

# LASA Forum

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## The United States and Latin America: "Out of Phase" Again?

by  
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Past President of LASA\*

Several hundred participants in LASA's 20th Anniversary International Congress in Boston attended the presentation and discussion of a major new paper on Latin America's recent development experience by Albert O. Hirschman, winner of the 1986 Kalman Silvert Award. This award was created by the LASA Executive Council in 1982 to honor senior members of our profession who have made a distinguished lifetime contribution to the study of Latin American countries and to the advancement of the profession generally.

LASA is an *interdisciplinary* organization, and the occasion of awarding the Silvert prize provides an opportunity to recognize and underline that special characteristic of our association. The breadth of a scholar's contribution and influence beyond the boundaries of his or her own home discipline is, therefore, an important criterion of selection. LASA is also an *international* organization, and it is expected that the person chosen to receive the Silvert Award will be one whose intellectual influence and whose service to the profession have extended well beyond the United States.

On these and a number of other key dimensions, the selection committee for the 1986 Silvert Award<sup>1</sup> felt that Albert Hirschman is singularly well qualified. It would be difficult to think of another member of the Latin American studies profession whose work has been drawn upon so extensively by practitioners of all of the social science disciplines and history. It would be equally difficult to think of another member of our profession who has contributed more to even broader currents of social science thought and inquiry, and who has done more to integrate Latin American studies into the mainstream of social science in the United States.

Indeed, Albert Hirschman's career is a tribute to the power of ideas: powerful, unorthodox ideas, so simply and lucidly formulated that they travel extraordinarily well across international and disciplinary boundaries, and across generations. There are few practicing Latin Americanists today whose graduate training did not include some exposure to such Hirschman books as *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*; *The Strategy of Economic Development*; *Journeys Toward Progress, Exit, Voice and Loyalty*; *A Bias for Hope*; and *Development Projects Observed*; and classic

## Is Latin American Development Dead? A View from the Mid-1980s

by  
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[Editor's Note: The following is an edited transcript of the address given by Pedro Pablo Kuczynski at the Plenary Session of the LASA International Congress in Boston, October 23, 1986. The speech was given from memory and a few reconstructed notes, since the prepared version had been lost the previous day when Mr. Kuczynski's briefcase did not arrive with him at one of his international stopovers.]


I will talk about where the Latin American economy stands as of the mid-80s and where I think it is going. The obvious backdrop is the debt crisis. We all know what that has done to the average Latin American economy, with a drop in per capita income of about 14 percent from 1981-82 to the present time. One should always look at income—not simply at GNP figures which measure production; one should look at the purchasing power of production, which is affected by the terms of trade.

### Stagnation and Commodity Depression

There has been no significant employment growth in Latin America since 1982 other than in Brazil during the last year, and in the intervening years the labor force has grown by about 15 percent. Hence the effective unemployment and underemployment rates are probably extremely high and certainly much higher than the official numbers show except for countries that have relatively good statistics in this field such as Chile and Colombia.

It is also clear that during that period investment and savings have plummeted. There has been a drop of about 40 percent in investment, and because of the huge transfers by governments for debt service, purely in the definitional sense, savings have fallen by a similar amount. Latin America has transferred out something like \$120 billion in net terms, which is roughly equivalent to the trade surplus during that period; this surplus is in turn roughly equivalent to the amount of interest paid to commercial banks during the same period. The commercial bank interest bill per year, about \$25 billion at the moment, was as high as \$35 billion in 1984.

The total external debt has grown from about \$325 billion in 1982 to something like \$380 billion today, with little to show for it. Less visible but equally clear is the fact that Latin America's export earnings in nominal terms have stayed



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articles like "The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course of Economic Development" and "The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding." And there are also probably few among us who are not exposing our own graduate students to such rich and provocative fare, whose freshness and relevance to the intellectual and public policy debates surrounding Latin America remain undiminished.

For more than three decades, Albert Hirschman has blended the theoretical and applied dimensions of research with consummate skill. He has been a leader of socially constructive social science dealing with Latin America. In his occasional advice to Latin American governments, his evaluations of the activities of various international development agencies operating in Latin America, as well as his active support and encouragement of research institutes in Latin America, Hirschman has demonstrated his strong commitment to public service.

It is a source of inspiration and encouragement to many of us that Albert Hirschman remains so active professionally, still doing fieldwork and turning out a stream of important books and articles in his early 70s. His latest paper, prepared at the request of the Silvert Award selection committee for presentation at LASA's Boston Congress, draws upon interviews which he conducted during a two-month field research trip to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico in April-May, 1986.<sup>2</sup>

While the paper does contain a certain amount of retrospection, as implied in its subtitle, the issues addressed in this analysis could hardly be more timely and controversial. Professor Hirschman's analysis of these matters is, characteristically, fresh and provocative, and merits wide attention as a corrective to much of what passes as the conventional wisdom on Latin America's current economic crisis.

Hirschman's review of the development experiences of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico since the early 1970s yields some startling new hypotheses (e.g., that the Geisel military government's import-substituting industrialization policy helped to set into motion the dismantling of repressive authoritarianism that has occurred in Brazil in the 1980s), and some new concepts (e.g., "import-preempting industrialization") that seem destined to become part of the vocabulary of Latin American social science.

His concluding observations on Latin America's external debt crisis constitute a spirited attack upon what he terms "the relentlessly ideological positions" on such matters being taken by the current U.S. administration and many members of the international financial community. Arguing that, as in the 1960s, the United States is seriously "out of phase" with its southern neighbors, Hirschman points out that "North Americans, so proud not long ago of their pragmatism, have taken an ideological turn while Latin Americans have become skeptical of their former sets of certainties and solutions." Latin Americans, chastened by "the spectacular miscarriage

of ideology-driven economic policies (of both Left and Right)" during the last ten years, now react "with considerable mistrust toward any system of thought that pretends to have all the answers to complex problems faced by their societies."

Hirschman warns that incessant U.S. preachings to the Latin Americans "full of unqualified praise for the free market and...condemnation of the state" are "vastly counter-productive," and that "by pretending to export its free-market credo as a universal remedy, the Reagan administration is inadvertently cutting itself off from any kind of rapport with the new leadership of the emergent Latin American democracies."

The expert commentators assembled in Boston to discuss Professor Hirschman's paper from five different disciplinary perspectives found much to agree with. However, there was some uneasiness about Hirschman's revisionist view of Brazil under the Geisel administration; some skepticism concerning the durability of Brazil's and Argentina's recent successes with "heterodox shock therapy" to fight inflation (skepticism reinforced by more recent events in Brazil<sup>3</sup>); criticism of the relative neglect of changes in class structure and class alliances and an overemphasis on "statecraft" in Hirschman's explanations of policy successes and failures; and a call for greater attention to the unsolved problem of wealth redistribution, combined with concern that in a number of Latin American countries, IMF-imposed economic policies of the 1970s and '80s have seriously reduced the state's potential role in redistribution.

Finally, commentator Tom Skidmore (History, University of Wisconsin) ended speculation about Albert Hirschman's disciplinary center-of-gravity by pronouncing him a "closet historian." The commentaries by four other panel members are reproduced below, in slightly condensed form.

### A Sociologist's Perspective

by Gilbert W. Merx  
University of New Mexico

Throughout his illustrious career, Albert O. Hirschman has specialized in "turning the prism": taking information and viewing it in a new light or from a different angle. In these "Seven Exercises in Retrospection," Professor Hirschman has once again helped us to reassess the nature of change in Latin America. Hirschman's exercises are not, for all their clarity of exposition, "seven easy pieces." They are rather a theme with six variations.

Let us first consider the central theme, which is rich in sociological implications. The theme of "*les trente glorieuses*" is that from 1945 to 1980 Latin America experienced rapid economic growth, improved social well-being,

and demographic transition, despite the prevailing theoretical pessimism and certain "unhappy policy experiences" whose implications became clear in the 1980s. Hirschman's diagnosis suggests that the dominant approach to economic development in the postwar period, import-substitution industrialization, must have been at least a partial success. His analysis also suggests that Latin American development during the "*trente glorieuses*" led to significant contrasts in the experiences of different nations in the region.

Hirschman therefore takes issue with two popular, even dominant, viewpoints in Latin American studies: first, that import substitution failed, and second, that the dependent character of development on the periphery has common implications for the nations of Latin America. Is Hirschman correct in these bold assertions? Of course. When he tells us that we have been wrong in our collective pessimism, it now seems obvious. One is reminded of the little boy in the crowd who said "The Emperor has no clothes!" when Hirschman says "The Empire has no clones."

If it is conceded that Hirschman is right about the theme of Latin America's "*trente glorieuses*," what are the implications of his six variations? These exercises address certain issues of political economy that have surfaced at a time when the previously unrecognized glory has been replaced by pervasively recognized gloom.

Two of the variations concern policy failures: "deindustrialization" in the Southern Cone and "desubstitution" in Mexico. Three of the variations concern apparent policy successes, all involving Brazil: "forced-march industrialization," "import preemption," and "heterodox stabilization," the latter also involving the Argentine case. Hirschman's last variation concerns the "postideological mood" and "new experimental spirit" that are found in Latin America as a consequence of past successes and failures that are now in the process of being sorted out.

It is difficult to take issue with Hirschman's lucid characterization of the policy experiments, although I do not fully share his optimism about the future of Brazil's microcomputer industry or of the heterodox stabilization programs underway in Brazil and Argentina. Setting aside the future, however, and accepting Hirschman's assessment of these experiments, a sociological perspective still leads me to have reservations about the causes of the various policy successes and failures that Hirschman's account implies.

Looking across these exercises in comparative political economy, one notes that the interaction of two variables appears in Hirschman's analysis to account for the success or failure of economic policies. The first variable is implied by phrases such as "the determination to extirpate," "wrong-headed praxis," "the stubbornness of policymakers," "delicate steering," and "theoretical acumen and practical imagination." Such terms relate to political will and policy skills, or to what is now fashionably labeled "statecraft." The second variable is represented by what Hirschman calls

"special circumstances prevailing in international finance," "unprecedented opportunities to borrow," "a trap set by the international financial system," and "the energies of free enterprise in international finance." This variable can be summed up as "opportunity." Easy money gave policymakers the opportunity to make big mistakes (as in Mexico) or big achievements (as in Brazil), with statecraft making the critical difference. Now, of course, that opportunity is gone, to be replaced by the challenges of managing austerity.

To a sociologist, this line of analysis seems suspiciously close to the phenomena being explained. Is the explanandum independent of the explanans? Putting it more simply, if the policy experiments work in a context of opportunity, this is assumed to reflect good policy and if they fail, bad policy. To identify the content of policy with the virtues or failings of the policymakers is to fall victim to the circularity common in statecraft theories. The question of why certain policies are adopted instead of others or of what determines their content, raises issues more fundamental than statecraft.

Having recently interviewed a number of economists who held key positions in several Argentine and Chilean governments, I was led to two inexplicable conclusions. All the economists were alike in possessing "theoretical acumen and practical imagination," and they uniformly viewed the presidents under whom they served (whether generals or politicians) as economic ignoramus. Yet it was the presidents, and not the economists, who made the key economic decisions, doing so for political reasons. Hirschman himself suggests as much when he notes that the democratic governments of Argentina and Brazil turned to the heterodox economists only as a last resort, when other measures had failed or were politically unacceptable.

The notion of the unacceptability of certain policies returns us to the social context in which policies are shaped. The importance of the social context is the subject of Hirschman's opening theme, but is deemphasized in his subsequent exercises in comparative political economy. There is, however, a linkage between the growth of the "*trente glorieuses*" and the various policy temptations and experiments that resulted. The nature of this linkage during at least one phase of policy selection is convincingly explored in Guillermo O'Donnell's account of the impact of "threat" upon the programs of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes that emerged in South America.<sup>4</sup>

Latin America's sustained growth in the "*trente glorieuses*" led to major alterations in the composition of social classes and in overall class structures, accompanied by shifting class alliances that shaped policy outcomes. The broad outlines of these alliances up to the 1970s have been well analyzed in the writings of O'Donnell and others, although they have been less thoroughly explored for recent years. In the early part of the "*trente glorieuses*," the rising middle class allied with organized urban labor in the joint promotion of populist or reformist programs of import-substitution

industrialization. Growing working class mobilization and rising expectations, combined with the shock waves from the Cuban revolution, led to fears of socialism and the dissolution of the middle class-working class alliance. The "have-nots" were seen as outnumbering the "haves," leading to the conclusion that democracy would lead to revolution. As the allegiance of the middle classes shifted towards the upper classes, the social base for bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes and their neo-orthodox economic policies took shape.

Yet if the totality of the "*trente glorieuses*" is viewed, as in Hirschman's perspective, it can be suggested that Latin American development has had significant cumulative effect on class structure. Despite the rapid overall growth of Latin America's population, increases in the size of the middle classes and the formal proletariat have at least kept pace with overall demographic trends, and may well have gained as a proportion of the economically active population. Although Alejandro Portes' recent study suggests that the "informal proletariat" is a relatively constant element in Latin America, his data can also be interpreted as indicating considerable upward social mobility, particularly given the growth of urban informal employment at the expense of rural informal employment.<sup>5</sup>

At the same time, the perception of "threat" by the middle classes has shifted from the fear of revolution from below to the fear of repression from above. As a consequence, the middle class-working class coalition has either been reinstated or is in the process of reemergence in programmatic or party alliances; it is visible in terms of shared support for civil liberties and electoral forms of parliamentary democracy. The new heterodox policy experiments discussed by Hirschman also reflect this emergent political context.

Hirschman's closing discussion of "democratic, postideological space" in Latin America can therefore be linked to his opening theme of the "*trente glorieuses*" by the effects of changes in class structure and class alliances. The transformations of growth have at last, despite various interim disasters, created in Latin America both a social base for democracy and a favorable ideological atmosphere. If there is now a "*desencuentro*" between U.S. and Latin American ideological trends, as Hirschman notes, there is also within Latin America a new "*encuentro*" between social structure and democracy, with corresponding implications for political economy. Hirschman's new turn of the prism therefore gives us a fresh perspective on Latin America and a new set of theoretical challenges.

### **An Economist's Perspective**

*by Miguel Urrutia*

*Inter-American Development Bank*

As has been often the case before, Professor Hirschman expresses elegantly and in the form of political-economy propositions, the somewhat disorganized thoughts of Latin

American economic policy practitioners and academics. And as usual, I find myself in agreement with the lessons he draws from his four stories.

His most interesting message is about the *desencuentro* between the Western industrialized countries and Latin America. He identifies a Latin American shift out of ideology into pragmatism, a phenomenon which probably will have a very deep impact on the welfare of the region's inhabitants, and a puzzling nonpragmatic and ideological consensus in the industrialized countries about what must be done in order to achieve economic growth: privatization and economic "laissez faire." The consensus in the developed countries is puzzling because it is so ahistoric. The moralistic tone in which these recommendations are given is also puzzling.

The theological arguments about privatization sound hollow in the mouths of the same bankers that have made the nationalization of the private debt a condition of restructuring the debt of many Latin American countries. The arguments for financial liberalization and the efficient allocation of savings by financial intermediaries come too soon after such liberalization produced excessive indebtedness in most Latin American countries and the collapse of the major private financial institutions in Chile, Colombia, Venezuela and, to some extent, in Argentina. The calls for fiscal austerity also lose credibility when they come from bureaucracies based in Washington, D.C. Finally, when the issue of capital flight comes up, one cannot help noticing that it is used by bankers who do not want to lend to Latin America, but who hold the flight capital deposits.

It has also become fashionable to recommend to Latin America that it follow the Asian path to development. Latin American economists have begun to study Asian economic history, and they find it odd that Korea and pre-oil shock Japan should be held up as models of economies driven by free markets.<sup>6</sup>

Latin American economists, fortunately, are now less ideological than they used to be. As Professor Hirschman and Albert Fishlow argued in the 1985 *Economic and Social Development Report* of the Inter-American Development Bank, this is a very hopeful trend. There is sometimes little sympathy for that trend from such traditional pragmatists as the North Americans and the Japanese. For that reason there is much *desencuentro* even in the staid offices of the Inter-American Development Bank.

The new-found pragmatism in Latin America may lead even to interesting breakthroughs in economic theory. Avoiding the extremes of liberal neoclassical prescriptions or *dependencia* theory, practical new schemes for industrial policy may be emerging for different categories of developing countries at different stages of economic growth, as Professor Hirschman illustrates in the case of Brazil. New combinations of selective trade liberalization with controls on capital flows have also been used with some success in Brazil or Colombia, as they were used with even greater success in Japan or Korea.

A new generation of Latin American economists is exploring the economic theory related to some of these issues, and is reaching unorthodox conclusions solidly based in Latin American economic history. As Professor Hirschman has described, Argentina and Brazil have translated some of the conclusions of this new generation of Latin American economists into interesting and innovative approaches to inflation control. Bolivia, too, is in the midst of a crucial experiment of pragmatic economic management.

Two last thoughts were provoked by my reading of Hirschman's paper. First, I have argued elsewhere<sup>7</sup> that inflation is unpopular in democracies (much more so than in authoritarian societies). The political tolerance of inflation has certainly been low in Colombia and Venezuela. The radical attempts at controlling inflation as the democratization process progressed in the continent may, therefore, not be so surprising. The accelerating inflation in Mexico may also be a symptom of a decreasing pluralism in that country's political system.

Second, I must say that I was struck by the description of Brazil under Geisel. Professor Hirschman feels that there was "confidence that, with the proper quantity and quality of such steering from above, the country was assured of a brilliant and truly modern destiny." This phrase might be found in a historical work on Japan in the beginning of the twentieth century. Economic growth can take place through a revolution from above. One hopes, however, in the case of Brazil, that the brilliant future will not involve imperial dreams, and that the present democratic developments will be more lasting and have deeper roots than the Taicho Democracy—that period of growing democratization in Japan, unfortunately cut short by militarism in the 1930s.

### **An Anthropologist's Perspective**

*by June Nash  
City College, CUNY*

Hirschman's paper offers a most useful critique challenging orthodox economic principles and policies that have dominated international financial circles. I shall translate "principles" and "policies" into the anthropological terminology that is more familiar to me, myths and rituals, to sum up what I have learned from his "Seven Exercises in Retrospection."

The first myth is that free trade and the elimination of tariffs should be the cornerstone for international exchange. Brazil's success in the computer industry that he points to is only the latest of a series of successful protectionist policies that made industrialization possible. U.S. advocates of free trade often forget that it was the tariff act of 1824 that rescued the industries that had sprung up in the War of 1812, enabling them to survive when England began dumping industrial goods in the ports of the former colony. Trade is, of course,

never free, and the lack of national constraints gives freedom to the dominant international interests in any historical period.

Myth number two is the dread of inflation that has justified monetarist policies to curb it through ritualistic manipulation of domestic currency. Hirschman demonstrates how this resulted in the demise of the television industry in Argentina and the loss of many smaller industries in Mexico. As he points out, inflation made it possible for new industries to find a foothold in Brazil. The abrupt devaluation of the currencies of those economies, once they are saddled with debts incurred during the period of overvaluation of domestic currencies, has made it nearly impossible for them to pay the service charge.

The third myth that Hirschman attacks is the worship of oil as the universal medium of prosperity. Brazilian industrialization may even have benefited, as Hirschman shows, from the lack of oil since the government promoted alternative strategies, whereas Mexico's heavy reliance on expected oil revenues left that nation burdened with a mountain of debts. An even more flagrant example of this is Bolivia, which made heavy investments in oil refineries in the seventies but failed to extend exploration for new fields, finding itself without oil to sell at any price when payment on the debt was due.

The fourth myth, masked as the Law of Comparative Advantage, led to policies advocating the elimination of hundreds of firms resulting in the unemployment of thousands of workers, as Hirschman illustrates with the case of Chile under the influence of the "Chicago boys." As he points out, if this myth were pursued, the law of comparative advantage would have led to the perpetual underdevelopment of the area.

I endorse Hirschman's use of a political-economic framework in assessing Latin American development. I would, however, go beyond him in linking political events with economic policies. The "accidental overthrow" (which Hirschman himself puts in quotation marks) of a democratic government in Brazil in 1964 has parallels in the Dominican Republic and in Bolivia the same year. I would ask whether these accidents might not have been linked with change in U.S. policy when Latin Americans started their own course of redistributive programs. The diminishing tolerance on the part of the U.S. for populist government may be more than coincidentally related to the fall in the return on capital (I have figures from 1966 to 1975 that show a drop from 18.7 to 13 percent) and a more aggressive policy of promoting investments in Latin America. The resurgence of populist governments in the beginning of the seventies—Allende in Chile, Torres in Bolivia, Torrijos in Panama, and Velasco in Peru—again began to address the interests of the working masses in a way that, according to Oscar Ugarteche, "confronted international capital."<sup>8</sup> Two of these leaders were killed in circumstances that may have been directly linked to international capitalist interests, and a third died in an airplane accident.

These events give a special dynamic to the political-economic approaches advocated by Hirschman. In the restructuring of the international economy in the second half of the seventies, political solutions backed by military pressures became ever more important in economic trends. When the U.S. economy went into a recession in the second half of the 1970s, the U.S. pursued a policy of fighting inflation with high interest rates. With declining investment resulting from this policy, there came a decline in the demand and prices for raw materials that had been the major exports of Latin American countries. At the same time, the Latin American countries that had contracted their debt at 6 percent interest were beginning to feel the squeeze on servicing the debt with interest rates that rose to 17 percent. The positive net transfers of credit reached a peak in 1980, and then Latin American countries began to export capital to the developed centers. Many Latin American politicians assert that U.S. recovery in the 1990s is based on debt repayments at exorbitant rates of interest from Third World countries. Investments in the form of credits to nationalized firms that were not expropriable were a surer form of revenue than investments in real property that could be taken over by the national government.<sup>9</sup>

Similarly, Oswaldo Sunkel has stressed the serious repercussions of the international recession on Latin America. This recession brings to light "the gravity of the structural problems which the development style had long been trailing in its wake, and which the financial boom had made it possible to cover up."<sup>10</sup> These are: the "problems of external imbalance, dependence and vulnerability; of intensive concentration of the fruits of economic and social progress, in terms both of income and ownership and of their geographical complement; and the problems of income distribution, of unemployment, underemployment and poverty and socio-political marginality in very large sectors of the population." I would like to emphasize that problems that were endemic to Latin America in the "thirty glorious years" have been exacerbated by the export of the crisis from the U.S. to the Third World, via the international banking system.

Although Hirschman recognizes that the problem of redistribution has not been solved, he does not make it central to his analysis of industrialization. Neither Mexico nor Brazil have succeeded in avoiding the increase in wealth differences which accompanies the advance of industrialization. In a recent article, Werner Baer has pointed out that between 1950 and 1982, when Mexico and Brazil experienced their highest industrial growth rates, the distribution of income worsened in both countries, with the share of the national income of the lower 50 percent of the population declining from 17.7 in 1960 to 14.6 percent in 1980, while the top 10 percent's share increased from 39.7 percent in 1960 to 47.7 percent in 1980. In Mexico, the share of the lowest 20 percent of income earners declined from 7.8 in 1950 to 1.9 percent in 1975, while the top 10 percent increased their share from 38.6 in 1950 to 43.5 percent in 1975.<sup>11</sup> These figures do not take into account

recent sharp declines in real wages due to inflation and unemployment.

Prebisch calls this widening gap "the fundamental problem of synchronizing redistribution of the fruits of technical progress and accumulation of reproductive capital."<sup>12</sup> He argues that development in the long run depends upon the redistributive power of the labor force and of the state to maintain demand at a high level, and he goes on to point out that the present system of capital accumulation "precludes an efficacious fulfillment of the design of equitable distribution."

I tend to subscribe to this more radical critique. So long as wages are the primary claim on redistribution of the social product, the capital-intensive industrialization pursued by Mexico and Brazil as well as other Latin American countries, mitigates the power of both labor and the state. Moreover, the specific policies promoted by the IMF that require reduction of the state spending in debt-ridden countries have weakened the ability of the state to mediate resource distribution. Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Mexico have resisted these measures, whereas Chile has anticipated such moves. In the past, it has often been the case that when the unions and the state have reached more equitable levels in the redistribution of returns from production, military regimes have intervened. The growing presence of U.S.-backed troops in Central America and the intervention of a military force in Bolivia, on what some nationals call the pretext of drug eradication, is a sobering consideration for those concerned with the declining power of labor unions and the state to prevent the shift of debt burden to the most impoverished sectors.

