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LASA's Third Decade: A Look Ahead

by

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This year LASA will celebrate the 20th anniversary of its founding. Our XIII International Congress, to be held in Boston on October 23-25, will provide a fine opportunity to reflect upon all that has happened in LASA's organizational life since 1966. In this, my first and last personal message to the membership as President, I want to look forward into LASA's third decade, informing you of some important changes already at hand and alerting you to some opportunities and challenges that face our Association.

New Leadership

On July 1, both the LASA Secretariat and the Presidency will change hands. Cole Blasier (Political Science, University of Pittsburgh) will assume the Presidency. It is particularly appropriate that Cole, who was among the founders of LASA in 1966 and who for many years has chaired LASA's Task Force on Scholarly Relations with the USSR, will preside over the Association's 20th anniversary celebration.

I am pleased to announce that the LASA Executive Council recently voted to accept a generous bid from the University of Pittsburgh to serve as LASA's new home for a five-year period. At Pittsburgh the LASA Secretariat will have the same high level of administrative and financial support that it has enjoyed for the past five years at the University of Texas, Austin. The Association was fortunate to receive strong bids and expressions of interest from several institutions. We are very grateful to all who participated in this process, and hope that they will maintain their interest in LASA.

Our new Executive Director will be Dr. Reid Reading, currently Assistant Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. Dr. Reading has lived and done field research in several Latin American countries (Colombia, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Ecuador, among others) for a total of more than four years. He teaches Latin American politics and international relations at Pittsburgh, and has had ten years of administrative experience in that University's Center for Latin American Studies and College of Arts and Sciences. His most recent book is *Confrontation in the Caribbean* (co-edited with Alan Adelman; University of Pittsburgh, 1984).

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While we are extremely pleased with our new arrangements at Pittsburgh, the strength of the Association today and its attractiveness to major universities like Pittsburgh are due in no small measure to the contributions of our current host institution, the University of Texas-Austin, our outgoing Executive Director, Richard Sinkin, and the Assistant to the Executive Director, Jana Greenlief. During LASA's stay in Austin, the Association's financial condition has been greatly improved; its management has been fully computerized; its newsletter has been transformed into a significant vehicle for scholarly communication and debate; and its "National Meetings" have evolved into "International Congresses" with the participation of numerous Latin American and other non-U.S.-based scholars. While these and other accomplishments of the past five years are the work of many hands, the professionalism and initiative of the Secretariat staff in Austin have been essential ingredients of success.

In the past two and a half years, LASA has also been fortunate to have as one of its officers Mario Ojeda Gómez of El Colegio de México. Professor Ojeda played a crucial role in the program and local arrangements committee for LASA's International Congress in Mexico City, and he was the first Latin America-based scholar to be elected to the Executive Council. On September 20, Mario Ojeda became President of El Colegio de México, a responsibility that has made it necessary for him to resign from the Executive Council. We offer him warmest congratulations on this highly significant appointment, and express our gratitude for his pioneering service to LASA.

Future Congresses

LASA's XIII International Congress in Boston promises to be one of the largest and most exciting meetings in the Association's history. Program Chair Merilee Grindle (Harvard University) reports that a record number of proposals for panels and papers have been received. Arrangements for internationally distinguished guest speakers at the plenary session are being completed, and a variety of special events commemorating LASA's 20th anniversary are being planned.

At its meeting in April, 1985, the Executive Council selected sites for the next four LASA Congresses. This was done to allow the maximum possible time for planning by local arrangements committees and to enable the executive director to negotiate favorable room rates and other arrangements with local hotels. The XIV International Congress will be held in New Orleans in the spring of 1988. Local arrangements will be coordinated by the Center for Latin American Studies at Tulane University. In the fall of 1989, our XV International Congress will meet in San Juan, Puerto Rico. In the spring of 1991,

LASA will meet for the first time at a site outside of the Western Hemisphere: Madrid. We will be hosted in Spain by the Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana (ICI) and the Comisión Nacional del V Centenario. In the fall of 1992, LASA will return to Washington, D.C., to hold its XVII International Congress. We hope that you will take note of these future Congresses and make plans to participate.

Fact-finding Missions and Field Seminars

In the past 12 months LASA has sponsored three field trips to Latin America. The first of these was our fact-finding mission to Nicaragua in late October and early November, 1984, which observed the last stage of the electoral campaign and the general election held on November 4. This was the first time in LASA's history that an official LASA delegation was sent to observe an election anywhere in Latin America. In June, 1985, the LASA Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Nicaragua conducted a two-week field seminar for 16 LASA members in Nicaragua. The seminar, which was open to all LASA members, was intended especially for non-Nicaragua specialists who were interested in beginning to do research in that country. Finally, in August-September, 1985, another fact-finding mission to Nicaragua was undertaken, this time by a group assembled by LASA's Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom. The purpose of this mission was to investigate conflicts and autonomy negotiations between the Sandinista government and various indigenous groups.

The results of these efforts to "get LASA into the field" have been very gratifying. The Nicaragua election observation resulted in a major report published by LASA which, whatever its imperfections, served to reopen public debate in the United States on the nature and significance of the electoral process in Nicaragua, and the U.S. role in that process (see my article elsewhere in this issue of the *Forum*). Similarly, the more recent report by Martin Diskin and Thomas Bossert, (which will be published in the next issue of the *Forum*) resulting from the LASA Human Rights Task Force's study of state-Indian negotiations in Nicaragua, sheds important new light on a very complex and often confusing process. And evaluations of the summer field seminar in Nicaragua by the participants were uniformly enthusiastic (see the report by Nola Reinhardt appearing in *LASA-NICA Scholars News*, No. 5, August, 1985).

Our experience to date has shown that using LASA's human and financial resources in this way is highly cost-effective and performs a unique service for both our membership and the general public. Investigatory missions to Latin America get the attention of policymakers, the mass media, and other groups whose actions have great

impact on U.S.-Latin American relations. They also generate new primary information that can be used by researchers and even more broadly by our members in their contacts with students, local media, community groups, and so forth. The financing of such activities is largely borne by other institutions (home universities of LASA participants, foundations, etc.); LASA's own costs are minimal. For example, the total net cost to LASA of the Nicaragua election observation, including the expense of producing and disseminating the observation team's lengthy report, was \$2,945; and the 1985 summer field seminar in Nicaragua actually netted a small amount of money for the Association.

It is my hope that LASA will build upon the past year's field activities, extending them to other countries and substantive concerns. Plans are also under way for another Summer Field Seminar in Nicaragua, to be held in June or July, 1986. At its April, 1985 meeting, the LASA Executive Council accepted in principle the idea of sponsoring further field activities in Latin America. We anticipate that most such activities will be organized under the auspices of the Association's various Task Forces; but any member of the Association may propose a field project to the Executive Council. Proposals should be submitted first to the Executive Director-designate, Dr. Reid Reading (Office of the Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, 917 Cathedral of Learning, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, U.S.A.).

A New LASA Constitution

LASA's Constitution and By-Laws, formulated 20 years ago and amended several times since then, contain a number of ambiguities, anachronisms, and apparent omissions that have caused the Association considerable grief in recent years. They are in need of revision, both to avoid future problems and misunderstandings and to bring the governing statutes of the Association into closer correspondence with current operating practices. There are also new areas of concern to important segments of our membership, not anticipated by LASA's Founding Fathers, that should be addressed in a revised Constitution and By-Laws.

In response to these needs, I recently appointed a Committee on Constitutional Revision, whose charge is to conduct a top-to-bottom review and critique of the existing statutes. The six-member Committee, chaired by past president Paul Doughty (University of Florida), will recommend revisions to the Executive Council early this year. The Council will act on these recommendations and submit all accepted revisions to the full membership for approval. If you have any suggestions for Constitutional revision, please communicate them to Chairman Doughty (Dept. of Anthropology, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611).

An Endowment Campaign

For several years the Executive Council has been discussing the need for a permanent LASA endowment fund. The creation of such a fund would be the last step in the process of stabilizing the Association's finances. Most importantly, it would enable LASA to finance special activities and projects that cannot be covered by the regular operating revenues. Examples would be travel by Latin Americans to participate in LASA Congresses, Task Force activities (including field activities in Latin America), and special publications.

The Ford Foundation has provided LASA with seed funds in the amount of \$15,000 for a permanent endowment. At its meeting in April, 1985, the Executive Council authorized a campaign to increase the capital in this endowment fund. An Endowment Campaign Steering Committee is currently being formed, which will conduct a feasibility study and, by July 1, make specific recommendations concerning the organization, administration and strategy of the proposed endowment campaign. You will have your first chance to contribute to the endowment when you renew your membership in LASA for 1986. Please do so; it is essential to convince major institutional donors that our membership is solidly behind the endowment campaign.

Building Membership

LASA's membership seems to have stabilized at around 2,200 individuals, 77 percent of whom are regular members, 13 percent are students, 7 percent are Latin Americans, and 3 percent are emeritus faculty. Total membership is down by about 200 from the high point reached in October 1983, immediately after our Mexico City Congress. Many of the members who failed to renew in subsequent years were Latin Americans who had joined for the first time at the Mexico City meeting, and who were deeply affected by the economic crises of recent years. But this does not explain the lack of growth in LASA's U.S.-based membership during the first half of this decade.

Income from membership dues is LASA's principal source of revenue, and it is clear that further decline or stagnation of the membership base will threaten the Association's currently solid financial status. We recognize that for most of our members, LASA is the "second" professional organization to which they belong, after their principal single-discipline association. Because of this, LASA must keep dues increases to the absolute minimum. We have been remarkably successful at holding the line in the past five years; again in 1986, there is no increase in dues. But financial stability will require a steadily growing membership.

To reverse the trends sketched above, a membership expansion drive will be conducted in 1986 and 1987. The directors of all Latin American centers and programs in the United States are being asked to urge their affiliated faculty, visiting scholars, and graduate students to join LASA. If each of our individual members would convince one or two colleagues to join, the impact would be even greater. Convenient membership application forms can be obtained from the LASA Secretariat. You can make a real difference in this effort. Please help.

Defending Academic Freedom

LASA's concerns for academic freedom traditionally have been focused on Latin American countries ruled by authoritarian regimes that have committed frequent violations of both academic and basic human rights. Recent developments have brought these concerns closer to home.

On a growing number of U.S. university campuses, chapters of far-right vigilante groups like "Accuracy in Academia, Inc." (a spin-off from Reed Irvine's "Accuracy in Media" organization) are emerging. Faculty members who bring to their classroom a critical perspective on U.S. foreign policy (expressed either in their own writings or in some of the materials used for teaching) are being attacked by these groups in the press and in public conferences. Student monitors are placed in classrooms "to make information [presented] in the classroom public," so taxpayers, contributing alumnae and state legislators can "find out precisely what they're paying for."[†] Some scholars now find it necessary to defend themselves by tape recording their lectures.

Judging by reports that have reached me, Latin Americanists are disproportionately represented among the faculty being targeted by these groups, which seem particularly concerned with defending U.S. actions in Nicaragua and Grenada. Latin Americanists—even moderate, non-Marxist scholars—who have visited or done field research in countries ruled by leftist governments are particularly suspect in the eyes of these self-appointed guardians of truth and objectivity. Apparently for this reason, several incumbent LASA officers, including myself, have been singled out.

It is obvious from their own statements and behavior that "Accuracy in Academia" zealots are not really concerned with accuracy, objectivity, or diversity of views. What they seek, rather, is conformity with their own ideologically charged beliefs, together with an uncritical portrayal of the current U.S. Administration's policies toward Latin America. The goal, quite simply, is harassment and intimidation of faculty members whose professionalism compels them to take a more objective view of reality, and to stimulate critical thinking among their students.

I have asked LASA's Task Force on Academic Freedom and Human Rights to look into this phenomenon and suggest ways in which the Association can help to prevent it from becoming a serious threat to the academic freedom of our members. If you have any relevant personal experiences, please share this information with the Task Force. Write to its chair, Professor Martin Diskin, at: Anthropology-Archaeology Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 20D-109, Cambridge, MA 02139.

In Conclusion

During the ten years in which I have served as an elected or appointed officer of LASA, I have had the opportunity to work with scores of dedicated individuals who have given generously of their time and talents to further the work of the Association. They have made my own tasks easier and considerably more enjoyable. In particular, I want to thank Richard Sinkin, Jana Greenlief, Merrilee Antrim, Peter H. Smith, Cole Blasier, Carmen Diana Deere, Meg Crahan, Paul Drake, Van Kemper, Chris Mitchell, Merilee Grindle, Gil Merckx, Arturo Valenzuela, Marysa Navarro, Paul Doughty, Mike Conroy, Laura Enriquez, and other members of the LASA 1984 election observation team in Nicaragua. Many others could and should be mentioned. Finally, I must thank Richard Fagen, who got me involved in LASA during his presidency. Little did I know. . . .

Preliminary Slate Announced for Vice-President and Executive Council

Abraham Lowenthal, Chair of the Nominations Committee, has reported that the Committee has selected the following people as candidates for the Executive Council election to be held in the spring of 1986. Those elected will serve 3-year terms of office beginning July 1, 1986. Members may nominate other candidates by petition, which must include 100 signatures of LASA members in good standing. Such petitions must be received by the LASA Secretariat by March 14, 1986.

[†] Les Csorba III, Executive Director, Accuracy in Academia, Inc., quoted in Bob Beyers, "Accuracy in Academia Backs Mosher," *The Stanford University Campus Report*, November 20, 1985, pp. 1, 12. See also: Alison Muscatine, "Group Monitoring Academia Stirs Support, Concern on Campus," *Washington Post*, November 3, 1985, pp. D1, D7; "In Review," *California Review* (LA Jolla, Cal.), Vol. 5, no. 1 (October 1985), p. 4; Rosanna Perotti, "Campus Watchdogs Bare Teeth," *In These Times*, November 13-19, 1985, pp. 7, 22; and Fred M. Hechinger, "Accuracy in Academia's 'Gentlemanly' Plans," *New York Times*, November 26, 1985, p. 11.

Proposed Slate

For Vice-President

Paul Drake, History, U. of California, San Diego
Jean Franco, Literature, Columbia University

For Executive Council

Werner Baer, Economics, Illinois
Peter Bell, Political Science, Carnegie Endowment
Lorenzo Meyer, History, El Colegio de México
Marianne Schmink, Anthropology, Florida
Kenneth Sharpe, Political Science, Swarthmore
Marta Tienda, Sociology, Wisconsin

Viewpoints: Special "Peru Issue"

(Editor's Note: This is a special issue of the *LASA Forum* devoted to Peru, its new president, Alan García Pérez, and the country's political and economic problems.

García took office on July 28, 1985 after winning an impressive electoral victory by a two-to-one margin. In doing so, Peru experienced the first orderly transfer of power between elected civilian leaders in more than 40 years. The new president heads one of Latin America's oldest political parties, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), which was founded 61 years ago by Raúl Haya de la Torre.

García is a man on the move—bold, outspoken, confident. He has launched a high-risk strategy designed to lead his country from the brink of economic collapse into prosperous democratic rule. But in so doing, he has pitted himself against powerful forces: his military officers and

security police, local drug barons, the IMF and international financial institutions as well as the superpowers.

García's radical thrust has won him scores of admirers in Latin America and the Third World—but there are many who fear that he is moving too fast, too soon. "The history of Latin America is filled with the blood of those who tried to alter the system too energetically and too quickly," says one Latin diplomat. "García is a man too much in a hurry and the situation could boomerang against him."

Recently, during a visit to the 40th anniversary celebration of the United Nations in New York, García granted an exclusive 90-minute interview to *Newsweek's* United Nations Bureau Chief Patricia J. Sethi. Below, is Sethi's personal impressions of the charismatic young leader from Latin America followed by the complete text of their conversation.

* * *

Alan García Pérez: An Interview

by

Patricia J. Sethi,
Newsweek

You cannot help liking Alan García. After all, the 36-year-old Peruvian President has just about everything going for him. He is handsome, with the rugged build of a football quarterback (6' 2", 220 lbs.); he has a charming boyish smile, tousled hair, expressive hands, and he is a dynamic and articulate speaker. Politically, he is a hit with his people: his popularity rating stands at 90 percent, according to a recent poll. And he scores high on the

personal front: a beautiful wife who quite obviously adores him (Pilar, his second wife, is an Argentine with the blonde good looks of Evita Perón) and four lovely children (one from his first marriage, three from his second).

During our conversation, I was struck by García's total lack of formality. No pomp and ceremony with this president: he is a natural, totally unaffected—in command. He treats his aides like brothers (they interrupt as and when

they please), his bodyguards like friends. García is an earthquake, constantly in motion, with an infectious energy and enthusiasm. If he is not rushing off to a meeting with another leader, he is downing a hurried breakfast, patting an aide on the shoulder for a job well done, discussing Peru's economic problems persuasively and eloquently with a journalist using impromptu hand-drawn graphs and diagrams. And as tension built during a session with a *Newsweek* photographer, García snapped his fingers, hummed a few bars, and did a soft-shoe number to relax before the cameras.

* * *

Sethi: Your speech at the UN General Assembly is being called one of the bluntest on record. Was that your intention, to shake up the place?

García: Yes. Not only do you have to shake the consciousness of the most powerful countries, but also the consciousness of the weakest, who cannot coordinate rational consensus policies. The objective of my speech was to say that we cannot lose any more time with rhetoric.

Q: But don't you think that in taking on the IMF by threatening to withdraw, you run the risk of isolating Peru—making it into a pariah nation for international financial circles?

A: We are not afraid to be left alone. We have been alone for the last 160 years. We do not take it as a risk to be alone. It is reality. We would want it to change, of course. We would rather there was a consensus not only between the debtor nations, but also with the more important countries for a better international rationality. But, until we obtain that, we still have to walk, we still have to keep on going. A country is to free to be—or not to be—within an organization considering whether or not it is convenient to its interests, to its development, to its well-being. That is not making threats; that is stating the truth. We want decisions on the reform of the monetary system and the distribution of world liquidity in a fair manner. Otherwise, it is not to our advantage, nor are we interested in belonging to an agency which benefits a single country. The IMF demands austerity from poor nations, and it favors the powerful ones. It does not have the moral authority to preach austerity to us when in the seventies—because of petrodollars—it promoted indebtedness. The IMF serves the interests of the only country that issues international liquidity, the U.S.A. The U.S. now has the biggest deficit in its history, but the IMF has voiced none of the reservations that we hear in relation to our countries. All of Latin America has suffered an economic earthquake in the past few years. And today the choice is a stark one: debt or democracy.

Q: What ideology motivates you? Or is Alan García an iconoclast—out to take on the establishment as the young crusader for Latin America?

A: That is a deep question. My government and my party, the APRA party, would correspond to what is known as democratic socialism. That is why I insist there is no socialism without freedom and without elections. Then the basis of creating a society allowing for human development is to have a national defense against the pressures—voluntary or involuntary—of a greater economic power. The attractions of the richer country generate tides of a social nature within the poorer country; to better our society, we need to gain greater economic strength. In that sense we exert our nationalism, which interpreted differently is called anti-imperialism. We are iconoclasts because there are a number of myths and inertias and kowtowing fears that we have to put an end to.

Q: What do you see as the biggest challenges facing you in Peru?

A: The Peruvian economy has problems which are visible. First of all, accelerated and rampant inflation. Secondly, underemployment of its resources, not only the present recession, but also the historical unemployment of its lands and its products from the sea. Thirdly, we have a poverty and violence which are on the increase. But you cannot really understand or interpret this unless you understand what the history of Peru has been. There has been a historical constant in Peru for centuries. The focal point has always been Lima where an industry has been built following international models, separated by a wide gap from the farming and peasant sectors. Thus, the gist of the problem has been the great abyss between the capital Lima and the rest of the country; between industry and agriculture; between a marginalized urban sector and the *barriadas* between the higher income level of people and the bulk who are poor. Some people say these problems have a solution: more industrial development, they say, citing the case of Southeast Asia—not realizing that Southeast Asia incorporated its industry at a moment of expansion of worldwide trade. Today, we are going through a contraction, a contraction of worldwide trade, and proposing such a model is an absurdity. We in Peru have at the top of the social pyramid industry and administration. But at the base—and that constitutes most of the social pyramid—we have farming and unemployment. We have to connect social production of foodstuffs with social consumption of the unemployed. In our country, industry does not generate any value; it only administers or manages value commanded by foreign parties. Only when you recognize and understand the divorce between the two sectors—the management and industry sector on the one hand, and the peasant sector on the other, the high-income sector and the poverty-stricken—can you start a heterodox reactivation that is the objective of my government.

The biggest challenge is to reconnect Peru within itself. European penetration in the past meant the historical

division of the society. The axis—which was really the Andean chain—was uprooted to be developed into a city, the oceanside city of Lima, which was the connection between Peru and the foreign nations. Everything was set up in Lima: management, industry, wealth, the introduction of the consumption of foreign foodstuffs. What we want is the rearticulation of the whole country, the reactivation of the farming areas as a way of reidentifying Peru with itself. We want one hectare of land in Peru, which now only produces five tons of potatoes, to produce 25-30 tons, as is the case with Holland. We propose the reactivation of the land as a way of reidentifying Peru with itself. And that is the challenge facing us.

