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Marysa Navarro Aranguren

Winner of the Kalman Silvert Award for 2017

Marysa Navarro Aranguren was born in Pamplona, Spain, in 1934, two years before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Her life was profoundly affected by the war. She and her family were exiled to France, where they lived until 1948. Realizing by then that the Franco dictatorship was firmly in power and not likely to fall, her parents decided to move the family to Uruguay.

Navarro Aranguren completed her undergraduate degree in 1955 at the Instituto José Batlle y Ordóñez, in Montevideo, Uruguay, and studied for two years at the Instituto de Profesores Artigas. In 1958 she entered the graduate program in history at Columbia University, receiving her MA degree in 1960 and her PhD in 1964. After teaching at Rutgers University, Yeshiva University, Kean College, and Long Island University, she accepted a position in the History Department at Dartmouth College in 1968. She immediately took a leading role in the discussions that led to the college's decision (in 1970) to become coeducational (i.e., to start admitting women). During her 42-year career at Dartmouth, she served as Chair of the History Department, founded and chaired the Women's Studies Program and the Latin American, Latino, and Caribbean Studies Program, and served as Associate Dean of Faculty for the Social Sciences. In 1992 the college named her the Charles A. and Elfriede A. Collis Professor of History. At the time of her retirement, in 2010, she was awarded the Elizabeth Howland Hand-Otis Norton Pierce Award for outstanding undergraduate teaching.

While teaching at Dartmouth, Navarro Aranguren also held visiting positions at the University of Barcelona; University of California, Santa Cruz; University College London, Universidad de la República (Montevideo); Universidad de Andalucía; Universidad del País Vasco;

Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Unidad Xochimilco (Mexico); and Brandeis University. Her research has been supported by grants and fellowships from the Institute of International Education, the Organization of American States, the Social Science Research Council, the American Philosophical Society, the Rockefeller Foundation, and Harvard University. In 1978, she became an Honorary Member of Phi Beta Kappa (Dartmouth College); in 1981, she was named Distinguished Woman Scholar by the University of New Hampshire; and in 2003, she was declared "Visitante Ilustre de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires" by the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Navarro Aranguren began her academic career in the field of political history, writing a dissertation and book on right-wing political movements in Argentina. Deeply affected by the feminist movements of the 1960s and 1970s, she soon joined the newly forming field of Latin American women's studies, becoming, along with Silvert Award winners June Nash (2004) and Helen Safa (2007), part of that field's founding generation. From the 1970s to the present, her professional mission has been twofold: to integrate scholarship on women and gender into mainstream disciplinary debates, and to promote cross-national and cross-cultural discussions and networks among scholars working on those issues.

On both fronts she has had major impacts on American (in the hemispheric sense) scholarly life. Her widely read articles on Latin American feminism and her biography of Eva Perón, released in multiple editions in Argentina, the United States, and Europe, remain obligatory references in the scholarly literature to the present day. But her role in the promotion and development of women's studies as a field go well beyond her own individual



research. Through her 20-year service (1976–1996) on the Editorial Board of the pioneering feminist journal *Signs*, Navarro Aranguren helped introduce North American readers to scholarly debates in and on Latin America. She did the same through her participation in the Organization of American Historians "Restoring Women to History" project, in which she and Virginia Sánchez-Korrol surveyed the historical scholarship on women in Latin America. First made available to the public by OAH in 1988, the papers and other resources resulting from that project were eventually published in book form in 1999. She helped disseminate the history of Latin American feminism to nonacademic audiences through the path-breaking PBS *Americas* project, for which she served on the Advisory Board and contributed to the project volume.

While introducing Latin American scholarship to North American readers, Navarro Aranguren felt that it was equally important that Latin American readers have access to debates going on in the United States and Europe. Together with Catharine Stimpson, founding editor of *Signs*, she coordinated the preparation of a four-volume anthology, *Un nuevo saber: Los estudios de mujeres*, that presented Spanish translations of major essays in American and European feminism and women's studies. Published by the Fondo de Cultura Económica between 1998 and 2002, those volumes remain an important resource for students and activists seeking an introduction to the field of women's studies.

The *Nuevo saber* volumes were undertaken as part of Navarro Aranguren's work as chair of the LASA/Ford Foundation Committee on Women's Studies in the Americas. Her chairmanship of that committee (1989–2003) was just one aspect of her deep and sustained involvement with scholarly organizations that promote Latin American studies, and above all with LASA. That involvement began with her joining the LASA Task Force on Women in 1976, co-chairing the group from 1983 to 1988, and serving as president of the New England Council for Latin American Studies (1981–1982). During the 1980s and 1990s she served on numerous LASA committees, including the Committee on Constitutional Revisions (1985–1986), the LASA Commission on Compliance with the Central American Peace Accords (1988), the Bryce Wood Award Committee (1991–1994), the Executive Council (1992–1995), the Development Committee (1995–), and the Program Committee (1999–2000). As one of the most visible and dedicated members of LASA, she was elected vice president of the Association in 2001 and served as president in 2003–2004. During her term as president she devoted herself in particular to broadening LASA's circle of institutional funders, obtaining support from the Inter-American Foundation, the Tinker Foundation, and the Open Society Foundation. Since concluding her term as president, Navarro Aranguren has maintained a high level of commitment to the organization. She chaired the search for LASA's executive director, oversaw the *Latin American Research Review's* move from the University of Texas to its current home at LASA headquarters in Pittsburgh, and served on the LASA Fact-Finding Delegation to Oaxaca in 2007.

In addition to her service to LASA, Navarro Aranguren has served on or

chaired academic, philanthropic, and feminist boards, including the Advisory Board of the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame; the Global Fund for Women; the Ms. Foundation for Women, *Ms Magazine*; the editorial boards of *Revista de Estudios de la Mujer* (Mexico), *Revista Estudos Feministas* (Brazil), *Debate Feminista* (Mexico), *Política y Cultura* (Mexico), and *Cadernos Pagu* (Brazil); Catholics for Choice; the Advisory Council of the International Women's Rights Project of Human Rights Watch; and the International Planned Parenthood Federation, Western Hemisphere Region.

In 1980, she was invited to join NEASC (the New England Association of Schools and Colleges) as a member of the Commission on Institutions of Higher Education. She served two terms (1980–1987) and participated in the institutional evaluation of Wellesley College, Harvard University, Boston University, Bates College, Bentley College, and the College of the Holy Cross.

Since her retirement, Navarro Aranguren has been a resident scholar at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University. Her current research examines the founding and early history of the Inter-American Commission of Women, a unit of the Organization of American States that was established in 1928. She is also writing a book on the civil war in Navarra and her family exile.

Selected Publications

Books

Los nacionalistas. Buenos Aires: Jorge Alvarez, 1969.

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Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.

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"Against Marianismo," in Rosario Montoya, Lessie Jo Frazier, and Janise Hurtig, eds., *Gender's Place: Feminist Anthropologies of Latin America*. New York: Palgrave, 2002.

"Encountering Latin American and Caribbean Feminisms," with seven coauthors, *Signs*, 28, 2 (2003). Reprinted in *Revista Estudios Feministas* 11, 2 (2003).

"Evita, historia y mitología," *Caravelle: Cahiers du monde hispanique et lusobrasílien*, N. 98, "Icônes d'Amérique latine," Juin 2012. ■

From the President

by JOANNE RAPPAPORT | Georgetown University | rappaport.lasa@gmail.com

The turn to the right of governments in Argentina, Brazil, and the United States, the economic and social chaos of Venezuela, the challenges that the government of Ecuador has posed to the continuing operation of major universities, and the unrelenting corruption and contempt for human rights in Mexico are propelling scholarly organizations and universities to rethink our missions and our methods. The politics of austerity and restrictions on social spending in Argentina and Brazil is complemented by Donald Trump's objectives of shredding the social safety net and bulldozing the National Endowments for the Arts and the Humanities, and Rafael Correa's threats to cut funding to the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales and the Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar. Trump's recent Muslim ban, barring travelers from seven majority-Muslim countries and all refugees from entering the United States, coupled with his quixotic call for the erection of a barrier wall between Mexico and the United States and the increasingly vicious immigration raids that are now taking place, are replicated in Latin America. Argentina has recently restricted immigration, while in other countries, Central American and Haitian refugees struggling to make their way to an ever more unwelcoming United States face increasing violations of their rights as human beings. A 2016 *NACLA Report on the Americas* analyzes these trends across the region, as will "Return of the Right," a presidential session at our Lima Congress.

Many of us have sought ways to resist these trends as individual citizens or as members of grassroots organizations. I won't reflect on that here. Instead, I want to think about what these developments mean for LASA as an organization and for all of us as Latin Americanists. The Social Science Research Council has graciously consented to a republication in this

issue of the *LASA Forum* of a statement by its president, Ira Katznelson. In it, Katznelson reflects on how the SSRC, as a funding institution based in the United States dedicated to fostering international intellectual exchange, is confronting the nationalism and xenophobia of the Trump administration.

LASA encounters itself in a unique position at this moment. While the founders of our Association were for the most part based in U.S. institutions, and our membership was once largely North American, LASA is increasingly international, with approximately 40 percent of our members based in Latin America, and a growing roster of European members. Thus, we are becoming a truly international organization in terms of our membership, but our administrative apparatus and the periodicals published by our Association (such as the *Latin American Research Review* or *LARR*) still follow North American models. The Secretariat, based in Pittsburgh, does an excellent job of making our Congresses a reality, but the intellectual content is determined by LASA officers and appointees working on a purely volunteer basis. We have striven, given these conditions, to expand Latin American engagement in the organization of our Congresses, but we still have a long way to go. And in the midst of our growing pains, political forces have emerged across the hemisphere intent on the closing of borders, both physical and intellectual.

There are several institutions within LASA through which we can intensify international dialogue and the sharing of ideas and experiences. *LARR* has been with us since before the formal founding of our Association. As I mentioned in my first column, during its first ten years *LARR* dedicated its pages to interdisciplinary surveys of research conducted on various



problem areas—agrarian reform, a central preoccupation of scholars in the 1960s and 1970s, comes to mind. In recent decades, *LARR* has hosted an increasingly disciplinary set of articles, contributions that do not necessarily attract the attention of scholars outside of the areas in which they were written, and sometimes so specialized that not even scholars in the authors' home disciplines are moved to read them. I urge LASA members to begin to refocus our contributions to *LARR* so that they take on broader social and intellectual issues of interest to our diverse membership, and so that *LARR* truly becomes a space of intellectual debate in which we can bring both disciplinary and interdisciplinary knowledge, theory and methodology originating in both the global South and the North, to bear on the pressing issues that we are confronting as scholars and as citizens.

Some of your concerns may not yet be ready for a peer-reviewed article. *LASA Forum*, in contrast to *LARR*, provides a space in which LASA members can share briefer contributions that may be more informative than analytical, or may take the form of an essay rather than an academic article. Over the past year, we have published dossiers focusing on political, social, and academic developments in various parts of Latin America—Central America, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela—as well as a Mexican analysis of U.S. foreign policy. We hosted an excellent dossier on climate change in Latin America. We have remembered the intellectual and social contributions of one of our founding members and Kalman Silvert awardee,

Rodolfo Stavenhagen. The current issue of the *Forum* includes a dossier on race in the Americas, the preliminary product of two of the teams awarded LASA-Ford Special Projects grants in 2015. *LASA Forum* is a space in which we can connect our academic activities to our broader social sentiments, engage in wide-ranging conversations with our colleagues, and more quickly respond to the cascade of developments taking place in the region.

One of our major challenges is the circulation and support of students in an increasingly xenophobic and anti-intellectual world. During the past year, the LASA Executive Council has been working to promote a variety of activities aimed at making students a more vital part of our membership. We have fostered the founding of a Student Section, with access to a funding stream based on its membership numbers, the right to organize Congress panels, and a mailing list to enable deeper communication. On the Friday before the Lima Congress begins, we will be hosting a meet-and-greet breakfast for students and potential mentors, as well as a workshop on seeking academic positions in Latin America and the global North; all LASA members are invited to sign up for these activities when you register for the Congress, particularly for the breakfast. In the medium term, we are setting up a mentoring network that will connect graduate students to scholars across the globe who are members of LASA. And in the long term, we have begun fund-raising for a series of short-term mobility grants that will award students and young faculty based in Latin American institutions of higher education with the wherewithal to pursue a month of research beyond their national borders; I invite you to the benefit concert that will inaugurate this campaign, which will take place on the Saturday evening of the Congress, and for which

you can obtain tickets at a range of prices through the Congress registration page. As it becomes increasingly difficult for students to circulate between North and South, we hope that LASA can provide conditions for their scholarly development.

The theme of our upcoming Congress, “Diálogos de saberes,” was formulated well before the U.S. elections, the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, and the many other developments that are hindering the movement of people and threatening academic freedom across the region. The dialogue we are seeking moves across academic disciplines, simultaneously bridging national and regional intellectual traditions. We hope to place different sites of knowledge production in conversation—linking academics, practitioners, journalists, artists, and grassroots knowledge producers. This objective is all the more urgent given the current conditions in which we find ourselves. Last year, I listened to an Argentine colleague speak at a seminar on collaborative research about how imperative it has become to place scholars in dialogue with nonacademics—in the case of her project, with provincial legislators—so that scholarly knowledge would have a greater impact on society, beyond the usual policy papers that academics write to inform policy makers. For her, socially committed research is not only an attractive option but a means of engagement as a citizen. Those of us in the global North have a great deal to learn in this respect from our colleagues in Latin American, who over the past 40 years have made significant contributions, both theoretical and methodological, to socially engaged strategies of knowledge production. We hope you find our *diálogo de saberes* in Lima to be an inspiration and a tool for continuing as researchers in the coming years. ■

Latin American Transformations: 50 Years of Change

Edited by Gilbert Joseph and Peter Winn

Introduction

by GILBERT JOSEPH | Yale University | gilbert.joseph@yale.edu
and PETER WINN | Tufts University | peter.winn@tufts.edu

“The more things change, the more they remain the same” is an old adage that used to be applied to a Latin America that seemed stuck in its colonial past, a mostly rural society still bearing the legacies of the conquest and slavery, where frequent changes of autocratic rulers only confirmed the underlying social status quo. But as the six articles of this dossier—revised versions of the authors’ presentations to the LASA2016 Presidential Panel “Latin American Transformations: 50 Years of Change?”—demonstrate, LASA’s first half century has been a period of dramatic change in Latin America. Some of the changes have clearly altered the region, although their depth is sometimes deceptive. Moreover, as Alejandro Portes warns in his essay on migration and urbanization, not all transformations are positive; and we would add, not all positive transformations are irreversible, as the Latin American Left learned to its sorrow.

LASA’s members have witnessed—and analyzed—a tumultuous half century, and LASA’s 50th anniversary is a moment to pause and look back at where we were and how we have gotten to where we are. LASA was born in the wake of the Cuban Revolution, which boosted Latin American studies in the United States for reasons that had more to do with the Cold War than with scholarship.