It is in this context that I would like to push a bit farther the innovative discussion of ideology and the debt contained in Hirschman's final observations. He has clearly illustrated the counterproductive practices of Washington policymakers preaching austerity to the agents of Latin American countries trying to renegotiate the debt. Their failure may stimulate controversy in Latin America as to whether the debts of many of the countries are legitimate, especially those loans that were contracted during military regimes that imposed their rule, sometimes with the help of the creditor country.

In conclusion, I have benefited greatly from Hirschman's critique of orthodox solutions to the economic stagnation and inflation in Latin America. I would like to share the same optimism about the future that he expresses. Since I have recently returned from Bolivia, where the economy is in a condition that one analyst called "terminal breakdown,"<sup>13</sup> I can only find ground for optimism in the incredible spirit and deep awareness of the people in their resistance to IMF-imposed conditions. The best way to illustrate this is from interviews I had with the miners in their "March for Life and Bread" that began on August 22 in the mining centers that are threatened with closure; a march that was terminated by the army on August 29. Hundreds of workers joined in a hunger strike in the mines, and women in



the Association of Housewives came to La Paz to set up their picket. A housewife from Huanuni, when asked about her goal in joining the hunger strike, responded as follows:

We have joined the fight to preserve the mines as property of the state and to deepen the nationalization process. Our parliament is composed of people linked to the great international oligarchy of the IMF. They are not carrying out the aims of the people. We live in constant dependency on the great firms of South American Placer, Shell and others that set the prices of our national resources. They are trying to dismantle the nationalized sectors of the economy and thrust us into the informal sector. We will not have any of the rights we have gained from years of struggle.

It is people like this that make me feel hope for Latin America, more than the success of an industrialization program that may indeed further the polarization of wealth.

### A Political Scientist's Perspective

by *Christopher Mitchell*  
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There are times when I think that Albert Hirschman might be described as a sort of intellectual anthropologist, studying the evolution of social ideas in the fields of public policy and economics. His clear and graceful prose picks up and turns over—for our minds' inspection—influential concepts, like (primitive?) man-made tools, showing how they may be used, misused, perhaps adapted to surprising new functions if placed in the right light or matched with a fitting task.

A striking freshness of viewpoint, made possible by this analytic style, is evident in "Seven Exercises in Retrospection." Patterns of public policy in Latin America during the past ten years come more clearly into focus, as fragmentary economic tools are compared with one another and their sometimes surprising effects are traced over time. Some of Hirschman's juxtapositions of ideas are initially jarring and dissonant, reminding us of Orwell's observations of how difficult it is to "hold in one's head at the same time" two ideas which convention, decorum, habit, or ideology dispose us to separate. One resists, at first, the notion that some forms of social improvement may well have endured or even advanced during the acute economic distress through which Latin America has passed during the last five years. To take an example closer to my own discipline, one must contemplate shifting several comfortable conceptual gears to credit the authoritarian Geisel regime in Brazil with what may turn out to have been constructive economic planning begun nearly fifteen years ago.

The danger run by unwary users of this daring style of reasoning, of course, is that one may strike out a great deal while swinging for the analytic fences. All of us could probably cite favorite examples of social scientists who propose

one valid conjunction of ideas for every nine whiffs at the plate. Hirschman skirts this peril very well indeed, and I have only one thing to quibble about: Hirschman's tracing of President Geisel's policies of industrial development and "the gradual dismantling of repressive authoritarianism" to a common wellspring in Brazil's positivist tradition. The "common-ness" of this source is posed in such general terms that one wonders whether the notion could ever be fairly tested.

Albert Hirschman's eclectic concept-mongering touches most interestingly on current political studies, perhaps, in the present paper's discussion of Argentina's *Plan Austral* and Brazil's *Plan Cruzado*. Hirschman argues that new democratic governments in Latin America may find surprising political authority in the trust they are conceded by conflict-weary mobilized electorates. The paper thus contributes both to the structural study of redemocratization, and to the sturdy rebirth of ideology as a central—and perhaps now creative—theme in understanding political change in the Southern Cone. One could easily elaborate the connection, which Hirschman only sketches, between political symbols such as human rights and civilian political supremacy, and the stabilizing economic strategies of Presidents Alfonsín and Sarney.

Pursuing this reflection, I could not help being reminded of a habitual remark by Kalman Silvert. When commenting on a manuscript, Kal would often note at the end: "And never omit *values!*" In a structuralist era, I often scanted the advice, and sometimes even wondered what it meant. Such wondering is over. In some Latin American societies, more is being revalued than the national currencies, and revalidated political symbols may help to integrate social coalitions that will prove both progressive and powerful.

In this paper—as in so much of his work—Albert Hirschman has anticipated the critic by performing well so many basic but often neglected tasks. "Seven Exercises in Retrospection" is of course interdisciplinary and theoretically eclectic, drawing on Burke and Hegel just as Hirschman's earlier studies put to use ideas from sources as diverse as Flaubert, Georges Sorel, Paul Tillich, Sartre, Machiavelli, Rousseau, Charlie Chaplin, and the Polish philosopher Kolakowski. This paper is vividly empirical, based on new research and field visits to Latin America. Much of it draws on the work of iconoclastic younger economists, and brings the perspective of four decades to bear in assessing (sympathetically) the new policy twists their studies discern. One has only to read contemporary social science—alas, even Latin Americanist social science—to grasp how rarely these virtues present themselves, especially together.

This paper reintroduces us, finally, to Albert Hirschman the qualified optimist, a turn of mind for which he has taken considerable criticism. In other hands—that have not shown, among other things, such serious care for the needs and strengths of the poor in our hemisphere—Hirschman's

discernment of the positive in contemporary affairs would ring hollow indeed. As it is, this paper does what he has so often done before: In good heart, he prods us out of making the last refinements to our neat analytic charts, to consider the importance of an intellectual flint, potshard, bone or antler we have not seen or understood before.

#### NOTES

\*Editor's Note: Wayne Cornelius retired from the LASA Executive Council on October 25, 1985, after 11 years as an appointed and elected officer of LASA, the longest continuous tenure in LASA's history. His last official responsibility was to preside over the selection of the 1986 Kalman Silvert Award winner and a session at LASA's XIII International Congress in Boston, built around the paper written by the recipient, Albert O. Hirschman. In this article Cornelius draws upon that paper and several of the commentaries presented.

1. The committee consisted of Wayne Cornelius (UC-San Diego), Chair; Helen Safa (University of Florida); Peter H. Smith (MIT and UC-San Diego); and Gilbert Merx (University of New Mexico).

2. The paper is entitled "The Political Economy of Latin American Development: Seven Exercises in Retrospection." It is currently available, in preliminary working-paper format, from the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California-San Diego (D-010), La Jolla, Calif. 92093, USA (Working Paper No. CE-03); and from the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana 46556, USA (Working Paper No. 88). The final version of the paper will be published by the *Latin American Research Review*, fall 1987.

3. See Alan Riding, "Brazil Increases Prices to Slow Consumption," *New York Times*, November 22, 1986.

4. Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley, California: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 2nd ed., 1979).

5. Alejandro Portes, "Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition and Change during the Last decades," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1985): 7-39.

6. The myth that the economic success of various East Asian countries is due largely to low state intervention is effectively dispelled in the papers presented at the conference on "Development Strategies in Latin America and East Asia: A Cross-Regional Comparison," Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, and Institute of the Americas, La Jolla, California, May 4-6, 1986. A selection of these papers will be published by the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies in 1987. [W. Cornelius]

7. Gremios, *Política Económica y Democracia* (Bogotá, 1983).

8. FLACSO, *La Deuda*, (La Paz, 1985), p. 48.

9. Ibid, p. 49.

10. Oswaldo Sunkel, "Past, Present and Future of the International Economic Crisis," *CEPAL Review* 22 (April, 1984), pp. 101-2.

11. Werner Baer, "Growth with Inequality: The Cases of Brazil and Mexico," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. XXI, Number 2 (1986), pp. 197-206.

12. Raúl Prebisch, "The Global Crisis of Capitalism and its Theoretical Background," *CEPAL Review* 22 (April, 1984), pp. 159-178.

13. Thomas Goslin, "Bolivia: A Nation in Crisis," *Christian Century* (February 6-13, 1985), p. 6.

#### Kuczynski

completely flat—stuck at about \$95 billion since 1982. Yet the volume of exports has grown between 20 and 30 percent, depending on the measure used, so that in effect the purchasing power of exports has declined by about 17 to 24 percent during that period.

As we all know, during periods of inflation like the 1970s it was fashionable to say that inflation is like the tide: it lifts all boats and makes all debts go down in real terms in the amount by which inflation raises nominal income. Unfortunately, general inflation is not always referent to particular commodity exporters, be they in Texas, Kansas, Chile, Peru or any commodity-producing country or company. The prices that matter to them are not general inflation, be it in their own country or in the world, but rather the prices of what they sell. Measured in that way, which is the purchasing-power-of-exports measure of debt, the debt has gone from \$325 billion in 1982 to about \$430 billion today. If one adjusts for U.S. inflation, which is the normal way, the debt has barely grown, from \$320 to about \$360 billion. But if one adjusts the debt for the purchasing power of the earnings which are needed to service it, then the debt has gone up by about one-third. This is why even though international interest rates around the world have fallen drastically, they are still very high for commodity producers.

If a U.S. steel producer has had declining sales prices per ton of steel for the past four or five years, it means that even though the nominal interest rate on its debt has gone down, in fact the interest burden has not. Similarly, the copper-adjusted debt of Chile has gone from \$20 to \$35 billion in the last five years, and the petroleum-adjusted debt of Mexico has gone from about \$80 to \$160 billion during the same period. Hence the difficulties of servicing the debt. We tend to forget effective burdens when we look only at nominal numbers.

#### Brazil and Mexico: The Terms of Trade Factor

It is true that there has been major positive development in the last year or year and a half. It is the favorable effect of declining oil prices upon oil-importing debtor countries, notably Brazil. Within the picture of Latin American debt difficulties, Mexico and Brazil symbolize the differences that have resulted from the accelerated commodity price drop and especially the huge drop in oil prices. Mexico borrowed between 1979 and 1981 when it need not have done so; it did so to accelerate growth. Its debt to the banks doubled from \$30 to almost \$60 billion during those two years even though its exports more than doubled. Brazil also borrowed between 1979 and 1981, but to a much lesser extent because the banks did not really want to lend to Brazil. Brazil borrowed because it had to in order to maintain a modicum of growth in the face of an adverse change in the terms of trade. The result is that countries like Mexico, which borrowed at the peak of their market and which are now at the bottom, are having enormous difficulties, whereas those like Brazil, which borrowed at the bottom of their market, are now floating upward as they feel the effect of the equivalent of a large capital inflow

in the form of lower costs for imported oil. Therefore if one compares the volume of Brazilian imports, which has gone up quite fast in the last year and a half, with their cost, which has gone down dramatically, a big acceleration in growth has become possible. The capital inflow, of course, makes the difference between the two countries. There are other differences. The large internal market in Brazil is certainly one, and this is what I think differentiates it from pure commodity exporters, such as some of the countries on the west coast of Latin America that do not have a large internal market to enable them to go forward.

Therefore if the terms of trade were to improve because of a large increase in export prices, most of the Latin American countries other than Brazil would experience a very dramatic and rapid change in their external outlook. However, that does not seem to be a possibility, let alone a probability at the present time. Thus as of the mid-1980s, we are basically sitting in the midst of a rather adverse climate for countries that rely on commodities for the bulk of their exports.

### **The International Setting**

Let us now turn briefly to the international setting. For the industrial countries the situation has been one of gradual decline in growth since the 1950s. When looking at commodity prices people tend to look at exchange rates, at per capita consumption, and at many other detailed variables. But the one crucial variable is: What is world growth? World growth in the 1950s was 6 percent; in the 60s, 5 percent; in the 70s, below 4 percent; so far in the 1980s world growth is 2 percent. This decline is evident regardless of which combination of years is selected—some people like to look at 1965 to 1973 to take in the Vietnam years, and so on—but the basic trend is there. The impact of the reconstruction of Europe and Japan, which was the big stimulus for world growth in the fifties and early sixties, is gone and there is nothing to replace it. That, combined with the massive restructuring of old industries because of the energy crisis and because of very high interest rates in the early 80s, has led to a drastic decline in per capita commodity usage in the industrialized countries. Metals use in the United States, for example, is now one-third less per unit of GNP than it was in 1973. The average pickup truck or car built in the United States in the early 70s used 3500 pounds of metal, but today it uses only 2300 pounds. As a result the consumption of major commodities has stayed flat in absolute terms and is declining in per capita terms.

The developing countries, particularly the commodity exporters, which are largely in Latin America, Africa and some of the South Asian countries, and those that are highly indebted, which is most of them except for countries such as India and China, have had to maintain the pace of their exportable production of commodities to pay for the interest on the debt. According to UNCTAD (the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), the index of commodity production in these countries has gone up from 100 to 107

in the eighties. That is not a big increase—about 1.5 percent per year or so—but it has occurred in flat markets. At the same time their consumption of commodities has gone down drastically. For example Latin American steel consumption has declined roughly one-fourth to one-third, from about 38 million tons in 1981 to something like 27 million tons in the last year, which is also the range of consumption decline in U.S. exports to Latin America, or about 40 percent. U.S. exports of machinery to Latin America fell even more in the last five years, from \$20 billion a year to around \$9 billion a year.

The commodity producers are thus running faster and faster but yet standing still in real terms because in every one of the last five years except 1984, there has been a decline in the purchasing power of their commodity exports. At no point since the Second World War have commodity prices been at such a low level as now in real terms. One can look at the World Bank series on commodity prices and see that today we are somewhere around 66 on an index of 100 for 1977-79; if we go back to 1945, we see that at no point was the index below about 95. In essence, the long-term problem of declining world growth has combined with economic pressure upon the debtors to keep producing even though their consumption is going down.

Thus at the margin, the people who increase world sales, namely the developing economies of the world, are in fact buying less while producing more and therefore exerting downward pressure on the prices of the very products which enable them to survive.

I do not see any prospect of the situation changing for some time. The way out would clearly be a revival of inflation around the world. This may take place, but usually inflation takes place when governments think they can step up the rate of growth. At the moment the rate of growth certainly does not seem to be a priority in the U.S., or in Japan, Germany or Europe in general. Rather the attitude of governments is to see stability as the main priority while keeping inflation low. Growth, as a result or as a cause, tends to be rather low. Unless one is a geopolitician, there is nothing on the horizon that makes one think that this pattern is going to change.

### **Is There a Way Out?**

The way out is not simple or dramatic. The measures are what I would call palliatives. What is particularly perturbing about these palliatives is that they are going to have to operate in an environment in Latin America in which the labor force is still growing at close to 3 percent a year as a result of the population increases that took place 15 or 20 years ago. Whether the rising expectations that existed until 1982-83 will continue or not is something I am sure you will debate in the course of this meeting and in your research. So far it seems that the populations have taken it on the chin and have been willing to lower their expectations. However there is probably some limit to this tolerance. I think we are seeing such a limit in a number of countries, Mexico in particular.

The palliatives are nothing more than that; they are not solutions. The Baker Plan presents the palliatives as solutions, but there is no solution to the fact that what a country is selling to the world is going down in price and to the fact that the world is growing ever more slowly each decade. There is no easy solution to the fact that a country has a debt that is six times its annual exports, which is the case in Mexico today. That means that if the average rate of interest is 7 percent, which looks low in nominal terms, 42 percent of export earnings go simply to pay interest on the external debt. That is what a 6:1 debt-to-export ratio means. On the other hand Brazil has a 3:1 export ratio, and therefore its interest service is much more manageable.

What are the palliatives? There are basically three: capital inflows, internal economic and probably social reform, and interest relief. The Baker Plan focuses on the first two and disregards the third. Most commercial bank lenders certainly are upset if anyone mentions the question of interest relief, particularly since interest rates are nominally rather low at present and they therefore do not see any justification for relief.

Let us look at each palliative: first, capital inflows. The Latin American trade surplus with the outside world has ranged around \$35 billion a year since 1983. That is the same sum that has gone to pay the interest on the commercial bank debt, which is the bulk of the debt. As long as a trade surplus of that size continues with constant or declining export prices, there will be very little real growth because that export surplus is in the range of 4 to 5 percent of GNP. It is twice the export surplus of Japan in relative terms. What happens then is accounting growth, not real income growth. Therefore the idea that Latin America can export its way out, without at the same time importing the inputs that are needed for those exports, is somewhat simplistic since as growth accelerates, the marginal propensity to invest, and therefore to import, is bound to go up. If we had a very low propensity to invest we would be using up excess capacity. When that excess capacity is used up, as is happening now in Brazil, imports go up very rapidly. At that point capital inflows become essential.

Where will the inflows come from? The favorite idea in Washington is that they will come from the reflow of private capital and from direct foreign investment. I do not think there is a reasonable chance of that happening in the next two or three years, even if one is optimistic. The capital reflow would after all require a drastic change in the conditions that caused the capital outflow in the first place. And the capital outflow was motivated more than anything else by overvalued exchange rates, unstable political conditions, and the prospect of slow growth. The overvalued exchange rates have clearly gone, but investors are going to wait and see if this is a permanent phenomenon or whether the forces that have tended in many Latin American countries to keep exchange rates overvalued will reassert themselves. Those forces are, among others, the fact that the voting strength in Latin America is in the middle class. The middle class reads *Time*, has a relatively

high propensity to import, wants a car, wants a house. In inflationary conditions this means that it has to have interest subsidies in order to afford the house and, except for Brazil, cheap dollars in order to afford imports or import-related products, such as travel abroad and an automobile.

Thus undervalued exchange rates, which have been suggested by many as the way out, are not as simple a solution as is commonly thought. There would probably be strong political resistance to such a policy. In Latin America there is one car per four or five people, while in East Asia there is one car per 30 people: that difference tends to show you what the consumption patterns are and why it will not be at all easy to reattract the money that has gone out. Some of it is coming back as a result of a tight squeeze on monetary policy, but the price is high and the results meager. Various special schemes—insurance schemes, *amnistías*, *blanqueos*, special bond issues—unfortunately fly in the face of market realities. You can buy a perfectly good U.S. junk paper yielding 14 percent; if you had bought first-class German paper a year ago you would have had a return of about 45 percent in U.S. dollars. So why bother to get your money back into country X or Y at rates of interest that are just not enough to offset the risk?

I think some reflow will take place as long as conditions are stable, particularly on exchange rates. But I am pessimistic about that being the case. Private direct investment in Latin America today is basically bargain hunting and platform type of investment. The debt-equity swaps are one form of this bargain hunting in countries whose debts sell at a large discount. Foreign direct investment into Mexico is important because Mexico is the lowest cost area closest to the United States, and there is a large amount of automobile investment for export to the United States, partly stimulated by the Mexican authorities, which have cajoled and squeezed the companies hard. If they had not done that the investment would probably have been less. There is some investment in Brazil, but a lot of it is reinvested earnings which are kept in because of exchange controls. So there again rather than autonomous market forces, it is really the government that is to some degree causing the investment.

I think some good will come out of the system of debt-equity swaps which has been launched in the last year with a great deal of fanfare. But the scheme relies basically on an exchange subsidy from the central bank: The buyer of the debt buys it at a discount outside, shows up at the central bank, and gets 100 percent or slightly less in local currency. Therefore there is credit creation and monetary expansion with offsetting monetary policies which keep interest rates high for domestic investors. For the countries that have low discounts on their external debts like Brazil or Colombia, the debt-equity swap mechanism is not really attractive. Other countries, such as Argentina, now want to halve the discount by making one put up double the investment: To get one dollar at a discount you have to put up a real dollar on the other side. That simply means the discount goes down by a

half. Since the discount is only 20 percent, the effective incentive is 10 percent, and 10 percent is not really enough of an opportunity incentive or a shadow return to make the investor come forward.

### **The Need to Stimulate Growth**

In the end what will stimulate private direct investment is economic growth. That is the truth. It is not gimmicks invented by commercial or investment bankers. The only thing that will stimulate direct investment is economic growth, and economic growth will take place only if countries have the resources to stimulate it. That in turn means sufficient capital inflows or else interest relief. One source of capital inflow is clearly the multilateral development banks which since 1982 have played a very small role in resource transfer terms, which is simply the net cash inflow. The World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank transferred to Latin America last year about a billion dollars or less. If one thinks that the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank have something like 3,000 people working to crank out this net inflow of just one billion dollars, it really does not look large in comparison with the trade surplus of \$35 billion and the interest service requirement of \$35 billion. These institutions clearly can do a lot more. The World Bank has cash reserves today of \$20 billion; together with the Inter-American Bank it has \$28 billion of loans committed to Latin America but not yet disbursed. Anybody who looks at this says "Surely they can do a lot more with what they've already got without talking first about capital increases and new formulas for lending."

Clearly what is needed in the short run, and in Latin America today the short run is extremely important, is a substantial expansion of disbursements. This could be done very easily just by taking all the existing loans and doubling the proportion which the international institutions are willing to finance. One of the reasons the disbursements are so slow is that countries have to put up something like 60 or 70 percent of the resources to match the foreign loan. In the present fiscal crunch, where interest on the debt in most countries is larger than the central government deficit, and interest on the external and domestic debt absorbs something like 25 to 30 percent of government expenditures, it is very difficult for governments to put up the resources; at that point public investment stops. The feeder road program stops, and the agricultural credit program stops and so on. This could be easily cured, since we are facing an emergency, simply by jacking up the disbursements. Now there are many people who say this is anti-technical, it is balance-of-payments assistance, and so on. But after all, what are these institutions doing if it is not balance-of-payments assistance? All capital inflows are a form of balance-of-payments assistance. It is simply balance-of-payments assistance with a development bent to it. The arguments against increasing the rate of disbursements are, I think, without economic merit; whereas to crank out a large-scale program of structural adjustment loans—where these institutions are going to try to change structural defects which

have existed for 40 or 50 years with one or two loans—is unfortunately unrealistic. I think that if we talk about this approach two or three years from now, we will see that it was exaggerated and that it had little effect. It could be effective in the long run, but when there is a fire on the roof one can't talk about the color of the tiles, which is really what is going on with several of the solutions proposed.

I think there is something that can also be done through market mechanisms. The gold exporters could raise some money on Wall Street. Capital can also be raised for stock markets. For example, along with others we are in the middle of trying to raise a large Brazil Mutual Fund in New York which will invest around \$200 million in the Brazilian stock market. There are things like this which can be done, and they are a very useful beginning. But we should not be fooled; they are not the solution to any problem. Nor is the much vaunted loan swap market. The fact that somebody is selling off a loan at 60 cents on the dollar in no way changes the obligation of the debtor, because the reason somebody is willing to buy it at 60 cents on the dollar is that he thinks he's going to get 100 cents at some point in the future. Thus much of this is sort of financial technicolor but has nothing to do with the solution of the problem. The solution of the problem requires a substantial inflow of capital from the outside, and the paradox is that today only public sources can really supply a substantial amount of capital.

### **Domestic Economic Reform**

Now we come to reform, which is the subject of a book that a group of us—Bela Balassa, Gerardo M. Bueno, Mario Henrique Simonsen and myself—completed under the sponsorship of the Colegio de México, the Getulio Vargas Foundation and the Institute for International Economics. In it we talk about opening up economies, fostering export drives, reducing the role of the state, and so on. I do not think anybody disagrees with the basic merit of these objectives. I think the problem lies, however, in the very serious difficulty there is in implementing these kinds of measures when the rope is really tight around the neck, which is the case in a number of countries at the moment.