Q: You are coming across as a crusader for Latin America. Do you perceive yourself that way?

A: I have never wanted to become an external leader. I am fulfilling my responsibility to the Peruvian people. But I do feel like a Latin American man. In working for the Peruvians, we do so without losing sight of our communion in humanity with other peoples of the world and the essential need for Latin American integration. If we do not unite Latin America in the next 15 years, we will get into the third millennium as a much weaker group of isolated countries. I do believe that by the year 2000, Latin America must be together, or we will get into an irreversible crisis of poverty and violence. Peru, with its subversive violence in the Andes as a result of poverty, is the mirror for the future of what will happen to other countries. But, at the same time, we don't believe in exporting our model, because the exportation of models might mean the exportation of personalities.

Q: The unity of Latin America is thus crucial for survival, if I understand you correctly?

A: Yes, but not unity in the sense of excluding our differences, because the dialectics of confrontation help in tuning up the response that Latin Americans as a group should give. But unity in prior national actions, in measures to be taken. We have to respond to the IMF and to Western banks without that implying a commitment to another type of hegemony. We wish that the U.S. would stop being an aggressively economic power. We are struggling against that in economic and political terms—but that doesn't signify a privileged relationship between Peru and the Soviet Union.

Q: In your first few months in office, you have moved very fast. You have fired military men, taken on the drug dealers, started cleaning up your security and police forces, irritated the U.S. and the IMF with your stance on the external debt. Do you think perhaps you are moving too fast, too soon? Is it necessary to attack on all fronts right away leaving no time for the consolidation process? Perhaps a brick by brick approach may be less dangerous.

A: I do not feel that we are moving too fast. Perhaps you are used to slow-motion films, you who see us from the outside. We have taken steps with regard to our foreign debt after much reflection. And I have clearly explained why it was necessary. The choice is clear: debt or democracy. Hunger and poverty breed terrorism and violence which in turn disrupt democratic institutions. And hunger and poverty are exacerbated when people struggle under the austerity measures instituted to pay off the debt. I do not believe that the problem of the police force—with regard to reorganization and the implementation of a strict code of morality and conduct—could be postponed or delayed. I don't know why we would have to wait in order to tackle clandestine airports used by drug smugglers—would somebody in the U.S. give me such advice? And I don't know why would we have to wait for a change in our strategy vis-à-vis subversion when it is a problem of great emergency in Peru. In the first few days of our government, we made decisions regarding the control of exchange rates, the regulation or adjustment of some prices, in order to control inflation. Also, a rationalization of government expenditures without lessening our social sense. We have complied with what we offered in our electoral campaign. I don't think that is going too fast. I would criticize people who would recommend the opposite.

Q: But aren't there times when you perhaps think you might be running a tremendous personal risk by attacking too many fronts at the same time? Aren't you worried about your personal safety?

A: I do believe that a ruler has to be alert to the risks and dangers ahead without losing sight of his objectives. I believe that every job has its risks, but my commitment to my people far outweighs those risks. My wife, who is my friend and companion for many years, realizes that the greatest risk is always death. I do too. But we know that I couldn't live quietly and at peace with myself if I weren't satisfied with what I was doing and if I were not doing what I believe in. The measure of objectives also includes risks.

Q: And you are obviously willing to take them?

A: Yes. The way President John Kennedy and Martin Luther King took risks, too. The same way in which all other leaders ran risks. To be a leader is to be on the front stage. You can get a great round of applause, and you can get tomatoes and onions thrown at you. That's life, and I face it squarely.

Q: You are being compared by many as the new Kennedy of Latin America: young, with courage, good looks. You even have a beautiful wife. Do such comparisons embarrass you?

A: No. Quite the contrary. They make me more committed to my work.

Q: Who are your heroes?

A: Mahatma Gandhi. I love Gandhi. His strength rises up like a ghost in the face of the irrationality of both powers. With his peaceful resistance he was able to mobilize an entire nation to change the system and change history. And when I compare him with the insanity of the Star Wars, and the reaction that it will produce in the Soviet Union, where they will be desperate in order to invent some kind of laser beam to counter Star Wars, then to me much more strength lies in Gandhi. So much silliness and stupidity govern us today.

Then, of course, there is Simón Bolívar. He is the embodiment of will. Human spirit has one weapon: our resolve, our will. And that cannot be replaced by bombs or money. Bolívar traversed the continent several times on horseback. He was a sick man. When he was running a high fever and had a grave disease, with his army already disbanded, someone asked him: What do you intend to do? And he jumped up and said: I expect to triumph. He was not understood in his own time. He wanted to unite Latin America. That did not occur while he was alive because provincial leaderships emerged which betrayed his purpose. But Bolívar is going to succeed. He is going to triumph before the year 2000. It is his will, his resolve that will finally succeed. That will, that resolve, will find its expression in the future.

Q: Do you believe you are picking up the banner of Bolívar in an attempt to unite Latin America?

A: I do not intend to do something so big.

Q: Are you being modest here?

A: No, just realistic.

Q: How do you relax? What do you enjoy doing when not being leader of Peru?

A: Opera. Last night, I went to see Pavarotti at the Met in *Tosca*. It was heavenly. I also like *Rigoletto*, especially the scene of the sadness of the buffoon. Then I like *Pagliacci*. I have tried earnestly to study Wagner. But so far I am still in favor of Latin lyrics. I also play the guitar and try to sing. And I like conversations with intelligent people, no matter their station in life.

Q: What do you like to read?

A: I am a bit pretentious about this because I started by studying law. A few years later I was learning history in order to know who drew up the laws. Then I studied sociology in France in order to understand the motivation behind history. That led me to psychology to understand the thinking itself. And I arrived at a philosophical trend, or philosophical school of ideas represented in this century by Edmund Husserl, the creator of phenomenology. To my mind, the logical research of Husserl is the most important book in my life. But, it is not a cliché to add

that life is still for me the most important book. I admire Jorge Luis Borges very much—especially his poems. And if I had to mention a novel, then it is Gabriel García Márquez's *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, which to me is the most perfect psychological, surrealistic, and exact description of Latin America without the constraints of centuries. It is timeless. It goes beyond time; it bursts through the boundaries of centuries.

Q: What pressures have you come under from the West and the international banking community to back off from your original plan to pay only ten percent of your export earnings towards your debt?

A: For the moment, no pressure at all. There are no signs for the time being at least. But, I do not discard that the banks will have to defend their interests. In the logic of life and the struggle, in order to understand your adversary I always try to think the way he is going to think. And I find it quite natural for the adversary to defend himself. If I were a banker, I would do the same. So, we are waiting. The response [to our decision regarding the IMF] may be the imposition of sanctions and amendments or the announcement that the Peruvian debt is value-impaired. But, I have already declared in the UN that our debt is value-impaired. The question is: by whom and how was our economy impaired and what historical answer must we give to this situation?

Q: Do you expect to make any more moves on the debt front?

A: I think what we have already said and done is sufficient.

Q: Who was your mentor?

A: Haya de la Torre. I was born into a political family under the sign of APRA, which was established by de la Torre in 1924. One of the principles of his party was to integrate Latin America behind the anti-imperialistic banner in order to promote justice without renouncing freedom. He was influenced by anarchism and freedom, and he also came under the influence of Marxism. Marxism taught him the progression of social conflicts towards freedom, and anarchism restated the freedom of the human being. He spoke of social democracy in 1924, which was the end result of the various influences. It formed the basis for what later on was democratic socialism, which is what I subscribe to. He created the ideology of the party that I represent and he also had a powerful influence on my youth with his personality and humanity.

Q: How successful is your struggle to root out excesses of the type that we saw committed in Accomraça, where security forces rounded up and killed 57 peasants?

A: The armed forces respond to a political power and are answerable to a political power. So politicians must assume responsibility and refuse to wash our hands of the

armed forces. I believe terrorism should be fought with energy because nothing should warrant violence. But our struggle against terrorism must be conducted within the norms of democracy and morality. And so, all excesses should be punished. Violence in Peru emanates not only from an ideological and messianic group. It takes advantage of poverty and at the same time make sure that there are no irrational reactions to aggressiveness in the law and order forces. An officer, if he remains for two years in an area where terrorism exists, might suffer psychological depressions that may dehumanize him. So rotations have

become part of our strategy. We do not neglect or discard the fact that subversion will continue and that our state has to defend itself. And that this will take a toll of lives but they will be victims of necessity and in no case victims of excesses.

Q: Are you religious?

A: Yes. But I do not go regularly to church. Whenever possible. Without religion there is no hope. And without hope, it is better not to lead.

Why Peru's Alan García Is a Man on the Move

by

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Indubitably, Peru's Alan García has moved very fast on many fronts. The great majority of Peruvians, however, welcome his sense of urgency. In their view, the country's difficulties had been mounting to the point that, if drastic steps were not taken by the new García government, Peru's slide toward civil war and economic ruin would be irreversible.

Indeed, many Peruvians had already despaired that any amelioration in the nation's problems would be possible, and even despaired also that any president would honestly seek to resolve them. To many, "politics" had become another word for "thievery." In such a context, a new sense of some minimal national trust and commitment may be a *sine qua non* for objective changes, and arousing new political attitudes may require the kind of dramatic steps taken by President García. Although García's efforts might fail, in my view his failure would be due not to his rapid, all-out approach to the nation's difficulties, but rather to their enormity and intractability.

Confident and determined leadership such as Alan García's was especially important to Peruvians as it had been lacking for what seemed like a very long time. For more than a decade, Peru's leaders appeared daunted and overwhelmed by the nation's difficulties.

Although General Juan Velasco Alvarado governed boldly from 1968 to the early 1970s, bringing about a great deal of social and economic reform in the country, he fell ill and suffered the amputation of a leg in 1973. Thereafter, he rarely spoke to the public or traveled about

the country, and his behavior seemed to become erratic. At about the same time, for various reasons, the economy was deteriorating. In 1975, General Francisco Morales Bermúdez seized power in a palace coup that aroused little popular reaction.

The Morales Bermúdez government was extremely unpopular. Although some of Velasco's reforms were consolidated under the Morales Bermúdez government, the period was one of severe economic austerity. Even at this time, in the mid-to-late 1970s, Peru was experiencing debt repayment difficulties; the Morales Bermúdez government accepted the austerity package proposed by the International Monetary Fund, and Peruvians' living standards plummeted. Political unrest ensued. In 1977, the government confronted a series of political strikes throughout the country. In July 1977, after less than two years in office, Morales Bermúdez announced a gradual return to civilian government. To his credit, Morales Bermúdez was sensitive to his government's illegitimacy, and kept his promise to step down. To Peruvians, however, Morales Bermúdez is still a singularly uncharismatic figure with no vision of the nation's future, and the man under whom Peru began to decline.

For a brief period in 1980, Peruvians were hopeful of earnest new leadership in the person of Fernando Belaúnde Terry. Belaúnde was re-elected to the presidency; he had also served from 1963 to 1968, when he had been ousted and exiled by General Velasco. President Belaúnde scored one major achievement: an orderly, democratic transfer of power in 1985 (to Alan García). A second consecutive

constitutional succession had not taken place since 1945, and before that since 1912. At the outset of the Belaúnde administration, many analysts had doubted that democracy would survive, given all the nation's problems and the interventionist tradition of the Peruvian military, and so Belaúnde's achievement is remarkable.

In most other respects, however, the second Belaúnde government was a disappointment. To many analysts, it seemed that Belaúnde was not up to the challenges of governing Peru in the 1980s. By the end of his term, he was in his seventies and a victim of Parkinson's disease. Moreover, he did not seem to grasp the dimensions of change in the country under the military government, during his decade of exile in the United States. Belaúnde not only failed to present policies for the resolution of Peru's problems, but often appeared oblivious to them. In conferences and interviews, he preferred not to discuss the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas or the economic crisis, but to dwell on the opening up of Peru's frontier lands or construction projects—topics dear to the President's heart, but somewhat marginal to a country suffering from unprecedented levels of hunger and violence. Cartoonists frequently portrayed President Belaúnde sitting on a cloud.

In one opinion poll, almost a third of respondents evaluated the Belaúnde government as "one of the worst governments Peru has ever had," while another quarter said that it had been "a bad government." Identifying the worst defect of the Belaúnde government, respondents cited "ineffective control of corruption, delinquency, and terrorism" most often.¹ In this same poll, the government did not even receive especially good marks for its restoration and maintenance of a democratic system. Perhaps this is the case because majorities did not judge the government democratic; in response to a question that my research team asked in various provincial sites in 1984 and 1985, majorities (over 90 percent in an Aprista stronghold on the north coast) considered that the Belaúnde government "was not acting in accord with democratic principles." Asked the reason for their judgment, most respondents said that the government was acting in the interest of only a small clique rather than the nation as a whole.

Many Peruvians began to believe that the spiral of violence and deterioration of the economy could not be reversed. A common statement was: "No hay salida" (There is no way out). Just after Alan García's election in April 1985, when I informally asked Peruvians about the incoming president's chances for success, many said that they did not know if he would succeed or not, but that he was Peru's last chance and last hope. Although Peruvians did not specify exactly what would befall Peru if Alan García's government did not succeed, they did clearly

express feelings of doom.

Peruvians' concerns about the violence in the country were very intense. In most respects, the military's counterinsurgency campaign has been ineffective. Except in the Ayacucho area (the original home base of the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas), violence has been increasing. Apparently, sympathy for Sendero has been growing, especially in Lima's slums, where perhaps up to ten percent or more of slum residents support Sendero.² Whereas during the four-year period 1980-1983, the average annual number of terrorist actions was put at 800, for only the first five months of 1985 the number was 700, or considerably more than in previous years.³ (Only about half the attacks counted are estimated to have been violent, however; such actions as propaganda dispersion are included in the official calculations.) About one-third of the attacks were in Lima.

Many attacks were on a very large scale and were extremely well-coordinated, probably aimed to suggest that the guerrillas could wreak havoc at their pleasure. For example, in early June 1985, during Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín's visit, Sendero Luminoso blacked out Lima for over two hours, and set off several car bombs less than a block from the Presidential Palace during the reception for Alfonsín, plus about a dozen explosions in stores and other facilities throughout the capital. Sendero Luminoso was also generally considered responsible for the numerous assaults against civilian officials during 1985. Right after the April elections, the President of the National Electoral Board was shot, convulsing the nation and spurring the decision against a second round of elections (out of fear that a presidential candidate would be killed). In October, four APRA party members were killed in incursions against five Aprista party headquarters in Lima.

The death toll has mounted. Whereas in late 1984 the toll was estimated at over 4,000 lives, by August 1985 it was put at between 5,000 and 7,000 by the new government.⁴ The final figure from the Belaúnde government was 5,169 dead, including 78 civilian authorities—more than double the number of a year earlier.⁵

At the same time, the "emergency zone" (the area under military control) has been extended.⁶ In December 1982, the zone incorporated seven provinces, almost exclusively in the Department of Ayacucho. By early 1984, the zone was enlarged to thirteen provinces,

2. Estimate from Datum, a respected Lima public opinion firm, in June 1985.

3. *Caretas*, No. 780 (December 1983), p. 15; and *Latin America Weekly Report* (1985), no. 25, pp. 6-7.

4. *Latin American Weekly Report* (1985), no. 41, p. 8.

5. *Visión* (May 19), 1985.

6. *Andean Report* (June 1985), p. 94.

1. *Debate*, vol. VII, no. 32 (May 1985), pp. 24-28. From a sample survey of 922 respondents in Lima.

including all of Huancavelica, almost all of Ayacucho, and some of Apurímac. Only a little more than a year later, by mid-1985, the number had doubled to twenty-six, including not only sixteen provinces in the southern highlands but an entirely new region in the north, embracing parts of Pasco, Huanuco, and San Martín. Sendero was also mounting frequent attacks in some highland areas of La Libertad and Ancash.

The military's counterinsurgency effort has been effective only in restoring government control in the Ayacucho area. The military has deployed a force of about 7,000 soldiers plus several Bell 212 helicopters for a region that incorporates roughly one million people. Apparently, the counterinsurgency campaign pushed the Senderista leadership out of Ayacucho, and also caused citizens in the region to reconsider their previous support for Sendero. First, support for Sendero became much more dangerous at the same time that citizens increasingly perceived the ruthlessness and ideological fanaticism of the guerrillas. Many Ayacucho citizens began to wish "a plague on both your houses"; they feared both Sendero and the military and desired an end to the war. The 1985 electoral returns showed a sharp decline in the Marxist vote and in the null and blank vote in the region. Ayacucho went for Alan García.

The costs of the counterinsurgency campaign have been great, however. The military was responsible for a large number of human rights violations. By mid-1985, more than 1,300 complaints of disappearances had been brought to the authorities, primarily in the southern highlands.⁷ Mass graves have been discovered at various times; as recently as August 1985, mass graves were found in three Ayacucho communities, with a death toll estimated at 130. While the number of Senderistas killed by the security forces has been put at about 2,500 and the number of Senderistas arrested at about 3,000, these figures are widely believed to include many innocent victims.⁸

The human rights violations were not acknowledged by President Belaúnde, and many analysts began to raise questions about the implications of human rights violations within a democratic regime. Many Peruvians attributed the root cause of Peru's violence to be the economic crisis and the moral weakness of the government and security forces, rather than foreign ideologies. Majorities also believed that it is possible to end terrorism while respecting human rights.⁹ In other words, majorities rejected the government's purely military approach to the insurgency problem, and favored more economic and political measures for its resolution. Indeed, there were numerous indications that even many military officers favored these measures.

Why exactly would this be the case, when Peru was trying to stop totally clandestine guerrillas? Perhaps because corruption was one of the most serious problems in developing a sound counterinsurgency effort. For example, according to various reports, in early 1985 only about five police cars, of more than one hundred, were actually in use because the police were keeping most of them garaged for better resale prices later.

Peruvians were almost also extremely worried about the country's economy.¹⁰ Except for a brief upturn between 1979 and 1981, the nation's living standard has been declining steadily since the mid-1970s; after 1983, it plummeted. From 1971/1972 to 1983, average real household income dropped by about 19 percent; for the poorest twenty-five percent of households, the drop was substantially more. Between 1983 and 1985, all indicators point to further declines. The real minimum wage, which stood at about 52 percent of 1973 levels in 1983 (about \$70 per month), sank to only 23 percent of the 1973 levels by July 1985 (a mere \$35 to \$40 per month, or barely one dollar a day). Nonagricultural unemployment, estimated at under 10 percent in the early 1970s, soared to over 15 percent by 1984; unemployment and underemployment also generally rose to almost 60 percent. The World Bank estimates that, during the early 1970s, almost one-third of the population was living "under conditions of absolute poverty"—that is, consuming inadequate amounts of food—and points out that this percentage was considerably greater by 1985.¹¹

In 1985, no end to the economic crisis was in sight. Although the country's debt was not especially high relative to its GDP, the Belaúnde government stopped meeting many debt payments in 1984. As a result, Peru was due to pay more than 100 percent of its export earnings in debt service in 1985. No dramatic improvement in export earnings is expected in the near future. Prices for Peru's key legal exports (minerals and petroleum) have been declining, and Peru is rapidly losing its petroleum reserves. Under President Belaúnde, the government's liberal free-market measures, including much lower tariffs, were tried and almost universally considered catastrophic. Even the original advocates of the measures—perhaps most prominently Richard Webb, a Harvard Ph.D. in economics and the president of the Central Reserve Bank during this period—judged them a failure. The measures were widely blamed for the economy's increasing dollarization and speculative orientation, as well as for the unprecedented three-digit inflation rate during 1983-1985.

At the same time, public opinion in Peru, which has generally been to the left of public opinion in other Latin

7. "A New Opportunity for Democratic Authority: Human Rights in Peru," *Americas Watch* (September 1985), p. 2.

8. *Visión* (May 19, 1985); and *Americas Watch*, (September 1985).

9. *Debate*, Vol. III, No. 34 (September 1985), pp. 50-55.

10. The source for most of the figures below is *The Andean Report* (October 1985), pp. 162-167. See also Cynthia McClintock, "Democracy in Peru," a paper for the Hoover Institution's Conference on Democracy in the Third World (December 1985).

11. *Ibid.*

American nations, shifted further leftwards. In 1985, the APRA party (considered "center-left" in Peru) won 53 percent of the valid vote and Izquierda Unida (the Marxist left) won 25 percent, for a total of more than three quarters of the valid vote for the Left.¹² This 78 percent figure represents a dramatic increase from 1980, when APRA and the Marxist parties (not running as a coalition) gathered a total of about 41 percent. In the 1985 tallies, citizens soundly repudiated the incumbent party, Acción Popular, giving it a mere 7 percent of the vote, and also rejected the Right, represented by the Partido Popular Cristiano, granting it a low 12 percent. Nor did citizens provide any hope to military officers who wanted to regain power via the ballot box: General Morales Bermúdez won less than one percent of the vote, despite a massive campaign effort.