LASA’s first years were Che Guevara’s last years. As Florencia Mallon argues in her contribution to this panel and Steve Stern concurs in his, LASA’s half century is also the era of the rise and fall of the myths

of both the heroic revolutionary and the heroic state liberating Latin America from its colonial chains. We would add that this leftist roller coaster has had more than one iteration over the past five decades, starting with the Cuban Revolution and the “heroic guerrilla” decade, which resurfaced in Central America with the Sandinista victory in 1979 and the Salvadoran and Guatemalan civil wars of the 1980s. But it also included Salvador Allende’s 1970s democratic road to socialism; the indigenous rebellion-turned-social movement in Chiapas that commenced in the 1990s; and the more recent “pink tide” of elected “revolutionaries,” led by Hugo Chávez and his Bolivarian “revolution,” and reformers, spearheaded by Lula in Brazil and the World Social Forum—a tide that now seems to be receding. The rise, decline, and legacies of a variegated and morphing Left that has reinvented itself several times is a theme of Stern’s intervention, with its evocation of “troublesome” youth and intellectuals, categories that could apply to many LASA members themselves over the past five decades.

But the ebb and flow of leftist politics was not the only political current that reflected efforts to transform Latin America during LASA’s half century. A counterrevolutionary Right that considered even a moderate Left to be subversive and set out to make sure revolutions could never again triumph in Latin America was arguably even more successful in its transformations.

One result was the civil-military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s, with their bureaucratic authoritarianism and their massive and profound violations of human rights. As LASA past president Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida brings out in her essay, before 1990 autocratic rulers and authoritarian regimes were the norm in Latin America. In the late 1970s, seventeen of twenty countries in the region were ruled by military dictatorships. But since 1990—and the end of the Cold War—democracy has become consolidated in Latin America and the issue is rather the quality and character of that democracy, an issue underscored by recent corruption scandals in several countries, crises of representation in others, and the questionable use of impeachment to oust an unpopular leftist president in Brazil. The impeached president, Dilma Rousseff, was a former leftist guerrilla and Brazil’s first female president, the hand-picked successor to Lula, who was the most popular president in Brazil’s history, despite being a self-educated rural migrant and blue-collar worker, a personal history that he shared with some 50 million Brazilians.

Lula was a mirror of the Brazil that he represented—and of LASA’s first half century. The last half of the twentieth century witnessed the largest internal migration in hemispheric history, with more than 100 million rural dwellers migrating to Latin America’s towns and cities, many more than those who migrated north to the United States during these same years. As a result, a Latin America that was 60 percent rural in 1950 is over 80 percent urban today, the most urbanized region in the world. Moreover, as Portes underscores in his contribution to this dossier, the differences are qualitative as well as quantitative, creating new residential patterns of suburban

shantytowns and an unregulated informal economy as large as the formal economy, while also deepening the divide between rich and poor.

Inequality is also a focus of José Antonio Ocampo's opening overview of economic models and changes in Latin American economies during LASA's half century. In a provocative essay he rethinks structuralism—preferring “state-led industrialization” to “import substitution industrialization,” and “market reform” to “neoliberalism”—while maintaining that the former was more successful than the latter. The period of market reform, he argues, was one of mediocre growth, with the partial exception of the 2003–2008 commodities boom, itself a cautionary tale of export boom and bust only too familiar in Latin America's longer history. This alternation of commodity and financial cycles was matched by the rise and fall of economic models, with few of them living up to their advance billing or reducing inequality. Economic models had implications that transcended the economy. The market-oriented reforms popularly known as neoliberalism brought with them a decentralization of the state in several countries and a privatization of many state functions within education and public health. This even altered how scholarly organizations such as LASA did their business, propelling closer relations between academic associations and popular social movements, fund-raising drives to support Latin American scholars who were increasingly cut off from state-sponsored funding, and a new commitment to understand and disseminate grassroots research and knowledge regimes. Ocampo's nuanced neostructuralist reading of the political economy of LASA's half century provides a fine frame for other contributions, whether they are centered

on the politics of state power or the more diffuse movements of civil society.

LASA's first half century also witnessed the blossoming of civil society in much of the region, with social movements transcending political parties in several countries, from Mexico's far-flung and multivalent democracy movement that interrupted the PRI's permanent government in 2000, to the human rights movements in the Southern Cone and their demands for truth, memory, and justice. A striking development of the last 50 years has been the emergence of diverse social actors, from the indigenous movements highlighted by Mallon and the intellectuals invoked by Stern, to the workers mobilized by Brazil's Catholic Church and CUT labor confederation (Central Única dos Trabalhadores) and the evangelical Protestants who joined the Church of the Kingdom of God.

Particularly prominent among these new social actors have been women and their movements, whether as mothers protesting their children's poverty in Peru's “Glass of Milk” movement or Argentina's Madres de Plaza de Mayo demanding to know where their disappeared children are. They made the personal political but largely escaped the worst repression because they acted as mothers in their time-honored role as protectors of their children, or as poor women in Chilean or Peruvian shantytowns organizing communal kitchens that pooled their resources to guarantee their families a nutritious meal—another traditional woman's role. Also important were the middle-class feminists in Chile (and elsewhere) who taught less-educated women how to organize and who formed “Women For Life,” which opposed their culture of life to the Pinochet dictatorship's culture of death and showed their men how to unite across

class and political lines, while demanding democracy in both their country *and* their homes.

Inevitably, given the constraints of a LASA session, with its five presenters and one commentator, many important areas of change during the last half century were omitted, not least the changing roles of women. During LASA's first half century, women in Latin America entered the work force in growing numbers and multiplied the economic roles they play. They also emerged from the “four walls” of their houses to participate in social movements and lead struggles for human rights and historical memory. The Madres de Plaza de Mayo are only the most famous of the groups in Latin America that transformed motherhood into leftist politics, although Poder Feminino in Allende's Chile underscored that mobilized women might also support a rightist agenda.

During the past 50 years, women have also become increasingly active in the politics of their countries, at both local and national levels. In 2015, the presidents of all three ABC regional powers of South America—Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—were women, something that has yet to happen in the United States. Several countries now have laws requiring that a certain percentage of legislative seats and party positions be reserved for women. The old distinction between *casa* and *calle* as gendered spheres no longer seems to hold, or at least not as absolutely as it did in the past. Still, women remain underrepresented in most areas of government and politics. Moreover, women in Latin America still face machismo in their daily lives and confront sexism when they try to transcend their traditional roles. But they have also made significant advances in their struggles for personal fulfillment

and public participation during LASA's 50 years.

Another area of change that we would have liked to address is religion. LASA was founded in the wake of Vatican II and just before Medellín made "liberation theology" and its "preferential option for the poor" mandates for change in a Catholic Church that had too often been identified with the status quo in the past. The 1980s and 1990s, however, witnessed the long reign of a conservative pope—John Paul II (1978–2005), followed by the equally conservative Benedict XVI (2005–2013)—who would roll back many of those changes and promote conservative clergy to positions as bishops and cardinals. LASA's most recent years, however, have seen the election of the first Latin American pope, Francisco I, who has embraced many of the values behind liberation theology, while following his own path. LASA's half century has also witnessed the explosive expansion of evangelical Protestantism, often in sharp conflict with Catholicism and embracing a rightist politics, but responding to the concrete needs of Latin Americans cut loose from their Catholic moorings by migration, civil war, and messages in the mass media.

Evangelical Protestantism, principally Pentecostalism, came to Latin America from the United States, but has become indigenized, transformed into Latin American religions. Still, U.S. religious influence remains strong, with Latin American televangelists often emulating their U.S. counterparts or Billy Graham, who filled Brazil's giant Maracanã Stadium in 1974, inspiring a generation of Brazilian evangelists. For many analysts, this is an example of U.S. soft power and cultural hegemony.

In LASA's founding decade, the United States was the major foreign power in Latin America, which it pressed to play a supporting role in the Cold War between the United States and the USSR. It had forced the nations of Latin America to oust a revolutionary Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS) and quarantine it with an economic embargo and a rupture of diplomatic relations. Washington also pushed through the OAS a resolution legitimating U.S. intervention to suppress a popular rebellion in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and backed a 1964 military coup in Brazil. In the 1970s, the United States covertly destabilized Allende's elected government in Chile and backed the Pinochet coup and dictatorship that put an end to Chilean democracy for 17 years. In the 1980s, Washington created a "Contra" army to undermine Sandinista Nicaragua and spent \$6 billion supplying a Salvadoran military notorious for its human rights abuses to fight a leftist guerrilla movement to a stalemate. During the Cold War it also propped up Guatemala's genocidal military regime and sanctioned the Mexican PRI's more tepid version of dirty war, especially in the indigenous southern region of the country.

Yet, in the twenty-first century, many analysts saw U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere as in decline, with China displacing it in many countries as the leading trading partner and investor, with Brazil and Venezuela heading regional groupings that disputed U.S. hegemony, and with a post-9/11 United States so obsessed with jihadist Islam in the Middle East that it largely left Latin America to its own devices. In his provocative essay in this dossier, past LASA president John Coatsworth disputes this conclusion, arguing that the United States is still hegemonic in Latin

America and that what other analysts view as proof of its decline—namely the smaller number of U.S. interventions in the region since 1990—can be read instead as demonstrations of continuing U.S. hegemony. Thus, he suggests that U.S. influence has become so pervasive that it does not need to be defended through U.S. unilateral interventions.

Of course unipolar or unilinear conceptions of culture and power have become increasingly difficult to sustain to over the course of the past 50 years, which points to a final area of change that our omnibus panel could only gesture to broadly: the transnational historical dynamic that has reciprocally reshaped Latin America's multistranded relationship with the United States and changed our conception of the locus of "the field" itself. Indeed, LASA's return to the great multicultural megalopolis of New York City—the site of its initial Congress in 1966—to celebrate its 50th anniversary was particularly fortuitous, for reasons more profound than historical symmetry. Over the course of the last 50 years, New York (along with other cities in the global North) has become a critical crossroads for the study of Latin America in its rich transnational and multilayered context. To study Latin America from the perspective of New York is to appreciate how imbricated Latino/a society, politics, and cultural imaginaries are with those of places traditionally regarded to be Latin American. Portes touches upon this dynamic in his assessment of the longer waves of international migration, not least when he observes that "what goes around comes around." Dynamics of power and resistance in the hemisphere play out on multiple levels and often with unanticipated outcomes, as Coatsworth also suggests in his characterization of U.S.-Mexican relations in the current

Half a Century of Deep Economic Transformations in Latin America

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moment. Fifty years after the creation of LASA at the height of the Cold War, we find ourselves almost routinely obliged to interrogate conventional notions of north-south and south-south encounters and politico-spatial concepts such as the imperial core and its peripheries.

Coatsworth's and Portes's contributions are typical of the informed provocations that animated the presidential panel in New York City, all with the goal of sparking debate on the issues raised by our reflection on LASA's first half century. We hope that by sharing these revised essays in the *LASA Forum* we will spark further debate among LASA's membership. To enhance the discussion and bring it up to date, we invited some of the contributors to extend their analyses into the Trump era. Portes, Stern, and Coatsworth took up that challenge, with Portes questioning Trump's Mexican Wall, Stern seeing Trump as complicating the "what now" question with his "extreme caricature," and Coatsworth arguing that if Trump resorts to Cold War style bullying he is likely to diminish U.S. hegemony and stimulate a movement to "make Mexico great again." But better for you to read their comments and then decide for yourself . . . ■

The half century that has passed since the creation of LASA has been one of deep economic transformations in Latin America. In 1966, the region was in the midst of a rapid industrialization process and about to experience its fastest rate of growth in history in 1967–1974 (6.7 percent per year). The industrialization model was already undergoing significant changes since the early 1960s, particularly the decision of most countries to mix import substitution with export diversification and regional economic integration. The combination of these strategies, which was behind the 1967–1974 boom, is why the term "state-led industrialization" captures much better the nature of the development process under way at the time than the usual term "import-substitution industrialization." Growth continued until the end of the 1970s, supported by high commodity prices and access to external financing on a scale that the region had not known since the 1920s, thanks to the recycling of petrodollars from the oil price rises of 1973 and 1979. This was, however, the prelude to Latin America's worst economic crisis of the twentieth century: the debt crisis of the 1980s that led to Latin America's "lost decade," when in most countries of the region foreign capital flows ceased, growth stagnated, and unemployment soared, and five of them experienced hyperinflation.

There have been intense debates about why the debt crisis was so strong. One hypothesis is that this was the result of the distortions generated by high levels of state intervention and the macroeconomic instability that characterized the industrialization process. However, this interpretation is not convincing. The levels of state intervention in Latin America were actually weaker on average than those of other developing countries. Moreover, the countries undergoing market reforms¹—

trade liberalization, privatization of state enterprises, and deregulation of the financial sector—in the second half of the 1970s, those of the Southern Cone, were actually more affected by the debt crisis, notably in the scale of their domestic financial crises. Chile, the market-reform poster child, suffered a 16 percent decline in its GDP between 1981 and 1983. Lack of macroeconomic discipline, particularly large public sector budget deficits, did spread prior to the debt crisis, but this had not been a general trend in the region during state-led industrialization, except in the Southern Cone and Brazil. A more persuasive interpretation is that Latin America once again became a victim of boom-bust cycles of finance, an experience that had been familiar in the past (the last time in the 1920s–1930s) and has continued to be frequent in recent decades. The unfortunate management of the crisis by international financial institutions—the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank—was also a major reason for the depth of the crisis, particularly because of their initial diagnosis that the crisis was only a temporary phenomenon and their stubborn decision later on to exclude any write-off of the debt as part of the recovery package. This was only done seven years after the outbreak of the crisis, with the 1989 Brady Plan, which provided a moderate reduction in debts and played an important role in putting an end to the "lost decade."

Market reforms that reduced the state role in the economy have spread throughout the region since the mid-1980s, under strong pressure by international financial institutions, but also as a result of changes in the balance of the economic debate and the power relations generated by the crisis. Most countries, therefore, followed the path set by the Southern Cone, notably Chile, in the 1970s. There were, however,

differences associated with national politics in the midst of the democratic wave that Latin America experienced during the 1980s and 1990s. The major expectation of market reformers was that less government intervention and stronger participation in the global economy would lead not only to a short-term economic revival but actually to faster long-term economic growth.

