capacity.

The committee reviewed all panel, paper, and session proposals that had been received by November 11. Any proposals received on or after November 14 will be acknowledged and kept on file, but there is little chance that they can be included in the congress.

Of the 250 panel proposals, 222 were approved. Of the 300 paper proposals, 269 were approved; from these, 48 new panels, involving about 195 papers, were created.

The committee decided that no roundtables will be held. Rather, all informal sessions will be organized as workshops, of which about 28 were approved (some panel proposers will be asked to chair workshops rather than panels).

Several topics were agreed upon for plenary sessions: Puerto Rico; U.S.-Latin American Relations; Mass Education in Latin America for the 1990s; Science and Technology in Latin America. The large number of panels militated against having other special sessions or meetings that would reduce the space available for panels.

The Program Committee reiterated its hope to provide up to one airfare and some per diem to cover housing expenses for one traveler from Latin America on those panels proposing the inclusion of a participant from the region. Since many of the panels requested more than one participant from Latin America, some approved panels are likely to be canceled. Steven Sanderson, chair of the Congress Finance Committee, will review all international travel requests.

SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT

This issue of the *Forum* contains the report of the LASA International Commission to Observe the Chilean Plebiscite.

CONTENTS

<p>A Brazilian Approach to External Debt Negotiation 1 <i>By Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira</i></p> <p>Report from the Program Committee XV International Congress, San Juan 1</p> <p>LASA Authors: Please Note 8</p> <p>Research Seminar in Nicaragua, 1989 9</p> <p>LASNET: Correction 9</p> <p>Contributors to LASA Endowment Fund 10</p> <p>Prospective Task Force Members 10</p> <p>New Task Force Established 11</p>	<p>LASA Media Award, 1989 11</p> <p>Announcements 12</p> <p>Forthcoming Conferences 13</p> <p>Employment Opportunities 14</p> <p>Research & Study Opportunities 15</p> <p>Publications 17</p> <p>The Chilean Plebiscite: A First Step Toward Redemocratization 18 <i>Report by the International Commission of the Latin American Studies Association to Observe the Chilean Plebiscite</i></p>
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(Brazil, cont.)

The Finance and Adjustment Approach

The finance and adjustment approach is the strategy adopted by the banks and governments of the creditor countries. It claims that interest on the debt can be paid provided that there is "an adequate combination of adjustment with financing." Bank financing is naturally very limited. In principle it should never go above 50 percent of the interest due each year. The debtor must produce large trade surpluses in order to pay the interest. This strategy earned the name "muddling-through approach" when it became evident that finance and adjustment alone would not solve the debt problem; despite the evidence, however, banks and governments did not change their approach. It became clear that creditors were just postponing the solution to the problem.

The partial financing of interest is basic in this strategy. Bankers call it "new money" (they are specialists in semantics), even though no real new money is involved. The debtor country receives no new resources; there is no provision for new investment, just financing of no more than 50 percent of the interest.

It is logical to limit the financing of interest to 50 percent. Since the real interest rate is roughly 50 percent of the nominal interest rate, the real total debt will remain constant. On the other hand, bankers try to limit the financing of interest. Given the discount in secondary financial markets of about 50 percent, every time a new loan is made it immediately loses half of its real value. In 1985, with evidence of stagnation and increased rates of inflation in debtor countries but no improvement in their capacity to pay, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury James Baker presented the Baker Plan. This added the expression "with growth" to the word "adjustment" and "with structural reforms" to "financing." Thus the formula read: "The interest on the debt can be paid provided there is an adequate combination of adjustment with growth and financing with structural reforms." This was the major creditor country's official recognition of the failure of the finance and adjustment approach.

The Baker Plan did not address the basic problem of incompatibility between payment of the debt and growth and price stability. It just said that debtor countries need structural reforms in addition to austerity programs that reduce the public deficit and make exchange rates realistic (adjustment), and that the financing of interest should be large enough to guarantee growth. "Structural reforms" were understood as reforms limiting state intervention, eliminating all kinds of subsidies and making the economy more competitive internationally. No suggestions were given about how to convince banks to increase their supply of credit.

During the annual IMF meeting in 1987, it became clear to everyone, including the U.S. authorities (see the speech of Mr. Baker and the communique of the Interim Committee), that while the finance and adjustment approach had succeeded in avoiding an international banking

crisis—the creditor banks are today much stronger than in 1982—not only had it failed to solve the crisis in the debtor countries, but was more damaging for the debtor countries than was thought initially, and that new ideas were necessary. The failure of the approach can be illustrated in several ways:

1. The per capita income of debtor countries had not grown since 1980, when the debt problem really surfaced and banks began to demand adjustments. During the next four years, per capita income fell sharply as a consequence of the adjustment programs. Since 1984 some growth has indeed occurred due to good export performance on the part of creditor countries and the partial abandoning of adjustment programs, but growth rates were clearly unsatisfactory. Stagnation and inflation have prevailed in all debtor countries since 1980, though to varying degrees. Latin American per capita income fell 7.6 percent between 1981 and 1986; Brazil's increased only 4 percent (after artificial growth in 1985-86 the country returned to inflation and stagnation in 1987 and 1988).

2. The debtor countries' ability to pay did not improve; on the contrary, it deteriorated. The basic objective of adjustment programs was to increase ability to pay through increased exports and reduced imports. Imports were reduced, but the reduction reflected declining investments as well as lower consumption; thus export capacity did not improve.

3. The deteriorating ability to pay became evident in the debt ratios, particularly in the debt/export ratio. During the 1970s economists and bankers agreed that the debt/export ratio should not exceed 2:1. In 1982 the ratio was 2.6:1 for the ten major debtors and in 1987, 3.8:1 (see *World Financial Markets*, June/July 1987), a 46 percent deterioration; for Brazil the ratio was 3.4:1 in 1982 and 4.7:1 in 1987, a 38 percent deterioration.

4. An increasing number of countries began resorting to total or partial moratoriums on interest payments; in 1987 nine Latin American countries were among this group. No country took the second unilateral step of defining a discount and/or saying how it would pay interest, but this was the probable next move.

5. In 1986 a discount appeared in international financial markets; it increased during 1987, reaching an average of roughly 50 percent. It was stated correctly that this market was small, and incorrectly that it was not significant.

6. As Sachs and Huizinga (1987) demonstrated, the losses in value of stocks of creditor banks are closely related to their credits against debtor countries, and, as the authors note, this is not a small market.

7. Following the move of Citibank, American and British banks began in 1987 to do what European banks had been doing since 1983: creating reserves against probable losses.

While the discount in the secondary market and banks' stock losses were informal recognition that the finance and adjustment approach had failed and that the debt could not be fully paid, the creation of reserves was

a formal acknowledgment. Thus it was clear in mid-1987 that new ideas and strategies were needed to cope with the debt problem. Before examining some ideas and strategies for doing so, however, let us look more closely at Brazil.

The Case of Brazil

In the beginning of the 1980s Brazil was considered one of the wonders of the world. Growth had been very rapid from the 1930s through the 1970s, and a solid industrial base had been established. More than 50 percent of Brazilian exports was industrial, demonstrating that sector's technological development and ability to compete internationally. There was a large working class, a strong middle or techno-bureaucratic class, and a competent entrepreneurial class.

Growth during the 1970s, however, was artificial. While the central countries engaged in an adjustment process after the 1973 oil crisis, Brazil decided to complete its process of import substitution. According to the Second PND (Project for National Development), the state responded for the basic industries (steel, oil, electric power), the private sector for capital goods and for cellulose production, and a combination of private and public sectors for nonferrous metals and petrochemicals.

The cost of this strategy was clear: public deficit through external indebtedness. The justification was compelling: (a) the new liquidity of the international financial market made it possible for commercial banks to lend large sums of money to developing countries; (b) the cost of these loans was low (real interest rates below 2 percent), and certainly considerably lower than the average rate of return on investment in Brazil, which could be particularly high given the high concentration of income; (c) Brazil had a project of national development, the Second PND, that legitimated if it did not urge large investments; (d) Brazil's exports increased rapidly during the 1970s, suggesting that the indebtedness and public deficit strategy was correct—that the country would be able to pay back its loans.

In 1979 the picture changed dramatically due to three new factors that developed in the creditor countries, particularly in the United States: (a) the second oil shock; (b) a sharp increase in nominal and real interest rates; (c) recession. The causes were, among others, the exhaustion of the deficit-oriented Keynesian economic policy and the adoption of monetary policies in accordance with the conservative wave that took hold of the central countries.

At that point there was no other alternative for Brazil but adjustment. The new finance minister, however, decided to continue growth in an effort to repeat in 1979 the successful economic policy of 1968. This was a terrible mistake. Economic conditions were entirely different from 1968. Brazil's growth rates in 1979 and 1980 were the result of irresponsible indebtedness. Brazil started adjustment only at the end of 1980, when all indications were that it was too late. Despite the strong adjustment in 1981 and 1983, and the stagnation of per capita income between

1981 and 1987, Brazil's ability to pay deteriorated, making the country unable to pay its debt.

The reason is very simple. In the second half of 1980, the Brazilian external debt was already too high to repay. Given an external debt of about \$60 billion and exports of \$20 billion, the compatibility between payment of interest on the debt and growth and price stability no longer existed. The debt/export ratio was well above the normally accepted ratio of 2:1.

This is the basic reason that creditors refused new loans to Brazil in 1980. The continuous rise of the Brazilian debt at a higher rate than the increase in exports made new loans to Brazil too risky. At the end of 1980 the Brazilian government changed its internal economic policy and started an adjustment process, and until August 1982 creditors again made voluntary loans to Brazil, but only to partially finance interest payments. Brazil has received no real new money to finance new investments since 1979. With Mexico's moratorium in 1982, voluntary lending to Brazil ceased.

In spite of the suspension of voluntary lending to Brazil, neither creditors nor the debtor acknowledged that the debt was too high and that its interest could not be paid. Creditors proposed, and Brazilian authorities accepted, the finance and adjustment approach, hoping to reestablish the country's ability to pay. Actually they mistook a structural disequilibrium for a conjunctural one. They confused a stock problem (an external debt that was too high) with a flow problem (a balance-of-payments deficit). Consequently Brazil's ability to pay did not improve; it deteriorated, while the debt/export ratio grew above 4:1 and per capita income stagnated.

Reasons for Failure

I am suggesting that the finance and adjustment approach failed in Brazil because the external debt was too high to be repaid, that the sheer size of the debt made the payment of interest inconsistent with growth. Experience is demonstrating that this is true, but the proposition requires further discussion. The simple affirmation that the debt/export ratio should not go above 2:1 is not sufficient. A theoretical discussion of this problem requires some assumptions. The success of the finance and adjustment approach will be measured by the growth rate achieved by the country after the adjustment process and by the decrease of the debt/export ratio. Simplifying assumptions are that: (1) international reserves will remain constant; (2) the "investment balance" between direct investments and net payment of profits and dividends will be negative; (3) creditors, including multilateral agencies and official export banks, will, on the average, limit financing to 50 percent of the annual total interest owed by a country.

The direct consequences of these objectives and assumptions are that the country will need a surplus in real transactions (trade surplus minus real services) equal to 50 percent of the interest to be paid plus a negative investment balance, and that exports have to increase at a rate

equal to 50 percent of the prevailing rate of interest including spreads. For example, if the debt is 100, the rate of interest 10 percent, and the negative capital balance 2, the real transactions surplus must be 7 (or trade surplus must be 10, given net real services of 3), in order to be consistent with 50 percent financing of interest; exports must increase at a rate of 5 percent so that the debt/export ratio remains constant.

If we relate these numbers to billions of dollars, they correspond roughly to the Brazilian case. The question, then, is first whether a trade surplus of \$10 billion can be obtained and maintained while the country continues to grow, and second whether exports and imports can increase at a rate of 5 percent after the required trade surplus is achieved.

Observe that the volume of trade surplus depends crucially on the volume of the debt, while the required rate of export increase is dependent on the rate of interest. If the debt were a reasonable 50 instead of 100, and if the interest rate were 5—that is, similar to historic interest rates before 1979—instead of 10 percent, the required trade surplus and the minimum rate of export growth would be much smaller.

To answer the first question, we have to add assumptions about the initial volume of exports and of trade surplus. Continuing our simplification process, let us assume for 1980 (since adjustment began in Brazil in 1981) 20 of exports and zero trade surplus. In that year the debt was around 60, so the required trade surplus in 1981 was 2 billion smaller (3 to cover 50 percent of interest, 2 for the negative direct investment balance, and 3 for real services equal 8). Finally, let us assume that the adjustment period would be three years, and that reduction of imports above 2 would have to be made at the expense of investments, the 2 corresponding to a viable reduction of consumption.

Given these assumptions, Brazil's exports would have had to increase 30 percent (9 percent per year) and imports decrease 10 percent during the three years of adjustment (1981-83) to achieve the required initial surplus of 6 billion. Such a reduction of imports was realistic, but not the increase in exports. The only new factor that would lead to a permanent increase in exports would be a real devaluation of the national currency, and it is quite unlikely that devaluation would lead to such a large increase in exports. What actually happened in Brazil was a 9 percent increase in exports between 1980 and 1983, while imports decreased 33 percent.

The large reduction of imports, which is typical of all adjustment processes monitored by the IMF and creditor banks, was made not only at the expense of consumption but also of investment, as can be seen by the reduced rate of investment in the country, from 22.4 percent in 1980 to 16 percent in 1983-84. During the same period, the transfer of real resources to creditors (identified with the surplus of real transactions) increased from -2.5 percent in 1980 to +5.4 percent in 1984. In the most recent years, this transfer averaged 3 percent of GDP.

If increased transfer of real resources results from increased exports, investment is not harmed; but if it really results from reduced imports, there is a direct correlation between this transfer and reduced rate of investment. That is what happened in Brazil and in Latin America generally. In 1983 the targeted \$8 billion of trade surplus was almost achieved, but at the cost of reduced rates of growth and investment. Since 1984 trade surpluses for Brazil have averaged \$11 billion, but it is quite clear that this has been possible only with reduced growth rates for GDP and investment.

The increase in exports can be explained by the real devaluation of the cruzado and by the utilization of idle capacity. Given the decreased rate of investment, however, the rate of increase in total capacity declined. In addition, given a modest but effective rate of increase in internal demand, the country's export capacity also declined. In 1986, with a large increase in internal demand, idle capacity was exhausted. This became very clear in 1987; exports increased \$4 billion, but only because of the economy's deceleration.

When Castro and Sousa (1985) emphasized the importance of the Second PND, they were correct; but when they concluded that the investments of the 1970s had produced a structural trade surplus that would allow Brazil to repay its debt, they were clearly influenced by the growth of exports in 1984 that had been made possible by a particularly good year for the economies of the central countries and by Brazil's use of idle capacity. And they disregarded the reduction in savings and investments and the increase in the fiscal deficit involved in the transfer of real resources.

Currently, to pay the interest on its debt in accordance with the finance and adjustment approach, and given the fact that its trade surplus is around \$11 billion (approximately consistent with the financing of 50 percent of the interest), Brazil would need to increase its exports at a rate of just 5 percent per year. This seems quite feasible. Given the rate of inflation in U.S. dollars, the required increase in exports would be around 2 percent. This analysis, however, suggests that the \$11 billion trade surplus is incompatible with a 6 percent growth rate for the Brazilian economy. The surplus was achieved not through increased exports but through decreased imports and reduction in the capacity to invest and export. The problem is not the necessary rate of export growth, but rather the present level of trade surplus, which is not consistent with growth and price stability in Brazil.

Certainly a large increase in Brazilian exports would solve this problem, but it is nonsense to hope that a substantial increase in the rates of growth of the central countries or a sharp decrease in the interest rate will lead respectively to a large increase in exports and a reduction of export requirements. Even the more optimistic analysts of the world economy would not subscribe to such a perspective for the next few years.

If the basic problem is reduced investment capacity caused by decreased imports or by the transfer of real

resources to creditor countries, would a compensatory increase in the country's internal saving capacity not be possible? Theoretically it is possible, and was the strategy proposed in the Macroeconomic Control Plan of July 1987. But we should not mix political economy, our science, with some kind of social engineering or mechanistic economics. To compensate for excess transfers of real resources caused by the excessive size of the debt, it would be necessary to substantially reduce internal consumption, well below the historic levels of the average Brazilian propensity to consume. There is no doubt that a strong internal effort must be made in this direction. The priority of the Macroeconomic Control Plan was the reduction of the public deficit and thus recuperation of the public sector's saving capacity; but the limitations of this strategy are quite obvious. The public sector exhibits disequilibrium not only in flow but also in stock.

The problem is not only the public deficit but also the public debt, especially the external public debt. Total public debt represents more than 50 percent of GDP, and its respective interest costs 3.5 percent of GDP; the external public debt alone represents more than 30 percent of GDP, and its interest 2.3 percent of GDP. Thus there is a structural or stock dimension of the public deficit that can be solved only through a reduction of the public debt, particularly the external public debt. To try to compensate for insufficient internal savings through reduction of internal consumption is not realistic.