The 1985 vote was a mandate for change. Certainly, Alan García's youth and good looks were a plus, but much more important was his apparent integrity and commitment to change. As Alan García said in his interview with Patricia Sethi, his political principles would be considered democratic socialism in the United States or Europe, and he is the first Peruvian president with this ideological coloration. His reformist intentions remind many Peruvians of General Velasco, but of course, Velasco seized power in a coup and his apathy toward democratic procedures is often now considered the Achilles heel of his regime.

The 90 percent-plus approval rating for Alan García in Peru's opinion polls (which may be contrasted to the 20 percent ratings for President Belaúnde in the latter years of his term) are again a tribute not only to the President's engaging personality, but also to his frontal assault on the status quo. Although there are no polls on specific policies in Peru, I believe that his policies are popular ones. Although certain elite groups may be alienated, popular support remains an important political resource for President García. The more popular he is, the more violent would be Peruvians' reaction to any kind of coup attempt. Given that there is already a great deal of violence in Peru, coup plotters would have to consider the possibility of a virtual civil war.

To improve the counterinsurgency effort, the García government has sought to purge the military and police for human rights violations and corruption, firing more than ten generals and one hundred colonels. A new emergency development plan has also been announced for the counterinsurgency area, with a special budget of about \$50 million in its first few months. Further, in fulfillment of one of the most important campaign pledges, agriculture's share in the draft 1986 budget was more than doubled. A Peace Commission has also been appointed to investigate human rights abuses and to review the cases of 1,500 suspected guerrillas.

On the economic front, Alan García has of course said that Peru will apply only ten percent of its export earnings each year for debt service. Special steps have also been taken to combat inflation: prices have been frozen, interest rates slashed, and strict currency controls implemented. In a measure to reduce government expenditure, the number of Mirage fighters to be bought from France has been halved to thirteen; at the same time, to quiet the military's geopolitical fears, new diplomatic negotiations were initiated with Ecuador and Chile, Peru's traditional enemies.

Another dramatic measure has been the government's attack on the drug traffic. In a few months, over eighty tons of cocaine, valued on the street at about \$5 billion, have been destroyed and numerous traffickers arrested. This step seems to be both part of the moralization effort and an attempt to appease the United States.

The United States government of course welcomes Peru's antinarcotics campaign, but is upset about Peru's stand on the debt and President García's anti-imperialistic rhetoric. Recently, U.S. banking regulators declared Peru's debt "value impaired," forcing United States banks to set aside special reserves on their loans to Peru; as a result, Peru's international trade relations are likely to be complicated, and new pressures will be placed on the country's reserves.

Alan García has also tried to make democracy more meaningful to Peruvian citizens. He has emphasized that "democracy" should be more than "representative democracy"; that it should be a "social democracy," which cannot "cohabit with misery," with the norm of both "bread and freedom." The President is almost invariably called by just his first name, Alan. One of his trademarks is the *balconazo*: stepping out to the balcony on the presidential palace and engaging in dialogue with the crowd.

Of course, it is still very far from clear whether or not Alan García will succeed in reducing the guerrilla threat and reversing the country's economic decay. There are many question marks, first among them whether or not any government could reach these goals. Another concern among some Peruvian analysts is an overcentralization of power in the person of Alan García; to date, delegation has not been the new president's forte. In this light, assassination also becomes a particularly terrible threat. Some skeptics also wonder about the government's knowledge and expertise, especially in the areas of international economics and relations with the United States.

It is clear, too, however, that Alan García's principal goal for his first hundred days was to restore hope and will to the Peruvian people. President García achieved this goal, which seemed almost impossible a few months before his inauguration. That's a good start.

12. Electoral results from *Resumen Semanal*, Vol. VIII, No. 319 (May 31-June 6), p. 1.

El Señor de los Milagros

by

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En el Perú, octubre es el mes morado. Ese es el color con que se cubren los Andes del Señor de los Milagros, y también con morado se visten sus fieles los días en que la procesión recorre el centro de Lima. Medio millón de personas acompañan, durante tres días a Cristo de los Temblores, invocado desde tiempos coloniales, cuando la tradición recuerda que su imagen fue lo único que sobreviviera a un terremoto. Siglos atrás, otro Señor de los Temblores, el dios Pachacamac, concentró el poder de los pueblos costeños del sur y obligó a los Incas a consultar con sus augures. Sospechosa similitud que hace pensar que estamos de nuevo frente a un culto que se superpone a otro, imagen simbólica de dos verdades, una expresa y otra insinuada, que parece caracterizar al Tercer Mundo, desconcertar a los sociólogos y aguzar el ingenio de los políticos.

El público que en esta ocasión sale a las calles, proviene de todo el espectro social limeño, pero refleja la manera precisa el volumen donde está concentrada la mayoría poblacional: la clase media baja. No son, pues, campesinos, aunque en la mayoría de los casos lo fueron sus padres. No es el resultado de una migración reciente puesto que el gran flujo desatado a fines de los años cincuenta parece haberse detenido hacia 1977. El cupo urbano, largamente sobrepasado en la década del setenta, empezó a generar imágenes negativas de la ciudad, que incluso alcanzaron las regiones de donde afluyó la invasión provinciana, haciéndoles perder la ilusión de un viaje al vacío. Quienes ahora llegan a Lima, más que buscar la "tierra prometida" escapan de las provincias donde la insurgencia armada y la represión militar han tirado por la borda los derechos humanos. Más que migrantes son refugiados y dada la severidad con que también son perseguidos en la capital, se les ha creado la necesidad de agruparse y ser clandestinos o bien renegar de sus lugares de origen. Es decir que van ingresando a la dolorosa realidad de convertirse en minoría étnica discriminada en su propio país.

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Resulta notable el número de niños callejeros, unos pocos acompañarán a sus madres en la procesión por un momento, luego volverán a trabajar codo a codo con los más, los abandonados de siempre. Le tocó al líder izquierdista Alfonso Barrantes llamar la atención sobre su miseria. Pasadas las campañas electorales, la esposa del Presidente va encabezando un movimiento nacional para aliviar su situación, esfuerzo denodado e insuficiente en un país donde el crecimiento demográfico compite con la paternidad irresponsable.

La procesión también convoca una extraordinaria cantidad de vendedores ambulantes. Ocupación socorrida a la que parcial o totalmente se dedican la mayoría de los desocupados limeños. Es posible comprar cualquier cosa en las calles o en los lugares donde el Municipio los ha concentrado. Desde ropa, zapatos, televisores, etc., hasta dólares, en una especie de cambio-al-paso que desde hace unos años ha convertido a varias calles en los que se conoce como el Wall Street criollo. Este carácter de feria no desvirtúa la procesión, de hecho se incrementan también las ventas tradicionales de esta fecha: el turrón de doña Pepa y las velas con visos morados. Y quizá hasta devuelva, en este tono variopinto y festivo, el sentido de los rituales y ceremonias precolombinas, todavía hoy el concepto de peregrinaje en el idioma quechua se traduce mejor si se entiende como "ir de fiesta."

Por lo demás ser vendedor en las calles o simplemente "ambulante," como se le conoce coloquialmente, ha ganado status. El propio Presidente convocó a una reunión con ellos para ganar su apoyo y proponer políticas que evitaran lo que ya era endémico en el gobierno anterior: el enfrentamiento con las fuerzas policiales en defensa de los lugares donde vender, lo que proporcionaba un bochornoso y cotidiano espectáculo. Más todavía, los ambulantes llegaron a contar con un concejal que provenía de sus filas, lo que hipotéticamente aseguraría una fluida relación con el Municipio, cosa que recién se logró con el cambio de gobierno.

La procesión se detiene ante el balcón presidencial. Esta vez, el nuevo Presidente rezará con una de sus hijas, siguiendo con lo que suele ser una vieja costumbre

colonial, ceremoniosamente cumplida por el gobernante anterior y respetada en su estilo por Alan García. Un año antes, vestido él con el hábito morado, participó como fiel en los actos, haciendo noticia su pertenencia a una de las hermandades. Tampoco el alcalde Barrantes deja de asomarse ante el Cristo Morado, pragmatismo político de dos líderes que saben que la fe religiosa es mucho más importante que las instituciones que viven con ella, y que puede reconceptualizarse como sentimiento de confianza en favor de una plataforma ideológica secularizada.

Para alivio de todos, las concentraciones generadas al paso del Señor de Pachamilla (otro nombre que invoca su origen prehispánico) no tuvieron el sobresalto de los frecuentes atentados que conmueven a todo el Perú y especialmente a los seis millones de limeños. Los Tupac Amaru y Sendero Luminoso parecen estar de acuerdo en no antagonizar públicamente con la religiosidad del pueblo que de alguna forma aspiran a gobernar. En todo caso, Lima es ahora el terreno donde se da la batalla y otra parece ser la audiencia que va ganando la prédica revolucionaria. Mientras que los penales se han convertido en focos de atención debido a la actividad de los reclusos por terrorismo, los barrios populares esconden en su densidad lo que parece ser una nueva estrategia de adoctrinamiento y divulgación política. El nuevo público, básicamente urbano, con un techo salarial de un millón de soles (40 dólares mensuales) hace ya bastante tiempo que rueda por la pendiente de la desesperanza donde el *no tener* puede transformarse en *no tener que perder*. Y en una ciudad donde los bienes se publicitan de manera apremiante incitando a un consumismo inalcanzable, no faltan ingredientes para un caldo de cultivo mucho más lleno de odio que el campesinado ayacuchano.

Concuera con esto la noticia de supuestos líderes y bases senderistas que habrían rendido sus armas desengañados de sus ideales. Nada más incierto, los empobrecidos agricultores que se han acercado a los campamentos militares allí destacados, son parte del desorden social que se iniciara en 1980 y que hoy día enfrenta a comunidades supuestamente subversivas contra los "ronderos," grupos de campesinos, que alentadas por las FFAA luchan por una democracia de la que sólo tienen información superficial e interesada. Si fuera verdad que Sendero Luminoso ha perdido fuerza y se recluye ahora en la banda oriental de los Andes, la vitalidad de sus ataques en otros frentes hace que sea tiempo que se repiense la estrategia que ha convertido en zona militar a una gran parte de la sierra peruana, donde la muerte de campesinos inermes ha hecho ya pasar a retiro a más de un jefe militar.

Cargar las andas del Cristo crucificado es un privilegio largamente solicitado por los miembros de las hermandades que forman la Cofradía del Señor de los Milagros. Tradicionalmente fueron negros los que la integraron, siguiendo al anónimo esclavo que pintó la imagen

preservada del sismo colonial. No es entonces extraño que deportistas y ex-deportistas figuren en la lista de cargadores y entre ellos más de un notable futbolista de color. Consecuentemente, octubre es el mes en que el equipo de fútbol más popular (Alianza Lima) cambia su uniforme blanquiazul por uno morado, entonces la gente confiará en el Señor para que en la cancha, su cuadro favorito reciba algo más que el aliento de sus fanáticos. También el Presidente acudirá al estadio dentro de poco, pero no irá a esperar ningún partido, aunque no rechazará un poquito de ayuda divina. Se ha anunciado que irá a inaugurar el congreso de juventudes para el que ya se preparan canciones y lemas que apoyarán las palabras del mandatario.

Difícilmente podemos encontrar en la historia republicana un jefe político que ha hecho un uso tan importante de los medios de comunicación, transmitiendo con su palabra y gesto una imagen de liderazgo que era largamente necesitada. Asumiendo—como ha hecho—la realidad como punto de partida, las habituales promesas quedaron descartadas desde su primer discurso y el permanente reclamo de sacrificio mutuo sigue siendo la tónica de sus palabras. Jaqueado por la deuda externa y la corrupción estatal, la nueva austeridad y moralización han impactado de tal forma que ha "comprado tiempo" para realizar las reformas necesarias en busca de desencadenar reacciones favorables en la economía nacional. Fortalecer el Sol (moneda nacional) y devolver la confianza en la justicia han sido las metas de una política drástica que entre otras medidas congeló los depósitos en dólares de una parte y reprimió severamente a los invasores de terrenos privados que llevaban pancartas con su nombre y el de su esposa.

¿Cuánto tiempo dura el carisma? Nadie puede hoy día disminuir el valor de los factores subjetivos en la conducción de un pueblo, y cada gobernante latinoamericano sabe que los planes y los programas de los partidos tendrán que sumarse a su habilidad personal para despertar en sus conciudadanos la confianza en el futuro. Los gobernados deben estar convencidos de que el estado no sólo sabe proponer políticas correctas sino que es capaz de llevarlas a cabo. En el caso peruano se han dado las razones para que el equipo de Alan sea visualizado con más cercanía que la administración anterior, donde la repetición de apellidos vinculados al Presidente la hizo acreedora del mote "La Sagrada Familia," lo que al mismo tiempo brindaba la imagen de un gobierno rancio y extranjerizante. Desterrada la retórica pomposa, el expeditivo de los ministros actuales resulta correspondiente con las prisas de una situación de emergencia, donde los privilegios son abusos y los resentimientos están a flor de piel. Cuidadoso al detalle del simbolismo que implica conducir una canción tercermundista, el Presidente García se sabe protagonista en un vasto escenario con varias clases de localidades. Debe, pues, mostrar muchos y distintos atributos, es así como lucirá el bastón de mando frente al ejército, recibirá la vara

de los alcaldes en el Cuzco, llevará la pistola de Tupac Amaru en su balcón de Lima. Difícil y fatigosa representación en la que el público o los públicos exigen un múltiple esfuerzo de su mandatario.

Hasta ahora la labor ha rendido sus dividendos. El gobierno ha ganado el plazo que solicitaba. Si se cree en las encuestas, todos los sectores sociales asienten en la necesidad de apoyar el proceso que va dejando sin banderas a la Izquierda y mudos a los partidos ex-gobernantes. ¿Cuánto dura el carisma? En términos de ciencia política habría que desconfiar de este sentimiento y buscar—a través de otras muchas encuestas—explicaciones en la correlación de fuerzas que se modifican cotidianamente en la fluidez de las sociedades latinoamericanas. Pero ¿tienen estas cifras el valor de las que miden la popularidad de un político de los Estados Unidos o Europa? Difícilmente.

Dicen los arqueólogos que Pachacamac floreció 600 años después de Cristo, y todavía vemos que el Señor de los Temblores sigue caminando. ¿Habría encontrado el APRA la vía para eternizar un proyecto que fue revolucionario en los años 30 y es aún modernizante en los 80? Si esto es así, más parece depender del esfuerzo de García y de sus inmediatos colaboradores que en las doctrinas del venerado Haya de la Torre. Decidido a ejercer un liderazgo tercermundista, el Presidente no parece haber ganado las simpatías ni de la Habana ni Washington, pero esto, haciendo durísimo su empeño, tampoco beneficia a sus enemistados colegas. Lo que resulta claro es que nadie ganará si es que perdida esta opción, no quede mucho espacio para alguna otra en esta vacilante democracia. De suceder esto, más probable es que se generalice el caos y se sumen a los odios ancestrales aquellos que generarían una represión sin límites.

The Peruvian President's Economic Dilemmas

by

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This article first examines Peru's recent economic performance to determine Alan García's economic inheritance on becoming President on July 28, 1985. Next, it rapidly surveys his proposed solutions to economic problems and the dilemmas they impose on presidential decision making. It concludes with an overview of both presidential management problems and some positive factors that could affect the outcome of economic policy.

The Problems

The accompanying table of recent economic indicators summarizes the lackluster economic performance of recent years. Real production data show that GDP in 1983—with a 12 percent drop owing mainly to adverse climatic conditions—had fallen to 1978 levels. The sluggish recovery that began in 1984 and accelerated in early 1985, is expected to falter by year's end. During 1983, the losses occurred in more than the agricultural sector, whose 10 percent drop was substantial; they were also noted in manufacturing and construction with decreases of 17 and 21 percent, respectively. In 1985, agriculture appeared headed for a record production year, having recovered completely; manufacturing's recovery only began in 1985, while

construction has remained stagnant. Investment slowed down as well, from 20 percent of GDP in the early 1980s to less than 15 percent of a much smaller GDP in 1983 and 1984. The continued drop in investment as the economy recovered resulted from the limited government savings and the continued presence of excess capacity in the economy. These somber GDP data indicate the first economic problem facing Alan García when he took office: how to reactivate the Peruvian economy.

Looking even further at the table to money and price data, a major shift in the inflation rate occurred during recent years, from the relatively high, for Peru, 60 percent rates that prevailed at the end of the Morales Bermúdez administration (1975-1980), to an even higher 110 percent by 1983 and 1984. Monthly rates for the first half of 1985, projected on an annual basis, indicate an even higher jump, to 250 percent. Quadrupled annual inflation rates were accompanied by an even greater shift in the exchange rate, which went from 225 soles to the dollar in 1979 to an average of 8,400 to the dollar during the first half of 1985 and then peaked at 20,000 to the dollar in frenzied trading in early August. Monetary data indicate an intense liquidity squeeze with a halving of credit to the private sector and a net concentration of credit to the public sector.

Money supply in real terms plummeted as early 1985's 25.6 percent nominal growth fell far short of the 87.7 percent inflation rate. These data indicate the second economic problem facing Alan García when he took office: how to reduce the Peruvian economy's runaway inflation and slow the devaluation.

Public finance data suggest a similar medium-term disaster as the substantial central government current savings of 1979, 5 percent of GDP, were gradually eroded under the Belaúnde administration (1980-1985). Recession-lowered tax receipts compounded the problems brought about by continued high current expenditures, resulting in a 4.9 percent deficit by 1983. The government's capital expenditures dropped, but not fast enough to balance the drop in current savings. Consequently, the central government deficit grew to almost 9 percent of GDP. Although 1985's rising tax receipts improved the situation, the deficit remained a substantial 3 percent of GDP. These data indicate the third economic problem facing Alan García when he took office: how to reduce the Peruvian government's sizeable deficit.

Balance of payments data in the table show a drop in the volume of imports after 1981's splurge of pent-up demand. By 1983 and 1984, the substantial imports drop represented weakened domestic demand that even counterbalanced the need to replace the lowered supply of domestically produced agricultural raw materials for industrial use. The continued drop, even after agriculture's 1984 comeback, demonstrates the feeble domestic demand recovery. The positive trade balance from 1983 to 1985, as the government used favorable exchange rates to promote nontraditional exports to offset declining international prices for the traditional export mix, could not offset the increased foreign payments for services, so the balance on current account remained negative after 1980. Peru's government had difficulty in financing that deficit because from 1983 through early 1985 no new commercial bank credits were forthcoming. These data indicate the fourth economic problem facing Alan García when he took office: how to restart the flow of foreign capital to the Peruvian economy, thereby reinforcing recovery, while maintaining the growing positive trade balance.

External public debt dramatically increased from less than \$8 billion in 1979 to \$13.4 billion in 1985. During that time, the debt service more than tripled, and the debt service coefficient (that is, the ratio of debt service for interest and amortization to the exports of goods and nonfinancial services) jumped from 22.7 percent in 1979 to almost 90 percent in 1984. The Belaúnde administration regularly failed to meet its obligations, however, and in the third quarter of 1984, it paid less than 10 percent of exports in debt service. The arrears kept increasing, making Peru's current export earnings insufficient to meet its foreign debt payments. These data indicate the fifth economic problem

facing Alan García when he took office: how to reduce the domestic impact of debt payments on the Peruvian economy while reactivation was under way.

Employment and wage data demonstrate the shallowness of the 1984 recovery. Despite the increases in GDP and in sectoral output components, open unemployment continued increasing, to almost 11 percent of the labor force in 1984, while underemployment reached more than half the labor force. Absorbing the yearly 3 percent growth in the labor force proved impossible for the recessive economy. By mid-1985, disposable personal income had been badly eroded as indicated by the 45 percent fall in the index of real minimum wages since 1980. These data indicate the sixth economic problem facing Alan García when he took office: how to reduce un- and underemployment in the Peruvian economy while restoring the workers' purchasing power.

The Proposed Solutions

Peru's depressing economic panorama underscores the main economic tasks that faced García when he took his oath of office in July, namely, how to solve a set of pressing, major economic problems. Two of those problems received top priority: reactivating the economy, and slowing the inflation rate. These and the other economic problems must be solved within a politically charged environment that calls for remedying Peru's regional and income disequilibria and diminishing Peru's perceived external dependency. The new economic team swung into action in early August with an aggressively ambitious agenda. During the first weeks of the new administration, they had proposed and instituted more far-reaching changes than those carried out during the first months of the Velasco administration in 1968.

Reactivation of the economy is planned, in part, via supply-side actions, by raising barriers to protect the local economy from foreign competition. The long-term goal of the reactivation is import-substitution industrialization, but one quantitatively different from previous efforts by promoting more vertically integrated processes and less dependence on imported raw materials. As a first step, the administration deemed necessary restrictions on the unfettered access to foreign exchange. On taking office, the government promulgated a two-day bank holiday to give the new economic team enough breathing room to hone its policies. It then introduced a two-tier exchange rate, with imports judged necessary by the administration receiving foreign exchange at the official fixed rate, and nonessential imports getting foreign currency at the freely floating rate. The official rate was set following a 12 percent devaluation against the dollar, and the Central Bank drove the floating rate to 30 percent above that. All local production benefited from the new exchange policy in

another way as the new official rate was fixed until the end of the year to remove some of the foreign exchange uncertainty from the production and investment decisions, thereby enabling local producers to plan their import budgets more reliably.

