




LATIN
AMERICAN
STUDIES
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FORUM

SUMMER
2019

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LASA2020

**América Ladina:
Vinculando Mundos
y Saberes, Tejiendo
Esperanzas**

GUADALAJARA, MEXICO
MAY 13 - 16, 2020

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Opinions expressed herein are those of individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Latin American Studies Association or its officers.

From the president / De la presidenta

por **Mara Viveros-Vigoya**, presidenta de LASA | Universidad Nacional de Colombia | mviverosv@unal.edu.co

El congreso de LASA2019 en Boston, en mayo pasado, trajo varias novedades que vale la pena resaltar y agradecer a Lynn Stephen, nuestra pasada presidenta. Me gustaría destacar tres de ellas: la primera, el necesario y bienvenido reconocimiento de todo el trabajo —voluntario, de nuestros miembros, y técnico-administrativo del personal de LASA— que hay detrás del éxito de cada congreso de LASA. Es la primera vez que se hizo en LASA y pone de presente todo el trabajo que muchas veces se invisibiliza al no ser nombrado; la segunda, la atribución de tareas centrales en el congreso a los estudiantes, no solo en los paneles y foros sino en la elaboración, a través de su representante en el Comité Ejecutivo, Vivian Martínez, de una nueva política de LASA como la de antiacoso; la tercera, el reconocimiento del lugar del congreso, Boston, como una zona de tierras y naciones indígenas.

El tema del congreso de LASA2020 que se realizará en Guadalajara del 13 al 16 de mayo próximos busca proseguir y profundizar en la tarea de subrayar y dar cuenta de la participación de las poblaciones indígenas y de origen africano en este proyecto llamado América Latina y que en esta oportunidad nombraremos como *América Ladina*, utilizando el concepto acuñado por la intelectual afrobrasileña Lélia Gonzalez. Con esta expresión, su autora buscaba reivindicar esta ancestría plural de la que fuimos desposeídos, como un lugar de enunciación que ofrece una nueva orientación histórica, cultural y política para el continente, a partir del legado de las luchas y proyectos de vida, liderados muchas veces por mujeres, que han buscado despatricularizar y descolonizar el continente.

Vale la pena precisar que, en el contexto en el que es utilizado por Lélia Gonzalez, el adjetivo “ladina” que acompaña al sustantivo “América” —al cambiar la “t” de “latina” por la “d” de “ladina”— busca expresar la sagacidad que han desarrollado estas poblaciones amefricanas para garantizar su

supervivencia material y simbólica y para resignificar sus formas de existir, es decir, de estar en el mundo en condición de sujetos. No tiene que ver con la acepción que puede tener la palabra “ladino” en países como Guatemala en donde el término ha sido utilizado para designar una identidad de negación, de no indígena y ha sido esgrimido para alimentar tensiones étnicas entre “indígenas” y “ladinos” que se agravaron durante la reciente guerra civil del país.¹



Por otra parte, no sobra aclarar que el mestizaje del que hablamos en la convocatoria no es una noción utilizada para eliminar y cancelar memorias y genealogías originarias sino para afinar la capacidad de resonancia que produce asumir una ancestría plural y contenciosa pero también potencialmente armónica, a través de formas dialogales. En un momento como el que vivimos en las Américas, de marcadas tendencias conservadoras, homófobas y racistas en el cual se están desmantelando políticas de carácter redistributivo e incluyentes que se estaban poniendo en marcha o consolidando, se pone de presente la vigencia de proyectos emancipadores y tradiciones críticas de pensamiento como los de Lélia Gonzalez, a manera de fuentes de inspiración intelectual, política y afectiva, para poderlas explicar y desafiar.

En el llamado a convocatoria y en las áreas temáticas que nuestro comité de programa ha definido para el congreso en Guadalajara, hemos incluido algunos temas nuevos, o reformulado

algunas áreas, para dar cuenta de las orientaciones académicas que organizan este llamado a contribuciones. Nombremos algunos de estos temas en orden alfabético: “Afrodescendencia: territorios, luchas y epistemología”; “Biodiversidad, cambio climático y políticas ambientales”; “Democracias en crisis, ciudadanías alternativas”; “Derechos humanos y políticas de la memoria”; “Economía y políticas sociales”; “Estudios laborales y relaciones de clase”; “Feminismo negro e indígena en América Latina”; “Masculinidades y feminismo”; “Otros saberes: Los métodos colectivos y la política de investigación”; “Políticas de género y reacción antigénero”; “Pueblos indígenas: territorios, luchas y epistemologías”; “Relaciones internacionales y geopolítica”; “Relaciones y políticas del cuidado”; “Teorías decoloniales y del buen vivir”.

Quiero invitar a las y los miembros de LASA a enviar propuestas de talleres, mesas redondas, paneles y simposios que subrayen claramente su vínculo con las áreas temáticas que escojan. Solo una nutrida participación en estas áreas, vendrán a confirmar el sentido y la justeza de estas orientaciones. Agradezco de antemano el servicio que prestarán a LASA y el apoyo que me brindarán las y los coordinadores de áreas temáticas (*track chairs*) para que el congreso de LASA2020 en Guadalajara colme tanto sus propias expectativas académicas como las de la diversa membresía de LASA. Trabajaré con ustedes y con mi Comité de Programa a fin de que este congreso sea una experiencia académica y vital estimulante y gratificante.

En el congreso de Boston, tal como lo destacó nuestra presidenta anterior, hubo una fuerte participación latinoamericana en el congreso, un 43 por ciento, que esperamos aumente, dando cuenta de su representación en el total de la membresía de LASA. Pero también anhelamos que esa presencia latinoamericana se diversifique más y vincule un mayor número de colegas bolivianos, venezolanos, centroamericanos y del Caribe. Somos conscientes de que estos porcentajes dan cuenta de las situaciones políticas y económicas recientes, pero también de la geopolítica del conocimiento. Deseamos igualmente que la participación norteamericana y europea de nuestra membresía

se sienta convocada y se mantenga o aumente. ¡Que toda nuestra membresía se sienta muy bienvenida!

El trabajo riguroso y comprometido que llevó a la puesta en vigencia de una política antiacoso de LASA en el congreso de Boston, merece un especial reconocimiento. Este ha sido un paso firme en el proceso de institucionalización de una política que posiciona a LASA como una asociación comprometida con la lucha contra todo tipo de abuso de poder y con la puesta en marcha de una política contra el acoso de cualquier tipo, que fija procedimientos e instancias para atender a las víctimas y sus denuncias, y sancionar a quienes las agreden. Es una tarea importante que implica cambios en la cultura organizacional de LASA y por lo tanto ofrece desafíos interesantes para lograr que todos los espacios académicos respaldados por LASA sean incluyentes y libres de agresiones. Darle continuidad y fortalecer esta política será también parte de la labor de mi presidencia.

Por último, como editora de LASA Forum, en éste y sus siguientes tres números, voy a continuar con la publicación de dossiers específicos en cada número para discutir temas que nos parecen de relevancia en relación con el tema del congreso.

Iniciamos con el dossier titulado “El pensamiento de Lélia Gonzalez: un legado y un horizonte”, a cargo de Osmundo Pinho, miembro del Comité de Programa de LASA2020 en Guadalajara y gran conocedor del trabajo de esta intelectual y luchadora afrobrasileña. Este dossier —que incluye siete trabajos originales sobre el tema en portugués, inglés y español de investigadoras e investigadores basados en universidades de Brasil, Estados Unidos y Colombia— pretende dar a conocer a la membresía de LASA la vida y el pensamiento de Lélia Gonzalez. Explica en profundidad el concepto de *Amefricanidade*; aclara las ambigüedades que puede generar el término “ladino” en contextos sociales como el de Guatemala y pone de presente la vigencia del pensamiento de Lélia Gonzalez y la necesidad de una nueva orientación histórico-cultural y política para la región, en un momento de derechización del continente.

Como novedades, en este número tenemos dos nuevas secciones: “Huellas inspiradoras” y “Voces latinoamefricanas”. En la primera, Mariana Mora, integrante del Comité de Programa de LASA2020 presenta una semblanza de la socióloga feminista y líder afrobrasileña Marielle Franco, electa como concejal del Partido Socialismo y Libertad (PSLO) en 2016 y asesinada el 14 de marzo de 2018. Marielle Franco ha dejado huellas inspiradoras que vale la pena consignar, en su trasegar contra el racismo, la violencia policial y la corrupción, y en su defensa de las luchas feministas —particularmente de las que han sido libradas por las mujeres negras que residen en las favelas— y de la comunidad LGBT.

En esta oportunidad, las potentes voces latinoamefricanas que provienen de Colombia se hacen leer/escuchar con el poema “Mujer Lunar” de la educadora, escritora y activista afrofeminista Ashanti Dinah Orozco y la poesía de Wiñay Mallki/Fredy Chikangana, poeta Quechua Yanakuna Mitmak, en su lengua original y en su traducción al castellano. Sus voces hablan desde otros lugares de enunciación, pero con el mismo propósito de los ensayos que componen el dossier: invitar a explorar la pluralidad de alternativas de sociedad que desafían la hegemonía ultraconservadora que nos atenaza.

Regina Martínez Casas, una de las dos integrantes mexicanas del Comité de Programa de LASA2020, es quien se encarga en esta oportunidad de invitar a la membresía de LASA al congreso de Guadalajara para pensar conjuntamente “la reconfiguración de la región latinoamericana” a través de espacios de diálogo “marcados por la convergencia de miradas desde diferentes realidades nacionales, distintas perspectivas disciplinares y nuevos marcos analíticos”.

Astrid Ulloa (Co-chair del área temática “Biodiversidad, cambio climático y políticas ambientales”) junto a las colegas colombianas Diana Ojeda, Camila Esguerra y Tatiana Sánchez serán las encargadas de coordinar el dossier del número de otoño 2019, cuyo tema será el de “Violencias contra defensoras y defensores del medio ambiente en tiempos de extractivismo”, una cuestión de infortunada y persistente actualidad en nuestra región.

El número de invierno de 2019 estará a cargo de Jo-Marie Burt, integrante del Comité de Programa de LASA2020, quien planea explorar los esfuerzos de Justicia y Memoria en la región en el contexto actual.

El número de primavera de 2020, será bastante sustancioso, pues tendrá dos dossiers. El primero sobre “La ofensiva conservadora contra la ‘ideología de género’ y sus estrategias de avanzada en América Latina”, a cargo de Eleonor Faur, integrante argentina del Comité de Programa de LASA2020 en Guadalajara y el segundo, por ser el último número antes del congreso, explorará una temática vinculada a México y a las políticas migratorias, y estará a cargo de Regina Martínez Casas, la integrante del Comité de Programa mencionada anteriormente.

¿Cómo no sentirme honrada y emocionada de iniciar mi período como presidenta de LASA bajo la égida del pensamiento de Lélia Gonzalez, llamada muchas veces “amazona de torço estampado de esperança” y con este programa en mente, que podrá hacerse realidad gracias al apoyo y sostén de muchas y muchos de ustedes?

Las y los espero en Guadalajara, ciudad mexicana que será por segunda vez anfitriona de LASA y nos acogerá para vincular mundos, conocimientos y saberes, y tejer, bailar y cantar nuevos sonos, para desafiar juntos la desesperanza.

Notas

Agradezco el apoyo editorial de Grace Acosta (Universidad Nacional de Colombia) y Sara Lickey (managing editor de la Revista LARR).

¹ Laura Matthew, 2006. “Mexicanos and the Meanings of Ladino in Colonial Guatemala,” *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 7, no. 1 (2006), DOI: 10.1353/cch.2006.0033. //

From the Past President / De la ex-presidenta de LASA

por **Lynn Stephen**, ex-presidenta de LASA | University of Oregon | stephenl@uoregon.edu

Ha sido un gran honor y privilegio servir como su presidenta electa y presidenta en los últimos dos años. Ahora me toca como “past president” reportar a ustedes sobre el exitoso congreso en Boston e invitarles a enviar sus propuestas para nuestro siguiente congreso de LASA en Guadalajara, los días 13 al 16 de mayo de 2020.

He recibido muchos correos y saludos de agradecimiento porque tuvimos un congreso de mucha diversidad en todos sus sentidos y de paneles, mesas redondas y eventos de alta calidad. Estoy orgulloso de lo que hicimos, junto con mi Comité de Programa, que incluye a Carlos Aguirre (Profesor de Historia, Universidad de Oregón), Lorraine Leu (Profesora Asociada de Estudios Brasileños, Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies/LLILAS y Departamento de Español y Portugués, Universidad de Texas en Austin) y Juan Carlos Moreno Brid (Profesor Titular C de la Facultad de Economía de la UNAM, Tutor de doctorado y maestría en campos de conocimiento de Desarrollo Económico e Historia Económica, Investigador Nacional). Gracias a mis colegas!

También tenemos que agradecer a todas las personas que contribuyeron este año a la organización de LASA y el Congreso. Por primera vez en la ceremonia de bienvenida expresé nuestro reconocimiento a las 425 personas que proporcionaron servicio a LASA de muchas formas, incluyendo los órganos de gobierno, copresidentes del programa del congreso, presidentes de áreas temáticas, curadores y director del festival de cine, 11 comités de premios, comités de becas y otros grupos de trabajo y comités. Este servicio prestado como voluntarias y voluntarios sumó más de 27,000 horas de trabajo, y eso hizo posible que LASA funcione. No lo habiéríamos podido lograr sin

ustedes. ¡Gracias! Es muy importante que sigamos visibilizando la gran cantidad de servicio que prestan nuestros miembros.

Hubo casi 5,000 personas que hicieron presentaciones en nuestro congreso y aproximadamente 5,621 personas registradas. Las personas que hicieron presentaciones, en orden descendiente en cuanto a su cantidad, vinieron de EEUU (2,061), México (456), Cuba (450), Brasil (330), Chile (218), Colombia (180), Argentina (158), Perú (132), Reino Unido (128), Canadá (117), Ecuador (68), España (68), Alemania (67), Puerto Rico (57), Uruguay (40), Francia (21), Países Bajos (19), Suiza (14), Japón (12), Costa Rica (11), Italia (11), Portugal (11), Venezuela (11), Bolivia (10), Guatemala (10), Noruega (9), Nicaragua (8), Suecia (8), Australia (7), Bélgica (6), Corea del Sur (6), Irlanda (5), Austria (4), China (4), Dinamarca (3), El Salvador (3), Honduras (3), Rusia (3), Finlandia (2), Israel (2), Croacia (1), República Checa (1), República Dominicana (1), Ghana (1), India (1), Malasia (1), Nueva Zelanda (1), Panamá (1), Paraguay (1), Polonia (1), Rumania (1), Taiwán (1), Turquía (1) y Emiratos Árabes Unidos (1). Realmente podemos decir que el congreso fue global.

Abajo comparto algunas estadísticas sobre el congreso y comento sobre algunos aspectos. Aunque el congreso fue en Boston —nuestro último congreso en Estados Unidos hasta que las políticas migratorias y de derechos humanos y hacia varias países Latinoamericanos cambien— 42% de los registrados en el congreso provenían de América Latina, sin duda un número impresionante. De Norte América llegaron 50% y de Europa 7%. Es más que probable que en el siguiente congreso en Guadalajara el porcentaje de participantes de América Latina sea aún más alto.

Unos de los datos que es importante resaltar es que 23% de los registrados fueron estudiantes. La participación de estudiantes de maestría, doctorado y en algunos casos de licenciatura en los foros de LASA es muy importante. Pero su presencia va mas allá del congreso. Ahora tenemos una representante de los estudiantes elegida en el Comité Ejecutivo de LASA, quien es Vivian Andrea Martínez-Díaz de la Universidad de los Andes en Colombia. Vivian ha sido una integrante activa del Comité Ejecutivo de LASA y también ha tenido un rol fundamental, junto con otras personas, en la aprobación, por vez primera en la historia de LASA, de una política antiacoso que incluye lineamientos específicos.

El Congreso de Boston fue nuestro primer evento en que esta política ha entrado en vigencia. Este ha sido un paso institucional importante para asegurarnos que LASA ofrezca un entorno seguro y acogedor para todos los participantes, libre de acoso en base a la edad, raza, grupo étnico, origen nacional, religión, idioma, preferencia sexual, identidad de género o expresión de género, discapacidad, condiciones de salud, estatus marital, estatus doméstico o estatus parental. La política antiacoso fue publicada en la parte interior de su programa y en la App de la asociación. Agradezco a los miembros del Consejo Ejecutivo, Vivian Martínez-Díaz y Aníbal Pérez-Liñán; la Directora Ejecutiva de LASA Milagros Pereyra; la expresidenta de LASA Joanne Rappaport; Tanya Hernández, miembro del Grupo de Trabajo Antiacoso de LASA; y Kevin O'Leary, un abogado dedicado a la investigación, capacitación y consultoría en trabajo antiacoso, por toda su ayuda en la elaboración de esta política y sus procedimientos. Un Grupo (Taskforce) de Trabajo Antiacoso especial también trabajó en los últimos diez meses para recolectar información, proveer insumos para un futuro cuestionario de LASA y publicar un dossier sobre el tema; también participaron en una sesión presidencial especial en el congreso. Los miembros del Grupo de Trabajo Antiacoso incluyen a Mercedes Prieto, copresidenta, de FLACSO, Ecuador; Vivian Martínez-Díaz, copresidenta, de la Universidad de los Andes, Colombia; Michelle McKinley, copresidenta, de la Universidad de Oregón; Tanya Hernández, de Fordham University; Alexandre Da Costa, de la Universidad

de Alberta; Ginetta E. Candelario, miembro del Comité Ejecutivo, de Smith College; Juan Carlos Callirgos Patroni, de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú; y Sales Augusto Dos Santos, de la Universidade Federal de Vicosa. Les agradezco a todos por su trabajo en los últimos diez meses. El acoso es un asunto complejo que demanda nuestra atención y trabajo continuo.

Otro aspecto novedoso que adoptamos en la ceremonia de bienvenida fue el reconocimiento de las tierras y naciones indígenas de la zona de Boston. Fue interesante que esta misma tradición se fue duplicando en varios paneles y otros eventos de LASA y espero que en el futuro siga siendo una parte importante de las actividades de nuestros congresos. Tuvimos varios paneles presidenciales históricos incluyendo "Vozes/Voces: Black Women's Poetry, Performance, and Politics" con la participación de Elizandra Souza (escritora y activista independiente) y Ana-Maurine Lara (Universidad de Oregón). También por primera vez tuvimos un panel con diálogo multilingüe entre representantes de pueblos indígenas de varias partes del continente. El panel, "Indigenous Matters: A Critical Hemispheric Dialogue by Native Women," contó con la participación de Lisa Brooks (Abenaki Nation of Missisquoi y Amherst College), Angela Mooney D'Arcy (Juaneno Band of Mission Indians, Acjachemen Nation; Founder and Director of Sacred Places Institute), y Lorena Cañuqueo (Mapuche-Puelche, Lof Mariano Epulef y Equipo de Enseñantes de Mapuzungun; Universidad Nacional de Río Negro, Argentina). Hubo mucho público en casi todos los paneles presidenciales y la mayoría fueron transmitidos en vivo. Los videos de las diversas mesas presidenciales pueden ser vistos en nuestro canal de YouTube a través de este enlace: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCml-xur6F96Q7NtTTF-_scg. El diálogo de Carmen Aristegui con Julia Preston, "Media, News, and Democracy: A Conversation," por ejemplo, ha tenido hasta ahora 6,700 visualizaciones. Invito a todos a que vean estos videos, los compartan con colegas y estudiantes y los usen en sus clases y otros eventos. Los temas de estas sesiones y videos incluyen la inmigración, los esfuerzos contra el acoso, territorialidades, retos y solidaridad en Puerto Rico, los 60 años de la revolución cubana y el empleo, inclusión social y justicia. También se puede ver,

en el canal de youtube, el video del panel y plática de Lars Schoultz, ganador del premio Kalman Silvert. Gracias a Vanessa Chaves y su equipo por la exitosa transmisión de estos eventos. El App del congreso fue también muy exitoso, a juzgar por los comentarios de muchas personas que la encontraron muy útil y funcional.

El Congreso de Boston combinó presentaciones y paneles de alta calidad académica, poesía, música, arte y mucha diversidad, inclusión y justicia. Gracias a todos los que lo hicieron posible. Nos vemos en Guadalajara! //

2019 Kalman Silvert Lecture

by **Lars Schoultz**

Improving Latin Americans

I never knew a man who had better motives for all the trouble he caused.

—Graham Greene, *The Quiet American*

If they have managed to make it this far, most early baby boomers are now retiring, including one born prematurely in 1942. We came of age in the 1960s, a time when US foreign policy officials believed that Latin Americans were caught up in what was called “the revolution of rising expectations.” A substantial majority also believed that the containment of communism required the United States to help Latin Americans fulfill these expectations. After arguing in the 1950s that the region was “not in the line of Soviet advance,” in the early 1960s President Kennedy repeatedly warned that Latin America had become “the most dangerous area in the world.”

So it was that our parents’ generation started this ball rolling, but then we boomers took over and transformed development assistance from a rudimentary activity into today’s sophisticated uplifting industry, comparable in its own modest way to what happened to the telephone after Alexander Graham Bell.

Much of this transformation was based on a set of long-standing beliefs about Latin Americans and how to improve them. As in the Kalman Silvert address at LASA’s Boston congress, the pages that follow are an exploration of these beliefs, using the current debate over Central American immigration as a focus. It is a cautionary tale, a warning to the generation that follows.

The participants in today’s immigration debate can be placed into two categories. On one side are the *traditionalists*, who are realists in the political science sense of the word: they believe the purpose of foreign policy is to promote and protect a nation’s interests, period. Anything else is ancillary. These migration realists are called traditionalists because they advocate doing what governments traditionally do when confronted with an immigration problem: they narrow the funnel through which migrants flow.

That narrowing is their overarching strategy, and it is a constant, but the traditionalists’ tactics to implement this strategy have varied to fit the circumstances. At one point in US history the principal funneling tactic was to screen entrants at places like Ellis Island. Another tactic has been to enact laws that have the effect of denying entry to certain groups—the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act or the 1924 National Origins Act.

Today, the primary traditionalist tactic is to build a wall.

On the other side of today’s immigration debate are Washington’s *progressives*, so named because their beliefs closely resemble the thinking of policymakers during the Progressive Era in the first two decades of the twentieth century, even if the circumstances differ. Today’s progressives concede that the United States has a legitimate interest in controlling immigration, but they have a softer side, believing, for example, that accepting refugees is important in and of itself—the right thing to do. Progressives also believe a wall is no solution for the recent wave of Central American immigration; they say that tide will only ebb when Central Americans are more satisfied with conditions at home, and the United States should lend a hand. As the devoutly progressive *New York Times* editorialized last November, “Any immigration plan has to include

serious development aid to Central America's troubled states. Cutting off what little aid they get, as Mr. Trump has threatened to do, will only create more caravans."¹

The progressives' strategy, then, is to provide Central Americans with development assistance,² but their tactics also vary. Progressives once focused on economic development; today they focus on political development—on improving Latin Americans' governance.

Before turning to the beliefs underlying these quite different strategies and how they play out in today's Washington, candid baby boomers would want readers to know that their generation agrees on one thing: most Latin Americans are "underdeveloped." While boomer traditionalists regularly blurt this out, progressives are more circumspect. Nonetheless, it has never been difficult for researchers to examine progressives' behavior and then infer this belief's existence. Specifically, when progressives advocate for development assistance, by definition they are expressing a belief that the recipients are insufficiently developed. Progressives refer to them as "developing peoples."

What Boomers Inherited

This belief in Latin Americans' need for improvement was present from the very beginning of US–Latin American relations. Indeed, the State Department's nineteenth-century archives are packed to overflowing with reports from US envoys similar to this one about Ecuadorans: "I witnessed little else than ignorance, indolence, wretchedness, dishonesty, and misery, on the part of the great mass of the people, and selfishness, low-cunning, sordid ambition, avarice, and blood-thirsty revenge on that of those who either lead or force the unconscious, unthinking multitude." A good one-sentence summary of this nineteenth-century thinking came in a US envoy's dispatch from Brazil: "There is a sad defect somewhere either in the institutions of the country, or the temper and habits of the people." Generally these were simple observations, but occasionally they were accompanied by a recommendation that Washington do something about those defects—

that the United States "force these Spanish American Republics to keep the peace" or, more gently, that "in taking them cordially by the hand we may lead them upward."³

At one point annexation was the most frequently proposed solution, but after the mid-nineteenth-century war with Mexico and then the Civil War (which ended the South's interest in more slave states), the dominant belief was that absorbing Latin Americans would spell nothing but trouble. In the post-Civil War debate about accepting the Dominican Republic's offer to be annexed, most senators nodded in agreement when one of their colleagues warned that "if you incorporate those tropical countries with the Republic of the United States, you will have to incorporate their people too. . . . Do not touch a scheme like this; do not trifle with that which may poison the future of this great nation, beware of the tropics."⁴

Since then—the early 1870s—a consensus has existed that it is inadvisable to expand the nation's boundaries if it entails the addition of Latin Americans. The single exception, Puerto Rico, was just that—an exception, and one that almost everyone in Washington still hopes will never be repeated.

Then at the turn from the nineteenth into the twentieth century came what may be the most important single step in the two-century history of US policy toward Latin America: the United States moved from merely observing these sad defects to helping Latin Americans overcome them. This move was triggered by the 1898 Spanish-American War, when the victors required Spain to hand over Guam, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. Now, here on the cusp of the Progressive Era, the United States had to decide what to do with these tropical people. Progressives decided to improve them.

Having taken this step atop a slippery slope, the United States quickly slid into an acquire-and-develop policy. Cuba and Puerto Rico were followed almost immediately by Panama and then Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. No one called them colonies; they were "protectorates."

In addition to infrastructure projects (many in Cuba and Panama, fewer in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, almost none in Nicaragua), in each case the progressives' strategy to assist these Latin Americans involved three tactics. The first was to establish order through the US military, which created and trained local constabularies. Until these new constables were prepared to maintain order, US soldiers stayed to keep citizens from fighting among themselves. Then, once order had been established, progressives began sending democracy doctors to create and improve governance—to help these protected Latin Americans write their laws and even their constitutions, and especially to supervise their elections. In 1913 President Woodrow Wilson said his policy was to teach Latin Americans to elect good men. For a third tactic, progressives sent money doctors to improve the way Latin Americans handled their finances.

Now, a century later, all three tactics have been adopted by today's baby boomers.

Honduras, the principal source of the recent migrant caravans, did not become one of these protectorates, but it was not for lack of trying. The effort began in 1911, when the Taft administration's secretary of state, Philander Knox, notified Congress that "there is no hope for peace and prosperity for Honduras except through the United States." Meanwhile, his assistant secretary informed the press that Honduras "has politically, financially and economically about as bad a record for stability as could be found on the face of the earth."⁵

Since none of today's development institutions existed, Secretary Knox's solution was for Wall Street to loan Hondurans some money, with repayment guaranteed by converting Honduras into another protectorate. Although the Knox-Paredes Treaty failed to gain approval by either country's legislature, this rejection took no wind out of the progressives' sails. Within a few months the Marines had landed next door in Nicaragua, and the United States did not abandon that protectorate until 1933.

Washington's motivation during this two-decade period was complex. US interests were involved—everything from thwarting German adventurism (real or imagined) to building a canal—but the

archives strongly suggest that most of these early progressives were driven primarily by a broad impulse to help those who needed assistance, to develop the underdeveloped. Many considered it an obligation.

The Cold War: Creating Uplifting Institutions

Now fast-forward from the Progressive Era to the mid-twentieth century and the first intensive effort to improve Latin Americans. These were the dark days of the Cold War, when all foreign and much domestic policy was being made in an anticommunist trance. Senator Joseph McCarthy was an outlier in many ways but was not the only one who warned that "today we are engaged in a final, all-out battle between communistic atheism and Christianity. The modern champions of communism have selected this as the time. And, ladies and gentlemen, the chips are down—they are truly down."⁶

That was in 1950. A decade later, when Cuba's revolutionaries appeared to be moving their chips to the Soviet side of the table, the best and the brightest of JFK's generation decided that development assistance would serve US interests by making Latin Americans less sympathetic to communist appeals. If the United States could improve their daily lives, they would not move their chips.

Cuba was lost by 1961, and the State Department worried that Honduras might be next: "With stagnation in recent years, unrest is growing. Serious obstacles to advancement are dishonest and inefficient administration, poor transportation and difficult terrain, and extremely low educational levels. About two-thirds of the 2 million population is illiterate."⁷

Washington responded with the region-wide Alliance for Progress, administered by a new Agency for International Development (AID or, as the agency now prefers, USAID). Cold War progressives also applauded the creation of a Peace Corps, which sent 5,720 volunteers to Honduras. (Safety concerns led to their withdrawal in 2012.)

During AID's first half century, Honduras received over \$3 billion in all forms of assistance, but with significant year-to-year variation. The Contra War period of the 1980s was the high until recently, but that is now being surpassed. In fiscal year (FY) 2017 the United States spent \$180,947,214 on all types of assistance.⁸

Of that \$180 million, the Agency for International Development was responsible for spending 82 percent, or \$149,375,791. Here is what it was doing:

In Honduras, USAID programs strengthen the participation of marginalized groups in local and national governance; increase food security for the poorest sectors of society; support renewable energy and environmental conservation; expand basic education and skills training for at-risk youth and adults; and improve decentralized health care in terms of quality and access for local citizens and civil society. Efforts also address citizen security through community-based crime prevention activities. USAID projects work to spur economic growth, advance social justice, improve education and health, and engage the poorest members of Honduran society in the country's development.⁹

Ten verbs (underlined) in one three-sentence paragraph is close to par for AID's course. Those verbs suggest that the United States is now addressing almost every social, political, and economic problem Hondurans might have. It is doing the same for Guatemalans and Salvadorans, guided today by AID's Country Roadmaps, "an analytic tool that visualizes each country's overall level of self-reliance and performance on each of 17 self-reliance metrics."¹⁰ We have come a long way since Alexander Graham Bell.

The Results

Despite this development assistance, Honduras appears to be moving backward. In addition to the unfiltered evidence in front of our eyes at the border, Amnesty International notes that Hondurans go about their daily lives in "a general climate of crime and violence." Human Rights Watch agrees: "Violent crime is rampant." Earlier this year, in May, Azam Ahmed titled his *New York*

Times article "Either They Kill Us or We Kill Them." A month earlier, Sonia Nazario had titled her *New York Times* article "Someone Is Always Trying to Kill You." "Migrants are fleeing a society controlled by criminals," she writes. "Unlike much of the world, where most murdered women are killed by their husbands, partners or family members, half in Honduras are killed by drug cartels and gangs. And the ways they are being killed—shot in the vagina, cut to bits, strangled in front of their children, skinned alive—have women running for the border."¹¹

This is the situation after more than six decades of continuous US assistance.

When challenged by these negative assessments, progressive boomers fall back on two responses. First, they argue, conditions in Honduras would be even worse without US aid. "How much worse could it be?" might be Ahmed's and Nazario's response, but that would only trigger an interminable debate about a counterfactual.

The second boomer response is that the United States is getting better at this development business, and now the United States is making real progress. Perhaps. But perhaps we should consider the possibility that decade after decade of development assistance has not simply failed but may be making a bad situation worse. That possibility would not occur to the boomers responsible for today's assistance.

Unfortunately, no one has yet figured out how to conduct a reliable study of this "more harm than good" hypothesis. Clearly, there is no nefarious plot of the type boomers once attributed to a money-grubbing Wall Street or a trigger-happy Pentagon. Instead, a useful focus for the next generation of researchers might be on the mentality—the constellation of beliefs—that boomers have brought to the task of improving other peoples and are now passing along to Generation X. Two of these beliefs seem especially relevant.

Belief 1: Establish Order

The first belief is that *order is a prerequisite of progress*. Order makes progress possible.

When today's progressives talk today about establishing order, they are talking about improving "state capacity," an anodyne term we boomers favor. It can have an almost infinite number of dimensions, but if dollars are the metric then the most important one of these dimensions has always been the improvement of Latin America's military and police, the two parts of the state that provide order. The US Department of Defense has been training and arming the Honduran military continuously since 1954, and various Washington agencies have been training and equipping the Honduran police since 1963.

Honduras currently hosts the Pentagon's Joint Task Force Bravo, with five hundred to six hundred US troops stationed at a base near Palmerola. It is a regional facility for various activities in all of Central America, but the Department of Defense provided Hondurans with \$20.3 million in straight bilateral aid in FY 2017. A current example are the TIGRES being trained by the US Army's Green Berets and the Policía Nacional de Colombia.¹² The goal is to create an uncorrupted unit of the national police, which is widely considered both incompetent and corrupt.

In addition, the FBI is helping establish order with its Transnational Anti-Gang Unit. And since gangs deal drugs, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is doing much the same, while the Department of State is helping establish order with its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). And the Department of Homeland Security is working with all these US institutions plus the Agency for International Development to create and then coordinate task forces to address specific problems. As with all these law-and-order-focused activities, each task force is composed of US advisers and Honduran security forces. Progressive boomers classify all this as building state capacity—the capacity to maintain order.

The outcome? Here is the most recent assessment of the police by Human Rights Watch: "Efforts to reform the institutions responsible for providing public security have made little progress. Marred

by corruption and abuse, the judiciary and police remain largely ineffective. Impunity for crime and human rights abuses is the norm."¹³

It is easier to assess the Honduran military if we go back a decade to 2008–2009, when it looked as if a fairly elected Honduran government led by Manuel Zelaya might rewrite the constitution, perhaps in ways that could lead to dramatic changes. What kind of changes? Well, the Zelaya government had already aligned itself with Hugo Chavez's left-leaning ALBA, and in 2008 it had raised the minimum wage by an average of 58.9 percent.

Clearly alarmed, in 2009 the Hondurans who disapproved of the linkage to ALBA, the Hondurans who disliked paying increased wages, and the Hondurans who worried about amending the constitution—basically, the Honduran elite—turned to the military, which yanked an elected president from his bed and flew him out of the country. Then an interim government conducted an election, which was won by the leader of the conservative National Party, who was the candidate defeated by President Zelaya in the 2005 election.

As the ousted interior minister explained, Honduran progressives had miscalculated: "The impression that stuck with the traditional political class and with the most conservative business leaders of the country was that Zelaya had taken a dangerous turn to the left, and therefore that their interests were in jeopardy. We underestimated the conservatism of the Honduran political class and the military leadership."¹⁴

So here in 2009, the 55th year of Washington's effort to strengthen the Honduran military coincided with the military putting the brakes on change.

The verb "coincided" is used because that much is indisputable—it was the 55th year and there was a coup. Did US military aid cause the coup? Certainly not directly, but would the Honduran military have acted as it did without decades of grooming by the United States? No one can say. Searching for evidence of a US colonel holding a smoking gun is not the same as sinking analytic teeth into the maddeningly vague mentality that accompanied

those decades of providing military hardware and especially training, and of embedding US officers in Latin Americans' armed forces.

One thing is certain: of the hundreds of competent scholars who have studied the US relationship with the Latin American military over several generations, not one of them has uncovered a reason to disagree with Hans Morgenthau, the voice of hard-core Cold War realism: "Military aid is bound to have an impact upon the distribution of political power within the receiving country."¹⁵

In any event, here we are, a decade after the coup, with the UN's World Income Inequality Database indicating that Honduras now has the most unequal distribution of income in Latin America. Promote order by strengthening the right kind of state capacity and there is no need for progress.

Belief 2: Incrementalism

Now add to this pursuit of order the boomers' second belief about development assistance: *incremental change is more desirable than radical change.*

In their Vietnam years a substantial number of young boomers favored radical slogans like "All Power to the People," and "Up Against the Wall, Mother F***ers," but many were attracted to Washington after the US withdrawal from Southeast Asia. There they were inducted into a culture that makes headlines out of absolutist slogans but prizes incremental change. Like their predecessors, we boomers learned to accept half a loaf, to compromise. Take Ted Yoho, a member of the ultraconservative Freedom Caucus of the House of Representatives: "My whole impetus in running for Congress in the first place was to get rid of foreign aid. It was my thing. But if we reformulate and modernize it, yeah, I have no problem with that. There are people who want to do this for humanitarian aid, fine. There are people like me who want to do this for national security, like me, fine."¹⁶

Charles Lindblom's term for negotiating such compromises was "muddling through," and it has always been considered a strength of the US

political system. In democracies, Lindblom argued, "policy does not move in leaps and bounds, [and] a wise policy-maker consequently expected that his policies will achieve only part of what he hopes, and at the same time will produce unanticipated consequences he would have preferred to avoid. If he proceeds through a *succession* of incremental changes, he avoids serious lasting mistakes."¹⁷ As this suggests, muddling through means that the United States rarely reaches closure on any controversial issue, and when Washington manages to reach what appears to be closure, the debate is reopened almost immediately.

So there is only part of a border wall. It is being built incrementally and may never be finished. Should it be completed, a debate will begin about whether it should be torn down.