That expectation was entirely frustrated. This was so despite the fact that reforms did lead to an increase of Latin America's share in world trade and attracted significant levels of foreign direct investment. Economic growth settled on an average rate of 3.1 percent in 1990–2015, just above half of that achieved in 1950–1980, when Latin America grew at 5.5 percent a year. The slowdown was particularly strong in the two largest economies: Brazil slowed from 7.0 percent in 1950–1980 to 2.6 percent in 1950–2015, and Mexico from 6.6 percent to 2.7 percent. The only exception to slow growth since 1990 has been the 2003–2008 quinquennium, when GDP grew at 5.1 percent per year thanks to massive positive external shocks: rapid growth of international trade, booming commodity prices, the best access to external financing since the 1970s, and rising migrants' remittances. In contrast to what some have argued, this is not true for the 2003–2013 decade as a whole, as growth came down again in 2008–2013 to rates that were close to the mediocre average of the last quarter century. As a result of its slow growth, Latin America's share in the global GDP, which had increased from 5.2 percent in 1929 and 7.2 percent in 1950 to 9.5 percent in 1980, fell to 8.0 percent in 1990 and has remained around that level since then.²

Growth also became more unstable, more than twice as unstable as was typical

during the industrialization period, as measured by the coefficient of variation of the annual growth rate. This largely reflects the periodic crises generated by the boom-bust cycles in external financing: the Mexican shock of 1994–1995, the series of crises in the emerging markets that started in East Asia in 1997 and worsened with the Russian default of 1998 and then spread to Latin America, the effects of the 2007–2009 North Atlantic financial crisis, and now the collapse of commodity prices, in large part due to China's slowing growth and lessened demand for raw materials.

The reasons for this weak performance during the market reform period have been subject to equally heated debates. For reformers, the incomplete character of reforms was the major problem. In their view, the orthodox package was not fully implemented (e.g., privatizations), and there was also a lack of important ingredients, particularly deep labor market reforms that would make it easier to fire workers, restrict labor unions, and allow managers full flexibility to reshuffle workers as needed. In contrast, for Latin American structuralists, the explanation was the premature and powerful deindustrialization process that was unleashed by both the debt crisis and market reforms, as well as the massive lag in technological development that has characterized the region vis-à-vis both the developed countries and the most dynamic developing countries of East Asia. This reflects, in the structuralists' view, the lack of a central role for production and technological strategies under the market reform model.

There is a consensus that productivity growth has been weak over the last quarter century, and indeed negative if measured by the evolution of total factor productivity. The modernization of leading

firms has certainly taken place. But there has been a lack of capacity to absorb in high-productivity sectors the labor that has lost jobs due to market restructuring. This has been reflected, in turn, in high levels of labor market informality, with large numbers of workers self-employed or laboring in unregulated enterprises without contracts or social protection.

One issue that was entirely absent from the orthodox criticism of state-led industrialization, which in contrast was at the center of structuralist critiques, was the high level of domestic inequalities associated with that model. Industrialization was accompanied by rapidly increasing levels of human development, as measured by the United Nations Development Program, and particularly a reduction in the gaps with developed countries in health and, to a lesser extent, education. Also, about two-thirds of the poverty reduction achieved in Latin America from 1913 to 1990 took place between 1950 and 1980.³ However, trends in income distribution were not as positive. There was an early improvement in this area in the Southern Cone countries, but also a deterioration during the military dictatorships of the 1970s and part of the 1980s. Brazil also experienced increased inequality in the later stages of state-industrialization, but there were improvements since the mid-1960s or in the 1970s in other countries, such as Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Venezuela.⁴ Overall, income distribution probably worsened in several countries and in the region as a whole during the industrialization period, and inequality certainly remained excessively high.

With much better information for recent decades, we know that income distribution worsened in most countries during the 1980s and 1990s. This means that both

the debt crisis and market reforms initially increased inequality. Poverty levels rose sharply in the 1980s and only improved marginally in the 1990s, and therefore in the early 2000s poverty remained for the region as a whole above the 1980 level. This means that in terms of poverty reduction, Latin America experienced not a lost decade but rather a lost quarter century! In contrast, one of the contributions to the democratic wave that the region experienced simultaneously with market reforms was the general increase in social sector public spending. This major “democratic dividend” led to a constant improvement in the nonincome dimensions of human development, and particularly in education levels, which had advanced much less than health during the era of state-led industrialization. The most persuasive interpretation of the evolution of the social indicators during market reforms is that there has been a major mismatch between improvements in human development and the employment opportunities provided by a relatively weak economic performance.

Rising education levels were also behind the significant improvement in income distribution that took place in most countries from 2003 to 2013. Other factors contributed, particularly income transfers from the state to the poorest households, notably through conditional cash transfers, a major Brazilian-Mexican innovation, with the basic condition being children’s school attendance and pregnant mothers using health care controls. However, a growing literature clearly indicates that the most important contribution to the reduction in income inequality throughout the region came from the reduction in the income premiums paid to highly educated workers. This factor, together with the acceleration of economic growth, particularly in 2003–2008, also led to the most important episode

of poverty reduction since the 1970s: from 44 percent in 2002 to 28 percent in 2013.⁵ The combination of rising levels of human development generated by higher social spending, improvements in income distribution, and rapid poverty reduction implied that Latin America did experience a “golden social decade” during 2003–2013, despite the fact that in terms of economic growth the decade as a whole was not exceptional, only the quinquennium 2003–2008.

As we close the half century examined in this dossier, the economic challenges facing Latin America are immense. South America is facing an economic crisis, which is particularly strong in Venezuela and Brazil. Renewal of growth requires more active production sector strategies focused on major technological catching up—the traditional strategy of the East Asian countries. But this requires a major shift in development policies. It is also critical to generate quality employment to match rising educational levels, the “scaling up” that is taking place in East Asia. Continuation of the positive social trends of the past decade is key, but poverty is rising again and improvements in income distribution have stalled. To paraphrase the title of this dossier, the time is ripe for renewed, strong, and speedy transformations.

Notes

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¹ I prefer this term to that of “neoliberal” reforms or “neoliberalism” for two basic reasons. The first is that the concept “liberal” is used in very diverse senses in different parts of the world, and notably in the United States (and even the United Kingdom) vs. continental Europe. In fact, it would be more appropriate to call the market reforms “neoconservative” rather than “neoliberal.” The second reason is that reforms were much more diverse than usually recognized and, in this sense, they did not follow a uniform “neoliberal” recipe.

² These are estimates from my joint work with Luis Bértola (Luis Bértola and José Antonio Ocampo, *The Economic Development of Latin America since Independence*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), which I have updated for this essay.

³ Leandro Prados de la Escosura, “Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 41, no. 2 (2009): 279–307. This is also consistent with the estimates for the 1970s by Juan Luis Londoño and Miguel Székely, “Persistent Poverty and Excess Inequality: Latin America, 1970–1995,” *Journal of Applied Economics* 3, no.1 (2000): 93–134.

⁴ In any case, Londoño and Székely’s claim that there was an improvement in overall income distribution in the 1970s is thus a debatable proposition.

⁵ Data from CEPAL/ECLAC (UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). ■

Migration in the Contemporary History of Latin America: An Overview of Recent Trends

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It is possible to tell much of the history of Latin America through the migrations that have taken place there. It is even possible to say that migrations are largely responsible for the social makeup of the region and for its economic evolution over time. This feat has been due not to the absolute size of successive migration flows but to their different composition, intent, and consequences. We can distinguish at least five types of migration into and out of the region:

- Colonizing migrations
- Coerced migrations
- Induced migrations
- Spontaneous inflows and outflows
- Refugee flows

Colonizing and coerced migrations defined the colonial era after the European conquest of the Americas. Europeans migrated to their “New World” in search of economic gain and social status. Many more Africans crossed the Atlantic in a forced labor migration of slaves, who in the plantations and low-altitude mines of Spanish and Portuguese America replaced a mistreated indigenous labor force that had been decimated by Eurasian epidemic diseases against which they had no defenses. This led to the re peopling of the Caribbean and Atlantic coast colonies/countries that transformed the demographic profile of the region. It shifted from a white-mestizo-indigenous mosaic to a predominately white-mulatto-black one.

The end of slavery in the nineteenth century produced a new shortage of labor in much of the region. The new mechanism devised to meet this situation was deliberate recruitment to induce migration. So successful were these recruitment programs that descendants of Italian laborers came to rival natives of Spanish

descent in Argentina and descendants of Indian indentured workers matched the population of African descent in the Guianas; meanwhile the Chinese became a visible component of the Cuban and Peruvian populations and the Japanese of the Brazilian.

Deliberate recruitment was also the system used by ranchers and growers in the newly acquired U.S. states of California and Texas to find Mexican labor for their expanding ventures. Over time, Mexican migration to the United States became a self-sustained flow. But its origins are in these deliberate recruitment efforts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In the twentieth century, the colonizing, coerced, and induced migrations that had populated the continent for three centuries gave way to a new form of migration that did not depend on any deliberate effort on the part of the receiving societies. Instead, these societies found themselves in the position of regulating what economists came to label an “inexhaustible labor supply.”

Spontaneous Migrations: Internal and External

Flows that begin with deliberate recruitment can reproduce themselves over time through the power of social networks. News of the opportunities in places of destination pass through word of mouth from migrants to kin and communities left behind, insuring a steady flow of new recruits. In North America the flows initiated by deliberate recruitment endured and became self-reproducing. Despite deliberate campaigns of deportation in the early 1930s, the mid-1950s, and now the 2000s, Mexican migrants continued moving north, becoming the mainstay of

American agriculture and, in time, the largest foreign minority in the United States. More and more, this flow became spontaneous and self-driven, rather than the result of deliberate recruitment.

With notable exceptions, the mostly rural population of Latin America stayed put in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth. The economic lifeblood of the region consisted of the export of commodities—agricultural products and metals—and the import of industrial goods from Europe and, later, the United States. Economic production centered on the countryside, and that is where most of the population remained. Urban life was restricted to one or two main cities per country. Not surprisingly, most of these cities were also ports, channeling the flow of rural commodities for export and receiving and consuming most of the manufactured imports. Latin American elites, who derived their wealth from the land, lived in those cities, which is where the cultural and political life of the time was centered.

This simple urban/rural scheme was to change dramatically with the Great Depression and the subsequent advent of import substitution industrialization (ISI). Started by necessity because of the dearth of industrial exports from the core countries during World War II, import substitution industrialization was extended subsequently as a means to overcome the centuries-old dependence of the region on agricultural and mineral exports. Strongly advocated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America under the leadership of Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch, import substitution promoted the emergence of new industrial elites in a number of large and medium countries, such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.

The ISI model also produced two fundamental features relevant to our story. First, industrial production was concentrated in the one or two cities per country where markets and productive infrastructures actually existed. Second, in due time, multinational corporations jumped the tariff barrier established by ISI policies to compete directly with domestic industry. Multinationals not only elbowed aside local industrialists but brought in technology that was capital- rather than labor-intensive.

The concentration of industrial employment in the largest cities then triggered a spontaneous flow of migrants from the smaller towns and the countryside. Slow at first, rural-urban migration became a flood by the 1950s and 1960s, rupturing the traditional urban order inherited from colonial times. Unable to afford housing within the established city, the migrant poor created their own solutions by the simple expedient of occupying vacant land in the urban periphery and building shacks on it.

Due to these massive internal migrations, the urban systems of Latin America came to acquire the profile with which we are familiar today: first, deep demographic imbalances, with one or two cities per country concentrating both population and economic resources; second, the emergence of vast belts of unregulated settlements surrounding these “primate” cities. Suburban shantytowns, with different names in each country but evocatively called *villas miserias* in Argentina, became signature features of Latin American urbanization in the late twentieth century.

The ISI model, perverted by the dominance of the multinationals, was incapable of providing suitable employment to the masses of internal migrants since the

industrial technology imported by the multinationals was labor-saving. As a consequence, the bulk of this population had to create not only their own housing solutions in the peripheral settlements, but also their own economic solutions through invented employment. Consequently, the informal economy of these cities exploded, becoming larger, in many instances, than that regulated by the state. The response of Latin American masses to the constraints of dependent economies and the defects of the ISI model, as applied in the region, came to dominate the physical, demographic, and economic landscape of Latin America to our day: gigantic urban heads on dwarfish bodies; pervasive poverty and economic informality; rising crime and increasing insecurity in both city and countryside represent some of the key features inherited from internal migrations in the twentieth century.

In due time, the poor and not-so-poor in a number of countries started borrowing a page from what Mexican peasants had been doing for decades, namely heading north. The onset of spontaneous migration flows from Latin American countries to the United States in the last half century had as immediate causes two factors: first, conditions of continuing economic scarcity, lack of employment opportunities, and rising public insecurity in the sending countries; second, the relentless penetration by the institutions of advanced capitalism, including multinational corporations, and the consequent diffusion of consumption expectations out of reach for the majority of the Latin American population. A logical way to right the balance between imported consumption aspirations and local economic scarcity is to move to the places where these aspirations originally came from, which is what an increasing number of people started doing. Contemporary migrations from

Latin America to the United States are overwhelmingly spontaneous. There is no need to recruit Dominican urban workers, Guatemalan rural laborers, or Colombian and Argentine professionals to come north. That “recruitment” is done by advertising through the media and by the levels of relative deprivation that they trigger. These self-driven flows from Mexico, Central America, and elsewhere in the region form the immediate precedent for the rapid growth of the Hispanic population of the United States, now approaching 60 million.

What goes around comes around. The distortions of Latin American economies by foreign capital, including limited employment opportunities, rising inequality, and unreachable expectations find their counterpart in the movement of a not inconsiderable part of the population to major cities and abroad. The neoliberal model that replaced import-substitution did not resolve the problems created by earlier policies. It compounded them. As a result, population displacements, internal and external, have continued to our day. About one-tenth of the Mexican population now lives in the United States, and comparable proportions of Colombians, Ecuadoreans, Peruvians, and Central Americans have also moved abroad. With some notable exceptions, Latin America has yet to find its way into and its place within the developed world. The continuing out-migration of its population reflects that reality.

Refugees

The legal figure of “refugee” is a relatively recent creation under United Nations auspices. Almost since independence, a tradition existed in Latin America of providing asylum to those persecuted politically in another country. This legal figure was commonly used by the losing

side in interelite political struggles but was seldom employed on a mass scale. Mass international migration in Latin America has been primarily driven by economic incentives: from Bolivia, Chile, and Paraguay to Argentina and from Colombia and Peru to Venezuela. Peasants and poor people escaping civil wars or other political violence were seldom granted a defined legal status in the receiving country, which handled the flow as best it could on an ad hoc basis.

The largest movement of people defined legally as refugees and granted resettlement assistance in the contemporary period is that triggered by the Cuban Revolution and received in the United States. Consequences of Cuban refugee migration over several decades have been momentous and would require separate treatment. It would suffice to note that the reception granted to Cubans in the United States was far more favorable than that awaiting subsequent claimants for asylum fleeing murderous civil wars in Central America. The U.S. government routinely denied these latter requests, confining Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and others to a precarious legal status if they remained in U.S. territory or putting their lives at peril if they were forced to return to Central America. This disparity shows clearly that the status of “refugee” does not depend on the situation of individuals but on the geopolitical priorities of the receiving states. Cubans were warmly received as U.S. allies in the global struggle against communism, even as Central Americans were routinely denied asylum as they fled right-wing regimes considered allies of the United States in that same global struggle.