Restrictions on access to foreign exchange also meant that access to the substantial dollar-denominated deposits in Peruvian bank accounts would have to be curtailed. By early 1985, the economy had become "dollarized," with approximately 60 percent of Peruvian liquidity held in dollars. After discarding the Mexican option of complete convertibility of dollar deposits into local currency, withdrawal of foreign currency from dollar accounts was temporarily frozen. Although some business sources spoke of a "dollar confiscation," the foreign currency was still available for authorized imports or it could be exchanged for soles. The government thus gained control over substantial dollar holdings to help reactivate the economy.

Additional protection came in the form of a sizeable list of products whose importation was subject to prior government approval, an additional list of products whose importation was completely banned, and a new buy-national policy imposed on the entire public sector.

García's economic reactivation model varies from the orthodox openness doctrine advocated by the International Monetary Fund that argues against protection of domestic suppliers via restrictions on imports and preferential access to foreign currency. The IMF model assumes, however, that capital, once invested, is mobile, whereas Peru's economic team assigns a zero cost to sunk investment. The team's goal is not to develop more hothouse industry, but to induce production from idle, existing capital stock.

The cost of capital was also lowered in an attempt to promote reactivation. The Central Bank progressively revised the maximum annual interest rates downward from 280 percent to 110 percent, then to 75 percent, and later 45 percent to decrease the cost of both investment in fixed capital and increased working capital needs for using excess industrial capacity. Interest rates and monthly payments on previously contracted loans were adjusted to match new levels.

Reactivation through actions affecting local suppliers was not the only avenue envisaged to get the sluggish economy moving again. Consumer demand-led reactivation was planned through substantial increases in wages and salaries for workers in the formal sector. In early August, the minimum wage was raised 50 percent while other workers received lower increases. Workers later received interest-free loans.

Strange as it may sound, the increased labor costs were coupled with other measures designed to lower the rate of inflation, thereby attacking the second basic problem affecting the economy. Recall that the cost of capital was

lowered by fiat. The administration held, based on its analysis that the inflation was cost-push and not demand induced, that the savings thereby generated would offset the increased cost of labor in most businesses, enabling them to hold the line on prices.

The visible attack on inflation centered on a price freeze for all goods and services. The freeze was coupled with vigorous enforcement action that saw the President and other top officials going through the markets almost on a daily basis to verify prices. A Consumer Defense Office was set up in the Vice-Ministry of Finance for concerned citizens to call government attention to price hikes. In a startling move, prices of government-produced goods and services, including the bellwether petroleum products and such immediate consumer impact services as electricity, water and wastewater, were raised immediately after the freeze was declared, undermining consumer confidence. Initial results of the price freeze were so positive, however, that at the end of August, in a hastily scheduled presentation, the prime minister announced the preliminary figures on television and radio. The September price rise was held to only 3.5 percent, roughly a third of the pre-July 28 levels. Although cracks in the price freeze structure began appearing almost immediately, the government held a tough line. By the end of 1985, fissures had become apparent and shortages of some consumer items in major retail stores had forced the government to back down and allow some prices to rise.

So far, I haven't addressed debt issues—and for good reason. Notwithstanding the play given to presidential pronouncements in the U.S. press, debt is not the most important problem. Indeed, it's viewed as subsidiary to economic reactivation and reducing inflation. The current economic team views increasing the economy's capacity to service the debt as the key to repayment. Hence, reactivation comes first. In order to devote sufficient funds to reactivation, the Presidential acceptance speech contained a strongly worded message to the international financial community indicating that no more than 10 percent of Peru's export earnings would henceforth be devoted to debt repayments. This marked a major shift from the Belaúnde administration, which allowed the debt service coefficient to rise, while maintaining a prudent silence about its policies of accumulating debt arrears. On average, the 10 percent figure is lower than the portion of export earnings actually used to pay the interest and amortization during the last quarters of the Belaúnde administration, but it does exceed 1984's low.

A clue to the administration's flexibility came with the routine suspension of new U.S. economic and military aid to Peru because the Belaúnde economic team had missed a payment on its overdue debt. Despite the attempt by the more sensationalist Lima newspapers to blow the event out of proportion into a U.S. government castigation of García's debt position, and despite some initial posturing by

the President in a Trujillo speech where he denied that Peru could be brought to its knees "for a fistful of dollars," the arrears were quickly and quietly repaid.

The Policy Dilemmas

The first dilemma deals with the choice of sectors of the economy to be reactivated. There, the basic choice is between an inward-looking, demand-oriented industrialization and an outward-looking, export-oriented reactivation, following the lines proposed by the exporters' association, ADEX, and its advisors. The administration has clearly chosen the former, although the recent extension of the export rebate program indicates some hedging, and that choice involves a dilemma. The table provides information on capacity use in the principal subsectors of Peruvian industry. Capacity underutilization is widespread. In 1984, it was strongest in shoes, whose long-term decline has been apparent from the early 1970s, automotive and transport equipment, nonelectrical machinery, and electrical machinery and appliances. None of these industrial categories has a high share in manufacturing output, certainly not as important as are textiles and food processing, nor are they major employers. Currently, automotive and transport equipment manufacturing has most depressed manufacturing subsectors will not provide the required boost in employment; reactivation of textiles will be oriented to the export market; while reactivation of food processing and the continued expansion of fishmeal depend largely on climatic factors beyond the reach of policy instruments available to the García administration.

Relying heavily on increases in consumer demand to fuel the recovery may also lead to other problems. After the erosion of consumers' purchasing power in recent years, it is reasonable to expect that rising real wages will be channeled principally to consumption items, and foodstuffs in particular. Shoes and machinery manufacturers will barely benefit from such a course of action. Incompatibilities between local demand structures and depressed manufacturing sectors indicate that a stronger export reliance is advisable.

New price support policies to promote local wheat production have been instituted, and both Mario Barturén, the new agriculture minister, and President García have promoted a return to the precolonial diet patterns that relied on quinoa and olluco for starches. The latter policies certainly underestimate the difficulties of changing established dietary patterns and the natural lags in changing agricultural production patterns. More recently, import duties were dropped on a wide variety of agricultural machinery. By cheapening the cost of capital relative to labor, these and other measures act to the detriment of the underemployed rural labor force. Also, they can't benefit the smallest and poorest farmers who most need assistance. Finally, they cannot remedy the massive un- and underemployment concentrated in Peru's urban areas.

A second dilemma involves the apparent uncoupling of demand-fueled reactivation of the economy from the supply response necessary to ensure reactivation. Microeconomics theory argues that an increase in demand gives rise to an increase in supply through a temporary increase in prices. The price mechanism thus ensures that increased demand is

Peru: Recent Economic Indicators

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984+	1985++
<i>Real Production (Rates of growth)</i>							
GPD	4.2	3.0	3.9	0.9	-11.8	3.5	2.8+++
Agricultural sector	3.1	-5.3	10.7	3.0	-10.2	9.4	1.8
Mining sector	9.1	-2.8	-4.4	8.3	-7.4	3.9	4.1
Manufacturing sector	4.1	5.3	1.8	-2.7	-17.2	1.7	7.2
Construction sector	5.2	18.8	9.4	2.3	-21.3	1.0	-0.5
Investment (% of GDP)	13.5	17.0	20.1	19.9	14.7	14.0	n.a
Public sector share (%)	5.8	7.7	9.3	9.8	7.8	7.8	6.7
<i>Money and Prices (Rate of growth)</i>							
Consumer prices	66.7	59.2	75.4	64.5	111.1	110.2	87.7+++
Money supply	78.0	73.0	26.0	36.9	91.7	123.0	25.6+++
Domestic credit	-10.0	52.0	86.0	75.1	106.9	79.8	26.9++++
Public sector	-26.0	57.0	58.0	40.0	143.0	-21.0	-102.7++++
Private sector	79.0	81.0	72.0	92.8	93.7	116.1	47.1++++
Exchange rate (Period average S/. per dollar)	224.5	288.7	422.9	697.6	1628.6	3464.9	8353.2++++

- + 1984 and 1985 data are provisional.
 ++ First trimester.
 +++ First six months.
 ++++ First five months.

- * Service on the debt as a percentage of exports of goods and non-factor services.
 ** Data refer to the principal non-financial public enterprises only.
 *** PETROPERU only.
 **** Taxes paid less current transfers, less capital transfers.

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984+	1985++
<i>Central Government (% of GDP)</i>							
Current revenue	15.9	20.5	17.9	17.6	14.1	15.9	17.4
Current expenditure	10.9	18.1	17.7	17.4	19.0	17.4	17.4
Current savings	5.0	2.4	0.2	0.2	-4.9	-1.5	0.0
Capital expenditure	6.2	5.3	5.1	4.2	3.8	3.5	2.9
Deficit or surplus	-1.2	-2.9	-4.9	-4.0	-8.7	-5.0	-2.9
<i>Balance of Payments (Millions of dollars)</i>							
Merchandise exports (FDB)	3,469	3,898	3,247	3,106	3,019	3,096	680
Merchandise imports (FDB)	2,088	3,062	3,815	3,508	2,724	2,200	496
Trade balance	1,381	836	(568)	(402)	295	896	184
Net services	(885)	(940)	(1,200)	(1,269)	(1,388)	(1,427)	(307)
Current account balance	618	31	(1,601)	(1,511)	(870)	(363)	(88)
Official capital	416	336	416	659	1,349	1,263	173
Private capital	125	91	366	308	(114)	(182)	(64)
Change in new reserves (-increase)	(1,043)	(722)	625	127	67	(223)	134
<i>External Public Debt (millions of dollars)</i>							
Total	7,997	8,388	8,468	11,340	12,442	13,431	13,400
Debt service (interest and amortization)	923	1,504	1,895	2,400	2,800	3,500	702
Debt service coefficient* (%)	22.7	32.4	46.0	57.0	68.0	89.0	81.0
<i>Employment and wages (% of labor force)</i>							
Open unemployment	6.5	7.1	6.8	6.6	9.0	10.9	n.a
Underemployment	33.0	26.0	26.8	28.0	45.8	54.0	n.a
Minimum wage index (1979=100)	100.0	125.4	105.3	97.4	98.2	76.1	71.0
<i>Industrial Production Components Index (1979=100)</i>							
Food processing	100.0	100.4	99.9	97.3	82.2	89.5	83.0
Beverages	100.0	110.6	109.3	102.0	99.2	89.6	104.0
Textile products	100.0	95.2	95.1	94.4	79.5	75.8	78.0
Shoe industry	100.0	111.5	102.1	81.1	58.9	57.7	n.a.
Fishmeal	100.0	66.6	70.0	94.6	32.5	72.9	93.0
Paper products	100.0	121.7	112.9	84.1	74.4	73.1	n.a
Industrial chemicals	100.0	105.4	105.1	112.6	100.7	125.4	102.0
Rubber manufactures	100.0	121.3	118.5	106.7	96.1	103.8	n.a.
Glass	100.0	103.2	103.3	118.9	92.7	98.2	n.a
Cement and other non-metallic minerals	100.0	112.6	113.5	102.9	90.5	77.4	n.a
Steel and basic metals	100.0	112.3	101.5	84.4	75.4	88.2	n.a
Metal manufactures	100.0	120.4	109.2	109.9	76.6	76.8	95.0
Non-electrical machinery	100.0	121.2	130.5	96.4	82.2	62.0	n.a
Electrical machinery and appliances	100.0	117.6	133.0	106.6	65.1	67.0	66.0
Automotive and transport equipment	100.0	154.6	162.2	156.2	64.7	66.6	97.0
<i>Public Enterprise Fiscal Impact** (% of central government revenue)</i>							
Taxes paid	24.1	27.1	22.8	27.2	35.3	34.5	36.1***
Net contribution****	20.8	21.3	21.2	26.0	33.0	32.1	n.a

Sources: Real Production, Central Government, Money and Prices, Balance of Payments, Public Debt: Inter-American Development Bank, *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America* (Washington: various years); Public Enterprise Data: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú and International Monetary Fund, *Government Finance Statistics Yearbook*,

1984 (Washington: 1985); Employment: Peru, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, *Informe Estadístico*, various issues (except 1984 -IADB); all 1985 data from Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, *Memoria 1984* (Lima: 1985); all 1985 data from Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, *Reseña económica Junio de 1985* (Lima).

translated into increased supply. One of the first moves of the new administration, the price freeze, was a clear response to pressures on the APRA government to do something to slow down the runaway inflation. García was thus caught in another dilemma. Freeze prices and delay or postpone the reactivation, or let prices rise and speed up the reactivation. Manufacturers immediately responded by dropping product lines entirely or by diversifying into related items that were new on the market, and hence exempt from the controls. The consequent massive inventory drawdown from August to October coupled with the stalling on restocking inventories as evidenced by increasingly empty shelves clearly indicates the chosen solution to the dilemma may have to be rethought and modified.

Some top government economists claimed that they never expected the suppliers to adhere completely to the imposed freeze. Instead, they were using the price freeze for largely psychological motives, to reduce the consumers' expectations of high price rises, slowing down an inflation auto-fueled on its own momentum. If the principal reason for the price freeze was to scale down consumer expectations, then that motive is well hidden from the general public. Moreover, subsequent government actions in denying many requested price hikes indicate that it was hidden from many government economists as well.

A third dilemma opposes the traditional APRA populism to the revenue needs of a government trying to pull an economy out of recession. García is caught between the option of lowering or stabilizing prices of public-enterprise produced items at rates that barely cover costs or that require enormous subsidies and raising those same prices to generate sufficient revenues to cover government needs. The ramifications of the dilemma between populist policies and revenue needs may be seen in the table's figures on the public enterprise fiscal impact. In both 1983 and 1984, taxes paid by public enterprises accounted for more than a third of all Peruvian central government revenue. Evidently, most of the taxes are paid by the government's petroleum producer, PETROPERU, which in the first quarter of 1985 collected 36 percent of those revenues. Moreover, even the net contribution, once subsidies to all companies on current and on capital account are subtracted from the tax bill, still almost reaches a third of government income. Any lowering of prices or any increase in the subsidy bill would have substantial negative consequences on the central government deficit. Faced with the dilemma of keeping low prices in the expectation of building and maintaining political support, while allowing the deficit to increase, or the politically unpopular price rises in order to hold down the deficit and to pay for government programs, García clearly took the pragmatic, yet unpopular, choice and raised gasoline prices by more than 33 percent and upped rates charged by the major public utilities.

Sucking additional money out of the economy into government coffers and tying up dollar-denominated liquidity, two components of the invisible attack on inflation, suggest a fourth dilemma. Both measures reduce consumer spending on other goods and services. Recent government austerity plans—including a freeze on new hiring and the expected dismissal of one-third of the top executives in public enterprises—accelerate that drop in consumer spending. These measures are contrary to the demand-fueled reactivation that the government so desperately wants. Indeed, their harshness has provoked knowledgeable Lima financial experts to observe that the García economic measures are much tougher than any the IMF could have obtained.

García's refusal to use the IMF as an intermediary in dealing with the commercial banks has been repeated in different forums. While linked to the debt issue, it, too, has roots in the perceived incompatibility between the protectionist and expansionist reactivation to ensure debt repayment that the government has stated as policy, and the orthodox expenditure reduction that is the standard, austerity-based IMF prescription. Yet, the García team's choice of deflation over demand parallels the IMF recommendations and may smooth the way for a mutually acceptable agreement to result from the bank negotiations.

A fifth dilemma involves a choice between an economically desirable boosting of foreign investor confidence to attract capital inflows and a politically desirable strike against the symbols of external dependency. García clearly opted for political expediency in unilaterally rescinding the petroleum operations contracts with Belco, Occidental, and Oxy-Bridas in August; rescinding a contract favorable to Peru at the time of a world oil glut and when Ecuador and Colombia offer more attractive geology, topology, and communications; rescinding the contracts with minimal input from economic advisors; and taking that decision against the advice of key knowledgeable administration sources indicate that the political content was paramount. The location of the presidential announcement, Tacna, may be interpreted as signifying a shift to the left in Peruvian politics, a reversal of the shift to the right that the Morales Bermúdez coup, directed from Tacna, signified when compared to the Velasco policies.

Negative Factors

Several managerial problems have arisen that may delay the progress of the new administration's economic policies. Two of them involve presidential style. Alan García has become totally identified with his administration's economic policies. He irregularly appears on the balcony of the national palace to report on economic decisions taken at cabinet sessions. In a surprise move he appeared in Lima

metropolitan wholesale markets to enforce vigorously the price freezes. He personally announces and takes credit for the price drops that result from major jawboning efforts carried out by his cabinet ministers. The president's personal identification with the radical and audacious departures in economic policy may be necessary to ensure their success, and indeed, a large measure of the credit for the favorable early policy results has to be attributed to the president. Continued success is not guaranteed beyond an extended honeymoon period, however, and any economic downturns could not only tar the administration economists, the failure would rebound on the president himself. Efforts to distance García from day-to-day economic policies and to leave policymaking in the hands of the economic team should be watched closely.

The second problem, one closely linked to the first, in more than the field of economic policy, is García's unwillingness or inability to delegate authority. Even some trivial and rather routine decisions, such as allowing retailers to pass on wholesalers' price increases, were regularly referred to the president, rather than being taken at corresponding lower levels of the public administration. While the Belaúnde regime exemplified excessive delegation of presidential authority, García's excessive presidential centralization of authority must be recognized as a handicap for smooth decision making.

Third, the early weeks of the new administration were marked by a rash of apparent policy inconsistencies. As an example, on August 1, the agriculture minister announced a price freeze on 10 basic food items; this was followed by the prime minister's announcement of a generalized price freeze, followed in turn by price hikes for public enterprise products; the list of basic foodstuffs was expanded on August 9, the same day that the freeze was rescinded for

of authority evolve. There are indications, however, that the Peruvian situation involves more than those normal frictional relationships. Internal factional disputes among various wings of the ruling APRA party are reportedly behind some of the externally visible confusion. As head of the party, García must resolve those disputes if economic policies are to become coherent output of a smooth decision-making process. Certainly, much of initial confusion arises from transitional administrative friction as new lines

Positive Factors

Two notable hints exist that the bold and audacious plans of Alan García's administration may attain some measure of success. First, although many members of his economic team lack the impressive academic or experiential credentials of some of President Belaúnde's appointees, they do have one key ingredient that was missing during the previous five years—presidential support. Alan García is deeply concerned with the economy, and certainly demonstrates more interest in economic problems than did his predecessor. He must, however, learn to walk the thin line between support and overwhelming domination.

Second, the economic team is pragmatic, willing to listen to outsiders, and willing to consider, and even adopt, alternative courses to those planned or undertaken. Ideological rigor has often given way to a measured consideration of alternative policies and a judicious choice marked by pragmatism. When the extreme negative consequences of chosen policy alternatives are pointed out, they do not hesitate to undertake a course correction. Thus, seemingly irreconcilable choices posed by apparent dilemmas will be resolved by calculated risks whose consequences are continually analyzed, discussed, and changed if necessary.

Plan Now to Attend LASA's 20th Anniversary Celebration in Boston October 23-25, 1986

The 1984 Nicaraguan Elections Revisited

by

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More than a year has passed since the Latin American Studies Association's delegation to observe the Nicaraguan elections of 1984 completed its work. The detailed report resulting from this exercise has circulated widely, eliciting mostly praise but also sharp criticism from Reagan Administration officials and from a few members of LASA. The delegation has encouraged discussion and debate on its report. At LASA's XII International Congress in Albuquerque, the entire delegation reassembled and hosted an open-forum discussion of its methods and conclusions. Delegation members and the LASA Secretariat have continued to receive readers' reactions to the report.

In this article I will discuss a number of concerns that have been raised about the report, while reflecting more broadly on the functions and conduct of the fact-finding mission from which it resulted. I and the other members of the LASA delegation feel it is important to respond to these concerns, especially if LASA is to institutionalize the process of election observation that we began in Nicaragua. Like the elections that were the object of our study, the 1984 fact-finding mission to Nicaragua was an important benchmark, setting a standard by which future activities of this type can be judged. How did the LASA delegation go about producing its report? Was this a worthwhile and appropriate project for LASA to undertake? What, specifically, did it accomplish? To what extent do the report's conclusions and speculations about the future help us to understand more recent developments within Nicaragua and in U.S.-Nicaraguan relations?