On the other hand, it is convenient to remember that a reduction in consumption, if not correctly managed, may have perverse results. Instead of increasing savings capacity, it may reduce it. If the reduction in consumption is abrupt, as it was in 1983, the contraction of internal demand will lead to a decline in investments and consequently, in savings. To avoid such distortion, it would be necessary to compensate for reduced internal consumption with increased exports and export-oriented investment. But such a change cannot be easily achieved.

In conclusion, the Brazilian external debt was already too high at the end of 1980, when the finance and adjustment approach was first implemented. In 1988 it is still higher, while the country's export capacity has been relatively reduced as the rate of transfer of real resources to creditors has sharply increased and the rate of investment has decreased accordingly. If at the beginning of the decade we already faced a basic incompatibility between growth and payment of interest on the external debt, this inconsistency is all the more evident at the present time.

Brazil's 1987 Strategy

I must admit that I was not completely aware of this inconsistency when, as Finance Minister of Brazil, I presented the Macroeconomic Control Plan. In May I asked my staff to prepare a plan with two basic objectives: a 6 percent growth of GDP after an adjustment process during 1987, and a trade surplus consistent with a 50 percent financing of interest by external creditors. My implicit

assumption was that these two objectives were consistent: that it was possible for Brazil to grow at a rate of around 6 percent and negotiate its debt in conventional terms, according to the finance and adjustment approach.

In July 1987, however, practically at the moment that the plan was completed and published, I realized that it was unrealistic. During the elaboration of the plan, two things became clear: first, that 50 percent financing of interest was insufficient and that we must change to 60 percent, consistent with trade surpluses in the following years of a little more than \$10 billion; second, and more important, that a very great reduction of internal consumption would be needed to increase the public sector's saving capacity to 5 percent in four years, and that only a heroic economic policy fully supported by society would achieve such a result.

On the other hand I was learning a great deal more about the debt problem, discussing it almost daily with bankers, economists, and politicians. The discount in the financial secondary markets was a clear indication that bankers had also realized that the finance and adjustment approach was unrealistic, that it was actually a muddling-through approach, a strategy for the banks and for economic authorities in the creditor countries to postpone solving the problem. Its only positive effect was to give the banks time to strengthen their financial positions, to improve their capital ratios, and thus to minimize the negative impact that sooner or later would occur when the partial default of the debtor countries became a reality that must be included in their profit-and-loss statements.

I also learned that there was another alternative for the debtor countries besides the unilateral decision to partially reduce the debt. Consideration was being given to debt relief systems based on conversion of the debt to discounted bonds with a guarantee by the creditor countries. There was some support in the United States for debt relief along these lines, although this did not change the generally conservative position of the U.S. government.

I further learned that after Citibank's decision to create large reserves to cover defaults on its foreign loans, American and English banks were finally following the example of European banks and assuming a more realistic approach to the debt problem. Both banks and debtor countries began to realize that the threat of retaliation by the banks would ultimately lose force. As a Japanese banker told me in August 1987, five years after the 1982 crisis, it was obvious that: (1) the finance and adjustment approach had failed; (2) a discount on the debt was unavoidable; (3) banks and taxpayers in the creditor countries would have to share the burden of the discount; and (4) the creditor countries, with the exception of the United States government, were coming to a consensus on these three points.

It then became clear to me that the moment had come for Brazil to denounce the finance and adjustment approach and to propose an alternative solution—one in which the burden would be shared by debtors and creditors. In February Brazil had declared a moratorium on

payment of interest due to commercial banks on long- and medium-term loans. The best way to suspend the moratorium was to replace it with an innovative agreement with creditors.

It was also clear to me that this agreement should ultimately involve the creation of a debt authority controlled by the IMF and World Bank that would buy the credits extended by commercial banks to the highly indebted countries at a discount, exchanging them for its own bonds; this discount would then be transferred to the debtor countries on a case-by-case basis. I made this proposal in Wien, at the U.S. Congressional Summit: An Agenda for the 90s (1987).

I could not wait then for the maturation of this global solution that is now widely discussed in the creditor countries; it was obvious, however, that Brazil needed to take some initiative in that direction.

My first proposal to the banks then was a partial and negotiated conversion of the present debt into new bonds, either with the same face value but fixed rates of interest below market rates, or with a discounted value and interest at market rates. This conversion would have to be partial because the new bonds would have to be secured; the ideal situation would be for the governments of the creditor countries to guarantee the new bonds, but they were not ready to accept this alternative. The debt-bond conversion would be negotiated in the sense that Brazil would propose and discuss with its advisory committee what portion of the debt—say 20 percent—would be converted initially.

The reaction to this idea by the banks, and especially by the U.S. government, was very negative. This was the first time that a finance minister of a debtor country had spoken clearly about the need for a discount on the debt and had offered an alternative to obtain this discount based on the behavior of the market. The creditors felt threatened, the American government challenged. Initiatives on the debt problem had heretofore always been taken by the creditors.

Since I was committed to seeking a negotiated solution for the moratorium, I decided to change my proposal, making the conversion completely voluntary. In Brazil's formal proposal of September 25, 1987, however, the conventional aspect, based on "new money" or the finance and adjustment approach, was clearly distinguished from the proposal for a long-term solution based on the conversion approach, that is, on reduction of the debt. Two mechanisms should be used to reduce the debt: debt-equity conversion, much favored by the banks, and debt-bond conversion. To count on debt-equity conversion alone is unrealistic given the monetary limitations of this mechanism.

In its formal proposal Brazil underlined the failure of the finance and adjustment approach, and stated clearly that the negotiation should be an improvement over the former Mexican and Argentine model of negotiation, which did not represent a solution to the debt problem. To demonstrate its willingness to end the moratorium through

a process of negotiation, the Brazilian government yielded to the U.S. government and signed an interim agreement in November that extended negotiations until the end of January.

Clearly the banks had little desire to negotiate an agreement that even slightly contradicted the finance and adjustment approach. Brazil, on the other hand, had demonstrated its willingness to negotiate in good faith. Therefore before leaving the Ministry of Finance in December 1987, I had already decided with the President of Brazil that if an agreement was not reached by 29 January 1988, Brazil would dismiss its advisory committee and begin negotiations on the conversion approach with each bank individually. In other words, Brazil would go a step beyond the moratorium. The moratorium meant only the suspension of interest payments; the next step would be to say how much and in what manner Brazil would pay.

It was quite clear to me that this decision carried risks. The creditors would say that Brazil was taking a unilateral position and would eventually try to retaliate. I was convinced, however, and I am still convinced, that this is the only alternative that will make payment of the debt compatible with growth. I was also convinced that to seek a solution to the Brazilian economic crisis by demanding sacrifices only on the part of creditors was neither reasonable nor sufficient. One way to solve the structural disequilibrium of the public sector is to obtain reduction of the external debt, but another necessary way is to proceed with the adjustment process, to seriously fight the public deficit by demanding effective sacrifices from workers and from business enterprises. When I realized conclusively that such action was not possible in Brazil at this time, that the government was not ready to adopt this line of action, I resigned. It would be meaningless to adopt strong measures with respect to the external debt and do nothing, or very little, with respect to internal problems.

Brazil will pay its debt, but according to what is realistically possible. It will pay the debt, but with a discount, since it is clear that paying interest on the Brazilian debt in full is to condemn the country to its present condition of stagnation and inflation.

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RESEARCH SEMINAR IN NICARAGUA

June 18 - July 1, 1989

Once again, the evaluations of last summer's Research Seminar in Nicaragua, June 11-June 25, 1988, were filled with praise for both the seminar and its organizers, Tom Walker and Harvey Williams. The respondents called it "excellent," well balanced as to program and speakers, "very well organized," and made up of an excellent group of participants. Walker and Williams were uniformly praised, eliciting such comments as "very well informed," "accommodating," "good sense of humor." Note was made of their "extreme patience" and willingness to deal with problems and work with individual needs. Cooperation from CONAPRO and TURNICA also received positive evaluation. All the participants reported the seminar to have been very useful.

Based on such warm praise from the participants themselves, the seminar was a resounding success. Tom Walker and Harvey Williams are to be commended for their hard work, excellent results, and their great service to the Task Force on Nicaragua and Central America.

--John A. Booth, Chair

The LASA Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Nicaragua and Central America will conduct a fifth two-week field seminar in Nicaragua for LASA members this summer from June 18 through July 1, 1989.

As was the case with the previous four seminars, this one is designed to introduce established Latinamericanists and graduate students to some of the variety of institutions, people, resources, protocols, and methods for studying Nicaragua, teaching about the country, and doing research there. A second objective of the seminar is to give LASA scholars a close-up view of the multifaceted reality of revolutionary Nicaragua.

Participants will be exposed to various social science "think tanks," academic institutions, and research facilities. Latin Americanists with a general interest in Nicaragua that is not necessarily tied to specific research objectives are welcome to participate. The group will have discussion and interview sessions with important political and social actors from across the political spectrum, including representatives of the churches, mass media, business community, grass-roots organizations, diplomatic community, the government, military, etc.

Though much of the time will be spent in Managua, trips outside of the city to a variety of rural communities are also envisioned. The activities of the group as a whole will be tailored to the major interests of the participants. In addition, throughout the seminar an effort will be made to accommodate individual interests through special

interviews, etc. To understand how this type of seminar works in practice, prospective participants are advised to read the reports on the last three seminars, published in the Winter and Fall 1987 and Summer 1988 issues of the *LASA Forum*.

Unless there are unforeseen price changes, the entire seminar, including living expenses, in-country transportation, and round-trip group airfare between Mexico City and Managua, will cost around \$1200 per person. (Bona fide graduate students will receive a \$200 discount.) The group will be limited to 15-18 participants plus the co-coordinators. Participants must be LASA members who speak Spanish. All philosophical and political points of view are welcomed.

Each applicant is requested to submit a current resume and a 250-500 word letter of application explaining what she or he expects to gain professionally from the seminar. The participants will be selected primarily on the basis of the potential relevance of the seminar to their professional plans as outlined in the letter of application. An effort will be made to balance the group in terms of gender, discipline, region of origin, etc. The deadline for the first round of selection is May 1, 1989. Qualified later applicants will be included if space permits.

For more information, write or call the seminar co-coordinators:

Thomas W. Walker
Department of Political Science
Ohio University
Athens, OH 45701
614-593-4376 (or 4372)

Harvey Williams
Sociology Department
University of the Pacific
Stockton, CA 95211
209-946-2931

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL CHANGE

Because of schedule conflicts with upcoming meetings of the LASA Executive Council, Peter Bell has found it necessary to resign from the EC. First alternate Richard Newfarmer, of the World Bank, will fill the remainder of Bell's term, ending October 1989.

CONTRIBUTORS TO LASA ENDOWMENT FUND

We want to thank the following members who contributed to the LASA Endowment Fund in 1988, since the publication of the previous list [*Forum*, Summer 1988]:

Diego Cardona	Francesca Miller
Thomas Cohen	Shelley Miller
Claudette Columbus Kemper	Frank Mora
William Cooper	Thomas Morin
Theo R. Crevenna	Richard Norgaard
Santiago Daydi-Tolson	Arturo Ortiz
Gwendolyn Diaz	Nancy Patchett
Ana María Díaz-Stevens	Mary Louise Pratt
Saul Diskin	D.A. Preston
David Felix	Alvaro Ramos
Leonor Figueroa	Jorge Rovira-Mas
Marilena Franca	Bohdan Saciuk
Barbara Freitag-Rouanet	Hector Samperio Gutiérrez
Linda Fuller	Rolando San Miguel Garza
Mary Gormly	Anthony Stevens-Arroyo
Janet Groff Greever	Silvio Torres-Saillant
Jimmy Harris	Elena Urrutia
Kevin Healy	Rosemary Valle
J. Noe Herrera	Jeannette Varner
Edward Jamison	William Waters
Thomas Kappner	Lawrence West
Georgia Kilpatrick	Ann Wightman
María Dolores Luque	

PROSPECTIVE TASK FORCE MEMBERS

LASA members who are interested in serving on a task force from September 1989 until March 1991 should contact president-elect Jean Franco, Department of Spanish, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027. Current task forces are the following:

Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom

Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Nicaragua/Central America

Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Cuba

Task Force on Scholarly Relations with the Soviet Union

Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Spain

Task Force on Women in Latin American Studies

Task Force on the Mass Media

Task Force on Natural Resources and the Environment of Latin America

LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION ENDOWMENT FUND

The LASA Endowment Fund was created with an initial grant from the Ford Foundation. Its purpose is to assure the financial stability of the Latin American Studies Association. Earnings generated by this fund will be used to support travel by Latin Americans to LASA International Congresses, to fund the activities of the LASA Task Forces, and to support LASA publications and other special projects that cannot be covered by regular income.

We invite you to join the generous members who have already contributed and to share in this important investment in the future of Latin American studies. Please indicate below the amount you wish to contribute.

\$25 \$50 \$75 \$100 \$150 \$_____ Other

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Please send form, accompanied by check payable to Latin American Studies Association, to: LASA Secretariat, 9th Floor William Pitt Union, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260.

NEW TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED

LASA has approved a proposal initiated by Tulane University's Center for Latin American Studies to create a new Task Force on Natural Resources and the Environment of Latin America. The objectives of the new task force are to:

1. promote increased participation of the natural science community in the activities of LASA;
2. stimulate interest of the LASA membership in current environmental issues in Latin America;
3. advise the LASA Executive Council on policy issues pertaining to environmental and natural resource concerns.

It is anticipated that the task force would eventually serve as an information clearinghouse for LASA members seeking collaborative research partnerships with scientific institutions and conservation organizations based in Latin America. Initially the major function of the task force will be self-definition: to clarify its potential role in LASA and to outline future directions of activities. The task force accordingly seeks broad input from LASA members interested in environmental and natural resource issues.

The Task Force on Natural Resources and the Environment of Latin America is comprised of the following LASA members:

John O. Browder (chair), Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
 Janis Alcorn, Agency for International Development
 Gerardo Budowski, Universidad para la Paz, Costa Rica
 Robert Buschbacher, The Conservation Foundation
 William Denevan, University of Wisconsin
 Christine Padoch, New York Botanical Garden
 Marianne Schmink, University of Florida

The new task force will schedule an open meeting at the XV International Congress in San Juan for all LASA members interested in participating in and planning future task force activities.

Members who would like to serve on the task force for the 1989-91 term, or who wish further information, are invited to contact:

John O. Browder
 Urban Affairs and Planning
 Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
 Blacksburg, VA 24061-0113

LASA MEDIA AWARD

The Latin American Studies Association is pleased to announce its competition for the 1989 LASA award for outstanding media coverage of Latin America. This award is made every eighteen months to recognize long-term journalistic contributions to analysis and public debate about Latin America in the United States, as well as for breakthrough investigative journalism. Nominations are invited from LASA members and from journalists. Journalists from both the print and electronic media are eligible. To make a nomination, please send one copy of the journalist's portfolio of recent relevant work, by July 14, 1989, to:

Richard A. Nuccio
 Chair of the LASA Task Force on the Mass Media
 Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies
 316 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E., Suite 500
 Washington, D.C. 20003
 (202) 547-7227

If the work is in the electronic media and a copy is not readily available, contact Dr. Nuccio to discuss further procedures.

A three-member screening committee from the Task Force on the Mass Media carefully reviews each nominee's work and selects the top five candidates. The entire task force then votes to determine the winner, who is honored at the next LASA International Congress. LASA invites the awardee to speak at a session and to submit materials for possible publication in the *Forum*. The association also assumes the costs of the awardee's travel to the meeting site.

Recent recipients of the Mass Media award have included Charles Krause of the McNeil-Lehrer Newshour and Bill Buzenberg of National Public Radio.

LASA's forthcoming congress is in San Juan, Puerto Rico, September 21-23, 1989. The next congress is scheduled for Crystal City, Virginia, March 28-30, 1991. The deadline for that competition will be comparable (mid-January 1991).

1989 DUES RENEWALS

Renewals for 1989 LASA membership are due as of January 1. If you have not yet renewed, you can do so using the enclosed form (marked "Second Notice"). If you have already renewed, please accept our thanks and disregard the form.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers, which will publish its sixth *Yearbook* in 1989, is calling for papers for that volume. The *Yearbook* is a peer-reviewed publication that seeks to publish original manuscripts dealing with Latin America and Latin Americans from the disciplines of geography and related social and physical sciences. Contributions from scholars in a broad range of disciplines are encouraged. Manuscripts in English, Spanish, and Portuguese are welcome. The deadline for submission of manuscripts for the 1989 volume is *31 March 1989*. For further information on the preparation and submission of manuscripts, please write to Robert B. Kent and Vern R. Harnapp, Editors, *CLAG Yearbook 1989*, Department of Geography, University of Akron, Akron, Ohio 44325-5005.

The Hispanic Division, Library of Congress, will request from Congress funds to establish and operate a regional office to acquire and process materials from Mexico, Central America, and certain other countries in the Caribbean basin. The office could purchase publications for university and research libraries as well as for the Library of Congress. Participating libraries would pay the purchase price of the publications plus an administrative charge, perhaps 30 percent. Monographs and new serial titles would be distributed with preliminary catalog cards. Members of the scholarly community can help by writing to the Library of Congress in support of this office and indicating whether their institution would be interested in joining a cooperative program as well as the nature of the latter's impact on their area studies programs. Letters may be addressed to Robert C. Sullivan, Director for Acquisitions and Overseas Operations, or to Cole Blasler, Chief, Hispanic Division, The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540.