This commitment to incrementalism guides development assistance. After skimming off their administrative costs—probably a quarter and perhaps more of the \$180 million—the US government's various uplifting institutions divide up what remains into thousands of little pieces based on that ten-verb paragraph. In 2016, for example, the nominally independent but government-funded (99.1 percent in 2018) National Endowment for Democracy (NED), after skimming off its share for administration, granted \$575,000 to a nominally independent National Democratic Institute (NDI), which skimmed off its share and spent the rest to fund "a small office in Tegucigalpa to provide technical assistance to support all the political parties represented in the Congress on transparency and political participation issues."¹⁸

The NED currently has seven additional projects in Honduras—\$40,000 for the Jóvenes Contra la Violencia Honduras to "empower youth leaders to become 'Ambassadors for Violence Prevention' and develop localized campaigns promoting prevention."¹⁹ A \$200,000,000 AID contract with Creative Associates International to operate "Outreach Centers" may seem large in comparison, but first Creative Associates skims off its administrative costs, then splits what is left among four Central American countries, where it is filtered to dozens of individuals centers—nearly fifty in Honduras.

Although it writes checks for larger amounts, AID is following the lead of the US government's Inter-American Foundation (IAF), which since its creation in 1969 has become the gold standard for incrementalism. It currently has 35 active projects worth \$11.3 million in Honduras. One recent grant of \$50,000 to the Centro Integral Misión de Amor is "to improve the quality of life and integration of youth with disabilities by improving their technical skills, raising public awareness through a campaign about the rights of people with disabilities (PWD), and providing sign language training. The project will benefit 90 people and 260 indirectly."²⁰

The belief underlying all this is that if the United States funds enough such projects among enough such recipients, it will enable Hondurans to muddle through from "underdeveloped" to "not so underdeveloped." And that will be the end of migrant caravans.

Progressive boomers often conduct evaluations to determine if they are being successful, and generally find that project X or approach Y is making progress.²¹ They can be excused for not evaluating whether their belief in order-focused incrementalism is holding back progress, since no one knows how to conduct such an assessment. That said, it seems strange that the same boomers who applauded what President Obama said about the Cuba embargo—"When what you're doing doesn't work for fifty years, it's time to try something new"²²—these same boomers appear to have never thought of applying that thinking to evaluating not what they are doing today or the day before yesterday, but what the United States has been doing for more than half a century.

Enter the Traditionalists

Were progressives to apply that thinking to a mega-evaluation and conclude that it was time for the United States to end its effort to improve Central Americans, the traditionalists would block their exit.

In the five years from FY 1994 through FY 1998, which eliminates causal factors that would motivate traditionalists—Cold War anticommunism, drug trafficking, migrant caravans, and the like—in those five years when traditionalists were

uninterested, Hondurans received an average of about \$26 million per year in all types of US assistance, economic and military.²³ Then Honduras became a stop along the drug-trafficking highway between producers and consumers, which the United States had a perfectly legitimate interest in closing. And this trafficking was accompanied by a set of pathologies that encourage emigration, which, given the migrants' choice of countries, the United States also has a right to control.

Soon the budget began to grow, from \$26 million in 1994-1998 to \$180 million in 2017.

Progressives never could have engineered this alone. The fact that assistance increased sixfold indicates that Washington's realists now believe the United States has an interest in becoming involved in Central Americans' development, an interest it did not have in the mid-1990s.

This was nothing new. Like today's traditionalists, realists have always believed that today's development assistance is a useful weapon in the foreign policy arsenal. As Cold War realist Hans Morgenthau argued decades ago: "Foreign aid is no different from diplomatic or military policy or propaganda. They are all weapons." More recently, in 2010, the Obama administration made this type of soft power one of the "3Ds" of national security: "Development, diplomacy and defense mutually reinforce one another in an integrated comprehensive approach to national security." And so, as AID's chief executive said last November: "Our job is to be a vibrant tool in the toolbox of American foreign policy. Foreign assistance must always serve American interests."²⁴

Yes, today's traditionalists believe it will take too long for development assistance to have any impact on Central Americans' decisions to emigrate, but this assistance is useful as a lever—as both a carrot and a stick.

Traditionalists find strengthening state capacity to be especially attractive. It means empowering many recipients who generally oppose dramatic change. Every society has its share of civilians who favor the status quo or, if pushed to do something, believe order-based incrementalism is the best

option. These recipients cooperate because they hold the same beliefs as Washington's boomers. And each receives some carrots—a piece of the \$180 million.

And once these recipients come to depend on development assistance, as anyone might after half a century, traditionalists now have the ability to wield their soft-power stick: a threat to stop the assistance. That is what the Trump administration is now doing, and it probably will succeed. The sledgehammer-subtle message from the White House to Honduras's military and police: the money will stop flowing until you stop your citizens from crossing the border into Guatemala. That country's assistance has also been suspended, so now it is in Guatemala's interest to stop both its own citizens and the Hondurans who manage to slip through.

As for Mexico, it is unclear why the White House recently threatened to increase tariffs instead of withholding the \$79 million in development assistance proposed for FY 2019.²⁵ Perhaps tariffs are a more effective way to tell Mexicans that the United States is serious about stopping migrants before they reach the US border.

Whatever the case, no one can look at the recent aid cutoff and not see that development assistance is being used as an instrument of power. It encourages recipients to do what Washington wants them to do.

The Future?

The longer you study this traditionalist-progressive alliance, the more impressive it seems. Here are two quite different groups of boomers tuned to a common key, a harmonious symphony of assistance performed by an elaborate ensemble of permanent uplifting institutions—an entire industry with tens of thousands of individual players who, like those Honduran recipients, profit personally from the continuous search for one more verb to cram into a three-sentence paragraph that already has ten.

There is no reason to believe that the United States will change its approach to Latin Americans' development so long as the current boomer

coalition is in charge, and so far there is no evidence that its successor Generation X, some of whom are now in their fifties, hold beliefs that differ from the boomers. After all, we progressive boomers also inherited our beliefs about development assistance—"good governance" is today's term for what Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson promoted a century ago—so why should we expect Generation X to do anything other than accept what progressive boomers are currently dropping into their lap—order-based incrementalism?

And on the migration issue there is no logical reason for Gen X traditionalists to withdraw from their alliance with the progressives—to voluntarily give up a useful foreign policy tool.

But who can resist wondering what could happen if the following US generation—the millennials—stopped trying to improve Latin Americans. For that to happen the millennials will have to look closely at what has occurred while we boomers have been in charge. Should they find insufficient time to examine this generation's effort, here is the *Cliff's Notes* summary of an Everest-high mountain of research by hundreds of researchers: from Nicaragua to El Salvador to Guatemala and to Honduras, we baby boomers, following in the footsteps of our predecessors, have *on balance* done more harm than good in Central America.

As with climate change, these researchers will tell you it is no longer a matter of reasonable people disagreeing. It is a matter of fact, and the fact is that the more Washington helps, the worse Central America becomes. You can point out the difference between covariation and causality for only so long; after so many decades of covariation, it is time to accept some level of causality, some level of responsibility.

If the millennials understood what Graham Greene understood about the Quiet American and therefore stopped trying to improve Central Americans, the sledding would almost certainly be rough. Washington would be abandoning a significant number of significant people, and one reason today's aid recipients are significant is that they have been sharing the development assistance pie, including the military and police who anchor

the state's capacity. For that to stop would be to reduce the clout of groups that favor the status quo or order-based incremental change.

No one can say how a US withdrawal would play out—how these recipients and their local adversaries would react—but we know that the redistribution of political power is prone to disorder. In the worst of outcomes there would be the horror of dirty wars, which is not an option anyone should endorse. In the best of outcomes Central Americans would conduct something like Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution, which is an outcome most progressive boomers would vigorously applaud.

About this future we can only hypothesize, always with an awareness that Washington's pessimists are going to foresee gang-sponsored mayhem without today's protectorate. Meanwhile, optimists will hope for a day when Central Americans, having declared their independence from Washington's uplifters, are free to solve their own problems in their own way—free, as the first generation of US citizens wrote in their Fourth of July declaration, to select their principles and organize their powers as to them seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.

Notes

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- ¹ "Common Sense on the Caravan," *New York Times*, November 4, 2018; "Build Central America, Not a Wall," *New York Times*, February 25, 2019.
- ² "Development assistance" is today's more precise term for yesterday's omnibus "foreign aid." This effort to help other peoples "develop" should not be confused with relief from famines or recovery from earthquakes, civil wars, and the like. Obviously there can be some overlap, but nothing that follows is about what is commonly known as *humanitarian* assistance; *development* assistance aims to make others less underdeveloped.
- ³ Delazon Smith to Secretary of State John Calhoun, August 10, 1845, Communications from Special Agents, vol. 13, Special Agents, vol. 13, Record Group (RG) 59, Microfilm Set (M) 37, Reel (R) 6, National Archives (NA); William Hunter to Secretary of State John Forsyth, August 12, 1839, Despatches from Brazil, vol. 11, no. 96, NA M121, R13; John Randolph Clay to Secretary of State Daniel Webster, June 8, 1852, in *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1860*, ed. William R. Manning (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1932-1939), vol. 6, 290n; William Churchwell, Special Agent of the United States to Mexico to Secretary of State Lewis Cass, February 8, 1859, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States*, vol. 9, 1027.

- ⁴ Senator Carl Schurz's speeches, January 11, 1871, and March 28-29, 1871, reprinted in *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Charles Schurz*, ed. Frederic Bancroft, 6 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913), vol. 2, pp. 71-122 and 177-252.
- ⁵ Philander Knox to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 1911, in *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1912, p. 593; Assistant Secretary Francis Huntington Wilson to newspaper editor William Hoster, June 24, 1911, Wilson Papers, Ursinus College. For the same assessment three years later ("there is no hope of improvement and every prospect of worse conditions unless the country is afforded decided help from without"), see Memo, Boaz Long, February 10, 1914, 814.77/259, RG 59, NA.
- ⁶ Senator Joseph McCarthy, speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, February 9, 1950, reprinted along with McCarthy's commentary in *Congressional Record*, February 20, 1950, pp. 1952-1981, quotation p. 1954.
- ⁷ Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Latin America - Current Stage of Progress in Key Socio-Economic Reforms, by Country," Research Memorandum RAR-4, September 4, 1961, NSF Regional Security, Box 215A, Folder "Latin America General 9/61-12/62," JFK Library.
- ⁸ "US Foreign Aid by Country: Honduras" (2017), USAID, <https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/HND> (accessed April 10, 2019).
- ⁹ "About Honduras," <https://www.usaid.gov/honduras>. The verbs in this paragraph have been underlined for ease of reading.
- ¹⁰ "Country Roadmaps," USAID, <https://selfreliance.usaid.gov/>.
- ¹¹ *Amnesty International Report 2015/16*, <https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/pol1025522016english.pdf>; "Honduras: Events of 2018," *Human Rights Watch World Report, 2019*, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/honduras>; Azam Ahmed, "Either They Kill Us or We Kill Them," *New York Times*, May 5, 2019; Sonia Nazario, "Someone Is Always Trying to Kill You," *New York Times*, April 5, 2019.
- ¹² The search for a catchy acronym determined an uncommonly awkward title: Tropa de Inteligencia y Grupos de Respuesta Especial de Seguridad.
- ¹³ "Honduras: Events of 2018," *Human Rights Watch World Report, 2019*.
- ¹⁴ Victor Meza, former Minister of the Interior, in "Honduran Coup Shows Business Elite Still in Charge," *New York Times*, August 6, 2009.
- ¹⁵ Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," *American Political Science Review* 56, no. 2 (June 1962): 308.
- ¹⁶ Glen Thrush, "Trump Embraces Foreign Aid to Counter China's Global Influence," *New York Times*, October 14, 2018. Named one of "Eight Tea Party Morons Destroying America" by *Rolling Stone*, and one of GQ's "America's 20 Craziest Politicians," Yoho was referring to a proposal to consolidate the government's development finance tools, such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Development Credit Authority (DCA) of USAID, into a new Development Finance Institution.
- ¹⁷ Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through,'" *Public Administration Review* 19 (Spring 1959): 79-88, quotations at 84, 86.

- ¹⁸ Email communication from the NDI's Latin America specialist, James Swigert, August 23, 2017. For this project the NED gave the NDI \$475,000 in 2018. For another example, this one a spreadsheet with a stunning 25,814 rows, each about a "commitment" or a "disbursement," see AID's spreadsheet of projects between 2011 and 2017: first go to <https://foreignassistance.gov/#/search>, then type in "Honduras" and click on "Download All Honduras Data" (accessed June 9, 2019).
- ¹⁹ "Honduras 2018," National Endowment for Democracy, <https://www.ned.org/region/latin-america-and-caribbean/honduras-2018/>.
- ²⁰ "Centro Integral Misión de Amor, Public Statement 2017," <https://archive.iaf.gov/our-work/where-we-work/country-portfolios/honduras/2016-cima.html>.
- ²¹ On this see Lars Schoultz, *In Their Own Best Interests: A History of the U.S. Effort to Improve Latin Americans* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), 295–297.
- ²² Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes, December 17, 2014.
- ²³ "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 2017," USAID, <https://explorer.usaid.gov/reports.html> (October 4, 2017): \$35,819,268 (1994), \$23,028,000 (1995), \$21,208,200 (1996), \$29,548,000 (1997), \$23,411,204 (1998), or a total of \$133,014,672 divided by 5 = \$26,602,934. Hurricane Mitch devastated Honduras in October 1998, just as the 1999 fiscal year was beginning, and humanitarian relief (not development assistance) increased substantially during FY 1999 and FY 2000.
- ²⁴ Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," 309; President of the United States, *National Security Strategy*, May 2010; the quotation is from the State Department's press statement unveiling of this new strategy document. USAID administrator Mark Green quoted in Edward Wong, "U.S. Continues Giving Aid to Central America and to Millions of Venezuelan Refugees," *New York Times*, November 3, 2018. (Green's comment at the very end of the article was not included in every *NYT* edition.)
- ²⁵ "U.S. Foreign Aid by Country: Guatemala," USAID, https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/GTM?measure=Obligations&fiscal_year=2017&implementing_agency_id=7; "Foreign Assistance in Mexico," foreignassistance.gov, <https://www.foreignassistance.gov/explore/country/Mexico>. //

Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens Receive 2019 O'Donnell Prize

by **Gabriela Ippolito-O'Donnell** and **Kevin J. Middlebrook**

We are pleased to announce that Professor Evelyne Huber and Professor John D. Stephens were selected as recipients of the 2019 Guillermo O'Donnell Democracy Award and Lectureship.

Evelyne Huber is the Morehead Alumni Professor of Political Science and John D. Stephens is the Gerhard E. Lenski, Jr., Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Sociology at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. They both received their PhD degrees (in, respectively, political science and sociology) from Yale University, and they have both held prestigious research fellowships and grants from, among other sources, the Guggenheim Foundation, National Science Foundation, Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton University), Kellogg Institute for International Studies (University of Notre Dame), and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Multiple book prizes from the American Political Science Association and the American Sociological Association attest to the importance of their academic contributions. Professor Huber is a past president of LASA.

Over the course of their distinguished careers, Professors Huber and Stephens have investigated both the conditions that favor the installation and maintenance of democracy and the conditions under which democracy can function in an egalitarian way, with strong representation for subordinate classes and policies that reduce inequalities in life chances. Inspired in part by Guillermo O'Donnell's challenge to modernization theory and its interpretation of the consistently positive statistical association between development and democracy, their agenda-setting book *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (1992, coauthored with Dietrich Rueschemeyer) argues that the historical origins of mass democracy can best be explained by examining in

a broadly comparative context changes over time in power relations in civil society, between civil society and the state, and in the international economy and system of states. In *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets* (2001), they demonstrate that fostering democratic politics among subordinate classes promotes redistributive social policies in advanced industrial (and postindustrial) societies. And in their most recent book, *Democracy and the Left: Social Policy and Inequality in Latin America* (2012), Professors Huber and Stephens explore the impact of democratization on social policy, poverty, and inequality in Latin America.

The text of their O'Donnell lecture appears in this issue of *LASA Forum*.

We are grateful to Kenneth M. Roberts (Cornell University), Timothy R. Scully (University of Notre Dame), and Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida (Universidade de São Paulo) for their generous service on the award selection committee. //

Guillermo O'Donnell Award Lecture

by **Evelyn Huber** and **John D. Stephens** | University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Receiving this award is really a great honor for us and we are very thankful for it. Guillermo O'Donnell was very important for our intellectual development and for our careers. Guillermo's work on democracy inspired ours, as we shall explain shortly, and his support and intellectual feedback were important for our stay at the Wilson Center in 1983 and later twice at the Kellogg Institute at Notre Dame.

Guillermo was such an insightful social scientist, and he did not shy away from going in pioneering directions and addressing controversial topics. And while he followed the canons of social scientific procedure, he was motivated by deep moral concerns with human welfare. So, he set several successive intellectual agendas for the field. He first played a leading role in the study of democratic breakdowns (O'Donnell 1971), then he did the same in the study of democratic transitions (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), and after that he gave new directions to studies of the quality of democracy and citizenship and their relationship to inequality (e.g., UNDP 2004).

Every one of these scholarly agendas influenced our own intellectual development. When we were in graduate school, the modernization paradigm was hegemonic in North American social science. We were at Yale, home of one of the leading members of the Social Science Research Committee on Political Development, Joseph LaPalombara, and Guillermo had been there a few years before us and had written his book *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*. This book was a bold and fundamentally important challenge to the idea that all countries would follow the path of today's developed countries, and it was really exciting to read it.

In fact, Guillermo's challenge to the modernization paradigm became the starting point for our work on *Capitalist Development and Democracy*. We were acutely aware of the discrepancy between the many quantitative studies of the relationship between development and democracy and their interpretation in the theoretical frame of modernization, on the one hand, and the less numerous but empirically compelling comparative historical studies and their interpretation in a class power theoretical framework, on the other hand. This discrepancy was the starting point for our work with Dietrich Rueschemeyer (1992).

So, what we want to do here is reflect on some of these issues that were so important to Guillermo, from the conditions that support transitions to and maintenance of democracy, to the quality of democracy, or the extent to which promises of democracy are realized in the political process, and finally the consequences of democracy, or the extent to which and under what conditions democracy changes policy.

Capitalist Development and Democracy

Let us begin with the conditions that support transitions to and maintenance of democracy, which we addressed in *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (1992). Our goal was to explain the breakthrough to and maintenance of full democracy, defined as a political system with free and fair elections with universal male suffrage, responsibility of the government to the elected representatives, and freedom of expression and association. Our theoretical frame was built on three clusters of power: the distribution of power in civil society, between civil society and the state, and in the international economy and system of states. We took a very broad comparative view, including all of today's postindustrial democracies plus Latin America and the Caribbean, and a

long historical view covering the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, focusing on changes in power constellations as a result of capitalist development and international competition.

Our central arguments for today's postindustrial societies were the following. Economic development changed power relations in two fundamental respects: it reduced the economic and therefore political power of large landowners, and it facilitated the self-organization of subordinate classes. Urbanization and the spread of literacy facilitated middle-class organization, and industrialization facilitated working-class organization through concentration in factories and cities. The working class was the most consistently pro-democratic force, but democracy was by no means an exclusively working-class affair! First, there are cases of agrarian democracy where the working class played little role (Switzerland, Norway, the North and West of the United States); in these cases the dominant landholding pattern was by small and medium farmers. Second, in order to achieve and stabilize democracy the working class needed allies among small farmers or sectors of the middle class. Moreover, the strength of the enemies of democracy did matter. Where large landowners dominated the countryside and were dependent on a large pool of cheap labor, they were formidable enemies of democratization and worked to undermine democracy when it was installed. Power constellations in the international system shaped chances for democratization insofar as defeat in war weakened authoritarian elites.

The situation in Latin America was very different. The industrial impulse remained weaker than in Europe and North America, and accordingly large landowners remained more powerful and the working class remained smaller and weaker, and democratization was a more difficult process as a result. Urbanization and economic growth did expand the middle classes, and they became the leading pro-democratic force. However, the middle classes fought for full democracy, including universal suffrage, only in the presence of a strong labor movement. Regarding our third cluster of power, Latin America's position in the international economy and system of states was particularly unfavorable for democratization, at least

until the end of the Cold War. Economically, the location on the periphery of the world economic system retarded industrialization and entrenched dependence on raw material exports, with its attendant cyclical fluctuations. Politically, the location in the US sphere of influence strengthened authoritarian elites and weakened organizations of subordinate classes through overt and covert interventions, from the military invasions in Central America and the Caribbean in the first part of the twentieth century to interventions during the Cold War.

It is important here to explain our conceptualization of class and of classes as social actors, because this is what distinguishes us from some of the newer authors who infer interests from class position and use rational choice models to explain democratization. We conceptualize class, following Elster (1985, 330–331), as “a group of people who by virtue of what they possess are compelled to engage in the same activities if they want to make the best use of their endowments.” Thus, classes are shaped by the structure of capitalist economic production. However, this definition does not delineate class boundaries. We follow Weber ([1922] 1968) and use the criterion of easy and typical mobility (mobility closure) and social interaction and communication (interaction closure) to delineate class boundaries. However, we emphasize that one cannot infer subjective class interests and class action from an objective class position. Rather, class formation, or the formation of class consciousness, class organization, and collective action, is a historical and sociological process; there is nothing automatic about it. Working-class ideology was shaped by the main organizers; in Europe those were mainly Socialists, though Christian Democrats and anarchists organized followers too. In Latin America, Socialists and anarchists were active as well, but they often faced competition from charismatic leaders whose main interest was the construction of a personal power base. If the main organizer was such a charismatic leader, personalistic loyalty could substitute for ideology (e.g., Perón in Argentina).

Newer Work on Democratization

In this brief piece, we cannot possibly mention all the work on democratization that has been published since the publication of *Capitalist Development and Democracy* in 1992. Rather, we want to point to some major types of theoretically distinctive work that have attracted attention and assess how the findings of the authors pursuing these types of work relate to our own. Newer work in the comparative historical tradition has focused on processes of democratization, analyzing individual episodes of progress and regress on the path to democracy (Collier 1999; Ziblatt 2017). These authors partly find different actors responsible for advances toward democratization. Specifically, Collier (1999) argues that we overestimated the role of the working class in European transitions. Our response is that you will get different results if you focus on earlier steps on the path to democratization rather than on the breakthrough to full democracy with universal male suffrage. If the issue is accountability of the executive to a parliament elected with property-based suffrage, you would expect different actors to be leading. Similarly, if the issue is extension of the franchise to males with property, you would expect different actors to be involved. It has even happened for universal suffrage to be introduced legally by competing elites in the absence of an organized working class or peasantry, such as in Chile in the nineteenth century, but *de facto* elites remained in control of the electoral process, so this episode of democratization did not lead to full democracy because the system violated the criterion of free and fair elections.

As we argued in *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, “the more you reduce the time frame and the number of cases in an analysis (individual episodes of institutional change in one society), the more you hold structure/power constellations constant and privilege strategic choices of actors” (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 31–35). By focusing on specific episodes of or steps toward democratization, the timeframe of analysis is greatly reduced. However, it is important to analyze the context of structural constraints under which actors operate, and this context can only be highlighted by comparison of cases

over long time periods. Moreover, a long-term perspective enables an analysis of sequences of actions and events, and sequence does matter to establish causality.

A second major type of work on democratization has built on models based on rational choice assumptions (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Ansell and Samuels 2014). These authors focus on inequality and its consequences for democratization. They insist that their models are superior to more structurally focused comparative historical analyses because they are based on micro foundations. The micro foundation is a micro model of human behavior in which the behavior is the result of actors’ preferences. These preferences are basically materialistic or, if more complex, generally (tautologically) inferred from the actors’ behavior. The models that assume materialistic preferences then infer conflicts of interest from individuals’ position in the income distribution, and they implicitly deny the social construction of class interests. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) postulated a U-shaped relationship between inequality and democratization: Where inequality is low, there is no reason for the masses to pressure for democratization, and where it is too high, the masses lack the capacity for effective action and elites have too much to lose. In their book, they did not perform any statistical analyses nor did they feel obligated to address the findings of comparative historical work. In a 2013 APSA Newsletter article (Acemoglu et al. 2013) they acknowledged that the postulated relationship was not supported by statistical analyses. Boix argued that elite resistance varied depending on the type of assets; fixed assets made elites more vulnerable and thus more strenuously opposed to democratization than liquid assets. Ansell and Samuels (2014) argued that democratization is the result of rising elites demanding protection from expropriation. Their conceptualization of elites is extremely broad, extending to the ranks of skilled workers. Where our analyses are compatible is in their emphasis on the importance of land as a fixed asset and thus as a theoretical reason for elites to resist democratization. We went beyond simple land ownership, though, and argued that

the additional condition for intransigent resistance to democratization on the part of large landowners was the need for a large cheap labor force.

Weyland's (2014) work on diffusion also focuses on actors' strategic choices, but he starts from a micro foundation that is diametrically opposed to that of rational choice analysis. He builds on the notion of bounded rationality, that is, the assumption that people use a number of cognitive heuristics to make sense of events around them. Specifically, he emphasizes the heuristics of availability, if events are vivid or close, and of representativeness, if circumstances appear similar. Individuals have a tendency to interpret vivid events in circumstances seemingly similar to their own as events that could happen to them, or that they could set in motion. Such cognitive heuristics galvanized people into actions of regime contention at different historical times and thus created waves of pro-democracy mobilization.

Weyland analyzes how these cognitive heuristics shaped behavior in different institutional contexts and thus integrates organizational density into his framework. Essentially, the denser the organizational environment is, the less important are these cognitive heuristics in shaping regime contention. Organizational leaders have more experience and perform more careful analyses of possible courses of action than nonleaders. Moreover, negotiations among organizational leaders slow the process and improve chances for success compared to spontaneous mass action. Thus, he finds that later waves that occurred under conditions of greater organizational density were less influenced by cognitive heuristics and had greater rates of success than earlier waves.

Whereas we agree that explanations of human behavior based on the assumption of bounded rationality have a strong grounding in psychological theories and are a useful corrective to the explanations based on rational action, we would put more weight on macro organizational variables to explain macro level outcomes like regime change. We would interpret Weyland's findings in a power constellations framework and argue that the denser organizational environment changed power relations. Certainly, examples in other places,

particularly if they are close or appear very similar in circumstances, can trigger pro-democracy mobilization, but in order for such mobilization to be successful, power constellations must be favorable. Thus, less reliance on cognitive heuristics in 1848 would not have led to greater success at that point, as the organizational power base of the forces attempting to bring about regime change was not strong enough.

The most recent type of work examining the relationship between distributive conflicts and democratization consists of the careful statistical analyses by Haggard and Kaufman (2013) and Haggard, Kaufman, and Teo (2016). They examined regime changes in the third wave, from 1980 to 2008, and found that 40-45 percent of democratic transitions were not motivated by distributive conflicts, that is, they were not a result of direct pressure from below inducing elite concessions. Rather, these transitions were initiated by incumbents due to intralite conflicts and/or external pressures. However, 75 percent of transitions in high-inequality contexts were conflict transitions. Moreover, they found that manufacturing, which is an indicator of the strength of the industrial impulse, had a consistent impact on conflict transitions. This finding is certainly compatible with our emphasis on the effect of capitalist development on the capacity of subordinate classes to organize and pressure for democratization.

In light of this most recent work, we have to engage in the following self-criticism. We should have been more explicit about the scope conditions of our theoretical generalizations. We never claimed to have a universal theory of democracy, but we should have specified that our generalizations pertained to the first and second waves of democratization in the course of the great transformation of industrialization in the core countries and in Latin America. Dynamics of the third wave have been different, though they can still be usefully analyzed and explained with our three clusters of power. The third wave of democratization coincided with deindustrialization and a concomitant weakening of labor in much of the world. At the same time, the left largely abandoned any revolutionary commitments. These

two developments combined to reduce the threat perception on the part of elites and thus their resistance against democratization. Nevertheless, pressures from civil society as a whole remained important for democratization, whether in defense of human rights or in protest against economic and social policies that depressed living conditions of the masses. Finally, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international system became at least temporarily more permissive or even supportive of democratization.

The Quality of Democracy

Capitalist Development and Democracy was published in 1992, so we finished writing it in 1991, just when the transitions in South America had come to an end and citizens and scholars alike had become concerned with the quality of the new democracies. Again, Guillermo's work was pointing the way, in particular his contribution to the 2004 UNDP report *State of Democracy in Latin America*. He provided a tightly articulated theory of a democracy of citizenship and a state-of-the-art empirical diagnostic of the state of the dimensions of citizenship. He proposed to assess democracy from the point of view of citizenship, founded on Marshall's conception of civil, political, and social rights. His core argument was that the citizen has to have the capacity for autonomous decision-making. High degrees of poverty and inequality undermine this capacity and thus undermine the very essence democracy. At the time, this was an extremely important contribution politically as well as social scientifically, because it highlighted the hypocritical inconsistencies in the positions of technocrats and politicians who professed a commitment to democracy but an opposition to redistributive state action.

We addressed the question of the relationship between formal or electoral democracy and the quality of democracy in terms of the realization of political equality in participation and policy responsiveness in a 1997 article with Dietrich Rueschemeyer entitled "The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions." We worked with the same definition of formal democracy as in *Capitalist Development and Democracy* and defined

participatory democracy as a formal democracy with high levels of participation without systematic differences across social categories. We defined a social democracy as one with increasing equality in social and economic outcomes. We argued that the forces that historically had promoted democracy in the first wave remained the forces that mobilized subordinate classes into participation and also became the forces that promoted the construction of the welfare state.

The formal, participatory, and social dimensions of democracy mutually reinforce one another. Formal democracy is necessary to make possible participatory and social democracy, and the forces that push for effective formal democracy also support advances toward participatory and social democracy. Lower economic and social inequality in turn has positive feedback effects in that it supports higher levels of participation and lower differences across categories, and those in turn help enforce accountability and effective realization of civil rights. However, just as these dimensions can be part of a virtuous cycle, they can also be part of a vicious cycle, where high inequality and lack of power of subordinate groups depresses their political participation and thus their capacity to claim their rights, hold elites accountable and ensure free and fair elections, and influence policy in a redistributive direction.

The international community generally regards countries as democracies when they meet the test of regular and apparently reasonably free and fair elections with universal suffrage. However, many of these countries are deficient in other criteria that define formal democracy. Most prominently, accountability is often weak because of overpowering presidents and weak legislatures and judiciaries. Second, civil and, to a lesser extent, political rights are very unevenly protected across classes, genders, and territorial units. Third, patrimonialist practices blur lines between the public and the private realms. The poor quality of formal democracy then depresses participation and prevents public policy from rectifying the underlying conditions of very high inequality. If power relations in civil society are driving democratization, chances of virtuous cycles

are higher. If external forces or elite conflicts are driving democratization, the probability of a vicious cycle is higher.


Empirical support for the contention that the strength of civil society is important for drawing people into political participation and for improving the quality of democracy comes from the large international research project Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). That project provides time series data, based on expert surveys, for electoral democracy, egalitarian democracy, and participatory democracy. It also has an index for the civil society organization (CSO) participatory environment, which assesses the density of civil society on a four-point scale based on whether there are few or many CSOs, and whether most people don't belong or do belong to one or more CSOs. The lines in the graph show the trajectory of the CSO participatory environment and of electoral, participatory, and egalitarian democracy in Latin America from 1980 to 2014. The shaded areas indicate the confidence intervals. It is certainly striking how closely the lines move in tandem. Obviously, this graph cannot establish causality, but the correspondence is impressive.

As noted, we argued in the “Paradoxes” article (1997), as well as in our 2001 book *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State*, that the forces that historically had promoted democracy in the first wave also became the forces that promoted the construction on the welfare state in today's postindustrial societies. To the extent that the third-wave transitions responded to different dynamics and these forces were weak, welfare state construction would be held back.

However, formal democracy did hold out the promise or the possibility that forces representing the interests of the underprivileged might organize and gain strength and ultimately influence policy such as to improve human welfare for the masses. And this process became the focus of our 2012 book, *Democracy and the Left: Social Policy and Inequality in Latin America*.

Consequences of Democracy

In this book, we started from the basic fact that social policy in Latin America for a long time had failed to reduce the high degrees of poverty and inequality in most countries, and we asked whether



democracy made a difference for social policy and for reducing poverty and inequality. In other words, we were interested in exploring whether democracy made a difference for people's welfare—and how. We wanted to know whether democracy in the medium and longer run would lead to changes in social policy and to a reduction in poverty and inequality. There clearly are important differences between Latin American countries in their levels of poverty and inequality, and we wanted to see whether countries with longer democratic records had shaped policy (social policy but also labor market policy and more) such as to combat poverty and inequality more effectively than others.

Of course, we also wanted to know what it is about democracy that affects social policy and poverty and inequality. Specifically, we wanted to know how the power balance between political parties with different types of commitments shaped our dependent variables. In terms of social policy, we were particularly interested in income support and health and education, or human capital policies. We wanted to know which kinds of policy regimes were particularly redistributive and what kinds of social and political forces shaped such regimes. We carried out both quantitative analyses and systematic comparative analyses of historical processes. Specifically, we identified who—which parties and interest groups—pushed what kinds of policies, who won and why, how the policies were implemented or not, and what kinds of effects they had on poverty and inequality and on political support for the forces that favored the policies.

In a nutshell, our main findings were that the strength of the democratic record, operationalized as years of democracy since 1945, had a strong impact on social spending, particularly on investment in human capital, as well as on poverty and inequality. We also found that it took some 20 years of democracy for this effect to take hold. This makes sense if we think about the causal chain that links democracy to lower poverty and inequality. Democracy affords the opportunity for the organization of subordinate classes and for the growth of parties representing their interests. Then these parties need to gain sufficient electoral support to be able to influence social and labor

market policy in the legislature, and finally they and the civil society organizations supporting the policies have to be able to enforce effective implementation of the policies. It is important to emphasize that there is nothing automatic about any of these processes. Democracy by no means guarantees organization of subordinate classes and growth of left parties, it simply offers a more favorable environment for these processes to take place than capitalist authoritarianism, which was the alternative regime form in Latin America, except for Cuba, in the second half of the twentieth century. In Latin America, only three countries had reached the threshold of more than 20 cumulative years of full democracy in 1990 (Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Venezuela); 9 countries, or half of the countries in our study, reached this threshold by 2000, and a total of 11 by 2005.

We explored the impact of the strength of left and center-left parties by constructing a summary variable that is the cumulative average of the percentage of legislative seats held by left and center-left parties and the presence of a left or center-left executive, both in democratic years only from 1945 on. We found no partisan effects on spending but we did find effects on poverty and inequality. What these quantitative findings suggest is that parties of all stripes spent more on social policies under democracy, but left and right allocated that spending differently. Left parties shaped spending patterns in a more redistributive direction. We know that particularly social security spending in Latin America traditionally benefited income earners in the upper half of the income distribution. Still, we found that social security and social assistance spending combined reduced poverty and, in a democratic context, actually reduced income inequality as well.

It is worth having a closer look at policies and their distributive profile. We choose an example from Brazil in 1997 that is very illuminating and quite typical for Latin America. The distributive profile of social security is very different from that of social assistance, and those of health and education spending are different yet again.

Household Income and Government Expenditure by Income Quintile: Brazil 1997

	INCOME	SOCIAL SECURITY	SOCIAL ASSISTANCE	HEALTH	EDUCATION
Top quintile	66	51	8	19	27
Fourth quintile	17	19	16	23	19
Third quintile	10	15	22	22	18
Second quintile	5	8	25	20	18
Bottom quintile	2	7	29	16	17
Gini, Quasi-Gini	56	40	-20	4	9

ECLAC (2005: 144, 158)

This table illustrates the two meanings of progressive and regressive incidence of spending. The first meaning of “progressive” is that the poor get more than their proportional share and the rich get less. So in Brazil in 1997, only social assistance was progressive by this definition. Health was more or less proportional, with both the bottom and top quintiles receiving less than their share, and education was moderately regressive, with the top quintile receiving the largest share. Social security was massively regressive, with the top quintile receiving over half of the total. The second meaning of “progressive” compares the incidence of spending to the distribution of income before taxes and transfers. The underlying idea here is that if the benefit is financed by a proportional tax, then it will redistribute income downward if it is more equally distributed than pre-tax and transfer income. From this point of view, even social security in Brazil in 1997 was redistributive, and social assistance and social services were massively so.

By the way, this is an important point to keep in mind: In all countries, and particularly in Latin America, if one assigns monetary value to education and health services, welfare states are much more redistributive than if one just looks at cash transfers. The implication is that if tax systems are roughly proportional in contexts of highly unequal market income distributions, one can achieve very significant redistribution even with transfer systems and social services that

benefit all income quintiles. This is important for the construction and maintenance of a political support base for such policies.