The Making of the LASA Report

Among the written critiques of the LASA report on the 1984 Nicaraguan elections, by far the most thoughtful and specific is that of Professor Daniel C. Levy (Political Science, SUNY-Albany).¹ The Levy letter encompasses most of the criticisms that have been made of our report, by both academics and U.S. Government spokesmen. It therefore provides a useful framework for organizing my response. Professor Levy apparently believes that the LASA delegation set out to write a report that consistently ignores, downplays, rationalizes, or apologizes for the

failings of the Sandinista government. He writes: "While I cannot know why the delegation wrote its report the way it did, I wondered at times whether it was more intent on counterbalancing a terribly distorted picture than on presenting as balanced a view as possible on its own."²

Levy and, indeed, most other critics of the report do not challenge the validity of the evidence gathered by our delegation concerning the FSLN government's conduct of the elections and its regulation of the campaign period that preceded them. Nor does Levy criticize our analysis of the U.S. Government's role in the events discussed in the report—a subject to which we devoted considerable attention. Rather, he seems disturbed by various points of interpretation that could be construed as sympathetic to the domestic policies of the Sandinista government. He sometimes questions whether we present sufficient evidence to support these points, and also raises doubts about the representativeness of the group of informants interviewed by the delegation. Finally, Levy takes the delegation to task for failing to suggest alternative explanations for some of the events and behaviors mentioned in our report—explanations that, in his view, would be less flattering to the Sandinistas than those outlined in the report.

The picture of what was happening in the Nicaraguan electoral process that had been widely disseminated by the U.S. mass media (with few exceptions) and by the Reagan Administration in the six months leading up to the 1984 elections was, indeed, terribly distorted. The LASA delegation became fully aware of this only after we arrived on the scene. In our report, we were anxious to dispel as many as possible of the myths that had been created about these elections (e.g., their allegedly "noncompetitive" character; the alleged inability of opposition parties to get their message out because of Sandinista censorship and engineered campaign disruptions). But we sought to do this by marshalling the best possible evidence and interpreting it as judiciously and objectively as possible—not by sacrificing normal academic standards and basic standards of fairness. Neither did we set out to write another "sins-of-the-Sandinistas" exposé, of the sort that has become so fashionable among U.S. newspaper editorial writers and disgruntled liberals since mid-1984.³

Indeed, any deliberate effort to write a consistently

* I am indebted to Lars Schoultz, Thomas Bossert, and Laura Enríquez for their valuable comments and suggestions. All three were members of the LASA delegation to observe the 1984 elections in Nicaragua, which I headed. I bear sole responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation contained in this article.

1. "Letter to the Editor," *LASA Forum*, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (Spring, 1985), pp. 8-10.

2. Levy, "Letter to the Editor," p. 10.

3. See, for example, Robert Leiken's "Nicaragua's Untold Story," in *The New Republic*, October 8, 1984, pp. 16-22.

"pro- " or "anti-Sandinista" report on the 1984 elections would have torn the LASA delegation apart and prevented us from issuing a unanimously-agreed-upon report. This was an ideologically diverse delegation consisting of strongly independent-minded scholars. Half of the members were not Nicaraguan specialists, and had no vested professional interests to defend. As noted in the Preface to the report, "In forming the delegation, special care was also taken to insure that a wide range of views regarding the Nicaraguan Revolution would be represented, which was, in fact, the case."⁴

In the six weeks preceding the delegation's departure for Nicaragua, there was considerable debate both among the prospective delegation members and within the LASA Executive Council concerning the wisdom of sending an official LASA delegation to observe the 1984 elections. The debate became particularly intense after the October 21 decision of Virgilio Godoy, leader of the Independent Liberal party (PLI), to withdraw from the elections. Several members of the delegation, including myself, were deeply concerned that, by sending a delegation, LASA's action would serve only to legitimate what was being portrayed by the U.S. media as a totally noncompetitive "sham election."

On the other hand, there had been press reports—particularly the investigative reporting of Philip Taubman of the *New York Times*—alleging U.S. Government interference in the Nicaraguan electoral process, specifically efforts to prevent the participation of prominent opposition candidates like Arturo Cruz or to induce those already participating, like Virgilio Godoy, to withdraw.⁵

In the end, we agreed that the actual situation in Nicaragua was sufficiently complex and confusing that it warranted a serious investigation by an impartial, scholarly group. We reasoned that even if the elections had been rendered "uncompetitive" by the nonparticipation of Godoy and other opposition party candidates, LASA could perform a valuable service to its members and to the general public by illuminating the events and circumstances that had produced such an outcome. Why were opposition politicians suddenly trying to take their parties out of the elections, after several months of active campaigning, under rules-of-the-game that all had accepted and that, in fact, had been liberalized to the benefit of the opposition

parties during the last weeks of the campaign?

The members of our delegation were also disturbed, particularly after our interview with a senior U.S. diplomat in Managua, by the consistent application of a double standard in official and media accounts of the Nicaraguan electoral process. It was clear to us that if the same elections had been held in a country whose government was currently in favor with the U.S. Administration (e.g., El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras), they would have been praised as models of democratic practice and political pluralism. Doubts about their competitiveness or significance would not have been raised, even in the case of Central American countries where elections serve only to install civilian leaders who must take orders from their country's military establishment. But as our U.S. diplomatic informant in Managua explained, "The United States is not obliged to apply the same standard of judgment to a country whose government is avowedly hostile to the U.S. as for a country, like El Salvador, where it is not."⁶

Our report sought to redress the obvious imbalance in public information about what was happening in Nicaragua that made it so easy for the U.S. Government to apply this double standard. The thrust of the Reagan Administration's "public education" efforts in the 15 months preceding the Nicaraguan elections had been to deny the possibility of a genuine political opening in that country and, after the Sandinistas announced the holding of elections, to discredit the process as a "Soviet-style sham." These efforts, initiated in July, 1983, were well-organized and well-financed. They were coordinated by the newly created Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean, situated in the State Department, which was not subject to the federal law that bars the U.S. Information Agency from disseminating information to the U.S. population.⁷

The need to correct distortions and imbalances in the information reaching the U.S. public about the Nicaraguan elections did not, of course, relieve us of our responsibility to portray the situation as accurately and objectively as possible. We made a strenuous effort to reach the broadest

4. *The Electoral Process in Nicaragua: Domestic and International Influences*—The Report of the Latin American Studies Association Delegation to Observe the Nicaraguan General Election of November 4, 1984, p. 1. This and other page references to the LASA report correspond to the first edition of the report, published on November 19, 1984, rather than the version included in the Winter, 1985, issue of the *LASA Forum*. Copies of the separately bound, first edition are still available, at \$3.50 per copy, from the LASA Secretariat.

5. See Philip Taubman, "U.S. Role in Nicaragua Disputed," *The New York Times*, October 21, 1984, p. 12.

6. Quoted in LASA, *The Electoral Process in Nicaragua*, p. 32.

7. See Joanne Omang, "Public Diplomacy: Getting the Policy Act Together and Taking It On the Road," the *Washington Post*, National Weekly Edition, November 4, 1985, p. 33. This article reports that the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean now has 19 employees "who spent \$935,000 last year, preparing documents, traveling around the world and delivering hundreds of speeches, among other things." This expenditure figure does not include the salaries of the Office's eight professional staff members, who are on loan from other government agencies, nor travel expenses for many of the speeches they made, which are often paid by the groups requesting their appearance.

possible range of political actors in Nicaragua. While Professor Levy believes that we "came up short" in interviewing opposition spokesmen, I can only affirm that the delegation did as much as we possibly could have done in eight days to gather data from opposition groups. Our 45 "key-informants" included high-ranking leaders of all of the political parties participating in the November 4 elections as well as two of the parties that boycotted or withdrew from the elections. By our count, we conducted detailed interviews with ten persons who were openly in opposition to the Sandinista government; nine who were not partisan in any open way; seven who were legally neutral electoral officials; and nineteen who were overtly FSLN supporters (government officials, local community leaders, etc.).

The delegation was unable to interview representatives of *La Prensa* and COSEP, the principal association of private business owners in Nicaragua. While Professor Levy suspects that we simply did not try hard enough to gain access to these people, or that they may have been put off by the LASA delegation's "biases," the facts are quite different. We were told by the management of *La Prensa* that its editor and co-director were out of the country for the duration of our stay in Nicaragua. We compensated by careful, daily reading of *La Prensa*, which communicated, in virtually every article, its own views as well as the opinions of COSEP, the Church hierarchy, and other elements of the conservative opposition. Interviews with COSEP representatives had been arranged on two different occasions, but could not be conducted because, at the last minute, these spokesmen did not make themselves available. Explanations by COSEP staffers centered on communications foul-ups within the organization and competing demands on the spokesmen's time. The latter explanation has some plausibility, since there were hundreds of election observers—official and unofficial—in Nicaragua during this period, and COSEP was on the itineraries of many of them. The fact that our delegation was received cordially by other leaders of the conservative opposition, like Adán Fletes, suggests that our failure to gain access to COSEP and *La Prensa* officers was not due to any advance perception of pro-Sandinista bias. Finally, while only one nationally prominent Church leader was interviewed by the delegation, four other clerics were interviewed. These interviews explored in great depth the conflicts within the Catholic Church in Nicaragua and between the Church hierarchy and the Sandinista government.

Professor Levy believes that we drew selectively upon the information resulting from our interviews, apparently in an effort to gloss over aspects of the Sandinista government's performance that reflected poorly upon it. As an example, he cites the brevity of our treatment of abuses

of university autonomy by the Sandinistas.⁸ While it is questionable whether the issue of university autonomy should claim substantial space in a report devoted to the 1984 elections, I can assure readers of the report that we utilized every scrap of reliable information on this subject that came into the delegation's hands. This is a complex issue meriting systematic, in-depth investigation. We simply did not have the time nor the personnel to pursue it in this way.

Levy also objects to our "one-sided" selection of direct quotations from the interviews we conducted. Using his own coding scheme (not explained in his letter), he finds that "quotations that at face value supported the Sandinista case greatly outnumbered those that criticized it." While different readers would, no doubt, classify the quoted material in different ways, the point of such an exercise in "keeping score" remains obscure. The particular concept of "balance" implied here is a disturbing one. It is as though, in writing the report, we should have tried to arrive at truth and objectivity through some sort of numerically weighted equation of special pleadings on each side of an issue. We believed, rather, that in trying to explain such highly complex—and highly politicized—events, the logic of argument and not simple numerical balance should dictate choices of quotations.

Levy argues that there are a number of plausible, alternative explanations for some of the actions described in the report that we failed to suggest. He is concerned only with our explanations for Sandinista behavior, which he finds excessively flattering. Optimally, we would have devoted more space to articulating alternative explanations for the events and behaviors discussed in the report. But that would have required significantly more time than we had at our disposal. We brought back from Managua a huge collection of field notes, documents, and secondary materials that had to be collated and summarized for our report. It must be recalled that the report was written, edited, typeset, and published within two weeks of the delegation's return to the United States. This production schedule, which was mandated both by our charge from the Executive Council and by the emergency situation that prevailed in the two weeks following the elections (the nonexistent Soviet MiGs crisis which brought overt threats of U.S. military intervention in Nicaragua), left little time for the kind of textual elaboration that Levy—as well as our delegation—might have preferred.

Nevertheless, we tried very hard to underscore the great uncertainty that surrounded some of the key political events covered by the report, such as the failure of the Rio de Janeiro negotiations between representatives of the Sandinista government and the conservative opposition.

8. See LASA, *The Electoral Process in Nicaragua*, p. 28.

Our report clearly acknowledges that "there have been many different explanations for the failure to reach a final agreement in Rio de Janeiro," and then goes on to cite four alternative explanations, one of which we identify as being the most convincing, based on the evidence available to us. We also criticize the FSLN for "not extending itself a bit more, either to strike a deal or to call [Arturo] Cruz's bluff."⁹

Levy takes our report to task for failing to acknowledge the possibility that external pressures led to the political opening that occurred in Nicaragua in 1984. In fact, far from discounting the importance of international influences, especially the FSLN government's desire to reassure its Social Democratic allies in Western Europe, we report that "all Nicaraguan political leaders whom we interviewed, irrespective of their feelings toward the FSLN, told us that internal pressures, whether from opposition parties or individual citizens, were *not* a factor in the decision to call for elections this year. In their view, the pressures were all external."¹⁰

While we point out that considerable preparatory work for elections was done by the FSLN government in the 1981-1983 period (pp. 3, 11), we recognize that the Sandinistas' decision to schedule elections in 1984 was in response to external pressures. The report also acknowledges the existence of divisions within the FSLN leadership concerning the desirability of holding elections and of continuing the government's long-running negotiations with opposition groups during the postelection period. Levy criticizes the LASA report for not delving more deeply into the Sandinistas' motivations, and implies that our failure to do so constitutes another form of pro-Sandinista bias ("Might we not see the lessening of repression during the campaign period as a serious yet neither heartfelt nor trustworthy response to the unusual foreign media and government attention?").¹¹ In essence, Levy faults us for being unable to read the minds of Nicaragua's leaders. To this we must plead guilty.

Considerable care was taken in drafting and revising the report to use precise language. As principal drafter of the report, I spent many hours on the telephone consulting with all of the 14 other members of the delegation. More than 500 changes were made in the text in response to these discussions, most of which focused on word choice and interpretive nuances. The general thrust was to avoid the appearance of pro-Sandinista bias. Word choices were also debated at length during the delegation's collective discussions in Managua, held at the end of each day's fieldwork. For example, the adjectives used in the report to describe *La Prensa* ("virulently partisan") were chosen

through one of these group discussions. We were at pains to describe *all* newspapers published in Nicaragua as strongly partisan. We were struck particularly by the content of *La Prensa*, which had been depicted by virtually all U.S. media and by the Reagan Administration as a beacon of truth and objectivity, in contrast to the FSLN-manipulated media. In this and other cases of "questionable" wording choice mentioned by Levy in his critique, the words appearing in the report are accurately reflective of the realities we observed.

Does the report pull its punches when dealing with "Sandinista transgressions," as Levy alleges? His prime example is our treatment of government censorship, which the report allegedly "does not condemn . . . with the same decisive vigor used in condemning anti-Sandinista offenses." In fact, we devote four lengthy paragraphs to a critique of press censorship practiced by the Sandinista government.¹² Our condemnation of such practices is strong and unequivocal. In our interview with FSLN Vice Presidential candidate Sergio Ramírez, one member of the delegation asked him point-blank: "Why in hell do you censor the press?" We found the explanations given by Ramírez, Comandante Jaime Wheelock, and other Sandinista officials unconvincing, and we reported them as such.

Neither did we accept at face value the claims of some opposition politicians and of the U.S. Government that press censorship, as practiced by the government during the electoral campaign period, effectively prevented the opposition from getting its message to the electorate. (Our delegation concluded, for various reasons mentioned in the report, that it did not.) Does this treatment of the issue amount to justifying or rationalizing government censorship, as Levy believes? This was certainly not our intent. Rather, we were seeking to explain how press censorship and other forms of "abuse of incumbency" by the FSLN affected, or failed to affect, the electoral campaign and outcome.

Levy's principal regret about the LASA report is that "it does not come across clearly enough . . . in condemning Sandinista transgressions, even those that it itself finds." Assuredly, much more could be written about the FSLN Government's errors in public policy and in its responses to domestic opposition groups than one can find in the LASA report on the 1984 elections. Our mandate, however, was not to portray the Sandinista regime—favorably or unfavorably—but rather to report on an electoral process, highlighting those aspects of the domestic and international environment that constrained that process. We stand firmly behind our conclusions, which have been corroborated by virtually all other

9. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

11. Levy, "Letter to the Editor," p. 9.

12. LASA, *The Electoral Process in Nicaragua*, p. 22.

nongovernmental observers of the 1984 elections.¹³ Critics like Levy appropriately point out that a LASA-sponsored fact-finding mission has an obligation not only to *be* impartial but to *appear* impartial. If we failed, in their view, to meet this latter standard, it was not for lack of effort.

The Impact of the Report

What was accomplished by publication of the the LASA report on the 1984 Nicaraguan elections? The report was aimed at three main constituencies: the LASA membership (and more generally, the international academic community); the general public in the United States; and the U.S. Congress. While we expected and hoped that the report would be read by members of the executive branch of the U.S. Government, we had no illusions about changing many minds there. We also hoped to force editorial writers at major U.S. newspapers to reexamine their views of the Nicaraguan electoral process, in light of the new evidence presented in our report.

There is no doubt that the report was readily consumed and extensively utilized by the academic community. The feedback that we received at the well-attended open forum on the report held at LASA's International Congress in Albuquerque indicated that the report had performed a valuable service for LASA members. It was appreciated especially by those based at small institutions, who lacked access to alternative sources of information (e.g., colleagues who are specialists on Central America). The report was drawn upon for numerous classroom lectures, talks to community groups, and newspaper articles written by LASA members. From a broader scholarly perspective, the report helped to resolve a number of important questions of fact, questions that could not be answered on the basis of journalistic reports and other published materials. As the most detailed and, I believe, authoritative study of the 1984 Nicaraguan elections

published to date, the report is an important part of the historical record of these elections, containing a great deal of primary information developed by the delegation through interviews and archival research that should be useful to future researchers.

The delegation also hoped that its report would influence the public debate over U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. Our first task was to get our findings into the broader public domain, via the mass media. This proved far more difficult than I had anticipated. U.S. editorial opinion on the Nicaraguan elections had been set before the first ballot was cast, and our findings were unwelcome in most editorial boardrooms. It was difficult to engage the attention of "straight news" reporters and their editors, since the elections were quickly forgotten in the scramble to report on the hyped-up Soviet MiGs crisis and on the U.S. presidential elections. Our findings were not used by most reporters who covered the November 4 elections in Nicaragua, since we considered it unwise to issue an "instant" statement to the press while we were still in Managua and before the detailed evidence supporting our conclusions could be written up and made public. As a result, most of the media exposure attained by the report came in the form of "op-ed" articles written by members of our delegation, which summarized the report's findings.¹⁴

Numerous members of the Washington policy-making community read the LASA report—not all of it, perhaps, and not as carefully as we would have liked. But most members of the executive branch and staff members of Congressional committees who have a direct responsibility for U.S. policy toward Nicaragua are fully aware of the report and its contents. In addition, every Latin America-oriented nongovernmental organization in Washington has staff familiar with the report, and they have used it in their dealings with Congress and the general public.

The practical consequences of this "awareness" among members of the Washington policy-making community are more difficult to assess. It is impossible to prove that the March, 1985, vote by Congress against resumption of U.S. aid to the *contras* was influenced significantly by the LASA report; but the report did have an impact on the attitudes of several members of Congress who worked diligently to prevent resumption of aid. It must be recalled that an effort to delegitimize the 1984 Nicaraguan elections was an important element of the Reagan Administration's strategy for obtaining more aid for the *contras*. The Administration labored to convince Congress that the "real" opposition had been effectively excluded from the

13. See, for example, International Human Rights Law Group and Washington Office on Latin America, *A Political Opening in Nicaragua: Report on the Nicaraguan Elections of November 4, 1984* (Washington, D.C.: IHRIG and WOLA, December, 1984); and Francis Moore Lappe, "Elections and Other Questions of Democracy in Nicaragua" (Research Report, Institute for Food and Development Policy, San Francisco, Calif., 1985). Other recently published studies of the 1984 elections include William I. Robinson and Kent Norsworthy, "Elections and U.S. Intervention in Nicaragua," *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Spring, 1985): 83-110; "Las elecciones que Reagan quiere enterrar: Un análisis del voto popular el 4 de noviembre," Instituto Histórico Centroamericano, "Envío" report series, Managua, 1985 (which presents election results disaggregated to the level of "zonas electorales," urban municipalities, and specialized regions such as Managua and the East Coast); and the chapter by John Booth included in Paul W. Drake and Eduardo Silva, eds., *Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-1985* (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies and Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, University of California-San Diego, forthcoming, 1986).

14. See, for example, Wayne A. Cornelius, "Nicaraguan Vote Is Impressive, Despite U.S. Interference," *Los Angeles Times*, December 7, 1984, Part II, p. 13.

electoral process; therefore, the Sandinista government had yet to submit itself to a true test of the will of the Nicaraguan people. It was still, as President Reagan told the *New York Times* on February 11, 1985, no more than "a government that seized power out of the barrel of a gun—it's never been chosen by the people."

As memories of the November 1984 elections faded, the constant repetition of this construction of reality—even in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary—apparently was sufficient to define Congressional opinion. By June, 1985, the Congress, provoked by President Daniel Ortega's fund-raising trip to the Soviet Union and four West European countries in mid-May, was ready to approve new aid to the *contras*, on the grounds that such military pressure was needed to compel power-sharing negotiations between the Sandinistas and their domestic opposition. Already, some members of Congress who switched their votes on this issue between March and June are having second thoughts about the efficacy of this approach.