“The Wall” and Labor Immigration

The promise by U.S. President Trump to build a wall on the southern border plays well in conservative circles but it will be, at best, a costly redundancy. Since 2008, undocumented migration from Mexico has declined dramatically. Net Mexican immigration, taking into account arrivals and departures, is now estimated to be near zero. Agricultural and other unskilled labor demand, formerly sourced by undocumented migration, is now increasingly met by the H-2 program of temporary visas, greatly expanded by the Obama administration. In 2015, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deported 268,000 undocumented Mexicans. In the same year, U.S. Immigration Services (USCIS) granted 268,000 H-2-A visas for Mexican agricultural workers and another 95,000 H-2-B visas for other unskilled workers. In effect, the United States now has a temporary labor program. The only positive effect of the “wall” will be to provide employment for hundreds of Mexican workers who, inevitably, will be those who build it. ■

From Authoritarianism to Democracy and After

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For a long time, authoritarianism has been the modal political regime in Latin America. When LASA was founded in 1966, a handful of countries in the region, including Brazil and Argentina, were ruled by dictatorships. During the decade that followed, even such model democracies as Chile and Uruguay were overthrown by military coups that imposed autocratic regimes notorious for their political violence and violations of human rights. For almost two decades, only Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica escaped the authoritarian tide.

Although they were similar in their disregard for democratic institutions, civil liberties, and basic citizen rights, these authoritarian regimes diverged greatly with regard to their economic policies, social bases of support, and the degree to which their autocratic rules were institutionalized. Some practiced developmentalist policies; others appropriated neoliberal doctrines. Some of these regimes were modernizers, others purely reactionary. Some permitted controlled elections and muzzled parties; others banned both. Some were based on dictators' personal rule; others were more impersonal governments of military and civilian bureaucrats.

This gamut of authoritarianism posed analytical challenges for intellectuals inside of Latin America and internationally, inaugurating an extremely rich debate that produced seminal contributions to the study of autocracies. The most outstanding theoretical contribution came, first of all, from Juan Linz, who differentiated among autocratic regimes according to the degree of pluralism, the presence or absence of an official dominant ideology, the existence of limits to the leader's discretionary behavior, and the regime's efforts to mobilize the population. Linz's typology gave us distinctly political criteria that permitted

a better understanding of the institutional and ideological varieties of autocratic rule, other than totalitarianism, a clearly inadequate concept to explain the nature of recent Latin American dictatorships. The second seminal theoretical contribution was Guillermo O'Donnell's concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism, which shed light not only on the political economy of some types of autocracy, but also on the complex state structures that sustained them.

From the late 1970s through the 1980s, Latin American countries lived the uncertainties and surprises that accompanied transitions from authoritarianism to liberal democratic regimes. Varying in terms of their timing, speed, and the challenges they faced, such transitions resulted from societal mobilization, but also, and primarily, from the complex interplay of radical and moderate political actors in both the authoritarian ranks and among the opposition forces. Transition processes featured strategic choices made by democrats and authoritarian moderates who acted amid great uncertainty. How far could one go without calling for violent repression; how far could one concede without losing power to the democratic opposition; how far could one negotiate without betraying one's goal to defeat autocracy or to maintain it?

Here, too, the transition to democracy in Latin America gave rise to innovative theoretical and empirical contributions for understanding regime change and processes of democratization. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, the work of an outstanding group of scholars under the leadership of Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, in short order became a classic in comparative politics. Meanwhile, throughout this extended time of troubles,

the Latin American Studies Association provided an open and lively forum where seminal ideas were thoroughly examined, improved, and disseminated.

In Latin America, authoritarianism has ebbed since the 1990s, with the sole exception of the Cuban regime. I do not think that pure authoritarian regimes constitute a menace in the near future, nor can they offer an equitable solution to the multiple and recurrent crises of Latin America's current democracies. Even governments that are trying to silence their political opposition, control the press, and thwart congressional and judicial powers—such as those in Venezuela and Ecuador—have been chosen in free and competitive elections and are being forced to live with a reasonable degree of citizen's freedom, a tribute authoritarian leaders must pay to democracy's prevalence in the hearts and minds of the people of the region.

Let us therefore concentrate on current democracies' weaknesses and strong points. I would like to raise three issues that seem particularly important for this discussion. The first issue has to do with beliefs and attitudes. Leading recent surveys conducted in the region, by Latinobarómetro, LAPOP, and World Values Survey as well as national polls, all converge in showing support for democracy—in varying degrees—but also a pervasive dissatisfaction with its workings, as measured by negative evaluations of governments, parliaments, and, most notably, parties on the Right, Center, and Left.

Of course, this is far from being just a regional problem: as recent watershed national elections have demonstrated, disaffection haunts democracies all over the world, and in this matter Latin America seems to follow a global

trend. Indeed, disaffection and mistrust regarding representative institutions seem to be an inherent and durable feature of contemporary democracies. These trends have been accentuated by the long-lasting world economic crisis and its slow and difficult recovery, but certainly they are a constitutive feature of what Bernard Manin, in *The Principles of Representative Government*, has called democracy of the public. By this he meant a political system where parties are no longer the main source of information and no longer forge strong political identities; and where political information is more easily available to citizens, with increasing exposure of both the daily routines of governments and the internal rifts of political parties, as well as of the public and private lives of politicians. Due to these changes, electoral choices become more volatile and less determined by party identification.

A long time ago, Bismarck said something like, “Oh, if people only knew how laws and sausages are made!” Well, now they know how laws are made, or at least information is within arm’s length. Disaffection does not entail political apathy but, more frequently, it entails protest. The novelty of democracies, old and new, both in the North and the South, is manifested in individuals occupying streets and squares to assert their opinions and aspirations, frequently independent of traditional mobilizing organizations such as unions, civic associations, and parties.

The second issue is a sociological one and has to do with important processes of social mobility that have occurred during this century in almost all of the countries in the region. Some have referred to it as the rise of new middle classes due to a significant reduction of poverty. (I prefer to talk about emerging social strata, in order to avoid the strong valences associated with

the concept of middle classes.) We have barely studied the political consequences of such an important social change. But I would argue that these emerging groups may be associated with the demise of traditional forms of authority and with aspirations for citizen equality as they translate into claims for better public services and universal social policies, as well as for governments and public officials less corrupt and more accountable and open to people’s scrutiny. I would dare to say that these processes echo what Tocqueville called the increasing passion for equality nested in the hearts of individuals. There are the sounds of Tocquevillian revolution in the streets of La Paz, Mexico City, São Paulo, and Santiago. On the other hand, since Tocqueville, we know that there is not an easy answer to the question of how the passion for equality relates to liberal democracy.

Finally, the third important issue has been the significant wave of institutional innovation at different levels of the democratic political system in Latin America. Such institutional innovation encompasses new forms of participation, new tools for citizen advocacy, new mechanisms of electoral supervision, the modernization of voting procedures, new instruments of monitoring and controlling governments’ activities, and new forms of public-private partnerships. Behind these institutions there are actors trying to give efficacy and efficiency to an array of antimajoritarian powers, that is to say, institutions and mechanisms that protect the rights of minorities and moderate the excesses of majoritarian rule.

The impact on real existing democracies in Latin America of these three issues—dissatisfaction regarding representative institutions, aspirations for actual equal rights, and antimajoritarian institutional

innovation—are not predetermined: they can foster democracy or allow for forms of electoral autocracy. In brief, their positive or negative impact depend fundamentally on political systems’ capacity to open up spaces to new actors and demands in electoral competition, as well as in the day-to-day exercise of government. It also depends on the room left for the kind of leadership that Juan Linz once referred to as disloyal oppositions: that is, politicians and groups willing to exploit within the democratic system feelings of disaffection, the quest for equality or the fear of its expansion. Needless to say, the closure of the political system and the formation of new oligarchies, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the emergence of disloyal oppositions—on the Right or the Left—are possibilities lurking just around the corner. ■

Beyond Colonialism: Race and Ethnicity in the Mobilization of Indigenous People

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My essay has the title “Beyond Colonialism” in order to highlight the very important tension in the history of Latin American politics between the notion that the Marxist left could carry out the kind of political change that would empower everyone who was oppressed in the existing societies, and the reality that empowering oppressed peoples could not solely be done from above by a leftist leadership with its own idea of what was the best route to liberation.

This notion, in my opinion, is at the heart of the debates over guerrilla struggles in Latin America, and most especially in the context of the Cuban Revolution and the subsequent failures of other guerrilla *focos* to carry out successful revolutions in other parts of the region. The first critical consideration of the problem of guerrilla *foco* came from Régis Debray in his famous work *Revolution in the Revolution?* In this work, Debray was interested in considering critically the lessons that had been taken from the victory of the Cuban Revolution. In the introduction to his book, Debray wrote that the notion that the Cuban Revolution could not be repeated in Latin America had become a dangerous cliché. Ultimately, the danger lay, according to Debray, in the idea that the impossibility of repetition “reduce[d] Cuba to a golden legend, that of twelve men who disembark and whose numbers multiply in the twinkling of an eye, no one knows quite how.”¹ He continued: “Thus we cannot but deplore the continuing lack of a detailed history of the Cuban insurrectional process, a history which can come to us only from those who organized and participated in it. This lack constrains us to reduce our references to allusions, whereas what is really needed is a systematic investigation.”²

These questions came back into the forefront in Latin American politics with

the crisis of socialism that occurred with the decline and dissolution of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991. This coincided with a series of events in Latin American countries that also called into question the viability of socialist projects based on class struggle—including the 1973 military coup in Chile, the horrors of the Shining Path insurgency in Peru between 1980 and 1992, and the ongoing genocide of Maya peoples in Guatemala from the 1960s through the 1990s. As a result, indigenous, feminist, and human rights movements came back into the picture.

For the purposes of this essay, I will focus on the tense relationship between leftist projects for revolutionary transformation and indigenous movements. In addition to the critical and important reflections by Debray, we now know, thanks to the work of Julia Sweig, that Ernesto Che Guevara’s interpretation of what brought about the Cuban revolutionary victory was not entirely correct. Given his limited perspective on Cuban politics—which did not include an understanding of the political role of the urban underground, and of the leftist women who managed to gather funding support from Cuban exiles—his notion of the centrality of the guerrilla *foco* was at best a partial explanation.³ Still, the powerful image of the self-sacrificing guerrilla, and how such a figure could bring about the liberation of oppressed peoples, reverberated dramatically through Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s.

To the notion of guerrilla self-sacrifice, it is important to add the deep emotional satisfaction of revolutionary victory. As Daniel Wilkinson observed in his book *Silence on the Mountain*, a reflection about and observation of the Guatemalan Revolution, there were guerrilla fighters in Guatemala—he focuses specifically on

“Silverio”—who were trying to repeat the joyous victory and satisfaction they had experienced in Nicaragua. Quoting from the work of Irish poet Seamus Heaney, Wilkinson suggests that the moment of victory, especially as remembered in Nicaragua by “Silverio,” was the moment when “hope and history rhyme.”⁴ Wilkinson’s final reflection on “Silverio” is especially poignant when he writes: “He returned to Guatemala and spent the next decade killing people and seeing his friends be killed, always with the hope that he would hear the rhyme again.”⁵

This, then, would be guerrilla self-sacrifice, an effort to connect with peasants in order to bring down oppressive governments. When it was successful, it led to what Seamus Heaney called “when hope and history rhyme.” In this sense, there is a powerful emotional dimension to the vision of victory Wilkinson describes in *Silence on the Mountain*. Here I will compare the cases of the Guatemalan Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo (EGP) and the Chilean Movimiento Campesino Revolucionario (MCR), the mass organization of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR). While only the EGP was an actual guerrilla organization, both saw the path to revolutionary change as necessarily an armed path, and highlighted an alliance with indigenous peoples.

In the case of the Guatemalan EGP, in his memoir *Days of the Jungle* guerrilla leader Mario Payeras likened the guerrilla struggle to attempting to cross a dangerous and slippery bridge, an immensely long and slender tree trunk laid across a dizzying torrent. I quote from his memoir: “We had to cross over twice: to pick up supplies and bring them back—a hundred pounds on our backs. Half-way across, advancing slowly, trying to keep a foothold, the

ceaseless flow of the water would suddenly make us feel dizzy. Whoever hesitated at midpoint would become paralyzed, unable to go back or forward. The secret was to cross slowly but without hesitation.”⁶ This powerful image is a particularly dramatic example of the memory of heroic agency.

My second example comes from the Movimiento Campesino Revolucionario (MCR), an attempt by the Chilean Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) to connect the Left with indigenous peoples. Gustavo Marín, one of the leaders of the MCR in the Mapuche region of Cautín and who went by the name José Peralta, describes in the collective MCR memoir entitled *A desalambraz* how the MCR began to consider the strategy of *corridos de cerco*, or fence runnings. Beginning with his arrival in the Cautín region in 1969, he describes the conversations he had in Mapuche communities during which, in a process he terms “inductive,” Mapuche peasants would conclude that they needed to run the fence. “The elders of the communities,” he explains, “searched for the Títulos de Merced (original community land titles) at the Instituto Indígena (Indigenous Institute) in Temuco; they were given the titles and they returned also with the map, that was drawn on wax paper.” This, in Marín’s experience, was the beginning of an intergenerational dialogue in the communities, which also became, in a sense, an intercultural dialogue that involved the communities’ own views of the territory they held, as well as the views of their new non-Mapuche allies. According to Marín, “We would put the title map on another map that represented landed property and it was extremely clear where the old fence had been, you didn’t have to be a geographer to understand this. In addition the elders had a very clear vision of the fence, it had remained

engrained in their memories, they knew it went through this stream, by the side of that apple tree, in that particular valley. When someone has taken away your land and your house, the place where you were born and grew up, you never forget. The elders had the memory, but they did not speak of it; after our conversations between mate teas, we began rediscovering the history with them.”⁷

During the Popular Unity government between 1970 and 1973, the MCR developed a land recuperation strategy in the south of the country they called *corridos de cerco*, or fence runnings. Beginning from where the MCR saw the consciousness of the Mapuche indigenous people, in the memory of usurpation of their original lands by invading landowners after the defeat of Mapuche resistance at the end of the nineteenth century, these fence runnings would, MCR activists reasoned, quickly make clear to the Mapuche the limitations of a land recuperation strategy as a long-term solution to the agrarian problem. In effect, then, the recuperation of Mapuche territory was seen by MCR activists as beginning a process of educating indigenous peasants in Marxism and class struggle.