Juscelino Kubitschek, a former president of Brazil, is the subject of several current publications and dissertations. Edward A. Redinger, a former secretary for English correspondence to President Kubitschek (1972-1976), wants to form a Kubitschek research group. The purpose is to establish a communications network to inform Latin Americanists about research and resources and to be a forum for presentation and discussion of research on the Kubitschek period. Those interested in such a group should contact Edward A. Redinger, The Berkeley City Club, 2315 Durant Avenue, No. 408, Berkeley, CA 94704; (415) 549-3152 or (415) 848-7800 (messages).

The Tinker Foundation has announced the recipients of its visiting professorships at U.S. universities for 1988-1989. Those interested in contacting the Tinker Professors should write to them directly at the institution of their appointment.

Columbia University, Departments of Political Science and History: Lorenzo Meyer Cosío, Professor, Center of International Studies, El Colegio de Mexico, fall 1988; De-

partment of Political Science: Carlos Huneeus Madge, Associate Professor, Institute of Political Science, Catholic University of Chile, spring 1989.

Stanford University, Center for Latin American Studies: Juan Martínez-Alier, Professor of Economics, Autonomous University of Barcelona, winter and spring 1989; Department of Anthropology: Verena Stolcke, Professor, Department of History of Precapitalist Societies and Social Anthropology, Autonomous University of Barcelona, winter and spring 1989; Department of Economics: Edmar L. Bacha, Professor of Economics, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, spring 1989 (tentative).

University of Chicago, Department of History: Gabriel Tortella, Professor of Economic History, Universidad de Alcalá de Henares, Madrid, fall quarter 1988 and Enrique Tandeter, Professor of colonial American History, Universidad de Buenos Aires, winter quarter 1989; Department of Anthropology: Juan Ossio Acuña, Professor of Anthropology, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, winter quarter 1989 and Mario Rivera, Professor of Anthropology, University of Tarapaca, Chile, winter and spring quarters 1989; Department of Sociology: Salustiano del Campo Urbano, Professor of Sociology, Universidad de Madrid, spring quarter 1989 and José Luis Reyna, Director of the Mexico office of Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), spring quarter 1989.

University of Texas at Austin, Department of Sociology and Institute of Latin American Studies: Fernando Calderón, Executive Secretary of the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO), Bolivia, spring 1989.

University of Wisconsin at Madison, Department of Political Science: Eduardo Ferrero Costa, Professor in the Law School and director of the master's program in international economic law, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, spring 1989; Department of Agronomy: Aino V.A. Jacques, Dean of the School of Agriculture, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, spring 1989; Department of Spanish and Portuguese: Tomás Segovia, Professor, Centro de Estudios Lingüísticos y Literarios, El Colegio de México, spring 1989.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

All purchasers of LASA mailing labels are sent the following notice:

"The sale of LASA's mailing labels does not in any way represent an endorsement by the Latin American Studies Association of the products, services or political stands of the purchasers of the labels, nor is the name of the Latin American Studies Association to be mentioned in conjunction with mailings utilizing these labels."

FORTHCOMING CONFERENCES

The University of Florida Center for Latin American Studies will hold its 38th Annual Conference on Alternative Development Strategies in the Caribbean on *March 31, 1989*. The conference is being cosponsored by PACCA (Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America) as part of an ongoing project of its task force on the Caribbean.

A core group consisting of task force chair Carmen Diana Deere (University of Massachusetts) and members Lynn Bolles (Bowdoin College), Peggy Antrobus (Women and National Development, Barbados), Marcia Rivera (Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Puertorriqueña), Edwin Meléndez (MIT), Peter Phillips (University of the West Indies), and Helen Safa (University of Florida) has received funding from the MacArthur and Ford Foundations to develop a document on alternative development strategies for the Caribbean, the focus of the conference and the basis for commentary by invited Caribbean and U.S. scholars.

Commentators will include Patricia Anderson (Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies), Richard Newfarmer (World Bank), Compton Bourne (University of the West Indies), Robert Pastor (Carter Center, Emory University), Sally Shelton Colby (former ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean), Alex Stepick (Florida International University), Bernardo Vega (Dominican Republic), and Emilio Pantojas (University of Illinois at Chicago). For further information contact Helen Safa, 319 Grinter Hall, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611; (904) 392-0375.

NCCLA. The North Central Council of Latin Americanists will hold its annual conference *October 12-14, 1989*, at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. The theme will be "Continuing Encounters: Latin America Since the Conquest." Papers are invited from any academic field; interdisciplinary topics are encouraged. Proposals for complete panels are especially welcome. Anyone interested in presenting a paper should send an outline or abstract by *May 1, 1989* to the program chair. Completed papers should be submitted by *September 12, 1989* to David Schodt, 1989 NCCLA Program Chair, Department of Economics, St. Olaf College, Northfield, MN 55057; (507) 663-3156. For information on local arrangements contact Julie Kline, Outreach Coordinator, Center for Latin America, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, P.O. Box 413, Milwaukee, WI 53201; (414) 229-5986.

The International Development Ethics Association (IDEA) will hold its Second International Conference *July 2-8, 1989* at Universidad Autónoma de Yucatán, Mérida. The conference theme is "Economic Crisis, Ethics, and Development Alternatives." IDEA is a cross-cultural group composed of philosophers and development theorists, policy makers, and practitioners who apply ethical reflection to

development goals and strategies, and to the relations between rich and poor countries. The deadlines for submission of abstracts and papers are *February 28* and *April 30, 1989*, respectively. Inquiries, abstracts, and papers (three copies) should be sent to David Crocker, IDEA, Department of Philosophy, Colorado State University, Ft. Collins, CO 80523.

The Caribbean Studies Association will hold its 14th annual conference *May 23-26, 1989*, at the Dover Convention Center, St. Lawrence, Barbados. The theme is "Caribbean Visions: A Tribute to Sir W. Arthur Lewis." For further information contact Joycelin Massiah, Program Chair, Institute for Social and Economic Research, Cave Hill Campus, University of the West Indies, Barbados.

The Association of Caribbean Studies will hold its 11th annual conference in San José, Costa Rica, *July 29-31, 1989*. The theme is "New Affiliations: The Caribbean and Latin America." Papers are solicited from both members and nonmembers from all traditional areas of the humanities and social sciences plus agriculture, business, communications and mass media, science and technology, theater, and tourism. Papers on interdisciplinary topics are most welcome. Speaking time is limited to 15 minutes; almost all papers are delivered in English. Abstracts of 200-300 words, double-spaced, must be submitted before *April 1, 1989*. Notification of acceptance will be made by 31 May. As in past years, a booklet of abstracts will be issued, and authors may submit full papers to be considered for publication in the association's *Journal of Caribbean Studies*. Persons not offering papers are cordially invited to attend as cultural events are included. For additional information contact Yvonne Alleyne, Conference Coordinator, Association of Caribbean Studies, P.O. Box 22202, Lexington, KY 40522-2202.

The 1989 Chaire Quetelet Seminar will be held in Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, between 16 and 20 October 1989. It is organized by the Institute of Demography, Catholic University of Louvain, in collaboration with the Société de Démographie Historique. The topic is "Demographic Aspects of Main Political Revolutions." The opening session will be dedicated to the commemoration of the bicentennial of the French Revolution. The working sessions will deal with: direct demographic effects of revolutions; importance and role of demographic factors in the making of revolutions; demographic concerns in revolutionary (or counterrevolutionary) ideologies. The organizers welcome papers dealing with "the main political revolutions" that have brought a radical change in the structures of societies and in the way of life, as well as comparative studies. The languages of the seminar are French and English. For information contact Chaire Quetelet 1989, Institut de Démographie UCL, 1 Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium; Tel. 010-47.29.51 - Telex 59037 UCLB; Telefax 010-47.29.97.

Thirty Years of the Cuban Revolution. The Canadian Association of Latin American and Caribbean Studies will hold an international conference on "Thirty Years of the Cuban Revolution: An Assessment" in Halifax, Nova Scotia, October 25-28, 1989. Topics to be discussed will fall into four groups of panels and workshops: social change (women's issues, housing, education, health care, religion, youth, culture), economic development (the process of *rectificación*, diversification, central planning, agricultural strategy), political (democracy, human rights, institutionalization, mass organizations, social classes, role of Fidel Castro), and international relations (with the U.S., U.S.S.R., Latin America, developing world). For further information contact: Cuba Conference Coordinator, International Development Studies, St. Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada B3H 3C3. Papers, abstracts of proposed papers, or other communications may be sent by mail, phone (902-423-0376) or BITNET (OMALLEY@DALAC).

Translating Latin America. An interdisciplinary conference on "Culture as Text..." is scheduled for *April 19-21, 1990*, at the State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of Comparative Literature, Latin American and Caribbean Area Studies, Center for Research in Translation. This conference on the interpretation of Latin American culture will include not only the Hispanic U.S. and Central and South America, but also the Anglophone, Dutch, Francophone, and Portuguese cultures of the region. Papers will be invited on such topics as gender, identity, *transculturación*, ethnicity, politics, and literary theory as they are expressed in literature. Prospective participants are invited to contact conference coordinators: William Luis, LACAS; Julio Rodriguez-Luis, Comparative Literature; Marilyn Gaddis Rose, Center for Research in Translation, all at SUNY-Binghamton, Binghamton, N.Y. 13901.

FORUM ADVERTISING

The *LASA Forum* accepts a limited number of display ads (camera-ready copy) for each issue. Listed below are the rates for 1989:

Full page	\$225
Half page	125
Quarter page	75

The deadlines for receipt of copy are as follows: Winter (late January), December 1; Spring (late April), March 1; Summer (late July), June 1; Fall (late October), September 1.

Call the LASA Secretariat (412-648-7909) for size specifications and distribution dates.

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

University of Florida. The Department of Political Science invites applications for a tenure-track position in comparative politics with a Latin American area specialization. Thematic and country interests are open. The appointment will be made at the assistant professor level and includes affiliate faculty status at the Center for Latin American Studies, a national resource center with 110 affiliated faculty members. Selected candidate will be expected to teach in the undergraduate and graduate comparative politics curriculum, supervise graduate students in political science and Latin American studies, and pursue an active research agenda. Competence in Portuguese and/or Spanish is expected. Salary is competitive. The University of Florida is an equal opportunity, affirmative action employer; women and minority candidates are especially encouraged to apply. Send letter of application with curriculum vitae and three letters of reference to Steven E. Sanderson, Chair, Latin American Politics Search Committee, Department of Political Science, 3324 Turlington Hall, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611. The deadline for receipt of applications is *March 1, 1989*.

Bard College. Applications are invited for a tenure-track position at the assistant professor level in comparative politics with a preferred specialization in Latin America. Additional interest in either Africa or Western Europe is desirable. Research interests might include, but are not limited to, public policy-making under constraints of the global political economy and state theory. Consideration may be given to candidates with competence in any two of the above geographical areas. Bard College is an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer. Minority candidates are strongly encouraged to apply. Send curriculum vitae and letters of recommendation to Stuart Levine, Dean, Bard College, Annandale on Hudson, N.Y. 12504. The deadline for receipt of applications is *March 1, 1989*.

California State Polytechnic University, Pomona. The Department of Social Sciences anticipates the availability of a tenure-track position at the rank of assistant professor (salary range \$27,588-\$34,740 per academic year). Selected candidate will teach nine four-unit courses per year on a quarter system. Areas of competence include physical geography, image and map interpretation, cartography, remote sensing, computer cartography, geographic information systems using ARC-INFO, image processing, field geography, and two or more of the following regional specializations: Africa, Asia, California, Latin America, or Soviet Union; areas of specialization should be applied physical geography, cartography/remote sensing, geographic information systems. The Ph.D. in Geography is required by date of application. Candidates are expected to demonstrate substantial preparation in teaching of all the areas of competence and familiarity with computer geographics on mainframe computers, minicomputers, microcomputers

and peripherals. Two or more years of full-time college teaching is required. Request application form from Crane S. Miller, Chair, Geography Search Committee, Social Sciences Department, California State Polytechnic University, 3801 W. Temple Avenue, Pomona, CA 91768; phone 714-869-3569.

The Department of Social Sciences also has a tenure-track opening for an Assistant Professor of Philosophy (salary range \$27,588-\$30,252 per academic year). Successful candidate will teach nine four-unit courses per year on a quarter system. Areas of specialization are comparative philosophical or religious traditions. Competence in one or more the following areas is required: applied ethics, philosophy of religion, modern religions, tribal religions, religion and the arts (including literature), religion and the social sciences, women and religion. The Ph.D. in Philosophy or Religious Studies must be completed by June 30, 1989; ABD status is required by date of application. Prior teaching experience at the college level is preferred. Request application form from David G. Lord, Chair, Social Sciences Department, California State Polytechnic University, 3801 West Temple Avenue, Pomona, CA 91768; 714-869-3569.

Applicants for either position should submit a completed application form, curriculum vitae, official transcript showing highest degree earned, and three recent letters of reference postmarked no later than *March 15, 1989*. California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, is an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer and hires only individuals lawfully authorized to work in the United States.

The Library of Congress. The Office of the Chief, Hispanic Division, is seeking a secretary/office manager to perform a wide variety of administrative duties. Applicants must have two and one-half years of general experience (or a bachelor's degree) and one year of specialized experience, six months of which must have been at the GS-6 level in the Federal service or at a comparable level of difficulty. The ability to read easily, converse fluently, and write well in Spanish or Portuguese is required. Prospective applicants should telephone (202) 707-5400 to verify that the position is still open.

LASNET: CORRECTION

There was an omission in the LASNET Electronic Addresses listed in the Fall 1988 *LASA Forum*. The correct addresses are:

INTERNET: ILASUT@EMX.CS.UTEXAS.EDU

BITNET: ILCJ775@UTA3081

We apologize for any inconvenience.

RESEARCH & STUDY OPPORTUNITIES

Visiting Scholars Program. The University of Illinois/University of Chicago Joint Center for Latin American Studies announces its annual Visiting Scholars Program for faculty from U.S. colleges and universities without major research facilities. The program enables visiting scholars to do research and write on a Latin American topic for a month during the summer at either Chicago or Urbana, or both. Awards of up to \$1,400 cover travel and basic living expenses for the month of residence. Visiting scholars will be associate faculty of the joint center and will enjoy full access to libraries, faculty, and other resources at both universities. Applicants should submit a letter of application, curriculum vitae, a separate letter of reference, and project proposal of no more than 500 words; the proposal should include an indication of how a period of residence at either or both institutions would relate to the project. The deadline for receipt of applications for summer 1989 is *March 15, 1989*. Send applications and inquiries to: Visiting Scholars Program, The Center for Latin American Studies, University of Chicago, 5848 S. University Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637; phone 312-702-8420.

Fellowship Programs in Grassroots Development. The Inter-American Foundation offers fellowship programs providing initial support for projects; counterpart funding is required to complete field research or graduate studies. The Master's Program awards 15 fellowships annually to candidates in master's or equivalent level programs to support three to six months of field research in Latin America and the Caribbean. Other eligible graduate students include, for example, those studying law or medicine, as well as those conducting predissertation doctoral field research. Applicants from Latin America, the Caribbean or the United States must be enrolled in U.S. universities, must write and speak the local language, and must establish a formal affiliation with an appropriate local institution. The application deadline is *March 1, 1989*.

NEH Summer Seminars. Six-to-eight-week seminars offered by the National Endowment for the Humanities provide college teachers and independent scholars with an opportunity for advanced study or research in their own fields or in areas related to their interests. Each participant will undertake an individual research project or a program of intensive reading under the guidance of the director. A tentative plan of research or study for the seminar is a required part of the application. Stipends of \$2,750 for six weeks or \$3,500 for eight weeks are intended to help cover travel expenses to and from the seminar location, books and other research expenses, and living expenses for the period. The program serves those whose primary duties involve teaching undergraduates as well as scholars with an academic affiliation. Applications from members of Ph.D.-granting departments are normally not accepted. Applicants must have completed their professional training by March

1, 1989. Although an applicant need not have an advanced degree in order to qualify, neither candidates for degrees nor persons seeking support for work leading toward a degree are eligible. An individual may apply to no more than two seminars in any one year. College teachers who participated in NEH Summer Seminars in 1987 or 1988 are not eligible. Seminars that may interest LASA members include: *Critical Approaches to Twentieth-Century Spanish Poetry*, Andrew P. Debicki, University of Kansas, June 12-July 21; *The Oral Tradition in Literature*, John Miles Foley, University of Missouri, June 19-August 11; *Humor in Cross-Cultural Perspective*, Stanley Brandes, University of California-Berkeley, June 26-August 4; *Anthropological Approaches to Law*, Lawrence Rosen, Princeton University, June 12-August 4; *Jazz: A Comparative View*, John F. Szwed, New Haven, CT, June 12-July 21; *Political Cultures*, Aaron Wildavsky, University of California-Berkeley, June 12-August 4. The application deadline is *March 1, 1989*; announcement of awards will take place on March 23, 1989. For further information write: NEH College Teachers Seminars, Room 406, 1100 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506.