General public opinion in the United States has not been responsive to elite opinion on Nicaraguan policy. For example, while no direct question about the 1984 Nicaraguan elections was asked, a national survey conducted in late February, 1985, found that 70 percent of those interviewed said that they opposed U.S. involvement in overthrowing the Sandinista government; only 18 percent favored such a policy, while 12 percent had no opinion. Analysis of the poll data showed that U.S. involvement in overthrowing the FSLN government "is opposed overwhelmingly in all regions and by all segments of the population, including the strongest Reagan backers. . . . It appears that [public] opposition to U.S. involvement is at a higher level than in any of the three other [Washington] Post-ABC News surveys on the matter during the past year and a half."¹⁵

In short, as long as strong doubts about the wisdom of current U.S. policy toward Nicaragua exist among the general public and at least some members of Congress, the academic community concerned with Latin America can play a useful role, especially by raising questions about the medium-to-long-term consequences of U.S. actions within Nicaragua. What can the U.S. strategy of military and economic pressure on the Sandinista government reasonably be expected to accomplish, given Nicaragua's twentieth-century history and the present configuration of political and economic forces within the country? How much more political space for opposition groups is likely to be created in Nicaragua by such a strategy? Is U.S. policy creating a basis for national reconciliation, as the Reagan Administration claims, or driving Nicaragua into what Daniel Ortega recently called a state of "permanent civil war" that threatens to turn the country into another

Lebanon?¹⁶ If the U.S. strategy ends up destroying the Nicaraguan economy and driving health and living standards down to prerevolutionary levels or below, what kind of political system could be built on the ruins? Is it likely to be any more democratic and pluralistic than the present one, especially if the FDN or one of the other current *contra* groups becomes the new hegemonic power?

Relevance to More Recent Events

"The key variable is: what happens with the war?"

—E. V. K. Fitzgerald¹⁷

Have the LASA report's conclusions, especially with respect to the future evolution of the Nicaraguan political system, been invalidated by subsequent events, or does the report actually help to explain these developments? The Reagan Administration and conservative Nicaraguan opposition leaders continue to insist that U.S. military and economic pressure on the Sandinistas has been useful in creating or preserving political space in Nicaragua for the so-called democratic forces. In our treatment of the postelection period, the LASA delegation made exactly the opposite argument. We speculated that "if the pressures of a war economy and war psychology are relieved, there is a good chance that political liberalization will proceed." But we also expressed concern that "this process could easily be truncated, or even reversed, by an intensification of the war or of the external economic pressure being exerted on Nicaragua by the United States."¹⁸

Such an intensification is precisely what occurred, beginning only 48 hours after the polls closed in Nicaragua, when erroneous reports about the Sandinistas' alleged acquisition of high-performance military aircraft from the Soviet Union were leaked to the press by a Reagan Administration official. The siege mentality in Managua was subsequently reinforced by persistent public discussion by U.S. officials of the need for a "surgical intervention" in Nicaragua; by the resumption of overt U.S. aid to the *contras*; the U.S. decision to break off the bilateral talks with Nicaraguan officials that had been going on for several months in Manzanillo, Mexico; and by the imposition of a trade embargo by the United States in June, 1985.

What might have happened if the United States had eased up its pressure on the Sandinistas after the 1984 elections, instead of escalating it? Regrettably, we shall never know. We do know that, emboldened by the prospect of U.S. intervention in some form, the abstentionist opposition led by the Democratic Coordinating Committee ("La Coordinadora") became more intransigent

15. Barry Sussman, "Americans Oppose Any Reagan Bid to Oust Nicaragua's Rulers," *Washington Post*, National Weekly Edition, March 11, 1985.

16. Quoted in Stephen Kinzer, "Disabled in Nicaragua: War's Growing Legacy," *New York Times*, November 29, 1985, p. 8.

17. Quoted in LASA, *The Electoral Process in Nicaragua*, p. 34.

18. *Ibid.*

in the period following the elections, provoking several heavy-handed punitive measures by the Sandinistas (e.g., three weeks of bureaucratic obstructionism aimed at impeding foreign travel by opposition leaders). The Sandinistas' disposition to bargain with opposition groups, so evident during most of 1984, seemed to evaporate. Not surprisingly, the "National Dialogue" process described in our report (pp. 32-33) self-destructed on November 30, 1984, when the FSLN and most conservative opposition groups found themselves so far apart that they could not even agree on an agenda. The *coup de grâce* was administered by the Social Christian party (PSC), one of the Coordinadora-affiliated political parties that had boycotted the 1984 elections, which insisted on annulling the election results and calling new national elections for December, 1986 (they were not scheduled to occur, under current electoral law, until 1990).

Hard-liners within the Sandinista leadership had their hand strengthened by these developments, and by the mounting casualties resulting from *contra* attacks: an estimated 11,000 killed and another 5,000 seriously wounded, the majority of them civilians, in the four-year period through November, 1985. (These figures do not include losses by the *contras*.) FSLN pragmatists who, at least in 1984, supported some sort of accommodation with opposition forces have seen their position weakened commensurately in the postelection period. Resistance to the military draft, instituted in January, 1984, in anticipation of a major increase in U.S. support for the *contras*, has risen sharply. The perceived need to contain such resistance—which has been encouraged by conservative opposition groups in Nicaragua—was a key factor in the Sandinista government's recent decision to suspend civil liberties and tighten press censorship.

During the postelection period, the deformation of Nicaragua's economy by the war effort has become much more pronounced. In 1985, defense was expected to consume at least 40 percent of the total government budget, while expenditures for virtually all other government activities have been slashed. Inflation ran between 250-300 percent in 1985, partly due to elimination of basic food subsidies, an 80-percent currency devaluation, and other IMF-style austerity measures implemented in February. Shortages of all sorts of consumer goods, medicines, and other essential commodities deepened during the year. The ambience of fear created by *contra* assaults and frequent military mobilizations of the population lowered productivity.¹⁹

One member of the 1984 LASA delegation, who has continued to live in Nicaragua, has summarized the impact of these developments as follows:

"The polarization of the population has increased. Those people not committed to the FSLN are more

isolated now; those supportive of the FSLN have strengthened their convictions. A general strengthening of the FSLN position has resulted from this process."²⁰

But as U.S. military and economic pressure keeps ratcheting up the misery index for the Nicaraguan people, the FSLN's support base will continue to erode, and Sandinista leaders will be tempted to clamp down harder on the opposition—thereby creating additional justification for the present U.S. policy, but making its stated goal of promoting democratization and "national reconciliation" in Nicaragua ever more elusive.

The conclusions of the LASA report remain quite germane to the continuing debate over what is happening in Nicaragua, and why. The political opening generated by the 1984 electoral process has not led to a further opening and, in fact, many of the restrictions on political activity eliminated prior to the 1984 electoral campaign have now been reimposed. Those who ascribe all Sandinista behavior to the Sandinistas' rigid ideological predilections, and who saw their decision to hold elections in 1984 as nothing more than a brief tactical retreat, will find this outcome eminently predictable.²¹ The evidence gathered by the LASA delegation in 1984 leads me to conclude, however, that this outcome was by no means inevitable. Nor is it necessarily irreversible, especially if the United States Government and its internal allies in Nicaragua are truly disposed to bargain with the Sandinistas rather than simply demand their surrender. If the LASA fact-finding mission has helped to prevent a premature closure of the public debate on these matters, it was well worth doing, and may in time contribute to a more informed, more sensitive U.S. policy toward Nicaragua.

19. For analyses of changes in economic and social conditions in Nicaragua during the period since the 1984 elections, see: E. V. K. Fitzgerald, "La economía nacional en 1985: La transición como coyuntura" (unpublished paper, 1985, available from: Central America Writers Clearinghouse, P.O. Box 2327, Austin, Texas 78768); and Richard Harris and Carlos M. Vilas, eds., *Nicaragua: A Revolution under Siege* (London: Zed Press, 57 Caledonian Road, London N19DN, U.K., 1985).

20. Laura Enríquez, presentation to the Fifth Annual Briefing Session for Journalists, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California-San Diego, June 21, 1985.

21. For an analysis along these lines, see: Shirley Christian, *Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family* (New York: Random House, 1985).

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Nicaraguan Health: An Update†

by

David Siegel, M.D., M.P.H.

In the Winter 1985 issue of the *LASA Forum*, (XI: 4, pp. 44-46) I reported on an October 1984 investigation of the effects of the war in Nicaragua on health care. Based on that investigation, I concluded that Nicaragua's major health problem was war and that the *contras*, the anti-government military forces based in Honduras to the north of Nicaragua and in Costa Rica to the south, had made health facilities and personnel the deliberate objects of attack, in clear violation of the Geneva Convention of 1949. A report of our investigation and other work was published in a monograph entitled "Health and the War against Nicaragua, 1981-1984," which was distributed to all members of Congress (available from the Committee for Health Rights in Central America, 513 Valencia #6, San Francisco, CA 94110 for \$2.50). Since that time, there continues to be considerable disagreement among the people of the United States about the war being waged in Nicaragua.

Part of this disagreement involves the character of the *contras*. Are the *contras* "freedom fighters" and the "moral equivalent of our Founding fathers," as the Reagan Administration suggests, or are they terrorists waging a brutal war against the civilian population of Nicaragua? Because the *contras* are supported by U.S. tax dollars and trained by U.S. advisors, the answer to this question has both political and moral implications for the United States. To determine if the *contras* continue to violate principles of medical neutrality, we repeated our investigation of the effects of the war on health care this year.

From November 7-16, 1985, 120 North American health workers, including 20 Canadians and 100 citizens from the U.S. from 18 states visited Nicaragua to participate in the Third North America-Nicaragua Colloquium on Health. During this time, members of our delegation were able to examine the accomplishments and shortcomings of the Nicaraguan health system. We toured hospitals, neigh-

22. See S. U. Sethuraman, ed., "The Role of the Urban Informal Sector in Developing Countries (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1981), pp. 3-47; Caroline O. N. Moser, "Informal Sector or Petty Commodity Production: Dualism or Dependence in Urban Development," *World Development* 6 (Sept.-Oct. 1978): 1041-1064; Ernesto Parra Escobar, *Microempresa y desarrollo* (Bogotá: Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, 1984).

23. *Congressional Record, Senate*, August 12, 1982, S.10316.

† (Editor's Note: Dr. David Siegel is an associate clinical professor of medicine and Andrew Mellon Scholar in the clinical epidemiology program at the University of California-San Francisco. He has visited Nicaragua five times in the past three years, including serving as a visiting professor of medicine at the Managua branch of the University medical school.)

borhood clinics, and rehabilitation and psychiatric facilities. We attended scientific presentations by the Nicaraguans at the conference, and we had frank discussions with a variety of Nicaraguan health workers and members of the Nicaraguan Ministry of Health. Over 40 members of our group also participated in the investigation of the effects of the war in Nicaragua on health care. During this investigation, we not only spoke with Nicaraguans, but we also spoke with members of the International Red Cross, the Pan American Health Organization, and many North American health professionals working in Nicaragua.

As described previously, there have been major public health improvements in Nicaragua in the six years since the present government replaced the Somoza regime. A unified health care system provides free medical care throughout the country. Accomplishments in the areas of vaccination,[†] oral rehydration for childhood diarrhea, and health education, have contributed to a decrease in infant mortality from an estimated 120-140 per 1,000 live births during the Somoza years, to 72 per 1,000 in 1985. In 1982, UNICEF of the World Health Organization awarded Nicaragua its annual prize for the greatest achievements in health by a developing nation.

This progress continues to be seriously undermined by the war. Results of our repeat investigation reveal that the *contras* continue to make health facilities and personnel the deliberate objects of attack. We were given the names of 35 health workers who have been killed by the *contras*, 11 who have been wounded, and 28 who have been kidnapped, almost all while carrying out medical duties. This figure does not include medical students or popular health workers who are not paid for their medical work. We were also given the names of 51 health facilities of different types that have been completely or partially destroyed by the *contras*, and 37 more that have been temporarily closed due to *contra* activity. It appears that the *contras* continue to target health workers and facilities because accomplishments in this area have served as a stabilizing force in Nicaraguan society and disruption of health services is a blow against the present government.

Members of our investigating team visited the sites of *contra* activity to confirm, firsthand, the destruction of health facilities and to assess the personal cost behind these brutal statistics. On Saturday, November 9, we went to La Trinidad Health Center, which had been attacked by 300 *contra* troops August 1, 1985. We interviewed Dr. Pedro Altamirano, medical director and administrator of the hospital, and other eyewitnesses. We examined bullet holes and entered the pharmacy, which had been ransacked. We talked to a woman of 26 years whose husband had been killed in the attack. Her words to us: "Now I am

alone, with three children, and no one—what will I do?" We also visited the former site of Las Praderas health post, north of Jinotega and close to the Honduran border, which was destroyed August 15, 1985, by the *contras*; only the foundation and floor were left. The rubble was littered with destroyed medical equipment and medication containers. Nurse Dalila Rico Siles, who had witnessed the attack, spoke with us. The site of the former health post is in an isolated rural location, away from any possible military target. We also visited La Colonia health post, destroyed by the *contras* one year ago, and we interviewed eyewitnesses. Again, the post was completely destroyed.

We also learned of the kidnapping by the *contras* on September 11, 1985 of six health workers, including three International Red Cross nurses, at the north edge of Pearl Lagoon near Bluefields on the Atlantic coast. The Red Cross boat was clearly marked. Dr. Gustavo Sequierra, associate dean of the Managua branch of the medical school in Nicaragua, told us of his kidnapping earlier this year while he was conducting a vaccination program on the Atlantic coast. He was wounded and was released only after several months of intensive international pressure.

Peter Stocker, head of the International Red Cross in Nicaragua, told us that his organization has the cooperation of the Nicaraguan government in visiting prisoners held by them to determine their medical status. He also told us that the IRC cannot visit Nicaraguan prisoners held by the *contras* in Honduras and Costa Rica.

Juan Guillermo Orozco, a sanitary engineer working with the Pan American Health Organization, reported to us the destruction of a water treatment plant this past summer near Puerto Cabezas. Myriam Ruiz, a Colombian nutritionist also with the Pan American Health Organization, told us of *contra* attacks on health workers attempting to carry out nutritional programs.

Economically, the war continues to have far-reaching effects on the health of the Nicaraguan people. Money has had to be diverted from health programs to the military. Members of our team visited Oscar Danilo Rosales Hospital, in Region II, and spoke to Dr. René Meléndez. He told of a decrease in civilian services, including availability of hospital beds, because of the need to transfer these resources to the military. We spoke with Pablo Coca Ruiz, vice-minister of health. He reported difficulty in getting medical equipment, including spare parts from the U.S., even though medicines and medical equipment are not covered by the Reagan Administration embargo. Only 42 of 80 X-ray machines in the country are working. Many need only an inexpensive spare part. We met with Miguel Márquez, head of the Pan American Health Organization in Nicaragua. He told us that the inability to buy insecticides due to lack of funds and the economic blockade of the United States has resulted in an increase in *Aedes Aegypti*, the mosquito vector that spreads dengue

[†] Due to immunization programs begun in 1980, there have been no new cases of polio since 1982 and the incidence of measles, tetanus and whooping cough have greatly decreased.

fever. He believes that this has contributed to the recent severe epidemic of this disease, which has infected over 600,000 Nicaraguans, causing enormous suffering and loss of productive time.

Nationwide statistics reveal that the health consequences of the war in Nicaragua, a poor country of 3 million, have been devastating. According to Alejandro Acevedo, National Director of Civil Defense for the Ministry of Health, 3,652 civilians have been killed by the *contras*; 4,039 civilians have been wounded; and 5,232 civilians have been kidnapped. Due to the war, there are now 7,582 orphans in Nicaragua.

As a physician, I am deeply concerned about this pattern of activity by the *contras* that continues to violate principles of medical neutrality. Article 9, section 1 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 states: "Medical and religious

personnel shall be granted all available help for the performance of their duties"; and article 11, section 1 states: "Medical units and transports shall be respected and protected at all times and shall not be the object of attack." Based on our direct observations, there is little doubt that these principles continue to be repeatedly and intentionally violated by the *contras* in Nicaragua. I am also concerned about policies of the Reagan Administration that effectively deny to Nicaragua insecticides and other medical supplies that aid in the control and treatment of disease resulting in unnecessary suffering by a civilian population. These actions reflect on the moral and political goals of the people and government of the United States. Based on direct observations, I must conclude that the real terrorists in Nicaragua are the *contras*. The Reagan Administration must share responsibility for their actions.

Immigration Reform Again: The 1985 Proposals[†]

by

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During 1985, Congress has been again in the midst of what has become a yearly ritual: the introduction of an immigration reform bill and its endless debate in both houses. This five-year-old ritual embodies a paradox: everybody seems to be in favor of immigration reform and yet Congress has been unable to enact an effective program. At the core of this paradox is the issue of unauthorized immigration.

Twelve years ago, I tried to tally the economic and political forces behind this mass inflow.¹ My conclusion at the time was that little change could be expected since the interests favoring the continuation of the movement were far more powerful than those opposing it. This prediction has held over the years, although the present situation has changed somewhat. Before considering what changes have taken place, it is important to summarize the basic features of unauthorized immigration and of legislative attempts at controlling it. This summary can be organized around six core questions:

1. *What does the proposed legislation, Senate bill 1200, and its predecessors attempt to do?* They aim at eliminating unauthorized immigration or at least reducing it to the point where it ceases to be a significant problem.
2. *How will this goal be accomplished?* It is clear that unauthorized aliens are primarily entering the U.S. in search of jobs. Since the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Border Patrol have proven unable to deter the flow, the proposed bill will reduce the incentive for aliens to come by depriving them of access to jobs. This will be accomplished by penalizing employees who hire them. Until now, the law stipulated that it is a felony to be or to harbor an unauthorized alien but not to hire one—a tailor-made loophole known as the "Texas Proviso." Under it, employers have been able to make free use of these workers.
3. *What will be the consequences of controlling immigration?* The U.S. government will recuperate an important attribute of its sovereignty, namely, the capacity to regulate entry of foreigners into the country. Jobs vacated by unauthorized aliens will become available to American workers, thus reducing unemployment and lightening the state welfare load.

[†] Revised version of a paper written originally for the Seminar on Immigration Policy and the Future of American Pluralism, John Carroll University, October 23, 1985.

1. See my "Return of the Wetback," *Society* 11 (March-April, 1974): 40-46.

These goals are unexceptionable and account for the first part of the paradox, namely the broad public support for reform. A few organizations, notably Mexican-American ones, have opposed vocally the strategy of employer sanctions. Neither they nor their congressional allies, however, are a match for a current of public opinion going strongly in the opposite direction. It is thus necessary to move beyond legislative pronouncements and public debates to find the real reasons why a seemingly popular bill has been repeatedly stalled. This inquiry encompasses the three remaining questions.

4. *Why do employers hire unauthorized workers?*

Small and medium-sized firms face, at present, an uncertain and highly competitive environment. Farm growers, garment makers, electronics assemblers, and other producers find that they must compete increasingly not only against each other, but against low-priced imports. Construction and service sector firms such as restaurants, landscaping, custodial and cleaning companies, and others do not face foreign competition but are labor intensive and highly competitive internally. To succeed they require a supply of labor that is both dependable and hard-working. Because of the threat of foreign or domestic competition, all these firms are compelled to maintain low wages. Otherwise, their owners and managers argue, they would go out of business or, in certain cases, be forced to relocate abroad.

In certain regions of the country, unauthorized immigrants have become the *only* source of labor for these industries. Domestic workers are either unavailable or unwilling to perform harsh, menial tasks for minimal compensation. In other regions, immigrants are the preferred labor force since, although domestic workers are still available they are deemed to be less dependable or motivated than the aliens.²

5. *Why don't American workers compete effectively with the immigrants?*

The domestic labor supply that could in theory fill the jobs now occupied by unauthorized aliens is formed by certain special groups, such as teenagers, and by the unemployed, disproportionately nonwhite minorities. Teenagers are able to perform certain specific occupations, such as counter work in the fast food industry, but they are

unsuitable for the physically demanding tasks required by many farm and construction jobs or for the repetitive and delicate ones in electronics and garment production. Domestic workers are available to perform even the harshest tasks, provided that wages and other benefits are sufficiently high. Mining is a prime example of a demanding physical occupation where wages are sufficiently high to retain a mostly native labor force. When these conditions do not exist, domestic workers tend to withhold their labor, relying on welfare payments or self-employment.

The reason why domestic workers do not compete effectively with unauthorized immigrants is simply that jobs held by immigrants are generally not attractive. The goal of most American workers—including blacks, Mexican Americans, and other minorities—is to find occupations that pay enough to maintain a modest but reasonable standard of living and that offer at least some opportunities for mobility. Dead-end jobs paying low wages in return for highly demanding menial work are not deemed a real option and, when taken, are abandoned at the earliest possible time.

6. *Why are foreigners willing to accept those jobs?*

At \$3.35 per hour, the U.S. minimum wage is approximately six times that of Mexico, which is, in turn, higher than those prevailing in most of Central America. A series of studies have shown that the bulk of unauthorized immigrants were not unemployed in their countries of origin, but were rather low-paid urban and agricultural workers.³ Their principal reason for migrating is not, however, the absolute money gap with U.S. wages, but the fact that the wages received at home are insufficient to meet even minimum local consumption standards. The cause of mass unauthorized migration is thus not unemployment, but poverty-in-employment.