Conclusions

Inspired by the heroic image of guerrilla sacrifice embodied by Che Guevara, both EGP and MCR activists saw their destiny as educating the indigenous people of their societies in the necessary Marxist truth of class exploitation, which would make clear that, for the purpose of political struggle, rural indigenous people needed to be seen as peasants. Given the failure of these movements to bring about lasting change, as well as the bountiful violence they endured, indigenous activists began,

as of the early 1980s, politically to rethink the place of indigenous peoples in Latin American politics. In so doing, they reformulated the idea of internal colonialism initially put forth by Mexican intellectuals and activists Pablo González Casanova and Rodolfo Stavenhagen and gave it an entirely new meaning. Especially as envisioned by Demetrio Cojtí Cuxil in Guatemala and Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui in Bolivia, the notion of internal colonialism brought to the fore the enduring racism and colonialism still present in Latin American revolutionary thought.⁸

While Mario Payeras and others, badly impacted by the massive losses of life and brutal massacres endured by guerrillas and their indigenous supporters, could not engage fully in the personal reflection and self-criticism to consider the political possibility that indigenous peoples were not simply peasants, it turned out to be a different story in the Chilean case. Indeed, although the limitations of space prevent me from going fully into detail on this, surviving MCR activist Gustavo Marín, exiled to Europe, would ultimately suggest in his personal testimony that the error of the MIR and the MCR was in fact to see the Mapuche simply as peasants rather than as an indigenous people.⁹

As we have seen in the emerging pan-Maya and Mapuche indigenous movements in Guatemala and Chile over the past decades, they are very much taking us beyond colonialism. They are also challenging us to think through the difference between socialist revolution and national liberation, and to consider the possibility that these two struggles, even if connected and articulated, are not the same.

Decline of U.S. Hegemony?

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Notes

¹ Régis Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), 15.

² Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution?*, 16.

³ Julia E. Sweig, *Inside the Cuban Revolution: Fidel Castro and the Urban Underground* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

⁴ Daniel Wilkinson, *Silence on the Mountain: Stories of Terror, Betrayal, and Forgetting in Guatemala* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 342.

⁵ Wilkinson, *Silence on the Mountain*, 342.

⁶ Mario Payeras, *Days of the Jungle: The Testimony of a Guatemalan Guerrillero, 1972–1976*, introduction by George Black (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), 94.

⁷ José Peralta, testimony in Rafael Railaf, Lucy Traipe, Félix Huentelaf, Víctor Molfinqueo, José Peralta, and Rudecindo Quinchavil, *A desalambrar: Historias de Mapuches y Chilenos en la lucha por la tierra* (Santiago, Chile: Editorial AYUN, 2006), 68–88, direct quotation on pp. 74–75; my translation.

⁸ Demetrio Cujti Cuxil, “The Politics of Maya Revindication,” in *Maya Cultural Activism in Guatemala*, ed. Edward R. Fischer and R. McKenna Brown (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 19–50; and Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, “Oppressed but Not Defeated”: *Peasant Struggles among the Aymara and Qhechwa in Bolivia, 1900–1980* (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1987).

⁹ Peralta, in *A desalambrar*, 68–88. ■

U.S. president Donald Trump has pledged “to make America great again.” The premise of this exciting pledge is that U.S. power has been declining over some recent period. Applied to the trajectory of U.S.–Latin American relations, the hypothesis of decline raises three interesting questions:

1. Has the United States government suffered a decline in its ability to impose its own policy preferences by force or persuasion on the 32 independent governments in Latin America and the Caribbean over the past 50 years (since roughly the date of LASA’s creation in 1967)? That is, has the U.S. capacity to project power in the region actually declined? I think the answer to this question is no.
2. Have U.S. policy preferences evolved over the past 50 years such that governments in the region are more likely than in the past to find them attractive, or at least consistent with their own perceived national interests? I think the answer to this question is yes.
3. Hegemony is a wonderfully elastic concept. In its modern Gramscian articulation, it refers to the dynamic role of ideas and institutions in securing popular acquiescence or even support for objectively exploitative social arrangements. Translating this notion to the international arena, one might ask whether the ideas and institutions that support U.S. policy preferences in the region have become stronger or weaker over the past 50 years. I think the best answer I can give to this question is probably stronger.

On the first question, the impression that U.S. dominance has declined seems to be based on (at least) two kinds of evidence.

First, the U.S. share of trade and investment flows has declined over the past 50 years. U.S. leverage, the argument runs, must have diminished accordingly. However, trade and investment flows do not necessarily convey proportionate political influence. Most of the main trade and investment rivals of the United States in the region—Western Europe, Japan, and more recently, China—avoid openly confronting the United States. None has devoted much time and money to cultivating domestic interest groups within Latin America to serve as political allies. In any case, the United States will always be a more important economic partner to each of them than any Latin American partner or collection of partners.

The second kind of evidence cited for the decline hypothesis begins with the observation that the U.S. government has successfully intervened to overthrow a sitting government in the western hemisphere only three times in the 25 years since the collapse of the USSR, in contrast to the 22 overturned in the 29 years between 1961 and 1990. The U.S. failure to intervene, it is argued, has allowed governments hostile to U.S. interests to persist in power and made even friendly governments more difficult to bully or persuade. Ergo, U.S. hegemony has diminished.

I think this evidence actually argues against the decline hypothesis. The interventions of the Cold War era suggest a much shakier hegemony than the historiography suggests. A truly *successful* hegemon (like the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, for example) would not have felt compelled to intervene so often.

The Cold War strategy of the United States in Latin America was to seek reliably anti-Communist allies, mostly conservative and right-wing economic and political elites,

secure their support for U.S. Cold War aims, and back them with money, training, and equipment for the military and police forces that kept them in power.

This strategy was poorly conceived at best. In most Latin American countries, citizen majorities preferred more socially progressive governments than those supported or installed by the United States. When majorities managed to elect such governments or threatened to do so, the U.S. government usually backed minority rule. Eleven of the 22 governments overthrown between 1961 and 1990 had been elected, while a 12th intervention (the dispatch of 22,000 U.S. troops to Santo Domingo in 1965) prevented the *restoration* of a reformist democratic regime.

Worse yet, the Cold War strategy spilled blood needlessly. In 10 of the 12 cases, the political movements or parties tossed from power were reelected to office once military rule ended. And nothing bad happened.

Finally, the Cold War strategy of the United States in Latin America generated widespread opposition within the United States, even within the policy establishment. Policy discipline and coherence were continually undermined, particularly (but for quite different reasons) during the Carter and Reagan administrations.

By the turn of the twenty-first century, U.S. policymakers had long since stopped paying much attention to Latin America. Conflicts over mistreatment of U.S. companies and property holders virtually disappeared with the development of a new international dispute-settlement regime beginning in the late 1970s. Left-wing and center-left parties, movements, and governments, which once triggered

interventions, now worry more about the next election than they do about the CIA. Latin American military establishments, their budgets cut and their numbers falling, no longer threaten democratic regimes.

Or, to put it differently, since U.S. policy no longer treats social progress and majority rule as potential threats to its national security interests, most people in the region, according to opinion polls, now have a fairly positive view of the United States and frequently, but not always, elect leaders who share that view. “Soft power,” aided by transnational flows of people, ideas, images, music, sports, and business have generally contributed to this positive trend. This may help to explain why the various regional or subregional institutions from which the United States has been deliberately excluded over the past two decades have mostly languished without major impact.

So what about hegemony in the Gramscian sense? Are Latin American citizens and their governments embracing U.S. policy preferences, even when by any reasonably objective standard their own interests should be propelling them to do otherwise?

The best example of this would be the U.S.-driven war on drugs, a war that has inflicted shocking losses of blood and treasure from the Mexican-US border to the high Andes. Some have argued that the market-oriented reforms and free trade agreements of the past quarter century provide another example. In these cases, as in most others, however, Latin American political interests and interest groups are deeply engaged for their own good (or bad) domestically rooted reasons.

Thus, it does not seem to me that the capacity of the U.S. government to impose its own policy preferences on the region

has diminished over the past 50 years. If anything, it seems to have increased, both because U.S. post-Cold War policy goals are more modest and because Latin American interests, however defined by mostly elected governments and increasingly vibrant civil societies, are more likely to converge with those of the United States on a broad range of issues.

The key issue for the Trump era is whether Latin American governments have developed, individually or together, greater *capacity* to balance against U.S. pressures to embrace policies they would like to oppose than was the case 50 years ago. I think the answer is no.

This is especially true for the smaller countries of Central America and the Caribbean, but the balancing capacities of larger states are also quite limited. Latin American governments can mobilize domestic support (easier for democrats and populists than dictatorships), appeal to regional or international organizations (usually ineffective), look to other superpowers for encouragement (seldom interested), even seek to influence public opinion or mobilize influential interest groups in the United States, but none of these strategies have worked very well in the past.

Two cases bear watching more closely in the coming years. The first, Mexico, is especially interesting. It is now true that almost any damage the United States might contemplate imposing to avert or reverse unwanted Mexican policies would be likely to damage significant U.S. interests as well. Mexican leaders may soon find themselves pushed to choose between exploiting the advantages of hyperintegration more effectively than they have up to now or reverting to “making *Mexico* great again.” The second case is Cuba, an

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improbably sovereign nation struggling to remain independent even as it transitions cautiously to a more productive economic model. For both of these countries, the next few years will likely involve more volatility in relations with the United States than they would prefer.

In the absence of serious threats to U.S. economic and security interests, now or in the past, the Latin American policies of the United States have usually been driven either by the vagaries of U.S. domestic politics (with generally suboptimal and sometimes appalling outcomes) or bureaucratic inertia (usually calm, but with missed opportunities). Trump may choose to revert to Cold War style bullying and interventions to please domestic constituencies, but only at the cost of provoking a decline in U.S. hegemony. Neglect and inactivity (and a Twitter ban) would better serve American greatness.

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I wish to focus on a question of politics and culture that frames somewhat differently a half century of transformation. I hope this approach will serve to complement the excellent insights of my colleagues. My goal is to draw out some politico-cultural implications, as seen through a different lens, of the half century of economic growth, migration, political mobilization, new social movements, and hemispheric power so well analyzed by my colleagues.

What large ideas captured the political and cultural imagination of “troublesome” intellectuals and youths in Latin America during the last half century? A corollary follows. How might answers to this question have changed over time?

The question and its corollary offer an interesting angle for the theme of this dossier. They recognize that intellectuals and youths—although by no means uniform in their political and cultural sensibilities or in their degrees of sociopolitical conformity or nonconformity—have been significant social actors, albeit not the only ones, in the skepticism and mobilizations that drove social justice and inclusion struggles during a tumultuous half century. Such questions are also pertinent because as a scholarly organization, the Latin American Studies Association has been a space of intellectual and intergenerational communication, attuned to shifts of thought and social action and repression affecting intellectuals.

The term “troublesome” carries a double valence useful for the purposes of this commentary. First, the term embraces the idea that a fundamental *positive* consequence of critical thought and generational identity formation is precisely to “trouble” the status quo ante. Second, its elasticity recognizes the diversity of social justice critics: they did not all adhere

to a uniform analysis of what was wrong with the status quo, let alone how best to combat or transcend it. The elasticity also recognizes the diversity of the targets of critique and their responses to dissent. The social actors who found themselves under fire by youthful or intellectual critics varied considerably. In the 1960s/1970s era of radical politics, for example, they could range from leftists considered too reformist or compromised by Old Regime politics, to moderate populists and centrist reformers, to landed oligarchs and conservatives and military dictators. The responses to troubling actors also varied. Military dictatorship regimes and their hard-line supporters often framed dissenters as dangerous antinational “subversives” fit for destruction in a “dirty” war. Others responded to them as political adversaries, albeit misguided or mistaken or ineffectual, to be won over or contained or neutralized politically.

During the last half century, the large ideas that captured the politico-cultural imagination of troublesome youths and intellectuals—what such a question meant, how it might be answered—changed dramatically. Consider three key moments: the 1960s/1970s, the “long” 1980s, and the post-1990s.

Before proceeding, it may be wise to note the limits of this commentary. I am speaking here of general tendencies and am aware that national chronologies vary and that countercurrents are also important. For example, my description below of the transition from heroic to postheroic conceits took place earlier in Chile than in Nicaragua, and awareness of the Nicaraguan example also provided a certain countercurrent within Chile. Moreover, it is worth recalling the multiple and overlapping temporalities—the “tricks of time”—that have long shaped

Latin America. In this conception, historical time is not a linear unfolding in which historical moment or event “C” displaces historical moment or event “B,” which in turn displaced “A.” Displacement and coexistence of distinct historical temporalities turn out not to be mutually exclusive and have inspired notions of circularity and persistence alongside notions of historical change and displacement. As a character in Alejo Carpentier’s novel *Los pasos perdidos* (1953) explained to a traveler from the North, here we live simultaneously with the Virgin, Rousseau, and Marx. (For a fuller discussion of temporalities within a frame of history-literature dialogues, see Stern 1999.)

With these caveats in mind, let us proceed with the general analysis. In the 1960s/1970s era, a key question was how to envision a Latin America that could transcend the still relevant and stifling colonial legacy. Whether understood as economic backwardness and dependence, or as sociopolitical oppression and injustice, the idea that the colonial inheritance still shaped the social order suggested that Latin America’s central problems and injustices had long roots, were structurally entrenched, and took especially acute form in the countryside.

Every country seemed to have its languishing regions of extreme agrarian misery that incarnated the idea of a long history yet to be overcome. Brazil had its Northeast of drought-stricken peasants on the move, Mexico had its Yucatán of landed oligarchs and Maya laborers, Peru had its southern highlands of Indians dominated by *gamonales*, Chile had its countryside of *inquilinos*. Such regions had long inspired artistic expression in music, literature, and film about social worlds of long historical root considered

both authentic and disturbing in the national imaginary, even as they were “rediscovered” in new political contexts in the 1960s and 1970s. Consider, for example, the cinematic redeployment in 1963, by Brazilian director Nelson Pereira dos Santos, of the 1938 novel by Graciliano Ramos, *Vidas secas*. Likewise, the *politics* of regional identity, modernity, and backwardness also emerged within a longer temporality. As Barbara Weinstein (2015) has recently shown, even well before the 1960s/1970s moment, the construction of the Brazilian “modern” was tied in politics and cultural imagination to differentiation—São Paulo not unto itself but in relation to the Northeast.

By the 1960s, the regions that symbolized structurally entrenched misery and neocolonial persistence and backwardness sparked not only art but also urgent debate, both political and academic. Could agrarian reform or revolution happen in the here and now, not in the far distant future? Were regions of extreme agrarian misery best understood as social worlds produced by the absence of modernity, or in contrast, as products of a modernity of inequality rooted in colonialism and dependence? Burgeoning literatures on the agrarian question, development and dependence, and colonial legacies reflected the climate of debate. (See, e.g., Stavenhagen 1970; and for retrospective analysis, Roseberry 1993, Stern 1988, Weinstein 2008; cf. Adelman 1999.)

Most important, the new moment sparked mobilization and experimentation, not simply debate. What changed by the 1960s/1970s moment was not the sense of an old legacy still present and unjust and problematic, but rather the level of complacency and acceptance. The social problems of the Old Regime had now turned urgent and explosive. Even

the institutional pillars of Old Regime conservatism—the Catholic Church, the military—seemed no longer so monolithic. Especially after the Cuban Revolution, social transformation had become an imperative, an idea whose time had come. In this era, when the idea of “reform versus revolution” was so much a part of politics and culture, and also intersected with a Latin American version of the Cold War, could the colonial legacy finally be transcended? Could some sort of social liberation finally happen, notwithstanding the resistance that would also meet such experiments?