Despite that basic difficulty, we see in Mexico a substantial opening to the outside which is hard for the country to finance in the short run. It may be very beneficial in the long run, however. The effort being made is enormous. In looking at the restructuring of economies internally, though, we ought to bear in mind one thing: the argument that has been made frequently that the East Asians could do it and, therefore, the Latin Americans ought to be able to do it too, disregards a basic fact about what is going on in the international economy. I do not refer to the cultural aspects or to the natural inward orientation of a large market economy such as Brazil or Mexico. Whenever Latin America has gone head to head with East Asia in markets which are crowded, protection has inevitably arisen. We have, for example, the case of textiles, which are highly protected; there are restrictions on

shoes; we have seen protection in specialty steels in Brazil and other countries, and we are now going to see it in cars. So far the protection has been exclusively on Japanese cars; however, as the Koreans, Taiwanese, Mexicans and Brazilians get into the crowded U.S. car market, one will inevitably see voluntary agreements at first and then not-so-voluntary types of agreements. So there are, I think, serious macroeconomic obstacles which derive simply from the fact that the industrial countries do not want to let go of old industries at the same speed that new exporters are willing to replace them. Thus you get a period of trade friction which could last 10, 20 or even 30 years.

In my opinion, the most constructive thing that could happen in the reform of Latin American economies is probably the reorientation of public investment towards social services and infrastructure. It is clear that in the seventies, because of the ease of commercial bank finance and multinational and export credit finance, governments misinvested in state enterprises. In some cases these were competing with investments the private sector would have made anyway, and in other cases they overbuilt capacity in industries that did not have a long-term future. It is also clear that getting rid of some of these investments is very costly; in fact, in some cases one cannot get rid of them. But the ones that can be sold are probably best sold at fire sale prices, because on a present value basis, a low price received would be far less costly to the government over a period of years than continuing the subsidies. One of the curious things about privatization is that it has become sort of the wave that everybody in Washington writes about. The World Bank has a group of about 30 people who are privatizing. The key to privatization is the key to enterprise, and that is SELL. If you are on a bond trading desk, you do not wait for the perfect price, you sell. If your job as minister of state industry is to get rid of enterprises, you have to begin by selling one. If you spend three years with a large World Bank study that will have all the perfect numbers in it, you will never sell anything. And experience shows that unfortunately that is what is happening, although I am hopeful that it will start to change.

I think the other important area is to substantially beef up social investment budgets. Education budgets have declined dramatically in real terms over the last five years, yet research has shown the rate of return for the modest sums involved in such budgets to be clearly much higher than the rate of return on the hardware type of investment. Electrical investment is going to be needed, and that is an area where the World Bank will have to step in. There are shortages building up, in Brazil in particular. There needs to be a reorientation of public investment to force the sale of commercial state enterprises and reorient the resources toward social and infrastructure investments.

### Interest Relief

Even capital inflows which, at least for a while, are going to be largely debt-related, and internal reforms will not be suf-

ficient; the mathematics just does not work out. We cannot expect capital inflow into Latin America in the range of \$20 to \$30 billion. We are getting \$5 or \$6 billion into Brazil because of the lower oil price, and that is clearly significant. That is a large part of the sum that has come from somewhere but that very few realistically expected. But there is still a huge gap; and therefore it is important, it seems to me, to seriously look at interest relief.

There is really only one argument against interest relief and it is contained in one word: *precedent*—just as in real estate the important thing is *location*. The only argument against interest relief is precedent because the bank supervisors, especially the Federal Reserve and the financial authorities in general, are scared. Since there is such a large structure of debt around the world built up during a period of high inflation and high price expectations, there is a legitimate fear that giving debt relief to Mexico on the interest side will inevitably trigger debt relief in Kansas, in Texas and around the world. There is clearly some truth to that.

There is some degree of interest relief already taking place with the farm loans in the United States. Also, a substantial degree of relief was given to the savings and loan industry five or six years ago through long periods of amortization on their exposed positions. There is therefore no reason, at least no intellectual reason, why the same could not be done with debtors that are in very definite trouble. Take the example of Mexico. Mexico's debt is roughly six times its current account earnings which, as I said earlier, means that about 42 percent of export earnings have to be used simply to pay the interest bill. This is a completely unsustainable situation. And when the package that has just been put together is completed and digested, which it will be by mid-1987, people will see that the debt has simply gone up by another \$12 billion and nothing has changed. To have one's debt go up by 12 or 13 percent in less than a year when one's terms of trade have gone down by 40 or 50 percent is a very serious matter. The main accomplishment will be that the banks will have been paid on time. That is not sufficient justification. To acquire debt of that magnitude at such speed—Mexico would have built up its present debt in eight years at that rate—with nothing to show for it in terms of investment that will produce future growth, and to maintain the fiction that creditworthiness still exists and that the country will have access to the market at some point in the indefinite future, is not intellectually responsible. This is basically the last shot of the old debt strategy, and that last shot in my view is likely to fail.

We therefore have to think of what other ammunition exists, and clearly the schemes all have to emerge from a very simple truth: the banks have become the partners of a significant number of countries. Anybody who lends you money which takes half of your income to service is your partner; he is no longer your banker. He is going to want to know how you sleep, eat, and what your health is every day of the year. The banks know that if the countries are able to limit their debt service for a period without wasting the money, and that

is the big condition that has to be underlined, *without wasting the debt relief*, they then will be in a much better position to grow. That is the same principle of venture capital. If you put money in some shed that makes electronics, you do not expect the fellow to give you a dividend for years. You are basically giving him a form of relief because you believe that five or ten years down the road he will make you rich.

The banks are going to have to change their way of thinking in the same direction. They would of course link relief to the possibility that relief will help the particular country to grow and export. One does not have to link it to oil or coffee. One simply has to link it to reserves and overall exports, and there are many formulas that could be found. The main obstacle is the reluctance of the Federal Reserve to create a worldwide precedent. On the other hand there are very few debtors around the world that have debt-equity ratios equivalent to debt-export ratios of 6 or 5 to 1 and survive. Most of those are in Japan, and they survive because until now they were growing rapidly and the central bank was willing to support the commercial banks.

The United States is reluctant to contemplate international debt relief since it is the lynchpin of the debt strategy. Whatever the Federal Reserve decides it is willing to do will affect the interest relief formula that is found. European banks are willing to accept an interest relief formula; they do not want to put more loans on the books. The big American banks are not willing to, not because they do not like that idea—although any type of relief is unappealing to the lender—but because they do not get the regulatory support to enable them to maintain these assets on their books in a way that will not wipe out their capital. But that way can be found; it is being done for other institutions. The stock market still writes down the value of bank stocks because it does not believe in the value of the loans that are on the books; so it is already saying what the write-down is. It should not be beyond intellectual ability to devise a contingent formula that would not have to be applied to every country. If such a formula had been in existence two years ago, we would not have had the charade that has gone on with the debtors of one of the two largest developing countries in the world in the last few weeks and months. It has been *parches*, as we say, or band aids, nothing more than that. And it has fooled no one. It has simply bought time for the thinkers to think more clearly, which so far they have been unable to do.

In closing it seems to me that we have two unappealing thoughts and one appealing one. The appealing one is that Brazil, with one-third of the population and 40 percent of the GNP of Latin America, is, despite the present world commodity environment, emerging from the problem. It is doing so quite quickly. There are huge potential fiscal and inflationary problems as the *cruzado* plan is unwound, but the fundamentals are there. If this breather is used productively so that Brazilian exports can, within the next three or four years, increase to \$40 billion a year without a significant increase in debt, the debt problem will be gone for Brazil, leaving a much smaller sum to be managed. That is the good news.

The middling news is that for the others to get out of the woods there is a need for public money, and public money is unpopular today. Ever since Proposition 13, which then blossomed into the Reagan administration which has been Keynesian in terms of expenditure, public money for the poor and for foreigners has been highly unpopular. Therefore only a crisis can change this attitude. Unfortunately, orderly forward planning will not take place: only a crisis will stimulate action.

The third item is that clearly the U.S. is going to have to take the leadership. Latin America has had no leadership in economic matters. Countries have not been able to get together and make a credible statement to the United States, which is their main interlocutor. The Cartagena process, for example, has been basically diplomatic and has been dominated by the fear of initiative. It has accepted the status quo and has made small changes around it. It has not really made clear what the new agenda should be. And I do not think that we are going to have a new agenda coming from the Latin American governments for some time. Therefore it will be the United States, out of fear and self-interest, that will have to come up with the last word.

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Thanks to all those who can give some time to this effort.

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**Popular Hegemony and National Unity:  
The Dialectics of Sandinista Agrarian  
Reform Policies, 1979-1986\***

by  
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**Introduction**

On January 11, 1986, the Sandinista government announced the modification of the 1981 Agrarian Reform Law. The new law institutionalizes significant changes in Sandinista agrarian policy which have yet to be analyzed.<sup>1</sup> The changes suggest that the Nicaraguan agrarian reform was reaching its limits during 1985, after successfully distributing over 2,500,000 manzanas of land to more than 83,000 families.<sup>2</sup> Further, six years into the institutionalization of the Nicaraguan revolution, the balance of forces which had emerged required a reevaluation of policies designed to achieve one of the central goals of the revolution: to radically change the socioeconomic conditions of the Nicaraguan peasantry through the implementation of an agrarian reform.

The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) has faced a central dilemma: how to design an agrarian reform policy which does not conflict with its commitment to a "national unity" policy while at the same time guaranteeing "popular hegemony." National unity commits the revolution to economic development and national independence under the auspices of a broadly-based, multiclass alliance. Popular hegemony, however, sees the revolution as fundamentally supported by the popular classes, and the interests and demands of these classes are considered the highest priority.

In this article we first provide a fresh analysis of several key aspects of Sandinista agrarian policy which challenges various assumptions made in the literature. Secondly we look at the political and economic factors that led the Sandinista government to revise its agrarian reform policy. The dynamics of the conflict between national unity and popular hegemony are brought into bold relief.

**On the Record: The First Six Years of Nicaraguan Agrarian Reform, 1979-1985**

The latest comprehensive data available on Nicaraguan agrarian reform shed new light on Sandinista agricultural policies. The overall record of the first six years is impressive. Under the agrarian reform law the Sandinista government distributed 2,523,388 manzanas, benefiting 83,322 families, from October 16, 1981, to December 1985.<sup>3</sup> However, only 838,454 manzanas of the total land distributed to cooperatives, individual farmers, and indigenous communities consisted of new land.<sup>4</sup> Of the remaining 1,684,934 manzanas, 1,421,951 manzanas constitute land in the agricultural frontier already held by farmers who were merely given secure titles for their properties. An additional 262,983 manzanas were later obtained by considerably reducing the

size of the state sector or area of people's property (APP). Further, in order to distribute 838,454 manzanas of new land to beneficiaries of the agrarian reform, the Sandinista government had to buy land from large landowners, and the president had to expropriate land under the right of public domain, since only 523,403 manzanas were obtained by applying the agrarian reform law from October 1981 until the end of 1985.<sup>5</sup> The fact that the land of as few as 448 agricultural producers was expropriated under the agrarian reform law, and only one-third of the land distributed consisted of new land, requires an explanation.

A brief examination of the three distinct phases of reform is helpful: (1) confiscation of the Somoza landholdings and consolidation of the state farms (1979-1983); (2) special titling programs at the agricultural frontier (1983-1985); (3) the process of land distribution to individual farmers (1985-present).

*Confiscation of the Somoza Landholdings and  
Consolidation of the State Farms, 1979-1983*

The first phase of the Nicaraguan agrarian reform was characterized by the confiscation of all rural properties owned by Somoza and his associates under decrees no. 3 of July 20, 1979, and no. 38 of August 8, 1979. A total of 2,000 farms, representing more than 20 percent of Nicaragua's arable land, were affected. This resulted in a drastic reduction of privately-owned large landholdings, since these farms represented 43 percent of all the land held in properties larger than 500 manzanas.<sup>6</sup>

The former Somocista properties were usually modern, large-scale operations, concentrating on export production. Their distribution among the landless peasants could have lowered or disrupted their productive potential. This economic consideration, reinforced by the political beliefs of some Sandinista officials, led to the establishment of a state-farm system. By 1984 there were 92 agricultural complexes, representing over 2,000 state farms and employing 64,855 workers.<sup>7</sup>

Previous analysis of the Nicaraguan agrarian reform has not revealed the considerable growth in the state sector (APP) from 1981-1982, after confiscation of the Somoza properties had been completed. In 1981 (the first year for which reliable statistics are available) the APP controlled 1,622,673 manzanas, or 20.1 percent of Nicaragua's arable land.<sup>8</sup> By 1982, the land incorporated into the APP reached 1,945,593 manzanas, or 24 percent. This increase is considerable if we take into account that all land distributed under the agrarian reform to



individuals and cooperatives from 1981-1982 amounted to a mere 131,857 manzanas. Thus, if we consider the substantial increase in the state sector from 1981 to 1982, a total of 322,920 manzanas, arguments that the pace of the reform was slow in its first year need to be modified considerably.

The data suggest that the perception of the bourgeoisie regarding the state's attempt to dominate the agricultural sector by expanding the size of its landholdings had some basis.<sup>9</sup> After all, the state received more than twice as much land as the cooperative movement and the individual farmers together. Further, it appears that the group within the Ministry of Agricultural Development and Agrarian Reform (MIDINRA) which considered the path of socialist transition to lie primarily in collectivization via state farms, was predominant until 1982.<sup>10</sup> This development represented a strong challenge to the policy of national unity.

The bourgeoisie, having observed the rapid expansion of the APP in 1981-82, has questioned the claim made by the Sandinista government that the area of the APP has been reduced considerably over the last years in order to increase the pool of land available for the agrarian reform. On this point the data support the Sandinistas, whose policy has been to reduce the size of state farms to the extent possible whenever the state could not farm the land efficiently,<sup>11</sup> to avoid antagonizing the rural bourgeoisie.<sup>12</sup> From 1981-1985 a total of 262,983 manzanas were taken from the state sector and made subject to agrarian reform.

The rapid pace of expropriation during the first years was succeeded by a considerable slowdown. During 1981-83, 422,000 manzanas were expropriated under the agrarian reform law, whereas a total of only 102,403 manzanas was expropriated in the next two years. National unity considerations appear to have been important in determining the pace of agrarian reform. The reaction of the bourgeoisie to the expropriations of 1981-83 explain, in part, the slow implementation of agrarian reform from 1984 to 1985.<sup>13</sup> In 1984, the election year, 290,929 manzanas were made available for redistribution, of which only 46,228 derived from expropriations under the agrarian reform law. The government again resorted to buying land and reducing the APP to obtain the remaining 244,701 manzanas. The same holds true for 1985, when only 56,175 manzanas were expropriated, while the government bought 121,743 manzanas and reduced the APP by 190,326 manzanas.

In short, though the bourgeoisie might have had valid complaints about other aspects of the revolutionary process, in these years the complaints frequently voiced by representatives of the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP) about the "radical" nature of the Sandinista agrarian reform are not supported by the data.

*Special Titling Programs at the  
Agricultural Frontier, 1983-1985*

In the 1950s the introduction of cotton on the Pacific Coast forced thousands of Nicaraguan peasants to move fur-

ther inland to the agricultural frontier, after losing their land to the expanding modern cotton farms. The agricultural frontier consisted of public-domain lands in the northern and eastern regions of the country. Generally speaking, settlers who relocated there had no land titles and led a marginalized and insecure existence. Under pressure from the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG), MIDINRA started a program in 1982 to distribute secure land titles to these settlers. With the help of UNAG, priority areas were selected for titling programs, and promoters were sent out to collect the necessary information so that farmers could receive titles.<sup>14</sup> During 1983 title was granted to 198,634 manzanas through this process.

The pace of land titling increased dramatically in 1984 when farmers received titles to over one million manzanas. The substantial increase can be explained by two factors, the national elections held in November 1984 and increased counterrevolutionary activity. The FSLN sought to maintain or increase the political support of the peasantry by fulfilling their long-standing claims to secure titles. Also, the farmers could be expected to put up more resistance against the counterrevolution with the knowledge that they were defending their own property. In 1985 the titling process started to decline with peasants receiving titles to only 133,616 manzanas.

An important aspect of the special title program has been overlooked. Though the population at the agricultural frontier benefited considerably from October 1981 to December 1985 (33,397 families received secure titles), one has to keep in mind that the 1,421,951 manzanas titled during this period were for farmers who already had possession of their land and long-standing claims to it, rather than being titles to new land. This distinction aids in constructing an accurate picture of the pace of agrarian reform.

*The Process of Land Distribution to  
Individual Peasants, 1985-Present*

During the first years of the agrarian reform, very little land was distributed to individual farmers. The already low figure of 23,761 manzanas given to 408 peasants from October 1981 to December 1982 became even lower in 1983 and 1984, with 13,144 manzanas and 15,348 manzanas respectively. This development was related to two fundamental factors. First, it was necessary to maintain an alliance with the bourgeoisie under the policy of national unity, and secondly, the FSLN cadre had a certain distrust of the traditional technology and culture of the peasantry.

In 1985, however, the self-imposed limits on expropriations by the FSLN and the prevailing bias against individual farming were to lose their argumentative force. The agrarian reform plan of MIDINRA for 1985 initially called for a continuation of established policies. Under a revised plan, however, 5,636 instead of 392 individual farmers were to be given title to 156,745 manzanas. This was three times the amount of land given to individuals in all the previous years of the agrarian reform combined. What accounted for this revolutionary change?

In early 1985 detailed studies of the election returns from November 1984 were available for the first time. The studies revealed data of great interest to the FSLN. In those rural municipalities where less than 10 percent of the population had received land under the agrarian reform, opposition parties received a higher percentage of the vote than they obtained at the national level, although they did not defeat the FSLN.<sup>15</sup> This was the first hard evidence for a development that could be sensed all over Nicaragua during 1984. The peasants with little or no land felt betrayed by their new government.

Also, in early 1985 UNAG, the organization of small and medium producers, recognized that it had neglected the landless.<sup>16</sup> UNAG had originally focused its attention on small producers organized in cooperatives, but after a process of reevaluation began giving more attention to the needs of individual producers, especially to the peasants with little or no land.

An indication of this revised policy is the events of Masaya in 1985. UNAG's president for Region IV, Juan Galán, headed a movement of landless peasants which took to the streets of Masaya, demanding to be given land as individual farmers.<sup>17</sup> Following the demonstrations, several private properties and state farms were invaded by armed peasants. Some of the properties were owned by Enrique Bolanos, president of the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP). Bolanos immediately took the opportunity to characterize the invasion of his land as a reprisal for his political activities and an attack on the policy of national unity.<sup>18</sup>

With the exception of Bolanos, all affected producers agreed to sell their properties to the state or exchange their holdings for fertile land in regions with no land pressure.<sup>19</sup> In order to expropriate Bolanos' land, MIDINRA had to declare part of Region IV a Zone of Agricultural Development and Agrarian Reform. This could be seen as a turning point in Sandinista agricultural policy. The earlier emphasis on preserving national unity even in the face of heavy costs to the peasant base of the FSLN was being replaced by a focus on the demands of the peasantry. Further, 1985 saw renewed pragmatism on the part of the FSLN, as it finally acknowledged the strong individualistic traits of the Nicaraguan farmer and changed its policies in recognition of this fact.<sup>20</sup> Masaya also demonstrated the demise of the 1981 agrarian reform law and contributed directly to the impetus for modifications announced on January 11, 1986.

### **The 1986 Revision of the Agrarian Reform Law**

#### *New Features*

On January 11, 1986, Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega decreed Law No. 14, a revision of the agrarian reform law.<sup>21</sup> The new law contains several significant changes in Nicaragua's agrarian reform policy.

Article 1 guarantees "the rights to private property over the land to all those who employ it productively and efficiently." This article is similar to the guarantee of private property provided in the old law. Article 2 makes subject to expropriation abandoned, idle or underused properties, as well as land being rented. Properties owned by absentee landlords and worked through sharecropping or similar arrangements are also subject to expropriation.<sup>22</sup>

The important new feature of Article 2 is the elimination of limits established under the old law on the expropriation of idle, underused or rented land. Whereas previously a producer could own up to 500 manzanas in the Pacific regions and up to 1,000 manzanas in the rest of the country, regardless of the conditions of exploitation and productivity of his land, under the new law all idle or underused land can be expropriated.<sup>23</sup>

The second significant change can be found in Article 20 dealing with compensation for expropriated idle land. Until 1986 owners of properties expropriated under the agrarian reform law were entitled to compensation, with the exception of producers who had abandoned their land. The new law treats owners of idle land the same as owners of abandoned land: they will not be compensated. However, the sanctions imposed on abandoned and idle land do not apply in cases where these situations are beyond the control of the owner, such as land in the war zones.

Another significant change in the new law relates to the right of public domain (*utilidad pública o interés social*). According to Article 9, the Minister of Agricultural Development and Agrarian Reform can declare the expropriation of rural property under the right of public domain. This measure makes it possible to expropriate the land of any agricultural producer, efficient or not, in an "exceptional case."<sup>24</sup> Under the old law, only the president had the power to declare expropriations under the right of public domain.<sup>25</sup>

Perhaps the most surprising feature of the new law, however, is not what has been changed but what has remained unchanged. The revised Nicaraguan agrarian reform law still does not establish upper limits for the size of landholdings. Jaime Wheelock, head of MIDINRA, has pointed out though that the implementation of the reform will be directed principally against those large landowners who do not live on their properties and have other professions.<sup>26</sup> This pronouncement is certain to affect the policy of national unity, vital to the revolutionary project of the Sandinistas.

#### *The Political Economy of the 1986 Reform*

In examining the reasons for the reform, one should distinguish between immediate factors that precipitated the change and the problems which developed over the first years of the implementation of the old law. The two most evident immediate factors are the actions of counterrevolutionary forces and the problem of the landless peasants.

Of these two, the more important factor has been counterrevolutionary activity. The *contras* who infiltrate from Honduras and Costa Rica affect mainly the north of the country and the southern part of the region of Zelaya. The attacks have resulted in a flow of displaced peasants, partly spontaneous and partly directed by the government's creation of resettlement camps. A total of 250,000 peasants have been relocated, resulting in a severe disorganization of the productive sector. The other problem, that of landless peasants, dates back to the period prior to the Sandinista victory; however it became more pronounced in 1984. As noted above, the Sandinista government did not satisfy the needs of this sector with the land confiscated from Somoza, but instead utilized it to increase the APP.

Given the political and legal constraints on expropriation under the 1981 law, the Nicaraguan government had four basic options for increasing the pool of land for redistribution: (1) it could reduce the size of the APP; (2) the head of MIDINRA could declare Zones of Agricultural Development and Agrarian Reform; (3) the president could expropriate land using the legal measure of public domain; or (4) the government could negotiate with producers and buy their land.

The first option was a partial solution as noted above. The second option, enabling expropriation of the land of efficient producers, was problematic, as evidenced by the 1985 expropriations in Masaya. Option three, expropriation by presidential decree under the right of public domain, was difficult to implement under Nicaragua's legal system.

In areas of intense land pressure, the difficulties of applying these measures frequently left the government with no option other than the fourth. In 1985 alone the state acquired 340 properties through negotiations, at a cost of more than 500 million *córdobas*.<sup>27</sup> Thus the government bought twice as much land in 1985 for distribution under the agrarian law as was accumulated from expropriations. Nicaragua's severe economic crisis, however, has made it prohibitive for the Sandinistas to continue spending large sums of money to buy land.

The provisions of the reform put the government in a better bargaining position with respect to farmers from whom it wants to buy land. Since it is now legally possible to expropriate the lands of any producer, the state can, to a considerable degree, dictate the price of properties it wants to buy. Moreover no compensation has to be paid for the expropriation of idle land.

A central political motive behind the reform, according to Nicaraguan officials, is to cripple the "internal front" of the counterrevolution, a group of agricultural producers who provide safe houses and logistical support.<sup>28</sup> These producers frequently attack the revolution internally, intentionally leaving their land idle or underused. Previously agricultural producers with medium-sized farms were able to act with relative impunity, since they were protected from expropriation under the provisions of the old law. The new law, however, makes

this group a primary target of agrarian reform, along with absentee landowners of large tracts of land.

The 1986 reform materialized in the wake of what appeared to be the strategic defeat of the counterrevolution.<sup>29</sup> The government sought to use this opportunity to eliminate the remaining internal support system. The price of such a move, however, is high. The new agrarian policy is likely to conflict with the principle of national unity. The Sandinista government has to weigh the cost of possible damage to the policy of national unity against problems which could emerge because of eroding support among the peasantry if the FSLN does not provide the land it has promised.