Our comparative historical analysis corroborated the findings from the quantitative analyses, and it allowed us to establish causality. In other words, we could demonstrate which kinds of parties pushed what kinds of policies with different distributive profiles. We also explored differences between left or center-left parties and found that left parties with close ties to social movements pushed more strongly for redistributive policies than their counterparts without these ties, the electoral-professional parties in Pribble’s (2013) terms. In addition, the comparative historical analysis allowed us to identify particularly serious obstacles to redistributive policy reform in democracies, such as policy legacies with a strong role of private providers of education and health services and political institutions with a high degree of fragmentation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we hope to have established that power constellations matter not just for the installation but also for the quality of democracy, in its electoral, participatory, and social dimensions. Specifically, the strength of civil society organizations mobilizing the underprivileged and of political parties representing their interests is crucial for the quality of democracy because these organizations can defend political and civil rights,

demand accountability of elected leaders, mobilize underprivileged groups into participation, and pressure for policies that lower inequality. Formal or electoral democracy makes it possible for such organizations to strengthen but does not ensure that they will strengthen. Moreover, organizational strength—just like elections—can be lost just as it can be gained, and competition among these organizations is likely to weaken them. Clearly, left parties have been losing elections recently in Latin America, but it is worth noting that divisions in the left were responsible for most of these defeats, rather than a massive turn of the electorate against the policies promoted by the left. But this would be a topic for a whole other lecture.

So, let us just end by pointing out that the problems of democracy, to the study of which Guillermo devoted his life, are far from solved, but that the intellectual directions in which he pointed us remain central and vibrant.

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LASA/Oxfam America 2019 Martin Diskin Memorial Lecture

por el Padre **José Alberto Idiáquez Guevara, S.J.**, Rector de la Universidad Centroamericana (UCA),
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Quiero iniciar expresando mi profundo agradecimiento al Comité 2019 del premio *Martin Diskin Memorial Lectureship* por haberme otorgado este especial reconocimiento. Conozco muy bien a la primera persona que lo recibió en 1998, el P. Ricardo Falla, y para mí es un inmenso honor formar parte de este grupo de personas comprometidas con el activismo y el saber. Desde luego, no estaría recibiendo este galardón si no fuera por las dos personas que me nominaron: la Dra. Irina Carlota Silber, de City College of New York, y la Dra. Serena Cosgrove, de Seattle University.

Sin querer pretender falsa humildad, quiero expresarles que vengo a recibir este premio en nombre de los jóvenes asesinados, los presos políticos, los desaparecidos y las madres de cada uno de ellos. Para mí, este premio es de ellos.

Una razón por la cual estoy aquí recibiendo este honor es porque he permanecido en Nicaragua hasta el día de hoy, trabajando como Rector en la Universidad Centroamericana. En ese sentido, he estado presente durante lo que podría considerarse como la peor crisis que ha sufrido la UCA desde su fundación, y una de las peores crisis que ha sufrido el país en toda su historia. Desafortunadamente, esta situación no es algo inusitado en mi vida. En enero de 1989 la Compañía de Jesús me retiró de El Salvador, donde me encontraba trabajando con comunidades marginadas. Mis compañeros que se quedaron en el país ya no están con nosotros.

En noviembre de 1989 fueron asesinados seis de mis compañeros y maestros jesuitas, y mis amigas Elba y Celina, en el campus de la UCA de El Salvador. De aquel hecho tan doloroso, y con una mirada evangélica e ignaciana, he sacado lecciones que guían mi labor en la UCA de Nicaragua.

En primer lugar, aquel crimen se convirtió para mí en una muestra más de cómo se asesina a quien busca la verdad. Asesinaron al justo: fue así de sencillo. Fue un ex-alumno del colegio de los jesuitas en San Salvador, el Externado San José, el teniente Espinoza, jefe del Comando Atlacatl, quien dio la orden de disparar a los sacerdotes. Un mes después de haber participado en el asesinato, Espinoza llegó a saludar a los jesuitas de la comunidad del que había sido su colegio. Ocho días después aparecía en los medios asumiendo su responsabilidad en el crimen. En el colegio tenemos alguna foto del padre Segundo Montes entregando el diploma de bachiller a quien años después lo asesinaría.

Rememoro esta tragedia porque es importante asumir que la educación no tiene como objetivo preparar ni para el éxito, ni para el prestigio, ni para la competencia. Prepara para buscar mayor eficacia en la construcción de una sociedad más justa.

Otra lección que saqué del asesinato de nuestros compañeros fue recordar cuán fuertemente fueron criticados por todos los sectores de la sociedad salvadoreña. Ellos decían lo que tenían que decir desde su posición académica, sabiendo que era imposible quedar bien con todo el mundo en un contexto de tanta violencia, de tanto empobrecimiento, de tanta polarización política. Eran conscientes de lo que les podía suceder. Años antes, en marzo de 1977, otro jesuita, el padre Rutilio Grande, ya había sido asesinado en la parroquia campesina de Aguilares y en los años siguientes otra docena de sacerdotes había perdido la vida por ser fieles a su compromiso con el humanismo cristiano y con el acompañamiento del sufrimiento humano de sus compatriotas.

Algunas de las personas que criticaban severamente a mis compañeros jesuitas, en cuanto inició la ofensiva final de la guerrilla y los combates se trasladaron a la capital, huyeron buscando asilo en organismos internacionales y embajadas, mientras los jesuitas y nuestras dos amigas se quedaron en el lugar de siempre y fueron asesinados.

En esos días las madres de los jóvenes asesinados, muchas de ellas mis vecinas y amigas, no cesaron en la búsqueda de los cadáveres de sus hijos. Recorrimos morgues, basureros, calles, buscando. Aprendí de ellas, de la valentía con la que enfrentaban su dolor. Su inquebrantable tenacidad es algo que quedó marcado de forma indeleble en mi mente y mi corazón.

El padre Amando López, uno de mis hermanos asesinados, también fue rector de la UCA de Nicaragua entre 1979 y 1983. Fue mi profesor de filosofía en quinto año de bachillerato y mi acompañante espiritual cuando decidí entrar en la Compañía de Jesús. Después fue mi profesor de teología y mi director espiritual mientras estudiaba en la UCA de El Salvador. Amando me enseñó a pensar desde la perspectiva de los pobres de la tierra y a asumir con humildad y con dignidad mi identidad de clase. El libro base para nuestra clase de filosofía era "Pedagogía del oprimido", de Paulo Freire. Diez meses antes de que lo mataran, cambiaba yo impresiones con él sobre las críticas que estaban recibiendo y él me decía: "Lo importante es mantenernos fieles al Evangelio y no defraudar la causa de los pobres. Nos vendrán más críticas y cada vez más fuertes. No te olvides que estamos viviendo en una guerra y eso significa ser atacados más que recibir honores". Estar al lado de los excluidos de este mundo implica muchas veces ser tenido por loco o idealista.

Después del brutal impacto que me causó el asesinato de mis hermanos, la forma en que los mataron, después de experimentar mucha incertidumbre y confusión, alguna certeza empezó a invadir mi caminar. Nada mejor para expresarla que las palabras del obispo de la Amazonía, Pedro Casaldáliga, en su libro "Descalzo sobre la tierra roja". Confiesa Casaldáliga:

"Cada vez estoy más confuso y al mismo tiempo más seguro. Sea en materia de economía y política, sea en materia de inculturación y de religión. Estoy más confuso en el sentido de que veo más de lo que veía, siento exigencias que no sentía, reconozco errores que antes no percibía... En este sentido estoy más confuso, porque descubro cada día más mundos, más horizontes, más caminos y más contribuciones que desconocía. Pero también me siento cada vez más seguro porque lo fundamental lo veo cada vez más fundamental, y uno de los principios que ahora me orientan más y me satisfacen es: relativizar lo que es relativo y absolutizar lo que es absoluto. Todo es relativo excepto Dios y el hambre. Y cuando digo "hambre" quiero decir la vida humana. En la palabra hambre englobo todas las necesidades básicas y fundamentales de la vida humana".

Este mensaje de Casaldáliga impacta a quienes trabajamos en el mundo académico. En definitiva, nos invita a pensar en cuál es el sentido de estar en las aulas, de investigar, de contribuir a generar pensamiento.

Otra lección duradera del asesinato de mis dos amigas y mis seis compañeros es que cuando asumimos un compromiso con seriedad y queremos llegar hasta las últimas consecuencias, no hay espacio ni para el victimismo ni para el fatalismo. En la pedagogía que nos enseñó Ignacio de Loyola, la primera condición para poder resistir con dignidad es no permitir que la maldad del mundo destruya en nosotros el espíritu de humilde agradecimiento para no dejarnos atrapar por la lógica de la violencia o por el resentimiento. El padre Pedro Arrupe, quien fuera nuestro superior general de 1965 a 1983, decía: "Cuando el odio del otro origina el nacimiento del odio en nosotros, somos nosotros los vencidos, a pesar de que consigamos aplastar al adversario". Y esas palabras, para mí, reflejan la gran lección que nos está dando el pueblo autoconvocado en Nicaragua: la rebelión cívica y pacífica que hemos visto, que se resiste a dejarse arrastrar por la lógica de la violencia a pesar de enfrentarse permanentemente al odio aplastante del régimen opresor.

¿Qué pasaba antes de abril en Nicaragua?

En abril de 2018 Nicaragua vivió una rebelión ciudadana espontánea e inesperada para el gobierno y para todos. Sus expresiones fueron mayormente pacíficas, cívicas y sin líderes visibles. Fue la juventud de las principales ciudades del país la que se rebeló contra el gobierno.

Desde fuera parecía que en Nicaragua las cosas iban bien. La economía, siempre dentro del modelo neoliberal, funcionaba, y no había la violencia que hay en El Salvador, Honduras y Guatemala.

Quienes vivíamos en Nicaragua sabíamos que las cosas no iban bien y presentíamos que iban a acabar muy mal. La preocupación tenía sustento en el rumbo que llevaba el país desde el regreso al gobierno de Daniel Ortega, su esposa y sus allegados.

Tras unas elecciones de dudosos resultados en noviembre de 2006, Ortega comenzó a aplicar métodos de control social y político que fueron derivando en una dictadura institucional.

En su primer mandato (de 2007 a 2011) abundó la millonaria cooperación petrolera venezolana. Los millones del favorable crédito petrolero no pasaron por el presupuesto de la república, de ellos nunca hubo rendición de cuentas. Ortega los privatizó. Con esos recursos palió la pobreza de algunos grupos sociales, desarrolló una estrecha alianza con el capital nacional tradicional y acrecentó su fortuna familiar y la de su círculo más cercano en una variadísima gama de negocios (hoteles, publicidad, canales de televisión...). El más lucrativo era el de la importación y distribución de los combustibles.

En las elecciones municipales de 2008 Ortega quiso ganar el mayor número de alcaldías. Asistimos al primer gran fraude electoral, el mejor documentado en el país, con el cual inauguró su camino a la dictadura.

Paso a paso Ortega comenzó a someter a todas las instituciones del Estado a la voluntad del Ejecutivo, a su voluntad personal. A la vez, Rosario Murillo, que controlaba la comunicación del gobierno y

todo el gabinete social, incrementaba su poder de decisión. La primera institución que colapsó, y se demostró plenamente en el fraude de 2008, fue el Poder Electoral. La Corte Suprema, la Contraloría, la Fiscalía, fueron poco a poco controladas por favores y prebendas. Hoy, 24 instituciones conocidas como “entes descentralizados”, que pertenecen al Ejecutivo, carecen de autonomía y son Ortega y Murillo quienes deciden todo lo que en esas instituciones se hace o deshace.

Las elecciones presidenciales de 2011, que fueron un nuevo fraude, resultaban importantes pues su objetivo era, además de retener la Presidencia, conseguir la mayoría absoluta de diputados en el Poder Legislativo. Así le garantizarían la aprobación de leyes con prácticamente nulo debate y sin consultas. Sobre todo, le permitirían reformar la Constitución, la Ley del Ejército y la Ley de la Policía, como en efecto lo logró en su segundo mandato (de 2011 a 2016). Además de la reforma de la Constitución, causó especial preocupación la resolución judicial amañada que le garantizó la Corte Suprema para permitir la reelección indefinida.

También preocupó la aprobación, sin consulta y en tiempo record, de la ley de la concesión canalera (en 2013). Por esta ley la soberanía nacional quedaba prácticamente en manos de un desconocido empresario chino que iba a construir un canal interoceánico por Nicaragua. El proyecto, de haberse realizado, hubiera causado una catástrofe ambiental. La ley existe y nadie conoce qué consecuencias traerá para nuestro país.

Este polémico proyecto motivó el movimiento de protesta más consistente en Nicaragua antes de la rebelión de abril. Fue un movimiento ciudadano de campesinos y campesinas que vivían en la zona de la ruta canalera y que serían expropiados de sus tierras. Se organizaron en el Movimiento en Defensa de nuestra Tierra, el Lago y la Soberanía, realizando más de un centenar de movilizaciones en la zona y llamando la atención internacional.

Ortega llegó a 2016, año en que habría nuevas elecciones presidenciales y legislativas, con un control prácticamente absoluto del Estado, pero con algunas limitaciones que no había tenido hasta

entonces. La cooperación petrolera venezolana venía reduciéndose por la crisis en Venezuela y era evidente el descontento en la sociedad por el exceso de control en todos los ámbitos de la vida.

Conseguir un empleo, una beca, una resolución judicial justa, un permiso, cualquier trámite en cualquier entidad del aparato estatal, dependía cada vez más del aval de los secretarios políticos del partido de gobierno en los municipios y en los barrios de las ciudades. La gente comenzaba a sentirse temerosa por la creciente indefensión ante las instituciones del Estado. La confusión Estado-Partido-Familia era evidente en la vida política y económica del país.

El sistema educativo empezó a debilitarse por decisiones políticas. Y en un país con un porcentaje muy grande de personas que no cubren sus necesidades básicas, era fácil que el poder las hiciera sentirse más como objetos de dádivas y favores que debían agradecer, que como sujetos de derechos que el Estado debía respetar y garantizar.

Las Comisarias de la Mujer, uno de los más importantes avances conseguidos en años anteriores, desaparecieron. La Ley contra la Violencia hacia las Mujeres, otro avance importante, fue alterada. Y desde el poder se ordenó no hablar más de “violencia contra las mujeres”, sino de “desentendimiento familiar”.

Cualquier manifestación de descontento era reprimida. Los campesinos anti-canal eran especialmente perseguidos. Y el modelo de “diálogo y consenso” de Ortega con el gran capital nacional les garantizaba, también a los inversores internacionales, que en sus empresas nunca habría huelgas y que podrían pagar los salarios más bajos de Centroamérica. En las zonas rurales del Norte había grupos de rearmados con motivaciones políticas. Muchos de sus líderes, calificados como delincuentes, fueron siendo eliminados por el Ejército en ejecuciones extrajudiciales. Y en la Costa Caribe la población indígena nunca dejó de sufrir muertes, desplazamientos y la continua invasión y despojo de sus tierras ancestrales. Esto me consta por los años de trabajo etnográfico que he realizado junto con comunidades garífunas.

En esta situación de control del poder y de adormecimiento o acomodamiento resignado de la población, a mediados de 2016 Ortega, preocupado por la posibilidad, no de perder la Presidencia, pero sí de perder la ventajosa mayoría absoluta en el Parlamento, tomó tres decisiones que consideramos son también antecedentes de la crisis de abril.

Valiéndose del control que tenía en la Corte Suprema, Ortega expulsó del Parlamento a todos los diputados de oposición. Al mismo tiempo proscribió a la alianza política de centro-derecha y centro-izquierda que se disponía a disputarle el poder y lograr escaños parlamentarios en las elecciones.

La tercera decisión fue elegir a su esposa, Rosario Murillo, como candidata a la Vicepresidencia de la República. Demostraba así que su proyecto no sólo era autoritario y estaba en marcha una dictadura institucional, el proyecto también era dinástico. Murillo se colocaba de primera en la línea de sucesión. El “fantasma” de la dictadura dinástica de Somoza, que duró medio siglo, apareció en el imaginario nacional.

En las elecciones de 2016 asistimos a la abstención mayor de la historia electoral nicaragüense. Pudo haber llegado a un 80 por ciento de la población votante. El distanciamiento del pueblo no se puede desvincular de los niveles de corrupción y de pobreza. A medida que crecía la corrupción, se debilitaba la cultura democrática y se reforzaba la cultura de la migaja y la limosna.

El pueblo de Nicaragua, que en apenas diez años había tenido la experiencia de sacar en 1979 una dictadura (la de Somoza) por las armas y de sacar un gobierno autoritario en 1990 (el del FSLN) por los votos, tenía cerradas ambas vías: no quería volver a las armas y no lograba elegir con sus votos.

¿Qué pasó en abril?

2018 inició en un ambiente de relativa calma. Los antecedentes inmediatos a la rebelión de abril fueron dos: ambos ligados a la conciencia de la juventud millennial de Nicaragua. En marzo, Murillo anunció que las redes sociales eran nocivas y que

se dictarían leyes para regularlas. Y a inicios de abril, una amplia extensión de la reserva biológica Indio-Maíz, al sureste de Nicaragua, fronteriza con Costa Rica, empezó a ser consumida por un incendio incontrolable. La juventud ambientalista del país se manifestó en la UCA exigiendo del gobierno respuestas más decididas y urgentes, que nunca llegaron.

Cuando lo que llegó fue un diluvio, que sofocó el incendio, el 16 de abril Ortega dio luz verde a una reforma a la seguridad social —en bancarrota por malos manejos del gobierno—, que entre otras medidas reducía las pensiones de las personas de la tercera edad.

El 18 de abril las protestas por la reforma a la seguridad social fueron reprimidas con extrema violencia, como ya era habitual, por “fuerzas de choque” del gobierno, miembros de la Juventud Sandinista y “motorizados”. Lo diferente en esta ocasión fue que al día siguiente, 19 de abril, hubo más jóvenes protestando en León, Managua, Masaya y otros puntos del país. Eran jóvenes defendiendo a sus abuelos y abuelas, a los ancianos que verían reducidas sus pensiones. Estudiantes de varias universidades del país protestaban en las calles. Y comenzaba a unírseles la población.

Ese día se hizo visible el rechazo generalizado de gran parte de la población nicaragüense ante los agravios, injusticias y abusos del régimen. El rechazo se había ido acumulando a lo largo de una década. Y por fin estalló. Fue un despertar, una “insurrección de la conciencia”.

La respuesta del gobierno ante las protestas, que no pararon de crecer desde ese día en las principales ciudades del país, y en buena parte de municipios más rurales, fue una represión desproporcionada. “Vamos con todo” fue la orden que dio Murillo el 19 de abril a los secretarios políticos de todo el país. “Todo” significaba cualquier medio, por criminal que fuera, con tal de sofocar la rebelión.

Por eso, desde el primer momento, policías antidisturbios y francotiradores emplearon armas de guerra. “Disparar a matar” fue el título que en su primer informe Amnistía Internacional utilizó para relatar la letal respuesta elegida por el régimen en

los meses de abril y mayo. La represión desmedida actuó como gasolina que se echa al fuego. Y ya en abril, la imaginación empática y la indignación convirtieron la rebelión juvenil en un movimiento de alcance nacional, de gente de todas las edades y de todas las clases sociales, una rebelión con contenido político y una determinación de cambiar cosas... tan estables aparentemente hasta entonces.

La juventud universitaria fue la primera que despertó en abril. La siguió la juventud en general. A la juventud la siguió la mayoría de la población. Fueron jóvenes estudiantes quienes despertaron a un país. “¡Eran estudiantes, no eran delincuentes!” fue la primera consigna que se coreó en las calles.

En Nicaragua matar universitarios significa matar el sueño de las familias pobres. Tener un hijo o una hija universitaria es la ilusión más acariciada por los pobres. Para lograrlo ahorran, se empeñan, se esfuerzan. Esto es fundamental para entender el repudio que provocó que el régimen disparara contra universitarios. “Todo te dejamos pasar, pero jamás hubieras tocado a nuestros chavalos” decía una cartulina que llevaba en sus manos una mujer en la primera marcha que hubo en Managua. Desde ese cartón le hablaba a Daniel Ortega. Todo —las instituciones controladas, los fraudes electorales, la corrupción generalizada—, todo se lo dejaron pasar, pero no que matara a los chavalos, a los jóvenes universitarios.

Al despertar, Nicaragua estaba asombrada y esperanzada. El movimiento crecía, era autoconvocado, nadie lo dirigía, nadie lo organizaba. En Managua se desarrollaron en abril y mayo varias movilizaciones masivas, nunca antes vistas. Igual sucedía en León, en Masaya... por todo el país. Muy pronto, los campesinos organizados en la lucha anti-canal encontraron en el levantamiento de tranques en las carreteras su forma de aportar a las protestas. Los pobladores de las ciudades replicaron el método y a mediados de mayo buena parte de la circulación vehicular estaba en dificultades por todo el país.

La marcha del Día de las Madres, 30 de mayo, en Managua fue la movilización más grande conocida en el país. Medio millón de personas de todas las edades recorrieron unos 10 kilómetros de la

capital de forma pacífica. Los disparos que ese día segaron la vida de una docena de jóvenes, en las inmediaciones de la UCA, marcaron el inicio del terror. Ese día, tan especial cada año en Nicaragua, sentimos que el régimen no conocería ni límites ni escrúpulos para sofocar la rebelión ciudadana.

Uno de los símbolos más poderosos de este momento histórico de Nicaragua, en correspondencia con el papel central que la Madre ha tenido siempre en Nicaragua, son las mujeres madres de los asesinados reclamando justicia y las madres de los encarcelados exigiendo su libertad. Tienen una fuerza enorme sus testimonios, su valentía, su presencia, su determinación. No es gratuito que el régimen decidiera atacar la marcha del Día de las Madres. Disparar ese día llevaba el mensaje del “vamos con todo” con que había iniciado la represión.

Ya desde el 22 de abril Ortega había retirado la reforma a la seguridad social y llamado a un diálogo nacional solicitando que los obispos fueran sus mediadores. El 16 de mayo inició el diálogo. Apenas duró hasta el 23 de junio. Fue más un ejercicio “de reconocimiento televisado” de las dos fuerzas en pugna: el régimen y los azul y blanco.

Las sesiones del diálogo evidenciaron la falta de voluntad política del régimen para lograr una salida que significara un cambio democrático. Fue en el diálogo cuando el régimen comenzó a calificar lo ocurrido de “golpe de Estado”, manteniendo hasta hoy esa interpretación de lo ocurrido.

Durante el diálogo, el régimen inició la llamada “operación limpieza” para derribar los tranques y barricadas que por centenares había por todo el territorio nacional. Policías uniformados y armados con armas de guerra, acompañados de parapolicías, hombres de civil y encapuchados, desarrollaban operativos militares propios de un ejército de ocupación. Sucedió así en Masaya, en Jinotepe, en Diriamba, en Jinotega . . . La “limpieza” culminó a mitad de julio y dejó decenas de personas ejecutadas y decenas de detenidas por haber llevado alimentos a los tranques, por haber curado heridos, por haber participado en esta forma de protesta territorial.

A pesar de todo, si el diálogo no consiguió ningún acuerdo para detener la represión ni para responder a las demandas ciudadanas de democracia, sí tuvo un logro de extraordinaria importancia: la llegada a Nicaragua en mayo de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH), organismo autónomo de la OEA. Y en junio, la llegada del Mecanismo de Seguimiento para Nicaragua (MESENI) y del Grupo Interdisciplinario de Expertos Independientes (GIEI), ambos organismos de la OEA. También llegó ese mes la Oficina del Alto Comisionado para los Derechos Humanos de la ONU. Los informes elaborados por estos organismos, investigando y documentando lo que había pasado en Nicaragua hasta que en agosto (OACNUDH) y en diciembre (MESENI y GIEI) fueron expulsados del país, abrieron los ojos del mundo a la tragedia nicaragüense.

¿Qué está pasando hoy?

Estamos en un callejón de muy difícil salida. En un país de unos 6 millones de habitantes, gobernado con mano de hierro por dos personas señaladas de cometer crímenes de lesa humanidad según el informe del GIEI, que permanecen aferradas al poder, sin voluntad alguna de cambio, negando los hechos que ocurrieron en abril, calificándolos obcecadamente de “golpe de Estado fallido”.

Según la CIDH unas 325 personas han perdido la vida en este alzamiento ciudadano. El número de heridos se calcula en unos 4 mil, pero pueden ser muchos más. Muchos quedarán con discapacidades de por vida. No es posible precisar el número de personas desaparecidas. Se calcula en 60 mil las personas que han tenido que exiliarse forzosamente para salvar sus vidas de una represión que no ha cesado ni un solo día. La mayoría ha huido a Costa Rica, que ha actuado con una solidaridad que nunca agradeceremos suficientemente. Capturadas, apesadas y acusadas de terrorismo han sido incontables.

Hoy, más de 600 personas permanecen en las cárceles del país, siendo torturados y en condiciones infrahumanas una buena mayoría. El 16 de mayo, al año de comenzar el primer Diálogo Nacional, fue baleado por la espalda en la Cárcel Modelo de Tipitapa, Eddy Antonio Gómez Praslin.

Llevaba más de cinco meses encarcelado, acusado de “terrorismo”. Su verdadero delito fue unirse a las protestas de la juventud en Matagalpa. “Yo lucho por ustedes porque mi tiempo ya pasó”, les decía a los muchachos. Diecisiete presos políticos resultaron heridos en ese ataque. El saldo de sangre resulta desmesurado para tan corto espacio de tiempo y en un país tan pequeño.

Esto no fue un golpe de Estado. Nunca aparecieron los planes del grupo golpista, que tampoco nunca nadie ha identificado. Así lo han reafirmado los organismos internacionales de derechos humanos: no hay evidencias de que la interpretación oficial sea la correcta. Tampoco fue un golpe financiado por Estados Unidos contra un gobierno de izquierda. Las relaciones de Ortega con Washington durante una década fueron muy cordiales. El gobierno de Ortega era de clara orientación neoliberal... aunque con una retórica anti-imperialista. Nicaragua estaba abierta a las transnacionales, la minería extractiva avanzaba aceleradamente. El control de la familia Ortega Murillo garantizaba estabilidad en comparación con los países del triángulo norte.

Lo que pasó en abril fue totalmente imprevisible, también para Estados Unidos. En año y medio la población nicaragüense no dudó más. Despertó y decidió luchar por un cambio. Aunque desde hace años pensamos que esto iba a “acabar mal”, nunca sospechamos el nivel de criminalidad, crueldad y saña que el régimen Ortega-Murillo y sus seguidores llevaban dentro.

Después de un año de haber iniciado esta lucha, la sociedad nicaragüense está herida y dañada muy profundamente. En una sociedad con familias numerosas no hay nadie que no haya llorado a un muerto o a un capturado... También es una sociedad dividida, porque aunque es una mayoría la que repudia a la pareja gobernante, también hay sectores fanatizados por lealtad y admiración a Ortega —no a Murillo— y sectores que reciben prebendas por colaborar con la represión.

Después del dolor por los asesinados, el dolor más extendido en el país es el de las familias con presas y presos políticos. El tiempo ha demostrado

que la cantidad de los encarcelados responde a convertirlos en rehenes de Ortega, fichas para cualquier negociación.

A todos los presos políticos se les han violentado todos los derechos que les garantiza la ley. Fueron capturados por autoridades policiales sin orden judicial o fueron secuestrados en sus casas o en lugares públicos por civiles armados que operan con los policías. Se les ha violentado el derecho a la presunción de inocencia, presentándolos ante los medios como delincuentes, sin pruebas y sin pasar por los tribunales. Retenidos por más tiempo del que ordena la ley (48 horas) para presentarlos ante un juez, todos han pasado semanas o meses encarcelados.

El maltrato y las torturas al interior de las cárceles ha sido el patrón: interrogatorios en la madrugada, amenazas, reclusión en aislamiento, con falta de sol, de luz, de ventilación, de suficiente agua, de alimentación adecuada, de atención a problemas de salud. Y también, golpizas, humillaciones, uñas arrancadas, violaciones sexuales...

Un año de crisis política y social ha derivado en una aguda crisis económica que mantiene a Nicaragua en recesión técnica desde el mes de octubre. La economía se viene desplomando. Medio millón de personas ha perdido el trabajo que tenía, la inversión se ha reducido a cero, el turismo ha colapsado, se ha fugado a bancos extranjeros el 30 por ciento de los depósitos en dólares que guardaba la banca nacional. En medio de esta recesión, una reforma presupuestaria, desesperadamente recaudatoria, impuesta por Ortega en febrero de 2019 para cubrir el déficit presupuestario, profundiza el estancamiento económico. La “marca país” de Nicaragua como “el país más seguro de Centroamérica” se derrumbó.

A un año de la rebelión de abril Ortega y Murillo están derrotados, pero aún no lo aceptan. Su ilegitimidad de origen —por sucesivos fraudes— y su ilegitimidad de ejercicio, por las graves violaciones de derechos humanos que han cometido, son conocidas ya mundialmente.

Ortega se mantiene en el poder por las armas con que sus policías y paramilitares continúan capturando, asediando, y en las zonas rurales y en el Caribe matando; y por las armas del Ejército, cómplice silencioso en toda esta etapa. Ortega se ha mantenido aplicando una política de terrorismo de Estado y controlando las instituciones y las leyes, que manipula a su antojo. Con armas, leyes y funcionarios sumisos continúa imponiendo su voluntad.

Las fortalezas de la población, manifestadas durante meses en las calles de todo el país y en su capacidad de multiplicar la indignación, se han visto reducidas a la resistencia. Desde fines de septiembre, y después de realizar desde abril marchas masivas de protesta contra el régimen por todo el país, cualquier movilización fue declarada ilegal por la Policía. Los derechos a la organización, a la manifestación, a la concentración y a la libre expresión han sido cancelados de facto. Nicaragua vive hoy un estado de excepción no declarado. Impera el terror desde el poder y la población tiene miedo. O como dijo un preso político: Nicaragua es hoy un país de enterrados, encerrados, desterrados y aterrados... pero no de derrotados.

En diciembre de 2018 se profundizó la represión. En vísperas de la Navidad fueron ilegalizadas varias organizaciones de la sociedad civil (de derechos humanos, de investigación sobre políticas públicas, de atención a las mujeres...), allanadas sus instalaciones y confiscadas sus cuentas bancarias. Fueron también confiscados dos medios de comunicación de gran influencia: el sistema de medios de *El Confidencial*, dirigido por Carlos Fernando Chamorro, hoy en el exilio, y el de *100% Noticias*, dirigido por Miguel Mora y Lucía Pineda Ubau, ambos exalumnos de la escuela de Comunicación Social de la UCA, hoy aislados en las cárceles, acusados de incitar al odio por ejercer un periodismo crítico. Unos 60 periodistas nicaragüenses han tenido que huir del país, después de amenazas contra ellos y sus familias. Muchos siguen informando desde Costa Rica y Estados Unidos lo que ocurre en Nicaragua y la población los sigue por Internet.

La resistencia de la población azul y blanco, su principal fortaleza, se ha visto potenciada por la presión internacional. Además de la presión que mantienen las organizaciones de derechos humanos de la OEA y de la ONU y organismos como Amnistía Internacional o Human Rights Watch, que informan periódicamente de lo que ocurre en Nicaragua, denunciando las graves violaciones de derechos humanos que ocurrieron y siguen ocurriendo, el gobierno de Estados Unidos ha sancionado a funcionarios clave del gobierno de Nicaragua.

La primera sanción (Ley Global Magnitsky) le fue aplicada en diciembre de 2017 al presidente del Poder Electoral, Roberto Rivas. En julio de 2018, después de la sangrienta "operación limpieza" les fue aplicada la Ley Global Magnitsky al Jefe de la Policía y consuegro de Ortega, Francisco Díaz, al secretario político del partido de gobierno en Managua, Fidel Moreno, y al presidente de Albanisa (contraparte de la petrolera venezolana PDVSA) y tesorero del partido de gobierno, Francisco López. Todos aparecen sancionados por graves actos de corrupción y los tres sancionados en julio por graves violaciones a los derechos humanos. En noviembre de 2018 una sanción insólita afectó, por los mismos delitos y por una orden ejecutiva, a Rosario Murillo y al operador de la pareja presidencial para "trabajos sucios", Néstor Moncada Lau, con consecuencias similares a las que produce la Ley Global Magnitsky.

Las sanciones internacionales, especialmente éstas, individualizadas, han sido de enorme importancia para desgastar al régimen.

¿Qué podemos hacer?

¿Qué podemos hacer para hallar una salida a este callejón en el que nos metió la represión despiadada con que el gobierno respondió a la insurrección de abril?

Una de las características más positivas de esta rebelión es haber sido mayoritariamente cívica, ciudadana. En un país que ha vivido sus casi 200 años de independencia de guerra en guerra, que está acostumbrado a resolver por la fuerza de las armas sus conflictos, el hecho de que la mayoría de la población se haya mantenido en la convicción de

que la salida debe ser cívica es un logro enorme. Es un cambio en la realidad política nacional que hay que relevar, conservar y apoyar. Hay que mantener ese civismo, pero sin que dé ocasión a Ortega de continuar imponiéndose por la fuerza y por el engaño.

Una de las características de estos meses es que, por convicción y por necesidad, la oposición azul y blanco, la organizada y la desorganizada, ha reunido a jóvenes muy jóvenes con gente mayor, a estudiantes con empresarios, a campesinos con gente de la ciudad. De esa unidad puede salir, esperamos, un nuevo proyecto para Nicaragua. Hay que apoyar esa unidad, incentivándola.

El futuro del país, cuando todo esto pase, se vislumbra muy complicado. Nicaragua necesita de una negociación para salir de Ortega y Murillo. Pero para salir de los escombros materiales y morales de esta etapa hará falta mucho más. Es indispensable garantizar, con apoyo internacional, el desarme de los grupos paramilitares acostumbrados a actuar criminalmente y con total impunidad durante meses. Y es indispensable organizar de nuevo a la Policía Nacional.

Hará falta cooperación internacional para garantizar un auténtico proceso de justicia transicional, no conocido nunca en Nicaragua a pesar de haber vivido tantos episodios de guerra y violencia. Un proceso que, partiendo de lo ya investigado por el GIEI, asegure conocer la verdad de lo ocurrido, acceder a la justicia, a la reparación y a la no repetición de tragedias como la vivida desde abril. Necesitamos, como recuerda con insistencia la jurista guatemalteca Claudia Paz y Paz, integrante del GIEI, que “el mundo no deje de mirar a Nicaragua”. Eso es lo que necesitamos.

Desde la Universidad tenemos mucho por hacer. Desde el quehacer académico, nuestra Universidad busca el poder que tiene la verdad para así dar nuestro aporte a las transformaciones que necesita Nicaragua. Y como lo que caracteriza a la Universidad y al mundo universitario es ser el espacio en donde convive la diversidad de credos y de pensamientos, creemos que es acoger y respetar toda esa diversidad la que va a potenciar nuestro quehacer docente, nuestras investigaciones

y todas nuestras tareas de proyección social. Recordando el asesinato de mis hermanos, me interesa señalar que una formación humanista debe preparar a nuestros estudiantes para asumir el fracaso sin renunciar a sus metas y para convivir con las propias debilidades sin decepcionarse.

Ni los seres humanos, ni tampoco las instituciones, estamos exentos de limitaciones, debilidades y egoísmos. San Ignacio fue un gran visionario, pero nunca dejó de ser realista para comprometerse con lo que era viable realizar, sin desanimarse nunca por los fracasos. Y como buen maestro de la sospecha, proponía someter nuestra vida a una prueba de realidad: el proceso de discernimiento que él sugiere es un aprendizaje no sólo de los engaños del mundo, sino de las traiciones que nos hace nuestra propia mente.

Una Universidad no puede ser neutral, no puede permanecer impasible ante la dolorosa realidad. Queremos construir una comunidad en diálogo fecundo, preguntándonos siempre con libertad para qué trabajamos y al servicio de quiénes trabajamos. Bien lo sabía nuestro hermano Ignacio Ellacuría. En su último discurso, pronunciado diez días antes de ser asesinado en el campus de la Universidad Centroamericana de El Salvador, afirmaba: “Suele decirse que la Universidad debe de ser imparcial. Nosotros creemos que no. La Universidad debe pretender ser libre y objetiva, pero la objetividad y la libertad pueden exigir ser parciales. Y nosotros somos libremente parciales a favor de las mayorías populares, porque son injustamente oprimidas y porque en ellas, negativa y positivamente, está la verdad de la realidad”.

El caso de Álvaro Conrado, un jovencito de 15 años, estudiante del Colegio Loyola de los jesuitas, a quien un francotirador mató de un disparo en el cuello el 20 de abril cuando llevaba agua a los universitarios que protestaban cerca de la catedral de Managua, es un caso emblemático de esta lucha. Cuando converso con su mamá, supuestamente ella en busca de consuelo en mi persona, soy yo quien sale consolado. La he visto crecer en los medios de comunicación. Una mujer tímida, callada, ahora es vocera de la junta directiva de AMA (Asociación de Madres de Abril), que por cierto tiene su oficina en la Universidad

Centroamericana. Lisbeth, como las madres salvadoreñas que buscaban los cuerpos de sus hijos, y como las madres quichés de Pueblo Nuevo en la selva del Ixcán en Guatemala, con quienes tuve el privilegio de buscar en las fosas comunes los restos óseos de los cadáveres de sus familiares, siempre guardaron la esperanza de encontrar a sus hijos y seguir luchando para que se hiciera justicia. Nunca dejaron de luchar contra un sistema perverso y excluyente para que se hiciera justicia por sus hijos, esposos, hermanos.