Becas de Postgrado en Ciencias Sociales. La Fundación Ford anuncia un concurso de becas en apoyo de estudios de maestría y doctorado en las ciencias sociales para ayudar en la formación profesional de postulantes que se hayan distinguido en esas disciplinas y que, terminados sus programas en el exterior, deseen participar en tareas vinculadas directamente al desarrollo de sus países de origen. Los campos incluidos en el concurso son los de antropología, asuntos internacionales, ciencias políticas, economía y sociología. Se dará también especial atención a solicitudes en temas pertinentes al programa regional de la Fundación Ford: pobreza urbana y rural, derechos humanos, estudios sobre la mujer y administración pública. El financiamiento se extenderá para programas de alta calidad académica en Canadá, Estados Unidos, Europa, Japón y Méjico, y se dirige a ciudadanos que sean a la vez residentes de los países de la región andina y el cono sur. Las becas cubrirán un máximo de dos años de estipendio de sostenimiento. Las solicitudes serán aceptadas para programas de postgrado que se inicien en 1989. Las solicitudes completas deberán llegar a la Fundación Ford, Lima, Perú, como último plazo, *el 15 de marzo de 1989*. La decisión de selección se anunciará aproximadamente el 15 de mayo de 1989. Requisitos para las solicitudes: Curriculum vitae actualizado; descripción del curso de estudios que se propone, incluyendo grado a obtenerse; descripción de sus planes profesionales después de obtener el grado propuesto; carta de una institución nacional que le asegure una posición al retorno del postulante a su país, y constituya, además, la nominación institucional para obtener la beca; tres cartas de evaluación académica y/o profesional; notas o calificaciones del más reciente programa de estudios e información explicando el sistema de calificación utilizado; carta de aceptación incondicional al programa de postgrado; constancia de ayuda económica

complementaria para otros costos; presupuesto detallado, sustentado por información sobre costos del programa proporcionada por la universidad respectiva; resultados del examen TOEFL, si los estudios fueran en inglés, o prueba de nivel semejante si se tratara de otro idioma. Las solicitudes e información deben enviarse a: Programa de Becas, Fundación Ford, Apartado 6025, Lima 100, Perú.

Center for the Study of Philanthropy. The center's Research Awards Program fosters research into all aspects of voluntary sector activities in Latin America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia. It awards grants of up to \$1,500 to scholars engaged in research on such issues as individual, corporate and foundation giving, voluntarism, and social reform by nongovernmental organizations outside the United States. Dissertation-level graduate students and postdoctoral scholars from any discipline are eligible. The size of awards depends on the scope of the project and the candidate's travel and research needs. Applicants should submit a one-to-two page synopsis of their project, including a description of the thesis, methodology, sources, existing literature on the topic, the nature of the project (book article, etc.), an itemized budget for which funds are requested, and the anticipated completion date. If the work is being done under contract to a publisher or as a consultancy, this should also be noted. Include a one-page CV highlighting relevant publications and work experience and a cover sheet listing the candidate's name, address, telephone number, and social security number. Two letters of reference should be sent under separate cover. Proposals must be postmarked no later than *March 31, 1989*, and should be sent to: Center for the Study of Philanthropy, Graduate School and University Center, City University of New York, 33 West 42nd Street, Room 1512, New York, N.Y. 10036-8099.

The United States Institute of Peace. The institute invites proposals in 1989 that use the case-study approach to examine specific historical incidents of regional conflict management and resolution in the developing world. The institute is particularly interested in specific cases from Latin America, as well as Africa, Asia and the Middle East, that may provide insights for the constructive reduction and resolution of contemporary or future international conflicts, as well as pitfalls to be avoided. Examples of Latin American cases that might be examined are *Nicaragua, the Contadora Group, and the Arias Plan; Argentina/Chile and the Beagle Channel Dispute; The Falklands/Malvinas War; The "Soccer War" between Honduras and El Salvador*. The closing date for receipt of solicited grant applications in the current review cycle is *April 1, 1989*. Announcement of awards will be made on or about September 1, 1989. For further information or application material, write or call: Solicited Grant Projects, United States Institute of Peace, 1550 M Street, N.W., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20005-1708; 202-457-1700; fax number 202-429-6063.

Summer School in the Caribbean. Michigan State University has organized a Caribbean Summer Study Program to be held July 10 - August 9, 1989. It will be conducted at three different centers in the Caribbean: the Cave Hill Campus of the University of the West Indies in Barbados, the St. Augustine campus of the University of the West Indies in Trinidad and Tobago, and the University of Guyana at Turkeyen, Georgetown. Students will visit and observe the workings of governmental institutions and major industrial plants, both foreign owned and local. They will also meet political activists and some of the marginalized groups in the society. The program is designed for general undergraduate students interested in sociology, political science, and international relations. Students from other universities are welcome to enroll through Michigan State University's Office of Overseas Study for credit that can be transferred to their own institutions. The approximate cost is \$1,892 including tuition for seven credit hours (out-of-state students pay \$83 per credit), overseas administrative fees, class activities fees for field trips, room and two meals daily at the University of the West Indies; it does not include round-trip transportation, independent travel, or spending money. The enrollment deadline is *April 21, 1989*. A deposit of \$75 is required. Acceptance will be based on academic standing and approval of the MSU program instructors. For additional information contact the Office of Overseas Study, 108 International Center, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-1035, 517-353-8920; or Ruthven N. Prime, James Madison College, 316 South Case Hall, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, 517-353-3538.

FLACSO anuncia cuatro programas docentes que se inician en 1989 en la sede Ecuador: I. Maestría Internacional en Economía con Especialización en Desarrollo y Política Económica; II. Maestría Internacional en Ciencias Políticas con Mención en Políticas Comparadas de los Países Andinos; III. Maestría Internacional en Historia Andina; IV. Diploma Superior en Ciencias Sociales con Mención en Estudios Amazónicos. Con excepción del último, se trata de convocatorias internacionales que considerarán las solicitudes de postulantes de todos los países. La sede recibirá solicitudes hasta el 28 de febrero de 1989. Los interesados que requieran información adicional, o formularios de solicitud, deberán dirigirse a Carmen Gaybor, Area de Coordinación Docente, FLACSO, Avenida Amazonas 1615, or Casilla 6362 CCI, Quito, Ecuador; teléfonos: 236-144, 520-653. Note: Given tight deadline, contact LASA for applications if desired.

PUBLICATIONS

The National Coalition for Haitian Refugees is beginning publication of a monthly bulletin called *Haiti Insight*. It will cover human rights and current affairs in Haiti, and related refugee and immigration concerns in the United States. The bulletin will provide brief, authoritative reports of important Haitian developments in such areas as the government, the army, opposition activities, the economy, relations with the Dominican Republic, and labor and peasant organizations. Subscriptions are available free of charge by writing to: National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, 275 Seventh Avenue, 11th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10001.

LASA PUBLICATIONS FOR SALE

Several LASA publications are available from the secretariat:

Final Report of the LASA Commission on Compliance with the Central America Peace Accords. March 1988. 44p. \$3.00.

Peace and Autonomy on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua. Martin Diskin, Thomas Bossert, Salomón Nahmad S. and Stéfano Varese. Report of the LASA Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom. 1986. 36 p. \$3.00.

Report of the LASA Delegation to Observe the Nicaraguan General Election of November 4, 1984. 36 p. \$3.00

Available back issues of the *LASA Forum* may be purchased for \$5.00 each. All prices include third-class domestic mailing and international surface mail. Please add 50 cents for domestic first class or \$3.50 for airmail outside the United States.

THE CHILEAN PLEBISCITE: A FIRST STEP TOWARD REDEMOCRATIZATION

Report by the

**International Commission of the
Latin American Studies Association
to Observe the Chilean Plebiscite**

Commission Members*

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The Commission was invited by the Asociación Chilena de Ciencia Política. It received funding from the Ford Foundation and acknowledges gratefully the support of Jeffrey Puryear in the Lima office. The report was written by Paul Drake and Arturo Valenzuela incorporating suggestions from each of the commission members.

The Chilean plebiscite of October 5, 1988, presented analysts with three intriguing questions to answer: (1) Why did a dictatorship hold an honest referendum? (2) How did the opposition win a contest controlled by the government? (3) Why did the regime and its supporters accept defeat? The significance of that outcome for the current negotiations over Chile's political future also requires extensive analysis. This report will address these questions through an examination of: the background and context of the plebiscite; the key actors behind the "Yes" and the "No"; the campaigns; the vote itself; the subsequent interpretations, bargaining positions, and issues; and the implications for transition to democracy.¹

*Two other commission members, Liliana de Riz (CEDES, Argentina) and Karen Remmer (University of New Mexico, USA), had to withdraw for personal reasons. Although not a formal member of the commission, Reid Reading, LASA Executive Director, traveled to Chile and made valuable contributions to the commission's work.

Background to the Plebiscite

Military rule in Chile began on September 11, 1973, when the Chilean armed forces overthrew the Popular Unity (UP) government of socialist President Salvador Allende Gossens. The military commanders vowed to stamp out Marxism and depoliticize society. Thereafter, the military junta gradually developed a model of prolonged and personalized authoritarian rule, a free-market economy emphasizing export promotion, and the privatization of government social welfare programs. That system was sustained through sharp repression during the 1973-77 period and through an economic boom fueled by financial speculation in the second half of the 1970s.

In response to international criticisms of human rights abuses, General Pinochet, who assumed the title of President of the Republic in December 1974, held his first plebiscite in 1978. It called for a "yes" or "no" vote on the following proposition: "In the face of the international aggression unleashed against the government of the fatherland, I support President Pinochet in his defense of the dignity of Chile, and I reaffirm the legitimate right of the republic to conduct the process of institutionalization in a manner befitting its sovereignty." The government claimed a 75 per cent victory in that referendum, but it was conducted with no guarantees of freedom, secrecy, or fairness.

Thereafter, the regime sought to institutionalize its transformation of Chile through an authoritarian constitution. It was ratified in a 1980 plebiscite held at the height of the economic boom, again with no safeguards for opposition participation or honest voting. According to the government, 67 per cent of the voters approved the new charter. Reliable reports indicate that President Pinochet wanted an uninterrupted sixteen more years in office, but he was convinced to include a provision for a plebiscite midway through that period. Transitional articles in the constitution gave President Pinochet sweeping powers for eight years and established the Junta as a legislative body until a congress was elected in 1990. Its permanent articles created a "protected democracy" by providing for a tutelary role for the armed forces through their control of a national security council with the power to "admonish" other organs of the state on national security grounds.²

In 1982 an international recession coupled with domestic mismanagement ushered in the worst depression

in Chile since the Great Crash of 1929. In response, Chilean labor leaders spearheaded an outpouring of discontent which shook the regime and galvanized the previously downtrodden and dispirited opposition party leaders into action. Through much of 1983 and 1984 protests and strikes periodically paralyzed the country. By 1985, groups on the political right had joined the center-left parties in signing a "National Accord," demanding fundamental changes in the government's political itinerary and the establishment of a fuller democracy than the one envisioned in the 1980 charter. Soon thereafter, however, the protests ran their course and the accord fell apart in the face of government intransigence and serious disagreements among the signatories. The government rebuffed opposition demands for a more rapid redemocratization timetable, insisting that its legitimacy and authority rested on absolute adherence to the 1980 Constitution, which provided for a phased and orderly transition. The military leadership believed that its constitution, the exclusion of the Marxists from political participation, and the free enterprise economic system would be their fundamental legacy. By 1986, the economy was well into a recovery, retaining many essential features of the market-driven "Chicago-Boys" model. As opposition hopes faded that democracy might be restored through social mobilization, the fragmented parties began to focus on the promised plebiscite.

Many members of the opposition had been reluctant to participate in the plebiscite because they feared that doing so would legitimize the authoritarian regime—and that they would probably lose in any case. They gradually accepted participation in an inherently undemocratic and unequal contest because no other viable alternative existed. Neither social protests nor international pressure could convince the regime to hold competitive elections or to step down prior to the plebiscite. The insurrectionary path endorsed by part of the Communist Party offered no hope of victory, particularly after the failed assassination attempt against Pinochet in September of 1986.

Moreover, the experience of other transitions had shown that it was possible to use the government's own rules to challenge a dictatorship. Democratic forces elsewhere—Brazil, Uruguay, the Philippines—had taken advantage of small institutional spaces to combat authoritarian regimes. The opposition believed that, although dictators never call elections they expect to lose, they can be defeated when their foes are united.

By 1988, the context had changed dramatically from the 1980 referendum. Although the economy was doing relatively well in both periods, its inequities had by now been exposed. Whereas the social and political opposition groups had been cowed and silenced in 1980, they were now regrouped and assertive. Highly restricted liberalization had given them some small openings to express their views, for example through a number of radio stations and two newspapers. Moreover, the international setting had been totally transformed. Nearly all the other Latin American dictatorships had been replaced by democracies, and the United States had taken a stronger stand in favor of

democratization. Nevertheless, Pinochet still seemed determined to perpetuate his rule, still controlled the major means of coercion and communication, still presided over prosperity, and still evoked support or fear from a large segment of the population.

Preparing the Plebiscite

According to the constitution, the commanders-in-chief of the army, navy, air force, and *carabineros* (national police) had to name a date and a single candidate for the plebiscite prior to December 11, 1988. Within thirty to sixty days of that announcement, a yes-or-no referendum would be held on that nominee to serve as president for eight years from March 11, 1989 to March 11, 1997. In the event of a victory for the No, the current government would rule until March 11, 1990. At that time, a president and two houses of congress—to be chosen in competitive elections on December 14, 1989—would take office. Despite reservations on the part of the air force and *carabinero* commanders and doubts among important leaders of the Right, Pinochet was selected on August 30, 1988 to be the candidate in the October 5 plebiscite.

Although rejecting the opposition's call for truly free and competitive elections, the junta was committed to assuring that the plebiscite would be seen as a valid expression of public opinion. Throughout 1988, the junta had insisted on allowing sufficient time for voter registration (there had been none in 1978 or 1980). When the registries opened in February of 1988, the authorities registered their partisans first, including members of the armed forces. Both the government and the opposition felt that a large registration would help their respective causes, but the opposition feared that the cumbersome registration process was designed to make it difficult for its supporters to register in time. Also, the opposition was convinced that most Chileans, particularly of the middle and working classes, were tired of military rule and wanted a change. The government, however, was convinced that the "silent majority" wanted order and progress and would not follow the politicians.

The junta further opened up the process the last thirty days of the campaign by lifting the repressive state of exception on August 24. It allowed virtually all exiles to return home after September 1. For the first time in fifteen years, the opposition had fifteen minutes every day on national television and with some restrictions was permitted to hold public meetings and rallies. Although these liberalizing measures did not eliminate the government's huge advantages in the campaign, they did give the opposition a fighting chance.

The most important safeguard was that the rules for the voting itself were designed to insure fairness. The regulations for the plebiscite grew out of an amalgam of new laws decreed by the junta and previous electoral practices in Chile. This blend produced a contradictory system in which the process leading up to the plebiscite was very authoritarian—with many restrictions on dissent and

opposition activity—but the procedures for voting, as the report will detail further below, were very democratic, with many protections against fraud.

Why did a regime long noted for its widespread violations of human rights and democratic norms structure a fair voting process? Several reasons stand out. First, the regime wanted to use the voting to legitimize the system established in the 1980 Constitution, regardless of the outcome. They could scarcely argue for the legitimacy of their constitution while violating it. Polls showed that the overwhelming majority of citizens thought both sides should recognize the honest results: 87 per cent if the Yes won and 96 per cent if the No won. Chileans were aware of the destabilizing impact of rigged elections under authoritarian regimes in the Philippines and elsewhere.

Second, the armed forces felt honor-bound to abide by its own constitution. Although its behavior since 1973 often appeared arbitrary to outsiders, the military always saw itself as obeying strict rules and codes. In its own subculture, it was just as legalistic as its civilian adversaries. According to the constitution, "the armed forces and *carabineros*, as armed bodies, are essentially obedient and not deliberative." The military's own internal regulations—as the opposition often reminded it—prohibited soldiers from "participating in politics or in demonstrations or meetings of this type."

Third, some minimal guarantees of fairness were necessary to convince the No forces to participate. During the year prior to the plebiscite, the junta met many opposition demands for electoral safeguards, even though there were never any formal face-to-face negotiations. For example, the government made concessions by postponing the date of the plebiscite to allow full registration, by lifting the state of emergency, by allowing exiles to return, and by granting access to television.

Fourth, the whole world was watching, as thousands of foreign journalists and observers, including prominent personalities such as Adolfo Suárez, Yves Montand and a large delegation of legislators from numerous countries, poured into Chile. The government and its partisans generally viewed those observers as prejudiced and biased against them and warned that they might get hurt. Nevertheless, the regime was anxious to overcome Chile's political and diplomatic isolation. Foreigners were allowed to enter and observe freely. The international press, which had often been shunned by government officials, was welcomed by a press service eager to please. The opposition for its part embraced the visitors as vital guarantors that the plebiscite would be held fairly or exposed as a charade.