### Conclusion

The overall record of the Sandinista agrarian reform is impressive: the extent of large landholdings has been reduced considerably, the cooperative movement is growing stronger, and more than 83,000 families have benefited. The foregoing analysis of key aspects of the Sandinista agrarian reform suggests, however, that the policy of national unity protected the landowning class and impeded a more thorough implementation of the agrarian reform, to the detriment of the peasantry. The data demonstrate that little new land was distributed during the first years of the reform. Further, during this period the land of fewer than 500 agricultural producers was expropriated under the agrarian reform, and most received compensation even though they were not entitled to it under the agrarian reform law.

The political and technical limitations of the agrarian reform law precipitated the 1986 reform, which is designed to solve the problems of peasants with little or no land by facilitating government's acquisition of redistributable land. The new law does not appear to repudiate the policy of national unity. Efficient producers, regardless of the size of their landholding, will be protected under the new law as they have been in the past.

Maintaining a climate of security, however, will not be easy. While it can be argued that agrarian reform has so far not significantly eroded the policy of national unity, an important sector of the rural bourgeoisie, continues to hold that the "radical" Sandinista agrarian reform significantly violates the principle of national unity and endangers productivity, as well as the rights of landholders. The FSLN's only hope is that the political cost generated by these perceptions will be more than offset by the support it receives from the peasantry, as that sector begins to view itself as having an appropriate share in the stakes of the political system.

The new law provides the Nicaraguan government with an instrument to ameliorate the problems of the peasantry. Only the implementation of the law will demonstrate, however, whether the renewed emphasis on popular hegemony will translate into benefits for the peasantry and represent a net gain in political support for the FSLN.

## NOTES

\*An extended version of this article will appear in the May 1987 issue of the *Journal of Latin American Studies*.

1. This article is based on extensive field research conducted by the author in Nicaragua during the 1984-85 academic year and from January to February 1986.
2. One manzana = 0.7 hectares = 1.75 acres
3. All data in this article are calculated from published and unpublished data obtained from the Dirección General de Reforma Agraria (D.G.R.A.), unless noted otherwise.
4. New land is land which has been expropriated under the agrarian reform law, bought by the government, or expropriated by presidential decree. The amount of new land distributed under the agrarian reform is actually less than 838,454 manzanas, since most of the 101,408 manzanas distributed to indigenous communities consisted of secure titles to land traditionally claimed by these communities.
5. Ministry of Agricultural Development and Agrarian Reform (MIDINRA), *Avance y Perspectivas de la Reforma Agraria* (Managua: D.G.R.A., 1986), p.2.
6. Joseph Thome and David Kaimowitz, "Agrarian Reform," in Thomas Walker, ed., *Nicaragua: The First Five Years* (New York: Praeger, 1985).
7. *Ibid.*, p.301.
8. Percentage figures for 1981-1984 are from Carmen Diana Deere, Peter Marchetti, S.J., and Nola Reinhardt, "The Peasantry and the Development of Sandinista Agrarian Policy, 1979-1984," *Latin American Research Review* XX, no. 3 (1985), p.94. The absolute numbers, as well as the data for 1985 are calculated from published (1981-1984) and unpublished (1985) data from the Dirección General de Reforma Agraria (D.G.R.A.).
9. This perception was frequently pointed out to the author in interviews conducted with representatives of the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP) in Managua during 1984-85. COSEP represents the private-sector opposition to the Sandinista government.
10. See Deere, et al., for a discussion of policy disputes within MIDINRA, p.84.
11. Jaime Wheelock, *Entre la Crisis y la Agresión: La Reforma Agraria Sandinista* (Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1985), p.37.
12. COSEP and UPANIC representatives interviewed during 1984-85 do not give credence to the effort of the Sandinistas in this regard.
13. The response of the bourgeoisie to the expropriations in 1981-82 resulted in a drop in agricultural production for the same year. See Jaime Wheelock, *Nicaragua: The Great Challenge* (Managua: Alternative Views, 1984), p.36.
14. Thome and Kaimowitz in Walker, ed., p.308.
15. Instituto Histórico Centroamericano, *Envío* (Managua) 4, número 51 (1985), p.14c.
16. National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG), Main Report, First National Congress (Managua: UNAG, 1986), p.10.
17. *Barricada* (official party newspaper of the FSLN), June 3, 7 and 14, 1985.
18. Press conference with Enrique Bolanos, Club de Prensa Internacional, Managua, June 25, 1985.
19. *Barricada*, June 18, 1985.
20. A thorough evaluation of the agrarian reform up to 1985 led MIDINRA to give future priority to the demands of poor peasants with little or no land. The same priority was awarded to peasants displaced by the war. Further, this policy was to be implemented using "the organizational form most appropriate to the region in question" [author's emphasis]. See MIDINRA, *Avance*, p.8.
21. *La Gaceta: Diario Oficial* (Managua), no.8, January 13, 1986.
22. This provision, however, does not apply to landowners who possess less than 50 manzanas in the Pacific regions and less than 100 manzanas in the rest of the country.
23. *Barricada*, January 28, 1986.
24. The following three situations constitute exceptional cases: situations of social emergency which demand that peasant families be cared for through special agricultural programs; the existence of rural properties in zones of a high concentration of *minifundia* which impede advances toward a just and equitable distribution of land; and the necessity to incorporate rural properties into plans of agricultural development and agrarian reform needed to fulfill goals of the state. See article 12 of "Reglamento a la Ley de Reforma Agraria," *Barricada*, February 10, 1986.
25. *Barricada*, January 12, 1986.
26. *Barricada*, January 13, 1986.
27. To put this amount of money in perspective one has to realize that 500 million *córdobas* represented 50 million U.S. dollars at the official exchange rate in 1985. Total export earnings for the same year were only \$260 million.
28. This analysis was offered by senior officials of MIDINRA and UNAG in interviews conducted in Nicaragua during January and February 1986.
29. By strategic defeat is meant that the counterrevolution ceased to pose a military threat, though serious terrorist attacks, carried out by counter-revolutionary task forces, continued.

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## CALL FOR SILVERT PRIZE NOMINATIONS

The Kalman H. Silvert LASA President's Prize committee, Cole Blasier (chair), Wayne Cornelius, Helen Safa and Gilbert Merckx, requests nominations for the 1987-88 recipient. The Silvert prize, awarded to a member of the profession who has made outstanding contributions to the advancement of Latin American studies, will be presented during the 1988 congress in New Orleans. Nominations should be sent to the LASA Secretariat, William Pitt Union, 9th Floor, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, by April 1, 1987. Proposers should include biographic information and a rationale for each nominee.

## FINAL REPORT OF THE PROGRAM COMMITTEE XIII INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS

LASA's Thirteenth International Congress convened in Boston, October 23-25, 1986, along with the Annual Meeting of the New England Council of Latin American Studies. Some 1700 scholars from the United States, Latin America, Europe and China attended the meetings, making LASA/86 one of the best attended congresses in the association's 20-year history. The program included over 180 panels and workshops that addressed a wide variety of topics, plus a large number of other scholarly events.

The success of any international gathering of this size is critically dependent on the numerous session organizers who put together the stimulating panels, workshops and roundtables, while maintaining high standards for scholarly presentations and debate. The excellent quality of the sessions at the Boston meeting is directly attributable to the seriousness with which these individuals fulfilled their roles as organizers.

LASA/86 organized six multidisciplinary sessions, following the custom begun in Albuquerque in 1985. These large meetings, two of which were scheduled each day, brought together scholars from a variety of disciplines to discuss the state of the art of topics of broad interest to Latin Americanists or current issues of controversy within the field of Latin American studies. The topics for the state-of-the-art panels were diverse and stimulating: *Feminist Criticism and the Problem of Marginality*, *Theories of Change in Latin America*, and *Peasant Studies*; as were the topics considered in the current issues and controversies meetings: *Can the United States Promote Democracy in Latin America? State and Society*, and *Claims of the Past and Hope for the Future in Puerto Rico*. Attendance at these meetings was high, and the presentations were uniformly exceptional. The multidisciplinary sessions provided an important counterpoint to the more specialized topics characterizing the smaller panels held in the morning and early afternoon hours.

An event of particular note was the presentation of a major paper by Albert O. Hirschman, "The Political Economy of Latin American Development: Seven Exercises in Retrospection." This paper is a major contribution by a scholar of distinguished achievement. Hirschman delivered the paper as recipient of the 1986 Kalman Silvert LASA Presidents' Prize.

The issues of economic crisis and political response in Latin America provided thematic unity to a large number of sessions organized for LASA/86. Given the concern of so much scholarship, it was appropriate that the Plenary Address also address these issues. Responding to the question, "Is Latin American Development Dead?" Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, Cochairman of First Boston International, assessed the issues of debt, austerity and stabilization in Latin America's future.

The book exhibit, organized by Harve Horowitz, made an important scholarly contribution by presenting a large col-

lection of published work in the field of Latin American Studies. Complementing this was an exhibition of a rich collection of Latin American materials prepared by the Boston Public Library and a special session commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Alliance for Progress at the John F. Kennedy Library.

The LASA Film Festival, expertly organized by Lavonne C. Poteet, featured the international, North American and U.S. premieres of 17 films. Among the most significant features of this highly successful event were the premiere of a new film by Brazilian director Nelson Pereira dos Santos, and a workshop on the craft of filmmaking attended by eminent filmmakers from Latin America. Bonnie Poteet was ably assisted in organizing the Film Festival and Film Exhibit by Julianne Burton (University of California, Santa Cruz), Randal Johnson (University of Florida, Gainesville) and Dennis West (University of Idaho).

Funding to enable a number of Latin Americans to travel to the congress was efficiently coordinated by Reid Andrews (University of Pittsburgh), and travel arrangements were skillfully managed by Jana Greenleaf. We are grateful to the Ford Foundation, the Howard Heinz Endowment, the Inter-American Foundation and the Tinker Foundation for making available a total of \$43,000 for travel to the congress by Latin Americans. The international character of the meeting was well served by the generous support of these foundations.

LASA celebrated its 20th anniversary at a birthday banquet on Saturday evening. Richard Adams, LASA's senior living former president, Riordan Roett, president 1978, and Richard Morse, chairman of the constitution committee (1966) made amusing and instructive remarks about LASA's history, and many volunteers spoke from the floor. Cole Blasier was emcee.

The members of the Program Committee—Merilee Grindle (Harvard University), G. Reid Andrews (University of Pittsburgh), Jaime Concha (University of California, San Diego), Viviane Márquez (EI Colegio de México), Florencia E. Mallon (University of Wisconsin, Madison) and Lavonne C. Poteet (Bucknell University)—worked diligently to ensure the success of LASA/86. Central to the program planning effort were Lili Wadsworth and Caroline Whitney, of the Committee on Latin American and Iberian Studies at Harvard University, and Joanne Giovino and Andrea Yelle, of the Harvard Institute for International Development. These individuals managed data, correspondence, mailings and telephones with expertise, patience and remarkable good humor. Local arrangements were ably coordinated by Joseph Criscenti (Boston College), who supervised a large number of student and faculty volunteers from Boston area institutions and ensured that registration and ticket sales proceeded as smoothly as possible. Reid Reading and Lynn Young of the LASA Secretariat at the University of Pittsburgh worked tirelessly prior to and throughout the meeting to coordinate and schedule diverse aspects of such a large and complex meeting. The efforts of these individuals and the support of their institutions were indispensable to the success of the Boston meeting.

LASA congresses have grown in recent years to become very large professional gatherings. The Program Committee for LASA/86 believes that the XIII congress was a very successful meeting, notable for the stimulation and scholarly content of activities. It offered a rich variety of activities that were closely scheduled, often requiring participants to make difficult choices among alternatives. Given the growth of the meetings in recent years and the large number of individuals who wish to be formal participants, it may be appropriate to begin thinking about extending congresses to 3-1/2 days. Attendance at the Boston meeting, as well as the invigorating interaction of a larger, more diverse and more international group of scholars, suggest that LASA meetings have the potential to expand without sacrificing high scholarly standards.

### FILM FESTIVAL

Recipients of the 1986 LASA Award of Merit in Film are listed below:

**Who's Running This War?** U.S./Nicaragua, 1986, 60'. Executive Producer, Frontline: David Fanning. Producer: Martin Smith. Distributor: PBS Video.

**Nicaragua: The Dirty War.** Nicaragua, 1985, 68'. Directors: Daniele Lacourse, Yvan Patry. Producers: AlterCine, National Film Board of Canada. Distributor: Cinema Guild.

**Havana Report.** Cuba, 1986, 52'. Producer-Directors: Holly Aylett, Michael Chanan. Distributor: Cinema Guild.

**Imágenes de Reinos.** Latin America, 1986, 24'. Producer-Director: Robert M. Levine. Distributor: South American Resources.

**Centroamérica: Un Volcán que Desafía.** El Salvador, 1985, 60'. Producer: Sistema Radio Venceremos, FMLN. Distributor: Sistema Radio Venceremos.

**How Tasty Was My Little Frenchman.** Brazil, 1971, 80'. Producer-Director: Nelson Pereira dos Santos. Distributor: New Yorker Films.

**Sweet Country.** Chile, 1986, 57'. Producer-Director: Juan-Andrés Racz. Distributor: Icarus.

**Guatemala: A Journey to the End of Memories.** Guatemala, 1986, 55'. Director: Llan Ziv. Distributor: Icarus.

**These People May Pass.** Nicaragua, 1985, 21'. Director: Rossana Lacayo. Producer: Incine, Dany Perez. Distributor: Icarus.

**Etnocidio, Notas Sobre El Mezquital.** Mexico, 1976, 105'. Director: Paul Leduc. Producer: Carlos Resendi. Distributor: Zafra, A.C.

**Jubiaba.** Brazil, 1986, 100'. Director: Nelson Pereira dos Santos. Producer: Regina Filmes. Distributor: Embrafilme.

**Las Madres: The Mothers of Plaza de Mayo.** Argentina, 1985, 64'. Directors: Susana Muñoz and Lourdes Portillo. Distributor: First Run Features.

**Memoirs of an Everyday War.** Chile, 1986, 29'. Directors: Gatón Ancelovici, Jaime Barrios, René Davila. Producer: Cinemateca Chilena. Distributor: Icarus.

**Returning to Chile.** Chile, 1986, 28'. Director: Estela Bravo. Producer: Producciones América Latina. Distributor: The Cinema Guild.

**Nicaragua Innovando.** Nicaragua, 1986, 30'. Director: John Mraz. Producer: Luis Ocampo Simpson. Distributor: Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, Mexico.

**Cabildo de Mujeres en Managua.** Nicaragua, 1986, 40'. Director: César Rodríguez. Producer: Emila Vargas. Distributor: Sistema Sandinista de Televisión.

**Breaking the Silence.** Nicaragua, 1984, 15'. Director: Iván Argüello. Producer: Incine. Distributor: Icarus.

**Vidas Secas.** Brazil, 1963, 115'. Director: Nelson Pereira dos Santos. Distributor: New Yorker Films.

**The Battle of Vieques.** Puerto Rico, 1986, 40'. Producer-Director: Zydna Nazario. Distributor: The Cinema Guild.

**Lejania.** Cuba, 1985, 100'. Director: Jesús Díaz. Producer: ICAIC. Distributor: The Cinema Guild.

**Gentile Alouette.** Chile/France, 1985, 105'. Producer-Director: Sergio Castilla. Distributor: Sergio Castilla.

### DISTRIBUTORS OF FESTIVAL FILMS

Cinema Guild, 1697 Broadway, New York, NY 10019; (212) 246-5522.

Embrafilme, Rua Mayrinic Beiga, 28, Centro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

First Run Features, 153 Waverly Place, New York, NY 10014; (212) 243-0600.

Icarus Films, 200 Park Avenue South, Suite 1319, New York, NY 10003; (212) 674-3375.

New Yorker Films, 16 West 61st Street, New York, NY 10023; (212) 247-6110.

PBS Video, 1320 Braddock Place, Alexandria, VA 22314-1698; (703) 739-5380.

Sergio Castilla, 195 Hicks Street, Apt. 6C, Brooklyn, NY 11201; (718) 624-5576.

Sistema Radio Venceremos del FMLN, El Salvador Media Project., 799 Broadway #325, New York, NY 10003; (212) 947-9277.

Sistema Sandinista de Televisión, Managua, Nicaragua.

South American Resources, 40 East 62nd Street, New York, NY 10021; (212) 838-1732.

Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, Centro de Información y Documentación de la Cultura Audio Visual, Puebla, México; (905) 688-2420.

Zagra, A.C. Cine Difusión, Leonardo da Vinci 82, México 19 D.F., México; (905) 598-7215.

### XIII CONGRESS PROGRAM AND PAPERS FOR SALE

A limited number of programs from the XIII International Congress in Boston are available from the Secretariat at \$5.00 each. The following papers may also be ordered from the Secretariat for \$3.00 each. Prices include postage. LASA made every attempt to retain at least one copy of every paper, whether sent to the Secretariat in advance or brought to Boston. If your paper is not listed below, please send a copy to the Secretariat and we will include it in subsequent listings.

- Agosin, Marjorie. Whispers and Triumphs: Politics and the Latin American Woman Writer
- Aguayo Quezada, Sergio. Los centroamericanos olvidados de México
- Anderson, Rodney D. Race, Class and Capitalism in Early Republican Mexico
- Baer, Werner. Austerity Under Different Political Regimes: The Case of Brazil
- Benassy-Berling, M.C. Nuevo examen de algunos documentos relacionados con el fin de la vida de Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz
- Berry, Albert. Patterns of Economic Change in Ecuador: Before, During and After the Oil Boom
- Biddle, William Jesse and John D. Stephens. Dependency and Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice in Jamaica
- Boswell, Thomas D. Racial and Ethnic Change and Hispanic Residential Segregation Patterns in Metropolitan Miami: 1980
- Brockett, Charles D. The Commercialization of Central American Agriculture: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment
- Buchanan, Paul G. Labor Administration and Democracy in Argentina
- Caldeira, Teresa Pires do Rio. Houses of Respect
- Calvert, Peter. British Relations with the Southern Cone States
- Cardoso, Ciro Flamarion S. The Transition from Coerced to "Free" Labour in Latin America and the Caribbean
- Cardoso, Ruth Correa Leite. Segregation and Integration in the City: The Study of Poor Neighbourhoods on the Outskirts of Large Cities
- Carr, Barry. The Mexican Communist Party and Agrarian Mobilization in the Laguna 1920-1940: A Worker-Peasant Alliance?
- Cavalcante, Antônio Mourão. O charme discreto das terapias populares
- Chaffee, Lynan. Political Graffiti and Street Propaganda: Dimensions of Basque Nationalism
- Child, Jack. Antarctica and South American Geopolitical Thinking
- Clark, Margaret L. Antarctica: Cornerstone of the South. The Potential for Southern Cooperation
- Coleman, Kenneth M. and Charles L. Davis. How Workers Evaluate Their Unions: Exploring Determinants of Union Satisfaction in Venezuela and Mexico

- Conway, Dennis, Ualthan Bigby and Ronald S. Swann. Caribbean Migrant Experiences in New York City
- Cott, Kenneth. The Presidency, The Courts, and Foreign Entrepreneurs in Porfirian Mexico
- De Souza, Juarez. Social Backlog in Brazil: A Parameter in the Renegotiation of External Debt
- Duarte, Luiz F.D. What It Means to Be Nervous (Competing Concepts of the Person in Brazilian Urban Culture)
- Dussel, Enrique. Del descubrimiento al desincubrimiento, el camino hacia un desagravio histórico
- Epstein, Edward C. What Difference Does Regime Type Make? Economic Austerity Programs in Argentina  
\_\_\_\_\_. Recent Stabilization Programs in Argentina (1973-1986)
- Fiscal Pérez, María Rosa. "De noche vienen" o el despertar de la conciencia social de Elena Poniatowska
- Frederick, Howard H. Electronic Penetration in Low Intensity Warfare: The Case of Nicaragua
- Fruhling, Hugo. La defensa de los derechos humanos en el cono sur. Dilemas y perspectivas hacia el futuro
- García Passalacqua, Juan M. Uncertainty Dispelled: Steering Puerto Rico Towards Its Future
- Garretón M, Manuel Antonio. Transición y consolidación democráticas en América Latina: Una perspectiva general
- Gordillo, Gustavo. Mercado, democracia y movilización social: La deconstrucción del levitán rural mexicano
- Helguera, J. León. Some Observations on the Cartoon as a Source for Colombian Social History
- Henderson, James D. Conservative Thought in Twentieth Century Latin America: A Statistical Approach to the Study of Intellectual History
- Henkel, Ray. Resource Utilization in the Upper Amazon of Bolivia and Its Impact on the Environment
- Ho Kim, Sung. Intervention in Nicaragua: The Issues of International Law, Morality, and Prudence in U.S. Foreign Policy
- Holston, James. The Signature House: A Study of "Auto-Construction" in Working Class Brazil
- Jameson, Kenneth P. The Effect of International Debt on Poverty in Bolivia and Alternative Responses
- Keck, Margaret E. Great Expectations: The Workers' Party in Brazil (1979-1985)
- Kramer, Frank. The Impact of External Markets on the Structure of Peasant Agriculture in Western Honduras
- Langton, Kenneth P. Who Should Manage the Shop? Worker Self-Management Ideology, Protest and Electoral Participation in Peru
- Laplantine, Francois. Os sistemas de representações da doença e da saúde na umbanda em Fortaleza
- Leite Lopes, José Sérgio. Domination and Resistance to Domination in a Brazilian Northeastern Textile Company-Town
- Love, Joseph L. Raúl Prebisch: His Life and Ideas
- Maier Hirsh, Elizabeth. Las sandinistas: La lucha de la mujer nicaragüense por su igualdad

- Mattos Gomes De Castro, Hebe Maria Da Costa. A margem da história: Homens liveres pobres na crise do trabalho escravo
- McCoy, Jennifer L. The Politics of Adjustment: Labor and the Venezuelan Debt Crisis
- Mezzer, Jaime. El sector informal como expresión del excedente de oferta de trabajo urbano
- Naim, Moisés and Ramón Piñango. Una ilusión de armonía. Los resultados del proyecto "El Caso Venezuela"
- Ogliastri-Urbe, Enrique. Estado, empresarios, sindicatos, trabajadores, administradores: Experiencias sobre gerencia y revolución en Nicaragua
- Ortiz, Renato. Cultura de massa e cultura popular no Brasil
- Padrón, Mario. NGOs and Grass-Roots Development in Latin America  
 \_\_\_\_\_ . Linking Latin American and Western Development Organizations
- Paoli, Maria Célia. Working Class São Paulo and Its Representations
- Peschard, Jacqueline. Las elecciones en el Distrito Federal (1964-1985)
- Reinhardt, Nola. Agro-Exports and the Peasantry in the Agrarian Reforms of El Salvador and Nicaragua
- Riesco. Ausencia y presencia: "La flecha y la manzana" de A. Roa Bastos
- Rigau, Marco Antonio. Certain Future for Puerto Rico
- Rodríguez Berrutti, Camilo H. Diplomacia de los Estados Unidos en la historia de las fronteras argentinas
- Rubluo, Luis, Juan Manuel Menes Llaguno and Victor M. Ballesteros. La explotación británica de las minas de Real del Monte: Expansión del colonaje en América Latina
- Sabat-Rivers, Georgina. Antes de Juana Inés: Clarinda y Amarilis, dos poetas del Perú colonial
- Schneider, Ben Ross. Framing the State: Economic Policy and Political Representation in Post-Authoritarian Brazil
- Schodt, David W. Austerity Policies in Ecuador: Christian Democratic and Social Christian Versions of the Gospel
- Schutte, Ofelia. Three Representative Philosophers of Liberation
- Scott, Renée. Cristina Peri Rossi: Superación de un exilio
- Semo, Enrique. Las raíces sociales del autoritarismo y la democracia en México (1810-1930)
- Sikkink, Kathryn. The Influence of Raúl Prebisch on Economic Policy Making in Argentina, 1950-1962
- Smith, William C. The "New Republic" and the Brazilian Transition: Elite Conciliation or Democratization?
- Street, James H. Mexico's Prospects for Resuming a Growth Path Under Institutional Reform
- Torres M., David. Local Elections in Mexico (1986: The Struggle for Peace, Bread and Democracy)
- Trudeau, Robert H. Democracy in Guatemala: Present Status, Future Prospects
- Williams, Harvey. The Social Impact [draft chapter for inclusion in Thomas W. Walker, ed., *Reagan vs. the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua*]
- Zamosc, León. Lucha por la tierra, recampesinización y capitalismo agrario en la costa atlántica colombiana
- Zapata, Francisco. Sindicalismo, ideología y política en Lázaro Cárdenas, Michoacán
- Zapata, Roger A. Tradición y cambio en la cultura peruana: Del neoindigenismo de Arguedas a la Historia de Mayta de Mario Vargas Llosa
- Zermeno, Sergio. Hacia el fin del populismo mexicano (Propuestas para discusión)
- Zimbalist, Andrew. Cuban Industrial Growth, 1965-1984

[For information on the Albert O. Hirschman paper, "The Political Economy of Latin American Development: Seven Exercises in Retrospection," see footnote 2 of Wayne Cornelius' article in this issue.]