“Me duele respirar” fueron las últimas palabras de Alvarito Conrado al caer herido de muerte. Esa frase conmovió a todo un país. “Hoy Nicaragua respira por vos” decíamos en las marchas de mayo, en el momento de máximo entusiasmo y esperanza. “Queremos una Nicaragua en la que a nadie le duela respirar” decimos hoy pensando en el futuro. //

CONVOCATORIA DE PROPUESTAS



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LASA2020

América Ladina: vinculando mundos y saberes, tejiendo esperanzas

GUADALAJARA, MÉXICO / 13-16 DE MAYO DE 2020

América Ladina, pretende dar un paso en la misma dirección que el apelativo Nuestra América, en lugar de América Latina, que subraya la latinidad de esta región, es decir sus vínculos con Europa, y oculta o deja de lado la participación de otras poblaciones como las amerindias y de origen africano en este proceso. La expresión América Ladina, acuñada por la intelectual afro-brasilera Lelia González, busca visibilizar explícitamente la presencia de estas poblaciones y las poblaciones mestizas en el proyecto social de Nuestra América, y reivindicar esta ancestría plural de la que fuimos desposeídos.

¿Por qué “vincular mundos, saberes y disciplinas” y “tejer esperanzas”? En primer lugar, porque las marcadas tendencias conservadoras, excluyentes, misóginas y racistas que caracterizan este reciente “giro a la derecha” con el que nos enfrentamos en nuestra región, exigen un gran esfuerzo mancomunado intelectual y político para poderlas explicar y desafiar. En segundo lugar, porque la racionalidad neoliberal, que esparce los valores del mercado en cada esfera de la vida, ha fragmentado y roto el tejido social de la región y el reconocimiento de una común humanidad, incrementando las desigualdades de clase, género, etnicidad y color de piel. Y, en tercer lugar, porque en este contexto necesitamos propiciar la posibilidad de pensar e interpretar diferentes maneras de vida colectiva, y de generar diversas prácticas colaborativas de producción del conocimiento.

Ante la constatación de los efectos de esta derechización del continente y el desaliento que produce y se generaliza, vale la pena volcar nuestra mirada y nuestras expectativas hacia las enseñanzas que brindan muchas de las experiencias concretas y cotidianas de las y los prójimos cercanos de esta América Ladina, para sostener la vida colectiva e individual, humana e inter-especies, preservándola, reparándola y prolongándola. Ellas y ellos han entretejido vínculos sociales, practicando los principios de solidaridad, cuidado mutuo y compartir

recíproco. Pero, ¿en qué medida estas experiencias han incidido en las políticas públicas o se ha escuchado sus voces en los órganos de decisión política?

En la perspectiva que abre el proyecto de América Ladina, los “estudios latinoamericanos” junto a otras formas de pensamiento ancladas en las luchas por la despatriarcalización, la emancipación y la descolonización, pueden responder de nuevas maneras a las preguntas propias y a las necesidades tanto intelectuales como materiales de esta región.

El Congreso de LASA2020, en Guadalajara, invita a dar algunos pasos en esta dirección; vinculando de manera cada vez más estrecha el legado intelectual internacional con las realidades y experiencias “ladino-amefricanas”; estimulando un profundo análisis de la estructura y dinámica del poder y la dominación que incluya lo comunicacional, lo mediático y los contra-públicos de las redes sociales; fomentando los debates horizontales e interdisciplinarios entre las y los estudiosos latinoamericanos, y con los movimientos sociales; incorporando a las y los académicos que trabajan sobre América Latina y se comunican principal o exclusivamente en inglés, en igualdad de condiciones, es decir sin una voz privilegiada o dominante; promoviendo una mayor participación de intelectuales indígenas y afrodescendientes (mujeres y hombres) en todas las secciones; mejorando las oportunidades para que estos intelectuales participen en las distintas actividades académicas que promueve LASA.

Necesitamos entrelazar mundos y saberes que abordan los mismos problemas desde perspectivas y ángulos diferentes y cuya separación ha sido acentuada por las lógicas del mercado y las tendencias políticas derechizantes. Requerimos tejer esperanzas, intelectuales, sociales, ecológicas, políticas y culturales para avanzar en el camino sinuoso de búsqueda de un futuro sostenible en el cual América Ladina tiene lecciones de sobrevivencia y re-existencia para compartir.

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LA FECHA LÍMITE PARA EL ENVÍO DE PROPUESTAS ES EL
5 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 2019, A LAS 5 p.m., HORA DEL ESTE

CONSULTE LAS INSTRUCCIONES
EN LA SIGUIENTE PÁGINA.

Se le invita a proponer una ponencia o un panel que aborde el tema del congreso o cualquier tema relacionado con el temario del programa. LASA también recibe solicitudes de subvenciones de viajes de quienes presenten ponencias o paneles y reúnan los criterios para calificar. Visite el sitio web de LASA para ver los criterios de elegibilidad. Todas las propuestas de ponencias, paneles y subvenciones de viajes deben enviarse a la Secretaría de LASA a través del sistema de propuestas en línea, antes del 5 de septiembre de 2019, a las 5 p.m., hora del este.

La fecha límite para el envío de propuestas es el 5 de septiembre de 2019, a las 5 p.m., hora del este.

Los formularios de propuesta y las instrucciones estarán disponibles en el sitio web de LASA: <https://www.lasaweb.org/>

No se aceptan presentaciones por correo postal. Se enviará un correo electrónico de confirmación inmediatamente luego del envío con éxito de la propuesta. Si no lo recibe, comuníquese con la Secretaría de LASA antes de la fecha límite para confirmar el envío a lasa@lasaweb.org.

Todos los participantes deberán inscribirse previamente en el congreso.



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TEMARIO DEL PROGRAMA Y MIEMBROS DEL COMITÉ

Seleccione el tema más apropiado para su propuesta de la siguiente lista e ingréselo en el espacio designado del sistema de envío. Puede enviar solo un tema. Los nombres de los miembros del comité del programa se proporcionan solo a modo informativo. Envíe su correspondencia ÚNICAMENTE a la Secretaría de LASA.

Afrodascendencia: territorios, luchas y epistemología

Ingrid Bolívar (Universidad de los Andes)
Tatiana Alfonso (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México)

Arqueología y patrimonio

Cristina Oehmichen Bazán (Instituto de Investigaciones Antropológicas-UNAM)

Biodiversidad, cambio climático y políticas ambientales

Astrid Ulloa (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)
Andrea Zhouiri (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais)

Ciudades y urbanismo

Jaime Amparo-Alves (CUNY/ICESI)

Cuestiones agrarias y rurales

Carla Gras (UNSAM-CONICET, Argentina)
Sergio Pereira Leite (Universidade Federal Rural de Rio de Janeiro)

Cultura, poder y subjetividades políticas

Amarela Varela (Universidad Autónoma de la Ciudad de México)
Elizabeth Velásquez (Evergreen College)
Miguel González (York University)

Culturas expresivas: artes visuales, música, teatro y danza

Hettie Malcomson (University of Southampton)
Zenaida Osorio (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)

Democracias en crisis, ciudadanía alternativas

Jaime Zuluaga (Universidad Externado de Colombia)
Tulía Falletti (University of Pennsylvania)

Deporte y sociedad

Julia Hang (UNLP/CONICET, Argentina)
Rodrigo Soto (Universidad Andrés Bello, Chile)
Sergio Varela (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México)

Derechos humanos y políticas de memoria

Pilar Riaño-Alcalá (Universidad de British Columbia)
Santiago Garaño (Universidad de Buenos Aires)

Economía y políticas sociales

Juliana Martínez Franzoni (Universidad de Costa Rica)

Educación, ciudadanía e inclusión

Emma Fuentes (University of San Francisco)
Rocío Moreno (Universidad de Guadalajara)

Estado de derecho, derechos, y ciudadanía

Ana María Arjona Trujillo (Northwestern University)
Enrique Desmond Arias (Baruch College)

Estudios de cine

Amaranta Cesar (Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia)

Estudios de juventud e infancia

Valeria Llobet (Conicet- Universidad Nacional de San Martín)
Elena Jackson Albarrán (Miami University, Ohio)

Estudios laborales y relaciones de clase

Nadya Guimarães (Universidade de São Paulo)
Paulo Fontes (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro)

Etnicidad, raza y pueblos indígenas

Christina Sue (University of Colorado at Boulder)
Genner Llanes-Ortiz (Universidad de Leiden)

Feminismo negro e indígena en América Latina

Flavia Rios (Universidade Federal Fluminense)
Gladys Tzul Tzul (Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla)

Género, sexualidades y estudios LGBT

Lamonte Aidoo (Duke University)

Historia e historiografía

Carlos Macías Richard (CIESAS Peninsular)

Instituciones y procesos políticos

Christy Thornton (Johns Hopkins University)
Eduardo Dargent (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú)

Interacciones sur-sur y transregionales

Pedro Pablo Gómez (Universidad Distrital Francisco José de Caldas)

Interrogando los estudios latinoamericanos

Vasundhara Jairath (Indian Institute of Technology)
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Carlos Decena (Rutgers University)
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Lenguas y literaturas indígenas

Rosa Yáñez Rosales (Universidad de Guadalajara)

Literatura de las Américas

Marco Antonio Chavarín (El Colegio de San Luis)

Literatura y cultura: enfoques interdisciplinarios

Viviane Mahieux (University of California, Irvine)
Javier Guerrero (Princeton University)

Masculinidades y feminismo

Teresa Valdés (Observatorio de Género y Equidad)
Norma Fuller (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú)

Medios de comunicación y cultura popular

Cristian Alarcón (Universidad Nacional de San Martín)
Rossana Reguillo Cruz (ITESO - Universidad Jesuita de Guadalajara)

Migración, desplazamientos, diásporas

Marie-Laure Coubès (Colegio de la Frontera Norte)
Maria Emilia Tijoux (Universidad de Chile)

Otros saberes: los métodos colectivos y la política de investigación

Christopher Loperena (Cuny Graduate Center)
Héctor Nahuelpan (Universidad de los Lagos/ Comunidad de Historia Mapuche)

Periodismo, noticias y democracia

John Dinges (Columbia University)
Rocío Silva Santisteban (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú)

Pluralismo lingüístico y políticas lingüísticas

Fidencio Briceño Chel (Centro INAH Yucatán)

Política y desigualdad

Merike Blofield (University of Miami)
Carmen Ilizarbe (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú)

Políticas de género y reacción antigénero

Gloria Careaga (UNAM)

Pueblos indígenas: territorios, luchas y epistemología

João Pacheco de Oliveira (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro)
Ernesto Díaz-Couder (Universidad Pedagógica Nacional, México)

Raza, racismo y política racial

Luciane Rocha (University of Manchester)

Relaciones internacionales y geopolítica

Renata Segura (Social Science Research Council)
Cynthia Sanborn (Universidad del Pacífico)

Relaciones y políticas del cuidado

Bila Sorj (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro)
Javier Pineda Duque (Universidad de Los Andes)

Religión y espiritualidad

Renée de la Torre (CIESAS – Occidente)
Nahayelli Juárez (CIESAS-Peninsular)

Sociedad civil y movimientos sociales

Gabriela Delamata (Universidad Nacional de San Martín / CONICET)
Marisa Revilla Blanco (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)

Teorías decoloniales y del buen vivir

Verónica López Nájera (UNAM)
Emenek Mejía (Universidade Federal da Bahia)

Verdad, justicia, reparación y no-repetición

Francesca Lessa (University of Oxford)
Elizabeth Lira (Universidad Alberto Hurtado)

Violencia e inseguridades

Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)

LASA2020: La reconfiguración de la región latinoamericana

por **Regina Martínez Casas**, LASA2020 Co-chair | Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social | reginamc@ciesas.edu.mx

La región latinoamericana se encuentra en proceso de grandes cambios políticos y demográficos. Están surgiendo hitos en la historia regional que quienes nos dedicamos a estudiar fenómenos sociales tenemos el privilegio de documentar. El riesgo es perdernos en la velocidad de los cambios y en la complejidad de los procesos que vivimos en nuestra vida cotidiana, pero también a través de los diferentes medios de comunicación. La experiencia de “estar allí” en distintos países de la región y presenciar los conflictos, tensiones y desafíos que se enfrentan en diversas esferas nos representa una gran oportunidad para hacer investigación novedosa y con compromiso social. Por otro lado, implica también una gran responsabilidad con nuestras instituciones y con quienes colaboran con nosotros proporcionándonos información que nos permite seguir llevando a cabo nuestra labor académica y de difusión de nuestros resultados de investigación. Nunca tuvimos acceso a tanta información de manera simultánea pero tampoco nunca estuvimos tan vigilados en lo que hacemos, decimos y escribimos. Nos encontramos generando nuevos marcos narrativos e interpretativos para hablar de América Latina desde la propia región y fuera de ella y en este proceso se incorporan nuevas voces como aquellas de colegas provenientes de pueblos indígenas y de comunidades afrodescendientes de toda la región.

La compleja relación que se ha construido entre la región Latinoamericana y los Estados Unidos forma parte del escenario que nos toca experimentar y documentar. Vivimos de manera cada día más estridente, descalificaciones, insultos, expresiones xenófobas, misóginas, homófobas y racistas. Por otro lado, experimentamos incipientes movimientos solidarios y esperanzadores que apuntan a una mayor equidad de género, de

reconocimiento a los derechos culturales y de nuevas expresiones artísticas, pero nos preocupa que no resulten todavía suficientemente efectivos como para contrarrestar fenómenos violentos como las desapariciones, los feminicidios y otras realidades que atentan contra toda la sociedad, especialmente contra quienes se encuentran en situación de mayor vulnerabilidad. En el último año, los cambios en la orientación política de muchos de los gobiernos de la región se encuentran redefiniendo la geopolítica de todo el subcontinente latinoamericano no solo con Estados Unidos y Canadá, sino también con el resto del mundo. Los movimientos pendulares que han hecho girar las posiciones políticas de muchos países generan preocupación e incertidumbre. Las hegemonías continentales están cambiando y las dinámicas que mueven personas, mercancías, intereses económicos y expresiones culturales se han vuelto más densas. En este complejo escenario, los espacios de diálogo que buscamos generar el LASA2020 estarán marcados por la convergencia de miradas desde diferentes realidades nacionales, distintas perspectivas disciplinares y nuevos marcos analíticos.

Seguramente algunos de los temas que históricamente se han discutido en LASA seguirán presentes, como es deseable, pero estamos convencidos de que esta es una buena oportunidad para formular nuevas preguntas, diferentes metodologías y mejores reflexiones ante las problemáticas que aquejan a la región como las violencias, las desigualdades sociales, los desastres medioambientales, las discriminaciones, los desplazamientos y la movilidad humana forzada. También encontraremos nuevos espacios para las expresiones artísticas en la diversidad que nos caracteriza como comunidad.

Guadalajara, en el estado mexicano de Jalisco será —por segunda ocasión— anfitriona de LASA. Esta ciudad del Occidente de México es cuna de la abolición de la esclavitud en territorios que fueron parte de la corona española hasta el siglo XIX, es también una metrópolis multiétnica y pluricultural llena de espacios artísticos y de expresiones fuertemente asociadas a la mexicanidad como el tequila, el mariachi y la charrería. Es cuna de grandes artistas plásticos, escritores y creadores. Confiamos en que este escenario nos facilite la generación de nuevas formas de conversación entre colegas de todo el mundo y permita tejer redes que acojan todas las formas de producción de conocimiento que se presentan en LASA. Durante los próximos meses el comité organizador de LASA2020 estará comprometido en que este congreso sea una celebración a la creatividad, la inteligencia y el respeto de todas las formas de acercarse al análisis y a la búsqueda de transformación social, de nuestra cambiante región, a la que, a manera de provocación, en esta oportunidad invitamos a nombrar como América Ladina. //

Introduction

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Born on February 1, 1935, Lélia de Almeida later adopted the name of her husband, Luiz Carlos Gonzalez. The importance of this white man in her life is highlighted by many authors dedicated to understanding the complex trajectory of Lélia Gonzalez and the successive changes and displacements that shaped her political position, crossed by the contradictions and challenges of an increasingly hemispheric, diasporic, and insurgent subjectivity.

The transition from Minas Gerais to Rio de Janeiro in 1942, due to the success of her brother's career as a professional soccer player; the presence of her parents, her father, Acacio, a railroad worker, and her mother Urcinda, an illiterate woman of indigenous origin; the careful academic study at Pedro II High School and at the State University of Guanabara, currently University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ); and her transit between intellectual and economic elites in Rio de Janeiro as a translator and teacher, are some of the features that seem to have paved the way for her turn toward the affirmation of a black and diasporic identity and consciousness that took place beginning in the 1970s (as described by Ratts and Rios 2010; Carneiro 2014; and discussed in this dossier by Keisha-Khan Perry and Flavia Rios).

In this context, disquieted by the Cold War and the recrudescence of the military dictatorship in Brazil, Lélia's thinking took place at the confluence of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and candomblé, laying the foundations for her original work. Her work, so unjustly neglected in the Brazilian academic context, is immersed in the coloniality of knowledge, in epistemic racism, and in the obstinacy that denies voice, place, and protagonism to the black subject in the interpretation of their own history and social position (Pinho and Figueiredo 2002). It is not for any other reason that in "Racism and Sexism in Brazilian Culture"

Lélia confronted and provoked the elite of the Brazilian social sciences at the Congress of ANPOCS (National Association of Graduate Studies in Social Sciences) in 1980: "O lixo vai falar: E numa boa" ([1984] 2018).

In the 1980s Gonzalez was already one of the main activists of the Brazilian black movement. The strength of her militant and political activity was combined with the originality and density of her critical thinking. When she ran for state representative of the House for the Democratic Labor Party in 1986, she presented a résumé that included numerous accomplishments: founder of the Unified Black Movement, member of the board of the Zumbi dos Palmares Memorial, member of the National Council of Women's Rights, vice president of two UN Seminars on "Women and Apartheid," and much more. I briefly outline these biographical milestones to emphasize how the trajectory of Lélia, who crossed countless racial, geographical, and class frontiers, formed her rich and dense point of view, effectively diasporic and pan-African, as pointed out by Keisha-Khan Perry, Edilza Sotero, Augustin Lao-Montes, and Juliana Goes in this dossier. Lélia's writings and life were dismissed as "escrivência," even before the concept was coined by Conceição Evaristo, who pointed out how personal and collective memory were articulated in the production of an Afro-Brazilian poetics and politics (Evaristo 2008).

In this dossier, motivated by the foresight and courage of the new LASA president—with whom I have the responsibility and honor to cooperate as a program co-chair—we go beyond the biographical narrative, without neglecting it, to present Lélia's work, notably the concept of *América Ladina*. This was developed through intense exchanges and dialogue with intellectuals and activists such as Angela Davis, Carlos Moore, and Molefi Asante in the United States, Latin America, and Africa,

but fundamentally in connection with working class and black cultures and their reinvention, as in the “bloco Afro” Ilê Aiyê in Bahia, and, above all, in contact and communication with black women in the various spaces and contexts in which she circulated. Lélia Gonzalez finds a place alongside diasporic or pan-African black female freedom fighters and thinkers, as Lao-Montes and Goes suggest here: “Lélia Gonzalez trasciende a Martí, al establecer la diferencia específica de las Américas Negras [Lélia Gonzalez transcends Martí, establishing the specific difference of the Black Americas].” In the same sense, Diana Gómez Correal points out in this dossier the innovative agency of the Amefrican women like Lélia in how they “depatriarchalize and decolonize [depatriarcalizar y descolonizar].”

The present Amefricanity in the Americas reveals itself as a way of looking at social and subjective processes and sociocultural landscapes as fundamentally stressed and fractured “from below [desde abajo].” The institutional and ideological superstructure of Latin America is deceit and violence, which is confronted and deformed by the agency of countless individuals and institutions who throughout history have constructed conscious and unconscious ways of resisting. Notably, this resistance is also thanks to the position occupied by the black woman as the “black mother,” protagonist of an unconscious civilizational process that precisely allows Africanity and indigeneity to become *amefricanidade*, subverting the structure of the assimilationist argument as “nêga ativa” present in Gilberto Freyre. As Lélia says: “the black mother is the mother. And when we talk about a maternal role, we are saying that the black mother, in exercising it, passed all the values that were relevant to her for the Brazilian child” (Gonzalez [1984] 2018, 205, my translation). We can also see this concept in Claudia Pons Cardoso’s essay in this dossier, which presents Lélia’s thinking as a “decolonial black feminist theoretical-political formulation of agency, contributing to the construction of another civilizing project.”

It is also necessary to consider the “ladino” aspect of Lélia Gonzalez’s theorizing. In Portuguese, *ladino* means “smart; expressing a lot of intelligence, cleverness, sharpness of mind. Smart-aleck; to

describe the astute person who acts dishonestly.”¹ And again: “intellectually sophisticated, sly, clever, finicky . . . to describe the slave or the Indian who already spoke Portuguese” (*Novo Dicionário Aurélio da Língua Portuguesa*). In the context of Brazilian slavery, ladinos would be relatively acculturated slaves, fluent in colonial cultural codes. From among this group, rebels were recruited for the numerous slave rebellions that occurred in Brazil. The ladinos were opposed to the so-called “boçais” Africans who had recently arrived and were not qualified in the culture of their masters (Schwarcz and Gomes 2018). The word also resonated on the medieval Iberian Peninsula, since “Ladino” also refers to Sephardic Jews and their language in that context. We are also aware that in other Latin American countries, the word has other meanings and political uses, as in Guatemala, where the policy of miscegenation/whitening and distancing of the indigenous population is concerned (Adams 1994).

However, for Lélia, the word seems to mean this transitory and insurgent connection of a subject in movement and transformation, that recolonizes from within, and as a strategy of subversion, the colonial structures of Latin America. The example of the Catholic brotherhoods in Brazil is paradigmatic, like the Sisterhood of the Good Death in Bahia, mentioned in my essay in this dossier. In this case, black, African, freed, ladino women used the structure and cover of Catholic Marian devotion to ensure continuity of worship to the *orixás* and ancestors, just as I myself tried to assume an Amefrican perspective to address social death and structural antiblackness. Or in the case of *pretuguês* (“blackguese”), the subversion of the Portuguese language carried out by the ladino blacks, who, when learning the language of Camões, transformed it into something else, in the slave quarters and streets, as discussed in this dossier by Thula Pires. Ladinity in this sense is precisely this capacity of the enslaved and their descendants to manipulate codes to simulate adherence, when in fact they produced dissent. This is relevant in Pires’s article, where she describes the possible contributions of a Latin American perspective to human rights, questioning the colonial and racist legal order from Fanon’s nonbeing zone.

It is in this way, at this moment, under the advance of neofascist policies that stun the Americas—"proyectos de negación y muerte," as Diana Gómez Correal puts it—that Lélia's thinking and the *ladinidade* of our ancestors summon us to bind worlds and knowledge—indigenous, African, violated and resistant, working class and campesino—to build hope and solidarity, inspired by the courage of generations of women who, over the centuries, have faced dehumanization and poverty, shame and extermination.

Note

¹ *Dicionário Online de Português*, <https://www.dicio.com.br/ladino/> (accessed June 4, 2019).

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Amefricanidade: Proposta feminista negra de organização política e transformação social

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Introdução

O pensamento de mulheres negras brasileiro vem sendo parido à luz de saberes, práticas e experiências cotidianas de resistência das mulheres negras. Gestado e alimentado por valores, princípios e cosmovisão com referenciais negroafricanos-indígenas/amefricanos, constituído e elaborado por diferentes linguagens, se manifesta em diversas áreas, faz da pluralidade da diáspora negra, sua riqueza. Herdeiro do legado e da tradição do pensamento de Lélia Gonzalez, intelectual negra brasileira, que lançou outro olhar sobre as trajetórias de mulheres negras e indígenas, visando ao iluminar suas estratégias históricas de luta concorrer para a autodefinição da mulher negra (Gonzalez 1983). O pensamento da autora tem destacada importância para o feminismo negro, não só do Brasil, mas da América Latina e Caribe. Ela aportou questões centrais para a construção de um feminismo afrolatinoamericano que ainda hoje alimentam nossos debates.

Neste artigo, exploro como a categoria político-cultural amefricanidade, desenvolvida por Lélia Gonzalez, mais do que um instrumento de análise constitui uma formulação teórico-política feminista negra decolonial de agenciamento, contribuindo para a construção de um outro projeto civilizatório, referenciado em diferentes epistemes em oposição ao projeto global deshumanizador vigente. Para apresentar o argumento, tomo como ponto de partida que a categoria ao trazer em seu bojo a valorização das diferentes experiências políticas-culturais-estéticas-religiosas de resistência na diáspora contra as opressões, desenvolvidas por mulheres e homens negros, em especial

pelas mulheres negras, buscando anunciá-las como processos pedagógicos de aprendizagem, disseminando narrativas distintas da história única hegemônica, aporta elementos que contribuem para a definição de uma concepção pedagógica feminista negra decolonial.

Amefricanidade: Para uma pedagogia feminista negra decolonial

Amefricanidade, [...] Reconhecê-la é, em última instância, reconhecer um gigantesco trabalho de dinâmica cultural que não nos leva para o lado do Atlântico, mas que nos traz de lá e nos transforma no que somos hoje: *amefricanos*. (Lélia Gonzalez, 1988a, 79)

Com a categoria político-cultural de Amefricanidade, Lélia Gonzalez mostra que a presença efetiva de mulheres e homens negros nos diferentes países das Américas e Caribe foi constante, entretanto, ocultada e silenciada pela negação da existência desses, como *ser*, como sujeitos agenciadores. Os passos negros foram invisibilizados pelo discurso do colonialismo que os inventou como incivilizados, primitivos e pelo aviltamento sistêmico na atualidade. O contexto de reflexão de origem da categoria é traçado pelo colonialismo e pela colonialidade, ou seja, a lógica global desumanizadora que permanece mesmo após o fim do colonialismo e mantém o homem branco heterossexual cristão como padrão inalterado de humanidade a ser valorizada (Quijano 2010). Lélia Gonzalez opera com raça e racismo como estruturantes de uma classificação e hierarquização global, e não como epifenômeno,

contudo sem menosprezar a existência ou reduzir o impacto de outros eixos de hierarquização, pois considera a opressão interligada (Collins 1986).

Diante disso, defende com a aplicação da categoria promover o deslocamento do olhar, alterando o lugar de enunciação das narrativas do centro da Europa para as margens da América, propõe produzir conhecimento “desde dentro as culturas indígenas e africanas” para contrapor interpretações centradas na visão de mundo do pensamento europeu (Cardoso 2014, 970). Como exemplo, no texto, “A Socio-Historic Study of South-Amefrican Christianity: The Brazillian Case”, Lélia Gonzalez explora a criação das Irmandades Católicas Negras no período escravista brasileiro para demonstrar uma expressão concreta da Amefricanidade no passado, deixada como legado. Ressalta as estratégias de sobrevivência de mulheres e homens negros escravizados, que se utilizaram da negociação e da resistência com perspicácia e sagacidade em muitos momentos, tanto para se manterem vivos quanto para preservarem seus saberes, crenças, valores e heranças culturais, e caracteriza isto como o começo da América. Conforme seu argumento, as Irmandades Católicas Negras, no Brasil, desempenharam o papel de mediadoras com o modelo dominante, posto que por um lado serviam de proteção aos que frequentavam “para receber “informações” religiosas” e por outro lado eram usadas “como um subterrâneo através do qual eles mantiveram os benefícios e práticas da herança africana” (Gonzalez 1988d, 213, tradução nossa). Eram espaços para socialização, vivências de experiências, organização de planos, fortalecimento da humanidade atacada diariamente. Dessa maneira, defende Lélia Gonzalez, mulheres e homens negros formaram a estrutura de sua religião africana no Brasil, “não foi em nenhum caminho baseado em qualquer modelo europeu, ou mesmo em um único modelo Africano”, por isso conclui, “não podemos aceitar a ideia comum de que o sincretismo caracteriza o sistema de crenças Amefricano no Brasil” (Gonzalez 1988d, 213, tradução nossa). O ponto de partida da investigação, de Lélia Gonzalez, reside no lado ‘de cá’ do Atlântico, no lado da diáspora negra e dos povos indígenas. Ela nos ensina a refutar explicações fornecidas

pelo olhar hegemônico europeu e oferece uma reinterpretação amefricanizada a partir da *América*, entendida como

sistema etnogeográfico de referência, é uma criação nossa e de nossos antepassados no continente em que vivemos, inspirados em modelos africanos. Por conseguinte, o termo *amefricanas/americanos* designa toda uma descendência: não só a dos africanos trazidos pelo tráfico negreiro, como a daqueles que chegaram à AMÉRICA muito antes de Colombo. Ontem como hoje, *amefricanos* oriundos dos mais diferentes países têm desempenhado um papel crucial na elaboração dessa Amefricanidade que identifica, na Diáspora, uma experiência histórica comum que exige ser devidamente conhecida e cuidadosamente pesquisada. (Gonzalez 1988a, 77, grifas da autora)

A amefricanidade é constituída pelos acontecimentos da travessia do Atlântico, matizada pelos diferentes contextos e cosmovisões das Américas e Caribe, e atua para a construção de “toda uma identidade étnica”, sublinha Lélia Gonzalez (1988a, 76), em referência à valorização das experiências e da história das (os) amefricanas (os) na diáspora negra. Identidade, aqui, percebida como lugar de enunciação de fala, nessa direção, importante lembrar, como afirma Linda Alcoff, que o colonialismo criou identidades, silenciou e desautorizou epistemicamente algumas e fortaleceu outras, sendo assim “um projeto de decolonização epistemológica presume a importância epistêmica da identidade porque entende que experiências em diferentes localizações são distintas e que a localização importa para o conhecimento”, dessa forma, identidade é entendida como processo de construção de sentidos para as experiências individuais e coletivas e narrativas históricas (Alcoff 2016, 136).

Nesse movimento de construir conhecimento a partir da identificação das diferentes experiências, defende Lélia Gonzalez, se faz necessário determos o “olhar para melhor apreendermos a importância das mulheres nas lutas das comunidades amefricanas de ontem e hoje” (Gonzalez 1988c, 24), uma vez que constituíram/constituem um dos

sujeitos mais desautorizados e silenciados. Ressalta, diante dessa realidade, a necessidade imperiosa de investigar e anunciar o lugar epistêmico das mulheres negras na amefricanidade, não só as narrativas contra o colonialismo moderno de sujeitos femininos apagados pela historiografia hegemônica, como as experiências diárias das amefricanas da atualidade, que continuam a enfrentar o racismo, o sexismo, o classismo, a heterossexualidade como norma e outras iniquidades sociais.

O trato dos efeitos do racismo e sexismo e a produção de desigualdades para as mulheres negras e indígenas no Brasil, nas Américas e Caribe tem destaque no pensamento de Lélia Gonzalez, muito embora não tenha desenvolvido investigação aprofundada sobre a realidade das indígenas, ao incluí-las em suas reflexões de modo a enfatizar a discriminação e exclusão históricas, tem por objetivo as anunciar como sujeitos de direito e protagonistas de um longo processo de resistência e resiliência, pretende, ainda, registrar e ratificar uma relação de parentesco entre mulheres negras e indígenas cunhada na luta contra as opressões.¹

Lélia Gonzalez propõe a articulação entre racismo e sexismo com o intuito de entender a forma como as mulheres indígenas e negras “dada a sua posição social, que se articula com sua discriminação racial e sexual, são elas que sofrem mais brutalmente os efeitos da crise”. Por isso, sublinha a relevância de “esclarecer a articulação entre as categorias de raça, classe, sexo e poder”, na medida em que a investigação, assim realizada, “desmascara as estruturas de dominação de uma sociedade e de um estado” (Gonzalez 1988b, 138). Ao interseccionar sexo, classe e raça, ou, em suas palavras, articular as categorias procura “faz[er] submergir as desigualdades de gênero que colocam as mulheres negras em uma dimensão das relações sociais diferentes das mulheres brancas” (Cardoso 2014, 974), embora não explicita a categoria gênero Segundo Lélia Gonzalez:

É importante insistir que, no quadro das profundas desigualdades raciais existentes no continente, se inscrevem e muito bem articuladas, a desigualdade sexual. Se trata

de uma dupla discriminação das mulheres não brancas da região: as amefricanas e as ameríndias.

O duplo caráter de sua condição biológica — o racial e o sexual — faz que elas sejam as mulheres mais oprimidas e exploradas de uma região de capitalismo patriarcal-racista dependente. Justamente porque esse sistema transforma as diferenças em desigualdade, a discriminação que elas sofrem assume um caráter triplo, dada sua posição de classe: ameríndias e amefricanas fazem parte, em sua grande maioria, do imenso proletariado afrolatino americano. (Gonzalez 1988b, 137-138, tradução nossa)

Lélia Gonzalez situa as mulheres negras e indígenas no contexto da colonialidade e destaca “nós, mulheres e não brancas, temos sido faladas, definidas e classificadas por um *sistema ideológico de dominação* que nos infantiliza” (Gonzalez 1988b, 135, grifas da autora), busca com a assertiva denunciar e investigar a especificidade da lógica de dominação e expropriação desse modelo sobre corpos construídos a partir da negação, como são as mulheres pertencentes aos grupos sociais racialmente discriminados. Diz: “Ao nos impor um lugar inferior no interior de sua hierarquia (apoiado em nossas condições biológicas de sexo e raça), suprime nossa humanidade justamente porque nos nega o direito de ser sujeitos não só do nosso próprio discurso, mas de nossa própria história” (Gonzalez 1988b, 135, tradução nossa).

O lugar social de inferiorização e exclusão da mulher negra foi anunciado, como evidencia Lélia Gonzalez, quando “abolida sua humanidade, elas são vistas como corpos animalizados: por um lado são os “burros de carga” do sexo (de que as mulatas brasileiras são um modelo). Desse modo, se constata como a superexploração econômica se faz aliada a superexploração sexual” (Gonzalez 1988b, 139, tradução nossa). Aqui em diálogo direto com a colonialidade de gênero, analisa como os corpos femininos racializados foram construídos no colonialismo para sustentar o modelo de exploração e opressão disseminado globalmente, tanto para regular as relações de produção quanto as relações sociais, relações afetivas e sexuais.

Como escrevi em outros textos (Cardoso 2019), e recupero aqui, Maria Lugones, inspirada na definição de colonialidade de Anibal Quijano, desenvolve o Sistema Moderno Colonial de Gênero, resultado do projeto colonial europeu, que impôs uma série de distinções dicotômicas e hierárquicas sobre os colonizados a serviço do homem branco ocidental. Entre elas a divisão entre humano e não humano, sua classificação primária, seguida pela invenção de gênero, que carrega em sua constituição a supremacia do homem branco europeu detentor de direitos sobre as mulheres de seu próprio grupo, a mulher branca europeia, percebida como companheira e reprodutora da raça e do capital, ela também humana e, por último, a divisão homem e mulher, constituindo a marca do humano e da civilização (Lugones 2008, 2011). Esse sistema construiu o gênero e as relações de gênero hegemônicas, isto é, organizou de fato e direito, somente, as vidas de mulheres e homens brancos, burgueses e heterossexuais. As pessoas colonizadas se transformaram em machos e fêmeas, sendo assim, a “mulher colonizada” é uma categoria vazia: nenhuma fêmea colonizada é uma mulher”. E todas as violências e violações a que estarão submetidas se orientam por esta premissa (Lugones 2011, 106).

O pensamento de Lélia Gonzalez, chega ao presente, portanto, dialogando com o debate atual sobre gênero e colonialidade, ou seja, mostra o lugar de gênero reconfigurado por raça na estruturação da dinâmica de exploração capitalista. Seus estudos evidenciam que o lugar ocupado pelas mulheres negras no gênero define, inclusive, o padrão de feminilidade associado à mulher branca; o de masculinidade associado ao homem branco provedor e proprietário do feminino ideal, e a heterossexualidade como modelo para assegurar a manutenção e perpetuação do modelo familiar nuclear branco cristão conservador. Ao identificar e analisar os processos que construíram corpos femininos racializados como não humano e não mulher, revela e evidencia a complexidade das violências produzidas sobre esses corpos. Lélia Gonzalez opera com os princípios que constituem o que é conceituado como modernidade/colonialidade e colonialidade de gênero (Quijano 2010; Lugones 2011; Grosfoguel 2018). Suas reflexões são contribuições teóricas que oferecem

lentes de interpretação, ensinam a promover posicionamentos críticos à realidade adversa do mundo organizado por sólidas fronteiras de hierarquização e segregação e apontam caminhos de investigação para fazer submergir o lugar social determinado às mulheres não brancas nesse cenário.