It was this atmosphere and reality of social struggle that could create new projects and ideas in unexpected places. In Peru, for example, junior officers turned in the late 1960s from fighting insurgent leftist guerrillas to promoting a military politics and language of revolution including agrarian reform, Indian emancipation, and worker cooperatives under General Juan Velasco Alvarado. Meanwhile, a historically conservative Catholic Church could produce a Gustavo Gutiérrez, a priest whose social action experiences with poor people in the late 1960s and early 1970s inspired the language of liberation theology. Of course, Peru was not the only example, and transnational encounters also mattered. The 1968 conference of Latin American bishops in Medellín, not simply a response to Vatican II but also, and more deeply, a leadership response to grassroots religious social action experiences in humble communities, was fundamental in the turn toward a language of preferential option for the poor.

Beyond the details of specific cases, a compelling conceit shaped the political and cultural moment of the 1960s/1970s, especially among dissident intellectuals and youth: the idea of a “heroic state”

and a “heroic pueblo.” Of course, the idea of state-led reform to usher in a new era of transformation that would liberate the pueblo had prior roots. The Mexican Revolution; the rise of populist leader-heroes with mass followings, such as Lázaro Cárdenas and Juan Domingo Perón in the 1930s and 1940s; the spread of projects of state-led industrialization in the middle third of the century—all testify that the myth of a heroic state did not come on the scene in a sudden big bang in the 1960s. Likewise, the idea of a combative pueblo that would mobilize heroically to demand rights and create a new society of justice for *los de abajo* also did not arise out of nowhere. Nonetheless, it was in the 1960s/1970s moment that notions of a heroic state and a heroic pueblo forging a social liberation—especially for workers, peasants, and urban migrants—synergized and fired a new political imagination. New utopias, demands, and mobilizations inspired many youths and intellectuals. (For an astute panoramic analysis of Latin America’s 1968 moment of youth and student politics, including the nuances of relations with workers and between “Old” and “New” Lefts, see Gould 2009.)

Even in defeat, as military dictatorships repressed citizens, among them many young people and intellectuals now considered the antinational internal enemy, such ideas did not suddenly disappear. As Salvador Allende put it in his eloquent radio farewell on September 11, 1973, “History is ours, and it is made by the people [*los pueblos*].”

Although the focus here is on troublesome youths and intellectuals, it may be worth noting that even in the more conservative and paternalistic social sectors, the idea of the heroic state embarked on development projects to transform society was influential. The military regimes that spread

over South America in the 1960s and 1970s typically offered a heroic official story of saving their societies from subversion and Communism and disorder. Their doctrines of national security did not necessarily preclude projects of state-led development or physical monuments testifying to a future of geopolitical and economic greatness. The Itaipu Dam at the confluence of Brazil and Paraguay was an extreme example. Other kinds of monuments were more abstract—for example, the statistics of growth, consumer acquisition, and alleged economic “miracles” of Brazil and Chile in the 1970s. In short, the ups and downs and transformations of the twin conceits of heroic state and heroic pueblo did not march in lockstep.

Nonetheless, the 1960s/1970s moment of hope gave way. It had rested on the complementary yet competing nature of the conceits of heroic action by the state and the pueblo, that is, from above and below. The crushing military dictatorships that spread over much of South America came down hard on youths and intellectuals, among others, as they redefined troublesome citizens into war enemies. Political projects had failed. Utopia had turned into illusion. Elsewhere, the moment also gave way while reflecting specific histories and struggles. In Mexico, for example, the 1968 massacre of student demonstrators at Tlatelolco undermined the PRI’s particular version of the heroic state conceit—a paternalistic state fulfilling its revolutionary legacy to a needy pueblo that had once risen up in revolution. The credibility of such a framework, already wobbly, crashed hard, especially among youths and intellectuals. By the 1980s, as debt crisis and neoliberal ascendancy took hold from Mexico to South America and produced a “lost decade” of economic shrinkage and social deterioration, the epic conceits of earlier times seemed remote and

unrealistic—not a narrative of heroism and liberation, but a prologue to failure and suffering.

Yet, what destroys some possibilities and ideas can open up others. A second moment emerged. New social actors and new social values, less stifled by the politics and parties of another era, can arise. In a second moment, the “long” 1980s that spilled into the 1990s, Latin American sensibilities among troublesome youths and intellectuals shifted toward the post-heroic. The post-heroic state would not lead the way to the promised land of economic development or social liberation. The state, even the post-dictatorship states haunted by the constraints of democratic transition paths and neoliberalism, would step aside and defer to the market. The post-heroic pueblo also turned out not necessarily as combative and resilient and politically organized as once thought. It would not forge a clear path to political and social emancipation. Such transitions to a post-heroic sensibility and the attendant disillusion were especially notable, of course, in the Southern Cone transitions from dictatorship. (See, e.g., Paley 2001, Moulian 1997, and Winn 2004 for the case of Chile.) But they extended as well to the politics of civil war regions, for example, the decline of heroic conceits by the Left and eventually the Right during the Shining Path war and the Fujimori collapse in Peru during the 1980s and 1990s. (For analyses encompassing both coast and highlands, and grassroots as well as elite politics, see, e.g., Burt 2007, Degregori 2000, Stern 1998.)

Yet, the era of a post-heroic state and a post-heroic pueblo did not preclude strong social mobilizations that caught the imagination of critical youths and intellectuals. On the contrary, the 1980s was also the era of “new social

movements.” Newly visible and newly assertive actors—for example, middle-class and poor women, the urban poor in their shantytown neighborhoods, indigenous peoples, human rights victims and activists—came on the scene. The key actors were not reducible to the categories of worker or peasant. New values and new languages of rights—for example, human rights, women’s rights, native peoples’ rights—came to the fore as forceful priorities. New struggles—for example, a struggle for democracy, and against the misinformation and impunity that accompanied state terror regimes—also came to the fore.

The post-heroic moment, in short, was also a moment of emancipation that fired the imagination. The failure of past utopias meant that action, thought, and the identity of social protagonists were less tethered and less stifled by the political parties and transformational schemes of the earlier era. A certain kind of optimism and return to the idea of a struggle of liberation could reemerge, now within a context of the plurality of grassroots struggles and demands for dignity and inclusion, rather than an orderly master scheme of liberation. This was a kind of self-making process of identity formation and liberation. (For contemporaneous case study analysis and theorization, see, e.g., Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Massolo 1992.)

By the 2000s and into our time, however, a third sensibility has begun to take hold: perplexity. The urgent question is, “What now?” The sense of perplexity is rooted not only in disillusion with earlier schemes of liberationist utopia in the 1960s/1970s moment. It also reflects the weight of persistent socioeconomic inequality and the awareness of the modest impact of the social movement mobilizations and pressure from below that had seemed

promising in the long 1980s. By the current era, when neoliberalism, globalization, and constrained democratic transition seemed to have undermined the prospects of major change through creative self-making agency from below by new social actors, Latin America—particularly the “troublesome” youths and intellectuals who dare to dream of something better—arrived at the moment of the question without an answer: “What now?”

To be sure (as noted earlier when comparing Nicaragua and Chile), not all regions marched in tight step to the same chronologies. More important, countercurrents could also arise. The first decade of the twenty-first century produced a substantial countercurrent, a kind of parenthesis between the disillusion of the 1990s and the current moment of perplexity. A new cycle of left political turns and social mobilizations took hold and drew attention. One variant was the notion that radical leaders such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador would promote, with popular support and mobilization, a twenty-first-century socialism and (in the latter two countries) an intercultural democracy that would decolonize internal social relations of power and education. In solidarity with Cuba, they would presumably create an international counterweight to neoliberal capitalism. Another variant was the notion that leftist leaders in the former military dictatorship countries, such as Lula (Luis Inácio Lula da Silva) in Brazil, Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández in Argentina, and perhaps Michelle Bachelet in her first presidential term in Chile, could ride the wave of popular demand for a society of well-being beyond neoliberalism, despite working within the constraints of global capitalism. Both at leadership levels and in street mobilizations and voting

returns, the “Pink Tide” moment had arrived.

Yet the potential for disillusion was not far below the surface. As Fernando Coronil (2011) presciently observed, the new emergence of the Left was precarious, haunted by a profound paradox. A future of expectation had taken hold in societies where the idea of the future itself was in doubt. Latin America’s “crisis of futurity” (260) meant that the Left’s resurgence and even its own future might prove fleeting. Yet, people insisted on the right to a better future with dignity. In this new context, utopias and concomitant struggles would continue to inspire social actors, but what they also sought was the ability to “dream their futures without fear of waking up” (264).

In recent years, the falling apart of the Chinese-driven commodity boom, the resurgence of conservative politics, the magnitude of corruption exposés and the Odebrecht scandal, all have contributed to the sense that, indeed, we cannot yet dream “without fear of waking up.” The moment of hope, a welcome detour from the disillusion one could already perceive in the 1990s, gave way to perplexity: What now?

One can exaggerate the bleak side of the “what now” moment. Renewals of creativity, agency, mobilization, and hope happen, and these testify to the imagination of youths and intellectuals, among others, who refuse complacency. Such agency seems most authentic and real on a small scale, at the level of microinitiatives, rather than scaling up into a larger sense of hope. On the one hand, such initiatives have a larger significance than meets the eye. They can transmit progressive values and yearnings into the larger culture and feed a national imagination that again demands a more inclusive future, respectful of

rights and critical of social injustice. The remarkable recent study by Víctor Vich (2015) of art and culture in Peru in the wake of political violence and atrocity—the making of an insistent human rights sensibility, notwithstanding state lethargy and hostility—is an excellent example. Elsewhere, the potential of creative street culture performance and organizing to seep into the wider environment of political demand and expectation has also been notable. Consider, for example, the impact of youth taking to the streets to demand quality education without debt in Chile, or more recently, to demand that a botched plebiscite on the Colombian peace accord not shut down a possible future of peace.

At the same time, however, such moments of hope and creativity contend with a larger sense of perplexity and disillusion that can feed conservative and self-defeating sensibilities—the sense that the world of social interaction is fundamentally predatory, that security against criminals and gangs is the overwhelming public policy concern of citizens, and that nearly all elites, of any ideological persuasion, fail to resist the allure of corruption. The damage caused by the Odebrecht scandal is not limited to the economic sum total of nefarious direct effects on public works and revenues. It also includes the consequences for belief in a politics of future possibility within societies of inequality and injustice. Corruption and the attendant white-collar political criminality have become part of the current moment of perplexity.

No formulaic answer can respond to the question, “What now?” In some ways, the dilemma is global rather than exclusively Latin American. The election of Donald Trump as president of the United States has created an extreme caricature, a kind of theater of the absurd and dangerous, of the fact that perplexity has gone global. In

a sense, the answer has yet to be written—by a myriad of social actors, not simply intellectuals or youths.

Yet for two reasons, the current moment of questioning without the security of a convincing answer is not altogether depressing. First (and as noted above), even if micro-level initiatives do not always scale up into a confident scheme of liberation, they can transmit critique and aspiration into the wider culture of yearning and insistence. In that sense, they keep hope and social demand alive.

Second, as intellectuals we know that perplexity, the sense of not knowing, has a positive dimension. It drives people to formulate new questions, to insist on new social issues, to reach for new creative insights. As the late Fernando Coronil demonstrated in his own remarkable essay on “the future in question,” we have arrived at a moment when it is both sobering and exciting to study Latin America, and to dream of an inclusive future of dignity.

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Anti-racist Struggles in Latin America

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Black and Indigenous Lives Matter: LASA-Ford Special Grants for Research on Racism in Latin America

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During the tenth cycle of the Ford-LASA Special Projects grants, which are intended to support transregional research initiatives, LASA awarded grants to two initiatives that brought together activists and scholars involved in antiracist research and action in Latin America and the United States.

One of the awards helped fund a meeting of the research teams involved in a multiyear research project of the Red de Acción e Investigación Anti-Racista (RAIAR, the Antiracist Research and Action Network) that began in 2014. The project, entitled "When Rights Ring Hollow: Racism and Anti-Racist Horizons in the Americas," encompassed seven cases/countries across the Americas: Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala, Colombia, Mexico, Mapuche mobilization in Chile, and the United States. The central hypothesis of this research project was that a successful rights-based frame of black and indigenous movements for recognition, advancement, and redress—in place for at least three decades—had run its course, and that a phase of dramatic across-the-board expansion of formally recognized black and indigenous rights since the 1980s was coming to an end. This closure was particularly relevant for struggles for racial justice, because black and indigenous rights often have been conceived and deployed as the anchor of antiracist struggle. As Charles Hale, Pamela Calla, and Leith Mullings explain in their recent article on RAIAR: "When we formulated this two-part 'end of an era' research hypothesis in the course of 2014, we could not have fathomed the

horribly amplified confirmation that history would soon deliver, perhaps most evidently in the United States. Donald Trump's 2016 election and the ugly racial animus that his campaign unleashed in the U.S. have parallels in each of the six other sites of struggle in our study."¹ Two of the most innovative aspects of the research project undertaken by RAIAR—its Americas-wide comparative scope and the concerted attempt to place indigenous and Afro-descendant experiences and perspectives into a single analytical lens—have been rendered prescient by the politics of racial backlash that seems to be accompanying Latin America's current "right turn," notably in Brazil.

Another LASA-Ford award helped fund the international workshop "Insurgencies: Police Violence and Pedagogies of Resistance in the Americas" in New York City, which brought together activists and established and emerging scholars in the field of racialized policing practices in the Americas. The workshop sought to advance transnational collaborative research on the lived experiences of state terror and the radical pedagogies of resistance that emerge from such contexts. The scholars and activists involved in this project sought to reframe the debate about police violence and democracy. Their point of departure was the fact that the racialized aspect of this particular form of state violence remains systematically obscured. In the wake of the protests that emerged in Ferguson, Missouri, following the killing of Michael Brown, and the surge to prominence of the various organizations

involved in the Movement for Black Lives (of which Black Lives Matter is the most well-known), we know that the United States lacks federal data on the number of people killed by police, a gap that has begun to be partially filled by websites such as “The Counted.”² Meanwhile, police in Brazil have killed nearly as many people (most of them black and poor) in the past five years as U.S. police have killed during the past 30 years.³ Rather than seeing killings by the police as a symptom of democratic failure, these scholars and activists argue that police violence is part of a racialized regime of rights in which black and indigenous populations are regarded as enemies of the state, and their lives are consequently made disposable.⁴ Probing the question of scholarly and activist responses to state terror, they raise crucial questions about what justice looks like, and who can deliver it, when the law itself is deeply compromised by a racialized regime of disposability.