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#### NOMINATIONS INVITED FOR 1987 SLATE

The LASA Nominating Committee is considering potential nominees for Vice President and three members of the Executive Council. Criteria for nomination include professional credentials, character, and credible previous service to LASA.

The winning candidate for Vice President will serve in that capacity from January 1, 1988, until June 30, 1989, and as President from July 1, 1989 until December 31, 1990. Under the present constitution, he/she then serves an additional 18 months as Past President. The winning candidates for members of the Executive Council will serve for a three-year term beginning January 1, 1988.

LASA members are invited to suggest potential nominees. Biographic data and the rationale for nomination must accompany suggested names and be sent to Lars Schoultz, Chair, LASA Nominating Committee, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514, by April 1, 1987. The other members of the Nominating Committee are: Albert Berry (University of Toronto), Elizabeth Garrels (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Louis Goodman (American University), Herbert Klein (Columbia University), William LeoGrande (American University), and Enrique Mayer (University of Illinois).

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**REPORT OF THE BUSINESS MEETING  
XIII INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS  
BOSTON, OCTOBER 24, 1986**

LASA President Cole Blasier began the meeting by welcoming attending members and announcing that LASA is celebrating its 20th birthday. He then introduced LASA's past president and secretariat staff, the current staff, and the program and local arrangements chairpersons for the XIII Congress. Arturo Valenzuela was designated parliamentarian for the meeting.

Blasier offered his priorities for LASA during the next year and a half: membership expansion; an increase in the endowment fund; maintaining or expanding public policy functions of the task forces; and the recognition by LASA of superior scholarly achievement.

Two days earlier the Executive Council had elected Werner Baer treasurer of LASA, and approved the change to a calendar fiscal year. Since the fiscal year was previously October 1-September 30, there will be a three-month budget period, with the next full fiscal year beginning on January 1, 1987. Reid Reading, Executive Director, gave the financial report for 1986: \$113,557 income; \$76,136 in expenditures; \$36,480 surplus. He predicted a deficit of \$5,850 for the next fiscal year because of Congress expenses, but the two-year average should show about a \$15,000 annual surplus. The association's cash reserves are approximately \$98,000.

**PRESENTATION OF THE SILVERT PRIZE**

Wayne Cornelius, past president, formally presented the Silvert prize to Albert O. Hirschman. [See article on page 1.]

**TASK FORCE REPORTS**

Reports presented at the business meeting and written reports received from task forces appear in a separate article.

**RESOLUTIONS**

Paul Drake, chairperson of the resolutions subcommittee, reported that five proposed resolutions were submitted to the LASA Secretariat and sent to the resolutions subcommittee for consideration. The subcommittee subsequently reported to the Executive Council on October 22, 1986. The Council decided to refer resolutions on Cuba, Paraguay, Chile and Nicaragua, with modifications, to the business meeting on October 24, 1986.

Drake noted that the Executive Council decided not to refer the text of the fifth proposed resolution to the business meeting. However, there was a motion from the floor that the proposed resolution, as amended in the motion, be presented to the membership for approval. The motion carried by majority vote.

The wording below represents the final texts of the resolutions. The results of the secret-ballot vote in the business meeting are indicated, as well as results of the mail ballot submitted to the entire membership.

**I. Resolution on Scholarly Exchanges with Cuba**

President Reagan's proclamation of October 4, 1985, has the effect of closing U.S. borders to Cuban academics, artists and scientists in retaliation for Castro's suspension of the U.S.-Cuban immigration agreement of 1984 which, in turn, was in retaliation for the inauguration of Radio Martí in May of 1985.

The free flow of ideas and information between Cuba and the United States has thus been further impeded. Americans are denied the right to hear the views of others. This violates the founding values of this nation and is inconsistent with the stated policies of the administration.

Worse, since Cuba does not impose all-inclusive prohibitions on the entry of U.S. government officials, academics or artists, we are left in a situation in which U.S. measures are more restrictive than are those of Cuba. That is not the sort of position in which the United States should place itself.

In view of the above, the Latin American Studies Association, which has a long history of commitment to openness in government, to academic freedoms, and to the free exchange of ideas, calls upon the President to lift the restrictions on the entry of Cuban academics, scientists and artists. In parallel fashion, we urge the Cuban government to lift its current restrictions on the entry of Cuban-American scholars for purposes of research and academic exchanges in Cuba.

Affirmative: 61; Negative: 0; Abstain: 0

If ratified by mail ballot, this resolution will be sent to President Ronald Reagan, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, the State Department's Office of Cuban Affairs, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. [Subsequently ratified by mail ballot by a vote of: Affirmative, 970; Negative, 25; Abstain, 24.]

**II. Resolution on Paraguay**

The Latin American Studies Association deplores the recent increase in the level of repression with which the Stroessner government has responded to the orderly efforts of the citizenry to exercise constitutional political rights. Since March 1986, peaceful public demonstrations of political parties, trade unions, students, nurses and farmers have been brutally attacked by police and paramilitary forces identified with General Stroessner. Their leaders have been beaten and incarcerated.

LASA endorses the call of the Catholic Church of Paraguay for a national dialogue with the participation of the government and all political forces in the country to seek a nonviolent route to democracy. LASA also strongly supports the proposed U.S. House Resolution 673 of July 17, 1986, and the concurrent Senate Resolution 155 of July 24. Both condemn the current repression of the democratic opposition in Paraguay, support the pro-democratic policies of the U.S. government, call for a reasonable timetable for transition to

democracy, and propose the withdrawal of bilateral and multilateral economic and technical assistance until the government of Paraguay improves its record on human rights.

Affirmative: 47; Negative: 2; Abstain: 2

If ratified by mail ballot, this resolution will be sent to President Alfredo Stroessner, President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of State George Shultz, and the Chairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. Congress. [Subsequently ratified by mail ballot by a vote of: Affirmative, 919; Negative, 36; Abstain, 56.]

### III. Resolution on Chile

Whereas, the military junta headed by General Augusto Pinochet continues to rule Chile in flagrant violation of human and civil rights thirteen years after deposing the constitutional government of Salvador Allende, recently reimposing a state of siege; and

Whereas, the opposition is launching concerted efforts to bring about the immediate restoration of democracy in Chile, united under the program of the *Asamblea Nacional de la Civilidad*;

The Latin American Studies Association calls for the end of the state of siege, the immediate restoration of human rights, and the immediate and unrestricted return to democracy in that country, urging the Reagan administration to use its voice and vote to oppose multilateral development bank loans to the military junta, as required for all human rights violators by section 701 of the International Institutions' Act.

Affirmative: 55; Negative: 3; Abstain: 1

If ratified by mail ballot, this resolution will be sent to President Augusto Pinochet, President Ronald Reagan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, the U.N. Rapporteur on Chile, The U.S. Secretary of State, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. [Subsequently ratified by mail ballot by a vote of: Affirmative, 935; Negative, 48; Abstain, 34.]

### IV. Resolution Against U.S. Aid to Anti-Nicaraguan Forces

The Latin American Studies Association, the largest U.S.-based professional organization of specialists on Latin American affairs, deplores the U.S. Congress' approval of military aid to the anti-Nicaraguan "contra" forces attacking Nicaragua from Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica. That action gives a bipartisan imprimatur to the Reagan administration's policy of aggression against a sovereign nation in defiance of the World Court and in violation of the principles of nonintervention and self-determination which should be the foundation of U.S.-Latin American relations.

LASA reiterates its support for a negotiated settlement of the Central American conflicts within the framework of the Latin American peace initiatives of the Contadora nations, now bolstered by the South American Lima Support Group. LASA calls on Congress to reverse its dangerous course, which opinion surveys continue to show is not supported by a majority of the U.S. public, and calls on concerned U.S. citizens to redouble their efforts to halt the war against Nicaragua.

Affirmative: 53; Negative: 4; Abstain: 0

If ratified by mail ballot, the resolution will be sent to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. [Subsequently ratified by mail ballot by a vote of: Affirmative, 906; Negative, 83; Abstain, 26.]

### V. Resolution on U.S. Policy in Central America

The Latin American Studies Association deplores the continuation of a U.S. foreign policy which emphasizes military solutions to Central America's conflicts. This policy is evidenced in:

1. Emphasis on military aid and buildup of counterinsurgency forces, despite the fact that the region's problems are fundamentally social, economic and political;
2. Complacency in the face of continuing human rights violations, which include recent attacks on trade unions and human rights organizations in El Salvador, as well as air and artillery attacks, against the civilian populations, which have produced more than one million displaced persons and refugees;
3. A failure to condition increased economic and military assistance to Guatemala on improvement in the human rights situation, an accounting of the disappeared, and judicial proceedings against officials of previous regimes accused of human rights violations;
4. Use of U.S.-funded "contra" forces in a war against Nicaragua, together with economic and political coercion of both Honduras and Costa Rica to permit such aggression to be organized from their territories;
5. Refusal of the U.S.-backed Salvadoran government to support efforts arising from within Salvadoran society to achieve a political solution involving the belligerent parties and all other concerned sectors;
6. Lack of attention to the region's economic crisis which has brought further deterioration of living standards and already inadequate educational and health care services;
7. A repressive and inhumane U.S. immigration policy which continues to deny refugee status to the hundreds of thousands of Guatemalans and Salvadorans who have sought sanctuary in the United States.

LASA calls for an end to U.S. military intervention in Central America, calls on the U.S. Congress to reassert its human rights responsibilities in Central America through certification limitations on nonmilitary aid programs, and calls upon the United States to openly and energetically support the Contadora process of negotiated settlement to the conflicts in the region.

If ratified by mail ballot, this resolution will be sent to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. [Subsequently ratified by mail ballot by a vote of: Affirmative, 856; Negative, 113; Abstain, 45.]

### MOTIONS

Three motions were presented to the Executive Council 24 hours or more before the business meeting, as required by the bylaws. Motions are introduced and a vote is taken on whether or not to refer them to the Executive Council for action.

1. Brian Loveman introduced the following motion (cosponsored by the Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom): "LASA calls for the immediate freedom of our distinguished Chilean colleagues, sociologist Germán Correa and architect Patricio Hales." [This is a communication to Ricardo García, Interior Minister, Government of Chile, with copy to Harry Barnes, U.S. ambassador to Chile.] The motion carried.

2. Marjorie Bray introduced the following motion:

Whereas, Margaret Randall, who is presently teaching in the Women's Studies Program at the University of New Mexico, is a Latin Americanist who has enhanced understanding in the field through her writings, particularly on Cuba and Nicaragua, with especially important contributions on women; and

Whereas, Margaret Randall is being denied the right to be a resident of the United States based upon a finding under the ideological exclusion clause of the McCarran-Walter Act that she is guilty of advocating world communism because of her writings which report favorably on women in Cuba and her expressed opposition to the U.S. role in the Southeast Asia War; and

Whereas, the provision of the McCarran-Walter Act under which Margaret Randall would be expelled from the United States is the same one which has denied U.S. scholars and audiences the right to have access in the United States to such figures as Gabriel García Márquez, Pablo Neruda, Carlos Fuentes and Farley Mowat; and

Whereas, as scholarly Latin Americanists and Latin American teaching specialists in various fields we regard the academic freedom of us all to be threatened by this decision; and

Whereas, we wish to have continued access to Margaret Randall as a writer, teacher, speaker and cultural worker in the United States in order to benefit from her long experience, expertise and writing on Latin American issues, particularly those involving women; and

Whereas, Margaret Randall is appealing the decision to expel her from the United States to the Immigration Review Board;

Be it also resolved that the members of the Latin American Studies Association at this business meeting call upon the Immigration Review Board to reverse the finding that Margaret Randall is not eligible to continue residing in the United States and that this motion be communicated to that board and to the press by the LASA Secretariat; and

Be it also resolved that this meeting go on record as being opposed to the ideological exclusion provision of the McCarran-Walter Act and urge that LASA members and others pursue efforts to see that it is repealed by the U.S. Congress.

The motion carried.

3. Helen Safa moved that LASA endorse the text of the following telegram, sent earlier that day to the *Sindicato 19 de Septiembre* in Mexico on behalf of the LASA Task Force on Women, and to publish the text in the *LASA Forum*: "Como parte de los esfuerzos de las mujeres continente americano a organizarse respaldamos los esfuerzos del Sindicato 19 de Septiembre en México en defensa de sus derechos legales y solicitamos que el gobierno mexicano reconozca y proteja los derechos sindicales de las mujeres trabajadoras. Comisión de Mujeres LASA." The motion carried.

Two additional motions were made from the floor. President Blasier noted that neither had been presented previously to the Executive Council as required by the bylaws but said that they could be transmitted to the Executive Council. Carmen Diana Deere requested LASA to urge the U.S. government to distribute relief funds directly to the Salvadoran victims and the academic community to assist institutions of higher education affected by the earthquake and the civil war. Elizabeth Dore requested the LASA Executive Council to help obtain the reentry into the United States of Dr. Enrique Kirberg, who having left the country temporarily for a family emergency, was barred reentry by the U.S. Consulate in Switzerland. Dr. Kirberg had organized a panel for the LASA Boston congress.

## REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE MASS MEDIA

### *LASA Media Award*

by

*Cynthia McClintock*

*The George Washington University*

The goal of the media task force is to enhance the relationship between LASA and journalists. One of its most important activities is to present the LASA Media Award. The winner is selected by the task force, which studies the work of journalists nominated by LASA members. The award is given for long-term exceptional work during a career or for break-through coverage in the last 18 months.

Bill Buzenberg of National Public Radio was selected to receive the 1985-86 LASA media prize for outstanding media coverage of Latin American affairs. The award was presented during the business meeting of the XIII International Congress in Boston on October 24, 1986. Mr. Buzenberg accepted the award in person.

Bill Buzenberg was selected because his past and present work has represented a major contribution to understanding and debate about Latin America in the United States. Many who listen to NPR's "All Things Considered" have long admired Bill's consistently fine reporting on topics as varied as the Letelier trial, the history of United States policy in Central America, and the international debt crisis.

During 1985-86 Bill undertook in-depth investigative journalism on Mexico. His stories on the critical 1985 mid-term elections, on the aftermath of Mexico's worst industrial accident (the PEMEX explosion), and the September earthquakes—among others—demonstrated rare courage and insight.

The LASA media prize is awarded every 18 months at the Latin American Studies Association's international congresses. For further information contact Cynthia McClintock (Chair), Department of Political Science, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. 20052. Other members of the LASA Task Force on the Mass Media are Robin Andersen (Fordham University), Max Azicri (Edinboro University of Pennsylvania), Louis Goodman (American University), Daniel C. Hallin (University of California-San Diego), John Nichols (Pennsylvania State University), Richard A. Nuccio (Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies), Mark B. Rosenberg (Florida International University), and Bill Buzenberg (National Public Radio), ex-officio.

## REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES

Marysa Navarro reported that the task force had sent a telegram to Chile on behalf of women suffering repression, and one to Mexico in support of the rights of women workers [see text in the "Report of the Business Meeting"]. The task force has proposed a change to the LASA Constitution, as follows:

The Task Force on Women strongly urges that an Ethics Committee be created to implement Article 10 regarding Professional Ethics and Conduct, and that one of its cochairs be automatically included on the proposed committee. Insofar as Article 10 does not include a definition of sexual harassment, the task force will offer the committee, when constituted, a statement on sexual harassment to be included in its deliberations on policies and procedures. The task force interprets the provisions on Professional Ethics and Conduct of proposed Article 10 to apply to behavior of LASA members toward non-LASA members as well as behavior of LASA members toward each other.

Members of the LASA Task Force on Women in Latin American Studies are: Norma S. Chinchilla (Cochair), Program in Women's Studies, California State University, Long Beach, CA 90840; Marysa Navarro (Cochair), Dartmouth College, 307 Wentworth Hall, Hanover, N.H. 03755; Edna Acosta-Belén (SUNY- Albany), Heather Blader (Bradley University), Lynn Bolles (Bowdoin College), Edith Courturier (National Endowment for the Humanities), Helen Delpar (University of Alabama), Kristina Demaree (California State University-Chico), Elizabeth Dore (OEF International Suite), Judy Ewell (College of William & Mary), Raquel Kersten (University of Wisconsin-Green Bay), Virginia Leonard (McLean, Virginia), Kathleen Logan (University of Alabama-Birmingham), Lois Oppenheimer (Whittier College), Lynn Stephen (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Sharon Ugalde (S.W. Texas State University), and Virginia Vargas (Centro Forá Tristán, Lima, Peru).

## REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON SCHOLARLY RELATIONS WITH SPAIN

### *Call for Papers and Assistance*

The Latin American Studies Association's Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Spain met during the recent LASA international congress in Boston to select new members and outline activities for the coming year.

Task Force members are Federico Gil (University of North Carolina), Chair, Judith-Maria Buechler (Hobart and Smith Colleges), Joaquín Roy (University of Miami), Pilar Saro (Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana, Spain), Joseph S. Tulchin (University of North Carolina), and Diana Vélez (University of Pittsburgh).

As its first order of business, the task force is requesting assistance from the LASA membership in accomplishing the dual objectives of (a) stimulating interest among LASA's membership in working with Spaniards on topics of mutual interest and developing a Spanish-Latin Americanist constituency for LASA, and (b) developing panels on Latin America and Spain for the next two LASA international congresses to be held in New Orleans (1988) and Puerto Rico (1989). While both objectives are intended to create the momentum for interest in this area that will culminate in the 1991 LASA congress in Madrid, the task force is also concerned that scholarly relations with the peninsula on matters relevant to Latin America become a permanent and dynamic part of the association's activities.

Those Latin Americanists in the United States, Latin America and Spain, as well as Latin and North American Hispanists, who are interested in this effort are urged to make their ideas and interests known to the task force. In addition, the task force is calling for possible panels and papers on Latin America and Spain to be considered for the program of the next two LASA congresses. All proposals and correspondence should be forwarded to Dr. Federico Gil, Chair-LASA Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Spain, 314 Hamilton, 070A, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514.

### **REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON SCHOLARLY RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION**

Alejandro Portes, chair, was unable to attend the business meeting in Boston; Cole Blasier, previous chair, reported. The task force's relationship with the Institute of Latin America in Moscow is continuing, but is being broadened to the Soviet scholarly community in general. This is taking two forms: (1) two additional exchanges, one by Richard Feinberg on Third World economic questions and one led by Ivan Schulman and Evelyn Picon Garfield on literature; (2) becoming acquainted with and deepening relationships with a number of other institutes in the Soviet Union which were visited last June during the fifth conference under the US/USSR exchange.

The task force members are Alejandro Portes (Chair), Department of Sociology, John Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218; Michael Meyer (University of Arizona), and Richard Newfarmer (Overseas Development Council).

### **REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON SCHOLARLY RELATIONS WITH CUBA**

Wayne Smith reported that the task force's activities have consisted primarily of testing administration policy. A status report of exchanges with Cuba has been completed [published in last issue of the *Forum*], and the task force requests information on additional exchanges. A letter was sent to the U.S. Surgeon General protesting a memo issued to all entities under the Surgeon General's authority advising them not to have any kind of contact with Cubans without authorization. This would preclude any kind of health exchange or even exchange of information on contagious diseases. The task force drafted a resolution protesting the State Department's treatment of visa requests for Cuban academics to enter the U.S. [see resolution 1 under "Report of the Business Meeting"], and has suggested that LASA members embark on a letter-writing campaign to Congress and the Department of State. The task force is also getting together a packet to send to members of Congress and the media to ask their support in protesting the Cuban visa policy, and is trying to get a number of university presidents to jointly raise this matter with the Secretary of State. Any suggestions for additional action are welcome.

Helen Safa indicated that a full report of the first seminar under the LASA-CEA exchange was published in the last issue of the *Forum*. A second seminar was tentatively planned for January [now June]. The need for these seminars has become all the more critical since Cuban scholars have not been permitted to attend the last two LASA congresses. The seminars were originally planned to alternate between Cuba and the U.S., but they must now all be held in Cuba. This adds to the urgency of trying to ease the barriers preventing Cuban scholars from entering the United States.

The members of the LASA Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Cuba are: Wayne S. Smith (Co-chair), School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; Helen I. Safa (Co-chair), Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida, 319 Grinter Hall, Gainesville, FL 32611; Pamela Falk (Columbia University), Chris Mitchell (New York University), Marifeli Perez-Stable (SUNY College at Old Westbury), Rebecca J. Scott (University of Michigan), Van R. Whiting (Brown University), and Peter Winn (Tufts University).

## REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON SCHOLARLY RELATIONS WITH NICARAGUA

Charles Stansifer and Michael Conroy reported that the production of *LASA-NICA Scholars News* is one of the task force's major activities and that the newsletter will continue. The first issue of the second year (#14, September-October 1986) was published as a special Boston Congress issue, listing panels and papers of interest to Nicaraguanists. The issue also included an essay on the politics of the Nicaraguan constitutional debate, a profile of the Nicaraguan Association of Social Scientists (ANICS), and reports on the activities of CINASE (*Centro de Investigaciones y Asesoría Socio-Económica*), INIES (*Instituto Nicaragüense de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales*), CONAPRO, CRIES, and CIDCA. Subscription renewals for the second year are due. The cost is \$10.00 per subscription. *LASA-NICA Scholars News* now reaches roughly 250 Nicaragua scholars in the U.S., Europe and Latin America, plus more than 70 within Nicaragua. A subscription form is provided in this issue of the *Forum*.

The task force's other major activity is the annual research seminar in Nicaragua. It is planned again for 1987, during the last two weeks in June, and a strong effort will be made to attract people who are teaching about Central America, especially Nicaragua. [The report on the 1986 seminar appears below.] In addition the task force is exploring possibilities for a special session or workshop in Nicaragua, which would hopefully be sponsored by INIES to give Nicaraguan scholars an opportunity to anticipate the discussions which will take place at the New Orleans congress in 1988. Efforts to promote contacts between individual Nicaraguans and North Americans are continuing, but the task force is also exploring at least 28 private exchange arrangements existing between Nicaraguan universities and those in the United States in an effort to promote and extend institutional contacts. A further concern is the problem expressed by Nicaraguans that they feel isolated from their own colleagues in Central America.

Current members of the LASA Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Nicaragua are Charles Stansifer, Chair (University of Kansas), Michael E. Conroy, Cochair (University of Texas-Austin), John Booth (North Texas State University), Laura Enriquez (Managua, Nicaragua), James Malloy (University of Pittsburgh), Nola Reinhardt (Smith College), Rose Spalding (DePaul University), Thomas Walker (Ohio University). Correspondence should be forwarded to the chair or cochair at the following addresses: Charles Stansifer, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045; Michael E. Conroy, Department of Economics, University of Texas, Austin, TX 78705.

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### *Research Seminar in Nicaragua August 2-16, 1986*

by  
Thomas W. Walker  
Ohio University

LASA sponsored its second Research Seminar in Nicaragua in August 1986. The purpose of the seminar, which was open to Spanish-speaking LASA members of all political points of view, was to provide the participating scholars with intensive exposure to the current situation in that country and with an introduction to universities, think tanks, research facilities, colleagues, etc. which might be helpful to them for doing further research in Nicaragua. There were eleven participants: four professors, six graduate students, and a retired international civil servant.