Fifth, the Yes forces were sure of winning and did not want any irregularities to tarnish their expected victory. Why was the Pinochet camp so sure of victory? It controlled the timing and rules; moreover, it believed that it had won decisively previous plebiscites in 1978 and 1980. The government counted on the opposition being divided, fratricidal, and ineffectual. Polls indicated generally low public esteem for opposition parties and politicians. Voting

"No" seemed like a leap into a void. By contrast, Pinochet offered security and continuity. The Yes leaders relied on fear of a return to the conflicts and crises of the Allende years. They hoped that the homecoming of some of the more militant leaders of the Popular Unity would arouse traumatic memories. Indeed, the return of Communist Volodia Teitelboim damaged the opposition when he called for street demonstrations to protest a Yes victory or immediate formation of a provisional government to consummate a No victory. Although the long time Communist leader soon disavowed his earlier statements, they did cause considerable concern in opposition circles.

The *pinochetistas* could use the resources of the government itself—such as public works—to bolster their campaign. Both the armed forces and public employees were pressured to register and vote "yes," as were poor people dependent upon government subsidies. They also possessed a mammoth financial and media advantage over the opposition. The Yes campaign controlled most of the newspapers and radio stations, as well as all the TV channels except for the No's token fifteen minutes daily during the last month before the plebiscite.

In addition the Yes enjoyed solid support from nearly all the economic elites, who not only contributed to the campaign but also urged their employees and workers to vote correctly and in some cases threatened to fire them if they did not. They were also confident that two other traditionally conservative groups—women and country dwellers—would provide the margin of victory.

Finally, the relatively buoyant macro-economic indicators augured well for people voting their pocketbooks. The country was in the third year of growth rates over 5 percent. Inflation was down to 12 percent, while investment, employment, and real wages were rising. Copper prices were high, and total exports promised to exceed those of Argentina in 1988. Chile enjoyed a trade surplus and accolades from foreign bankers for its successful servicing of the external debt. The government assumed that the Yes would run particularly well in those provinces that had experienced significant export development.

Above all, the overconfidence of the Yes reflected a classic flaw in authoritarian regimes. The leader often gets only part of the picture, as advisers and underlings tell him only what he wants to hear. Pessimistic forecasts from even pro-government pollsters were ignored or rejected by the Pinochet camp. In the final analysis, that self-deception left the regime surprisingly unprepared to counterattack the predictable triumph of the No. And, while some government supporters, particularly in the intelligence services, may have realized that the No stood a good chance of winning, by the time that realization set in it was too late to reverse the process that had been put in place.

Key Actors

The Yes

The Yes campaign was dominated by Augusto Pinochet. Although some leaders of the armed forces (outside

the army) and the civilian Right preferred a younger, non-military, less confrontational candidate, Pinochet prevailed. Even polls that showed him doing poorly indicated that he would be the regime's strongest nominee in a two-way contest, because of name recognition if nothing else. No other political figure in the country enjoyed his level of support—even though that support rarely went over 20 percent. Shrewder political engineers might have opted for a more moderate Center-Right alliance to effect a smooth transition isolating the Left. That possibility was obviated by the ambitions of Pinochet, who could not be denied so long as the army stood behind him.

The armed forces were not monolithic, but they seemed united in their desire to avoid open rifts or feuds. The opposition still lacked good access to or information about thinking within the services. Most military leaders apparently agreed on the need to hold an orderly and correct plebiscite, to resist pressures from the United States, to preserve their political and economic models, to proscribe the Communists, and to rule out any discussion of human rights violations. They also wanted to protect their professionalism and discipline from further politicization. Despite fifteen years of adamant support for an ideological government, the armed forces still saw themselves as nondeliberating, apolitical soldiers. Available information suggests that most army commanders strongly favored Pinochet's election, partly because they had been appointed by him. Some Chileans, however, conjectured that a few officers may not have been totally dismayed to see their longstanding commander-in-chief lose.

The other strongest pillar of support for Pinochet was the property-owning class. Despite disagreement with some of his economic policies, most entrepreneurs staunchly backed the Yes, as evidenced by the statements and activities of the Industrial Promotion Society (Sociedad de Fomento Fabril-SOFOFA), the Confederation of Production and Commerce (Confederación de la Producción y del Comercio), and the National Agricultural Society (Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura-SNA.) Rural as well as urban capitalists were committed to the Yes and pressured their workers to vote accordingly. Unlike some other cases of transitions toward democracy, the bourgeoisie did not disengage from the authoritarian regime. They argued that a firm hand at the helm was best to defend the economic model, and they pointed with horror to the economic and social crises in neighboring democracies. Moreover, they did not trust the opposition, either the Christian Democrats or the Marxists. As one leader of the Yes explained, "Pinochet can learn democracy better than the opposition can learn economics."

Although not openly active in the Yes campaign, business groups issued dire warnings of the consequences of a No victory. On the eve of the plebiscite, SOFOFA projected falling rates of investment, growth, and employment in the event of an opposition triumph. Some entrepreneurs' commitment to the free-enterprise model, however, did not mean that they were absolutely dedicated to Pinochet and military rule; a number of business execu-

tives realized that most members of the opposition were not ready to risk embarking on a drastically different economic course.

The rejuvenated rightist parties mainly backed Pinochet, although not without serious reservations. Many endorsed a Yes for the system more than a Yes for Pinochet personally. No formal alliance of parties for the Yes emerged. The largest single organization was National Renovation, led by Sergio Onofre Jarpa. It was composed of independents and remnants of the old National Party. Whereas National Renovation was dedicated principally to the general conservative agenda of private enterprise and anti-communism, National Advance, an ultra-right group, was committed to Pinochet as a caudillo. Other factions of the former National and Radical Parties also backed the Yes, as did new entities such as the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) of Jaime Guzmán, one of the authors of the 1980 Constitution.

The No

In contrast to the Yes campaign, the No camp was dominated by political parties. During 1986-87, they pressed in vain for free, competitive elections. Previous unity efforts including the Democratic Alliance, the National Accord and the Assembly of Civilian Organizations had not been successful in bringing about the downfall of the regime. After a painstaking agreement in February of 1988, 16 parties finally came together to form the Command for the No. They subsequently hammered out minimal understandings on common social and economic policies (in May) and on future democratic institutions (in August). As the largest member party, the Christian Democrats (DC) became the leaders of the coalition and their president Patricio Aylwin, functioned as its spokesperson. The other key component was the Ricardo Nuñez faction of the Socialist Party, represented in the Command by Ricardo Lagos and the Partido por la Democracia (PPD). Smaller progressive parties such as the Social Democrats and Humanists joined in. The No also included a few prominent former officials of the regime, such as Pinochet's former ambassador to the United States and former press secretary. A small faction of the National Party, arguing that Chile's rightists should return to a democratic tradition they were proud of, also supported the No.

An important breakthrough occurred when the socialist faction led by jailed Allende foreign minister Clodomiro Almeyda decided to back the No and join the Command. Breaking with the Communist party which had resisted registration and considered participation in the plebiscite as a ruse that would favor the regime, the Socialists gave the No Command important backing from the Marxist left. Other groups of the United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU) that joined the No included the Christian Left, whose leader Luis Maira played an important role in the leadership of the opposition effort. One of the United Left's slogans encapsulated its position: "Con Allende en la Memoria, Con el No hasta la Victoria, Venceremos." In

other words, they retained a socialist project for the long run, but they accepted the plebiscite as the highest priority for the short run. Moreover, they stressed that their vision of socialism did not denote a return to the UP program of 1973. While accepting the importance of simply voting No, the parties identified with the IU still emphasized the need for social mobilization to truly democratize the state, the economy, and the society.

The most important No force outside the Command was the Communist Party (PC). In 1980 it had reversed its historically gradualist position by endorsing armed struggle as one means to topple the dictatorship and set up, with Cuban help, a military wing. By 1988 the PC was grappling with an agonizing dilemma: it needed to maintain a radical posture in order to mollify its more militant constituents, but it needed to moderate in order to begin to reintegrate itself into normal political life. Although severely divided over tactics and strategies, its dominant leaders gradually came to accept the need to follow the guidelines of the No Command and the desirability of returning to its traditional pro-electoral political line. After arguing for months for abstention to delegitimize the plebiscite and for mass mobilization to destabilize the regime, in June 1988 the PC issued a declaration calling for a No vote, and most Communists agreed to get out the vote and to refrain from street disruptions.

Even farther removed from the No Command was the small Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), which also tendered its reluctant support. Most distanced was the tiny, insurrectionary Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front, tied to the Communist Party, which had tried to assassinate Pinochet in 1986. By the time of the plebiscite, a portion of the Front had broken away from PC control, but nonetheless vowed restraint during the balloting.

As the plebiscite approached and the resuscitated political parties took full command, the role of other organizations faded. The most important of these for the opposition had been labor unions. In the wake of severe repression, restrictive labor legislation, and high unemployment, trade unions remained very weak, representing only about 10 per cent of the workforce. They were also divided. The largest confederation, the United Workers' Central (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores-CUT), had only been patched together in August 1988 and was scarcely ready to mount a major effort. Moreover its top leader, Manuel Bustos, had been sent into internal exile. The CUT was dominated by the Socialists, Communists, and Christian Democrats. More conservative, anti-communist DC unions belonged to the Democratic Workers' Central (Central Democrática de Trabajadores-CDT). There were also a few independent and even pro-government unions.

Although most unionists campaigned for the No, they left the initiative to their parties. Some union activists received death threats, and many workers felt pressure from their employers to vote Yes; one boss even tried to write a Yes commitment into a collective bargaining agreement. At the plant level, the unions helped educate workers on how to vote and convinced them that their

bosses would not know how they cast their ballots. In the outlying provinces where parties were weaker, unions provided crucial organizers for the No. At all levels, most union leaders gave the No campaign high priority. They believed that this step toward democracy was essential to subsequent changes in the oppressive labor-industrial relations laws and, eventually, their standard of living.

Other opposition nuclei among intellectuals, students, human rights organizations, and *pobladores* also worked for the No, but they played a secondary role to the political parties. Like labor, these interest groups were not only supporting the No but also focusing attention on their own grievances. For example, the Grouping of Families of the Detained and Disappeared (Agrupación de Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos) kept alive the hope of justice for past human rights violations.

The No expected to draw support primarily from men, younger voters, voters in large cities, and better educated voters. Polls showed that the No was receiving support from both middle and low income voters, but the largest percentage of support was coming from low income voters. *Pobladores* proved to be a highly contested sector. The Yes used its control of the municipalities to woo voters with employment programs, housing improvements, and even parties for children. The No enjoyed greater success with its class-based appeals to the impoverished, but everyone agreed that the Yes would have some success in the *poblaciones*.

From 1973 to 1985 the Roman Catholic Church had been essential to the survival and coherence of the opposition, but the clergy muted its participation as the show-down approached. The Church did not align publicly with either the No or the Yes, although the Episcopal Committee did call for a "consensus" candidate before Pinochet's nomination, indicating that it did not consider Pinochet the most appropriate person to lead the nation in the new term. The bishops still criticized the government's economic model for lack of concern with the poor. The Church also provided vital protection for the independent think tanks of the opposition intellectuals, whose polling guided the No campaign in the period leading up to the contest. But the Church's most significant contribution was to press for conditions that would assure a tolerably fair and representative plebiscite, once the government rejected calls for competitive elections.

The Catholic Church spearheaded two national registration drives in 1988. A small program called "Bethlehem" concentrated on civic education. A larger effort, the Civic Crusade (Cruzada Cívica) spread throughout the entire country to convince people that as citizens they should register and vote without fear. The Crusade received funds from the United States and the Organization of American States to help insure a free election. It concentrated heavily on young people who had never voted before. One innovative technique was holding rock concerts in small towns with the price of admission an electoral registration card. Beyond adding voters to the rolls, the Crusade raised consciousness about what it meant to

participate in a democracy. The work of voluntary groups like the Cruzada contributed significantly to reinforcing the opposition's campaign by providing people with basic information and dispelling lingering fear.

The No forces themselves received international support, though mainly in the form of solidarity rather than finances. Indeed, monetary assistance from overseas fell short of expectations. The most significant influx was \$410,000 from the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy. Pro-government groups like the newspaper *El Mercurio*, which had received U.S. covert aid against Allende, criticized this reliance on foreign funding. The No replied that the government had far more resources than the opposition and that accepting U.S. assistance was a lesser evil than enthroning Pinochet for another eight years.

The U.S. embassy was particularly outspoken in its support for democratization. Without taking sides, the U.S. government stood by the December 17, 1987, statement of the president and the secretary of state:

For the ideal of popular sovereignty to become reality in Chile, the United States believes that a climate of freedom and fair competition must be established many months before the actual balloting takes place. This atmosphere will be marked by easy and equitable access to the mass media, especially television, by unrestricted discussion of political issues, broad freedom of assembly, early announcement of the rules of any electoral proceeding, facilitation of registration by prospective voters, and freedom for citizens and political groups to campaign peacefully in favor of their ideas. States of exception which limit freedom of assembly, association, and expression are not compatible with a legitimate electoral procedure.³

The Foreign Ministers of the European Economic Community and the presidents of Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela issued similar calls for procedural guarantees of free expression. The U.S. embassy's explicit arguments for democratic freedoms and its implicit sympathy for the No enraged the government and heartened the opposition. Although the United States applauded the regime's economic model, its relations with the Chilean government had become quite poor.

The Campaign *The Yes*

The government and the armed forces mainly ran the Yes campaign. It began in earnest after the attempted assassination of Pinochet in September 1986 with a massive and unrelenting television campaign aimed at convincing Chileans that those who stood with the government were "millions." Public employees were mobilized and government monies used to support the campaign, despite the illegality of such practices. Indeed, the top campaign

manager was the Minister of the Interior, Sergio Fernández. The Yes people gave seasoned politicians from the rightist parties a very small role, another indication of the government's extreme confidence and the continued disdain and distrust of the authorities for politicians of any stripe.

The Yes campaign stressed two major themes: order and progress. Its dominant appeal was to fear of disorder, of communism, and of chaos. Warning that the No signified a return to the Popular Unity period, Yes television spots showed masked Miristas assaulting helpless housewives out shopping. The Pinochet camp conveyed the message that the No constituted a vote against social stability and national security: "The life of Chile is at stake." News items warned that radical leftists were planning to disrupt the plebiscite. Such scare tactics may have swayed some undecided voters in the closing days of the campaign.

The second major Yes refrain was the triumph of the economic model: "Chile: A Winning Country (Chile: un país ganador)." A sharp contrast was drawn between the successes in Chile and the failures in neighboring democracies. The regime stressed rising exports and falling unemployment and inflation. Many Chileans obviously agreed with this positive assessment of the economy, but many others were concerned with the model's failure to improve their own standard of living. Even some who hailed the essential features of the free-market model were concerned about their own income level and the social costs paid by millions of Chileans. In a national television debate, economist Alejandro Foxley hit a sore spot when he charged that 5 million out of the 12 million Chileans lived in extreme poverty. In any case, most Chileans realized that the election was not exclusively about economics, even though such issues were very important; the plebiscite was also about politics: about dictatorship versus democracy.

Among lesser themes of the Yes campaign was the appeal of Pinochet himself. Here the motif was a gentle, paternalistic, grandfatherly figure in civilian garb, embracing babies, old women, and the poor. Like the No campaign, the Yes propaganda claimed that choosing its option was a vote for democracy. There is some evidence that Pinochet's transformation from stern strongman to smiling democrat was an image-making mistake. Although never charismatic, Pinochet may have had more magnetism as an iron-fisted, omnipotent, unyielding military commander. He lost his aura of invincibility. Throughout 1987-88, non-government polls had shown that most people planned to vote No but nonetheless expected Pinochet to triumph; in September, a majority still favored the No but now believed that Pinochet could be defeated.

Pinochet's candidacy aroused passions on both sides. One poll showed that the word Chileans most frequently associated with him was "abuse." For many other Chileans, he symbolized "security." Those who feared uncertainty preferred "the devil they know." Meanwhile, his most fervent partisans hailed Pinochet as the savior of the fatherland.

Just as Pinochet's own constitution painted him into a corner, so did his economic model. The very success of the emphasis on the market instead of the state inhibited his ability to use populist measures to win votes. The government made some efforts to improve its electoral position, including a reduction in the value added tax, an expansion of housing subsidies and construction, a special payment to state workers, an increase in social services and public works, and an amnesty for overdue water rates. However, it did not undertake a massive campaign of public expenditures to "buy" votes and refused to follow the advice of some officials who wanted large-scale debt relief for mortgage holders who had fallen behind in their payments.

The Yes campaign also made little use of rallies and demonstrations. It became clear that the regime had trouble competing with the opposition where the latter had a comparative advantage: electoral politics rather than military maneuvers. Pinochet was not given to many public appearances or speeches in Santiago, although he was more visible in other parts of the country where the government thought its position was much stronger. Generally the Yes marches paled beside the turnout for the No. The final demonstration of support for the Yes was reduced to an automobile cavalcade around Santiago. Although large and noisy, that caravan looked weak compared to the final No rally; it also conveyed an image of the upper class composition of the Yes camp.