A Amefricanidade tem, assim, em sua concepção um caráter distintivo que a define como proposição pedagógica decolonial feminista, manifesto na tessitura de um caminho de aprendizagem, constituído pelos saberes e as histórias reescritas pelas mulheres contra a subalternização e exploração. Como conceitua Catherine Walsh, pedagogia presente nas ações de oposição historicamente levadas a termo pelos subalternizados para enfrentar processos de opressão, construindo respostas alternativas a essa dominação, apontando para outras formas de organização social e política. Pedagogia como “práticas, estratégias e metodologias que são entrelaçadas e são construídas tanto em resistência e oposição, como na insurgência, *el cimarronaje*, a afirmação, a re-existência e a re-humanização” (Walsh 2013, 29, tradução nossa).

As autoras feministas decoloniais Yuderkys Espinosa, Diana Gómez, María Lugones e Karina Ochoa, no texto “Reflexiones pedagógicas en torno al feminismo decolonial: una conversa en cuatro vocês” (2013, 412), seguem a mesma direção, conceituam pedagogia feminista decolonial como aquela que tem por objetivo “procurar acima de tudo o desenvolvimento da capacidade de (re)pensar o mundo e questioná-lo todo”; promover a investigação dos processos que instituíram determinadas visões de mundo em detrimento de outras, aliados à imposição de uma ordem social que se estrutura na manutenção de privilégios de alguns grupos sociais, desenvolver um novo ponto de vista (2013, 412, tradução nossa). A Amefricanidade ao recuperar experiências, que ensinaram as mulheres negras e indígenas a defender a si mesmas e a seu grupo, e ao apresentá-las como processos pedagógicos de aprendizagem, que oportunizam a compreensão e intervenção na realidade social, oferece contribuições significativas ao feminismo negro decolonial em seu objetivo de

transformar radicalmente as relações de opressão e dominação que tem submetido, ao longo da história, as mulheres racialmente discriminadas e inferiorizadas.

Finalizando

A amefricanidade propõe, portanto, iluminar as insurgências organizadas contra processos de aviltamento, destacar as metodologias e estratégias de mobilização, e investigar como a difusão de valores e saberes partilhados pelos subalternizados garantiram caminhos alternativos para estancar o sequestro cotidiano da existência humana, levado a cabo pelas rotas de desumanização e violências inauguradas pelos colonizadores, principalmente para as mulheres negras e indígenas. É, assim, um chamado para uma 'mirada' de aprendizagem com as lutas históricas que têm assegurado a nossa existência e sobrevivência na adversidade.

A amefricanidade é epistêmica, busca desaprender a narrativa hegemônica e a desprender do conhecimento branco colonizador, para pensar e elaborar novos critérios epistemológicos e categorias de análise, que promovam contranarrativas decoloniais, nascidas das trajetórias dos sujeitos situados nas periferias, nos lugares marginalizados, subvertendo o polo de enunciação e validação do discurso do lado colonizador para o do colonizado. A categoria promove um deslocamento epistêmico do feminismo negro, considerando que os pressupostos que orientam as avaliações e a produção de novos conhecimentos e significados são originários das próprias mulheres negras, que, com isso, assumem a realização da autodefinição. Com a categoria Lélia Gonzalez nos instiga a interpretar pedagogicamente as histórias daquelas que nos antecederam, apreender seus métodos e práticas transgressores das relações de poder assimétricas como processos pedagógicos. Ensina a valorização de múltiplos saberes e experiências diversas e concretas dos sujeitos para produzir novas estratégias epistemológicas para geração de conhecimentos relevantes para a emancipação social coletiva, que façam frente e ajudem a projetar respostas ao racismo patriarcal heteronormativo.

Notas

¹ Em 2004 por época da I Conferência Nacional de Políticas para as Mulheres, as mulheres indígenas e negras assinaram uma Aliança de Parentesco. Ver Aliança de Parentesco por determinação das mulheres negras e indígenas, 21 de julho de 2004, http://www.dhnet.org.br/tecidosocial/anteriores/ts067/documentos_cnpm.htm.

² Sobre gênero e como a discussão permeia o pensamento de Lélia Gonzalez, ver Cardoso (2014).

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Nossa América en clave do feminismos pretos: El imaginario geohistórico de Lélia Gonzalez

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Lélia Gonzalez foi uma das grandes articuladoras entre o movimento negro e o feminista, elaborando uma sofisticada análise do capitalismo racial-patriarcal. Partindo das particularidades do mito da democracia racial brasileira, Gonzalez revelou elementos transnacionais desse sistema que percorrem toda *América Latina*. Considerando isso, neste artigo debateremos (i) a análise dela sobre a neurose cultural brasileira, que é relacionada ao mito da democracia racial; e (ii) a importância dessa análise para a criação de um feminismo *amefricano*, centralizando o conceito de *amefricanidade*.

Gonzalez (1980) se refere a construção do Brasil como “neurose cultural”. Embora o país seja negro, ao ser fundado, ele foi pensando como branco. Esta neurose tem como fator sintomático o racismo — este é a base da construção da nação brasileira ao mesmo tempo que é negado pelo mito da democracia racial. Portanto, Gonzalez utiliza o conceito de *denegação* (processo segundo o qual o indivíduo formula o desejo e, ao mesmo tempo, o nega) para analisar como o sujeito da democracia racial nega a África que o constrói.

Como esta neurose cultural se constitui? Para responder esta pergunta, Gonzalez analisa a conexão entre racismo e sexismo. Durante a escravidão, três papéis sociais foram impostos às mulheres negras: a doméstica, a mulata e a mãe preta. Segundo Gonzalez, a origem destas está no termo “mucama”. De acordo com a definição retirada do Dicionário Aurélio, a mucama seria “a escrava negra moça e de estimação que era escolhida para auxiliar nos serviços caseiros ou acompanhar pessoas da família e que, por vezes

era ama-de-leite” (Gonzalez 1980, 229). Porém, esta definição excluía parte do seu significado original. A palavra viria da língua africana quimbundo e o seu significado original tinha conotação sexual. Para além do serviço doméstico, as mucamas eram obrigadas a prestar “serviços sexuais”.

Apesar da língua portuguesa omitir este fato, na prática, a noção de que a mulher negra é feita para sexo continua bastante viva através da ideia de mulata. Esta seria a preta/morena gostosa, aquela que deve servir ao prazer do homem. Além disso, se no cotidiano a ideia não é explícita, no carnaval a mulata é transformada em rainha. Ela se torna a deusa do samba e a imagem reverenciada pela mídia. Porém, no final do dia, esta mesma mulher retorna ao anonimato nos afazeres domésticos das casas negras e brancas. Portanto, embora a mulata apareça em determinados momentos nacionais, no dia a dia a figura da doméstica, aceita apenas em determinado cômodo da casa enquanto estiver limpando ou servindo aos brancos, é a mucama permitida.

Porém, o que faz a figura da mulata ser exaltada no carnaval? Para Gonzalez, esta exaltação é a performance do mito da democracia racial. Este nega, oprime e invisibiliza a negritude. Ao mesmo tempo, exalta a “cultura negra” em certos momentos como uma prova de que o Brasil não é racista, legitimando a exploração do sistema capitalista racial-patriarcal. Dessa forma, a transformação da mulher negra cotidianamente na doméstica ocorre em conjunto com a exaltação da mulata como símbolo nacional.

Contudo, para entender este processo, Gonzalez afirma que precisamos ir para além da análise da produção de ideologias. A exaltação da mulata é relacionada com o desejo (no sentido freudiano). A relação do homem branco com a mulher negra durante a escravidão não era de amor, bondade ou piedade (como diz o mito da democracia racial, segundo o qual o fato do colonizador fazer sexo com a mulher negra escravizada é uma prova de tolerância racial). O que explica o comportamento dos brancos, em relação à mulata, é o fato de que “homem branco também trepa”. Ele é movido pelo desejo inconsciente e irracional, pela fúria sadista contra a mulher negra. Essa fúria se relaciona com o fato de que o branco, e o Brasil construído como branco, sabe que, no fundo, ele é negro. O que chamamos de cultura nacional é, na verdade, uma cultura africanizada. Se deixarmos o rei (Brasil) pelado, vemos que “o corpo do rei é preto e o rei é Escravo” (Gonzalez 1980, 239).

Mas, por que o Brasil é africanizado? Entra, aí, a figura da mãe preta (ama-de-leite). Esta figura representa a tentativa de colocar as mulheres negras na posição de total dedicação aos brancos. Porém, a mãe preta é quem dá “uma rasteira na raça dominante” (Gonzalez 1980, 235). Durante a escravidão, ela era literalmente a figura da mãe (já que as brancas não cuidavam dos filhos). Eram elas quem os limpavam, colocavam para dormir, ensinavam a falar, contavam histórias etc. Durante a criação das crianças brancas, ela transmitiu valores da cultura africana para a juventude brasileira. Até a nossa língua foi profundamente modificada. O português do Brasil incorporou fonemas africanos e se tornou um *pretuguês*. Logo, o Brasil é preto e filho de mãe preta —um país amefricano.

Portanto, racismo e sexismo estão profundamente conectados com a criação do Brasil. Além disso, a denegação é um processo que se expande por toda região americana. Isto é, embora a performance nacional possa variar, Gonzalez afirma que “graças a um contato crescente com manifestações culturais negras de outros países do continente americano, tenho tido a oportunidade de observar certas similaridades que, no que se refere aos falares, lembram o nosso país” (Gonzalez 1988a, 70). O espanhol, o inglês e o francês falados nas Américas, por exemplo, também era

extremamente africanizado. A amefricanidade, portanto, permeia todo o continente. Considerando isso, perguntamos: qual a importância desse processo para o feminismo negro? Usaremos da obra da Gonzalez para explorar, aqui, um feminismo amefricano.

Gonzalez afirma que o feminismo da época excluía as mulheres negras e indígenas e esquecia-se que tanto o racismo quanto o machismo partem do estabelecimento de relações de dominação baseadas em diferenças biológicas (Gonzalez 1980, 1988a, 1988b). As mulheres brancas tratavam a categoria mulher de forma universal. À essa universalização, ao esquecimento das diferenças entre brancas, indígenas e negras, Gonzalez chamava de racismo por omissão. Além disso, ela apontava que essa forma de racismo é acompanhada de uma supressão do direito de fala das mulheres negras e indígenas. De acordo com a autora, “as mulheres brancas nos definem e classificam de forma que nos infantiliza, suprimindo o direito de sermos sujeitas do nosso próprio discurso e história” (Gonzalez 1988b, 136).

Logo, Gonzalez defendia que as mulheres não brancas, as *amefricanas* e as *ameríndias*, sofriam um duplo caráter de exploração devido ao racismo e ao sexismo. Além disso, por estarem dentro de um sistema capitalista, patriarcal, racista e dependente, a discriminação que as mulheres não brancas sofrem ganharia um caráter triplo – classe – motivo pelo qual elas representariam grande parte do proletariado latino-americano. Para a autora, portanto, é preciso entender a experiência das mulheres pensando nas categorias de raça, classe e gênero. Ressalta-se que, quando Gonzalez falava dessa tripla exploração, também questionava aqueles que insistiam em negar a incorporação das categorias de raça e gênero para lerem a sociedade brasileira apenas pela ótica de classe, pois segundo a autora, as primeiras categorias não estavam subordinadas a última (Gonzalez 1980; Gonzalez 1988b).

Assim, o trabalho de Gonzalez apresenta um feminismo *interseccional*, embora este termo não fosse usado pela autora. A sua interseccionalidade, contudo, não pode ser resumida à uma articulação entre diferentes eixos de opressão. As obras e

militância de Gonzalez revelam uma preocupação pela economia política e pela dimensão cultural para explicar a totalidade do sistema capitalista racial-patriarcal (ver Gonzalez e Hasenbalg 1982). Essa totalidade, portanto, representa um único sistema, de forma que classe não pode ser entendida sem raça e gênero (e vice-versa). Assim, se as relações de produção constituem um eixo horizontal que corta a modernidade (expressão do sistema capitalista racial-patriarcal) em termos de burguesia e classe trabalhadora; raça a divide verticalmente em humanos e não humanos. Antes de ser o trabalhador explorado, o negro é o objeto, o monstro, a carne — o Outro do sistema colonial que reduz humanidade à branquitude. Ainda, o gênero e sexualidade constituem eixos transversais. Isto é, a mulher negra, para Gonzalez, é primeiramente negra, já que a sua desumanização como raça oprimida vem antes que uma categoria humana, como “mulher”, pudessem ser aplicadas. Contudo, isso não significa que a opressão da mulher negra e do homem negro sejam iguais. Denunciando práticas sexistas dentro do movimento negro, Gonzalez também mostra como gênero modifica a experiência dos não-humanos-como-não-homens e não-humanos-como-não-mulheres, como diria Maria Lugones (2010). Portanto, um feminismo amefricano é profundamente decolonial, buscando entender não só a articulação de diferentes eixos de opressão, mas a constituição do sistema capitalista racial-patriarcal.

Amefricanidad: La diáspora africana

Como hemos visto, Lélia Gonzalez fue pionera del feminismo negro y, en esa vena, también de la perspectiva descolonial que hoy día gana fuerza. Es decir, su análisis del racismo y el sexismo como procesos constitutivos de la sociedad brasileña, y componentes claves de una dinámica histórico-mundial donde se articulan capitalismo, colonialismo e imperialismo; es una caracterización de la matriz de dominación, análoga al análisis de la modernidad en el feminismo descolonial, como una constelación global configurada por la colonialidad del poder.

Tocando ese tambor, Lélia acuña amefricanidade explícitamente como una categoría político-cultural. Ella maneja una compleja concepción de cultura, entendida como una forma de subjetividad colectiva, conformada y sedimentada por una madeja de relaciones de poder, entre las cuales destaca el racismo y el sexismo, junto al poder imperial y la explotación capitalista. Gonzalez esgrime amefricanidad (aquí en castellano) como un recurso de reconocimiento de los valores de la africanía en las Américas, un continente-región donde la neurosis provocada por la violencia ubicua y profunda, cotidiana y estructural del racismo anti-negro, vilifica e invisibiliza los valores múltiples de la africanía — culturales, epistémicos, éticos, estéticos, espirituales, tanto en el continente africano como en las diásporas amefricanas. Dicha categoría es un pilar en su gestión, que es político a la vez que epistémico, para repensar poder, subjetividad, historia y geografía, por medio de una suerte de valorización de la centralidad de las experiencias, conocimientos, expresiones culturales, movimientos sociales y políticos, estéticas y espiritualidades de matriz africana en el continente americano en general y en la región al sur del Río Grande que hoy denominamos como América Latina y el Caribe.

Al presentar y elaborar el concepto de amefricanidad, Lélia Gonzalez se sitúa conscientemente en una larga tradición panafricana. Con clara conciencia diaspórica, entendiendo el mundo afro como un universo interconectado, sin negar particularidades en tiempo y espacio, y diferencias de todo tipo, relaciona los movimientos negros de Brasil, Colombia, Perú, Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y el Caribe. Gonzalez arguye que el valor metodológico de la noción de amefricanidad radica en concebir una unidad específica forjada dentro de sociedades como parte de un mundo, es decir el postular una colectividad histórica que tiene su dimensión y valor específico en cada uno de los países, como el mundo afrobrasileño y afrocubano, a la vez que es un elemento dentro de un mundo mayor, una diáspora africana global en la cual se articulan todos los espacios diaspóricos de cada lugar específico. Aquí el argumento de Lélia es afín a la interpretación del concepto de doble consciencia en Du Bois que implica una formación de pueblo negro en cada país, a la vez que identidades

diaspóricas que trascienden la nación-estado, como el Atlántico Negro y la diáspora africana global, que constituyen espacios translocales en los cuales se constituyen movimientos políticos, estéticos e intelectuales. Es desde ese lugar de enunciación que invoca y se identifica con figuras como W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, Malcolm X, Walter Rodney y Abdias do Nascimento, sin dejar de observar que aun aquí, casa adentro de la diáspora, se oculta el papel protagónico de las mujeres amefricanas, y por ende, la gran relevancia del feminismo negro para la tradición de pensamiento y política de liberación en clave de africanía que Lélia conceptualiza con la categoría de amefricanidad.

En esta clave, amefricanidad, es una categoría de carácter descolonial, con la voluntad y la capacidad de descolonizar el imaginario eurocéntrico y occidentalista que todavía prima tanto en los discursos hegemónicos de historia y geografía, como en el inconsciente colectivo nutrido por la neurosis cultural sintomática del racismo anti-negro como componente clave de las culturas racistas de las Américas. A contrapunto, Lélia destaca la centralidad de la africanía en las culturas populares tanto de Brasil como del Caribe, lo que es ocultado por lo que denomina *velo del blanqueamiento* para significar los dispositivos ideológicos que niegan la negritud de nuestras culturas públicas, y que en los discursos gubernamentales tienen expresión máxima en las ideologías de mestizaje, armonía y democracia racial que maduraron en los 1920s como un proyecto étnico-racial a través de la región.

Amefricanidad es una categoría geo-histórica no-imperial y pos-occidentalista, del tipo que propone Fernando Coronil (1996) en su robusta crítica del occidentalismo, que acompaña con un llamado a la construcción de nuevas categorías para repensar y transformar la memoria histórica, las geografías, las subjetividades, las epistemes y el poder mismo. En esa veta, Lélia Gonzalez argumenta que la amefricanidad es una categoría necesaria para combatir las ideologías de blanqueamiento promovidas por un Occidente blanco que se proyecta como única fuente de valores universales.

Gonzalez también plantea que entendernos dentro de la amefricanidad significa superar cierta pasividad ante el discurso imperial estadounidense, lo que representa otra dimensión de su carácter descolonial. Más aun, implica una praxis de significación a contracorriente de la tendencia, presente en alguna retóricas afronorteamericanas, de reducir las Américas a los Estados Unidos, país-imperio definido en singular como *América* (en inglés), que lleva a expresiones como *African American* y *Afro-American*, donde lo amefricano se reduce a las personas negras de los Estados Unidos. Dicha crítica puede inscribirse en la tradición de José Martí, que creó la categoría *Nuestra América* con intención de distinguir América Latina —el territorio al sur del Río Grande, luego que en la Guerra Mexicano-Americana de 1846-1848 el naciente imperio del norte le arrebatara a México alrededor de la mitad de su territorio— de la América anglosajona.

Lélia Gonzalez trasciende a Martí, al establecer la diferencia específica de las Américas negras. Al decir que, América africana cuya latinidad inexistente lo va trocando en Amefrica Ladina, también cuestiona la idea misma de América Latina cuyo origen mismo debe mucho a los ideólogos imperiales de Francia en su batalla por la hegemonía con el imperio británico. Además, Lélia en sus análisis establece la relación histórica entre amerindias/amerindios y amefricanas/amefricanos, así que Améfrica se puede ver como análoga a la categoría de Abya Yala, propuesta por las redes de movimientos indígenas del continente para remplazar el concepto mismo de América en vista de su carácter colonial. Es siguiendo esa lógica que, en algunos de nuestros escritos, hablamos de “Nuestra Abya Yala” y “Nuestra Afroamérica” (Lao-Montes 2019).

Diríamos hoy, que amefricanidad constituye un marco categorial para pensar las Américas y el planeta en clave de africanía, con la misma fundamentalidad que Achille Mbembe (2016) nos ayuda a repensar la modernidad tardía con su concepto del “devenir negro del mundo”. Dicha suerte de enegrecimiento del planeta tiene un doble sentido, por un lado revela cómo el terror y la “necropolítica” de genocidio, sobreexplotación y negación de humanidad y sentido de ser, que

son elementos definitorios del racismo anti-negro, se están diseminando globalmente con la crisis civilizatoria de la modernidad capitalista en su era neoliberal, con la proliferación de violencias, hambrunas, cuerpos desechables, destierros y despojos; por otro lado, se manifiesta en las políticas de liberación y las sensibilidades críticas descoloniales de la tradición de largo arco de pensamiento y política del panafricanismo radical, contra todas las cadenas de colonialidad y opresión (étnico-raciales, de género y sexualidad, de clase social) en todas sus dimensiones (ecológicas, económicas, epistémicas, estéticas, espirituales, políticas), que hoy emerge con potencia transformativa y generativa. Este renacimiento y reinención de Nuestra América radical se expresa en movimientos sociales como Black Lives Matter y las Marchas do Mulheres Negras, cuya racionalidad político-intelectual está inspirada en la versión radical del feminismo negro descolonial (como le llamamos ahora) que surge de figuras de la lucidez y profundidad crítica como la de Lélia Gonzalez que definitivamente debe ser leída y valorada como una de nuestros ancestros principales.

La vigencia y relevancia del feminismo negro de carácter descolonial y de la política de liberación en clave de africanía de Lélia Gonzalez se vuelve urgente en momentos como este, cuando gobiernos neofascistas como el de Jair Bolsonaro en Brasil, embisten contra la mal llamada ideología de género como dispositivo ideológico en su ofensiva crudamente patriarcal, racista, y clasista. En estos tiempos de crisis global donde las peores versiones del autoritarismo, el conservadurismo y el despotismo del capital y el imperio están a la ofensiva, el pensamiento y política de Lélia Gonzalez nos brinda herramientas de liberación y recursos de esperanza.

Nota

Este artículo está escrito a cuatro manos y en dos idiomas, portugués y español, como un contrapunteo desde dos lugares de enunciación en América, en consonancia con el cruce de fronteras lingüísticas, territoriales, de género y generación, en el espíritu de crítica y construcción de Lélia Gonzalez.

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América Ladina, Abya Yala y Nuestra América: Tejiendo esperanzas realistas

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Desde finales de la década de 1970 Lélia Gonzalez avocaba por un feminismo que reconociera no solo el sexismo como un elemento explicativo de la dominación, sino que también contemplará el racismo y el clasismo como centrales para comprender la realidad de las mujeres negras e indígenas. Partiendo de una profunda convicción antirracista y de la experiencia de los sujetos racializados y generizados en el proceso colonial, Gonzalez propuso también la noción de América Ladina.

Lo que ya hace cuatro décadas planteaba Gonzalez como un enfoque epistemológico y político imprescindible, es hoy reconocido como uno de los núcleos centrales de la apuesta feminista descolonial. Propongo reconocer como feminismos descoloniales no solo aquellos que contribuyen a las reflexiones del grupo modernidad-colonialidad, sino también a los que como parte de las epistemologías del sur, y habiendo surgido de las reflexiones de intelectuales y procesos organizativos y comunitarios indígenas, afrodescendientes y feministas en Abya Yala, así como de otros movimientos sociales y expresiones políticas alternativas, han hecho acento en la necesidad de despatriarcalizar y descolonizar para avanzar en procesos de cambio social.

Los aportes de estas tradiciones críticas de pensamiento, además de ser una de las expresiones de cambio social más golpeadas por el conservadurismo político, económico, ideológico, cultural y espiritual bajo la supuesta existencia de una ideología de género, son sin duda alguna una de las fuentes más ricas de exploración de alternativas al estado actual de derechos de Nuestra América.

Además de ser crucial preguntarse por qué las propuestas y reivindicaciones con asiento feminista, antirracista y anticapitalista están siendo tan fuertemente atacadas en el presente, bien vale la pena interrogarse por los aportes de los feminismos descoloniales para enfrentar la agudización de la negación de la diferencia y de un proyecto de desaparición radical de la otredad. En un contexto como este, ¿qué pistas nos dan estos feminismos y las reflexiones de Gonzalez para orientar y pensar el cambio social? Las siguientes líneas son un esfuerzo por responder a esta última pregunta desde un conocimiento situado, con la intención de puntualizar algunos de los múltiples focos de atención que implica hoy pensar, hacer y re-imaginar el cambio social.

Lélia Gonzalez y los feminismos descoloniales

Al igual que lo que se comprende de manera amplia como feminismos descoloniales, Gonzalez planteaba la necesidad de una producción de conocimiento localizado para enfrentar lo que hoy denominados la colonialidad del saber. Esa colonialidad se situaba, a los ojos de Gonzalez (1983, 1988), tanto en la sociedad mayor como en los espacios de cambio social. Su propuesta epistemológica llama la atención sobre la importancia de observar lo que se ha hecho inexistente por la dominación. Por eso plantea que no es solo del sexismo o del racismo del que se deben ocupar respectivamente el feminismo y los movimientos antirracistas, sino de ambos para lograr comprender la realidad de las mujeres negras.

Con esto, Gonzalez propone vencer lo que más adelante Lugones (2014) va a nombrar como la ceguera epistemológica del feminismo

hegemónico, su incapacidad de observar y analizar la centralidad de la raza en la construcción del sujeto femenino racializado. Con la negación de la realidad pluricultural y multirracial de la región, nos dice Gonzalez, el feminismo pierde fuerza (Pons 2014). La epistemología que nos propone, debe entonces ser situada, partir de la experiencia, de los contextos particulares y la historia propia; y ser interdisciplinaria.

Esta aproximación epistemológica a la realidad de las mujeres negras y en general a las sociedades de la región, va a permitir, como lo hacen los feminismos descoloniales, explorar las particularidades de construcción de ese sujeto durante la colonia y el proceso de formación del Estado-nación.¹

Por eso Gonzalez (1983), partiendo de un análisis de los estereotipos existentes en la sociedad brasilera sobre las mujeres negras en tanto mulata, mucama, madre negra y empleada doméstica, logra ver y comprender los impactos aún presentes en el siglo XX de la historia colonial. Al tiempo que Gonzalez analiza la producción particular de las mujeres negras en casillas identitarias que restringen sus subjetividades y posibilidades de ser, dice con vehemencia que lo negro se ha negado como componente central de la construcción de América.

Esto ocurre al priorizarse la latinidad como fundamento de la conformación de las sociedades actuales, y a través de un proceso de “blanqueamiento” que incluye estrategias discursivas como la existencia de una democracia racial en Brasil que opera una nueva negación de la existencia histórica (pasada, actual y futura) de lo negro. En este proceso se hacen inexistentes sus aportes y agencia, se les convierte en objetos incluso de la producción de conocimiento y se les niega su humanidad (Gonzalez 1983, 232). Es precisamente al reconocer que sin lo negro no existiría la América de la segunda mitad del siglo XX, y que para permanecer las y los esclavizados y los amerindios resistieron de maneras particulares al embate colonial, que surge la noción de América Ladina.

Al plantear dicha categoría, Lélia Gonzalez (1988) nos propone al menos tres escenarios que resuenan con las reflexiones feministas descoloniales. El primero tiene que ver con que no podemos entender el presente sin analizar los impactos de la larga duración de la trata transatlántica, la invasión europea de Abya Yala y el proceso colonial tanto en los cuerpos generizados y racializados como en la constitución de la sociedad actual. Esto implica desarrollar una mirada interseccional que aborde de manera holística la configuración de la dominación en torno al sexismo, el racismo, el clasismo, el imperialismo y el poder.

El segundo escenario gira en torno a comprender que en medio de la historia de dominación colonial y su subsecuente mantenimiento incluso en la ficción de la democracia racial brasilera, o en cualquier otro tipo de racismo enmascarado e incrustado en los Estado-nación de la región, los sujetos femeninos racializados han desplegado una agencia innovadora para resistir. Es decir, que en esa experiencia de dominación se construyó un sujeto abierto al cambio que además dejó como legado aprendizajes del cómo resistir y transformar. Desde esa agencia, las *amefricanas* son sujetos del feminismo, de un feminismo afro-latinoamericano.

El tercer escenario tiene una enorme potencia en el presente. Gonzalez, junto con el feminismo descolonial, implícita y explícitamente, nos dicen que, en el despliegue del accionar de los sujetos negados y pospuestos por el proyecto moderno-colonial, se fueron construyendo imaginarios políticos otros en los que las mujeres juegan un papel central en distintos planos de la sociedad. En la puesta en marcha de onto-epistemologías propias, los mundos africanos de la trata transatlántica (América) y los pueblos pre-intrusión (Abya Yala), así como otros de los sujetos que emergieron de la experiencia moderna-colonial (Nuestra América),² han configurado proyectos de sociedad en los que anidan claves para enfrentar la crisis civilizatoria occidental y consolidar el pluriverso. Allí, el accionar cotidiano de las mujeres, no entendidas como individuos liberales sino como seres relacionales, son una potencia significativa.

América Ladina

Los textos de Léila Gonzalez invitan a observar la macro y la micro política. En términos de la primera, además de los imaginarios políticos más anclados en la izquierda latinoamericana, la región cuenta con diversidad de proyectos que buscan construir una sociedad alternativa a la dominante. Entre esos, proyectos como Abya Yala, América Ladina, Nuestra América y las apuestas descoloniales y comunitarias, ponen de presente la profunda colonialidad de los procesos de independencia y de construcción del Estado-nación, así como las debilidades del proyecto moderno del Occidente hegemónico en la región y el mundo.

Un punto de partida básico para cualquier proceso de cambio del presente incluye reconocer esa fuerte relación entre colonialidad y proyecto moderno dominante, entre los fundamentos del cambio ilustrado y el modelo de civilización occidental; así como que la dominación está estructurada sobre una *patrix*, como la bautiza Paredes (2010), de poder múltiple que mínimamente tiene como elementos fundantes el heteropatriarcado, el capitalismo y el colonialismo. Reconocer esto debe ir de la mano de lo que la intelectual afro-feminista nos plantea como fundamental: un pensamiento anclado en la propia experiencia histórica y cultural.

Al respecto, en el presente, es urgente una mirada crítica al proyecto de América Latina de las élites criollas y sus derivados actuales, y al de las izquierdas. América Latina en esas dos vertientes, nos dice Muyolema (2001), denunciando su fuerte carga racista, no es un proyecto ni inocente ni neutral.

En términos de la micro-política, Gonzalez nos da otra clave. Al fijarse en el proceso de construcción del sujeto dominado, y en diálogo con Fanon (1958), se pregunta por cómo la dominación se establece desde procesos de alienación en los que el dominado aspira a parecerse al dominador, y en los que opera la domesticación. En dicha alienación, la conciencia excluye lo que la memoria incluye. Una memoria que restituye la historia no escrita, lugar de emergencia de la verdad (Gonzalez

1983, 226), un espacio de reconocimiento de un pasado común y violento que se erige como un grito profundo de rebeldía, dignidad y humanidad. Además de abrir la pregunta por el tipo de identidad y subjetividad que se construye en el marco de la dominación, como buena feminista, Gonzalez presta atención a la construcción del cuerpo sujetado por el poder, que pasa incluso por las nociones sobre qué es y no bello.

El presente requiere de un doble movimiento. Por un lado, la articulación horizontal de la pluralidad de alternativas de sociedad que le hacen frente a la propuesta hegemónica ultra-conservadora, de forma tal que, de la manera más efectiva posible, se contenga el proyecto moderno-colonial dominante. Por el otro, urge un proceso intra alternativas que repense las formas de circulación de poder y práctica de la política cotidiana.

No es solo una ceguera epistemológica el no ver como las opresiones se entrecruzan para producir sujetos que ocupan posiciones de clase, género y raza específicas en nuestras sociedades, sino también el no reconocer la interseccionalidad de dichas opresiones desde la potencialidad que tiene como lugar de lucha y transformación, de potencia política. Es una ceguera epistemológica y política la incapacidad de diálogo entre las alternativas, los sujetos dominados, las exclusiones e imposiciones mutuas, el sectarismo y el dogmatismo.

Si bien la política de la identidad ha posibilitado el reconocimiento del sujeto sujetado, producido por la dominación, y la creación del sujeto de la resistencia, del cambio, dichas identidades no pueden ser esencialistas, estáticas y/o separatistas, sino que deben más bien ser móviles, diaspóricas, un medio y no un fin. Tampoco pueden convertirse en una excusa para generar una práctica que segmente hasta el agotamiento el campo de la transformación y las alternativas apelando a cuál es la contradicción principal o el sujeto más sufrido y vulnerable. Dado que somos sujetos diversos, el diálogo horizontal debe estar anclado en esas distintas posicionalidades que construyen una subjetividad múltiple subalterna, que como nos recuerda Gonzalez, comparten en esta geografía una experiencia histórica de dominación común. Diferenciada, bifurcada y específica de acuerdo a

la raza, la clase y el género, pero con ciertos rasgos afines que tienen como punto de encuentro la colonialidad del poder.

El mundo moderno-colonial se construyó en torno a clasificaciones que pretendieron ser rígidas, separando a los sujetos dominados y haciéndolos competir unos con otros. Somos herederas y herederos de una ideología de la clasificación social por sexo y raza, por clase, sexualidad y localización geográfica, que además se perpetúa a través de la represión estatal y la instauración del miedo (Gonzalez 1983, 1988). Pensando desde la realidad de la década de 1970 y el trato a lo negro como lo peligroso desde el Estado brasileiro, Gonzalez (1983) avizoró como la dominación haría hasta lo imposible para impedir cualquier forma de unidad del grupo dominado mediante la utilización de todos los medios que perpetúan su división interna.

El cambio del presente requiere de un reconocimiento y una práctica de las diferencias que no anule las metas compartidas. Esto solo será posible si por encima de las diferencias y las desigualdades que han sido construidas en un proceso histórico, antepone el diálogo y la articulación horizontal, entre pares, sin borrar ni anular las luchas particulares. Esto requiere, como primer paso, que todo aquel que ocupa posiciones de privilegio por género, origen geográfico, sexualidad, ocupación, clase y raza lo reconozca, no reproduzca la dominación y convierta los lugares de poder que ocupa en potencia para la transformación.

Cuando Gonzalez propone la categoría de América Ladina, plantea que lo hace para sobrepasar las limitaciones de carácter territorial, lingüístico e ideológico que la experiencia transatlántica y colonial implicó, abriendo de esa manera nuevas perspectivas para un entendimiento más profundo de la realidad regional. Hablar en plural de América Ladina, Abya Yala, Nuestra América, de despatriarcalización y descolonización, insta a reconocer que hay una lucha principal: todas las luchas posibles contra el proyecto de negación y muerte.

Los feminismos llevan décadas invitándonos a mirar la micro-política. Nos han dicho que lo personal es político. Es tiempo de que esa mirada sea tomada seriamente al interior de los procesos anti-sistémicos, que detonemos lo político de lo personal, y que además de posicionar, defender y enriquecer el pluriverso, volquemos la mirada hacia adentro, hacia el interior de los procesos de cambio social. ¿Cómo circula el poder entre procesos organizativos y movimientos, entre y al interior de los géneros? ¿Está circulando el poder de manera distinta en los procesos de resistencia y cambio a como lo hace en las relaciones de dominación? ¿Siguen siendo las relaciones de poder desiguales de género, raza y clase, entre otras, los códigos a través de los cuáles se estructura la dinámica interna de los procesos organizativos que abogan por el cambio social? ¿Qué tipo de identidades y subjetividades se están construyendo? ¿Potencian éstas el cambio liberatorio, la transformación profunda y estructural? ¿Son realmente consecuentes con los imaginarios políticos que se proponen?

La articulación horizontal implica trabajar mano a mano, como pares, desarticulando las relaciones de poder tradicionales, olvidando la práctica de vanguardia de la izquierda y aprendiendo a ver con nuevos ojos. Ver a la nueva mestiza al interior del sujeto mujeres racializadas; a las masculinidades no hegemónicas en la cotidianidad de las relaciones entre hombres y mujeres; al sujeto que, aunque privilegiado, se suma a las luchas anti-capitalistas y a la construcción de la equidad y la justicia económica. Lo que no puede ocurrir con los proyectos alternativos de sociedad es que estos excluyan a quienes están cruzados por dinámicas de dominación distintas a la propia cuando están abiertamente comprometidos con el cambio social.

Esta mirada interna sobre el poder, las identidades y las subjetividades, debe incluir una pregunta por la manera cómo siente el sujeto del cambio que ha sido histórica y dramáticamente vulnerado. El presente requiere de una *esperanza realista* que descentre el odio y el miedo, dos emociones que la experiencia colonial puso en el centro del relacionamiento entre diferentes y desiguales, y que aún nos acompañan. Dicha colonialidad emocional, debe ser transformada ubicando en el

centro del quehacer de la macro y micro política la digna rabia que ha movilizado a tantos, y el amor y el cuidado horizontal que forja sujetos autónomos y relacionales (Gómez 2016). En tiempo de desesperanza anclarse a la riqueza de las opciones de cambio en un contexto que debe verse con el mayor realismo posible, es vital para materializar de la manera más acertada los caminos de la transformación.

La lucha es epistémica y política. Es política, epistémica, ontológica y cultural. Se mueve entre los distintos imaginarios de sociedad que existen, las prácticas que los hacen reales y el cómo entre esos múltiples imaginarios se enfrenta el proyecto moderno-colonial en su expresión ultra conservadora. En su lado más oscuro y perverso. Ese proyecto que niega toda diferencia radical, que intenta borrarle hasta la saciedad, nunca ha podido deshacerse de la alteridad. El pluriverso es la máxima riqueza de las alternativas. Las últimas décadas han permitido tejer de manera más extensa y profunda esas opciones, sembrar un espacio de conciencia social, política, económica, ambiental, de género y racial en la que es necesario seguir arando articuladamente, que no es lo mismo que hacerlo uniformemente ni bajo la idea de un sujeto universal que borra las diferencias e ignora las desigualdades.