The seminar, which was designed by Nola Reinhardt (Economics, Smith College) and Thomas Walker (Political Science, Ohio University), was led in Nicaragua by Walker. He was assisted by the Nicaraguan professional association, CONAPRO Héroes y Mártires, and by a Chilean media specialist, Javier Bertín, who acted as assistant coordinator. Though the group traveled to the east, west, north and south, its central base of operations was the Hotel D'Lido in Managua. Participant fees—\$890 for graduate students and \$1090 for others—covered all seminar costs including round-trip travel from Mexico City, with the exception of lunches and miscellaneous purchases.

As in the previous year, the itinerary was designed to reflect the general interests of the group, which clustered around three themes: grass roots organizations, women in the revolution, and the roles of the Catholic Church. Specific interests of group members were also considered, and individual appointments were made, as requested, for each participant. The two-week itinerary included the following activities:

**Saturday, August 2:** Arrival in Managua and explanatory introduction.

**Sunday, August 3:** Morning visit to the home of Juan and Piedad Tijerino in Boaco. Juan is a National Assemblyman (FSLN), a former large landholder, and a member of UNAG, the peasant and landholder mass organization. Piedad is a founder of AMPRONAC, the prerevolutionary women's movement. Both are revolutionary Christians. Attendance at People's Mass (*misa popular*) at Uriel Molina's church in Barrio Rigüero.

**Monday, August 4:** Opening session at CONAPRO. Meeting with directors of INIES (Nicaraguan Institute of Social and Economic Research), CIERA (Center for Research and Study of Agrarian Reform), CIDCA (Center for Research and Documentation of the Atlantic Coast), and IES (Institute for Sandinist Studies). Bismark Jaime of INIES, Marvin Ortega of CIERA, Carlos Vilas of CIDCA, and

Roberto Cajinas of IES were present. Lunch with Reinaldo Antonio Téfel, President/Minister of INSSBI (Nicaraguan Institute of Social Security and Welfare); discussion of the impact of the war on social programs. Talk on the current military situation by 1st Lt. Guillermo González Ortega in the press office of the Sandinist People's Army.

**Tuesday, August 5:** Discussion of the constitution drafting process with Milú Vargas, general director of legal advisors to the National Assembly, in the National Assembly Building. Viewing of a videotape of the Women's Open Town Meeting (*cabildo abierto*) on the draft constitution. Lunch meeting with Lourdes Bolaños and María Heliete Helers to discuss women and the constitution.

**Wednesday, August 6:** Meeting on the Atlantic Coast with Carlos Vilas at CIDCA. Meeting on the media with Sofia Montenegro at Barricada. Lunch and discussion on grass roots organizations with Gary Ruchwarger, Codirector, *Programa de Estudios de Participación Popular* (Popular Participation Studies Program). Interview with Marcos Valle (second level) in the DRI (International Relations Office of the FSLN) on the FSLN. Visit to a CDS (Sandinist Defense Committee) grass roots organization in Barrio Jorge Dimitrov. Attempted interview at *La Prensa* blocked by demonstration (responding to a pro-*La Prensa* demonstration earlier that day).

**Thursday, August 7:** Interview with Norma Guadamuz, Vice General Director of CORADEP (People's Radio Corporation) to discuss the media. Interview with Melba Cecilia Blandón, Chief of Media Transmissions (*Divulgación de Media*) on media censorship. Lunch and discussion with Deborah Barry of CRIES on the militarization of Central America. Visit to INIES-CRIES and discussion with Bismark Jaime. Dinner and discussion with Adrian Meza, Director of Planning, Labor Ministry, about state-labor relations.

**Friday, August 8:** Travel to the north. Visit to a mechanics school near Chaguitillo run by Fred Royce. Visit to a CAS (Sandinist Agrarian Cooperative) in Chaguitillo. Visit to a cigar factory, a sewing cooperative and a CORADEP station, *Radio Liberación*. Night spent in Matagalpa.

**Saturday, August 9:** Travel into the war zone in the company of Mario Paniagua, of the Regional Office of Agrarian Reform. Visit to Sumu Indian resettlement camp at Paz del Tuma (north of Lago de Apanás above Jinotega). View of contra-caused destruction at a coffee-producing state farm (UPE) nearby. Interview in Jinotega with Justin and Margaret StormoGipson, a husband-wife doctor team sponsored by the Presbyterian Church to work in primary health care. Discussion of the effect of contra terror on health care. Return to Managua.

**Sunday, August 10:** Day of swimming and relaxation at the Pacific Ocean beach, Pochomil.

**Monday, August 11:** Interview with official in Agrarian Reform Ministry. Luncheon-discussion with Elio Montenegro, Vice President of the Central American University (UCA), concerning the current situation of Nicaraguan higher education. Interview with Roberto Vargas of the Department of Agitación and Political Information (DAPP) of the FSLN. Interview with Edgardo García, head of the ATC (Association of Rural Workers), and Ariel Bucardo, Vice President of UNAG (Farmers' Association), on rural grass roots organizations.

**Tuesday, August 12:** Visit to the Centro Valdivieso and other bookstores. Luncheon-discussion on the church and the revolution with François Houtart, a Belgian priest-sociologist doing quantitative research on religiosity and social status in Nicaragua. Mentor of Gustavo Gutiérrez, Camilo Torres, Clodovides Boff, etc. Interview at *La Prensa* with Cristina Chamorro and Horacio Ruiz, Editor in Chief. Discussion of press censorship and other Sandinista abuses, with Ruiz doing most of the talking. Dinner discussion on curriculum and education in revolutionary Nicaragua with Marvin Happel, Director of Secondary Education at the U.S.-sponsored American School.

**Wednesday, August 13:** Interview with Joaquín Mejía, Representative for the PLI (Liberal Independent Party) in the National Assembly. Discussion of the history of the PLI and Sandinista restriction of democratic freedoms. Interview with Garrott Sweany, Political Counsellor, U.S. Embassy, on evaluation of the Sandinista revolution. Interview with Fernando Cardenal, Minister of Education, former Jesuit priest and head of the 1980 literacy crusade. Discussion of the war's impact on education and Christians in the revolution. Interview with Ray Hooker, creole-miskito representative for the FSLN in the National Assembly and head of the national autonomy talks.

**Thursday, August 14:** Visit to IES's Museum of the Revolution and to IHCA (the Central American Historical Institute). Lunch with Jesuit Priest Peter Marchetti of IHCA. Discussion of agrarian reform and the contra war and of the church in the revolution. Visit to CIERA and talk with Marvin Ortega and others about CIERA's role. Visit to the ASTC (The Sandinist Association of Cultural Workers) and talk by Margarita Clark about art in the revolution. Return visit to Barrio Jorge Dimitrov to deliver equipment for their oral rehydration center which seminar participants had bought.

**Friday, August 15:** Interview with Father Uriel Molina in the Centro Antonio Valdivieso to discuss conflicting visions of the role of the church. Seminar evaluation luncheon with CONAPRO. Performance of the Cuban National Ballet with Alicia Alonso.

**Saturday, August 16:** Departure.

Our group was unable to talk with some people for whom interviews had been requested: Tomás Borge, Minister

of the Interior (with whom the 1985 group had conducted a 2-1/2 hour interview); Doris Tijerino, Chief of Police (whose child fell sick); spokespersons for the opposition Social Christian (PSC) and Conservative Democratic (PCD) parties (who never responded to our requests); opposition parish priest Osvaldo Mondragón of *Reader's Digest* fame (with whom we failed to make connection); and Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo (whose secretary would promise only to let us see him in a sort of audience, not in an interview format).

Upon returning to the United States, the participants were asked to fill out an anonymous evaluation form. These responses were very positive. Given the overall success of both the 1985 and 1986 seminars, the LASA Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Nicaragua is recommending that LASA sponsor a third seminar in 1987 [subsequently approved—see above]. LASA members wishing further information should write or call: Professor Harvey Williams, Department of Sociology, University of the Pacific, Stockton, CA 95211, (209) 946-2101, or Professor Thomas W. Walker, Department of Political Science, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701, (614) 594-5495 or 5626.

## REPORTS OF THE TASK FORCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM

The members of the LASA Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom are: Martin Diskin (Chair), Program in Anthropology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 20D-109, Cambridge, MA 02139; William Bollinger (Inter-American Research Center), Thomas Bossert (Sarah Lawrence College), Holly Burkhalter (Americas Watch), Patricia Weiss Fagen (Refugee Policy Group), Beatriz Manz (Wellesley College), Mitchell Seligson (University of Pittsburgh), Stéfano Varese (Stanford University), and William LeoGrande (The American University), ex-officio.

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### *Peru Opposition Leader and Brother Arrested While Voting in Lima*

Luis Varese, a well-known Peruvian journalist and political activist of the United Left opposition front, was seized on Sunday, November 11, 1986, at 2:00 p.m. by a heavily armed group of men dressed in civilian clothes.

As Varese, his wife, and his brother Francisco approached a polling place to vote in the Lima municipal election contested by the ruling APRA party and the United Front, they were surrounded by a large group of men who claimed to be policemen, although they refused to identify themselves. Luis Varese was forced into a car with no license plates. Francisco eluded his captors briefly but was apprehended by a similar large armed group as he went toward his car. He was released several days later, but Luis remains in custody.

This incident is particularly serious in view of the repeated statements by the government of President Alan García that the electoral process and democratic institutions would be fully guaranteed by the president himself. Some observers believe that this action may have been done by the military as a provocation to the García government and as a critique of what some believe to be too soft a policy toward the left opposition.

In the past two years, three Americas Watch reports have documented the human rights situation in Peru. The October 1984 report expressed concern over numerous violations on the part of the government and the *Sendero Luminoso*; in the September 1985 report, optimism was expressed with the new presidency of Alan García; but in September 1986 there was new concern that, "the gains that have been made in the battle for human rights are in serious jeopardy." Hopefully, the incident reported here is not part of a trend and will be speedily rectified.

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### *Human Rights Monitors in Latin America Under Fire*

by

*Holly Burkhalter  
Washington Representative  
The Americas Watch*

The past several months have witnessed a wave of attacks on human rights monitors in Latin America. In Chile, for example, General Pinochet promised on September 8 to "lock up or expel" human rights advocates, and within days a death squad was formed which threatened to kill a member of the Catholic Church's human rights office. Dozens of death threats were made against human rights monitors, and a number of church lawyers were arrested. In Cuba, a group of university professors and lawyers affiliated with the Cuban Committee for Human Rights (a prison monitoring organization formed within the jails by Ricardo Bofill Pages) were arrested recently. In Bolivia, an attorney who represented a number of political detainees was himself detained on political grounds. In Guatemala, the Army publicly denounced the president of the *Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo* as a "terrorist" and warned that she might become a "martyr." In Trinidad, a leading human rights lawyer faces criminal charges which are widely viewed as trumped-up as a result of his defense of political cases.

In Latin America, as in the rest of the world, human rights monitors, including writers, doctors, lawyers, and church people who report on their governments' abuses or provide assistance to victims, have been made victims themselves. The repression of these heroic men and women does more than abuse the individual monitors; it deprives their fellow citizens of advocates and protectors and denies the outside world news of human rights conditions in their countries. Not surprisingly, human rights monitors are regularly tortured, threatened, exiled, jailed or even killed because of



what they know and report and denounce. Because they have exposed themselves to danger from their own governments in defending the rights of others, human rights monitors have a special claim to support and assistance from abroad. Unfortunately, the United States Government's record of support for Latin American human rights advocates is a shabby one.

The Reagan administration got off to a bad start with human rights leaders in Chile. U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick refused to meet with the president of the Chilean Commission on Human Rights, Dr. Jaime Castillo, during a 1981 good-will mission to Chile. Dr. Castillo was expelled from the country just days later. James Theberge was posted as U.S. Ambassador to Chile; he had virtually no contact with Chilean human rights groups or victims of abuse. For four years human rights monitors were deprived of protection and assistance from the U.S. Embassy. (This situation dramatically improved with Theberge's replacement by Ambassador Harry Barnes in 1986, when cordial relations with the Chilean human rights community resumed.)

In Guatemala repression has been so great that no human rights monitoring organizations have been able to operate. However an organization of families of the disappeared, the *Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo* (GAM) was founded in June 1984. Following a public denunciation of the group as "subversive" by then-President General Mejía Victores, two GAM founders were assassinated along with several family members, and other GAM leaders fled the country. Unfortunately, relations between the GAM and the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City have been strained because certain State Department officials had also denounced the organization as "subversive." The GAM's suspicions were not allayed by the treatment received by the group's president, Nineth de García, when she arrived at O'Hare Airport for a brief visit to the U.S. in April 1986. She was pulled out of line, detained for hours, and harshly interrogated by customs officials about possible communist connections. Another GAM leader, Blanca Rosal, the wife of a disappeared agronomist, applied for political asylum in the United States following the murder of her colleagues in 1985 and death threats against herself. In its advisory opinion issued to the Immigration and Naturalization Service this September the State Department charged that Blanca's disappeared husband was a "guerrilla," though they provided no evidence to support the allegation. Worse, after the State Department endangered her still further by the reckless claim that she was the wife of a guerrilla, the Immigration Service denied her asylum request and ordered her and her two young children deported to Guatemala.

In Honduras the Honduran Human Rights Committee (CODEH) and its president, Ramón Custodio, have angered the Reagan administration by monitoring and reporting on violations against Honduran citizens by Nicaraguan contras within the country, and criticizing U.S. policies in the region. In September, the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa refused to condemn two fire bomb attacks on CODEH's office and death threats against Custodio. Further, State Department

bureaucrats even tried to dissuade congressional offices from protesting the attack to the Honduran government by denouncing CODEH's director as a "communist" and denying that CODEH was a legitimate human rights group.

Nowhere in Latin America have human rights monitors been more maligned by the U.S. Government than in El Salvador. In the early 1980s, when church human rights monitors were documenting and reporting some 1,000 assassinations every month, the Reagan administration reserved its harshest criticism for the critics themselves. State Department officials accused Socorro Jurídico, the legal aid office of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese, of a leftist bias because it tabulated killings by government forces and paramilitary forces allied to them, but did not monitor killings by the guerrillas. (Actually Socorro Jurídico's practices were the same as those then followed by human rights organizations all over the world, including organizations relied upon by the Department of State as authoritative.) A 1982 State Department cable widely circulated on Capitol Hill called Socorro Jurídico's figures suspect because of the organization's refusal to publish its sources. (Socorro Jurídico's sources were witnesses to government atrocities and relatives of victims. Their names were frequently kept confidential to protect their safety.)

In 1982 the Archdiocese replaced Socorro Jurídico with Tutela Legal, and the new organization documented abuses by both the government and the guerrillas. Nonetheless, U.S. Government attacks on the church's human rights monitors persisted. The 1983 State Department Country Reports on Human Rights falsely stated that Tutela Legal relied upon "announcements by guerrilla groups," and discredited individual testimonies collected by the office as "originating with the guerrillas themselves or from sources close to and sympathetic to the guerrillas."

To this day, the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador routinely distributes to journalists and other visitors a lengthy memorandum which harshly criticizes the Americas Watch, a New York-based private human rights monitoring group, and Tutela Legal. The Reagan administration's chief complaint about both groups is that they publicize and denounce attacks by the Salvadoran Armed Forces on unarmed civilians living in conflictive areas of the country. The Salvadoran government—and its U.S. supporters—clearly regard such attacks as justified because the victims are seen as guerrilla supporters. In fact, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the 1957 Protocol II to those Conventions, relating to internal armed conflict, explicitly prohibit military attacks on unarmed civilians—no matter what their political views are perceived to be.

In June 1986 the Salvadoran government rounded up and jailed five members of the nongovernmental Salvadoran Commission on Human Rights and several women affiliated with an organization of relatives of political prisoners. One of those arrested by the Treasury Police, María Teresa Tula, had

been abducted a month before by nonuniformed death squad members, who tortured and raped her repeatedly and interrogated her about her human rights activities. The U.S. Embassy in San Salvador not only failed to condemn the crime, but joined in the act by releasing a press statement which denounced her by name, along with the other jailed human rights advocates as "a group of FMLN members who have been running front organizations devoted to disinformation." The embassy's statement occurred before any formal charges had been made and while the group was actually undergoing interrogation (during which several of them were abused) without the benefit of legal counsel or a trial.

The quality of human rights monitoring in Latin America varies from group to group and from country to country. Some have political concerns and criticize their own governments and the U.S. policies as well. Some monitor abuses by both sides, others monitor only government abuses. Some have strictly professional methodology and are wholly reliable, others are less so. But in almost all cases, human rights monitors have risked their personal safety in denouncing abuses against others. They should not have to pass an ideological litmus test before the United States Government speaks out on their behalf. The Reagan administration is not required to endorse the findings or methodology of individual human rights organizations; indeed, the human rights community can expect to have disagreements with U.S. officials. But one thing we should all agree upon is that human rights monitors are special kinds of dissidents who require support and protection—however unwelcome their message may be to their governments and to ours.

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***Human Rights in Puerto Rico: 1987  
A Report to the  
Latin American Studies Association\****

by  
*Anthony M. Stevens-Arroyo\*\*  
Brooklyn College, CUNY*

According to the Executive Director of the Puerto Rican Civil Rights Commission, Eduardo Salichs, virtually all civil rights cases brought to the commission involve political prejudice. This is not to say that there is no racism on the island today, or that all Puerto Ricans respect the equal rights of the handicapped or of women. But, as a matter of record, most complaints brought to the commission allege violations of the rights of political advocacy.

The principal victims of this prejudice are the Puerto Rican *independentistas*, the advocates of island independence from the United States. There is solid evidence that, as an important political minority,<sup>1</sup> the *independentistas* are systematically denied equal protection under the law, often with the collusion of federal agencies, even when civil rights statutes were violated by the government agencies.<sup>2</sup>

In this sense little has changed in the human rights situation in Puerto Rico in the past 50 years. In 1937 Arthur Garfield Hays, then general counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union, headed the investigation of an incident known as the "Ponce Massacre," when 17 civilian independence advocates were shot by the military. The findings blamed the U.S.-trained National Guard for unprovoked violence, and questioned the impartiality of the investigation conducted by the U.S.-appointed governor, Blanton Winship. Nearly 25 years later, in response to an official 1959 report to Governor Muñoz that found significant abuses to members of the Nationalist Party,<sup>3</sup> the liberals under the present Commonwealth arrangement (1952-1964) set in motion a process that established (1965) an island Commission on Civil Rights, modeled on the U.S. Federal Commission.

This report focuses on government complicity in the politically motivated murder in 1978 of two young independentistas at Cerro Maravilla, and upon federal prosecution of the perpetrators of a 1983 Wells Fargo robbery in Hartford, Connecticut. These events are analyzed as examples of the systematic nature of many violations of the human and civil rights of Puerto Rican independentistas, which have continued virtually unchanged since 1937 despite the civil rights' legislation of the 1960s.

**The Cerro Maravilla Case**

On July 25, 1978, a police undercover agent (González Malavé) led two young independence advocates (Soto Arriví, age 17 and Rosado Ruiz, age 23) to a communications tower on a remote hilltop, Cerro Maravilla. The three men had hijacked a taxi and forced its owner (Ortiz Molina) to ride with them to the hilltop. The police had been informed of the arrival by the undercover agent, and when the two young men left the cab, they were killed by the police. The official press release described the police shootings as "self-defense" and the undercover agent was decorated by Governor Carlos Romero Barceló as a hero. The governor praised such decisive action as a characteristic of his administration, which he described as willing to give an example to all terrorists.<sup>4</sup>

Within the next two years, sufficient evidence surfaced to cast doubts upon the official police version. The governor's own administration conducted two investigations and, not surprisingly in an election year, found no justification for accusations of impropriety. Subsequently the Federal Department of Justice conducted an investigation (May-August 1979), but brought only two witnesses before the Grand Jury appointed to hear testimony. In December of 1979 another investigation was undertaken by the Federal Department of Justice, but once again no indictment was delivered.

Although Governor Romero managed to maintain his post (by a margin of only 3,000 votes out of nearly 2 million cast) in Puerto Rico's elections of November 1980, the principal opposition party, the Popular Democrats (PPD), won majorities in both houses of the island legislature. After considerable political jousting, the PPD-controlled Senate con-

vened hearings of its own into the case. These hearings were televised and although they had no juridic value, the daily transmission captured Puerto Rican public attention, much in the style of the Watergate proceedings in the United States.

Under the promise of immunity, individual officers and witnesses to the events reversed previous testimony and offered previously suppressed evidence. The new picture presented to the Puerto Rican public was that the killings were planned, that they constituted murder in cold-blood, and that a cover-up had been ordered from "higher up." Partly because of the Senate hearings on Cerro Maravilla, Romero Barceló was denied reelection in 1984, and the new governor, Rafael Hernández Colón, supported a thorough criminal investigation, which in 1986 produced some convictions against the police on charges of perjury. As of January 1987, no one has yet been brought to trial for the murders, and the statute of limitations has already expired on some federal charges (Nelson 1986:237).

#### *Use of Undercover Agents*

Long before the Cerro Maravilla case, the Puerto Rican Commission on Civil Rights had warned against the dangers of the use of undercover agents. Citing their lack of official training and insulation from criminal prosecution (CDC-021-1971:568-69), the Commission had objected to the use of these operatives (577-79). After Cerro Maravilla, the Commission denounced the use of undercover agents in counterintelligence activities against the independence movement (Statement of February 16, 1979). In effect, undercover agents have operated as secret police against the independence movement. In May of 1986, two senators of the PPD offered Project 681, legislation which would increase the use of undercover agents in the investigation of "political groups." Curiously, although Puerto Rico has a significant drug problem, the legislation did not propose this kind of surveillance to assist the prosecution of organized crime on the island. Hence, despite the scandalous episode of Cerro Maravilla, the structural bias in the judicial system against independence advocates remains, affording political activists less protection under law than some criminal elements of the society.

#### *The Grand Jury*

The Federal Grand Jury system also has been used against the independence movement in Puerto Rico. Unlike a trial, where innocence is presumed and the accused is assured proper legal counsel, the Grand Jury follows an investigative procedure, where the prosecutor may seek evidence without demonstrating that the information is linked to a crime. A witness before a Grand Jury may not have legal counsel present and must answer all questions of the prosecution; however, the proceedings are secret, and the public has no guarantee that justice is pursued with equal vigor in all cases.<sup>5</sup>

Crimes attributed to the Puerto Rican independence movement have often been the occasion to convene a Grand

Jury. In this context lawyers, labor leaders, and clergy have been required to divulge the names of friends or clients and to make available lists of members of a parish or labor union. In effect, the constitutional right of independence advocates against illegal seizure and search may be circumvented by the summoning of a Grand Jury. As in Cerro Maravilla, these procedures are often legitimized by invocation of an anti-Communist crusade. Former Governor Roberto Sánchez Vilella and a number of prominent members of the Puerto Rican Bar Association have complained that the Grand Jury process is being used in Puerto Rico to deny independence advocates their due civil liberties (*New York Times*, August 16, 1983.)

On the other hand, when the investigation is directed against elements favorable to the government, the prosecution in a Grand Jury may be lax instead of vigorous. Nelson details the conflicts over Grand Jury documents between Drew Days, head of the central administration's civil rights division in the Justice Department, and the FBI's San Juan office (Nelson 1986:183-190). Incredibly, the FBI later named Angel Pérez Casillas, the police commander of the Cerro Maravilla operation, to coordinate the bureau's investigation of the killings (Nelson 1986:193). Nelson states that Julio Morales Sánchez, who conducted the Grand Jury investigation for the Justice Department, was himself investigated in 1985 by the U.S. Department of Justice for his conduct in the investigation (Nelson 1986:238).

Political ideology enters the courtroom also because judges often reflect the bias of the system that appoints them, more on the basis of party affiliation than strictly on merit.<sup>6</sup> One such appointee, Judge Carmen Vargas Cerezo, required prospective jurors to reveal how they voted in 1984 as part of the qualification process for the Cerro Maravilla case. Sympathy for Puerto Rican independence was cited as sufficient reason to eliminate the person from consideration (*New York Times*, February 17, 1986).