Some Yes supporters counted on intimidation to win for their side. Many municipal authorities worked for the Yes and harassed No partisans, especially in rural areas. Rallies for the No were sometimes shunted off to obscure locations. Teachers and other public employees were pressured to back the Yes. There were numerous instances of arbitrary detentions of No campaigners and dismissals from their jobs. Poorer Chileans who favored the No feared loss of government subsidies for food, education, and housing; the opposition advised them to "Say Yes, Vote No." Numerous anti-government journalists continued to be censored or arrested. In the first six months of 1988, the Church's Vicariate of Solidarity tabulated 1,780 arrests for political reasons. Several No leaders received kidnaping or death threats from right-wing vigilante groups, such as the Chilean Anticommunist Action (*Acción Chilena Anticomunista*). With the lifting of the state of exception the month before the plebiscite, however, more and more Chileans felt safe opposing the government.

The No

In the face of the government's intrinsic advantages, the key to the No's victory was overcoming three fears: fear of Pinochet, fear of *Unidad Popular*, and fear of the unknown. Giving the people courage and optimism was crucial to begin recapturing a majority for the Center and Left. The social protests beginning in 1983 had helped reduce the level of fear. The No forces furthered that effort with a door-to-door campaign to get their people and some of their parties registered during 1987-88.

Women and campesinos were especially targeted for visits in the final lap of the contest. The appearance of No leaders on a few television forums—especially a dramatic denunciation of Pinochet by Ricardo Lagos—also dispelled fear. So did the No rallies, particularly the climactic gathering of hundreds of thousands of supporters in Santiago four days before the balloting. That rally culminated the "March of Happiness," converging on the capital from the northern and southern tips of the country.

The principal No effort that transformed the latent No majority into reality, however, was the twenty-seven 15-minute TV "spots." Although the authorities scheduled the spots late at night in the expectation that few people would watch them, polls showed that over 90 per cent of the people saw them. Compared to the heavy-handed, violent images conveyed by the Yes, the No adopted a rainbow as its symbol of joyous pluralism. The commercials transformed the negative word "no" into the embodiment of "happiness." Their spokespersons appealed to national pride in the democratic heritage. Whereas the Yes concentrated on the traumas—shortages, street clashes, property seizures—of the UP period, the No focused on the more recent horrors—murder, imprisonment, torture, exile—of the Pinochet years. Above all, however, the No emphasized the future instead of the past, a future of hope and reconciliation. The TV campaign's technically superior music and images aimed at a youthful audience.

Although the government still controlled television and continued to purchase air time for a multiplicity of paid advertisements, the No's brief interlude made a huge impact after fifteen years of prohibition. The TV spots proved particularly effective in the outlying areas, where national leaders of the opposition seldom had been seen. The No spots were thought superior by most Chileans, especially young people: 59 percent of youths considered them best, versus 16 percent who liked the Yes spots better. The TV blitz convinced many wavering Chileans that the No was legitimate and acceptable. It persuaded many others that they should not fear retribution for voting no, that they could mark "no" with impunity, as the ads repeated "without hatred, without fear and without violence."

Another key to the opposition's success was its disciplined unity. Ironically, the plebiscite structure helped cohere an incredibly diverse and fragile coalition around the one thing on which they totally agreed: no to Pinochet and his regime. There was very tight coordination on every official speech, strategy, tactic, and contingency plan. Voters were given instructions to cast their ballots early and then go home, to avoid any provocations, and to await further orders from the No Command.

The No also succeeded by striking a conciliatory tone. They downplayed divisive issues, such as retribution for human rights violations, class conflicts, and ideological disputes. They stressed that the No was not a vote against the armed forces or the economic model. Opposition economists merely indicated a preference for a mixed economy with respect for private property and expanded

programs for the poor. In contrast with the government's bellicose rhetoric, the No mainly portrayed the plebiscite as a reencounter with Chile's former civic culture, as a way for both Yes and No voters to solve disputes peacefully. Some No and Yes party leaders even reached tacit agreements to share information and recognize valid results on election day.

Two days before the voting, all electioneering legally stopped, except for a stray Yes banner or a No painted on the back of a bus. Nevertheless, the government circumvented the media blackout by presenting propaganda as news and by showing television "documentaries" on the difficulties of the Allende years. An expectant quiet settled over the nation, interrupted by car horns beeping out slogans of the two campaigns. Mysterious blackouts darkened the country the night before the voting. Beneath the surface tranquility, fear and tension were palpable, as the clock wound down to a historic faceoff. Although both sides exuded confidence, the Yes worried that their victory might trigger mass protests, especially from the Communists. The No wondered whether Pinochet knew he was about to be defeated, and what he might do about it.

Voting Procedures

When electoral registration closed the day Pinochet was nominated as the official candidate, 7,435,913 Chileans signed up to vote, a record 92.1 percent of the eligible voters age eighteen or older. Registration was administered by the government-appointed civilian National Electoral Service (Servicio Electoral Nacional-SEN). Citizens could either register near their places of residence or work. A polling table (*mesa*) was constituted for each group of 350 citizens registered at a particular center. In the end 22,131 *mesas* were created. Following earlier Chilean electoral practice, men and women registered in separate *mesas* and would vote in separate polling places.⁴

Opposition leaders repeatedly sought assurances that the registration process would be carried out with openness and fairness. In addition to being concerned that registration was expensive and cumbersome, and thus deliberately designed to discriminate against poorer citizens, they also feared that they would not be able to ascertain whether or not the registration rolls were legitimate. Electoral officials themselves were for the most part understanding and accommodating, and showed willingness to meet not only with opposition leaders but with a host of international visitors coming to Chile to inspect the preparations for the plebiscite.

After some hesitation government authorities agreed to provide for a fee the registry lists by *mesa*. They refused, however, to provide the opposition with a copy of the computer tapes with the entire registry. Only with access to the entire registry could technical experts ascertain whether there was any double registration or whether phantom voters had been added to the rolls. In the end the opposition was not able to carry out a fully systematic analysis of the final registry because it became impossible

to create a parallel record. Nevertheless, campaign leaders were able to check numerous *mesas* confirming that the registries included actual voters and that there was no systematic multiple registration which could have permitted widespread multiple voting. There is fragmentary evidence that some multiple voting took place in the 1980 plebiscite when there was no registration system and voters cast ballots with only their identification cards.

The voting mechanism conformed to traditional Chilean electoral practices.⁵ Each *mesa* was administered by five officials drawn by lot from a list of fifteen individuals registered in that *mesa* and proposed by the three members of the regional electoral board (*junta electoral*). Opposition leaders feared that because the seventy regional boards were made up of officials named by the executive, they would attempt to designate polling officials supportive of the Yes option. This did not happen, however, since the several thousand officials that each board had to nominate were drawn more or less randomly from the lists of each *mesa*. Thus, the opposition parties had ample representation among *mesa* officials.

On voting day, voters would show their identification cards to *mesa* officials on approaching the voting booth. The identification card, which contains both a picture and the signature of the voter, would allow polling officials to identify the voter and compare the person's name and signature with the ones appearing on the master registry of all 350 voters in that particular *mesa*. After signing next to his or her name, the voter would leave the identification card with the president of the *mesa* and obtain a ballot, after the number on a small tab on the ballot had been entered next to the voter's name. The voter would proceed to a closed voting booth and indicate a preference by marking a straight line through either the Yes or No options. The ballot simply said:

Plebiscito Presidente de la República
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte

Sí No

The voter would next fold the ballot, seal it with an attached adhesive, and return the ballot to the *mesa* president. The president would then tear off the tab and instruct the voter to place the ballot in a box with an open window on the front. Though some voters feared that the tabs on the ballots could identify their vote, any identification was impossible. Poll watchers for opposition parties could observe every procedure and had a right to challenge any that they deemed unacceptable.

The greatest challenge to the opposition in preparing for the vote, once it became apparent that people were registering in large numbers, was the selection and training of poll watchers (*apoderados*). Only the parties which had officially registered had a right to assign poll watchers to every *mesa*.⁶ For the opposition these were the Christian Democratic Party, the Humanist Party, and the Party for Democracy. Although the validity of the Humanist Party's

registration application was questioned by the electoral service shortly before the plebiscite, the Humanists were nevertheless able to assign poll watchers because the service's ruling was under appeal.

Together, the three opposition parties had to come up with 120,000 volunteers who would serve as poll watchers and back-ups for the thousands of *mesas*. The enormity of this task can be appreciated by the fact that together the three parties had not obtained that many signatures when they registered as parties. Party leaders realized that individuals willing to sign their name to a party registration form might not be willing to take the much more public role of acting as a poll watcher. In the month before the nomination of Pinochet, opposition parties had lined up a fairly large number of poll watchers in major cities. However, they had done little work in the smaller towns and rural areas and were having difficulty in obtaining volunteers in the poorer suburbs of Santiago. Often national leaders, who spent countless weekends going to different neighborhoods to conduct poll-watcher training courses, found that only a handful of those who had promised to attend actually did so. It was only after the beginning of the television campaign and the relaxation of fear that the opposition was able to recruit enough poll watchers. For the most part the opposition parties had better coverage on election day than did the parties supporting the Pinochet option. The Christian Democratic Party and the Party for Democracy appointed the lion's share of all poll watchers.

Among the parties favoring the Yes, National Renovation and National Advance were entitled to assign poll watchers. In addition, the candidate (Pinochet) had his own poll watchers, many of whom were recruited from the ranks of the UDI. Parties of the right also had difficulty recruiting poll watchers and were much less organized than the opposition parties. The authorities who ran the campaign for Pinochet paid more attention to propaganda and house-to-house campaigning than to organization for election day.

For the opposition, poll watchers for each *mesa* were crucial not only to monitor the fairness of the vote but also to provide a final tally for the parallel count that opposition parties were setting up for election night. Drawing on the experience of voting in other countries, notably the Philippines, the Command for the No was convinced that it could not hope to win the plebiscite unless it had its own foolproof system for computing the votes. Help from abroad and particularly from the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in the United States played an important role in giving the opposition the capacity to set up a parallel count. A computer system was devised which would receive voting totals from all *mesas* dispatched to Santiago via fax machines located around the country. Support from other countries and foundations contributed to the work of individual parties and party-affiliated research and political action centers.

The opposition was able to set up three separate mechanisms for monitoring the vote. In addition to the Command for the No, the Christian Democratic party created its own computer system with a similar format. At the same time, the Committee for Free Elections (CEL), also with help from the NDI, devised a vote count that would tally a sample of communities. The goal was to give the opposition the ability to monitor and project electoral trends quickly. The sample consisted of 10 percent of all *mesas* and was carefully selected to be representative of the entire country.

The importance of the parallel count to the opposition was such that extraordinary measures were taken to shield the computer system, particularly of the Committee for Free Elections. Concern was heightened when a bomb went off at the CEL headquarters in the days leading up to the vote count. CEL hid its computer and used a network of private homes and couriers who were not fully aware of all of the contact points to protect its operation. Both the No command and the CEL protected their power supplies by setting up auxiliary generators.

A parallel count system was also set up by the "Independents for the Yes" and was located at the Casa del Sí on Londres Street in Santiago. Because of their close contacts with the government, however, the Yes count planned to obtain their information directly from the authorities and then enter it into their computer system. In interviews with the LASA delegation, leaders and technical personnel of the Yes campaign dismissed the CEL quick-count effort by arguing that the sample of voting places chosen was a biased one, deliberately designed to under-represent the Yes vote by selecting polling places in areas that favored the opposition. CEL officials vehemently denied this, noting that they had taken the lead in approaching the Yes campaign technicians with a view to exchanging information on election night and assuring each other that the count was indeed fair. The Yes campaign, closely tied to the authorities, refused to respond to those overtures.

More receptive to conversations about sharing information on election night were the leaders of National Renovation, which did not have its own electoral count. They did not agree, however, to the proposal of the campaign for the No to select a sample of *mesas* based on information from their own poll watchers to systematically compare their information with that of the opposition. They also planned to rely on the government authorities for results, even though they had been critical of the government's handling of the campaign and its undisguised contempt for politicians of all stripes, including those who supported the Pinochet option.

Political Climate Immediately Prior to the Plebiscite

Days before the plebiscite took place, opposition leaders became alarmed by warnings that came directly from sources in the *carabineros*. This information cautioned that elements tied to the government security forces, indepen-

dent of the *carabineros*, had prepared contingency plans aimed at provoking violent confrontations the night of the plebiscite, confrontations which might then lead to the interruption of voting and ballot counting and a suspension of the plebiscite.⁷ In particular, *carabinero* officials were concerned that several of their buses had been stolen over the previous months. They feared that individuals dressed as policemen might seek to heighten tension and deliberately incite violence which might create a climate that could force a cancellation of the plebiscite. It is noteworthy that on the eve of the plebiscite the police issued a statement saying that its personnel would act only in uniform, leading to speculation that police officials feared that elements of the secret police in civilian dress would try to pass themselves off as policeman. The police went so far as painting special symbols on their buses to distinguish them from bogus vehicles.

Information coming from sources in the military, on the other hand, warned of rumors that elements on the far left were preparing to mount a violent campaign of protest to condemn a "fraudulent" Yes vote on the night of the plebiscite. Diplomats from the United States and other embassies in Santiago took these reports seriously and became worried that both the insurrectionary left and elements in the security forces, in a perverse symbiotic logic, might try to cause widespread incidents that would provoke the imposition of a state of emergency with unforeseen consequences. Adding to the pre-plebiscite tension was the blackout of the entire capital city on successive nights before the plebiscite, attributed by the authorities to terrorist bombs blowing up electric towers, but without the usual claims of responsibility by leftist guerrilla groups.

Reflecting concerns about possible attempts to provoke confrontation on the part of the government, the United States took the unusual step of calling on the Chilean ambassador in Washington to warn against any attempt to create a climate that might lead to a suspension of the plebiscite. This action was vehemently condemned by the Chilean authorities and many of their civilian backers as blatant interference in internal Chilean affairs. It was applauded, however, by opposition leaders who regarded the weight of international opinion as an important guarantee of the fairness of the electoral process.

The U.S. action may have strengthened the hand of moderate opposition leaders who urged the Communist Party to refrain from calling on their people to go out on the streets on election night in order to avoid playing into the hands of government supporters who might want to disrupt the peaceful outcome of the electoral process. Fear of violent confrontation on election night is also the reason why opposition leaders, in the closing spots of the television campaign and on radio, called on all the supporters of the No campaign to vote early and peacefully. They urged their backers to stay home on election night waiting for the electoral results to be provided by the No campaign through its own radio station outlets as well as

instructions on how the victory celebration was to take place. Yes leaders gave their partisans similar instructions.

October 5th: Day of the Plebiscite

October 5, 1988, the day of the plebiscite, was an extraordinary event in the life of the Chilean nation. Ninety-seven percent of the registered voters, or 90 percent of the eligible population, turned out to vote, the highest percentage in the nation's history. Members of the LASA delegation fanned out across Santiago; one member went to the port city of Valparaíso, and two members went to provincial capitals and rural towns to observe the vote. From the Instituto Nacional, where Pinochet arrived to vote at 11 o'clock, receiving a subdued reception by the long lines of male voters awaiting their turn to vote, to the working class neighborhood of San Miguel, to the shantytowns of San Ramón, thousands of Chileans queued up peacefully to vote. Because most voters chose to arrive early, lines were often long and many people stood for three hours or more in the hot sun. Voters waited cheerfully without incident, occasionally debating in a good humored way the political alternatives Chileans faced. Among the many moving scenes was the arrival at polling places of invalids and bed-ridden persons with the aid of relatives or nurses and of senior citizens dressed in their Sunday best.

By mid-afternoon, opposition leaders became concerned that the voting was proceeding too slowly. They feared that many voters would get tired and go home or find that the voting place had closed by the time they reached the front of the line. For the most part, the slowness with which the *mesas* began operation and undertook their work was due to the inexperience of many of the polling officials after fifteen years without fair elections and the complicated instructions they were supposed to follow. Even so, Juan Ignacio García, the head of the electoral service, gave assurances to opposition leaders that his office would see to it that the voting process was speeded up.

There was no evidence, however, that the military authorities were trying to slow down the voting process in working class neighborhoods or otherwise hinder the voting process. In fact military commanders from the different services were very polite to the voters and were anxious to ensure a fair and impartial procedure. At one voting place in San Joaquín, for example, the young paratrooper in charge had looked into every conceivable contingency, from having ambulances stationed outside in case someone had a heart attack to an elaborate evacuation plan in case of an earthquake. Finally, both foreign and domestic observers were allowed to watch the proceedings without hindrance.

Less accommodating than most of the military authorities were some officials and private parties in scattered rural areas. For example, some Yes partisans hired all of the buses and denied transportation to people from communities that were identified with the No. In a few instances individuals were denied the right to vote

since their names had been removed from the electoral registries because they were subject to prosecution for political offenses against the state. In some localities individuals who were openly supporting the No campaign had had their identity cards requisitioned by the police, making it impossible for them to vote. These incidents, however, pale by comparison with the fact that the overwhelming majority of Chileans voted without impediment. The authorities were committed to a clean and fair electoral process. In many polling places, voters embraced soldiers and officers, thanking them for guaranteeing a peaceful election.

As early as 5:00 p.m. some *mesas* closed and the vote count began. Interested voters and observers alike were allowed to watch the count. It took close to two hours at each *mesa*, as polling officials counted all of the signatures, ballot stubs and ballots to see that there was an equal number of each. The president and secretary of each *mesa* also signed each ballot before they were opened. The results of the vote were read aloud by the president after the secretary opened each ballot. The poll watchers for the candidate and the opposition parties closely scrutinized each vote. Sometimes the crowd around the *mesa* spoke up to argue against questioning the validity of a vote, for example in the case of a voter having marked an X over his preference rather than a single vertical line.