Notas

- ¹ Dado que por cuestiones de extensión es imposible citar la riqueza de la reflexión feminista descolonial, sugiero ver, entre otros, la compilación *Tejiendo de otro modo: Feminismo, epistemología y apuestas descoloniales en Abya Yala* (Espinosa, Gómez y Ochoa 2014), y el libro *Feminismos desde Abya Yala: Ideas y proposiciones de las mujeres de 607 pueblos en Nuestra América* (Gargallo 2014).
- ² *Abya Yala* es la manera como los indígenas Kuna nombran su territorio. Significa tierra en plena madurez. Esta designación ha sido asumida por intelectuales y expresiones del movimiento indígena para reivindicar un proyecto de sociedad propio. La noción de Nuestra América fue propuesta por el intelectual cubano José Martí, quien planteó que los procesos de independencia requerían más que el cambio de formas, la transformación del espíritu, erigiendo una crítica a la herencia colonial de la gesta emancipadora.

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Amefricanidade: The Black Diaspora Feminism of Lélia Gonzalez

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On September 30, 2015, the United Nations in Brazil celebrated the opening of its newest building, in Brasília, which now houses representatives of the UN Population Fund, UN Women, UN Environmental Programme, and UNAIDS. This new building was named after Lélia Gonzalez, iconic Brazilian activist of the black and black women's movements of the 1970s and 1980s in Brazil. This recognition of a black feminist scholar-activist came on the 70th anniversary of the creation of the UN in 1945, the 20th anniversary of the 1995 Beijing Fourth International Conference on Women, and in the framework of the UN's International Decade for People of African Descent (2015–2024). The year 2015 also marked the 40th anniversary of the UN's Decade for Women. During the period from 1975 to 1985, Lélia Gonzalez was a frequent participant in conferences and meetings organized as part of or separate from official UN events (Carneiro 2014). It was precisely during this time that she became a leader in a burgeoning transnational network of women's activists and intellectuals who organized themselves in social movements, cultural groups, and political collectives.

Between 1979 and 1981, Gonzalez traveled around the world to participate in academic and political events and meet with black leaders in several countries. In April 1979, she traveled to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in the US, to attend the LASA annual meeting and present a paper titled "Culture, Ethnicity and Work: Linguistic and Political Effects on the Exploitation of Black Women" (Gonzalez 1979a). That same year, she presented "Brazilian Black Youth and Unemployment" at the African Heritage Studies Association meeting, which she attended regularly (Fierce 2000). In May, she presented "A mulher negra na sociedade brasileira" (Gonzalez 1979b) at the Center for African American

Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. This is one of her most cited texts, which she later expanded and published as a book titled *Lugar de negro* with Carlos Hasenbalg (1982). In a visit to the Center for Puerto Rican Studies at SUNY Buffalo, Gonzalez spoke extensively with Molefi Kete Asante about the ideas he was developing for his book *Afrocentricity* (1980). Gonzalez returned often to the US, including to UCLA in 1980 to present "The United Black Movement," now a classic essay published in Pierre Fontaine's anthology *Race, Class and Power in Brazil* (1985). Gonzalez traveled within the US and to Panama, France, Italy, Switzerland, Finland, Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Mali. She describes her journeys abroad during the Brazilian dictatorship and the struggle for democracy as an opportunity to "breathe new air."

This article situates Gonzalez as a critical thinker in the black radical and feminist traditions who should be known and taken more seriously in North America. Her life and legacy teach us that in Latin America and the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, national narratives and policies of whitening and multiculturalism operate in stark contrast to the reality that the black population in the region forms the largest segment of the African diaspora outside Africa, with an estimated one hundred million people. Vibrant struggles for cultural recognition, citizenship, and human rights, oftentimes founded and led by black women, have always been occurring. What would it mean, then, for African diaspora studies and black feminist studies to decenter the Caribbean and North America and give more attention to Afro-Latin America?

To expand our assertion that African diaspora and Latin American studies need to refocus on the social, intellectual, and political experiences

of black women, we provide a description of Gonzalez's diasporic travels and experiences and the impact on her formulation of *amefricanidade* and black diaspora feminism, concluding with a reflection on the politics of a black feminist diaspora as an anti-imperialist and decolonial project in Africana and black feminist studies. Like Davies's recent work on Claudia Jones (2008), this ongoing research on black women in Latin America follows in this black left feminist intellectual tradition of resisting the erasure of black women as key social, economic, cultural, and political actors. In analyzing Gonzalez's travels, we assert that black women in Brazil should be centered as producers of knowledge, not just objects of study (and desire) in the region.

A Remarkable Life

The following brief biography of Lélia Gonzalez will help us to fully understand her formation as a global black radical female subject in black feminist and black diaspora studies.

Gonzalez's travels began in 1942 with her family's move to Rio de Janeiro. The second to last of 18 children, she attended the traditional Colégio Pedro II in Rio, still known as one of the best public high schools in Brazil, and completed her bachelor's degree in history and geography in 1959 at the State University of Guanabara (now the State University of Rio de Janeiro) and another bachelor's degree in philosophy in 1962. Before the recent implementation of affirmative action programs for poor black students in public universities, blacks made up less than 10 percent of Brazilian university students, and in some fields of study, like philosophy, less than 5 percent. It would still be remarkable today for any black woman raised in the poorest neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro to complete a bachelor's degree, a professional studies course in Lacanian thought, and a master's degree in communication at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, while founding the Institute of Research on Black Culture and the School of Freudian Thought, and to begin a doctorate in anthropology.

In 1976, Gonzalez joined the Instituto de Pesquisas das Culturas Negras (IPCN), which brought together students, scholars, and activists doing research and organizing against racism in Rio de Janeiro. In 1978 Gonzalez, along with other black activists including Abdias Nascimento, founded the Movimento Negro Unificado Contra a Discriminação Racial (MNU) in São Paulo. She attended gatherings in Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, and other major cities throughout Brazil to disseminate the work of the MNU, which would prompt the diasporic view of black consciousness she later espoused. The importance of Gonzalez's travels was not limited to her work educating young Afro-Brazilian students and activists. Through her travels she witnessed firsthand how black people lived and articulated politics across Brazil. She saw her activism as evolving alongside emergent black social movements, and that these movements had become spaces for the circulation of political pedagogies.

On one of her trips to Europe, she stopped in Dakar, Senegal, where she met exiled Cuban activist and intellectual Carlos Moore. Their friendship reflected the diasporic encounter between two Afro-Latin intellectuals outside their home countries, connecting around shared political ideologies of critiquing the racial conditions of the Americas. Gonzalez traveled throughout the interior of Africa, from Senegal to Burkina Faso. She was particularly interested in the social transformation of African-descendant women's lives, assuming the beginning of her role as an anthropologist.

Gonzalez joined the Workers Party in 1981 and ran for political office in 1982. A few years later she joined the Democratic Labour Party and once more sought a position in the House of Representatives of Rio de Janeiro. In 1983, after much discussion and critique of sexism in black movement organizations, she and other women founded the Nzinga Coletivo de Mulheres Negras in Rio de Janeiro, one of the first black women's organizations in the country (Gonzalez 1983; Santos 2010).

In 1984, as a Ford Foundation fellow, she traveled to the US and met with black women leaders such as Angela Davis in a seminar at Morgan State

University in Baltimore. The period between 1974 and 1988 was the most intense period of Gonzalez's political life, defined by her MNU and Nzinga activism, work as a professor, and commitment to diasporic travel, thought, and solidarity. Her last two trips, to Panama and Bolivia, deeply impacted her black diaspora feminist ideas, but her work in North America, Europe, and Africa were crucial for disseminating information about racial injustices in Brazil and dispelling the myth of racial democracy (Bairros 1999b; Carneiro 2014).

In 1990, Lélia traveled again throughout Africa. In early 1994 she became the head of the Department of Sociology and Politics at the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. On July 10 of that year she died suddenly of a heart attack. Her death was tragic for the black and black feminist movements.

Gonzalez's life reveals how her travels throughout Brazil, the Americas, and Africa shaped her intellectual formation and political consciousness. Her travels throughout the black diaspora made centering black people and culture and eradicating antiblack racism her core mission. Gonzalez's life exemplified the diasporic consciousness of a hemispheric blackness and interconnected struggles against gendered and class-based racism.

The impact of Gonzalez's work as an activist and intellectual can be seen in the celebration of her life, scholarship, and political work (Carneiro 2014; Barreto 2005; Cardoso 2014; Gonzalez 2018; Ratts and Rios 2010; Viana 2006). She is still remembered by a generation of scholars and activists who worked alongside her in the national black movement and those who forged solidarity with that struggle from black communities around the world (Bairros 1999a). Gonzalez has been a key reference for a new generation of activists driven by her original standpoint within the black feminism prism.

In the US, Gonzalez was one of few Afro-Brazilians actively participating in black academic circles, impacting the development of global perspectives and the centering of Brazil in Africana studies (Fierce 2000). Twenty-five years after her untimely death, we are struck by Gonzalez's intellectual erasure from Africana and black feminist studies in

North America. Her key ideas, like *amefricanidade* and Afro-Latin feminism, should be read alongside the theorization of Afrocentricity, hemispheric blackness, decoloniality, and the globalization of black feminist thought.

The Formulation of Hemispheric Blackness (*Amefricanidade*)

Much of Gonzalez's travels focused on her political work connecting the Brazilian struggle against racism with struggles in other American contexts, and she espoused a hemispheric and diasporic approach to black liberation. In Panama, Gonzalez observed that the discussions and analyses taking place helped to tear down barriers between disenfranchised women, such as some feminists' racism, and the antifeminism of American Indians and *amefricanas* (American Africans). In Bolivia, Gonzalez identified the significance of the *amef리카na* voice recognizing the racism and sexism that black women face. Drawing from psychoanalysts, specifically Magno's *América Ladina* (1980), she synthesized a conception of the African diaspora and coined the term *amefricanidade* to describe the common experiences of blacks in the Americas. She negated the idea of a "latinidade das Americas," arguing for recognition of Amerindian and African elements in the cultures. She argued that "latinidade" stems from colonizers' long and violent domination of the Iberian Peninsula. She defines *amefricanidade* as follows: "A historic process of intense cultural dynamic (resistance, accommodation, reinterpretation, creation of new forms) referenced in African models that shape the construction of an ethnic identity. The value of this category is in fact to rescue a specific unity, historically forged in the interior of different societies that are formed in a certain part of the world" (Gonzalez 1988a, 77; our translation).

Sterling (2012) argues that this new culture formed outside Africa does not erase the centrality of Africanness in the formulation of blackness. At the center of *amefricanidade* is black culture, shaping all of Brazilian culture, expressed in the everyday "speech, gestures, movements and ways of being that manifest in ways that we are not even conscious of them" (Gonzalez 1988a, 70). *Pretuguês*

(black Portuguese) was one such example, tied to African linguistic survivals, and African religions were key dimensions of black cultural life in the Americas.

Gonzalez identified some founding figures in African ancestry in the Americas, including maroon societies, namely Zumbi dos Palmares and Nanny of the Maroons. For Gonzalez (1988b), Nanny was significant in rescuing the history of black women's strength in the struggle against slavery and oppression and reestablishing the black woman as a founder of amefrican nations. Nanny reminded her of the forgotten black women heroines of Brazil such as Akotirene, Dandara, Maria Filipa, and Luiza Mahim. During her trips to Martinique in 1991, Gonzalez came to see amefricanidade as the cultural resistance to Eurocentric sociocultural standards and systems and the inheritance of a black/Afro ancestral past.

Understanding this perspective on defining a collective black identity that is hemispheric, Gonzalez calls for the transnational organization of African-descendant women in Latin America in her 1988 essay, "For an Afro-Latin American Feminism." The ideas in her writings resemble those ideas of Claudia Jones (Davies 2008, 2011), who understood black women as having a distinct subjectivity and militancy and thus envisioned a diasporic response to their exploitation. Gonzalez (1988c, 96) writes:

When I speak of my own experience, I am talking about a long process of learning which occurred in my search for an identity as a black woman, within a society which oppresses me and discriminates against me because I am black. But a question of an ethical and political nature arises immediately. I cannot speak in the first person singular of something which is painfully common to millions of women who live in the region, those "Amerindians" and "Amefricans" who are oppressed by a "latinness" which legitimizes their "inferiority."

Gonzalez's account reveals the unsurprising reality that black women throughout Latin America developed their militancy within the black movement rather than within the women's movements. Black women in Latin America

had to defend the need to develop their own political identities, and they claimed the right to organize autonomously within anti-black racism movements. Gonzalez's travels intensified her notions of blackness and feminism, and many credit her with the diasporization of black feminist activism in Brazil (Bairros 1999). As Bairros (1999, 355) wrote, Gonzalez articulated "other ways of thinking the African diaspora synthesized in the category 'amefricanidade', to define the common experience of black people in the Americas."

The Feminist Decolonial Project in Africana Studies

We have provided some key details of Lélia Gonzalez's life and political work in response to Campt and Thomas's (2008, 1) question, "What does it mean to theorize diaspora through an explicitly feminist frame?" A full answer requires that we excavate the contributions of black women in Latin America and the Hispanophone Caribbean.

Gonzalez's black diaspora feminist politics reminds us that bringing black women's intellectual work and ideas to the forefront necessarily contributes to significant shifts in representations of black subjectivity and the internationalization of antiracism and antisexism politics. Engaging black women's experiences and actions seriously in African diasporic research expands notions of how black people experience and politicize race, gender, class, and nation across multiple geographic communities. If we read more about women such as Claudia Jones, Eslanda Robeson, Angela Davis, Sueli Carneiro, Nilma Lino Gomes, Beatriz Nascimento, and Luiza Bairros, if we unearth the archives of knowledge that emerge from their intellectual and social justice work, then scholars of Latin America never have to question the validity of blackness or black womanhood as a category of humanistic or social scientific inquiry. Lélia Gonzalez's theorization of amefricanidade challenges the antiblackness foundational in the construction of the Americas, and the story of her life should inspire a more global commitment to eradicating imperialism, gendered racism, and all forms of subjugation at the core of our intellectual mission.

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Iku and the Amefrican Nightmare

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The anthropologist Júlio Braga, the *babalorixá* (priest of the orixás) of the Axelóia worship house in Salvador da Bahia, in his book on devotion to Babá Egum, divinized ancestors worshipped in the *terreiro* (temple) of Babá Aboulá on the Island of Itaparica, quotes William R. Bascom: "Every four days, she descended from the sky and invaded the Ojalfé market; She killed, she and her people, as many people as she could, with the help of large staffs. Most of the inhabitants of Ifé were soon massacred. The survivors then turned to the orixás, invoking Lafogido (then called Oni), Oduá, Orixalá, Ijugbe, Alass and all other existing orixás, so that they would come to save them. But the orixás could do nothing against death" (Bascom, in Braga 1992, 106).

The narrative in question is one of the myths that explains how death, Ikú, was "tamed" by a man named Ameiygun, who deceived her and dressed her with colored cloths and mirrors, so that death, impersonal, collective and irrational devastation came to be worshipped in the individualized figure of the divinized ancestor, the Egum, who in Bahia is still dancing on sacred nights, dressed in the powerful, multicolored *opá*. Death, a terrible male scourge that does not bow to anyone, not even to the cunning Exu, can be, if not defeated, transcended, once symbolized and individualized and effectively embodied as ancestors and male guardians (Prandi 2001).

We must obviously understand these mythological and cosmogonic meanings in their deepest dimension, as Yoruban forms of thought and epistemologies that live in Bahia and other parts of the African diaspora, and which only have full meaning when integrated with complex worldviews, supported in ritual forms and in exuberant symbolic wealth. These forms and senses make up the secular and ever-revived repertoire of our América Ladina as described

and proposed by Lélia Gonzalez in "The Political-Cultural Category of Amefricanidade" (2018; first published 1988). As a result of the critical and political reflection mediated by numerous hemispheric and transcontinental meetings, "Amefricanidade" is certainly more than merely the repertoires associated with the indigenous and African traditions transplanted and/or buried in the so-called New World. In fact, Lélia seeks to develop a new way of thinking or rather to take the perspective of "a cultural force," which takes the historical form of "resistance."

Mainly, this is resistance against the persistent Europeanization, or whitening, of cultural forms and structures of consciousness. The effort of de-Africanization and de-indigenization is persistent and continuous in the Americas, and its constant failure suggests that its nature is always this denial of the Other, at the same time inventing the Other. América Ladina is this resistance, which overflows the repertoires and treasures of Maya, Quechua, Yoruba, Bantu; as she says, then, the category incorporates "an entire historical process of cultural dynamics" (Gonzalez 2018, 329).

Tragically, death occupies a central place in this historical process: Physical death, individual, prosaic, and occupying its place in the dining room and in the memory of families. And social death, a tutelary phantom guarding a border, a checkpoint between the zone of being and the nonbeing. The violent and brutal death, spectacularized and staged as an instrument at disposal of the heteropatriarchal colonial order, as the "true superiority" of the colonizers (Fanon 1983). In the space of the Amefrican resistance, from this point of view, situated in the middle of the *samba de roda*, the *xirê*, the *caboclo de jurema*, at the crossroads in the middle of the city, can we interrogate the cosmological meaning of death in the *nagô*

(Amefrican) tradition, can we interrogate black death? Or the meaning of the historical category of “social death” (Patterson 2008)?

Lélia Gonzalez has repeatedly referred to the unjustified magnitude of state violence and the more or less diffuse or objectified structural violence that affects black people in Brazil. In 1981, still under the military regime, she declared in an interview: “the law facilitates this violence against blacks and women” (2018, 118). In the amazing text “Racism and Sexism in Brazilian Culture” she went further to interpret in a psychoanalytic way the violence against the black man as a function of sexual remarks of the white patriarch, tormented by the panic of castration created by racism itself, by projecting onto the black man fantasies and anxieties (2018; first published 1980). Lélia also participated in the founding of the MNUCDR (Movimento Negro Unificado Contra a Discriminação Racial, later renamed Movimento Negro Unificado) in São Paulo in 1978 (Ratts and Rios 2010), probably the most important experience of national organization of Brazilian blacks in the period of transition to democracy in the late 1970s. For the MNU, the issue of violence was central and the act of founding the movement was marked by the denunciation of yet another horrible act of brutality and death. The murder of the young Robson Luis was reported in detail by the journal *Versus*. Robson Luis, married and a resident of Vila Popular, died on April 28, 1978, at the Hospital de Clínicas after stealing three fruit boxes with friends returning drunk from a party. His face was disfigured and his scrotum had been ripped off at the 44th Police Station in São Paulo. According to the newspaper, the deputy, while beating him, said: “Blacks have to die by the stick” (Cardoso 1978).

In the cosmological, religious, and philosophical Nagô tradition, death is part of a transcendental cycle and in its individual and personal eventuality, it is inscribed in an eternal mystical return, consistent with the circular and nonbinary symbolic structures that define this epistemology. Orixás, transcendental deities, express a relationship symbolized by nature and the cosmos, duplicated between *aye* (world) and *òrun* (beyond); the *eguns*, ancestral spirits, watch over stability and social

order. Orixás and Eguns require separate and distinct cults. The Eguns to assume their position as guardians and ancestor counselors require specific rituals after death, and some characters of the orixás religion in Bahia are now eguns individually recognized and worshiped in Itaparica. The important point is that death, and deaths, are inscribed in a regime of truth, meaning, and revelation through proper rituals, symbolization, and appropriation. As happens in Àsèsè, funerary ritual among the Yoruba is also practiced in Bahia. The ritual converts the savage misfortune of death into an element of a poetics of transcendental existence. “There is no confusion between the reality of the *aiyè*—the dead one—and its symbol and double in the *òrun*—the *Égún*. There is a social consensus, a collective acceptance that allows to transfer, to represent, to materialize in a complex symbolic system the *Nagô* culture reality of the simultaneous existence of *aiyè* and *òrun*, of life and death. The self, integrated by the three principle-symbols and conveyed by the principle of individual life, will keep the complex gear of the system in motion and, through ritual action, will propel the successive transformations and the eternal rebirth” (Santos 2017, 270).

Thus, for example, we observe, as in Babá Aboula in Itaparica, and in the city of Cachoeira, also in Bahia, that the Sisterhood of the Good Death, with its secret cults, takes care of symbolizing death, guaranteeing the balance of life. The secular Sisterhood of the Good Death, founded in Salvador in 1820 by black women of the *candomblé* religion, who are still the only ones allowed to participate, performs its great ceremony in Cachoeira. The Sisterhood undoubtedly is an Amefrican institution, in particular because of the way in which its members occupy or colonize white, Christian, Western institutions and religious brotherhoods and convert them into institutions of devotion to the orixás. In the cult of Our Lady of Good Death, the sisters say, the slaves asked for a quiet death “without martyrdom” (Barbosa 2011). And here we see how it is to tame the violence of individual death in an age where martyrdom was a state policy and form of social control.

Or we can see the way Luciane Rocha describes contemporaneously the meaning of violence in documenting and discussing the mourning and struggle of mothers who lost their children to violence in Rio de Janeiro. To theoretically understand the agency of these black mothers, she proposes the concept of “de-killing” (Rocha 2017), because under the scorching scourge of social death, of the effective genocide of black people in Brazil, the sociological meaning of death is the negation of the legitimacy and dignity of black life. There is no proper symbolization, no mourning or social commotion, no recognition of the humanity of the dead, of his mother, of his community, of his ancestors or descendants. There is especially this nightmare, where near-human specters fight or hide. They deny who they are and flee from their brothers or poison their masters and disappear into obscurity.

On May 4, Rio de Janeiro state governor Wilson Witzel, who during the campaign proposed that snipers kill alleged thugs from helicopters, released a video on his social networks in which he appears inside a helicopter in mid-flight. He announces the beginning of a Civil Police operation in favelas of the region of Angra dos Reis. While the cops shoot from the helicopter, the governor says: “Let’s put an end to the banditry.” The governor was denounced to the United Nations (UN) by State Representative Renata Souza; he in turn has already requested her expulsion from the State Legislative Assembly, and it must be recognized that sadly many people in society support the pure and simple execution of supposed thugs in the favelas in a context of extreme urban violence, which tends to increase.²

The already incredible numbers of urban violence in Brazil have grown, and are expected to grow even more, affecting mainly black, indigenous and LGBT people. The number of deaths due to police intervention in Rio de Janeiro is the highest in the last 20 years. In the first three months of 2019 the state police killed 434 people in police operations.³ In Bahia, my home state, the indicators of violence have improved slightly, however, the level is so high that there is no reason to celebrate. In the first quarter of 2019, there were 293 fewer deaths compared to the same period in 2018. Even so, from January to March, there were 1,263 homicides,

robberies, and injuries followed by death.⁴ And as we know there is a strong racial bias in violence. According to the Map of Violence 2018, out of every ten people murdered in Brazil, seven are black. “According to the Atlas, there were 62,517 homicides in the country, which is equivalent to 30.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. The death toll caused by crimes among black people was 40.2 per 100,000 people, while among non-blacks it was at 16. Based on this proportion, research showed that 71.5% of individuals whose lives were harvested in 2016 in Brazil were black or brown.”⁵

It is in a context like this that the new Brazilian president, elected in 2018 with 57 million votes, proposes to increase access to and possession of arms, formerly exclusive to the military and for various professional and social groups such as residents of rural areas, elected politicians, lawyers, or truck drivers. According to analysts, if the decree is approved by the Congress roughly 19 million people will have legal access to automatic weapons of large caliber.⁶ It is easy to predict the intensification of violence, especially against indigenous peoples, LGBT people, women, peasants, and black youth.

It is easy and distressing to realize that the policies of death, genocide, state necropolicy (Mbembe 2003), and horizontal sovereignties will reach a nightmare level. The Amefrican dream of Lélia Gonzalez today, as yesterday, faces the supremacist and colonial nightmare that made martyrdom a device of nation building. Whether we are prepared or not, in Brazil and elsewhere, we come face to face with a time of death, which appears with the greenish color that haunted the voice of the prophet in Patmos: “When the fourth seal was opened, I heard the voice of the fourth beast crying: Come! And I saw a green horse appear. His knight was named Death; and the land of the dead followed him.” //

Notes

- ¹ Júlia Barbon, "Helicóptero com Witzel a bordo atirou em lona de oração em Angra, dizem moradores," *Folha de São Paulo*, May 8, 2019, <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2019/05/helicoptero-com-witzel-a-bordo-atirou-em-lona-de-oracao-em-angra-dizem-moradores.shtml>.
- ² RJ2, "Witzel é denunciado à ONU por presidente da Comissão de Direitos Humanos da Alerj," *Globo.com*, May 7, 2019, <https://g1.globo.com/rj/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2019/05/07/witzel-e-denunciado-a-onu-por-presidente-da-comissao-de-direitos-humanos-da-alerj.gh.html>.
- ³ Felipe Grandin and Matheus Rodrigues, "Número de mortes por intervenção policial no RJ é o maior nos últimos 20 anos; apreensão de fuzis bate recorde em 2019," May 3, 2019, *Globo.com*, <https://g1.globo.com/rj/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2019/05/03/rj-bate-recorde-na-apreensao-de-fuzis-em-2019-numero-de-mortes-por-intervencao-policial-e-o-maior-nos-ultimos-20-anos.gh.html>.
- ⁴ "Mortes violentas têm redução de 18,8% na Bahia no primeiro trimestre de 2019," *Correio da Bahia*, April 8, 2019, <https://www.correio24horas.com.br/noticia/nid/mortes-violentas-tem-reducao-de-188-na-bahia-no-primeiro-trimestre-de-2019/>.
- ⁵ Amauri Eugênio, 2019. "Mortes de pessoas negras aumentaram quase 25% no Brasil em uma década," *Alma Preta*, June 5, 2018, <https://www.almapreta.com/editorias/realidade/mortes-de-pessoas-negras-aumentaram-quase-25-no-brasil-em-uma-decada>.
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Direitos humanos e América Ladina: Por uma crítica amefricana ao colonialismo jurídico

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Este artigo tem como principal objetivo mobilizar o pensamento de Lélia Gonzalez para reposicionar as discussões sobre direitos humanos, tendo como premissa o fato de que colonialismo jurídico condiciona o vocabulário em torno do qual os referidos direitos são reconhecidos e juridicamente mobilizados, assim como impacta na percepção sobre sua construção política.

A partir da categoria político-cultural da *amefricanidade*, busca-se oferecer uma narrativa que implique o direito em relação aos processos de violência sobre a zona do não-ser, tomando como referência a experiência e produção de africanos/as em diáspora na *América Ladina*, bem como suas respectivas resistências à dominação colonial. O modelo normalizado de resolução de conflitos, construído e parametrizado pela experiência da *zona do ser*, simplifica as violências produzidas sobre a zona do não-ser em categorias como inefetividade ou violação de direitos. Como alternativa a esse modelo pretende-se, de um lado, romper com uma compreensão sobre os direitos humanos que reproduza a proteção ilusória que o colonialismo jurídico oferece a corpos e experiências negras e, de outro, informar uma proposta de construção dos direitos humanos centrada e compreendida a partir da zona do não-ser.

Nesse intuito, é necessário entender como Lélia Gonzalez constrói a noção de amefricanidade, para depois articulá-la com os processos que marcam a produção normativa no Brasil. Em seguida, objetiva-se relacionar as referidas contribuições com as leituras hegemônicas sobre direitos

humanos (Pires 2016 e 2017), para tensioná-las, ao fim, com possibilidades de produção que podem ser extraídas da experiência ladino-amefricana.

Trata-se de um convite para pensar o direito em *pretuguês*. A partir do legado de Lélia Gonzalez, renova-se o compromisso de racializar para politizar o aparato normativo e subsidiar formas encarnadas de exercício de liberdade e de limitação de poder na América Ladina.

Amefricanidade como proposta de repactuação político-epistêmica do direito

Lélia Gonzalez desenvolve a categoria político-cultural da amefricanidade a partir da experiência histórica compartilhada de luta promovida por africanos/as e seus descendentes e pelos povos originários na América Ladina. Lélia Gonzalez, ao contrário da ideia afirmada de que a formação brasileira tem o predomínio de elementos brancos europeus, pensa o Brasil e demais países da América Latina como uma “América Africana”, que sofreu uma forte influência negra na sua formação histórico-cultural.

Tendo como um dos pontos de enfrentamento o modelo moderno/colonial centrado na experiência europeia, a amefricanidade reposiciona o eixo de percepção sobre o legado da colonialidade. Atribuindo centralidade às resistências produzidas na zona do não-ser, lastreia politicamente os processos de formação da burocracia institucional brasileira, desenvolve categorias epistêmico-políticas radicadas na cosmo-sensação afrodiáspórica e propõe um letramento imbricado

entre raça, classe, gênero e sexualidade para o enfrentamento dos desafios concretos da hierarquizada realidade brasileira.

Para estabelecer uma conversa com a categoria da amefricanidade, são mobilizados os conceitos de zona do ser e zona do não-ser, por influência do pensamento de Frantz Fanon (2008), para explicitar o modo através do qual o projeto moderno colonial europeu organizou as relações intersubjetivas e institucionais que marcam a colonialidade do poder. A categoria *raça* foi instrumentalizada para separar de forma incomensurável duas zonas: a do humano (zona do ser) e a do não humano (zona do não-ser). O padrão de humanidade passou a ser determinado pelo perfil do sujeito soberano (homem, branco, cis/hétero, cristão, proprietário, sem deficiência), representativo do pleno, autônomo e centrado. As dinâmicas de poder na zona do ser fazem da afirmação do não-ser a condição de possibilidade de suas humanidades, condicionam o vocabulário a partir do qual passam a definir a si, ao outro como outro e a própria realidade.

A recuperação das categorias fanonianas ancora-se na premissa de que a construção normativa (teórica, legislativa e jurisprudencial) é produzida a partir da experiência da zona do ser, sendo incapaz de, nesses termos, oferecer uma resposta que reposicione o papel dos direitos humanos sobre os processos de violência sobre a zona do não-ser (Pires 2018). Busca-se aproximar referenciais afrodiaspóricos comprometidos com os desafios de autoinscrição para pensar os direitos humanos a partir de um repertório capaz de acessar os diversos corpos e formas de vida que conformam a sociedade brasileira (Pires 2017).

Achille Mbembe (2001) alerta para a necessidade de elaboração de uma autoinscrição que não encerre os/as africanos/as (e, aqui também, os/as amefricanos/as) em uma identidade limitada e essencializada, nem reafirme as leituras sobre os/as africanos/as (e sobre os/as amefricanos/as) criadas pelo opressor. Nesse sentido, as formas africanas de autoinscrição não se dão nos mesmos termos que na América Latina, mas as propostas de Mbembe e Gonzalez comungam do compromisso

de romper radicalmente com descrições hierarquizadas que a colonialidade fez dos/as africanos/as e da diáspora africana.

Lélia Gonzalez reivindica a importância de se reconhecer um fazer próprio da experiência amefricana. Para ela, tentar achar as “sobrevivências” da cultura africana no continente americano, atribuindo à África aquilo que aqui é produzido, é um equívoco que pode encobrir as resistências e a criatividade da luta contra a escravidão, contra o genocídio e a exploração que por aqui se desenvolveram. A amefricanidade carrega um sentido positivo, “de explosão criadora”, de reinvenção afrocentrada da vida na diáspora, afinal, “foi dentro da comunidade escravizada que se desenvolveram formas político-culturais de resistência que hoje nos permitem continuar uma luta plurissecular de liberação” (Gonzalez 1988,78).

O valor metodológico da amefricanidade, segundo Lélia Gonzalez, radica na possibilidade de resgatar uma unidade específica, forjada pela violência do racismo e pela resistência contra medidas seculares de espoliação, expropriação e apagamento da memória e das contribuições científicas, históricas e políticas de negros/as. A amefricanidade não é sobredeterminada pelo continente africano, tampouco pela hegemonia eurocêntrica. Produz-se a partir da resistência e criatividade que a luta negra em diáspora, protagonizada por mulheres, conduziu a partir da experiência colonial que por aqui se forjou. Mais do que um retorno deslocado para o lado de lá do Atlântico, potencializa o complexo trabalho de dinâmica cultural que “nos traz de lá e nos transforma no que somos hoje: amefricanos” (Gonzalez 1988, 79).

Lélia Gonzalez (1988) afirma que negros/as em diáspora não podem atingir uma consciência efetiva de si, se permanecerem prisioneiros de uma linguagem racista. Por isso, compromete-se com a assunção de uma linguagem própria (o *pretuguês*), propõe o termo amefricanos para designar a todos nós e rompe com a linguagem imperialista que define o mundo e os “outros” a partir da autoimagem de sua supremacia.

A hipótese que se defende é a de que através da amefricanidade, é possível interpelar a realidade e, nesse sentido o direito, em pretuguês. Falar pretuguês não é falar um dialeto, é colocar-se politicamente como alguém que reconhece e assume que a linguagem culta falada no Brasil é resultado dos processos de assimilação, aculturação e violência de povos africanos. Interpelar a realidade em pretuguês é pôr em questão as categorias de estratificação de humanidade que relaciona a zona do ser ao sujeito branco, masculino, cisheteronormativo, proprietário, cristão, sem deficiência e de origem norte-atlântica. É perceber que o indivíduo abstrato, sobre o qual a ordem da legalidade se constitui, é da ordem da branquitude como uma racialidade não-nomeada.

Compreender os direitos humanos em pretuguês exige o recentramento das implicações de estar na zona do não-ser, de enfrentar o secular processo de desumanização que se impôs a negros/as por processos de extermínio permanente ou pelas mais variadas práticas de morte em vida que marcam suas trajetórias. Em pretuguês, não se disputa a possibilidade de ser incluído/a (sempre de maneira controlada) na noção de sujeito de direito que está posta, disputa-se a produção do direito, do Estado e da política desde a zona do não-ser e nos seus termos.

O perfil que normalizou o sujeito detentor de respeito e merecedor de proteção do Estado, o representativo da zona do ser, fez com que boa parte das ferramentas jurídicas e das políticas institucionais existentes sejam incapazes de oferecer condições paritárias para muitas lutas por liberdade que são empreendidas na América Latina. Quando o “lixo” fala, em primeira pessoa, assume os riscos de falar com todas as implicações e confronta “numa boa” as propostas teóricas e políticas acumpliciadas com os mais diversos processos de desumanização (Gonzalez 1984, 225).

Enquanto categoria de resistência, a amefricanidade nasce como uma tentativa de oferecer caminhos para pensar e intervir de forma imbricada sobre todas as formas de opressão. Congrega disputas que decorrem dos atravessamentos que o racismo, sexismo, cisheterossexualidade compulsória, capitalismo,

cristianismo, capacitismo e imperialismo impõem aos corpos e experiências moídos pela colonialidade.

Colonialismo jurídico e direitos humanos no Brasil

O direito, enquanto mecanismo de controle social e de manutenção das elites, tem mobilizado uma série de dispositivos que marcam a perpetuação do empreendimento colonial-escravista no Brasil. Com a transição da economia feudal para o capitalismo na Europa, o direito se constitui para possibilitar a consolidação do regime capitalista, a manutenção da ordem, a centralização do poder, a unificação de territórios e o monopólio da produção normativa pelo Estado. O direito que resulta desse empreendimento foi transposto aos territórios colonizados.

O sistema jurídico reproduzido no Brasil não só estava intimamente ligado ao empreendimento colonial e às categorias de pensamento que decorriam dele, como desempenhou um papel central na sua consolidação. A história dos institutos jurídicos que afirmavam a liberdade se desenvolveu simultaneamente ao regime de escravidão, ao genocídio e à exploração dos povos colonizados. Nesse contexto, o sujeito de direito é a afirmação de uma pretendida uniformidade, forjada pela exclusão material, subjetiva e epistêmica dos povos subalternizados. A régua de proteção que determina o padrão a partir da qual bens como a liberdade passam a ser pensados deriva da afirmação da supremacia branca, masculina, cisheteronormativa, classista, cristã e inacessível a todos os corpos, bem como do resultado dos processos de assimilação e aculturação violentos empreendidos pelo colonialismo.

O ideal de igualdade que inspira a elaboração normativa a partir dos movimentos constituintes na Europa e nos Estados Unidos no final do século XVIII exigiu que as decisões políticas que se converteriam em normas regulamentadoras dos comportamentos sociais deveriam ambicionar romper com privilégios injustificáveis e permitir que todos os cidadãos pudessem ser contemplados por sua proteção.

A eleição do Antigo Regime como realidade a ser negada por aqui reproduziu desenhos institucionais para lidar com um problema que não afetava a América Ladina. Preocupados com as estruturas do Antigo Regime, mantiveram intactas as estruturas e práticas coloniais. Assumir o marco das Revoluções Francesa e Estadunidense como constitutivas de autoimagem constitucional brasileira e negar a influência real do haitianismo (Queiroz 2017) nos seus processos constituintes significou manter intactas as estruturas que sustentavam o modelo colonial e fortaleciam processos de colonialismo interno, extremamente elitistas e violadores da memória, do respeito e da dignidade de grande parte dos corpos que viviam no seu território. Os grupos que foram escravizados, submetidos a relações de servidão, expropriados de sua memória, forma de vida e dignidade são os mesmos que atualmente continuam sendo alvo das mais variadas formas de violência de Estado e ausentes da representação político-institucional.