#### *The FBI*

The FBI has been a part of this pattern of bias against independence advocates. González Malavé, the undercover agent, planted explosives in a post office in April of 1978 under the supervision of federal agents, who were present when he fulfilled his mission. This was part of the policy of "dirty tricks" designed to turn public opinion against independence. Other such "supervised activities" admitted by González Malavé included exploding Molotov cocktails and participating in a shotgun attack upon ex-Governor Muñoz Marín (*The San Juan Star*, April 27, 1980). Six days after the Cerro Maravilla shootings, the San Juan office of the FBI informed Washington that no investigation should be made because the incident was being used to "cause embarrassment" to the pro-statehood administration (memorandum of July 31, 1978). Another memorandum (August 28, 1978) from John Hinchcliffe, the bureau's director in Puerto Rico, argued that documentation of FBI investigations into the

Cerro Maravilla case should be given over to the Grand Jury so that the evidence gathered by the bureau could not become available under the Freedom of Information Act (Nelson 1986:178,195,238).

Sadly, the inability of the justice system in Puerto Rico to demonstrate effectiveness has led sometimes to an escalation of violence. The undercover agent in the Cerro Maravilla case had just been acquitted of kidnapping charges, when on April 29, 1986, he was shot and killed near his home. An independence group, Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution, claimed responsibility for the "ajusticiamiento." Just as quickly, José Taboada, president of the pro-statehood Puerto Rican Policeman's Association, raised the threat of vigilante reprisal from within the police force against the Secretary of Justice, who, it was claimed, had not defended González Malavé from the "terrorists" (April 30, 1986). Thus, after nearly nine years of investigations, hearings and trials, the legacy of Cerro Maravilla is an unending spiral of violence and an erosion of public confidence in the justice system in Puerto Rico under both federal and local authorities.

#### **Advocacy of Puerto Rican Independence: A Civil Right or Criminal Offense?**

The Cerro Maravilla case reveals the political nature of Puerto Rico's justice system. In some official quarters, independence has been equated with treason against the United States, even though the conventions of United Nations and other international agreements guarantee self-determination for nonautonomous territories.<sup>7</sup>

In the spring of 1987 it is expected that 16 independence advocates will be tried in federal court on charges related to a robbery of Wells Fargo Security that took place in Hartford, Connecticut, on September 12, 1983. Of immediate concern to the question of civil rights is the statement of FBI agent Richard Held (*New York Times*, September 8, 1985) that the trial is meant to link the suspects to the clandestine organizations of the *Macheteros* and the FALN (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional).

Most of the suspects were arrested by the FBI on August 30, 1985, in an operation consisting of sweeps conducted in different parts of the island, the United States, and Mexico by more than 250 FBI agents, heavily armed with combat gear and automatic weapons. Subsequently, two other suspects were detained on March 21, 1986. Because reports of police brutality can be found in the Puerto Rican press, this report will not detail these charges.

The FBI is accused by defense counsel of violations of the First and Fourth Amendments for their confiscation of the manuscripts, poems, and photographic film of the Puerto Rican poet, Coquí Santaliz. She has never been charged with any crime, but none of the materials have ever been returned despite protests from groups such as PEN, which delivered letters signed by leading Latin American authors protesting the violation of Ms. Santaliz's rights. Likewise, the office of

the pro-independence journal, *Pensamiento crítico*, was raided by the FBI, its printing press destroyed and its mailing lists seized. The authorities have never proven how this magazine is linked to the Wells Fargo robbery.

The defendants captured in Puerto Rico and Mexico were moved on September 1, 1985, and held incommunicado until brought to court in Hartford on September 3. In possible violation of their Sixth Amendment rights, their attorneys were prevented from knowing the whereabouts of their clients. Moreover, the Fifth Amendment prohibits direct interrogation of defendants represented by counsel, something the FBI has attempted repeatedly in this case, taking advantage of the attorneys' absence.

The fundamental premise of the government prosecution links the Wells Fargo incident to the activities of various clandestine independence organizations. However, this linkage is not one of the charges. It seems unfair, therefore, that the government makes the alleged link to the *Macheteros* the reason for denying bail to most of the defendants, but is not forced to demonstrate this relationship. The arrest process apparently utilized this nonproven charge as justification for the search of the home of Ms. Santaliz and the offices of *Pensamiento crítico*.

Finally, since the concept of trial by one's peers is the cornerstone of the legal justice tradition in the United States, it may be asked whether holding the trial in Hartford will deny Puerto Ricans the right to stand trial before other Puerto Ricans, whose thinking has been shaped by the same culture, language and history. This is not an idle question, since a 1986 *El Nuevo Día* poll conducted by Yankelovich, Shelly and White, Stanford, Klapper & Associates in Puerto Rico suggested that 47 percent of those polled on the island disagreed that the *Macheteros* are "terrorists." Additionally, 44 percent said that while the methods of the *Macheteros* were "extreme," they refused to classify them as "unacceptable."

Public respect for the *independentista* cause is not always understood in the United States. For instance, when the Reagan administration raised the possibility of training the Nicaraguan *contras* in Puerto Rico because no other Latin American country wanted them, there was significant public disapproval, including the exploding of bombs in several army installations on the island in protest (October 28, 1986). Puerto Rican Governor Rafael Hernández Colón admitted to the press that because public opinion significantly supported the *independentistas* on this issue, the training of *contras* in Puerto Rico would be highly controversial, even if the United States were legally free to ignore Puerto Rican wishes (*New York Times*, October 31, 1986).

#### **Conclusions**

This report has not included other significant incidents concerning human rights in Puerto Rico. Space does not permit analysis of the 1982 eviction of a squatters' settlement (Villa Sin Miedo) nor the fatal police shooting of a middle-

aged mother in the process. Various political murders, including the death of the son of Juan Mari Bras, leader of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, have gone unresolved. The continuing community struggle to prevent naval maneuvers on the shores of Vieques has led to the arrests and trials of prominent activists, including a Catholic bishop, and the unsolved death in prison of a socialist leader. The University of Puerto Rico was closed for much of 1981 because of ideological conflicts, and was the scene for serious incidents of police brutality. The tragic fire on New Year's Eve 1986 is only the latest example of how labor conflicts continue to generate serious violence, often resulting in charges of terrorism against any labor leader espousing independence.

Hopefully this report has shown that there is a pattern to the denials of equal protection for independence advocates in Puerto Rico, and that the root causes for this situation have not substantially changed in 50 years. The command structure of the police, the politicization of governmental process, the abuse of the judicial system, and the unequal application of the law by federal authorities are serious problems that have not yet been adequately addressed. Indeed, it has been argued that such long-standing and flagrant violations of the rights of Puerto Rican *independentistas* constitute an attack on the right of Puerto Ricans to advocate their independence. Such denial of justice in Puerto Rico takes place in that part of Latin America still under the U.S. flag, and thus merits particular vigilance from the members of LASA.

#### NOTES

\*Chairperson's Note: Dr. Stevens-Arroyo served on the Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom from Fall 1983 to Spring 1985. The views expressed in this report are his alone.

\*\*This report could not have been prepared without the assistance of Mr. Eduardo Salichs, Executive Director of the Puerto Rican Commission on Civil Rights, and Mr. Gustavo Marrero, legal counsel for the Commission, who provided a complete set of Commission publications for detailed research. The book, *Human Rights in a United States Colony* by Louise Cripps (Schenkman 1982), and the Summer 1979 edition of *Pensamiento crítico* have been very useful. Special thanks to Mr. Ronald Kuby of the legal office of William Kunstler for the valuable data he has supplied, and to my colleague Ana María Díaz for help with the manuscript.

1. The actual number of independence advocates on the island is much debated. The number of persons who vote on the Independence Party line for governor is an unreliable count since there has been much ticket splitting in recent elections. Sentiment for, as distinct from participation in, independence politics may touch more than the 7 percent of the population sometimes considered loyal to the independence ideal. (Cf. Cripps, p. 183; Raymond Carr, *Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment*, New York: Vintage, 1984, pp. 172-173). In the 1984 elections, Rubén Berrios, president of the Puerto Rican Independence Party, received a record high of nearly 200,000 votes as senator-at-large. Carr (p. 192 *et passim*) explains that independence influence exceeds its numbers.

2. Such violations of the civil rights of Puerto Rican independence advocates were admitted by William C. Sullivan, then Assistant Director of the FBI, in testimony before the Church Senate Select Committee, whose final report was published in 1976. Documents related to the phase of the counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO), carried out in Puerto Rico against the independence movement, are reviewed in an edition of the magazine, *Pensamiento crítico*, verano:1979.

3. See the two volumes published under the title, *Informes de la Comisión de Derechos Civiles del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico*, Document 1, part VII, 1959 (Orford, NH: Equity Publishing, 1973) pp. 1-212; referred to below as "CDC."

4. Readily available accounts can be found in the May 14, 1979, issues of *Time* and *Newsweek*. Anne Nelson's book, *Murder Under Two Flags* (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1986) narrates the events journalistically and explains the relevant political context. Articles in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* of that period are also useful.

5. See Morton Halperin, *et al.*, *The Lawless State* (New York: Penguin, 1976), pp. 209-219.

6. Reversals in a higher court have been so frequent for one of the pro-statehood judges, Juan R. Torruela, that he has been classified by the *American Lawyer* magazine as "one of the worst federal judges in the entire U.S. and the worst in the First Circuit." Cited in Cripps, p. 128.

7. See Robert Pastor, "Puerto Rico as an International Issue," pp. 99-136 in Richard J. Bloomfield, ed., *Puerto Rico: The Search for a National Policy* (Boulder: Westview, 1985).

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## LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

A Committee on Regionals (CORE), which includes the eight Latin American regional organizations (MACLAS, MALAS, NCCLA, NECLAS, PCCLAS, RMCLAS, SCOLAS AND SECOLAS), convened during the 1986 LASA Congress in Boston. After a business meeting, representatives heard presentations by Ray Sadler of RMCLAS and Herbert Miller of SCOLAS, who discussed "Regionals and Publishing," drawing upon their organizations' experiences with published papers of regional conferences as examples. CORE also organized a table where the organizations distributed newsletters and membership information.

Since its reestablishment in 1985, CORE has institutionalized the interchange of newsletters among the regional organizations, has periodically updated lists of regional officers, and is coordinating a project on capsule histories of each organization. A list of current officers is being compiled and will be published in a forthcoming issue of the *Forum*. Contact: Ann Twinam, Department of History, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221.

**REPORT FROM  
THE PROGRAM COMMITTEE  
XIV INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS  
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA**

The XIV International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association will be held in New Orleans, March 17-19, 1988. The Program Committee hopes that the meeting will be notable for the quality and scope of its scholarship and the diversity of ideas and information presented. We are counting on the help of all LASA members to reach these goals. Members are invited to propose sessions for this meeting as early as possible. Participation by Latin American and Caribbean scholars is particularly encouraged.

Four types of sessions will constitute the bulk of the program in New Orleans.

1. **Panels:** consisting of presentations of formal papers prepared especially for the occasion, and related discussion of them.

2. **Workshops:** consisting of several participants who exchange ideas about common research problems, techniques and perspectives, or teaching interests in new fields of study.

3. **Roundtables:** breakfast sessions consisting of no more than 10 persons who share in discussing a focused topic of common interest. Participants and organizers must sign up in advance for roundtables; session organizers serve as discussion leaders.

4. **Meetings:** consisting of members of formally constituted organizations who meet to discuss the business of their organization.

In addition, the program will include film showings, public forums, receptions, and other special events.

**PROGRAM COMMITTEE POLICIES  
AND GUIDELINES FOR  
SESSION ORGANIZERS**

Participants in the New Orleans meeting will be limited to one role on the program in order to broaden the opportunities for all applicants. The only exceptions to this are panel organizers, who may also present a paper on their own panel, and those who are attending from abroad.

Panels, workshops, and roundtables will be limited in size to assure orderly and full discussions. Sessions will normally be two hours long. Ample time must be allowed for questions and discussion. An "ideal" *research panel* would consist of three paper presenters who *summarize* their work and two discussants; it would allow at least 20 minutes for general discussion open to participation from the audience. An "ideal" *discussion panel* would consist of four brief "think pieces" and general discussion of them. An "ideal" *workshop* would consist of six persons. An "ideal" *roundtable* would consist of 10 people.

The Program Committee will communicate directly with session organizers. The organizers are responsible for gathering complete and accurate information from session participants and for keeping them fully informed of requirements and responsibilities for the session.

Session organizers are responsible for submitting **five** copies of their proposal to the Program Committee.

The Program Committee will provide information and assistance to organizers on a timely basis.

If you wish to organize a session for the New Orleans meeting, we ask that you send us the information requested on the following forms. We are deeply appreciative of your interest in contributing to the next LASA meeting. The Program Committee will be in contact with you as soon as possible in response to your proposal.

Members of the 1988 Program Committee are the following:

Charles Bergquist, Chair  
Center for International Studies  
Duke University  
2122 Campus Drive  
Durham, North Carolina 27706

Douglas Bennett  
Department of Political Science  
Temple University  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122

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Camino al Ajusco 20  
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Scott Whiteford  
Latin American Studies Center  
Michigan State University  
East Lansing, Michigan 48824

**LASA/88**  
**New Orleans, Louisiana**  
**March 17-19, 1988**

**Mail 5 copies to:**  
Charles Bergquist  
Center for International Studies  
2122 Campus Drive  
Duke University  
Durham, NC 27706

**PROPOSAL FOR PAPER PRESENTATION**

All participants in the congress must be members of LASA. Those nonmembers wishing to participate should request a membership form from the LASA Secretariat in Pittsburgh.

Instructions: We urge all those interested in presenting a paper on a panel to take the initiative to organize a session or to communicate with others who might be interested in organizing one. If such efforts prove unsuccessful, the Program Committee will assess your proposal and, where appropriate, attempt to ensure its inclusion in an organized session. Please submit the information requested below in the most complete and accurate form possible to help the Program Committee make an informed decision. Five copies of the proposal must be submitted as indicated above. This form may be submitted in English, Spanish, or Portuguese. **PROPOSALS MUST BE RECEIVED BY APRIL 1, 1987. Please type or print clearly.**

Title of paper:

Description of paper topic (25-50 words):

Name:

Discipline:

Institution:

Address:

Telephone: (office)

(residence)

Please suggest several broad themes that would serve as topics for panels on which your paper might be appropriate:

**LASA/88**  
**New Orleans, Louisiana**  
**March 17-19, 1988**

**Mail 5 copies to:**

Charles Bergquist  
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 Duke University  
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 Durham, NC 27706

**Type of Session Proposed:**

- Panel  
 Workshop  
 Roundtable  
 Meeting

**PROPOSAL FOR ORGANIZED SESSION**

All participants in the congress must be members of LASA. Those nonmembers wishing to participate should request a membership form from the LASA Secretariat in Pittsburgh.

Instructions: Please submit the information requested below in the most complete and accurate form possible. This will increase the probability that the proposed session will be included in the final program for the meeting. To aid the Program Committee in the selection process, particular attention should be given to developing a concrete and informative description of the proposed session. Five copies of the proposal must be submitted as indicated above. **PROPOSALS MUST BE RECEIVED BY APRIL 1, 1987. Please type or print clearly.**

Title of session:

Organization sponsoring session, if any:

Description of session (75-100 words):

Organizer:

Institution:

Address:

Telephone: (office)

(residence)

Brief biographical statement (including scholarly experience related to session topic):

Please suggest how the session will be organized, including allocation of time (in minutes) allotted to each participant and to general discussion. Innovative formats for sessions are particularly encouraged.



List participants in order of their appearance in session, including yourself as organizer. Please check carefully for accuracy in information about participants. Mark with an asterisk Latin American participants who may need financial assistance for travel. Papers may be given in Spanish, Portuguese, or English; paper titles should be listed below in the language in which the paper will be written and presented.

**Participant 1:**

Role in session: Organizer [ ] Presenter [ ] Discussant [ ]

Department: Position:

Institution:

Address:

Title of paper (panels only):

**Participant 2:**

Role in session: Organizer [ ] Presenter [ ] Discussant [ ]

Department: Position:

Institution:

Address:

Title of paper (panels only):

**Participant 3:**

Role in session: Organizer [ ] Presenter [ ] Discussant [ ]

Department: Position:

Institution:

Address:

Title of paper (panels only):

**Participant 4:**

Role in session: Organizer [ ] Presenter [ ] Discussant [ ]

Department: Position:

Institution:

Address:

Title of paper (panel only):

**Participant 5:**

Role in session: Organizer [ ] Presenter [ ] Discussant [ ]

Department: Position:

Institution:

Address:

Title of paper (panel only):

**Participant 6:**

Role in session: Organizer [ ] Presenter [ ] Discussant [ ]

Department: Position:

Institution:

Address:

Title of paper (panel only):

**LASA/88**  
**New Orleans, Louisiana**  
**March 17-19, 1988**

**Mail 5 copies to:**  
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 Duke University  
 Durham, NC 27706

**PROPOSAL FOR SPECIAL EVENTS AND MEETINGS**

All participants in the congress must be members of LASA. Those nonmembers wishing to participate should request a membership form from the LASA Secretariat in Pittsburgh.

Instructions: If you wish to schedule an event or meeting that does not fit the categories specified under organized sessions, please provide the information indicated below. This form may be submitted in English, Spanish, or Portuguese. (Please note that all proposals for films and videos not integrated into organized sessions must be submitted on the form entitled "Proposals for Film Submissions" and sent to Lavonne C. Poteet, Coordinator of the Film Council.) **PROPOSALS MUST BE SUBMITTED BY APRIL 1, 1987. Please type or print clearly.**

Title of session:

Sponsoring organization:

Type and purpose of event:

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Breakfast                    | <input type="checkbox"/> Business meeting        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Luncheon                     | <input type="checkbox"/> Organizing Meeting      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dinner                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Board/committee meeting |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Reception (paid by sponsor)  | <input type="checkbox"/> Panel                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Reception (cash bar/no host) | <input type="checkbox"/> Workshop                |

Is event open to all interested parties? yes  no

Do you plan to charge an admission fee? yes  no

Brief narrative description of event (for possible publication):

Name/affiliation of chair:

Name/affiliation of organizer:

Preferred date and hour:

Room set-up:  Theater (auditorium); head table set for \_\_\_\_\_ people.  
 Conference (up to 15 people).  
 Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

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Estimated attendance:

Will food and beverages be served? yes  no

If yes, name/address/phone of person to be billed:

Specify any audiovisual equipment required:

Form completed by (name/address/phone):



## ANNOUNCEMENTS

**Tinker Visiting Professors.** The following scholars are Tinker Visiting Professors resident at U.S. universities for the 1986-1987 academic year. Columbia University: Maria do Carmo Carvalho Campello de Souza (Brazil), Political Science, Fall 1986; Teresa Valdés (Chile), Sociology, Fall 1986. Stanford University: Stéfano Varese (Mexico), Anthropology, Fall and Winter 1986-87. University of Chicago: Manuel Burga Díaz (Peru), History, Winter 1987; Jorge Balán (Argentina), Sociology, Winter 1987; Alicia Hernández (Mexico), History, Spring 1987. University of Texas at Austin: Pablo Antonio Cuadra (Nicaragua), Spanish and Portuguese, Fall 1986. University of Wisconsin at Madison: Manuel Villaverde Cabral (Portugal), History, Fall 1986; Edmundo Flores (Mexico), Agricultural Economics, Fall 1986.

**Haffenreffer Museum of Anthropology, Bristol, Rhode Island.** The museum announces the March 1, 1987, opening of a new exhibit entitled *Costume as Communication: Ethnographic Costumes and Textiles from Middle America and the Central Andes of South America*. The textiles on view, which have been collected within the past thirty years, reveal pre-Columbian dress form survivals, imprints of Spanish occupation, and later European and American influences. On Saturday, March 7, the museum will host a symposium on "Current Topics in Ethnographic Cloth and Costume from Middle America and the Central Andes of South America" at which ten scholars will discuss their research on textiles and field work with the indigenous creators of costume and cloth from these areas. The public is invited. For more information call (401) 253-8388.

**Latin American Book Fair.** The 2nd Latin American Book Fair will be held May 1-2, 1987, at the City College of New York in Manhattan. The first fair in 1985, at which 150 publishers and distributors participated, drew an attendance of 10,000. Reservation forms for exhibit tables may be obtained from Lourdes Vázquez, Coordinator, Publishers and Distributors, 2nd Latin American Book Fair, City College of New York, Department of Romance Languages, NAC 5223, New York, NY 10031; phone, (212) 690-8172, 690-8271.

**Latin American Vanguard Project.** An NEH-supported project entitled "An Annotated Guide to Latin American Literary Vanguardism (1920-1945)" is soliciting contributions of critical studies on the Latin American literary vanguard and/or any references that might be recommended. All contributions will be given consideration for inclusion in the bibliography. In addition, a network of researchers and scholars is being developed. Send materials or inquiries to Dr. Merlin H. Forster, Latin American Vanguard Project, Institute of Latin American Studies, SRH 1.310, University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712; phone, (512) 471-5551.

**NPR Series on Native American Myths and Legends.** Beginning in January 1987, National Public Radio will distribute to member stations an eight-part series of half-hour radio programs, "Stories from the Spirit World: The Myths and Legends of Native Americans." The series focuses on the Cahuilla and Chumash tribes of Southern California and the Aztecs of pre-Columbian Mexico. It uses dramatizations made from the eye-witness accounts of Spanish explorers and their Native American informants, and contemporary field recordings of California Indian fiestas and sacred games to explore traditional mythology and its contemporary relevance. The performers are all Native Americans and Mexican Americans. Program cassettes are available from: Cassette Publishing, National Public Radio, 2025 M Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036; phone, (800) 253-0808 [from Wisconsin and Alaska, (608) 263-4892].

## FORTHCOMING CONFERENCES/SYMPOSIA

**Andean & Amazonian Archaeology and Ethnohistory.** The Department of Anthropology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, will host the 15th Midwest Conference on Andean and Amazonian Archaeology and Ethnohistory February 21 and 22, 1987. For more information contact: Sue Grosboll, Department of Anthropology, 1180 Observatory Drive, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706.

**Jewish Presence in Latin America.** A conference on "The Jewish Presence in Latin America" will be held February 22-24, 1987, at the University of Florida in Gainesville. Cosponsors are the Latin American Jewish Studies Association (LAJSA), the University of Florida's Center for Latin American Studies and its Center for Jewish Studies. Contact: Judith Elkin, Latin American Jewish Studies Association, 2104 Georgetown Blvd., Ann Arbor, MI 48105.

**Hispanic Languages and Literature.** The Louisiana Conference on Hispanic Languages and Literature will be held February 26-28, 1987. For information contact: Gilbert Paolini, Department of Spanish and Portuguese, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA 70118.

**Puerto Rican Politics.** The First Symposium on the Study of Puerto Rican Politics will be held March 12-14, 1987, at the University of Puerto Rico. Themes include theoretical problems in the study of Puerto Rican politics; parties, ideologies and electoral processes; Puerto Rico in the world system; the state, government and administration; women and politics; politics, education and the university; the teaching of politics in the school system, militarism in Puerto Rico; and the church, religion and politics. Contact: Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras, Puerto Rico 00931; phone, (809) 764-0000, ext. 2467.

### **Instituto Internacional de Literatura Iberoamericana.**

The 26th Congress of the Instituto Internacional de Literatura Iberoamericana will be held June 8-12, 1987, in New York City, sponsored by the City College of the City University of New York. The theme is "History and Fiction in Latin American Literature." Those interested in presenting a paper (maximum of seven double-spaced pages) should write to: Raquel Chang-Rodríguez, President, Instituto Internacional de Literatura Iberoamericana, Department of Romance Languages, City College, CUNY, New York, NY 10031. Deadline for receipt of papers is March 15, 1987. Participants must be members of the Instituto. Inquiries about membership should be directed to: Professor Alfredo A. Roggiano, Director, Instituto Internacional de Literatura Iberoamericana, University of Pittsburgh, 1312 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260.

**Military-Civilian Confrontation in Latin America.** The Political Science Department at The Citadel (Charleston, SC) is sponsoring its Third Annual Conference on Latin American Studies Wednesday, March 25, 1987. The theme is "The Military-Civilian Confrontation in Latin America: Myth or Reality?" Panelists will explore some of the changes which have occurred since the 1970s in the control of a number of Latin American governments as they have moved from civilian to military rule or vice versa. For further information contact: Dr. S.A. Arcilesi, (803) 792-6879; Dr. P.R. Benson, Jr., 792-4852; or Dr. W.L. Harris, 792-5044.