Throughout the country, however, the counting went on without serious incident, and citizens and officials alike treated each other with respect and civility. When the count was finished, the No, Yes, blank, and contested ballots were placed in envelopes and sealed with lacquer, as were the ballot stubs. Each poll watcher received an official form signed by the president and secretary of the *mesa* certifying the results. Opposition poll watchers quickly sent their information to Santiago to be tabulated in the computers of the Command for the No. Many Yes and No partisans exuded civic pride in the peaceful electoral process, concluding that "Chile was the winner." When the LASA delegation asked a representative of the Yes how he felt about losing his *mesa* to the No he replied, "I feel that it is a great day for Chile." That shared sense of reclaiming the country's democratic heritage helped hold the nation together in the tense hours ahead.

Soon after the polls closed, it became apparent to opposition leaders that the No was winning. The CEL, concerned that false information not be broadcast, had agreed that it would not give a preliminary count until it had information for at least 600 *mesas*, and only after it had informed the Yes campaign of its results. The No campaign was equally concerned about not raising false hopes so it agreed not to issue results until later in the evening. Radio stations supporting both the government and the opposition, however, began to broadcast partial results from polling places across the country, underscoring the fact that those tallies did not represent any particular trend. Television, almost totally controlled by the authorities, gave a decidedly different impression, conveying to viewers the certainty of a victory for the Yes.

The opposition strategy—to wait until substantial results had come in—was altered when the Undersecretary of Interior, Alberto Cardemil, appeared at 7:30 p.m., an hour and a half after he was supposed to give preliminary returns. He reported the results of only 79 *mesas* or 0.36 percent of the total with a vote favorable to the Yes. By that time the opposition already had counted over a half a million votes which were showing a clear trend for the No. Cardemil said he would have further results in an hour, but an hour went by and he gave none. In view of the refusal of the authorities to issue results, the opposition decided to broadcast its own figures at 9:00 p.m. Sergio Molina of the CEL also released his count with 735 *mesas* tabulated, after unsuccessfully trying to reach the Yes campaign on the telephone. That count favored the No and, in retrospect, turned out to be surprisingly close to the final tally. Television, however, refused to broadcast opposition figures. In fact, Secretary General of the Government Hernán Poblete later called the stations warning them that to broadcast any opposition news would have the "gravest" consequences.

When Cardemil appeared on television at 10:00 p.m. to announce that with 677 *mesas* the Yes was still winning, and national television began showing reruns of U.S. sitcoms, the level of tension increased in opposition headquarters. Leaders of the pro-Yes National Renovation Party also became upset with what they perceived to be an effort in governmental circles to provoke some kind of incident. Some of them believed that the government had been stunned by the results and was looking for some way out, short of openly recognizing the No victory. Renovation leaders contacted the Ministry of the Interior directly, warning them not to do anything "stupid."

Some government officials, led by the Minister of the Interior Sergio Fernández, actually were considering a plan to issue a statement around midnight declaring the Yes was winning on the basis of more than a million votes counted. Since they knew that the No was really ahead, such a plan required the careful selection of actual polling places to provide the desired totals—a very difficult task, particularly since there was an overwhelming tendency in favor of the No. The plan also envisioned calling on partisans of the Yes to converge on the center of Santiago to celebrate their "victory." What made such a scenario especially sinister was that some government officials simultaneously considered asking for the withdrawal of police and troops which had cordoned off the center of Santiago. Removal of the armed forces would not only permit the Yes partisans to congregate downtown, but also would heighten the risk of a dangerous clash between partisans of both sides if No supporters rushed there to protect their "victory." The authorities might then impose a state of siege and put into place military contingency plans to cope with disorder and violence. This could give the Pinochet government the upper hand and an excuse to blame elements of the opposition for provoking the incidents and not recognizing the fairness of the count. It also could permit a suspension of the vote count or, if the

unrest was widespread, a cancellation of the plebiscite. At the very least, the policy of not reporting returns was only adding to the tension in the country and the potential for confrontation.⁸

Despite the bitterness of the election campaign, political leaders of the Right and other junta members were more willing to accept the count of the opposition than the results given out by the government authorities and showed their determination to guarantee a fair electoral process. National Renovation maintained contact with the opposition as well as with the government and had access to the count from the Committee for Free Elections. Data from opposition computers were also taken directly to Generals Fernando Matthei, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, and Rodolfo Stange, Director General of the Police. Both junta members also obtained information from their own institutions confirming opposition results. Sergio Onofre Jarpa, the President of Renovation, went on television at midnight with Patricio Aylwin, president of the Christian Democratic party, to participate in a program which had been scheduled much earlier. The leader of Chile's right was prepared to accept the defeat of the Yes and said that his impression was that there was a "majority tendency in favor of the No." His statement had an extraordinary impact. It immediately defused the tension in the No headquarters and calmed listeners all over the country who could not understand why opposition radio stations were broadcasting figures continuously while the authorities remained silent.

Even more important in providing reassurance to a nervous nation was the declaration along the same lines by General Matthei at 1:00 a.m. He was on the way to the presidential palace to meet with General Pinochet and the other junta members for a meeting which had been scheduled originally at 9:30. Like some leaders of the Right, Generals Matthei and Stange had not been able to reach the Ministry of the Interior nor the Moneda palace to find out what was going on. Their annoyance was clear when they arrived at the palace, there to be greeted by an enraged Pinochet; but they refused to sign a decree which Interior Minister Fernández had prepared, giving General Pinochet broad emergency powers. According to some accounts, they also had harsh words with the minister when he tried to argue that the Yes had actually won because Pinochet obtained an extraordinary vote for someone who had been in office for fifteen years. In a testy exchange with the minister and with Pinochet, all three junta members (including Admiral José Toribio Merino) made it very clear that there was no alternative but to recognize the defeat and to adhere strictly to the constitution.

It was not only Renovation leaders and the other junta members who helped defuse tension and dissuade government officials from any desperate last minute attempt to salvage a catastrophic loss. General Jorge Zincke, commander of the Santiago garrison, had refused to go along with the request that security forces be removed from the center of Santiago. At two o'clock Cardemil recognized that the No had won. Opposition

leaders in the crowded press room of the No campaign openly embraced and wept before the cameras of the world.

In the final analysis the most important reasons for the absence of confrontations or incidents the night of the plebiscite were the maturity and good sense of ordinary citizens who followed the instructions of the No command and stayed home. The Communist Party's willingness to follow the directions of the Command for the No and to forego celebrating victory was crucial. The vast majority of Chileans waited patiently until the next day or until the mass rally at the Parque O'Higgins on Friday October 7, to celebrate what most had thought impossible only weeks earlier—the defeat at his own game of the 72-year-old dictator, who had prided himself on having won every previous test.

Plebiscite Results

The results of the plebiscite were very positive for the opposition. The No won 840,000 more votes than the Yes. A total of 3,967,579 people voted No and 3,119,110 voted Yes, giving the No 54.71 percent of the vote to 43.01 percent for the Yes. The No won in 10 of the 12 regions of the country. The highest percentage for the No was recorded in the second region of Antofagasta with 58.8 percent of the vote.

Generally speaking the Yes won in rural areas, but not by as large a margin as most observers expected. It also defeated the No in small towns, again by a very small margin. In areas considered high on socioeconomic indicators, the Yes came out ahead by 56 percent to 42 percent, whereas in low income areas the No won by 63 percent to 34 percent.⁹ Women, despite their history of voting more conservatively than men, provided majority support for the No: 51 percent of all females voting lent their support to the opposition, with only 46 percent voting Yes. More predictably, 58 percent of male voters cast ballots for the No, with 40 percent voting to retain Pinochet. In big cities such as Santiago, Concepción and Valparaiso, more women voted for the No than did men.

At this juncture, the best sources for remaining breakdowns of the vote are polls conducted shortly before the plebiscite.¹⁰ They had indicated that the most likely Yes voters would be people over 60 years old, those with low levels of education, women dedicated to housework, rural dwellers, higher income groups, and partisans of rightist politics. The least likely Yes voters would be men, young people, those with higher levels of education, the unemployed and low income workers, students, and partisans of centrist or leftist politics. Although close to one-third of the voters for both sides considered themselves to be independents, ideology appears to have been strongly associated with voting choice. In one poll, 67 percent of strong Yes voters (27% of the total) identified themselves as either of the Right (52%) or Center (15%). By contrast, 65 percent of the strong No voters (45% of the total) viewed themselves as Leftists (39%) or Centrists (26%). A

large 77 percent of the Yes voters "strongly" opposed, and 14 percent "somewhat" opposed a Marxist government. Among No voters, on the other hand, only 29 percent strongly opposed and 29 percent "somewhat" opposed a Marxist government. It is striking that after fifteen years of military dictatorship, Chile remains divided among its proverbial "three thirds."

Along with ideology, evaluations of the state of the economy and perceptions of personal economic well being played key roles in voting decisions. A majority of voters did not accept the government's incessant propaganda campaign aimed at convincing them that Chile had left underdeveloped Latin America behind. In September only 18 percent of the voters said that the economy was in good shape, while 44 percent said that the economic picture was only fair and 37 percent said it was poor. Only 45 percent thought their own family income was sufficient to cover necessities, while 55 percent thought it was inadequate. Among the voters intending to vote No, 89 percent thought the economic picture was either fair or poor. Even more significant, twice as many respondents said that the economy would be better under a No victory than under a Yes victory.

Economic issues proved to be far more important to voters than fear of the past, a theme exploited continuously in the Yes spots. The drumbeat against the UP referred to events occurring many years ago. Those memories were not terribly gripping for the over 40 percent of voters who were too young to have ever cast ballots. Polls showed that only 7 percent of all Chileans surveyed expressed any great fear of the consequences of a victory for the No, versus 11 percent fearful of a triumph by the Yes. Moreover, only 18 percent thought a victory for the No signified a return to the UP, and only 24 percent thought a future government of the opposition would be similar to the UP. Those expectations were important because only 24 percent held a positive image of the UP government, while 48 percent had a negative impression and 23 percent were indifferent. It is true that Yes voters were more concerned with issues of law and order, including delinquency, terrorism and strikes than with economic issues, but these factors were not enough to generate sufficient support for Pinochet. And although No voters identified economic issues as foremost (44%), they also singled out human rights, freedom and democracy (37%) as very salient concerns, outweighing the preoccupation that some Yes voters had with law and order.¹¹

As noted above, the opposition spots on television countered the negative images associated with the No and the UP period. The reassuring ads helped to legitimize the opposition, dispelling the view that the politicians could not address the country's problems. The spots help to account for the fact that between June and September the slight majority for the Yes among women and politically independent voters was transformed into a majority for the No.

Immediately after the election, the business elites accepted the results of the plebiscite. Manuel Feliú,

president of the National Confederation of Production and Commerce, declared that "democracy is the best system for the development of free enterprise." Other entrepreneurs praised the government's calm reaction, which they said proved that "Pinochet is really a democrat." Although disappointed, the property owners were not clinging to the past but rather adjusting to the new political realities and opening communication with the more moderate leaders of the No. An indication of the favorable political climate in the country was the fact that the stock market did not crash nor did the black market rate for the dollar surge, dire events which had been predicted only days before by business elites if the No were to win.

The day after the plebiscite, Minister Fernández repeated the arguments he had presented unsuccessfully to the Junta members the night before. In an address to the nation he suggested that Pinochet, in a special sense, had won. He claimed that it was extraordinary that after 15 years in power, a political leader would obtain 43% of the vote, which exceeded any percentage obtained in recent memory by the right on its own. While acknowledging that the No had won, he minimized the victory by arguing that the total had to be divided by 16, the number of parties in the No command. Fernández hinted that Pinochet would be a good candidate for the competitive presidential election scheduled for 1989.

It is doubtful whether the plebiscite can be read in Fernández' terms, though the vote for Pinochet was very strong. The Yes campaign was waged with the power and resources of the state on its side in a very uneven contest. It is unlikely that the government could resort to such blatant intervention when the issue becomes the choice of one of several candidates. Furthermore, the polls showed that in spite of the striking inroads of the No campaign, a critical percentage of the vote for the Yes was motivated by fear of a return to the unrest and violence associated with the Popular Unity government, or fear of being identified as an opposition supporter with its potential consequences in terms of job security and even physical safety. These factors would not be so dominant in an open and competitive race between several candidates. Indeed, a centrist candidate could conceivably attract a substantial number of votes that went for the Yes, provided the opposition were able to structure an electoral appeal with the same themes of moderation that characterized its campaign for the plebiscite. Earlier polls suggested that the core support for Pinochet himself might not be more than between 11 and 20 percent.

It is very unlikely that Pinochet will be able to satisfy his most ardent supporters by standing for election next year. UDI leader Jaime Guzmán, one of the principal architects of the constitution, noted that the document bars Pinochet from seeking a second consecutive term. Even if he resigned from office before the election, the intervening months would still be considered part of his term. It is very doubtful that the junta would agree to modify the constitution to permit Pinochet to be a candidate. His military colleagues agreed reluctantly to his candidacy for

the plebiscite, making it clear to the president that he assumed the responsibility for either triumph or defeat. Government supporters will have to look elsewhere in the coming elections for a candidate to carry on the legacy of the military regime.

Chilean Democracy: Prospects for the Future

According to the constitution, Pinochet will remain in office until March 11, 1990, despite the fact that he lost the plebiscite. The day after the election, Pinochet appeared in full-dress uniform to deliver an angry, defiant concession speech. That TV appearance signaled his determination to stand firm on his most solid base, the army. He also made it clear that he intends to fully implement his constitution. He sees that blueprint, as do most of his military colleagues including the other commanders of the armed forces, as the fundamental legacy of the military regime. In the view of the government it is a constitution that will permit the establishment of a modern and stable democratic regime, one that avoids the "vices" of the past. Key provisions of the constitution include the prohibition of "totalitarian parties" (Article VIII), the establishment of a military-dominated national security council which gives the military a broad tutelary role over other political institutions, the creation of a strong executive and a relatively weak congress, and an extremely cumbersome amendment process that would make difficult any profound change in the document.

It is clear that the 1980 Constitution remains a fundamental obstacle for the opposition. It is not considered legitimate by most opposition leaders, and a number of its provisions are regarded as profoundly undemocratic. The sixteen parties that supported the No campaign made it clear before the plebiscite that they regarded a No vote as a rejection not only of the candidacy of Pinochet, but also of his regime. Therefore they have requested negotiations that would lead to fundamental changes in the constitution before the next presidential elections. Those reforms would modify provisions that are viewed as critical by the military and its closest supporters.

It seems doubtful that the opposition will obtain fundamental concessions from the Pinochet government. Many military officers believe that the modifications asked for by the opposition will only open the door once again to the election of a leftist candidate to the presidency and a destruction of Chilean institutions. There are also practical considerations. The presidential elections have been scheduled by law for December 14, 1989. Any modification of the constitution would have to be agreed to by the junta and submitted to a plebiscite for ratification before that time. Opposition leaders may well realize that to press for fundamental changes might distract from their objective of preparing a campaign capable of winning the 1989 elections.

With the junta still in power, the opposition will be negotiating from a position of weakness. Although the No won the plebiscite, opposition leaders are stymied by the

weakness of their individual claims to representativeness and legitimacy. In a narrow legal construction, the No only signified a rejection of eight more years for Pinochet; it did not provide a clear mandate for an alternative to the 1980 Constitution. In the absence of competitive democratic elections, leaders with little popularity may claim as much authority as leaders with larger followings. The government has been skillful at incapacitating politicians. For every demand from leaders of the multiparty opposition, the government claims that its own spokespersons should have as much say.

It is possible that the government will be willing to negotiate some changes. The two most likely seem to be a relaxation of the stringent rules for amending the constitution and a modification of the provision that calls for over one-fourth of the senate to be appointed, not elected. These changes could be possible because parties of the right might join the opposition in making a case for them. Rightist politicians disapprove of a senate with a large number of unelected senators, would prefer a stronger legislature, and are worried about the tutelary role given in the constitution to the military. In the future, other constitutional requirements might be softened through implementation or interpretation. For example, the role of the national security council could be diluted by adding civilian members and by defining narrowly the scope of national security concerns. Even the highly restrictive Article VIII, prohibiting Marxist participation, will depend for its impact on how it is enforced.

The paramount question for both the Yes and the No forces is whether they will be able to maintain their unity for the coming elections. Because of its loss, the Right seems to be more divided in the weeks after the plebiscite than the opposition. Leaders have stumbled over one another trying to attribute blame for the defeat of the Yes option. Renovation has made it very clear that it intends to distance itself from the government and not allow the presidential palace to dictate the course of the campaign. UDI and other rightist parties, that are much more linked to the regime, are likely to seek partisan advantage by remaining close to the authorities. While it is likely that the Right will come up with a consensus candidate who would be supported strongly by the government, the choice may generate further conflicts and divisions and make it difficult for the right to project a coherent strategy and program.