Mexican, Central American, and other foreign workers willingly accept jobs disdained by Americans for two reasons. First, the acquisitive power of U.S. wages is far greater back home. Remittances of one or two hundred dollars per month enable entire families to survive and even improve their economic situation. Dollar savings also

2. See Wayne A. Cornelius, "Labor Market Impacts of Mexican Immigration: Two Generations of Research." Paper presented at the Seminar on The Urban Informal Sector, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, April 1984; NACLA, "Undocumented Immigrant Workers in New York City," *Report on the Americas* 13 (Nov.-Dec. 1979): 2-46; Sherri Grasmuck, "Immigration, Stratification, and Working-Class Discipline: Comparisons of Documented and Undocumented Dominicans," *International Migration Review* 18 (Fall 1984): 692-713.

3. See Joshua Reichert and Douglas Massey, "Patterns of U.S. Migration from a Sending Mexican Community: A Comparison of Legal and Illegal Immigrants," *International Migration Review* 13 (Winter 1979): 599-623. Ina R. Dinerman, "Patterns of Adaptation among Households of U.S.-Bound Migrants from Michoacan, Mexico," *International Migration Review* 12 (Winter 1978): 485-501. Wayne A. Cornelius, "Mexican Migration to the United States: Causes, Consequences, and U.S. Responses," Working Paper, Center for International Studies, M.I.T., 1978. Patricia R. Pessar, "The Role of Households in International Migration and the Case of U.S.-Bound Migration from the Dominican Republic," *International Migration Review* 16 (Summer 1982): 342-364; Grasmuck, "Immigration."

allow immigrants to purchase land, houses, or work implements after their return. Second, the stigma often attached to the lowest menial tasks is not an obstacle since the migrants' significant others are at home and not in the United States. Several studies thus report that immigrants willingly perform jobs that they would not accept in their own countries because they regard their sojourn as temporary and their contacts with American society as minimal.⁴

The rapid growth of unauthorized immigration in recent years can be explained as a result of these converging forces. Farm growers and industrial and service firms generate a low-wage labor market that is resisted by domestic workers, but eagerly filled by immigrants. The fit between the interests of employers and their foreign employees is so strong as to have rendered ineffectual both past attempts at controlling the inflow and efforts to replace immigrant with domestic workers. A recent study of industry in Southern California reports, for example, that up to a third of the labor force in the electronics assembly plants is unauthorized, mostly Mexican immigrants, and that this proportion is growing rapidly. In the garment industry, concentrated in Los Angeles, up to half of the labor force in legally registered plants and over 80 percent in the burgeoning "informal" sector of sweatshops and homework is estimated to be unauthorized.⁵

The proposed immigration reform bill is, above all, an attempt to reverse these powerful forces at play in the labor market. Employers would be prevented from hiring those whom they desire and would be forced instead to tap a more costly and, in their view, less motivated labor pool; goals of those to be hired—American workers—are precisely to abandon the kind of low-paid and frequently stigmatized jobs now held by immigrants.

Much of the current debate about immigration reform revolves around the issue of whether state power will be sufficient to bring about this reversal. Proponents believe that it will; critics are more skeptical. The critics point to the fact that the present immigrant labor system is rooted in social and economic processes that transcend national boundaries. They also note that never before has a large group of American employers been deprived of their main

labor source without either a suitable alternative or a major ensuing conflict.⁶ Replacements for unauthorized immigrants at current wages are nowhere in sight. Critics note finally that the scenario of an orderly replacement of immigrants with higher-paid domestic workers is probably the least likely outcome of reform. Other options available to industries that employ immigrant labor are to mechanize, go underground, move abroad, or simply to go out of business. In each of these instances, but especially the last two, the consequence would be the loss of thousands of better-paid administrative, clerical, and supervisory jobs now held by Americans. This is at least the conclusion of a well-publicized report by the Urban Institute as well as of the field studies conducted recently in California.⁷

Twelve years ago, at the time I wrote my first article of this topic, the balance of economic and social forces leaned so strongly in favor of the continuation of foreign labor immigration that this outcome seemed inevitable. Despite some changes since then, the situation at present is not too different. The principal change at present is the consolidation of a reform coalition composed of academics, journalists, and policy pundits. This coalition, which concentrates in the East Coast, brings together a disparate gamut of ideologies—from liberals, concerned with protecting domestic workers and restoring the rule of law, to extreme conservatives, intent on closing the door to all immigration and banning any more foreign influences in the country. This coalition is opposed, at the political level, by powerful lobbies representing growers and other employers and by their congressional allies, primarily from the West and Southwest.

The second recent change consists of the incorporation of a massive immigrant contract labor program in the 1985 reform bill. This provision—a *bracero* program in everything but name—represents a major concession by the Eastern reform coalition to its opposition. After years of legislative defeats, it has become clear that no immigration bill can be enacted that does not accommodate the interests of Western growers and their allies. It seems also clear, however, that this provision negates, to a large extent, the very intent of reform. A contract program not only provides employers with legal access to their preferred

4. See Charles H. Wood, "Caribbean Cane Cutters in Florida: A Study of the Relative Cost of Foreign and Domestic Labor," paper presented at the panel on Immigration, meetings of the American Sociological Association, San Antonio, August 1984. Josh DeWind, Tom Seidl, and Janet Shenk, "Contract Labor in U.S. Agriculture," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 11 (Nov.-Dec. 1977): 4-37. Pessar, "Role of Households."

5. Mariá Patricia Fernández-Kelly and Ana García, "Advanced Technology, Regional Development, and Women's Employment in Southern California," *Discussion Paper, Center for U.S.-Mexico Studies, University of California-San Diego, 1985.*

6. An example of such a conflict is the U.S. Civil War, caused, to a large extent, by the decision to deny Southern planters their preferred labor force. For a more extensive discussion of this point, see my "Of Borders and States: A skeptical Note on the Legislative Control of Immigration," in W. A. Cornelius and R. A. Moreno, eds., *America's New Immigration Law*, Monograph Series #11 (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexico Studies, University of California-San Diego, 1983), pp. 17-30.

7. Thomas Muller, *The Fourth Wave: California's Newest Immigrants* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1984); Wayne A. Cornelius, "Project on the Role of Mexican Labor in the California Economy: Preliminary Report of Research Findings," Research Report, Center for U.S.-Mexico Studies (University of California-San Diego, 1984).

workers, but also strengthens the underground flow. During the original *bracero* program, contract and unauthorized immigrations coexisted side by side. Contacts between employers and *braceros* and increasing knowledge by the latter of conditions in the United States made possible an easy shift underground once the legal program was terminated.⁸ The new labor contract provisions are likely to lead to a similar outcome, multiplied by the much larger number of workers involved in the cross-border flow and of industries relying on it.

Past legislative defeats and the prospect of an immigration reform bill that contains its own negations should persuade well-intentioned advocates of reform that they have followed the wrong path. Unauthorized labor migration is not a police matter, but one deeply embedded in an international economic structure that possesses its own dynamics and logic. An alternative approach that may prove more effective in the long run consists of targeting the root causes rather than the symptoms of unauthorized labor movements. In places of origin, this alternative approach calls for working with grass-root organizations in the development of small-scale enterprises in agriculture, industry, and commerce. The popular, small-scale sector has proven a far more efficient generator of acceptable employment in the Third World than large, capital-intensive industries, private or state-owned.⁹ Viable self-employment and participation in dynamic producer cooperatives would tend, in turn, to discourage out-migration.

In places of destination, efforts should be directed at wage and labor conditions rather than at the national origin of workers. Effective enforcement of minimum wage and fair labor standards laws, regardless of nationality, should discourage employment of unauthorized aliens for two reasons. First, improvements in wages and work conditions will encourage domestic workers to re-enter these labor markets. Second, inability to extract more-work-for-lower-pay from immigrants with the threat of deportation would undermine their status as a "preferred" labor source for many employers.

As Senator Kennedy remarked in the 1982 congressional debate over a similar proposal, it is hard to believe that the government can effectively enforce

employer sanctions against hiring immigrants when it has proven unable to enforce compliance with fair labor standards laws covering American workers.¹⁰ Clearly, the alternative approach that I propose cannot solve all the contradictions and problems surrounding unauthorized immigration, but will prove a more viable long-term solution than the rush to do "something" about immigration now widespread in Washington policy circles.

The OAS and Political Action

by

(Part 2 of a 3-part Series)

L. Ronald Scheman*

The issue, said Dr. Samuel Johnson, is not that we do not know, but that we do not remember. This is particularly relevant in the area of political action and peace-keeping in the inter-American system. The tendency to perceive the OAS as something apart from the member governments, as Secretary General Alberto Lleras Camargo pointed out in his resignation speech in 1954, is a fatal error.

Politically, there is no OAS apart from the member governments. Within the Secretariat there is no department that attends to political issues, no staff member who has any responsibility related to political analysis in his job description, or, except for the Secretary General, who has any authority to speak out on political issues. The practical implications of this are most evident in Central America today. Myriad voices within the member states complain about the inaction of the OAS in the face of one of the most traumatic and widespread conflicts in the hemisphere's modern history. Before we can address the issues of reforming the OAS Charter, we must have a firm grasp on why the people who have it within their power to change this pattern do nothing.

The history of the OAS is one of shared values and action by consensus, with nation able to communicate with nation even when enemies, and with no large bodies of ideologically oriented refugees. In this environment the OAS operated with relative ease, both formally and informally. The Inter-American Peace Committee, the principal agent for mediation and good offices during this period, did not even have a statute. The Permanent Council found no difficulty in writing "new Law" to

8. On this point, see Jorge Bustamante, "The Historical Context of Mexican Undocumented Immigration to the United States," *Aztlan* 3 (1973): 257-281; Mario Barrera, *Race and Class in the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality* (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1979), ch. 5; Robert L. Bach, "Mexican Immigration and the American State," *International Migration Review* 12 (Winter 1978): 536-558.

9. See S. U. Sethuraman, ed., "The Role of the Urban Informal Sector in Developing Countries (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1981), pp. 3-47; Caroline O. N. Moser, "Informal Sector or Petty Commodity Production: Dualism or Dependence in Urban Development," *World Development* 6 (Sept.-Oct. 1978): 1041-1064; Ernesto Parra Escobar, *Microempresa y desarrollo* (Bogotá: Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, 1984).

10. *Congressional Record, Senate*, August 12, 1982, S.10316.

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establish itself as a Provisional Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This was not the Permanent Council acting provisionally as some interpreted the Charter. It was the Council taking the initiative to accord itself full powers to act as an authentic Meeting of Consultation without requiring their acts to be ratified by the attending ministers. Months of debate and hand-wringing went into that innovation without any need for charter reform. It may seem a small point to the uninitiated, but it was a major step at that time in strengthening the machinery of the OAS.

Indeed, the hallmark of OAS action during its history was informality. The Permanent Council repeatedly dispatched ad hoc committees to the field at the sign of the slightest provocation to the peace. The committees, composed of the ambassadors to the OAS, had no statutory authority but were able, by force of personality and common perceptions of hemispheric needs, to act as intermediaries and achieve the cessation of threats and hostilities in over 40 cases. They spoke to all parties; they brought back evidence where there were claims of wrongdoing; and their reports served to quiet tension and to defuse polemics.

The preference of the governments for informal machinery was most evident in the way they treated their formal instruments. After devoting 20 years of drafting all sorts of treaties for peace-keeping throughout the 1920s and 1930s, they saw fit to use those treaties only once, in a border dispute between the Dominican Republic and Haiti in 1937. The irony is that *all of these treaties are still on the books*. Treaties on mediation, conciliation, and arbitration, treaties on rights and duties of states in the event of civil strife—all have been fully ratified by the 21 original members of the OAS. But this product of years of intense labor and thinking about the future of the hemisphere is not even referred to in debates today.

The Inter-American Treaty for Pacific Settlement of Disputes, the Pact of Bogotá, signed at the same time as the OAS Charter in 1948 and ratified by thirteen member states, was meant to replace these earlier treaties for the states that were signatory to the Pact. For those who did not sign, the previous treaties remained in force. This Pact of Bogotá has been called the world's finest legal and worst political instrument. The only time it was referred to, the nation involved—El Salvador—renounced it. It enjoys the dubious distinction as a living example that writing more rational and logical treaties and charters does not change the behavior of nations.

The problem today is that we are dealing with ideologically loaded questions that have split the hemisphere down the middle and given birth to new forms of subversion and terrorism that have sundered the traditional concept of nonintervention. Each nation now seeks the fora in which it feels it will get the best hearing,

which means that socialist-oriented states prefer the Third World-dominated U.N. even though the obligations under Article 23 of the OAS Charter, Article 2 of the Rio Treaty, and Article 52 of the U.N. Charter require the regional fora to resolve regional problems first.

This makes very relevant the issue of how items get on the OAS agenda. The history of the OAS is one of the gradual narrowing of these procedures. The old Inter-American Peace Committee allowed any nation that perceived a threat to the peace to place the matter on the agenda regardless of whether or not it was a party to the dispute. In the Rio Treaty, one of the nations party to the dispute had to agree to the action. The current rules for the Inter-American Peace Committee, now incorporated into the OAS Charter, require both parties to the dispute to agree. This has effectively precluded the committee from taking any action whatsoever. It is never heard from.

The practical implications of these procedures, in the highly charged ideological atmosphere, is that issues do not get to the agenda. The underlying basis for consensus no longer exists, except when it comes to open hostilities across borders. Charter reform will not change this.

The other vital area of concern for the nations is the underutilized policy-making machinery of the OAS. The usefulness of a central, regular forum for the community of nations to treat issues of common concern has been obvious to philosophers and practitioners since the days of Plato. Wise men have said that the history of civilization is that of getting our disputes off the battlefield and into the debating hall. In the Americas we have it, but we don't use it.

There are certainly enough issues that are uniquely international in character to keep the OAS Permanent Council and General Assembly busy for a long time. Examples of subjects that by definition cross national borders abound:

- armaments and arms monitoring
- nuclear free zone
- trade
- human rights and liberties
- international drug traffic
- terrorism
- migration and refugees
- disaster relief
- pollution and toxic waste

There is no shortage of critical issues to absorb the energies of the well-meaning gentlemen and ladies who grace the halls of the OAS. If we're serious about the OAS, all of them could be addressed without the need for Charter reform. What it takes, however, is for the people and organizations who are interested in these issues, the real actors in the hemispheric drama, to be able to express themselves before the OAS General Assembly. The

General Assembly already has the responsibility of coordinating the full range of inter-American activities. It's time to breathe life into that function by inviting hemisphere organizations of business and labor leaders, scientific and educational associations, and the Inter-Parliamentary Union to attend the meetings with the right to comment on the issues. Advisory and consultative bodies on which they can be represented could open a new dimension to hemispheric cooperation if we take their recommendations seriously.

In sum, get the major actors involved in the large list of unattended items of the inter-American agenda and breathe new life into the fora.

- Allow any nation to bring up any matter which it considers threatening to the peace of the hemisphere, even if that nation is not a party to the dispute.
- Establish a mechanism for monitoring the level and nature of armaments in the hemisphere, similar to the way the Human Rights Commission throws a light on human rights conditions.
- Permit the citizens' groups such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union, business and labor organizations to attend the General Assembly and present comments on a wide range of issues which uniquely cross national borders and require the cooperation of all.
- Charge the secretary general with undertaking a systematic annual review of urgent political issues before the hemisphere to enable the nations to listen to an objective voice on present problems and future concerns.

Perhaps if measures such as these are implemented, we could see an ambience developing in which the OAS might even establish machinery to guarantee the peace, monitor borders, and verify disarmament in Central America. Then charter reform could become a serious need instead of a palliative.

Latin American Film Festival, 1986 Boston Congress: Call for Entries

The Latin American Film Festival held at the 1985 Albuquerque Congress was one of the highlights of the meeting. Over 1200 people viewed the seventeen films and videos screened in the festival. Each of these works received the 1985 LASA Award of Merit in Film. Among the seventeen were two international premieres, one U.S. premiere, and two festival premieres. Festival films and videos were selected by the film jury from ninety-seven works submitted from Latin America and the United States. Most of these entries were suggested by LASA members. Such suggestions make invaluable contributions for formulating a quality festival that complements the research and teaching interests of the LASA membership. In addition to the Film Festival at the Albuquerque Congress, fifteen additional film and video works were presented in the noncompetitive Film Exhibit.

Plans are now under way for the Latin American Film Festival at the 1986 Boston Congress. The Film Council, composed of Julianne Burton, University of California, Santa Cruz; Dennis West, University of Idaho; and LaVonne Poteet, Bucknell University, welcomes your suggestions of films and videos to be considered for inclusion in the 1986 festival. Please provide as much information as you have about each work, using the "Proposal for Film Festival Submissions" form, reprinted for your convenience in this issue. Details on the criteria for selection are given on the form. Submit suggestions for the festival by April 1, 1986, to Prof. LaVonne C. Poteet, Coordinator, 1986 LASA Film Festival, Department of Modern Languages, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, PA 17837.

Conferences

"The Lessons of Grenada": Two years after the tragic denouement of the Grenadian revolution, many key questions regarding the origins, the dynamics and the wider implications for the revolution on the Caribbean and the Third World more generally remain unanswered. To address these theoretical and policy questions, a conference entitled "Democracy, Development and Collective Security in the Eastern Caribbean: The Lessons of Grenada" was held at Inter American University in San Germán, Puerto Rico, October 17-19, 1985. The meeting, organized by the

Caribbean Institute and Study Center for Latin America (CISCLA) and cosponsored by the Ford Foundation, brought together 22 scholars and policymakers from the Caribbean, Europe, the U.S. and South America who delivered 14 papers on many domestic and international aspects of the revolution and its reverberations. Conference participants included Francis Alexis, minister of labor of Grenada; Vaughan Lewis, director general of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States; Gordon Lewis and José J. Villamil from UPR; Constantine Menges from

Mail 3 copies to:
 LaVonne C. Poteet
 Coordinator, 1986 LASA Film Festival
 Bucknell University
 Lewisburg, PA 17837

LASA/86
 Boston, Massachusetts
 October 23-26, 1986

FILM COUNCIL:
 LaVonne C. Poteet
 Julianne Burton
 Dennis West

Please use a separate form for each
 film or video suggested

PROPOSAL FOR FILM FESTIVAL SUBMISSIONS

Film and video materials that are not integrated into a panel, workshop, round table, or meeting may be presented in one of two ways: (1) as selections in a LATIN AMERICAN FILM FESTIVAL; or (2) as part of a noncompetitive FILM EXHIBIT of visual and informational materials. Materials not selected for the FESTIVAL may be presented at the EXHIBIT for a fee.

Films and videos chosen for the FESTIVAL are designated as recipients of the 1986 LASA AWARD OF MERIT IN FILM for "excellence in the visual presentation of educational and artistic materials on Latin America." Approximately 15 such awards will be made. Criteria used in selecting films or videos to be screened are: (a) artistic, technical, and cinematographic excellence; (b) uniqueness of contribution to the visual presentation of materials on Latin America; and (c) relevance to disciplinary, geographic, and thematic interests of the LASA membership, as evidenced by topics proposed for panels, workshops, and round tables at recent congresses. Films and videos released after October 1984 and films and videos that will premiere at the meeting will be given special consideration if they also meet the above criteria.

The noncompetitive FILM EXHIBIT of Latin American films, videos, and descriptive materials (brochures, catalogues, etc.) is organized in coordination with the Book Exhibit. For information on the FILM EXHIBIT, contact: Harve C. Horowitz and Associates, LASA Film Exhibit, 10369 Currycomb Court, Columbia, MD 21044; Telephone (301)997-0763.

PROPOSALS MUST BE SUBMITTED BY APRIL 1, 1986:

Please print or type clearly:

Title of Work: _____

Film: _____ 16 mm _____ 35 mm _____

Video: _____ Available formats: _____

Distributor: _____

Address: _____

Director: _____

Producer: _____

Year of Release: _____ Screening Time: _____ Language: _____

Brief description (25-50 words) of subject matter, including country or area treated:

Name: _____ Affiliation: _____

Address: _____

Telephone: Office _____ Home _____

If you have questions, please call LaVonne C. Poteet at (717)524-1353.

the U.S. National Security Council; Robert Pastor of El Colegio de México; Wallace Joefield-Napier of the Caribbean Development Bank; Paget Henry from the University of Virginia; Arend Lijphart from the University of California, San Diego; Laurence Whitehead from Oxford University; Farley Brathwaite, Neville Duncan and Patrick Emmanuel from UWI-Barbados; Leslie Manigat from Simón Bolívar University in Caracas; Heraldo Muñoz from the University of Chile; Marcia Rivera of CEREP; Kai Schoenhals from Kenyon College; Selwyn Ryan from Trinidad, and Anthony Payne and Tony Thorndike from England.

A report on the conference is being written by Robertico Croes and Philip Pearson of USC, and will be available from CISCLA. A symposium volume, to be published in English and in Spanish, and edited by CISCLA's director, Jorge Heine, is being prepared.