The essays in this dossier are drawn from both of these projects. Rigoberto Ajcalón Choy’s contribution shows how extractivist economic projects in contemporary Guatemala serve to reinforce and cement existing ethnoracial hierarchies. He also argues that the criminalization of indigenous protests that challenge the presence of mining companies and other extractivist industries in their ancestral lands demonstrates the hollowness of the multicultural rights that were enshrined after the Peace Accords and end of the armed conflict. The essay by Héctor Nahuelpán and Jaime Antimil also focuses on the dangers that neoliberal extractivist projects pose for the survival of indigenous Mapuche people in Chile, but they situate these contemporary economic projects—which also criminalize Mapuche dissent and brand Mapuches as “terrorists”—within the *longue durée* of a colonial

political project to subdue the Mapuche and take over their lands. Mariana Mora’s essay on Mexico, meanwhile, situates the massacre of the 43 students in Ayotzinapa in 2014 in light of the indigenous identity of many of the victims and their families. As an anthropologist who participated in a study of the psychosocial effects of the massacre, Mora interviewed relatives of the indigenous victims. She raises key questions about how indigenous victims of serious violations of human rights can gain justice and truth given the still-incipient nature of discussions in Mexico about the role of racism and other historical exclusions in the many forms of violence that the country is experiencing. Raquel Luciana de Souza’s essay focuses on the nexus of race, policing, and violence in Salvador, Bahia, as illustrated by the Cabula Massacre by military police in 2015, which killed at least 12 people and left 3 wounded. Her essay tackles head-on how the racialized character of policing in Salvador is obscured by the fact that most of the police officers performing statehood daily are poor and quite often black. Finally, the powerful essay coauthored by Débora Maria Silva, of the Mães de Maio movement, and Jaime Alves describes the continued operation of a “machine of death,” that is, police killings of residents of impoverished urban communities in Brazil. In response to genocidal state violence, activists such as the Mães de Maio are deploying what they call a “mothering politics,” which counterposes to the politics of death an “ethics of life” that gives a voice to their dead. As Nahuelpán and Antimil argue in their essay, in an observation that applies to all the essays collected here, antiracist struggles by black and indigenous peoples throughout the hemisphere are literally struggles for life: of both human beings and the planet.

Notes

- ¹ Charles R. Hale, Pamela Calla, and Leith Mullings, “Race Matters in Dangerous Times: A Network of Scholar-Activists Assesses Changing Racial Formations across the Americas and Mobilizes against Renewed Racist Backlash,” *NACLA Report on the Americas* 49, no. 1 (2017): 81–89.
- ² “The Counted: People Killed by the Police in the US,” *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database>. See also Fatal Force, *Washington Post*, https://www.washingtonpost.com/policeshootings/?utm_term=.84e9efca0e30.
- ³ These statistics were compiled by the Brazilian Public Safety Forum, <http://www.forumseguranca.org.br/>.
- ⁴ See Jaime Amparo Alves, “From Necropolis to Blackpolis: Necropolitical Governance and Black Spatial Praxis in São Paulo, Brazil,” *Antipode* 46, no. 2 (2014): 323–339. ■

Luchas indígenas en Cubulco y Rabinal, Baja Verapaz, Guatemala, en el contexto del multiculturalismo neoliberal

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Después del movimiento multiculturalista iniciado en los años 90s, las personas indígenas de ascendencia Maya Achi de Rabinal y Cubulco, municipios de Baja Verapaz, al norte de Guatemala, previeron un escenario político nacional prometedor que era propicio para avanzar en sus luchas principalmente por el reconocimiento de sus derechos, la autonomía política y la justicia social. Esta época creaba un ambiente de expectativas para estos pobladores que fueron víctimas del conflicto armado interno en los años 80 y el desplazamiento forzado por la construcción de la hidroeléctrica Chixoy a finales de los años 70.

Este ensayo es una síntesis de un trabajo de investigación que realicé con el apoyo de Irma Alicia Velásquez en los municipios de Rabinal y Cubulco, Baja Verapaz en el marco del proyecto “Cuando los derechos suenan vacíos: Racimos y horizontes políticos en las Américas” de la Red de Acción en Investigación Antirracista. Para esta investigación entrevisté alrededor de 50 personas, incluyendo a la población víctima, los líderes de organizaciones locales y las autoridades de la alcaldía indígena, así también a ladinos de clase media, profesionales y extranjeros. Este trabajo empezó en marzo del 2015 y finalizó en abril del 2016. El argumento principal de la investigación es que: (1) el nuevo régimen de gobernanza ha propiciado el emplazamiento de capital nacional y extranjero, especialmente en lo que respecta a la industria extractiva en comunidades indígenas, y (2) que esto constituye uno de los medios por el cual se puede analizar las complejidades del racismo institucional en Guatemala en la época del multiculturalismo.

En Guatemala el multiculturalismo se materializó en la ratificación del convenio No. 169 de la Organización internacional

del Trabajo, la declaración universal de los derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas de la ONU y la firma de los Acuerdos de Paz en 1996, principalmente el Acuerdo de Identidad y Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas en el que por primera vez en la historia de Guatemala se reconocía el carácter multicultural del país, entre otros. Sin embargo, a pesar de este amplio marco de reconocimiento multicultural, los pobladores se enfrentan con restricciones en el ejercicio o demanda de sus derechos, a la vez que surge un patrón sistemático de criminalización y violencia que incluye capturas, intimidación y encarcelamiento de sus liderazgos locales.

Este nuevo régimen de gobernanza conocido como multiculturalismo neoliberal presenta varias paradojas. Primero, el multiculturalismo neoliberal reconoció derechos e identidades indígenas; sin embargo, propició paralelamente una ola de reformas neoliberales tales como las concesiones de los bienes del estado, la privatización de los servicios básicos, el Tratado del libre Comercio (2005) y la creación de un marco legal para la actividad extractiva (1997). Todo esto no hacen más que perpetuar la marginalización económica y política de estos pueblos indígenas. Segundo, se constata una ambivalencia en el discurso sobre la unidad nacional por parte de la elite económica nacional y de los ladinos de clase media. Existe un esfuerzo generalizado en enfatizar en que “no hay indígenas y ladinos, sino todos somos guatemaltecos.” Este discurso alienta un espacio de unidad étnica, pero no hay ninguna intención de dismantelar las relaciones de poder y los privilegios raciales en el ámbito económico y político nacional. Además impide el reconocimiento de particularidades jurídicas como la reforma al artículo 203 de la Constitución Política

de la República de Guatemala relacionado al sistema jurídico indígena.

Todo esto se desarrollan en un contexto complejo en el que intervienen otros factores históricos que también limitan el ejercicio pleno de los derechos, como por ejemplo, la permanencia de las prácticas de racismo cotidiano, el racismo institucional, el patriarcado (que incluye la violencia de género), y la criminalización de las reivindicaciones políticas. Esto contribuye a la exacerbación de la pobreza, la permanencia de las estratificaciones socio-raciales y de relaciones serviles en los municipios Rabinal y Cubulco, Baja Verapaz.

Las consecuencias del “desarrollo” en el caso Chixoy, así como del conflicto armado interno en la vida de los pobladores Maya Achi, ofrece un espacio para profundizar en el conocimiento de la experiencia de estas poblaciones con relación a las controversias del desarrollo y la agresividad de los proyectos neoliberales en la actualidad en áreas de población mayoritariamente indígena. Así mismo ofrece un análisis importante de las complejidades de las estructuras de poder histórico que aun operan en la sociedad que no permiten lograr el ejercicio pleno de los derechos reconocidos en las últimas décadas.

Desaparición forzada, racismo institucional y pueblos indígenas en el caso Ayotzinapa, México

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En el transcurso del mes de abril 2017 se publicará un diagnóstico sobre las principales afectaciones psicosociales de los ataques del 26 y 27 de septiembre, 2014, en la ciudad de Iguala, estado de Guerrero, México en que fueron desaparecidos 43 estudiantes de la normal rural Raúl Isidro Burgos, conocida como Ayotzinapa, asesinados tres de sus compañeros y heridos 40, algunos de gravedad. Desde los días posteriores a los actos violentos, el caso de Ayotzinapa ha detonado respuestas masivas de solidaridad en todo el hemisferio y en otras regiones del mundo. A pesar de las movilizaciones multitudinarias, los esfuerzos incansables de los familiares, junto con sus abogados, incluyendo activar la participación de actores clave de organismos internacionales de los derechos humanos que pocos casos logran conseguir, aún se desconoce el paradero de los normalistas indígenas y campesinos. El diagnóstico, elaborado en respuesta a las recomendaciones emitidas por uno de estos actores, el Grupo Interdisciplinario de Expertos Independientes (GIEI) de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, busca contribuir información empírica relevante para elaborar mecanismos de atención a las víctimas de los hechos de Iguala a partir de lo que es significativo para las propias víctimas.¹ Publico aquí elementos del documento relacionados con los familiares que pertenecen a pueblos indígenas dado su relevancia en aportar a discusiones aun incipientes en México sobre cómo víctimas indígenas de violaciones graves a los derechos humanos señalan el papel que tienen el racismo y otras exclusiones históricas en los impactos de los sucesos, junto con las prácticas culturales que les ayudan a continuar en sus luchas por la justicia y la verdad.

Aunque estudios que identifican los sentidos de los agravios, los impactos

y expresiones de resiliencia de víctimas indígenas y afro-descendientes en casos de graves violaciones a los derechos humanos se han realizado en otros países de latinoamericana, particularmente en Colombia y Guatemala, es un campo poco explorado en México.² Ello a pesar de la crisis de violencia extrema que azota el país desde hace más de una década, incluyendo en regiones indígenas. En el caso concreto de Ayotzinapa, numerosas publicaciones, estudios y notas periodísticas resaltan el hecho de que las víctimas son campesinos de las regiones más empobrecidas del país, pero pocos detallan que una parte de los familiares pertenecen a los pueblos indígenas na savi (mixteco), me’phaa (tlapaneco), nahua y huave.

Como antropóloga fui invitada a participar –junto con tres psicólogas sociales y un médico– a realizar el estudio coordinado por la organización mexicana, Fundar Centro de Análisis e Investigación. Visibilizar las afectaciones y mecanismos de afrontamiento propios de las víctimas indígenas fue un reto significativo, no solo por los pocos referentes nacionales sobre el tema, sino porque no existe una línea tan marcada entre víctimas campesinos e indígenas, por lo contrario, existe un entorno compartido de extrema marginación, incluyendo experiencias de actos de violencia física, exclusiones socio-económicas y discriminaciones de distintos índoles.³ Tanto los familiares mestizos como indígenas describieron experiencias de violencias estructurales y físicas de su pasado para explicar como han vivido los sucesos de Iguala así como el tipo de trato denigrante que han sufrido en sus interacciones con funcionarios públicos durante las investigaciones del caso. En ese sentido, es relevante entender que para la mayoría de los familiares de los jóvenes normalistas los hechos del 26 de septiembre no figuran como un acto violento aislado

del conjunto de las experiencias de vida, sino se insertan en una acumulación de violencias a lo largo de sus vidas.

¿Dado este terreno compartido de exclusiones sistemáticas y de violencias estructurales, cómo entonces aproximarnos a las afectaciones desde los sentidos específicos que otorgan los familiares que pertenecen a pueblos indígenas? En México, hablar una lengua indígena se utiliza en los censos oficiales para determinar la identidad indígena, por lo tanto el factor lingüístico resulta ser el punto de entrada más evidente. Ninguna de las reuniones con las instancias gubernamentales que los familiares han tenido a lo largo de más de dos años ha incluido el acceso a un interprete para que ellos se puedan expresar en su lengua materna y entender todo lo comunicado en español. Sin embargo, las exclusiones derivadas de la negación a sus derechos lingüísticos fue solo un aspecto de un racismo institucional más amplio señalado por los familiares. No solo resaltaron las condiciones de pobreza extrema, sino las formas en que funcionarios públicos intentan manipular la falta de dominio del español y el hecho de que viven en regiones aisladas, como si estas condiciones les hicieran tener pocas capacidades mentales. Para ofrecer tan solo un ejemplo, en el diagnóstico se incluye un extracto de una entrevista en que un familiar nahua interpreta porque distintos funcionarios públicos han insistido en ofrecerle dinero por la desaparición de su hijo a pesar de que él repite que no quiere dinero, quiere conocer dónde se encuentra y qué pasó:

“Pues para mi es parte del gobierno. [Una funcionaria pública] claro dijo que nos va a llevar con Osorio Chong [Secretario de Gobernación], ‘tan trabajando juntos pues. Por eso ella hace el ‘favor’ de que me lleve el dinero. [Osorio Chong le dijo] dale

muchas palabras, coméntale para enredarlo un poco, vas a ver que así va a aceptar ese dinero. Yo no tengo mucho estudio, solo hasta 3er año de primaria. Pensaba que [como campesinos indígenas] que muy fácil nos podía convencer... Ya no saben qué inventar más, piensan que nosotros como campesinos y gente indígena que con sus palabras ya nos convencieron.”

Las familiares indígenas apuntaron a su vez hacia mecanismos propios de afrontamiento, lo que les da la fuerza y el ánimo para seguir luchando. Psicólogos sociales señalan que la desaparición forzada genera lo que llaman un duelo alterado dado que se desconoce si el ser querido sigue vivo o está muerto, por lo tanto no se puede acomodar la ausencia. Esta incertidumbre extrema coloca a los familiares en un espacio liminal, entre seguir con la esperanza que sus seres queridos están vivos y el temor que no sea el caso. De cara a estas angustias, los familiares de los desaparecidos han trazado una ruta que trasciende la división marcada entre los espacios en sus pueblos en que se vela por los muertos y los dedicados a los vivos. Aunque siguen luchando por su aparición con vida, han optado por recurrir a los rezos y ofrendas en sus hogares y en lugares sagrados para cuidar las almas y los espíritus de sus hijos, independientemente del estado en que se encuentran. Activan prácticas, sobre todo las ofrendas, que protegen las almas de sus hijos, que piden la intervención de las potencias sagradas para que tengan la fuerza para salir del peligro y encuentren su camino a casa. Al mismo tiempo, los rezos y las ofrendas les otorgan fuerza a los familiares y los protege frente a los peligros que enfrentan como parte de la búsqueda por sus hijos.

Este tipo de elementos plasmados en el diagnóstico –producto de un estudio interdisciplinario elaborado con la

participación activa de las víctimas– coloca como aspecto fundamental de las discusiones sobre el caso las formas en que el racismo institucional y estructural intensifican como las víctimas indígenas viven la desaparición forzada de sus hijos y ofrece información para que los propios familiares fortalezcan determinadas prácticas culturales que les continúan dando fuerza. ¿De qué manera hablar del racismo como parte de las afectaciones de casos de desaparición forzada genera nuevas estrategias jurídico-políticas y abre otras exigencias de cara al estado? ¿De qué forma explicitar las prácticas culturales propias puede potencializar los mecanismos de afrontamiento de los familiares? Las respuestas a este tipo de preguntas permiten seguir haciendo un uso crítico y ampliado del derecho como parte de la lucha por la justicia y la verdad en el caso de los jóvenes normalistas de Ayotzinapa y miles de otros casos de desaparición forzada en México.