Opposition leaders realized that to win in the plebiscite they had to put aside profound ideological, group, and personality differences. They may be capable of retaining that solidarity in order to achieve the political power necessary to initiate more fundamental transformations in the institutional order, but their task will not be an easy one. The stakes are even higher now than before the plebiscite. The challenge no longer is unifying to block the reelection of an authoritarian leader, but uniting to shape the future of the country. The sharp divisions in Chilean politics, which brought democracy down in the early 1970s and allowed Pinochet to remain in office for sixteen years,

constitute serious stumbling blocks. The formation of a new left-wing coalition, the Broad Party of the Socialist Left (Partido Amplio de la Izquierda Socialista-PAIS), including socialists from the No campaign and the Communist Party, clearly complicates the unity efforts by once again pushing the Christian Democrats toward the right. Although the opposition is likely to turn to the Christian Democrats for a standard bearer, that choice has been further complicated by serious intraparty divisions along ideological, personal, and generational lines. Until the Christian Democrats are able to come up with a candidate, serious efforts at structuring a transitional program and coalition for "governability" will have to wait.

In this picture the Communist Party faces difficult choices. Party officials at first had refused to endorse voter registration and later had refused to call for a No vote. In both cases they relented when they saw that many of their own supporters favored trying to defeat the regime under its own rules. However, even though the Communists supported the No option at the last minute, they remained convinced that the Yes would win, either through voting fraud or some kind of internal coup. The fact that neither took place reinforced the arguments of the democratic opposition that the electoral route was the best way to seek political change in Chile.

The Communists contributed to the No victory by turning out voters and by agreeing to keep their own partisans home on election night. After the plebiscite they sought to recoup lost strength by helping to forge PAIS as an answer to Ricardo Lagos and the PPD. Even in PAIS, however, they will have to play a secondary role and wait for free and open elections and a return to full democratic practices to have an active say in politics. The military will be very reluctant to change Article VIII of the constitution nor will they permit Communist candidates. The Communists want a deal with the other opposition groups to obtain those changes after democratic politics have returned. This position may be rejected by the left of the party and by the armed Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front. Leftwing Communists fear that the moderate politicians will only betray the people by agreeing to operate within the framework of Pinochet's legality. Insurrectionary elements, in some cases aided and abetted by government security forces, may seek to provoke violence and to destabilize the political process. However, it is likely that these positions will receive much less support within the PC than they have in the past. Chile is likely to move to elections and to a democratic transition because most Chileans have opted for that course.

For Pinochet the options are much less promising than before the plebiscite. Pinochet is already feeling his power slipping as the logic of "lame-duckness" sets in. Within his own institution, the professionally oriented members of the army may well seek to distance themselves from their commander. Most likely, Pinochet will attempt to retain his position as commander-in-chief of the army, which he can do for another four to eight years. It is possible, however, that he will feel pressure to step down

in favor of newer leadership unless he is prepared to retain a largely ceremonial role.

For the armed forces, the transition process is complicated. The regime has defined the transition in a constitutional document they have sworn to uphold. Chile's armed forces have evolved away from the tradition of military leaders of the past, who viewed their role as clearly subservient to civilian democratic authority. Many army officers strongly believe that the military must maintain a tutelary role over civilian leaders they regard with contempt. Politicians will have to move cautiously in structuring reforms and attempting to dialogue with the armed forces in order to bridge the enormous chasm which exists between the civilian and military worlds.

At the same time the opposition will have to tread with caution in dealing with the issue of human rights. Human rights seems destined to become an important item on the agenda of a new civilian government. While elected leaders may have to respond to the demand for justice, they also will have to work out a policy aimed at reassuring the armed forces that the institutions themselves are not in jeopardy. A resolution of the civil-military relationship remains a vital element in the process of Chilean redemocratization.

For the future of Chilean democracy, the plebiscite represents only a first step, albeit a giant one. It leaves open minimal as well as maximal scenarios. A minimalist outcome resulting in "democradura"¹² would preserve virtually all the authoritarian features of the 1980 Constitution. The plebiscite would signify little more than a termination of the presidency of Pinochet, who could retain considerable behind-the-scenes power as army commander and member of the national security council. The armed forces commanders would maintain a veto power over the policies and actions of constitutionally elected representatives of the people in the legislature and presidency and would invoke those powers when they felt "national security" was threatened. Although a civilian president would be elected in December 1989, with strong powers vis-à-vis a very weak legislature, ultimate authority would reside in a remarkably autonomous military institution. The participation of opposition parties would legitimize the system and the Marxist parties—representing at least 25 percent of the population—would remain banned from political life. In this scenario, virtually no progress would be achieved on questions of human rights and social justice. Although the scope for democratic freedoms and activities might widen over the years, further democratization would remain gradual and tentative. A continual role for the armed forces might risk open politicization of the institution, a politicization which has not taken place under military rule because of Pinochet's and the junta's insistence on a clear separation between military and governmental functions for armed forces personnel. A minimalist outcome seems most likely if the parties represented in the No command fail to unite in order to win the presidency and a substantial majority of the Congress to be elected in 1989.

In a maximalist outcome, the plebiscite will have generated momentum toward an untrammelled democracy. Whether voting No or Yes, most Chileans expressed their preference for settling their disputes through the peaceful verdict of the ballot box. Despite fifteen years of harsh authoritarian policies, they have retained their partisan loyalties and democratic political culture. The logic of the political marketplace should take hold, as national attention turns to competitive elections for congress and the presidency. If the parties represented in the No Command succeed in structuring a joint transitional program led by a common presidential candidate, they stand a good chance of obtaining the mandate they need in order to bring about the constitutional reforms required to return to genuine democratic institutions. Only with substantial majority support will political leaders succeed in devising subordinate roles for the armed forces and an exit for General Pinochet while taming the passions of extremists from the Left and Right. Only with majority support will they be able to address the grievances of the millions of Chileans who expect that their vote for the No in the plebiscite will alleviate their serious economic predicament. Even if they win broad support for their policies, Chilean leaders will have to move cautiously in responding to the country's pent-up demands. The relatively favorable macro-economic picture of Chile should make that task somewhat easier.

The defeat of Pinochet in Chile had a profound impact on the fragile and struggling democratic forces in the rest of the continent. The fact that the Chilean people turned down a government which has received international praise for its economic policies, suggests that even "efficient" military regimes are incapable of addressing the fundamental problems of a political community, and gives pause to those who feel that authoritarian solutions are more effective than democratic ones in addressing the serious problems of the region. During the next few years, the international community will continue to watch to see whether Chile can translate the repudiation of dictatorship into durable redemocratization.

APPENDIX

Formation and Operation of the Commission

The Executive Council of the Latin American Studies Association authorized Paul Drake and Arturo Valenzuela to appoint and co-chair an international commission to observe and report on the Chilean plebiscite. The Commission was formed in September 1988 and visited Chile October 2-8, though some members stayed longer. All members contributed to the writing of this report, though Drake and Valenzuela took the primary responsibility. All members of the Commission do not necessarily agree with every statement in this report, but there was broad consensus on most points. The report will be distributed in Latin America and the United States.

Acknowledgements

The LASA Commission owes a debt to many Chileans who gave freely of their time and assistance. Some of them are listed below under interviews, but hundreds of others from many walks of life will remain nameless. For the warm hospitality shown by academic institutions during the Commission's visit, thanks are due to Gustavo Lagos and Boris Yopo and the Asociación Chilena de Ciencia Política, to Oscar Godoy and the Instituto de Ciencia Política of the Universidad Católica, to Norbert Lechner and the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), and to Alejandro Foxley and the Corporación de Investigaciones Económicas para Latinoamérica (CIEPLAN). The Commission also thanks Manuel Antonio Garretón and Carlos Huneeus for special presentations. The Commission is grateful to the Ford Foundation for its funding.

Interviews with Public and Academic Figures

Jaime Alé, Director of Research, Sociedad de Fomento Fabril
 Andrés Allamand, Vice-President, Renovación Nacional
 Clodomiro Almeyda, Secretary General, Partido Socialista/Almeyda
 Genaro Arriagada, Secretary General, Comando por el No
 Harry G. Barnes, U.S. Ambassador to Chile
 Manuel Barrera, Centro de Estudios Sociales
 José Miguel Barros, Comité Elecciones Libres
 Carlos Bascuñán, Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporánea
 Pablo Berwart, *La Epoca*
 Andrés Bianchi, CEPAL
 John Biehl, CIEPLAN
 Sergio Bitar, Comité Central, Partido por la Democracia
 Alvaro Briones, *Cauce*
 José Joaquín Brunner, FLACSO
 Fernando Bustamante, FLACSO
 Manuel Bustos, President, Central Unitaria de Trabajadores
 Carlos Cabello, President, Gran Frente Cívico Independientes por el Sí
 Guillermo Campero, Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales (ILET)
 Carlos Catalán, FLACSO
 Ascanio Cavallo, Editor *La Epoca*
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 Octavio Errázuriz, Ministry of Foreign Relations
 Jaime Estévez, President, Santiago District, PPD
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 General Pedro Ewing Hodar (r.), Army; Ministry of Foreign Relations
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Angel Flisfisch, FLACSO; Comité Técnico, Comando por el No
 Alejandro Foxley, CIEPLAN; Comité Técnico, Comando por el No
 Ricardo French-Davis, CIEPLAN; Comité Económico, Comando por el No
 Ricardo García, Foreign Minister
 Manuel Antonio Garretón, FLACSO; Comité Técnico, Comando por el No
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 Josefina Guzmán, Supervisora Nacional, Cruzada Cívica
 Patricio Hales, Partido Comunista de Chile
 Tomás Hirsch, President, Partido Humanista
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 General Jaime Izarnótegui, Army
 Mónica Jiménez, Cruzada Cívica
 George Jones, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Chile
 Gustavo Lagos, President, Asociación Chilena de Ciencia Política
 Ricardo Lagos, President, Partido por la Democracia
 Norbert Lechner, Director, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales
 Fernando Leniz, Businessman, Former Minister of Economics
 Marilyn McAfee, Public Information Office, U.S. Embassy in Chile
 Tomás MacHale, *El Mercurio*
 Admiral Ronald McIntyre (r.), Navy
 Luis Maira, President, Izquierda Cristiana
 Luis Medina, Confederación Unitaria Obrero-Campesina
 Admiral José Toribio Merino Castro, Junta Member and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy
 Oscar Mertz, Director of Studies, Centro de Estudios Públicos; Adviser, Secretaría General de la Presidencia
 Sergio Molina, President, Comité Elecciones Libres
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 Eduardo Ortiz, CEREN
 Andrés Palma, President, Izquierda Unida
 Mario Papi, Social Democracia
 Gianfranco Pasquino, Senator, Italy; International Observer
 Bernardino Piñera, Bishop of La Serena; Member, Comité Permanente del Episcopado Chileno

José Piñera, Former Minister of Labor and Mines
 Carlos Portales, FLACSO
 Cristián Precht, General Vicar, Arzobispado de Santiago
 Joseph Ramos, CEPAL
 Germán Riesco, Partido Nacional
 General César Ruíz Danyau (r.), Air Force
 Walter Sánchez, Universidad de Chile
 Andrés Sanfuentes, Partido Comunista de Chile
 Lucía Santa Cruz, *El Mercurio*
 Herman Schwember, PET
 General Santiago Sinclair, Vice-Commander-in-Chief of the Army
 Sol Serrano, Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporánea
 Ricardo Solari, Comité Técnico, Comando por el No; Partido Socialista/Almeyda
 Juan Somavía, International Relations Committee, Comando por el No
 General Roberto Soto Mackenney, Army
 Adolfo Suárez, Former President of the Government of Spain; International Observer
 Osvaldo Sunkel, CEPAL
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 Ignacio Walker, CIEPLAN
 Federico Willoughby, Former Presidential Aide
 Boris Yopo, Asociación Chilena de Ciencia Política

NOTES

1. With the exception of the "background" section, most of the material presented in this report comes from detailed interviews and direct observations by commission members. Most of the interviewees are listed in the appendix to this report. Arturo Valenzuela and Peter Winn spent most of August, and Alan Angell most of September in Chile. Some of the material in the report reflects those earlier research trips.

2. The word in the constitution is *representar*. Some experts argue that this is only an advisory function. Others have argued that such representation would constitute legal justification for a coup should the authorities that are admonished, including the congress and the president, not heed the warnings of the national security council. According to this view, it was the lack of such authority that prevented the Chilean military from acting sooner in deposing Allende. The legislative history of the constitution is found in Sergio Carrasco Delgado, *Génesis y vigencia de los textos constitucionales chilenos* (Santiago: Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1980). The most valuable source for the

Constitution of 1980 is Luz Bulnes Aldunate, *Constitución de la República de Chile: concordancias, anotaciones y fuentes* (Santiago: Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1981). All quotes are taken from this edition.

3. See United States Embassy, Santiago, Chile, *Chile: 1988 Plebiscite—Resource Book*, mimeo, 1988, pp. 69-70. This publication, prepared for use by observer teams going to Chile, provides valuable documents and information on the plebiscite.

4. Registration data are taken from mimeographed publications made available by the National Electoral Service (Servicio Electoral Nacional). The service was created by Law No. 18.556, Organic Constitutional Law on the Electoral Registration System and the Electoral Service, published October 1, 1986, in the *Diario Oficial*.

5. See Organic Constitutional Law No. 18.700 on Popular Voting and Counting, published in the *Diario Oficial* on May 6, 1988, modified by Law No. 18.733, published on August 13, 1988.

6. Opposition parties had great difficulty agreeing to register "in the legality of regime." The parties law required each party to obtain large numbers of signatures and to conform to a series of rules that were subject to enforcement by the Electoral Service. For the Organic Constitutional Law on Political Parties, see Law No. 18.603, published in the *Diario Oficial* on March 23, 1987.

7. This section and the longer section below dealing with the night of the plebiscite is based on conversations by a Commission member with key sources in the government, the opposition, and the diplomatic service. At first the events described here were denied by government supporters. Eventually, most of the events were confirmed in subsequent published reports. The first published revelations of the events of the night of October 5th appeared in veiled form in Ascanio Cavallo's column, "La hora de los audaces," *La Epoca*, October 9, 1988, p. 8, and Pamela Constable, "Chile Factions United to Safeguard Voting," *The Boston Globe*, October 13, 1988, p. 1. Because of its close ties to the government, the most politically significant account appeared in the rightist *Qué Pasa*, No. 914 (November 13-19, 1988), "La noche más larga...", pp. 6-7, under Patricia O'Shea's byline. Another good report, which draws on the *Qué Pasa* account, is Nibaldo Mosciatti's "La historia de un golpe frustrado," *APSI* (24-30 October 1988), pp. 4-7. The most complete description of what happened published to date is Ascanio Cavallo, Manuel Salazar and Oscar Sepulveda, "La historia oculta del régimen militar: 5 de Octubre," Special Supplement 53 of *La Epoca*.

8. Renato Gazmuri, a leader of Renovación Nacional, caused a sensation when he agreed with these accounts and noted in a public forum that "hot heads surrounding the President" had tried to "provoke a grave confrontation that would have resulted in military intervention...[and] maintain the government beyond the results of the plebiscite." See *Las Últimas Noticias*, November 10, 1988, p. 7. See also *La Epoca*, November 10, 1988, p. 10.

9. The totals are official results issued by the Electoral Service. The regional and small town breakdowns were obtained from the sample of polling places issued by the Committee for Free Elections.

10. Several organizations and research institutions conducted public opinion surveys in the months leading up to the plebiscite. Those identified with the opposition included FLACSO, CERC, ILET, and CIS. Those identified with the regime included GALLOP, SKOPUS, CEP, and the University of Chile. Generally speaking, the pro-regime polls showed results favorable to the government and the anti-regime polls showed results favorable to the opposition. However, with the exception of the CEP poll, the polls conducted by opposition research organizations appeared much more reliable and serious. FLACSO undertook the best polling up until April 1988. Particularly valuable was a regional poll, *Concepción 88: Una Encuesta Regional*, conducted by FLACSO in cooperation with several other research centers. CERC undertook some valuable national polls up until September, although the CERC poll tended to underestimate the Yes vote. The most valuable survey may well be the one conducted by CEP towards the second half of September. The data represented in this report draw on conclusions in the CERC and CEP surveys, which appear to coincide. The more detailed results are from the CEP poll. See CERC, *Informe Encuesta Nacional: Septiembre 1988* and the English language summary of the CEP poll in Brockbank and Associates, Inc., *Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública de Chile*, September 1988. It is instructive that the CEP poll, which was available shortly before the plebiscite and showed that the No would win, was suppressed by the CEP board. Rather than reporting the results of that poll, of which it had knowledge, *El Mercurio*, the pro-government daily, reported instead the results of a SKOPUS poll that showed the Yes winning by the same margin as that by which the No actually won. See *El Mercurio*, October 5, 1988, p. 1.

11. The above information is taken from the CEP poll. See *Estudio Nacional*.

12. As Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead have noted, transitions from authoritarianism may stop short of unfettered democracy. They identify four regime types: *dictadura*, or autocracy; *dictablanda*, or liberalized autocracy; *democradura*, or limited democracy; and *democracia*, or full democracy. The plebiscite marks Chile's movement from the first to the second type of regime, though some regression remains possible. Assuming continued progress, the foreseeable future could lead to types three or four, or a variant in between. The O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead work is found in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 4 vols. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

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