For further information, please write Centro de Investigaciones del Caribe y América Latina, Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico, San Germán, Puerto Rico 00753. Telephone: (809) 892-6055/5151.

American Historical Association: The Seventy-ninth Annual Conference of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association will be held at the Hawaiian Regent Hotel at Waikiki Beach, Honolulu, Hawaii, from August 13-17, 1986. Those interested in participating in the conference may send the program chair fully developed panels (2 or 3 papers, a chair, and commentators) or individual papers that might be incorporated into a proposed panel. Volunteers for chairs and commentators are also welcome. Address all correspondence by mid-January to Prof. G. Ralph Falconeri, Program Committee Chair, Department of History, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 97403-1217. Telephone: (503) 686-4802.

Institut d'Etudes Hispaniques et Hispano-Americaines: The Institut d'Etudes Hispaniques et Hispano-Americaines of the University of Paris VIII has issued a call for papers for a conference on "En torno a la abolición de la esclavitud en las Antillas hispánicas (Cuba, Puerto Rico, y República Dominicana)." The four themes of the conference are: (1) the condition of slave and free workers; (2) abolition movements in the Antilles and Spain; (3) resistance to abolition; and (4) antislavery in Antillean and Spanish literature. The time period of the papers should range from the end of the 18th through the 19th centuries. All inquiries, including an abstract in Spanish or French of the proposed paper, should be sent to Professor

Paul Estrade, Institut d'Etudes Hispaniques et Hispano-Americaines, Université de Paris VIII, 2 rue de la Liberté, 93526 Saint Denis, France.

International Institute of Sociology: Papers are requested for consideration for inclusion in a panel entitled: "Revolution and Reaction in Contemporary Central America." The panel is to be included in the 28th International Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, to be held June 16-20, 1986, in Albufeira, Portugal. Papers are sought which analyze any aspect of the current situation from a sociological perspective. The organizer encourages submission of papers from a variety of theoretical or ideological perspectives. Papers may be theoretical or data-based, and may deal with a single focus or utilize a comparative perspective. Submissions from nonmembers and nonsociologists, and from those living and working in Central America are encouraged. Send papers (or at least a detailed abstract) to: Harvey Williams, Department of Sociology, University of the Pacific, Stockton, CA 95211. Telephone: (209) 946-2101.

Central America and the U.S.: The Department of Puerto Rican, Latin American and Caribbean Studies at SUNY-Albany is sponsoring a two-day conference on "Central America and the United States: Global and Regional Perspectives" on April 18-19, 1986. For more information contact: Dr. Edna Acosta-Belén, Chair, Department of PRLACS, SUNY, Albany, N.Y. 12222.

Interdependence in the Americas: The 1986 Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies (PCCLAS) Conference will be held at Whittier College/The Whittier Hilton on October 9-12, 1986. The theme of the conference is "Interdependence in the Americas: A Global Perspective." Proposals for papers or panel sessions are welcome and should arrive by the March 15, 1986, deadline. Selected papers from the conference will be published in the PCCLAS Proceedings. Send proposals and inquiries for further information to: Professor Lois Oppenheim, Department of Political Science, Whittier College, Whittier, CA 90608. Telephone: (213) 693-0771, ext. 343.

The Hubert H. Herring Memorial Awards for the Best Article, Book, Master's or senior thesis, Ph.D. dissertation, and film in 1986 will be awarded at the Whittier Conference. Entries should be submitted to Professors E. Bradford Burns, Department of History, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Los Angeles, CA by June 15, 1986. Eligibility criteria and a description of the awards can be obtained from either Professor Burns or Oppenheim.

Announcements

"Nota Bene" Word Processing: Dragonfly Software has announced the availability of "Nota Bene," a new word-processing program designed specifically for scholars. In addition to extremely powerful word-processing capabilities, it includes an integrated mail-merge program and a free-form database that can be used to index any file or any number of files created with any word processor. Among its features are: what-you-see-is-what-you-get" editing; full support for Spanish, Portuguese, and French accents; unlimited file size; wide range of support for printers; ability to program keyboard; multiple style sheets; automatic indexes and bibliographies; multiple windows; built-in four-function calculator; and easy conversion of files created by other word processors to "Nota Bene." The program requires an IBM PC, XT, AT, or compatible computer with at least 256 kilobytes of active (RAM) memory. For further information, contact Dragonfly Software, 409 Fulton Street, Suite 202, Brooklyn, New York 11201. Telephone: (718) 624-0127.

New Journal to Publish Corruption Research: *Corruption and Reform* is a new international journal publishing comparative research in the areas of political corruption, political finance, and policy analysis of reforms, and in such related fields as patron-client relations, organized crime and parallel economies. The journal is to be published by Martinus Nijhoff of the Netherlands, and will appear three times a year beginning in 1986. Each issue will contain research articles and book reviews, news of research meetings and conferences, and short reports on important events, legislation, and investigations in various countries. *Corruption and Reform* welcomes papers employing the methods and perspectives of all related disciplines. Co-editors of the journal are Michael Johnston, University of Pittsburgh, U.S.A., and Stephen P. Riley, North Staffordshire Polytechnic, England. Alan Doig, University of Liverpool, will be the Reviews Editor. The editors invite participation and support of all interested scholars as authors, manuscripts referees, and book reviewers. Manuscripts (four copies) and inquiries may be directed to either of the co-editors: Michael Johnston, Dept. of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15206 (Telephone: [412] 624-3702); Stephen P. Riley, Dept. of International Relations and Politics, North Staffordshire Polytechnic, College Road, Stoke-on-Trent ST4 DE, England (Telephone: 078 45531, ext. 343). Books for review, and offers to serve as a reviewer, should be sent to: Alan Doig, Faculty of Social and Environmental Studies, Roxby Building, University of Liverpool L69 3BX, Liverpool, England (Telephone: 051-709-6022, ext. 2755).

NEH Seeks Columbus Quincentenary Proposals: The 500th anniversary of Christopher Columbus's voyage of discovery to the New World will be observed internationally in 1992. The National Endowment for the Humanities wishes to encourage scholarly and public consideration of a great variety of topics that are central to the understanding of world history during the past five centuries. Such topics include the expansion of European civilization through the encounters of native American, European, and African peoples; and the ideas—political, religious, philosophical, scientific, technological, and aesthetic—that shaped the processes of exploration, settlement, and cultural conflict and transformation, set into motion by Columbus's "event of epic chance." Accordingly, the NEH draws the attention of humanities scholars and of the professional staffs of museums, historical organizations, research libraries, public libraries, learned societies, civic organizations, and media organizations to the Columbian Quincentenary and invites proposals for original scholarship through conferences; public lectures; exhibitions; television, radio and motion picture productions; and through educational programs for high school and college students and for general audiences. For more information and examples of the types of work on topics relating to the Quincentenary that can be supported by NEH, contact: Public Affairs Office, National Endowment for the Humanities, Old Post Office, Room 409, 1100 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506. Telephone: (202) 786-0438.

Paul V. Murray Papers Offered as Gift: The family of the late Dr. Paul V. Murray is offering, as a gift, his papers, notes, correspondence and collected data, to a college or university or academic or research Latin American institute or organization library. Dr. Murray settled in Mexico City shortly after being graduated from college, and became a leading educator of the country. He is the author of the scholarly book *The Catholic Church in Mexico*, Vol. 1 (1519-1910), and was one of the four founders of Mexico City College, which later became La Universidad de las Américas. He served as its first dean and for many years as its president. His career in Mexico covers more than 50 years. Contact Sra. Elena C. Murray de Parodi, Río Ebro 92, #601, Del. Cuauhtémoc, 06500 México, D. F. Telephone: 514-01-56.

SAIS-University of Havana Academic Exchange Accelerates: The long-standing academic exchange between the University of Havana and the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) entered a new phase November 1-3, 1985, when Cuban and American scholars met in Mexico City for the first of a series of foreign policy workshops. The November meeting was hosted by CIDE (Central de Investigación y Docencia Económica), which placed its facilities in Mexico City at the disposal of the Cuban and American delegations.

American scholars will travel to Cuba for the next meeting, which is scheduled to take place early in 1986. The objective of these workshops is first to assess the international environment in which U.S.-Cuban relations develop, and then to go on to the analysis of the specific disagreements between the two countries. Dr. Riordan Roett, the director of the Latin American Studies Program at SAIS noted that:

neither we nor the Cuban academics can in any way negotiate for our respective governments. But if, as a result of our examination of the problems between us, we can point up ways to reduce or even resolve those problems, that might be useful to political leaders on both sides.

The workshops are expected to result in a book jointly authored by Cuban and American scholars—a book which Dr. Roett described as "a blueprint for conflict resolution and the first of its kind in U.S.-Cuban relations."

The book is to be edited on the U.S. side by Dr. Wayne S. Smith, the former chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, who was the Department of State's leading Cuba specialist until he left the Foreign Service in 1982 because of disagreements with the Administration's policies in Cuba and Central America. It will be edited on the Cuban side by Hugo Pons, the interim director of the University of Havana's Department for the Study of the United States (DISEU).

Other aspects of the SAIS program with Cuba have included exchanges of students, senior scholars, and research materials. In May, the exchange will enter a new dimension. The Johns Hopkins University baseball team will travel to Cuba to play the University of Havana. As one of the Cuban academics put it: "What's an exchange between schools without a baseball game?"

Library Travel Grants: The Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida, will again offer Library Travel Grants for summer 1986. Under a grant from the U.S. Department of Education, four individual awards of up to \$500 will be given to selected faculty members, researchers and advanced graduate students at U.S. universities in order to use the extensive resources of the Latin American Collection of the University of Florida Libraries. Letter of intent, brief library research proposal, travel budget and curriculum vitae must be received by the Center no later than March 15, 1986. Awardees will be expected to present one informal seminar at the Center during their residence, and complete their work in the Latin American Collection by August 15, 1986. For more information, contact: Dr. Linda Miller, Assistant Director, Center for Latin American Studies, 319 Grinter Hall, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611.

ATTENTION: LASA-NICA Scholars News: New subscribers will receive the latest issue at the time of subscription. They will not be billed again until one year from that issue. Only libraries will be able to receive back issues, as our stock is limited.

New Mexican Earthquake Fund: Due to the tragic earthquakes suffered by Mexico City on September 19 and 20, the Board of Directors of El Colegio de México has created a Fund to Aid the Victims of the Quake (the Condicolmex Fund). One of the purposes of the Fund is to assist the members of El Colegio de México community itself, including those academic and administrative employees and students who have been forced to leave their homes or whose homes have suffered considerable damage. Another objective is to collaborate in the reconstruction effort of other educational and cultural institutions. Donations to this Fund may be given in a lump sum or they may take the form of a periodic contribution for the amount of time that each person or institution wishes. The Condicolmex Fund constitutes one contribution among many that will allow both those who live in Mexico, and those outside the country, to rebuild the city. The Board of Directors invites contributions in the form of checks labeled "Fund Condicolmex" to be sent to El Colegio de México, A. C., Camino al Ajusco No. 20, Código Postal 01000, México, D. F. By return mail, contributors will receive a receipt for the donation, and the Board's gratitude.

Research & Study Opportunities

Foreign Language Study Abroad: The Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida, announces three foreign language study abroad programs and one teacher's institute for summer, 1986. Study abroad programs include a Spanish language program in Bogotá, Colombia; a Portuguese language program in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and a Spanish language/Mayan culture program in Mérida, Yucatan, Mexico. The deadline for applications is March 1, 1986. For further information contact: Center for International Studies Programs, 168 Grinter Hall, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611. The Summer Institute on African and Latin American Studies is for social science and foreign language faculty and classroom teachers. The Institute will be held from June 16-21, 1986, at the University of Florida. The application deadline is March 22, 1986. For further information contact: Summer Institute 1986, 470 Grinter Hall, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611

Summer Institute on Brazil: The Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, has designed a Summer Institute on Brazil as a means of meeting the public need for increased knowledge and expert

understanding of Brazil. With an intensive series of seminars of Brazilian language, culture, and society, the five-week program is intended for scholars who have as their main focus Spanish American studies. It is expected that the knowledge gained by program participants will result directly in new courses on Brazil and improve the coverage of Brazilian issues in general or comparative courses offered at the participants' home institutions. Participants will be given the opportunity for intensive study of beginning and intermediate Portuguese in courses designed for those already familiar with Spanish. In addition, a curriculum development seminar on Brazilian culture and society will be offered. The seminar will be interdisciplinary in focus, with a humanities emphasis, and will provide the background necessary to help individual participants develop their own curriculum projects. The program will also include Brazilian films, weekly seminar topics, guest lectures by leading Brazilianists, and will provide both language laboratory and library facilities. To maximize discussion and maintain an atmosphere in which Portuguese can be the language of informal discourse, both faculty and participants will be housed and take their meals at St. John's College in Santa Fe.

Application is open to university and college instructors currently teaching in Spanish American area studies who desire to extend their area of expertise to include Brazilian studies at their home institution. Participants will be selected by an evaluation committee from the application documents submitted (see below). Preferences will be given to candidates from institutions with lesser developed Luso-Brazilian programs. Applicants must have the support of their home institutions evidenced by a letter of support from the chairman of the department responsible for international studies. Awards to individuals selected for participation include food, lodging, and travel expenses for the full five-week session from July 7-August 9. Each applicant's home institution is expected to pay a \$225.00 fee to the University of New Mexico. Application materials (including the application form, two letters of recommendation, letter of institutional support, and a current CV) must be received by the Latin American Institute no later than March 1, 1986. Early applications are encouraged. Application forms are available from the Latin American Institute. Send all application materials to: Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico, 801 Yale N.E., Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131.

Wisconsin Offers Summer Intensive Portuguese: A grant from the U.S. Department of Education will fund the second Summer Intensive Portuguese Institute at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, June 16-August 8, 1986. Fellowships providing tuition and a \$1250 stipend are available to graduate students, with an application deadline of February 3, 1986. The institute is an eight-week course in beginning Brazilian Portuguese, useful to students and

researchers needing to develop communication skills and reading knowledge for research. Instruction is four hours a day, five days a week, and the institute features a newly revised text and cultural component with guest lectures on Brazilian affairs, videotapes, films, etc. Advance application is required, with an April 15 deadline, and forms are available from the Dept. of Spanish and Portuguese, 1018 Van Hise, UW-Madison, Madison, WI 53706. Fellowship applications are available from the institute sponsor: Ibero-American Studies Program, 1470 Van Hise, UW-Madison, Madison, WI 53706.

Employment Opportunities

Sociology: Brandeis University's Department of Sociology is seeking two (2) assistant professors, tenure track, beginning fall of 1986. Applicants must be prepared to teach in one or more of the following fields: urban, race and ethnic relations; mass culture and communications; third world women; quantitative methods; and a specialty in Latin America for one of the positions is desirable. Candidates must have Ph.D. by June 1986, proven teaching skills or demonstrated promise as a teacher, a strong research commitment and be able to provide evidence of high quality scholarship. To apply, send vita and representative samples of written work to George Ross, Chair, Recruitment Committee, Brandeis University, Department of Sociology, Waltham, MA 02254. EOE

New LAS Program—Agnes Scott College: Agnes Scott College, a liberal arts college for women in metropolitan Atlanta, announces an opening of a full-time faculty position beginning August 20, 1986, with the possibility of reappointment and consideration for tenure in its new Latin American Studies program. Candidates are required to have a doctorate. The position will be a joint appointment shared among the departments of history, political science, and Spanish. Thorough knowledge of history, politics, and literature of Latin America is required. Qualified candidates should send letter, vita, and list of three referees to Ellen W. Hall, Dean of the College, Agnes Scott College, Decatur, Georgia 30030. Application deadline is March 15, 1986. Agnes Scott College especially welcomes and encourages applications from minority and women candidates.

Political Science: The University of Pennsylvania's Department of Political Science has announced an opening in the area of comparative politics with a specialization in Latin America. The position is at the level of assistant professor (tenure track) or associate professor, depending on the candidate's qualifications. Please send all inquiries and supporting material to Prof. Edwin T. Haefele, Chair,

Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104.

Caribbean Studies, Chairperson: Applications are invited for the position of Chair of the Department of Puerto Rican and Hispanic Caribbean Studies in the faculty of Arts and Sciences at the New Brunswick Campus of Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. Applicants should hold an earned Ph.D. in a humanities or social science field and be sufficiently advanced in his/her career to be appointed to a tenured position at the rank of associate professor or professor. Requirements include a strong commitment to teaching, research and publication accomplishments which demonstrate a special interest in the Hispanic Caribbean, fluency in Spanish and English, and an interest in issues affecting the Hispanic community of New Jersey. Appointment effective July 1, 1986. Address correspondence to Prof. Gwen Hall, Acting Chair, Department of Puerto Rican Studies, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903. Closing date is February 1, 1986.

International and Comparative Studies: The University of California Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (formal approval pending) invites applications for positions beginning July 1, 1986. The school plans to offer an intensive two-year Master's, a small doctoral program, and mid-career training certificates. Geographical focus is on the Pacific Basin, including all of East Asia, Latin America, and North America. Faculty will teach in the school, develop curricula, and help establish the school. Interdisciplinary program will draw on such fields as political science, sociology, economics, anthropology, history, management, international relations, demography, public policy and other related areas. Appointments available at all levels. Requirements include a Ph.D., and a commitment to research and teaching. Salary negotiable, depending on rank, experience, research record (within the established salary schedule of the University of California, San Diego). Please send a curriculum vitae, names of references and other relevant materials to Professor Peter Gourevitch, Steering Committee, Q-060, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093. UCSD is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer. Closing date for applications: March 1, 1986.

Visiting Scholars Program: The University of Illinois/University of Chicago Joint Center for Latin American Studies announces a Visiting Scholars Program for faculty from colleges and universities without major research facilities to enable them to spend the summer of 1986 in residence at Chicago or Urbana doing research and writing on a Latin American topic. The combined UI/UC programs currently maintain over seventy full-time core faculty; and library holdings encompass at least 400,000 books and 6,100 periodicals, making the joint program one

of the largest concentrations of human and material resources devoted to Latin American language and area studies in the United States. Awards covering travel and basic living expenses will be made to scholars for a one month period of residence at either university. The visiting scholars will be associate faculty of the Joint Center for Latin American Studies and will enjoy full access to libraries, faculty, and other facilities. Applicants should submit vitae and project proposals (no more than 500 words), briefly indicating how a period of residence would relate to the project. Proposals will be evaluated by a joint interdisciplinary faculty committee from the University of Chicago and the University of Illinois. Letters of application and a letter of reference must be received by March 1, 1986, for summer 1986 projects. Send applications, references, or inquiries to Visiting Scholars Program, UI/UC Joint Center for Latin American Studies, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637.

Comparative Politics: The Department of Political Science of the University of Pennsylvania has an opening in the area of comparative politics, with a specialization in Latin America. The position is at the level of assistant professor (tenure track or associate professor, depending on the candidate's qualifications. Please send all vitae to the following address: Professor Edwin T. Haefele, Chair, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104.

Publications

Mexican Art of the 1970s: The Center for Latin American and Iberian Studies at Vanderbilt University has recently published *Mexican Art of the 1970s: Images of Displacement* as the first volume in a projected occasional series on Latin American and Iberian topics. This anthology was edited by Leonard Folgarait, a member of the Department of Fine Arts at Vanderbilt University. The purpose of the volume is to satisfy a need for a critical and analytical approach to its subject. Scholars from the United States, Mexico, and Canada contributed essays on architecture, sculpture, popular arts, film, and Chicano art, two of which are written in Spanish. An Introduction by professor Folgarait and an essay on the social-historical dynamics of Mexico in the 1970s establish a context for the essays on the art produced during that time. Included are fourteen black and white illustrations. Single copies are available for students at \$5.00; libraries/institutions, \$15.00; and regular, \$7.00. Please send orders and inquiries to: Enrique Pupo-Walker, Director, Center for Latin American and Iberian Studies, 018 Furman Hall, Box 1806 Station B, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee 37235.

On the Road to Democracy?: A Chronology on Human Rights and U.S.-Guatemalan Relations, January 1978-April 1985: Recently published by the Central American Historical Institute, this 66-page document offers a year-by-year table of key events in Guatemala-U.S. policy actions, and international press coverage. Each event is cited for confirmation. The publication can be purchased for \$5.00 (U.S.) from the Central American Historical Institute, Intercultural Center Room 307, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057.

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
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CASA Conference on Video: The Center for Advanced Studies of the Americas (CASA), a consortium of Washington-based universities, held in September its first teleconference made possible through a grant from INTEL-SAT and its Project Share. The first of three teleconferences, the September meeting included George Washington University, the Business Association of Latin American Studies, and the Escuela Superior de Administración de Negocios de Lima. The theme of the conference was alternate sources of energy in Latin America, including investment incentives for the exploration of nontraditional sources of energy, the role of state oil companies, and strategies for energy production and consumption in Latin America. A videotape of the conference is available for \$50. For more information, contact David R. Lessard, Executive Assistant, CASA, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Suite 104, Washington, D.C. 20036. Telephone: 202/462-3000.



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