A criação dos cursos jurídicos, discutida pela primeira vez na Assembleia Constituinte de 1823, procurou atender à demanda do Estado Nacional por uma elite própria para compor seu estamento burocrático e reproduzir o *habitus* e a disciplina europeia (Costa 1992, 52). O público-alvo do bacharelismo jurídico era formado pelas classes dominantes e oligarquias rurais, garantindo os seus lugares de privilégios na estrutura burocrática. As Faculdades de Direito se formaram como ambientes altamente hierarquizados e dominados pela elite econômica, racial e sexual pátria, moldando processos políticos que se realizavam à revelia das classes populares, racializadas como não brancas. Teoria do direito e jurisprudência passam a consolidar os interesses dos proprietários dos meios de produção do Estado brasileiro, excluindo do seu processo (não apenas do acesso à justiça, mas da construção normativa de forma mais ampla) os cidadãos considerados de segunda classe e aqueles cuja humanidade se negava.

A incapacidade do direito produzir emancipação para sujeitos e experiências que não são levadas em conta no processo de determinação dos bens jurídicos a serem tutelados, apresenta-se como a mais bem acabada forma de enunciação da legalidade e da liberdade como atributos

exclusivos da zona do ser. Por trás de uma suposta neutralidade e da afirmação de uma igualdade formal, o direito segue sendo lido e construído sob o signo da branquitude.

E como esses processos influenciaram a construção dos direitos humanos no contexto da América Ladina? A crença nas ideias de universalidade e neutralidade dos direitos humanos produziram, ainda que a partir de um discurso que prometia proteção, uma apropriação dessa agenda de forma hierarquizada e extremamente violenta para os grupos sociais minorizados e aliados dos bens materiais e simbólicos para o bem viver.

Uma característica central na noção de direitos humanos que se tornou hegemônica na segunda metade do século XX, momento em que sua construção passa a ser reivindicada de forma mais peremptória, é a defesa de sua universalidade. Enquanto universais, tais direitos representariam as faculdades e instituições capazes de promover condições de vida livre, igual e digna para qualquer pessoa. Entendidos como direitos naturais, seriam além de universais, a-históricos e, com isso, capazes de responder aos anseios de dignidade e pleno desenvolvimento da autonomia em qualquer tempo e para qualquer pessoa. Entendidos como produtos históricos, os contornos da proteção universal poderiam ser discutidos contextualmente, a partir das especificidades e desafios de cada tempo.

De todo modo, a uni-versalidade impressa na ideia de direitos humanos pressupõe uma única possibilidade de natureza humana, aquela radicada na figura do sujeito soberano representativo da zona do ser. Mais do que questionar a eleição de direitos como liberdade, igualdade, segurança, felicidade e dignidade, pretende-se explicitar a convivência entre a defesa desse ideário e o desenvolvimento, manutenção e aprimoramento de uma estrutura de dominação de matriz colonial escravista imposta pelo projeto moderno europeu à América Ladina.

Uma crítica amefricana ao colonialismo jurídico

A partir do discurso dos direitos humanos, o centro europeu promete(u) salvar do destino a que estariam fadados aqueles por eles atribuídos como primitivos, selvagens, subdesenvolvidos e não humanos. Sob o manto do humanismo racionalista, toda sorte de violação de direitos foram perpetradas pelo colonialismo e justificadas pela epistemologia hegemônica que nas mesmas bases se erigiu.

A experiência amefricana tem, com a teimosia e criatividade que permitiu a subsistência do povo negro em diáspora, muito a contribuir para a redefinição dos direitos à liberdade, propriedade e dignidade; resistência política; acesso à educação, saúde, trabalho, lazer; direitos sexuais e reprodutivos; direitos econômicos; meio ambiente e direito à cidade; presunção de inocência, devido processo legal e ampla defesa; consentimento informado; direito à memória, verdade e reparação; para listar apenas os direitos que a população negra tem mais frequentemente violados.

Essas reorientações têm por objetivo responder ao mundo herdado, e não ao mundo idealizado pelas declarações de direitos humanos. A eficiência da crença na universalidade e neutralidade dos direitos humanos, aliada no contexto brasileiro com o compartilhamento do mito da democracia racial, fez com que o impacto de sua utilização para promover o enfrentamento das desigualdades raciais se mantivesse esvaziado.

A amefricanidade valoriza e resgata saberes produzidos por mulheres negras e indígenas e os qualifica para informar outras práticas, outra gramática de direitos. Muitas das lutas por liberdade que foram empreendidas pelo povo negro ou não são apresentadas pelas narrativas oficiais sobre o Brasil, ou não são apresentadas como luta por liberdade. A Revolta de Carrancas (Minas Gerais) em 13 de maio de 1833, a Revolta do Cosme no Maranhão, entre 1838 e 1841, a Revolta de Búzios (Conjuração Baiana) em 1798, a Revolta dos Malês, em janeiro de 1835, na cidade de

Salvador são alguns dos eventos organizados que mobilizaram uma agenda normativa distinta da hegemônica.

Na construção de sociedades políticas complexas como os quilombos e nas múltiplas experiências quilombistas (Nascimento 2009), os conceitos de resistência e liberdade guardam contornos próprios que poderiam informar mecanismos alternativos de convivência, produção material e imaterial, relação com a natureza e de organização política.

A experiência amefricana oportuniza que se pense a violência a partir dos impactos desproporcionais dos processos de desumanização sobre a zona do não-ser, e não a partir dos processos de desestabilização da normalidade hegemonicamente enunciada e que mantém a liberdade como atributo exclusivo da zona do ser. Aberta às múltiplas formas de ser, estar e bem-viver, desarruma as fronteiras que estabelecem o centro e a periferia, acessa os diversos rostos e corpos que compõem o mosaico da América Ladina e informa uma nova *práxis* nos debates sobre o Estado e o direito.

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América Ladina: The Conceptual Legacy of Lélia Gonzalez (1935–1994)

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Lélia Gonzalez's thinking is paradigmatic in Latin America. Her work stands out among the theory and praxis of the plurality of feminism and black and indigenous women, the Western Marxist tradition, and international and national studies on racism. In addition, as an autonomous agent and the protagonist of collective action, Gonzalez was fundamental for the construction of the Brazilian black women's movement that sought to confront sexism, racism, and class inequalities. Her trajectory and production, however, do not obscure the biographies and voices of the *quilombolas* and poor black women who organized and campaigned during the transition from authoritarianism to democracy in Brazil. Lélia Gonzalez interpreted not only the national environment but also the great transformations of feminism and race relations around the world. In her theory, experiences involve national and transnational networks; Lélia Gonzalez's thinking offers an Afro-Latin-American and Amerindian perspective of Latin America, which she called *América Ladina*. In this way, her concept provides a new historical, cultural and political direction for the continent.

For a long time, Lélia Gonzalez was influenced only by a small circle of Brazilian black and white feminists of her generation and dialogue with North American specialists in Brazilian race relations. Noteworthy are her two articles published in English: "The Black Movement Unified: A New Phase of Black Political Mobilization," a chapter in the book *Race, Class, and Power in Brazil* (1985), and "The Black Woman in Brazil" that was included in the book *African Presence in the American* (1995), a collection organized by Carlos Moore. In Portuguese, she wrote several articles and coauthored three books. One of her most influential articles is "Racismo e sexism na cultura

brasileira" (1983) and her most read book is *Lugar de negro* (1982), written in partnership with the Argentine Carlos Hasenbalg.

In the year 2000, her production and trajectory were revisited and interpretations of these were intensified in order to highlight their relevance. The most significant mark of the broader critical reception of Gonzalez's production is directly connected to the establishment of the intersectional paradigm in the humanities, as well as the search for new epistemologies questioning the Euro-Western paradigm. In this sense, the recent translation of her article "La catégorie politico culturelle d'amefricanité," in the journal *Intersectionnalité et colonialité; Contemporary Debates* (2015) is noteworthy.

The renewed production on Lélia Gonzalez's thought has been based on new readings of her work. Some approach it with Afrocentric or diasporic perspectives, others prefer to emphasize its decolonial character, in particular, its criticism of the Eurocentric emphasis of the social sciences. Another line of research revisited the author's works by showing her intersectional perspective on the dimensions of sexual domination, class and race articulated within the forms of oppression and social hierarchy, as well as the formation of an identity of collective affirmation, thereby providing intellectual bases for black feminism. It is true that these different interpretations are very promising in terms of the contextualization of Lélia Gonzalez's intellectual production, as well as her national and international interlocution. However, I would like to highlight the originality and potential in her thinking, especially regarding her intellectual ambition to reimagine Latin America beyond an exclusively European influence.

At present, Lélia Gonzalez is a source of inspiration and creativity for collective and feminist organizations in Brazil. Both her textual legacy and her biographical accounts become objects of interest for research on her trajectory. In the last decade, feminists and anti-racists have also engaged in the dissemination of Lélia Gonzalez's works. An example of this is the project *Lélia Gonzalez: Black Feminism on the Stage of History*, written by Sueli Carneiro, and organized by Schuma Schumacher and Antônia Ceva (2014). In 2018, a complete collection of her work was published, put together by União dos Coletivos Pan-Africanistas, under the expert coordination of Raquel Barreto.

There are some elements of Lélia Gonzalez's biography that were fundamental for the development of her thought and for the creation of new categories and concepts. Born in 1935 in Minas Gerais to a poor family, her mother was of indigenous descent and her father was black. However, when Gonzalez entered high school she had to deny her origins to be accepted by teachers and white colleagues. Indeed, she experienced cultural whitening, a common process in Latin America. Later, that painful memory became a positive reflection about her family's cultural heritage.

As a university professor, Lélia Gonzalez engaged in the struggle for the re-democratization of Brazil. She was noted for her visceral involvement with social movements opposed to the military regime and the Department of Political and Social Order (DOPS), a state body for the control and repression of anti-regime elements. As an activist, Lélia Gonzalez belonged to one of the most influential anti-racist Carioca organizations, the Black Cultures Research Institute (IPCN); she also founded the Unified Black Movement Against Racial Discrimination in 1978; organized one of the first groups of Brazilian black women, Nzinga; and collaborated with the "Quilombo Samba School," an important space of cultural resistance against the commercialization and alienation of black culture. Aside from her many contributions to the alternative press, to theatrical groups, and to "blocos afro," Lélia Gonzalez advised filmmaker Cacá Diegues for his film *Quilombo* and

playwright Hilton Cobra for his play *Candances*. In short, Lélia Gonzalez sought to operate at the interface between culture and politics. Indeed, for Gonzalez, cultural language had to be subverted, since sexism, classism, and racism were the deep marks of the culture of colonial domination. For this reason, she chose to put a particular emphasis on language, calling the language spoken in Brazil *pretuguês* to emphasize its African influences, especially Bantu language.

Her membership in political organizations directly opposed to the military dictatorship is worth noting. Although she was never elected to the Brazilian Congress, she fought patriarchal and socioeconomic obstacles in Brazilian electoral competition. Gonzalez, as well as a significant number of women and black people, sought in the then new political parties a means of gaining access to the state, hoping to demonstrate the importance of racial and gender issues within the scope of institutional policy. In this sense, her vision in the context of the dismantling of the military regime was in the establishment of a participatory democracy that could express the diversity of the Brazilian population. Because of this, she became an advisor to Benedita da Silva in her first legislative term in Rio de Janeiro and collaborated with a caucus of black deputies during the process of writing a new Brazilian constitution (1986-1988), a "Carta Magna" which criminalized racism and guaranteed territorial rights to communities founded by escaped and former slaves (*quilombos*).

Therefore, Lélia Gonzalez's simultaneous social-movement and political-party activism was not only a personal project but, above all, an understanding that the collective demands and social claims of the movements of which she was a part should gain visibility in the sphere of power. Given Brazil's diminutive black and female political representation, Gonzalez and her generation also had a stake in the formation of participatory councils, serving on the national women's council, which was fundamental to the questioning of gender in the interaction between state and civil society. It was, therefore, part of the search for representation and participation on the political playing field of the state public sphere in the democratization of the country.

In this political context, which included the passage from an authoritarian regime to democracy, Gonzalez was intensely involved in national networks of political activists, while she systematically reflected on the forms of colonial and patriarchal domination still prevailing and operative in the cultures of the Americas. A specialist and a critic of Brazil's social sciences studies tradition, Gonzalez was part of that generation of alternative intellectuals that constructed different routes and networks to reflect upon the national reality, in particular, the constitution of a new political regime that would bring the years of state authoritarianism to an end.

In the second section of this short article, I will focus on the resonant Afro-Latin American, African, and Amerindian dimension in Lélia Gonzalez's intellectual production and in the formal and informal activism networks in which she worked. I will show the vitality and timeliness of the author's arguments in defense of a transnational horizon that encompasses the voices and experiences of lower socio-cultural and economic groups. Far from limiting herself to linguistic and national boundaries, Gonzalez, by characterizing the colonial legacy rooted in Latin American culture, sought to overcome these forms of oppression by proposing a collective identity on an ethno-racial and feminist basis in the Latin American continent, which became *América Ladina*.

Why América Ladina?

For analytical purposes, I divide Gonzalez's thought into two phases. In the first, she dedicated herself to analyzing the cultural, historical and economical processes that caused black people, especially black women, to feel inferior. Between 1978 and 1985, most of her writings are on the legacy of slavery and the effects of capitalism on the periphery of Brazil, focusing on issues of race and gender in society. Her paper, titled "Culture, Ethnicity, and Work: Linguistic and Political Effects on the Exploration of Women," presented at LASA in April 1979 in Pittsburgh is a good example of her academic leanings at that moment. Nonetheless, she did not focus solely on the oppression and exploitation of the Brazilian black woman. Her reflections also dealt with their

forms of resistance and, above all, their ways of subverting the dominant groups. In this way, she studied the "mãe preta" case: "In my view, 'Mãe Preta' and 'Pai João', with their stories, created a sort of 'family romance' which had fundamental importance in the formation of people's values and beliefs, of our 'Volksgeist'. Consciously or not, they passed on elements of African cultures that they represented to the white Brazilian. More precisely, it was the 'Mãe Preta', as subject-supposed-to-know, the africanization of Portuguese spoken in Brazil ('pretuguês' as Lusophone Africans say) and, consequently, the africanization of Brazilian Culture" (Gonzalez and Hasenbalg, 1982, 93–94).

In the second half of the 1980s, Gonzalez expanded her vision. Her international perspective and the intensification of her readings— especially of psychoanalysis, anthropology and history, promoted significant changes in her intellectual production. In her article "Por un feminismo afrolatinoamericano," published in 1988, she showed her critical standpoint on feminism: "For all these reasons, Latin American feminism loses much of its force by dismissing a fact of reality of the greatest importance: the multi-racial and pluricultural character of the region's societies. To deal with, for example, the sexual division of labor, without articulating it with its corresponding racial component, is to fall back on a kind of abstract universal rationalism, typical of a white, masculinizing discourse" (Gonzalez 1988b, 135).

These ideas were presented by Gonzalez during a presentation in Bolivia in 1987, with this article being one of the best examples of the transnational shift of the author. In it, Gonzalez is already making mature reflections about her experience as an Afro-Latin-American feminist. Although Gonzalez did not abandon a Latin American horizon for feminism, she offered an alternative way. Gonzalez understood that the kind of domination that subordinates women and black and indigenous peoples could be classified as a racist and patriarchal system. The articulation between feminism and anti-racism is a central weapon for combating the forms of domination that used biological arguments for the naturalization of the subaltern spaces occupied by women, black and indigenous peoples in Latin American societies.

For that reason, she defended the organization of indigenous women, black people, campesinas, quilombolas, and so on.

A fundamental political force for feminism would be the incorporation of voices, forms of traditional resistance, political experiences, and narratives of indigenous and black women, which Gonzalez called *amefricanas*. She developed this category to account for the collective identity formed by the groups from the different societies in the region. Taking into consideration this ethnic plurality and, at the same time, seeking solidarity on common ground, she wrote an article titled “A categoria político-cultural de amefricanidade,” which was published in the same year that “Por un feminism afrolatinoamericano” appeared.

The first intellectual to realize that América Ladina was a powerful concept was Luiza Bairros, a Brazilian black feminist who directed the Secretary of Public Policies for Equality between 2011 and 2014. In one of her articles, Bairros wrote in Gonzalez’s memory by claiming that her definition for *Amefricanidade* was a particular version of diasporic thought. Bairros wrote: “Lélia denied the latinity of the Americas. Considering, on the one hand, the preponderance of Amerindian and African elements. And on the other hand, the historical formation of Spain and Portugal, which can only be understood by taking the long domination of the Iberian Peninsula by the Moors as a starting point” (Bairros 2000, 350).

In 2015, Jules Falquet and Azadeh Kian translated Gonzalez’s article into French, introducing the term *Amefricanidade* to the Francophone world and emphasizing the decolonializing character of the Brazilian author: “The concept of amefricanity that she develops here is, indeed, not anything other than a critique of Latin America’s ‘Latinity’ as a form of Eurocentrism, which neglects the African, as well as the Indian, roots of the contemporary cultures of the continent” (Falquet and Kian 2015, 3).

For Gonzalez, to think of América Ladina, and not América Latina, is/was a multiple subversion. First, it foregrounds the groups subordinated by the patriarchal and colonial system on the continent. Secondly, because it emphasizes this reality,

the notion also highlights the experiences and the forms of resistance of black and indigenous woman. Thirdly, it seeks transnational solidarity without denying the pluralities of the territorial, cultural and demographic formations of each country. Fourthly, the idea of América Ladina problematizes the categories and languages created within colonial thought. Lastly, it represents an anti-imperialist approach to North America, especially against “the political purpose of the imperialistically dominant power of the region: the United States” (1988a, 75). For Gonzalez, *Amefricanidade* can be defined thusly: “In addition to its purely geographic character, the category of amefricanity incorporates a whole historical process of immense cultural dynamics (adaptation, resistance, reinterpretation and creation of new forms). Its methodological value in my view is that it allows the possibility of rescuing a specific unit, historically forged within different societies, which have formed in a certain part of the world. Therefore, America, as an ethnogeographic reference system, is our creation, and our ancestors” (Gonzalez 1988a, 77).

She concludes that amefricanidade refers not only to “the Africans brought by the slave trade, but also those who arrived in America long before Columbus [não só a dos africanos trazidos pelo tráfico negreiro, como daqueles que chegaram à AMÉRICA muito antes de Colombo]” (Gonzalez 1988a, 77). Finally, it is important to state that Gonzalez did not invent the term “América Ladina,” although she realized its potential as no one else had, as she sought to project a collective identity—beyond the national state, outside territorial and colonial linguistic barriers and categorical essentialisms—and the possibility of imagining the overcoming of the cultural, political and economic inferiority of the continent. And most importantly, for her, no transformational project that wants to be radical can disregard the political and cultural resistance of the amefricanas, because: “If we are committed to a social transformation project, we cannot be compromised by ideological postures of exclusion, that, for us, only favor one aspect of reality. As we claim our difference as black women, as amefricanas, we know well how much the exploitation of economic, racial and sexual

subordination has marked us. Therefore, we bring the mark of the liberation of one and all with us. (Gonzalez 1988c, 2).

More than renaming Latin America, Gonzalez's reflections on América Latina are an excellent invitation to think about other perspectives for the continent. Through her intellectual provocations and robust reflections, Gonzalez's ideas still help us to think about the region's past, present and future beyond the colonial paradigm.

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Marielle Franco, una huella inspiradora

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Estamos viviendo en Latinoamérica tiempos de autoritarismo y neofascismo como parte de estados democráticos, siendo una de sus expresiones más crudas el incremento escalofriante de asesinatos contra mujeres y hombres activistas políticos de izquierda, sobre todo de pueblos indígenas y comunidades afrodescendientes en países como Colombia, Nicaragua, Chile y Brasil. Así, el asesinato de Marielle Franco, mujer negra lesbica originaria de la favela el Maré en Rio de Janeiro, quien dedicó su vida a luchar contra el racismo y contra la violencia policial, electa como concejal del Partido Socialismo y Libertad (PSOL) en 2016 y quien fue brutalmente asesinada el 14 de marzo, 2018. Los más de 16 meses de impunidad se anuncian de manera insistente con la frase, *¿Quem matou Marielle Franco?*, pregunta que tapiza rincones inesperados de las calles en las principales ciudades de Brasil, acompañados de murales con el rostro de Marielle, quien contempla los diversos espacios públicos con una mirada nítida, de expresión amorosa, directa, que no titubea.

Cada año, los principales periódicos del mundo le dedican por lo menos una foto al carnaval carioca, resaltando sobre todo su exuberancia. Sin embargo, este año, la imagen fue de la escuela de samba, la Mangueira, que desfiló con el tema, *“História para ninar gente grande”*, un homenaje a líderes indígenas y negros que han transformado la historia de Brasil. La letra de su canción, que ganó el premio anual de carnaval, dice, *“A Mangueira chegou/ Com versos que o livro apagou/ Desde 1500 tem mais invasão do que descobrimento/ Tem sangue retinto pisado/ Atrás do herói emoldurado/ Mulheres, tamoios, mulatos/ Eu quero um país que não está no retrato”*.

Sin duda el momento más emotivo fue cuando emergió una bandera rosa con verde de grandes proporciones, estampada con el rostro de Marielle flotando por encima de los participantes, mientras



todos marchaban con sus propias banderas, creando un muro de rostros de la concejal. Si bien fue la Mangueira la imagen más difundida, no fue la única expresión callejera reclamando justicia por su asesinato y el de Anderson Gomes, chofer que esa noche la trasladaba después de un evento en Lapa, Rio. En São Paulo y en Salvador acciones callejeras la reconocieron como la antítesis al fascismo de Bolsonaro. *“Marielle Presente”*, *“Rua Marielle Franco”*, *“Luta como Marielle”*, llenaron las calles, al mismo tiempo que el carnaval se transformó en un desahogo colectivo contra el presidente mediante críticas creativas, artísticas y humorísticas. La respuesta del mandatario fue calificar los festejos de *“decadencia moral y deplorable”*. Como prueba de ello, circuló desde su cuenta de Twitter un video de dos hombres gays, uno orinando encima del pelo del otro mientras bailaban en la calle.

Pero la democracia autoritaria se caracteriza también por sus pequeñas concesiones. Terminando el carnaval y antes del primer aniversario de su asesinato, el gobierno, con la

intención poco exitosa de desinflar cualquier acto de protesta, anunció la detención de los presuntos responsables de su asesinato.

Pocos días después los medios de comunicación expusieron los vínculos entre los presuntos asesinos y la familia Bolsonaro. Uno de los hombres detenidos, Ronnie Lessa, vivía en el mismo complejo de condominios en el que la familia del actual presidente brasileño es propietaria de una casa. Las redes sociales circularon una foto de otro de los detenidos, Elcio Vieira de Queiroz, en la que aparece abrazando a Bolsonaro, y difundieron información sobre el noviazgo que una de las hijas de uno de los sospechosos sostuvo con uno de los hijos de Bolsonaro. A pesar de estos vínculos, la policía descartó la información y desconsideró que tuviera implicaciones para la investigación en marcha.

El ¿Quem matou Marielle Franco? se transformó en ¿Quem mandou matar Marielle Franco?. Una exigencia de llevar a la justicia a los autores intelectuales del crimen y no sólo a los materiales.

Pero la justicia no se reduce a identificar y castigar a los responsables, también significa seguir alimentando y fortaleciendo la lucha colectiva de la que ella forma parte, incluyendo la de su viuda Monica registrada en el documental, *Marielle and Monica, the LGBT Activists Resisting Bolsonaro's Brazil*, realizado por *The Guardian* (<https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2018/dec/28/marielle-and-monica-the-lgbt-activists-resisting-bolsonaros-brazil-video>).

Organizaciones no gubernamentales, como Criola, en Rio de Janeiro, organizaron eventos culturales y políticos en marzo pasado para resaltar las luchas y la dignificación de mujeres negras; colectivos de mujeres negras en otras partes del país, como Bahia, han formado foros permanentes de discusión y debate que mantienen el legado de Marielle como horizonte.

Muchas reconocen que fue el asesinato de Marielle el que las llevó a conocer de su existencia, a conocerla como concejal cuya trayectoria incluía evidenciar el racismo y denunciar la violencia policial que ella calificó como una guerra, defender

las luchas feministas y de la comunidad LGBT, además de denunciar las milicias que generan tanta violencia entre sectores empobrecidos, principalmente negros, y los nexos de corrupción con funcionarios públicos. Reconocen también que la memoria de Marielle se ha convertido en un campo de disputa entre distintos sectores. Mientras algunos deciden resaltar su trayectoria como activista de derechos humanos, otros critican que esa etiqueta diluye el carácter radical de su proyecto de vida contra el racismo como mujer negra lesbica. Dada su trayectoria, identifican en su muerte un mensaje dirigido a toda mujer negra que lucha en Brasil y se preguntan cuántas mujeres negras de favelas que luchan contra la violencia y el racismo existen en el país sin que nadie sepa de su existencia. Al asegurar que esto no suceda consagran sus energías colectivas a honrar el legado de Marielle. //

Mujer Lunar

Poema de **Ashanti Dinah Orozco Herrera**

Pudiera ser que, por un instante, me confundas con lo normal, con lo común,
pero soy una Mujer Lunar.
A veces ritualera, astrofanática,
otras veces rezandera, adivina, yerbatera, chamana de visiones.
Soy de este mundo y del más allá.

La mariposa viajera de mis pensamientos
se ha aferrado al estruendo de mis alas, abarcando los brazos del cielo.
Se han hecho savia en el ramaje de mis venas,
Sobre mis rizos asoma el clamor robusto de mis ancestras negras.
Mi boca siempre está llena de pócimas y conjuros.
Suelto mi risa hechicera,
tal como un búho que grazna sonidos del más hondo misterio.

En mis eclipsados caminos siempre hace viento,
y siempre trota un perfume de agua de rosas
o un aroma azucarado a melao de caña en mi nariz.

Probablemente no logres deletrear mis acertijos,
pero cuando deseo algo me lo pido a mí misma . . .
Se lo pido a mis ensalmos de estrella parpadeante,
a mis fuerzas secretas de habla embrujada
que atrapan la grafía fractal de mi imaginación.

Yo no necesito de palomas o globos
que broten de un sombrero de copa,
ni de pata de conejos en mis bolsillos
ni de barajas españolas o péndulos para leer la suerte
ni varitas mágicas
ni de una vieja escoba que remonte serranías.
En mí, una trama de sombras se alumbra con los sortilegios de Yànsá
y se vuelven tempestad
o gruñido de centellas cabalgando la danza de la brisa.

Tengo lámparas encendidas en mis dedos de alquimista.
Mi manos sudorosas de Mar Caribe cifran los pliegues ondulados de la vida,
reflejan el espejo del agua y su movimiento.

Cuando rezo y fumo tabaco,
elevo mi humo sagrado a las divinidades supremas
y pregonó la clarividencia de sus espíritus
que están en alguna estancia del futuro.

Bajo la invocación lluviosa de la noche,
aprendí a bajarme la luna a mí misma.
Y cual sibila Mambo,
me siento sobre el amanecer
a la orilla de un árbol milenario,
y yo misma me delineo un surco apacible
sobre el rostro pardo de la tierra.
Pitagorizo las galaxias que equilibran mi *Orí*,
soy co-creadora de mi propio destino y de mis huellas,
soy soberana de mí misma.

Con la complicidad de la magia sobre el tiempo que avanza,
yergo mi corazón transformado en luz que no se apaga.
Voy por la región cósmica de los sueños
bogando con mis muertas,
que junto al griterío de las aves mojadas
cosechan extractos de nubes
y hacen suya la azul inmensidad.

Y aunque el límite de mi ser es el silencio
eco de mi propio silencio ...
si hay un círculo de fuego en el horizonte,
procuro siempre guardar un tambor
en la cúpula de mi santuario femenino,
para cuando me crezca un arpegio de alegría
hechizos me hagan croar el más ruidoso grito,
y exhalen este canto de río que llevo dentro;
esta cumbia erguida en la memoria
con la hoguera de toda mi sangre en la garganta.

¡Yo soy la Mujer Lunar! ¡Soy la elegida por Oggún!
¡Suma Sacerdotisa del *Ashé* de la palabra!

Ashanti Dinah Orozco-Herrera nació en Barranquilla (Caribe Colombiano). Es activista y militante afrofeminista. Perteneció a la Organización Social de Comunidades Negras Ángela Davis en Barranquilla. Es licenciada en Educación de la Universidad del Atlántico. Magíster en Literatura Hispanoamericana del Instituto Caro y Cuervo. Es Santera, practicante de la Regla de Osha en la tradición espiritual afrocubana. Varios de sus poemas que integran el poemario. Es Vicepresidenta de la Fundación Macondo y Son. En el campo académico-intelectual, sus investigaciones se han centrado en indagar y analizar las obras literarias de autores/as afrocolombianos/as desde la perspectiva de la sociocrítica de la literatura, los estudios culturales, poscoloniales y descoloniales, así como el análisis de cómo circula el lenguaje, las representaciones culturales y sociales de lo “negro” y la ideología del racismo en los textos escolares desde el Análisis Crítico del Discurso (ACD). Como poeta afrocolombiana ha participado en diversos concursos y recitales de poesía en los que he ganado varios premios. Varios de sus

poemas que integran su poemario “Poética del Muntú Renaciente” han sido publicados en varias revistas, antologías nacionales e internacionales. Seleccionada por la ANTV (Autoridad Nacional de Televisión de Colombia) como una de las personalidades afrocolombianas destacadas del país para el Decenio Afro (2015–2024). Entre sus premios y distinciones se destaca: Premio Benkos Biohó, 2016, en la categoría de Etnoeducación, en el Día Nacional de la Afrocolombianidad, otorgado por el IDPAC, por su contribución como docente en el Programa de Pedagogía Infantil de la Universidad Distrital de Bogotá en la implementación de la Cátedra de Estudios Afrocolombianos en educación superior y en primera infancia. //



Poesía de Fredy Chikangana

por **Fredy Chikangana**, poeta Quechua Yanakuna Mitmak

Pacha I

Huclla piruru hina caklla ñan,
Raphishuk, takishuk hoccariy wairapaypi
Nuqanshimi mucmicuk kumushukpi pachamanta.

Tiempo I

Tan solo una rueca en el constante camino,
Un canto suspendido en el aire
Nuestra voz silenciada en una curva del tiempo.

Pisco Yakuy

Jahuapi shuk pisco riyma yakupayrayku
ccarakuna purik utirayak
quillaqanchaypi
ucjupay pisscomanta runarurakay
ppatatatay llacllaykuna llaquikuna
chhinsuyttukuna . . .
rieran lliplliy phiñaphiñacuy yakumanta
ucjun caimi llanthu taytacunamanta.

Pajaro y Rio

Sobre un pájaro que va por el río
la piel viaja pensativa
en la luz de la luna
el cuerpo del pájaro se hace humano
palpitan entonces los temores, las penas,
los largos silencios . . .
sus alas resplandecen en el crisper del río
su cuerpo es la sombra de los abuelos.

Samay Piscocok

Samay piscocok
Takicay pachamamak jatun rimaypi
chihuihuincay ima hamuy sachamanta
shimicay ttillayay ima maskay suttuyaypi sonccoruna
ahihuihuincay ñutu rimaina:
«Jaku nimapi ñanpura jukuna causaypa
quihuacuna suyanak ñoqa rimay tutapurakuna llanturi

ñukanchiyupi ucllanacay pachata takiruntupay
 yurapankapura.
 Ñukanchi ninapay coyllurmanta ima urmay ankas ananpachak
 hullilla kçayapacha
 çaypi muyupi pillpintumantak quellu
 tarpuyaku puruncunapi
 tukurita nunacay pisccomanta
 pponccopi mushcoypa».

Espíritu de Pájaro

Estos son cantos a la Madre Tierra en tono mayor,
 son susurros que vienen de bosques lejanos,
 aquellas palabras esquivas que buscan ser gota en el corazón humano.
 Son tonos suaves, como si dijéramos:
 «Vamos en silencio por los caminos húmedos de la vida,
 la hierba de la esperanza nos saluda entre la noche y sus sombras,
 nuestras huellas se abrazan a la tierra y el granizo canta
 entre las hojas del árbol.
 Somos el fuego de estrellas que se desprenden de la bóveda azul
 anunciando el nuevo tiempo,
 aquí estamos tejiendo el círculo de la mariposa amarilla,
 sembrando agua en los lugares desiertos,
 en fin, somos espíritu de pájaro
 en pozos del ensueño».

Hapttay Pachamanta

Ñukapi çaskichiy hapttayshuk pachamanta çaypipak çausay
 Çaycca pachak'uikamanta ñukapiñiy:
 Çaypi llank'ay, çaypi camay çjullu-huahua,
 çaypi çjamuy qan muchhascca sara
 Çaypacha pallacuy hapttay çay pachamanta
 quinchaykuna rumimanta mana yakuimapak
 ñukapimuyuy
 huaccayçay ppuyñu maki ñukamanta, kcoñichiykuna
 huaylluyñukamanta callarinari llank'ayman . . .
 Punchau-punchau takipayman çayta hapttay pachamanta
 çaypacha hamuy añankukuna, chillikpay, pisccotutapay
 amarucuna ichupampak
 munaypay yanapana hapttay çay pachamanta.
 Quechuk quinchapay hucnin-cace ñoqacoy kquitichayaqqe
 Ñoka quepapuy yapamanta runalla
 ppuyñu makihuan çhusak
 ñoka huiskay makikuna, ruraypuyñukuna sinchicay macçanacuy
 ima çay huc ñukanchi qquechuk.

Puñado de Tierra

Me entregaron un puñado de tierra para que ahí viviera.
 «Toma, lombriz de tierra», me dijeron,

«Ahí cultivarás, ahí criarás a tus hijos,
ahí masticarás tu bendito maíz».
Entonces tomé ese puñado de tierra,
lo cerqué de piedras para que el agua
no me lo desvaneciera,
lo guardé en el cuenco de mi mano, lo calenté,
lo acaricie y empecé a labrarlo . . .
Todos los días le cantaba a ese puñado de tierra;
entonces vino la hormiga, el grillo, el pájaro de la noche,
la serpiente de los pajonales,
y ellos quisieron servirse de ese puñado de tierra.
Quité el cerco y a cada uno le di su parte.
Me quedé nuevamente solo
con el cuenco de mi mano vacío;
cerré entonces la mano, la hice puño y decidí pelear
por aquello que otros nos arrebataron.

Fredy Chikangana. Su nombre en lengua indígena es **Wiñay Mallki**, raíz que permanece en el tiempo. Poeta y oralitor Quechua, de la Nación Yanakuna Mitmak, del Cauca, Colombia. Premio de Poesía Universidad Nacional 1992, Premio Poesía Nosside de Poesía Global Multilingüe, Italia, 2008. Ha publicado los libros *Kentipay llattantutamanta / el colibrí de la noche desnuda* (Bogotá: Ediciones Catapulta, 2008); *Samay Piscocok pponccopi muschcoypa / Espíritu de pájaro en pozos del ensueño* (Bogotá: Ministerio de Cultura, 2010); *Voces de Abya Yala* (2012). Ha trabajado en el fortalecimiento de identidad Quechua Yanakuna Mitmak y la “oralitura” que comparte con hermanos nativos en el Continente Americano. Su trabajo ha aportado a la recuperación y construcción de espacios sagrados como es la “Yachay Wassi” que significa casa del saber y la palabra en el sur de Colombia. //



Civil Society and the Challenges in Refugee Higher Education

by **Sonja Wolf** | CIDE México | sonja.wolf@cide.edu

Education is a basic human right that is recognized in a number of international conventions, including the 1951 Refugee Convention of the United Nations (UN). It is also one of the UN's 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and seen as critical for promoting peaceful and inclusive societies. The global refugee regime has shifted its focus from humanitarian assistance toward a development approach to forced displacement. These changing priorities acknowledge that education and jobs help restore vulnerable populations' autonomy and dignity. This is all the more important since the durable solutions of return, reintegration, and resettlement are increasingly difficult to pursue. Protracted conflicts, and the chronic weakness of many states of origin, often prevent repatriation within a reasonable period (Long 2014). Yet the number of resettlement places in third countries is dwindling, and most refugee-hosting countries refuse to consider permanent local integration, because they view refugees as an economic burden and a security threat.

The concept of education in emergencies accepts that education must be an integral part of the emergency response to a refugee situation. Education provides displaced persons with the skills and knowledge to live independent and self-reliant lives, and reduces their economic vulnerabilities and risk of involvement in armed groups. Moreover, it strengthens their potential to contribute to peacebuilding and postconflict recovery of war-torn societies (UNHCR 2017). Refugee access to primary and secondary education has greatly improved over the years. But tertiary education was, until fairly recently, rarely considered in humanitarian responses. The UNHCR 2012–2016 Education Strategy (UNHCR 2012) for the

first time made refugee higher education a core component of the agency's protection and durable solutions mandate.