**Evaluation of Latin American Studies.** The State University of New York at Buffalo is sponsoring a conference on "A Critical Evaluation of Latin American Studies" September 23-26, 1987. The purpose of the conference is to explore the state-of-the-art of main disciplines that comprise Latin American Studies: anthropology, art history, economics, geography, history, linguistics, literature, philosophy, political science and sociology. Latin Americanists who wish to participate should contact Jorge J.E. García, Department of Philosophy, Baldy Hall, SUNY at Buffalo, Amherst, NY 14260. The deadline for papers is March 31, 1987.

**SECOLAS Annual Meeting.** The 1987 annual meeting of the South Eastern Council of Latin American Studies will be held in Merida, Yucatan, April 1-5. The conference theme is "Regionalism and Nationalism in Latin America: Legacies of the Past, Directions for the Future." There will be special sessions on the Yucatan and Mexico. Contacts: Dr. Kenneth Coleman, Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506; or Dr. Melvin Arrington, Department of Modern Languages, University of Mississippi, University, MS 38677.

**RMCLAS Annual Meeting.** The 35th annual meeting of the Rocky Mountain Council on Latin American Studies will be held April 2-4, 1987, at the La Posada de Santa Fe hotel in Santa Fe, New Mexico. In addition to more than fifteen panels, there will be a plenary colloquium on "Supporting Redemocratization in Latin America: United States Foreign

Policy." For further information contact: Theo R. Crevenna, RMCLAS President, Deputy Director, Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico, 801 Yale NE, Albuquerque, NM 87131; phone, (505) 277-2961; BITNET use diecker@unmb.

**MACLAS Annual Meeting.** The 1987 annual meeting of the Middle Atlantic Council for Latin American Studies will be held April 3-4, on the campus of Lehigh University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. The registration fee for MACLAS members (dues are \$5 per year)—\$30 before March 30, \$35 at the meeting—includes a banquet on Friday, breakfast and lunch on Saturday, two cocktail parties, and all coffee breaks. Room reservations should be made before March 23 at either the Comfort Inn, Rt. 22 at Rt. 191 exit, Bethlehem, PA 18017 (\$29.95-single, \$32.95-double plus tax) or the Hotel Bethlehem, 437 Main St., Bethlehem, PA 18018 (\$50 plus tax, single or double). To preregister or obtain additional information, contact local arrangements chairperson Dr. Alvin Cohen, Department of Economics, Drown Hall #35, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA 18015.

**Teaching of Foreign Languages.** The 1987 Central States Conference on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (in cooperation with the Ohio Foreign Language Association) will be held April 9-11, 1987, in Columbus, Ohio. Contact: Valorie Babb, Program Chair, Minot High School, Minot, ND 58701.

**Criminal Justice and Human Rights.** An International Conference on "Criminal Justice and Human Rights: Anglo-American Common Law and the European-Latin American Legal Tradition" will be held April 13-17, 1987, at the School of Law and Social Sciences of the National University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. It is sponsored by Fordham University and the National University of Buenos Aires. Abstracts, papers and inquiries can be sent to Dr. O. Carlos Stoetzer, Department of History, Fordham University, Bronx, NY 10458, phone (212) 579-2000; or to Professor Rolando Costa Picazo, Avenida de Mayo 1285, 5to piso, (1085) Buenos Aires, Argentina.

**NCCLA Fall Meeting.** The North Central Council of Latin Americanists is soliciting papers for its annual fall meeting to be held October 1-3, 1987, in Northfield, Minnesota. Co-hosts are St. Olaf College and Carleton College. The conference theme is "State and Society in Latin America," but paper proposals outside of the theme will be given equal consideration. Papers are invited from any academic field, and multidisciplinary topics are encouraged. Those interested in presenting a paper should send an abstract to the program chair before May 1, 1987: Gastón Fernández, Department of Political Science, St. Olaf College, Northfield, MN 55057; phone, (507) 663-3345. Information about the North Central Council of Latin Americanists is available from: NCCLA Secretariat, Center for Latin America, P.O. Box 413, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 53201; phone, (414) 963-5986.

**Caribbean Studies Association.** The XII International Congress of the Caribbean Studies Association will be held May 27-29, 1987, in Belize City. The conference theme is "The Challenge of Change: Leadership in the Caribbean." For information on the program contact program chair Claudia Mitchell-Kernan, Director, Center for Afro-American Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90024. For information on the Caribbean Studies Association, an independent professional society of international membership dedicated to the advancement of Caribbean studies from a multidisciplinary and multicultural perspective, contact: Angel Calderón-Cruz, Secretary-Treasurer, GPO Box X, University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras, Puerto Rico 00936.

**Congress of Americanists.** The Latin Americanists of the Netherlands will host the 46th International Congress of Americanists in Amsterdam July 4-8, 1988. The deadline for proposing a symposium is May 31, 1987. Write, giving the suggested topic and possible participants, to: 46th International Congress of Americanists, c/o CEDLA, Keizersgracht 395-397, 1016 EK Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Those wishing to be brought into contact with scholars having interests similar to their own, or wishing to participate as observers, should write to the above address before October 1, 1987; be sure to include your full name (print), institution, position, and mailing address.

**Latin American Indian Literatures.** The Fifth International Symposium on Latin American Indian Literatures will be held June 3-6, 1987, at Cornell University. Contact: Dr. Richard N. Luxton, LAILA/ALILA Symposia Chair, P.O. Box 163553, Sacramento, CA 95816.

**North American Economies in the 1990s.** An international symposium on the economies of North America will be held June 18-21, 1987, at the Holiday Inn-Civic Center in Laredo, Texas. Sessions will be held on the following topics, among others: Foreign Debt Issues, Exchange Rate Fluctuations, International Banking Issues, Technology Transfer, Economic Performance of the Caribbean Region, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, Economic Relations with the Third World, Economic Relations with Socialist Countries, Border Issues: U.S.-Mexico, Development Planning in Mexico and Latin America, *Maquiladoras* and Production Sharing, and Sociocultural Issues. The registration fee (\$35 through April 15, 1987; \$45 thereafter) includes one copy of the Symposium Proceedings, two receptions, and a dinner with the keynote speaker. The Holiday Inn-Civic Center in Laredo is offering special symposium rates of \$38 single, \$45 double. To register or obtain additional information contact: Dr. Khosrow Fatend, Program Chair, International Symposium, Laredo State University, West End Washington Street, Laredo, TX 78040.

**Association of European Latin Americanist Historians.** The VIII Congreso de la Asociación de Historiadores Latinoamericanistas Europeos (AHILA) will take place

September 8-11, 1987, in Szeged, Hungary. The theme is "Iglesia, Religión y Sociedad en la Historia Latinoamericana (1492- 1945)." [The congress will be conducted exclusively in Spanish and Portuguese.] Contact: Dr. Gyorgy Kukovecz, Secretario General del Comité Organizador, Centro de Estudios Históricos de América Latina, Universidad de Szeged, Egyetem u. 2. 6722. Szeged, Hungria.

## RESEARCH & STUDY OPPORTUNITIES

**Summer Institute and Fellowships, Newberry Library.** Applications are invited from faculty in the humanities and social sciences for enrollment in the 1987 Newberry Library Summer Institute in Transatlantic Encounters. Funded in part by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the institute is designed to provide an intensive four-week exposure to recent scholarship and interdisciplinary methods for the study of the Hispano-American encounter of early modern times. Fellowships will be available to scholars. The Newberry Library also offers scholarships for the 1987-88 academic year for scholars working on topics related to the transatlantic exchange of ideas, products and peoples in the period 1450-1650. Application deadline for the summer institute and for fellowships is March 1, 1987. For application forms and additional information contact: Transatlantic Encounters Program, The Newberry Library, 60 W. Walton, Chicago, IL 60610; phone, (312) 943-9090.

**Visiting Scholars Program.** The University of Illinois/University of Chicago Joint Center for Latin American Studies announces its annual Visiting Scholars Program for faculty from U.S. colleges and universities without major research facilities. The program enables visiting scholars to do research and write on a Latin American topic for a month during the summer at either Chicago or Urbana, or both. Awards cover travel and basic living expenses for the month of residence. Visiting scholars will be associate faculty of the joint center and will enjoy full access to libraries, faculty, and other resources at both universities. The deadline for receipt of applications for summer 1987 is March 15, 1987. Applicants should submit a letter of application, curriculum vitae, a separate letter of reference, and project proposal of no more than 500 words; the proposal should include an indication of how a period of residence at either or both institutions would relate to the project. Send applications and inquiries to: Visiting Scholars Program, The Center for Latin American Studies, University of Chicago, 5848 S. University Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637; phone, (312) 962-8420.

**Mellon Visiting Professorship.** The Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Pittsburgh announces the competition for a Mellon Visiting Professor. The award is generally made for one term (September-December or January-April) but can be extended for an entire year if combined with some additional support through, for example, a Fulbright grant; scholars who can arrange for such additional support will be given preference. The successful candidate will be an individual who has made a significant contribution to the field of Latin American scholarship. Candidates must be fluent in English. The Mellon Visiting Professor will be appointed to one or more of the 18 schools and departments associated with the Center: Anthropology, Black Studies, Business, Economics, Education, Fine Arts, Hispanic Languages and Literatures, History, Law, Library and Information Sciences, Linguistics, Music, Political Science, Public Health, Public and International Affairs, Religious Studies, Social Work, and Sociology. He/she will teach one course at either the graduate or upper division undergraduate level. The majority of the time will be available for the awardee to concentrate on a current research project, which will be the subject of a public lecture to be presented during the course of the professorship. The award pays a monthly stipend, health insurance, and roundtrip airfare. To apply, send current curriculum vitae, short (3-5 pages) description of the research project to be conducted, and a sample syllabus for the proposed course by April 1 to: Mitchell A. Seligson, Director, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 4E04 Forbes Quadrangle, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. The University of Pittsburgh is an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer.

**OAS Fellowship.** The Organization of American States offers a "Regular Training Program" Fellowship to support research in the economic, social, scientific and cultural development of member countries. Applications are due by April 30. Contact the General Secretariat of the OAS, Secretary for Development Cooperation, Trainee Selection Unit: (202) 789-3209.

**Research Seminar in Cuba.** The Center for Global Education is sponsoring a seminar in Cuba June 14-29, 1987, on "The Revolution after 25 Years: Development Policy at the Grass Roots." The itinerary includes four days in Havana, three days in Santiago, and a week in Matanzas province. The \$1175.00 cost includes round-trip airfare from Miami and expenses within Cuba. All applicants are required to submit documentation that they qualify for travel to Cuba under a provision of the Treasury Department general license. Application deadline is May 1, 1987. For further information contact: The Center for Global Education, Augsburg College, 731 21st Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55454.

**Summer Quechua Institute.** An intensive course for beginners in Cuzco-dialect Quechua, stressing oral, speaking and grammatical structure, will be offered at the University of Chicago from June 22 to August 29, 1987. Instruction by a native speaker. For tuition and other details, write: Bob

Holden, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Chicago, 5848 S. University Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637.

**Kellogg Institute Residential Fellowship.** The Kellogg Institute at Notre Dame University is offering about five postdoctoral fellowships for the September-May 1987-88 academic year. The major emphasis of the Institute is on Latin America. Fellowships are for individual or joint research projects in the following fields: (1) alternative policies of economic development; (2) responses of those excluded from effective participation in political and economic life, (3) the social roles of religion and the Catholic Church; and (4) the possibilities for democratization. For application forms contact: Erika Valenzuela, Coordinator of Research Activities, The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame University, Notre Dame, IN 46556.

**Film and Politics in Latin America.** An interdisciplinary travel-study program sponsored by the International Honors Program will be conducted in Latin America from January to May 1988. It will include film studies and political science instruction during stays in Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Bogotá, and Mexico City (film coverage will include works from Chile, Cuba and Nicaragua as well). Students live with families in each location and study with a faculty team and guest lecturers. The program is limited to 30 students. For further information, catalogue and application contact: Victor Wallis [program coordinator], Political Science Department, Indiana University, 425 Agnes Street, Indianapolis, IN 46202, phone, (317) 274-1464 or 255-8961; or Joan Tiffany, Director, International Honors Program, 19 Braddock Park, Boston, MA 02116, phone (617) 267-8612.

## EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

**Department of History.** Radford University, a state-supported institution of 7,000 students located near Roanoke, Virginia, announces a tenure-track position beginning September 1987. A Ph.D. in Latin American history with evidence of scholarly promise and teaching experience is required. Preferred secondary fields are American Indian, European cultural and intellectual, German, or women's history. Teaching responsibilities are four classes each semester: at least three sections of United States survey and possibly one elective. Rank and salary are competitive. [Preference given to candidates who complete an application file by January 5, 1987, but applications will be accepted until the position is filled.] Submit a letter of application, curriculum vitae, copies of graduate and undergraduate transcripts, and at least three recent letters of reference to: Dr. John E. Davis, Chairman, Department of History, Box 5764, Radford University, Radford, VA 24142. Radford University is an equal opportunity/affirmative action employer.

**Assistant Professor, Political Science.** Fordham University, The College at Lincoln Center, announces a tenure-track position in Latin American studies with specialization in political science. Ph.D. required. Preference given to candidates who can also demonstrate competence in one or more of the following: (1) U.S. constitutional law; (2) political behavior; (3) political economy. Send curriculum vitae with names of three references, by February 15, 1987, to: Dr. Gustavo Umpierre, Chairperson, Search Committee, Division of the Social Sciences, Fordham University, 113 West 60th Street, New York, NY 10023-7475. Fordham University is an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer.

**Assistant Professor, Latin American Studies.** Linfield College, Oregon, announces a tenure-track position with teaching responsibilities in the history, politics or economics of Latin America and in some Spanish language and civilization courses. Commitment to four-year liberal arts program and international programs. Ph.D. by starting date of September 1, 1987, preferred; ABD considered. Write for complete position notice and application directions to: Kenneth P. Goodrich, Dean of Faculty, Linfield College, McMinnville, OR 97128. Screening begins February 15. Linfield College is an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer.

**Latin American History.** Smith College invites applications for a tenure-track position in history and Latin American studies beginning September 1987. Send letter of application, curriculum vitae, and dossier to: Carolyn Jacobs, Associate Dean for Faculty Appointments, College Hall 27, Smith College, Northampton, MA 01063. Application review begins on February 20, 1987. Smith College is an equal opportunity employer; women and minorities are encouraged to apply.

**Assistant or Associate Professor, Interamerican Relations.** The Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami, announces a tenure-track position in the area of interamerican relations. The primary area of expertise is the contemporary foreign policies of the Latin American republics. Candidates must expect to assume some of the typical administrative responsibilities of an expanding program. Professional fluency in Spanish is required; fluency in Portuguese is also desirable. Qualified Ph.D.s should direct inquiries and send a curriculum vitae and names of three professional references to: Chair, Interamerican Search Committee, GSIS, University of Miami, P.O. Box 248123, Coral Gables, FL 33124; phone, (305) 284-4303, ext. 5. Deadline for applications is March 1, 1987. The University of Miami is an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer.

**Visiting Professor, Latin American Studies.** Alfred University announces a one-semester position for a visiting associate or full professor in the Spring of 1988. Duties include teaching two undergraduate courses and public lectures. Candidates should have interdisciplinary experience and specialization in a humanities field such as literature,

history or philosophy. Salary commensurate with qualifications. Alfred University is a small university in western New York with a diverse academic environment. Submit resume and recommendations by March 16, 1987, to: NEH Steering Committee, Alfred University, Box 847, Alfred, NY 14802. Alfred University is an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer.

**Assistant or Associate Professor, Sociology.** The University of Pittsburgh's Department of Sociology invites applications for a tenure-track position starting in September 1987. Applicants at the assistant professor level should have completed the Ph.D. by that time and show potential for significant scholarship. Applicants at the associate professor level should have a strong record of research and publication. Primary interest is in persons pursuing research in Latin American or East Asian studies. Persons using comparative approaches with substantive interests in one of the following areas are encouraged to apply: demography, stratification, family and life cycle, political and cultural sociology. (Persons who have already applied for the position at the assistant professor level need not reapply; the same recruiting effort continues with an expanded scope.) Send curriculum vitae, letters of reference, and copies of relevant publications to: Norman P. Hummon, Chair, Department of Sociology, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. Position is subject to budgetary approval. The University of Pittsburgh is an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer; minorities and women are encouraged to apply.

**Director of Research.** The University of Pittsburgh's Center for Latin American Studies announces a nontenure-stream position classified as a research associate with faculty status. Primary responsibility is the preparation of grant proposals for external funding. Additional responsibilities may include directing research activities, coordinating short-term training programs, and managing academic publications of the Center. The position requires excellent writing skills and demonstrated competence in drafting research proposals. An advanced degree in the social sciences and fluency in Spanish and/or Portuguese are desirable. Salary commensurate with qualifications; may be augmented by external grants. The position is currently open; starting date depends upon availability of successful candidate. Send a curriculum vitae and letter detailing qualifications and experience to: Mitchell A. Seligson, Director, Center for Latin American Studies, 4E04 Forbes Quadrangle, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. The University of Pittsburgh is an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer.

**Professor or Associate Professor, Political Science.** The University of North Carolina's Department of Political Science invites applications for a senior position in the field of Latin American politics. Applicants must have a superior research record, extensive field experience, and strong evidence of teaching competence at both the graduate and undergraduate levels. Send curriculum vitae and the names of four references to: Lars Schoultz, Chairperson, Latin



America Search Committee, Department of Political Science, Hamilton Hall 070A, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514. The University of North Carolina is an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer; applications from women and minority group members are especially encouraged.

**Researcher/Writer.** The Central American Refugee Center (CARECEN) is seeking a full-time staff person for its Education and Information Project. Duties include writing and editing a bimonthly newsletter, summarizing and translating news clippings, preparing periodic reports, talks, public education and outreach activities. Requirements are a degree in social sciences or journalism with Central American area focus, fluency in Spanish and English, and excellent writing skills. Annual salary of \$11,000; three weeks paid vacation annually; health insurance package. Send resume and writing samples to: Isa Fucella, CARECEN, 3112 Mt. Pleasant St., N.W., Washington, DC 20010.

**Assistant Professor, Puerto Rican & Hispanic Caribbean Studies.** Rutgers University's Department of Puerto Rican and Hispanic Caribbean Studies invites applications for a three-year tenure-track appointment effective July 1, 1987. Applicants should hold a Ph.D. in history or the social sciences with concentration in the Hispanic Caribbean. Preference will be given to those with some teaching experience and publications. The successful candidate is expected to teach undergraduate courses and pursue independent research on Puerto Rico and/or the Hispanic Caribbean. Salary is commensurate with experience and rank. Send applications or inquiries to: Andrés A. Ramos-Mattei, Chairperson, Department of Puerto Rican and Hispanic Caribbean Studies, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903.

## PUBLICATIONS

*Fifty Caribbean Writers* (1986, 542 pages) is a bibliographical critical sourcebook compiled by Daryl Cumber Dance. Each of its 50 detailed essays on leading Caribbean writers provides biographical information, a critical review of major works and themes, a listing of major honors and awards, and a bibliography of primary and secondary works with full publication data. Available for \$65.00 from: Greenwood Press, Inc., 88 Post Road West, Box 5007, Westport, CT 06881.

*Bibliografía Teológica Comentada* (BTC) is an annual publication produced by ISEDET (Instituto Superior Evangélico de Estudios Teológicos) in Buenos Aires. It indexes 6,000-7,000 publications annually, including Spanish and Portuguese books and 600 periodicals, by discipline, author and theme. The bibliography includes the humanities and philosophy, insofar as they refer to religious matters, such as education, law, semiotics, psychology, anthropology, sociology and economics. The BTC is available for \$36.00 per year, plus \$2.00 shipping, from: ISEDET, Camacua 282, 1406 Buenos Aires, Argentina.

## FOR LASA MEMBERS IN LATIN AMERICA

If you live in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba or Uruguay, and find it difficult to pay LASA dues or other fees in U.S. dollars, we recommend that you consult with the National Commission for UNESCO in your country about the possibility of paying through the UNESCO coupon system. Addresses are listed below. The basic procedure is to purchase from the local commission a coupon for the cost of your LASA membership or other payment. You pay for the coupon in national currency at the official United Nations rate of exchange on the day of purchase. The commission may add a surcharge to cover handling costs, but this should not be more than 5 percent of the value of the coupon. You then send the coupon, made out in the amount of your payment, to the LASA Secretariat. Upon receipt, the Secretariat will update its records in accordance with your payment.

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## LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION 1987 MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION FORM

You are cordially invited to join LASA in 1987. Members in all categories enjoy voice and vote in the conduct of the association. The three-year rate (for 1987, 1988 and 1989) avoids probable dues increases in 1988 and 1989.

<u>Membership Categories and Rates</u>	<u>One Year</u>	<u>Three Years</u>	<u>Amount</u>
<b>Introductory (for new members only)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> \$21	(one year only)	\$ _____
<b>Regular:</b>			
Under \$20,000 annual income	<input type="checkbox"/> \$28	<input type="checkbox"/> \$84	\$ _____
Between \$20,000 and \$29,999 annual income	<input type="checkbox"/> \$32	<input type="checkbox"/> \$96	\$ _____
Between \$30,000 and \$39,999 annual income	<input type="checkbox"/> \$38	<input type="checkbox"/> \$114	\$ _____
Over \$40,000 annual income	<input type="checkbox"/> \$44	<input type="checkbox"/> \$132	\$ _____
<b>Joint Membership</b> (for second member at same mailing address as first member; <b>one</b> copy of publications sent. Add to rate (above) for highest income of the two, or to categories below:	<input type="checkbox"/> \$13	<input type="checkbox"/> \$30	\$ _____
<b>Student Associate (five-year limit)</b> [Professor's signature certifying student status]: _____	<input type="checkbox"/> \$18	<input type="checkbox"/> \$54	\$ _____
<b>Latin Americanists permanently residing in Latin America or the Caribbean (incl. Puerto Rico)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> \$18	<input type="checkbox"/> \$54	\$ _____
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If you wish to receive the **LASA Forum** by air mail, please add the following amount per year for postage: Canada and Mexico, \$3; all other countries, \$13. \$ \_\_\_\_\_

We encourage you to make a contribution to the LASA Endowment Fund. \$ \_\_\_\_\_

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Please make checks payable to the **Latin American Studies Association** and mail along with this page to: LASA Secretariat, William Pitt Union, 9th Floor, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA. Members residing outside the U.S. must send either a money order, a check in U.S. dollars **drawn on a U.S. bank**, or a UNESCO coupon for the U.S. dollar amount payable. There will be a \$10 charge for all returned checks.

All members receive three issues of the **Latin American Research Review** and four issues of the **LASA Forum** per year. If you desire air mail delivery of **LARR**, please contact the LARR office at the Latin American Institute, 801 Yale NE, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131.

### APPLICANT DATA

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INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION \_\_\_\_\_

MAILING ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

CITY, STATE, ZIP, COUNTRY \_\_\_\_\_

BUSINESS TELEPHONE \_\_\_\_\_ HOME TELEPHONE \_\_\_\_\_

COUNTRY INTEREST/SPECIALIZATION \_\_\_\_\_

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***The Revolution after 25 Years:  
Development Policy at the Grass Roots***  
**RESEARCH SEMINAR TO CUBA**  
**JUNE 14 TO 29, 1987**



*The purpose of the seminar is to examine how the Cuban government functions at the national, provincial, and local levels. Participants will travel to Havana, Santiago, and to the province of Matanzas where smaller groups will be able to pursue specific topics for more in-depth research. Cost of the seminar is \$1,175 including airfare from Miami. Dr. Gary Wynia, author of The Politics of*

*Latin American Development, will be one of the tour leaders.*

*This trip falls under the U.S. Treasury provisions of "professional research" on travel to Cuba. This provision includes certain graduate students. All applicants will be required to submit documentation that they qualify for travel under the provision.*

*The Center for Global Education at Augsburg College coordinates 30 travel seminars a year to Mexico, Central America, and the Philippines. For more information on the Cuba trip or other travel seminars contact the Center for Global Education, Augsburg College, 731 21st Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55454, 612/330-1159.*