Refugees themselves also see educational opportunities as crucial for their own future and that of their countries (Dryden-Peterson 2011). Interest in higher education in emergencies grew with the Syrian conflict. Prior to the outbreak of the war, Syrians were ranked among the most educated populations in the Middle East (Al-Hessan 2016). But the peaceful protests inspired by the Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt soon descended into brutal repression and armed fighting. When the violence interrupted their studies, many young Syrians hoped to continue their education abroad. Visa requirements and limited scholarships, however, often shatter these dreams. At the global level, only 1 percent of eligible refugees are able to enroll in university (UNESCO and UNHCR 2017).

Nonprofit organizations are stepping in to help meet these educational needs through scholarship programs in third countries. Examples of such mobility-centered approaches to displacement include the Institute of International Education (IIE), United World Colleges (UWC), the World University Service of Canada (WUSC), and the Global Platform for Syrian Students. The Habesha Project, whose staff and students I have interviewed since 2018, brings Syrian refugee students to Mexico to study Spanish and complete their higher education. Their experience shows that scholarship programs are critical in affording young refugees the chance of a dignified life. The organizations must, however, also understand and manage the expectations of scholarship recipients, and provide them with an adequate stipend and psychosocial support.

Kindling Compassion

Habesha emerged at the height of the Syrian conflict. Its founder and director, Adrián Meléndez, is a Mexican lawyer who had completed assignments in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Lebanon before conceiving his own humanitarian initiative. In 2013 his work in a Syrian refugee camp in northern Iraq gave Adrián his first direct immersion in the lives of displaced persons. These encounters, and his perception that Mexico was only marginally involved in the global response to the Syria crisis, were decisive for the creation of Habesha. Looking back on this time, Adrián remembers: “I felt I had accumulated a lot of experience since Afghanistan. Being in a war zone, with all the adrenaline, was like in a movie. In Lebanon I developed this fascination with the Arab Spring, wanted to write. Later, in the refugee camp, I soaked up all this information about Syria and the refugees. By then I had knowledge, I had ego, money, and drive. I felt I had to do something. Habesha became my obsession. It just had to happen.”

Throughout 2014 and much of 2015, Adrián used his contacts and funds to consult with scholars, diplomats, and activists on how to turn a wild idea into reality. The initial uncertainties and missteps beset subsequent efforts to turn Habesha into a sustainable project. Adrián recalls: “In Iraq and during my travels Habesha made a lot of sense. It seemed easy enough to do. Everyone congratulated me for what I was doing. I felt empowered, felt anything was possible. I thought that in a few months we’d be able to bring 30 Syrian students to Mexico. I didn’t imagine that we’d take so long to make it happen.” After a year and a half of nonstop meetings, Adrián and his collaborators were ready to present Habesha to the media and to raise money to bring over the first students.

Habesha, its name a reference to the Abyssinian Kingdom that welcomed strangers regardless of their origins, conveys the organization’s support for open borders. Its objectives are threefold: to provide Syrian refugee students with university scholarships and stipends; to foster intercultural dialogue; and to promote a philanthropic culture in Mexico. Habesha secures tuition waivers, facilitates visas and makes travel arrangements,

pays a modest maintenance grant, and helps with housing, health care, study materials, and leisure activities. The Syrian students, through informal and classroom exchanges, add to the intercultural and civic education of others. Refugees are valued for their positive contributions to society and can help dismantle prejudices toward them (Ferede 2018).

Habesha’s social media activity and public speaking engagements serve the dual purpose of sensitizing people to Muslim refugees and soliciting donations. Raising adequate contributions has proved challenging in a country with no tradition of charitable giving. Initially, crowdfunding campaigns and media headlines about the Syrian conflict helped raise travel funds. Habesha relied on student volunteers for much of its work and only in 2017 was able to rent an office and recruit a small team of staff. They are recent graduates who are prepared to work long, stressful hours in return for a small—sometimes unpaid—salary and professional experience in the nonprofit sector.

Habesha chooses its scholarship candidates through word-of-mouth advertising and charitable foundations. The selection criteria, which emphasize academic commitment and civic engagement, were at first only loosely applied. The organization was unknown, and applicants would be taking a leap of faith by moving to Mexico and joining the project. No age limit or other restrictions are established to filter out those who may need to support their family back home or be more interested in the stipend than in the scholarship. Sixteen individuals have been admitted since late 2015, although three have since dropped out after struggling academically or emotionally. The induction year is spent in Adrián’s hometown of Aguascalientes, a quiet provincial city in central Mexico. Here the students participate in a Spanish language and cultural immersion program before enrolling in an undergraduate or postgraduate degree of their preference—a choice that would have been unavailable to them in their native Syria.

Seeking Dignity

Habesha students are in their early twenties to early thirties, mostly men, from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Few in the group

are women, given cultural restrictions for Middle Eastern females to travel and live independently. Those who joined the project either had the support of their families or, like Silva,* a 24-year-old Kurdish woman, married fellow Habesha student Jackdar in order to be able to travel. Prior to the war, some had dreamed of studying and traveling abroad. Hazem, for example, had hoped to attend university in Germany. But the eruption of the armed conflict interfered with the 28-year-old Kurdish man's language classes. Eventually they all fled economic hardship, forced conscription, or violence in Syria.

Stories about their lives as refugees stir up memories the students would rather forget—memories of lives turned upside down, of separation from family and friends, of the loss of homes. For some, what is etched in their mind is a thwarted sense of agency, a sense of hopelessness; for others, it is the bitter taste of discrimination they suffered in cities like Beirut. Twenty-year-old Amjad, who spent his exile in Yemen, remembers: "It was like pressing a pause button. You feel your life is on hold." Most of the Habesha students were urban or camp refugees in Lebanon, Turkey, or Iraq, where they made ends meet through informal labor or NGO jobs. All were anxious but unable to find a way out of their situation.

Silva, who spent five years with her family living and working in Iraq's Domiz camp, says: "We felt very desperate, because we didn't know what was going to happen to us. We lived in a tent. When it rained, everything got flooded. There was no kitchen, no bathroom. Not being able to study was the worst part for me. I felt I couldn't breathe, found it difficult to accept that this was my life." Some of the students had thought of making the treacherous journey to Germany, a country they saw as offering a strong economy, a first-rate education system, and a generous asylum system. But any possibilities to reassert control over their lives seemed out of reach until they heard about Habesha.

The Syrians had not anticipated, nor particularly desired, going to Mexico. The place was culturally and linguistically unfamiliar to most of them, and the idea of moving even farther away from family and friends caused some unease. Hazem, who is

studying business administration in Monterrey, says: "I had many doubts about Mexico. When I googled the country, I found only bad news, about the drug war, the 43 disappeared students. I was afraid to go to Mexico—thought I'd be going from one war zone to the next. But I really wanted to study, and when I finally got to Mexico and saw what it was like, I felt better."

Being part of Habesha allows the Syrians not only to continue their university education but also to create a new identity for themselves. They are aware of their refugee background and recognize that refugee status counts toward permanent residency. But to be seen as refugees is, for them, to be labeled with a stigmatized identity—an identity associated with famished, idle persons, or even with stories of asylum fraud and illicit behavior that have tainted entire nations. Able to redefine themselves as students, Habesha participants feel also able to restore a sense of dignity to their lives. Hazem, who spent more than two years in Iraqi Kurdistan, says: "When you're a refugee, people treat you like you're nothing. That's an ugly experience. I don't want people to look down on me, to think that I'm just waiting for handouts. I want them to understand that I come from a country at war, but that I don't want to fight. I want to live my life like anybody else."

By rejecting the refugee label, Habesha students miss a chance to highlight the diversity, skills, and resilience among displaced persons. The project, however, is for them primarily a unique opportunity to make a fresh start, far away from the prejudices and xenophobia Syrian refugees have encountered elsewhere. Amjad adds: "In Mexico people have no stereotypes about us. That encouraged me to come here. You can start on a blank page and write your own story."

Coming from a socially and religiously conservative society, Habesha participants find that Mexico offers them a newfound sense of freedom and independence. Some have struggled to adjust, while others relish the prospect of a less restrictive lifestyle. Silva, who is living in a different city than her husband, says: "The culture in Mexico is very different. Women here can live and travel by themselves. Syrian women tend to be raised

conservative. Before I got married, I had only ever lived with my parents, never by myself. I was not used to taking care of things on my own, because in my country men do that. This is very difficult for me. But it also makes you stronger as a woman, helps you understand more things.”

The students also note contrasts when it comes to freedom of religion. Amjad, for example, observes: “In Syria, the lifestyle is shaped by religion. Islam regulates people’s life from birth to death. It feels a little oppressive. In Mexico, you don’t feel watched what you’re doing, or judged when you don’t pray. There is more openness here. You decide if you want to drink, or if you want to have sexual relations outside marriage. This is part of our educational experience in Habesha. We’re not just getting a degree.”

Chasing Dreams

Generating sufficient resources for staff salaries, operational costs, and student stipends has proved Habesha’s biggest challenge. This is even trickier now that the Syrian war is ending and donor fatigue has set in. Without a long-term fund-raising strategy from the beginning, money needs to be solicited on a rolling basis. The difficulty of relying heavily on citizen donations, however, has required the organization to shift more to government and foundation grants. A developing partnership with UNHCR gives the project added credibility, but its financial situation remains tenuous.

Habesha invites its scholarship recipients to serve as goodwill ambassadors. Their testimonials can raise awareness of the plight of refugees and launch emotive fund-raising appeals. But this has met with resistance from the students. Some recognize that media interviews and public talks may provide networking and professional development opportunities. Others, however, value their privacy or believe that organizational income generation is not their responsibility. For the time being, Habesha’s unpredictable financial situation puts its scholarship program on uncertain footing.

The resource constraints have important repercussions for students and staff. The modest stipend, which was reduced when the initially

pledged amount proved unsustainable, is a source of friction in the project. The Syrians came to Mexico with huge expectations for a more comfortable existence. They feel disappointed at the cutback and struggle to live on a tight budget in a foreign country. Most attend private universities where the disparities between wealthy and less privileged students can produce feelings of alienation. Some of the Habesha grantees supplement their stipend by teaching Arabic classes or selling homemade Middle Eastern food. But the financial worries and informal work distract from academic studies.

Habesha’s funding constraints also make it difficult for the organization to recruit and retain qualified staff. The project relies on volunteers, often university students, for administrative and teaching support. Given the time commitment and lack of pay, the volunteers’ involvement tends to be fleeting and erratic. This affects the quality and consistency of the Spanish language provision and can delay Habesha participants’ university admission.

The grantees’ stories show how inconsistent applicant screening and limited funds can impair their academic performance and mental health. Imran, one of the first Habesha students, abandoned his postgraduate course after struggling psychologically and returned to war-ravaged Syria. Tarek, at 31 years one of the oldest of the cohort, had intermittently studied economics and worked odd jobs from a young age to support his family. He feels he has never been able to pursue his own dreams and joined Habesha largely for the financial support. As a mature student in Mexico he grappled to reconcile informal employment with the demands of his new educational setting. Tarek suffered recurrent nightmares and, after leaving the project, struggled to find work and housing. With mounting despair, and no valid passport, he fell back into using and dealing drugs.

Habesha offers many learning opportunities for staff and funders. They organization needs to ensure its sustainability and implement a more rigorous applicant screening. It also must carefully manage students’ expectations and provide them

with psychosocial care to help them deal with the trauma of displacement. Besides facilitating access to scholarships, the organization may collaborate more closely with universities so that they can better support refugee students academically and emotionally. Despite its imperfections and limited reach, Habesha responds to the need for refugee higher education and helps change the image of displaced persons. It invests in the human security of vulnerable populations at a time when restrictive visa policies and travel bans close many doors. Its real contribution, however, may be symbolic: Habesha allows its participants to recover dignity, to savor freedom, diversity, and human rights, and to dream their future and that of their country.

Note

* The names of some of the students were changed to protect their privacy.

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
Julio Cotler (1932–2019)

by **Abraham F. Lowenthal**, Professor Emeritus of International Relations, University of Southern California

Julio Cotler, Peru's foremost social scientist of the last 50 years, one of its most esteemed public intellectuals, and a leading figure in the inter-American intellectual community, passed away in Lima on April 5, 2019. Cotler's writings, especially *Clases, estado y nación en el Perú* (1978); his earlier classics on rural Peru; his acerbic analyses of Peru's "Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces" in the 1970s; and his later contributions on the decay of democracy in Peru, on Peru's transition from military rule to democratic governance, on the bases for authoritarian and democratic tendencies in Peru, and on drugs and politics there provide a lasting contribution that will remain a touchstone for all who try to understand Cotler's enigmatic country.

As a social scientist, Cotler recurrently analyzed and emphasized Peru's colonial heritage, its unique structures of power and class, its ethnic composition and conflicting values, its clientelism, and its embedded racism. His concept of the "triangle without a base"—the tendency of marginal groups to establish relations with power in order to gain privileges, but not to associate with each other to promote their own rights—is one of the foundational ideas of the literature on Peru.

Beyond his social science writings, Julio Cotler became and remained for 40 years an indispensable, independent, and critical commentator on his country's society and politics. His periodic media interviews, consistent intellectual honesty, wry wit, and persistent skepticism, combined with eternal underlying hope, made him an iconic and widely respected figure in a fragmented nation. He was often out of step with volatile Peruvian public opinion, but he very often turned out to be right in warning against new conventional wisdoms. In 2006, when Jane Jaquette and I asked a cross-section of Peruvian interlocutors an open-ended question about who



both merited and received broad respect across Peru's multiple divisions, Cotler ranked as one of the three persons most often cited, together with the provisional president who restored democracy after Fujimori's rule and the Catholic University rector who presided over the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Cotler was also a region-wide intellectual leader in a generation of Latin American social scientists who began their careers sharply focused on social and economic injustices and were passionately committed to helping overcome these, but who

came to believe that liberal democratic ideas and institutions provide a better path to achieve these goals than revolutionary zeal and violence. His contributions in this vein, in Peru and across the region, were among the reasons the Latin American Studies Association honored Cotler with its Kalman Silvert Award for lifetime contributions to Latin American Studies in 2012. Together with others who have won that award, including Guillermo O'Donnell, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Albert O. Hirschman, and Edelberto Torres Rivas—and with Kalman Silvert himself—Cotler embodied a deep commitment to recognizing the rights and roles of all citizens in building a polity founded on respect, and to resisting the impulse, whether on the right or on the left, to impose one's own values and beliefs on others.

I met Julio in 1969, only a few weeks after I began working in Lima as a Ford Foundation officer. From the start, he was open and engaging, as he was with many international social scientists, to whom he asked almost as many questions as he answered.¹ We began to talk frequently—often over *café glacé* and a *cortado*—exchanging impressions about the nature, sources, and likely trajectory and meaning of the Velasco Alvarado military regime, thought by many at that time to be something new under the sun, a strongly reformist if not outright revolutionary agent of radical change. We discussed the messianic colonels and their civilian advisors, who were at the heart of Velasco's undertaking, and the uneasy relationship between fundamental military concepts of authority and the notions of “full participation” they claimed to be implementing. With his gift for the pungent phrase, Cotler pointed out that the military concept of “participation” was that of a military parade, and that the Velasco government's apparent aim to find an authoritarian path to democracy was an inherent contradiction. I sensed Julio's ambivalence, as the seductive efforts of key leftists to mobilize him into their political activities against the regime drew him briefly into uncharacteristic polemics, which led directly to his deportation in 1973 and forced him to live abroad with his family for several years.

I would underline Julio's self-conscious evolution over time—as a social scientist, as a public intellectual, and as an international professional—toward a strong commitment to liberal democracy. He came to understand and value its checks and balances, procedural designs and underlying attitudes, and how these can enable consensus building, compromise, and incremental progress and can restrain ideological imposition and repression from any quarter. He emphasized throughout the decades, and not just in the current environment, that the quotidian practice of effective democratic governance is always challenging, not only in Peru and Latin America but also in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, and he was deeply concerned about what is happening in the United States today.

Julio's evolving approach emerged from what he characterized as a life full of serendipitous “accidents and contradictions,” but it was also grounded upon core ethical values, particularly commitments to social equity, individual freedom of expression, and respect for others. He imbibed these values in part from his family's cultural traditions and their lived personal experiences, including his father's eight or nine years of constant migration—from Bessarabia (Moldova), to Shanghai, San Francisco, New York, Brazil, back to Europe, and finally to Peru. He also developed these from his youth as the only family member of his generation born in Peru, and the only one educated in a secular private school. As a teenager, he was a student leader in the Jewish community, but then, leaving that community, he engaged in the intense student debates and politics of San Marcos University and subsequently in Arequipa, where he was imprisoned for a time for his radical activities.

From an early age, as José Luis Rénique has astutely noted, Cotler sought to understand Peru, both from inside and with passion, and as an external observer. He was at first quite attracted to Marxist concepts and doctrines but came to observe and criticize how these actually functioned in practice. He was allergic to arrogant utopianism and condescending manipulation of the underclass, traits he criticized in Fidel Castro and Ché Guevara, just as he berated the presumptuous sense of superiority of Peru's oligarchy. His attitudes were

also strongly shaped by his fieldwork in rural Peru, then among urban popular movements, and later as an internationally connected and increasingly cosmopolitan intellectual.

Cotler was exposed to, engaged with, and learned from many diverse European intellectuals during his university days at Bordeaux, structural sociologists and modernization theorists with whom he worked in Caracas and at MIT, and other Latin American social scientists whom he met in exile, at conferences, in numerous stints as a visiting scholar at foreign universities, and on their visits to Peru. He worked closely with other members of the Joint Committee for Latin American Studies of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council on Learned Societies, including Hirschman, Cardoso, O'Donnell, and Osvaldo Sunkel. His deep knowledge of Peru and increasingly of other Andean countries, together with his growing comparative experience, made Cotler keenly aware of the importance of deep history and of path dependency. He focused on the role of strong political institutions as a means of securing effective popular participation in governance. "The democratization of society" could not produce democratic politics without stronger state and political institutions, he pointed out.

Although Cotler himself was very much an individual scholar and sometimes an iconoclast, he also understood the importance of building institutions for critical inquiry. He worked with his brother-in-law, José Matos Mar, to co-found and persistently strengthen the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos as his country's major social science research center, and an important space for civic dialogue and debate. He also came to greatly appreciate the work of the Catholic University in Lima, from which he received an honorary degree in 2010, prompting him to offer moving reflections on that university's role.

Julio was devoted to Leonor and their four children and basked in their companionship and achievements. He was a wonderful colleague and friend, loyal and perceptive. A marvelous raconteur and an enthusiastic participant in

irreverent repartee, Julio also greatly enjoyed exchanging theoretical ideas and identifying unrecognized trends.

Our own friendship was enriched when Julio became increasingly interested in international relations, trying to understand how the United States exerted its influence in the Western Hemisphere. After a landmark SSRC conference on US-Latin American relations, co-chaired at the Instituto by Cotler and Richard Fagen of Stanford, Julio and I exchanged several letters about the debates at the conference between a "Latin American bloc" that focused on what they saw as the intrinsically imperialist nature of the United States and dependent nature of Latin America, and a "Harvard bloc," from the United States, influenced by Graham Allison, that emphasized bureaucratic mechanisms and diffuse power centers that they believed shaped courses of action that Latin Americans saw as purposeful and aimed at domination. We came to agree that "no unitary rational actor mastermind determines US policy, but neither does it result usually from chaos and disorder; social and economic forces and entrenched mindsets give rise to recurrent and consistent policies by structuring and constraining the consideration of possible alternatives," as I summarized our agreement, which Julio teasingly called our "Summa Theologica."

Julio had an exceptional capacity to capture large truths by calling attention to small incongruences. An anecdote captures this and other qualities. We were the principal foreign speakers at an annual meeting of the German Association of Latin American Studies in Berlin. During a coffee break, an earnest young Bolivian participant joined us in a conversation and asked me how the US government would react to the possible presidential candidacy of a specific Bolivian figure he named. In an offhand way, I told him that I had no idea how the Carter administration would respond, nor was I sure that *it* had any idea, as its officials had to focus on so many different countries. As the Bolivian walked away, Julio grabbed my shoulder and scolded me with a perfect combination of controlled anger and sparkling good humor. He advised me that I needed to learn what power I had and how to handle it; he pointed

out that our Bolivian colleague would probably infer from my flip response that his preferred candidate would be vetoed by Washington!

Although in his last years, Julio's health gave way, his mind continued to be vibrant, rethinking texts by others and by himself that he was rereading and commenting on in the light of experience and reflection. In every conversation he had something new and interesting to say.

Julio Cotler was *fuera de serie*. May his memory be a blessing and inspiration for many years to come.

Note

- ¹ Cotler's self-described habit of "selecting friendships" from an early age is one of many insightful self-reflections that he shared in remarkable interviews with Martín Tanaka in October and December 2013. In writing this appreciation, I have drawn on many conversations with Julio over half a century, our numerous written and more recently Skype exchanges, Julio's published writings, and the Tanaka interview, which is to be published in a volume of interviews with Latin American political scientists and sociologists, edited by Gerardo Munck and Tanaka. A particularly interesting essay is Cotler's "Combining Ideas and Action," an appreciation of Kalman Silvert published in Abraham F. Lowenthal and Martin Weinstein, eds., *Kalman Silvert: Engaging Latin America, Building Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2016). //

Julio Cotler: In Memoriam

por **Ricardo Cuenca**, Director General del Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP)

El sonido de la campana en el IEP es un llamado al encuentro; la señal inequívoca de una convocatoria para conversar, debatir, reflexionar. El 5 de abril de 2019 la campana sonó para reunirnos alrededor de Julio y renovar con él nuestro compromiso por seguir pensando el Perú.

Julio Cotler, Premio Kalman Silvert 2012, fue siempre un intelectual público honesto. Preocupado por comprender el Perú, sus transformaciones y sus posibilidades, Julio inició su trabajo en la antropología de finales de la década de los años cincuenta buscando comprender los cambios en las relaciones de poder de la sociedad rural, a partir de los cambios en el sentido de propiedad entre las comunidades.

La preocupación por las formas de dominación siguió guiando sus reflexiones académicas. Luego de regresar de estudiar en la Universidad de Burdeos (Francia) y trabajar como invitado en el Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo (CENDES), de la Universidad Central de Venezuela, y en el Center for International Affairs del Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), en Cambridge, EEUU, se incorporó al IEP a finales de los años sesenta, donde publicó *La mecánica de la dominación interna y del cambio social*, investigación en la que se esfuerza por comprender los cambios y movilizaciones sociales desde la interpretación del Perú tradicional.

La crítica a las formas autoritarias del gobierno de Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) le valió la deportación. En México escribe su obra más difundida, *Clases, Estado y nación en el Perú*, en donde es posible identificar la importancia de la historia para comprender el país y el reconocimiento del análisis multidisciplinario para encontrar las causas de los problemas.

El proyecto totalitario de Sendero Luminoso de los ochenta y la reacción autoritaria del fujimorismo de los noventa lo obligan a poner la mirada en la democracia y lo empujan con más intensidad a la vida pública. Cotler, desde ese momento, activa una manera no partidaria de hacer política, anima la discusión pública sobre el país y enseña desde posiciones analíticas y críticas la necesidad de defender la democracia. La “herencia colonial” o el “triángulo sin base” seguirán siendo categorías de análisis válidas para intentar comprender el país, desde ese optimismo experimentado y cauto que Julio Cotler mantuvo permanentemente.

Vivió en el fragor del debate y eso lo hizo respetar y valorar los argumentos. Quienes estuvimos con él en el IEP no podemos sino reconocer la invalorable muestra de generosidad que tuvo siempre con sus compañeros de trabajo para compartir sus ideas, escuchar las de los otros y “hacer” las preguntas que nos hacen a todos seguir pensando el Perú.

Un largo abrazo, Julio. //

La búsqueda de Julio Cotler (1932–2019)

por **José Luis Rénique**, Professor of History, Lehman College, the Graduate Center, CUNY

El último 5 de abril Julio Cotler dejó de existir. De su primer trabajo —una monografía sobre una comunidad de la sierra central del Perú— a sus últimas entrevistas —en que realizaba un “análisis quirúrgico” de los candidatos a las elecciones presidenciales de 2016— destacó por su capacidad para poner su formación académica al servicio de la crítica del presente. Así, mientras sus ensayos se convertían en lectura obligatoria para comprender el complejo proceso de la construcción nacional habría de convertirse en uno de los intelectuales más influyentes de su país. De su singular biografía procedía su vocación por el rigor académico como aquello que algún periodista denominaría como su “legendario pesimismo”; su afán, vale decir, por discutir a viva voz aquello que la mayoría prefería eludir. Elementos ambos de una búsqueda propia a la que Julio se abocaría con abrasadora pasión.

En 1978, en la introducción de lo que vendría a ser su más importante trabajo (*Clases, estado y nación en el Perú*, Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1978), Julio Cotler afirmó que “encontrar un camino para dejar de ser forastero en este país” era el objetivo fundamental de su libro. Dejaba ahí una pista para explorar un tema clave de su trayectoria: su relación con el Perú. En torno a ella se desarrolló como intelectual desde que, a fines de los años 40, optara por la Etnología como el vehículo para conocer el país al que —como peruano de primera generación— ansiaba integrarse plenamente. Hijo de una familia judía procedente de Besarabia, más conectado con el drama europeo de aquellos tiempos que con las vicisitudes de la política local, había crecido. A los 17 años, tras una drástica ruptura con su comunidad, emprende su travesía personal. No va mal equipado. Lleva, en embrión, los elementos —sentido antiautoritario, actitud crítica, aspiración cosmopolita— de que derivará esa capacidad suya para mirar al Perú desde dentro y desde fuera simultáneamente. Una travesía que, a mediados de los 70, continuaba incompleta.

De sus primeras experiencias antropológicas procederían las preguntas —relativas al impacto de la modernización en curso en las áreas andinas del Perú (*Los cambios en la propiedad, la comunidad y la familia en San Lorenzo de Quinti*, Lima: Instituto de Etnología y Arqueología, 1959)— que incitan la primera etapa de su búsqueda. Trascienden estas el enfoque comunitario propiciado por la romántica visión indigenista de algunos de sus maestros. Amplía fronteras entre 1957 y 1966. En la Universidad de Burdeos, Francia, absorbe fundamentos teóricos y se vincula a la “nueva izquierda” que emerge al margen del stalinismo. En Venezuela —donde en el marco del “Punto Fijo” participa en un proyecto que explora la factibilidad sociopolítica del proyecto reformista de la Acción Democrática—, en contacto con los *nation-builders* realmente existentes, articula Cotler sus primeras críticas al carácter tecnocrático de la planificación desarrollista. Una estadía en el Massachusetts Institute of Technology, finalmente, le permite acceder a un gran ámbito teórico sobre la vida rural de diversas partes del mundo (Eric R. Wolf, George M. Foster, James C. Scott, Eric Hobsbawm, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán entre otros) que utilizará para elaborar una interpretación propia de la problemática rural andina.

En “La mecánica de la dominación interna y del cambio social” (en *Perú problema*, Lima: Moncloa Editores/IEP, 1968) —a partir de un análisis que Guillermo Rochabrún caracterizaría como un “estructuralismo que se apoya en alguna forma de ‘rational choice’”— vierte Cotler su renovada perspectiva. Situándose en las partes más tradicionales del país toma el pulso del desmoronamiento de los pilares del antiguo régimen y evalúa las respuestas sociales y políticas que se generan.

No son tiempos “normales” en el Perú. El llamado Gobierno Revolucionario de la Fuerza Armada encabezado por el General Juan Velasco Alvarado se proponía barrer la dominación tradicional. Que se multiplican las organizaciones “interesadas en la población campesina” observa Cotler a poco de iniciado el proceso (“Actuales pautas de cambio en la sociedad rural del Perú” en José Matos Mar, editor, *Dominación y cambios en el Perú rural*, Lima: IEP, 1969). Y en ese “mar de inesperados competidores” —explica— se produce “un proceso de liberalización del control de la masa campesina cuyas alternativas de existencia se amplían dramáticamente, favoreciendo así su movilidad individual”. ¿Se moverá la sierra, paulatinamente, hacia el modelo de cambio gradual prefigurado por los valles costeros o era una suerte de “desquiciamiento” social lo que venía?

Desde su exilio mexicano —en el marco del “terremoto” personal que su deportación le había suscitado— vería Cotler el final del velasquismo. En esas circunstancias, fijó su atención en comprender “el origen de los problemas estructurales que arrastraba el Perú” y la relación de estos con “la naturaleza de las relaciones personales que imperaban en el país”. Enfocando, para ello, en dos temas principales: la persistencia de “criterios étnicos y racistas para calificar a las personas (sustento del comportamiento soberbio y prepotente de los poderosos y “la mezcla de ira y humildad de los subordinados”) y la “propensión autoritaria” de los dominantes y las relaciones clientelísticas que establecen con quienes los rodean. Un audaz ejercicio de “sociología histórica” que implicaba revisar medio milenio de historia en busca de los caminos de la reproducción de la “herencia colonial”. Una mirada de “forastero” que interpelaba, necesariamente, al nacionalismo republicano tradicional abriendo nuevas perspectivas para pensar el Perú: la idea de un país que se modernizaba sin poder saldar cuentas con su pasado colonial, quedando confinado así a un permanente estado coloidal.

En 1979, preguntado por un periodista local si se estaba llegando al “punto límite” de cuatro décadas de “permanente” crisis política Cotler respondería que, en presencia de una “movilización popular” que llegaba a “los últimos rincones del país”, era

perentorio llegar a una “definición”: o se resolvía la crisis o una dictadura “como nunca antes hemos conocido” sería lo que tengamos que “padecer”. Creía Cotler, por ese entonces, en las posibilidades de la izquierda para “rescatar la democracia” y elaborar una “alternativa orgánica”; a condición, por cierto, de que entendiera que el Perú no era *Francia o Inglaterra*. Si acaso no admiraba la “eficacia” de un Stalin le inquieta el periodista finalmente. Que le parecía “profundamente cínico” pensar que la política fuese “el arte de lo posible”, respondería Cotler, que creía, más bien, que la política consistía “en hacer posible lo necesario”. De la interacción entre Ciencias Sociales e indignación moral —en el marco de una creciente valoración de la democracia liberal versus la deriva autoritaria de los socialismos realmente existencias— articularía Cotler una perspectiva propia que iría diseminando en decenas de entrevistas durante las décadas siguientes.

En la incertidumbre de los 80, cada vez más demandada sería su opinión; hasta hacerse, imprescindible, durante los aciagos años 90 en que —como diría Martín Tanaka— Julio se convertiría “en una suerte de conciencia moral”. En ese proceso — como ha observado Alberto Vergara— Cotler “elevó la entrevista de coyuntura política a la categoría de género literario”. Más importante aún, como verdadero “insider” comenzó a hablar el “forastero”. Por el significado de *Clases, estado y nación* en esa transición le pregunté en octubre de 2018. “Me hizo ser consciente de cuáles eran los problemas del país y cuáles eran mis problemas frente a esos problemas...” fue su palmaria respuesta.

A mediados de los años 70, en el punto medio de su larga vida, abrumado por el exilio, Cotler hizo un pacto consigo mismo: sería peruano por voluntad, un ciudadano pleno en un país en que prevalecía aquello que Manuel González Prada describió como “el pacto infame de hablar a media voz”. Durante los 90, asimismo, se propuso sumar a liberales e izquierdistas en la lucha por forjar democracia en el Perú. Reconociendo la futilidad de su intento emprendió —como González Prada un siglo atrás— un “apostolado solitario”. No le gustaban las entrevistas, pero mayor era su afán por interpelar y esclarecer. A unos les asustaba su “pesimismo”; otros lo veían como un verdadero

“oráculo”. A veces —confesaba— es la rabia que me suscita la irresponsabilidad, el cinismo, la incultura, lo que me motiva a hablar. En los últimas dos décadas, en que una inusitada prosperidad puso al límite a un sistema político crecientemente incapaz de representar a una sociedad bastante informal en el reino de la informalidad, sus entrevistas cobraron un notable tono pedagógico. Corregía a sus entrevistadores o les alcanzaba definiciones básicas. Y le molestaba, sobremanera, el localismo nacional.

Con el mismo tesón luchó contra la enfermedad. Nunca perdió la lucidez. Hasta que tuvo que irse, dejándonos el ejemplo de su honestidad intelectual y su enorme voluntad crítica. Por todo ello, gratitud eterna maestro querido. //

Julio Cotler (1932–2019)

por **Martín Tanaka**, Profesor Principal PUCP; Investigador IEP

El 5 de abril pasado, a los 86 años, nos dejó Julio Cotler.

Julio representa para las ciencias sociales peruanas muchas cosas: la generación de la fundación de las ciencias sociales contemporáneas, por ejemplo con sus trabajos sobre los cambios en la sociedad rural de la década de los años sesenta en el recién fundado Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.¹ También el traer al análisis social marcos conceptuales más sofisticados, propios de la política comparada: Julio selló en nuestro vocabulario el patrimonialismo, el clientelismo, el corporativismo, la herencia colonial, el colonialismo interno, las “sociedades de enclave”, entre otros. Representó además la figura de un académico parte de una comunidad académica latinoamericana (esos conceptos dialogaban con lo que trabajaban en sus propios países Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Pablo González Casanova o Fernando Henrique Cardoso, por mencionar algunos) y también global: estudió con François Bourricaud, y tuvo un estrecho diálogo intelectual con la nueva generación de latinoamericanistas del norte, como Alfred Stepan, Abraham Lowenthal o David Collier.

Representa también la figura de un intelectual con un pie firme en nuestra mejor tradición intelectual crítica latinoamericana, que trabaja partiendo de grandes preguntas, centradas en temas fundamentales, que requieren explicaciones complejas, recurriendo a la historia, a la economía, al análisis social y político;² pero también el inicio de una reflexión más estrictamente politológica sobre algunos temas más acotados, donde la agencia de los actores políticos tiene un papel más relevante.³

Representa también al intelectual comprometido con causas democráticas y sociales. Crítico del autoritarismo de la dictadura del General Velasco, terminó deportado en México, como tantos otros latinoamericanos, entre 1973 y 1976; en la década de los años ochenta, advirtió sobre los riesgos del totalitarismo de Sendero Luminoso; en los noventa, participó del Foro Democrático para oponerse al autoritarismo fujimorista. Más adelante, en el nuevo siglo, consolidó su imagen como uno de los intelectuales más respetados e influyentes del país.

Este reconocimiento en buena medida es fruto del hecho de que Julio es referente también de autonomía de pensamiento. Cuando se pensaban las dictaduras militares de los años setenta desde el modelo de los Estados “burocrático-autoritarios”, Julio llamó la atención sobre las particularidades del autoritarismo en las sociedades de enclave;⁴ cuando se pensaban las caídas de las democracias considerando la agencia de los actores políticos, llamó la atención sobre la centralidad de elementos históricos y estructurales;⁵ cuando sus lectores se acostumbraron a identificarlo con este tipo de perspectiva, demostró también capacidad de analizar la coyuntura de manera fina y llamar la atención sobre la necesidad de “hacer camino al andar”. Al mismo tiempo, políticamente fue de izquierda, pero crítico con sus derivas autoritarias; también fue un liberal, pero muy crítico con las derechas y los conservadurismos.

Afortunadamente, pudimos homenajearlo en vida, con el Premio Nacional de Cultura en 2015, con el Kalman Silvert Award de LASA en 2012, o el evento de celebración de sus 80 años ese mismo año en su casa de siempre, el Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. Nos hará mucha falta.

Notas

- ¹ Ver, por ejemplo, "La *mecánica* de la dominación interna y del cambio social en el Perú", en J. Matos Mar et al., *Perú problema: Cinco ensayos* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1968), 153-197.
- ² Ver su clásico libro *Clases, estado y nación en el Perú* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1978).
- ³ Ver, por ejemplo, "Military Interventions and Transfer to Power to Civilians in Peru", en *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Vol. II: Latin America*, editado por Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter y Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 148-172; o "Los partidos políticos en la democracia peruana", en *Democracia, sociedad y gobierno en el Perú*, editado por Luis Pásara y Jorge Parodi (Lima: Centro de Estudios de Democracia y Sociedad, 1987), 151-191.
- ⁴ Ver "State and Regime: Comparative Notes on the Southern Cone and the 'Enclave' Societies", en *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, editado por David Collier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 255-284.
- ⁵ "A Structural-Historical Approach to the Breakdown of Democratic Institutions: Peru", en *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America*, editado por Juan Linz y Alfred Stepan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 178-206. //

Proposed Change to the LASA Constitution and Bylaws

The Executive Council of LASA, at its most recent meeting, approved the following proposed change in the Constitution and Bylaws of the Association to accomplish the following:


To add an article to Bylaws allowing the removal from LASA membership of any member who violates LASA official codes of conduct.

Objections can be directed to LASA Executive Director, LASA, 416 Bellefield Hall, 315 S. Bellefield Ave., Pittsburgh, PA 15213, or lasa@lasaweb.org. The cutoff date for receipt of objections to the below proposed change is October 21, 2019.

Bylaws

Article V. Removal of LASA Members

Any LASA member procedurally found in violation of the LASA official codes of conduct can be removed from LASA by a vote of two-thirds of the Executive Council and face any other penalties imposed by the codes of conduct by a vote of simple majority of the Executive Council. //



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