Notas

¹ El GIEI publicó dos informes, el primero en septiembre 2015 y el segundo en abril 2016. Como parte de las recomendaciones de este segundo informe, sugiere que se crea un equipo independiente para realizar un estudio del impacto psicosocial y en la salud en las víctimas del caso Ayotzinapa con la finalidad de articular un programa de atención a las víctimas, de acuerdo a los distintos procesos que han vivido y sus necesidades particulares. Ambos informes se pueden consultar en línea. El primer informe: <http://redtdt.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Informe-ayotzi.pdf> ; el segundo, <https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/actividades/giei/giei-informeayotzinapa2.pdf>.

² Dichos avances incluyen publicaciones sobre reparaciones y pueblos indígenas y afro-descendientes. Referirse a: N. Gómez, “Indigenous Peoples and Psychosocial Reparation: The Experience with Latin American Indigenous Communities”, en *Reparations for Indigenous Peoples*:

Rebellion in the Brazilian Graveyard: Our Dead Have a Voice!

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International and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Federico Lenzerini (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); F. Lenzerini, “Reparations for Indigenous Peoples in International and Comparative Law”, en *Reparations for Indigenous Peoples*; Red Latinoamericana de Antropología Jurídica, *Formas de incorporación del tratamiento diferencial a víctimas de pueblos indígenas en procesos de justicia transicional en Latinoamérica: Memoria analítica*, Mesa 16, agosto 5–6 de 2010 (RELAJU, 2010); C. Rodríguez Garavito y Y. Lam, *Etnorreparaciones: La justicia étnica colectiva y la reparación a pueblos indígenas y comunidades afrodescendientes en Colombia* (Bogotá: Centro de Estudios de Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad, Dejusticia, 2010); L. Viaene, “Voices from the Shadows: The Role of Cultural Contexts in Transitional Justice Processes Maya Q’eqchi’ Perspectives from Post-Conflict Guatemala”, Tesis doctoral, Ghent University, Belgium, 2010.

³ Para leer sobre las historias de vida de los normalistas desaparecidos, asesinados y heridos, y sus familiares, referirse al libro, *Ayotzinapa, la travesía de las tortugas: La vida de los normalistas antes del 26 de septiembre de 2014* (Ciudad de México: Ediciones Proceso, 2015). ■

Although Brazil has not been in a formal war since the military conflict with Paraguay (1864–1870), when the Brazilian Army joined forces with its Argentinean and Uruguayan counterparts in exterminating half of the Paraguayan population, there is a permanent war against the poor and Afro-Brazilian population. Brazil kills more civilians than any other country in “peacetime,” and although the police are not responsible for all “casualties,” they are the main face of a delinquent state that supports, sanctions, and carries on extermination policies against the most vulnerable sector of the population. What can we expect from an institution whose lineage can be traced back to the history of colonialism?

Statistics on police killings become obsolete very quickly in Brazil. Brazilians have become sinisterly used to slaughters by the police, at times broadcasted live on prime time TV. Cases abound: five black teens killed with 111 shots fired when passing through a police checkpoint; an individual kidnapped by the police and forced to dig his own grave before being killed; dismembered bodies given to pigs; denial of rescuing wounded “criminals” to the emergency room; and the too-familiar

disappearance of favela residents who later are found in clandestine cemeteries.

The practices of the Brazilian police force supersede the most macabre imagination and turn Brazil into an open graveyard. From the Argentinean border to the north limit with Guyana and Venezuela, Brazil’s expansive territory is a geography of police terror, nightmares, anguish, and community destruction. Faithful to its founding genocide, the Brazilian state’s preferential victims are the indigenous, black, and nonwhite populations, historically crafted as the threat to social order. The numbers are consistent with the Brazilian racial project: according to the Brazilian Forum of Public Security, police kill an average of nine individuals every day. Between 2008 and 2015 the police killed 19,494 civilians. Approximately 45 percent of these deaths were concentrated in the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.¹ Imagine, if you can, a “democratic” society with such normalized levels of violence. What makes police terror so acceptable in Brazil?

Killings by the police are so rampant in Brazil that they account for 15 percent of the already astounding levels of violent deaths that plague the country.



The black movement protest in downtown São Paulo, March 12, 2015. Banner says: “I can’t breathe! Black youth want to live.” Photos by Uneafro-Brasil

In São Paulo, one out of five homicides is committed by the police. In Rio de Janeiro, police are responsible for 15 percent of all murders. Not surprisingly, 79 percent of the victims are poor, *favelado* black youth.² This may explain why the always vibrant and well-articulated Brazilian civil society turns a blind eye to the fate of those perishing in the hands of the police. Who is the subject entitled to police protection anyway? The state is a genocidal machine committed to protecting civil society, and civil society is a predominantly white, bloodthirsty body politic.

A moment in which the bloodthirsty urgings of civil society came into full display was May 2006, when, within the span of one week, approximately 600 individuals were killed by the military police in the periphery of the city and beyond.³ While *Mães de Maio* denounced the slaughter as a deliberate act of state terror, the main narrative in mainstream civil society was that those killed by the police were criminals who did not obey the commander to surrender. Eager to shed blood, state officials, members of the Public Prosecutor's Office, and mass media representatives justified the killings as a "reaction" to terrorist attacks by members of organized crime. The killings of unarmed youth were justified as a preemptive action, and the kidnapping and slaughter of individuals with a criminal record were seen as a final solution to mass incarceration. Anguished parents were prevented from going after the bodies of their children, and their outcries were considered as evidence of their involvement with the PCC, the criminal organization that controls most of São Paulo's periphery. In mainstream society's controlling narrative, the Crimes of May became "The Crimes of PCC," as if the criminal organization's retaliatory violence against



Mães de Maio's protest in downtown São Paulo in the 10th anniversary of the May Massacre, May 2016. Photo by Mães de Maio.

the police would authorize and justify state terrorism.

Ten years later, no police officers have been held accountable for the bloody week, and the Crimes of May figure as nothing but yet another massacre faded from the Brazilian national memory, like other similar events. For instance, April 2016 was the twentieth anniversary of the Eldorado dos Carajás Massacre, when the military police of the northern state of Pará killed twenty-one landless farmworkers protesting for agrarian reform. No justice!⁴ In the same vein, no state officials have been held accountable for the 1992 massacre of 111 prisoners in what came to be known as the Carandiru Massacre.⁵ In fact, as we write this piece, violence is once again breaking out in prisons throughout the country, and at least 134 prisoners have been brutally killed (many of them decapitated) since January 2017.⁶

Despite the struggle to stop the machine of death, killings by the police not only continue but also increase in exponential ways. The May Massacre of 2006 seems to have opened a new phase in policing practices in Brazil. While São Paulo's police *modus operandi* has been exported to other Brazilian states and even to other Latin American countries, the Brazilian army has been deployed to "pacify" urban areas with technologies tested in the U.S.-Israel counter-insurgency programs in Palestine

and Afghanistan. Black bodies destroyed from police helicopters, military tanks invading favelas, and prisons filling up faster than ever are the outcomes of the internationally advertised "pacifying" program of which Rio de Janeiro is a case in point.⁷ It is a white peace; a pale peace; a peace of the cemetery. The corpses left behind after each police operation open the way to real estate foreign investors and international events. Samba, carnival, and *feijoada* seal the spectacle of police terror in this "new" era of massacres.

What pedagogies of resistance are needed to face the persistent and increasing levels of death by the police in impoverished urban communities?⁸ There are multiple strategies and several agendas converging in the urgent matter of stopping mass incarceration and the political assassination of black and poor youth in Brazil. There is also an awareness that police terror is connected to broad practices of racial domination in the Americas, as seen in the exchanging of military technologies among nation-states, and as such the struggle must be politically plural and geographically transnational. From the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States, to the outcries of black women in the peripheries of Santiago de Cali (Colombia), to the protest of parents and teachers demanding the return of the 43 students of Ayotzinapa, to the black movement in São Paulo, there is a shared belief that a solution to our

shared vulnerability to police terror will come from our shared (collective) struggle beyond national boundaries. Because the state will not protect us against the state, traditional pedagogy relying on the system is destined to fail. Our field of struggle is the streets.

In this process, mothers are the main political actors to transform the Americas' zone of death into a demilitarized territory of peace. As in many parts of the continent, in Brazil mothers are the ones going after the disappeared, piecing together scattered bodies, collecting evidences to bring the killers to justice, and mobilizing terrorized communities to honor the dead. Black women's activist labor is what makes life possible in the Brazilian graveyard. To counteract the terrorist state, "fed with the blood of our children," mothering politics emerges as a pedagogical strategy to organize the collective struggle to rescue black and brown lives from the shadows of death.⁹

Unintelligible to white civil society, when demanding that the state bring back the dead—"we want our children back!" "They were taken alive!"—mothers are fighting with the womb (*lutando com o útero*) for an ethics of life that extends the reach of political protest beyond grieving and much beyond legal and financial compensation. That Mães de Maio adopts the motto "*Nossos mortos têm voz*" (Our dead have a voice) indicates the desperate attempt to break civil society's wall of silence, unveil the genocidal structure of the Brazilian state, and "let the dead speak" through their (our) collective praxis.¹⁰ In protests for racial justice, the mothers of the dead, the prisoners coming home, the survivors of police terror, and the terrorized periphery leave a resounding message: If the delinquent state turns Brazil (and the Americas) into a graveyard, we have no

other option but to turn Brazil (and the Americas) into a field of political struggle. Our dead have a voice!

Notes

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¹ Fórum Brasileiro da Segurança Pública, *Anuário brasileiro de Segurança Pública*, São Paulo, 2016.

² Anistia Internacional, "Você matou meu filho!" Relatório anual. Available at <https://anistia.org.br/direitos-humanos/publicacoes/voce-matou-meu-filho/> (accessed November 19, 2016).

³ Condepe, *Crimes de maio* (São Paulo: Conselho Estadual de Defesa dos Direitos da Pessoa Humana da Secretaria da Justiça e da Cidadania de São Paulo, 2006).

⁴ Anistia Internacional, *20 anos do massacre Eldorado dos Carajás*. Available at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/04/the-eldorado-dos-carajas-massacre-20-years-of-impunity-and-violence-in-brazil/> (accessed March 4, 2017).

⁵ Conectas Brasil, *Carandiru Massacre*. Available at <http://www.conectas.org/en/news/46875-carandiru-massacre> (accessed March 2, 2017).

⁶ See BBC, "Brazil Prison Violence: Gangs Clash at Jail Where 26 Died," January 19, 2017. Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-38675696>.

⁷ For an analysis of the relation between domestic and international antiblack security regimes, see Jaime Alves and Joy James, "Imperial Affinities," *Souls* (forthcoming). Rio's pacifying program has been analyzed by João Costa Vargas, "Taking Back the Land: Police Operations and Sport Megaevents

in Rio de Janeiro," *Souls* 15, no. 4 (2013): 275–303; Vera Malaguti Batista, "O Alemão é muito mais complex," *Revista Justiça e Sistema Criminal* 1, no. 1 (2009): 103–125; João Rafael Fabrés, "Pacifying the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro," *Time Magazine*, January 29, 2013.

⁸ This was the main question activists from Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Central America, the United States and Canada engaged with in the First International Workshop on "Pedagogies of Resistance against Police Violence in the Americas." The meeting (and the network generated from there) was possible thanks to a 2016 LASA/Ford Special Project Award. We thank also the participants in the workshop for their insights and critical perspective on the pedagogies presented in the meeting.

⁹ The pedagogies of mothering as politics has been analyzed by, among others, Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment* (New York: Routledge, 1990); Adriana Vianna and Juliana Farias, "A guerra das mães: Dor e política em situações de violência institucional," *Cadernos Pagu* 37 (2016): 79–116; Vilma Reis, "Atuacidos pelo Estado: As políticas de segurança pública implementadas nos bairros populares de Salvador e suas representações (1991–2001)" (unpublished master's thesis, Universidade Federal da Bahia, 2013).

¹⁰ The Mães de Maio are incisive in regarding their lost as the liminal moment of a "new consciousness" not only in terms of questioning heteronormative and white civil society's constructions of "good" motherhood, but also in relation to their gendered racial alterity as favelada black women in Brazilian politics. For Mães de Maio's "luta do útero" see Jaime A. Alves, "Blackpolis: Police Terror and the Struggle for Black Urban Life in Brazil" (University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming). Mourning and pain as political resources for black subject formations have been explored by Sharon Patricia Holland, *Raising the Dead: Readings of Death and (Black) Subjectivity* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), among others. ■

Ethnographic Notes from a War Zone: Surviving and Resisting

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"The State cannot fund extermination." Photo by *Correio da Bahia*, June 13, 2013

In Salvador, Bahia, the police's deadly violence inscribes race into space and, in doing so, produces the city's outskirts as a land in which the state's right to kill is given. A recent case helps to illustrate the police's violent, state-sponsored incursions. The Military Police killed at least 12 people and left 3 wounded on February 6, 2015. According to the police, the shooting happened around 4 a.m. when a group of about 30 men opened fire against the Special Police. The officers had received information that the group was planning to break into a bank branch. The Military Police found an abandoned vehicle during a patrol of the area, and to investigate the complaint, noticed that about 30 men were hiding in a marshland. The criminals opened fire against the patrol and the officers retaliated by injuring 15 men during the confrontation. The injured were transported to the Hospital Roberto Santos, where 12 of them died after being

admitted. However, the Cabula Massacre, as it became known, was much more complicated than the official version of the news media and the police would have us believe. Later investigations showed that police officers not only killed the 12 unarmed men but they also planned the attack as retaliation against drug traffickers who had refused to pay bribes to them. Federal investigations showed that the officers participating in the Cabula Massacre were part of a police-linked death squad. They planted evidence to incriminate the poor and predominantly black youth in Cabula. In fact, the Cabula Massacre is just another story of horror embedded in the Military Police's strategies to govern the social geographies of race and crime in Salvador.

The ways the police deal with the issues of race and violence in Salvador is quite explicit, yet it is hard to grasp at first

when we consider the fact that most of those police officers performing statehood daily are poor, and quite often black. To be a police officer in Bahia is an option for black men without options. There is evidence that often, black males are pushed to become part of the state repressive apparatus because the job market does not offer them many other possibilities. In that sense, they become agents of the state, carrying on a genocidal, white hegemonic project; this often makes it difficult for black activists to unmask and denounce the Brazilian police force and its practices as racially motivated. An ethnographic moment illustrates the precarious and complex work of race in informing policing practices in the city. Black police officers are increasingly serving as private guards after their official shift. They work for wealthy businessmen, who worry that poor black beggars will endanger their work. Police officers kill black youth in the favela during their official duty as officers, and they also kill them when off duty as private guards.

Studies have consistently demonstrated that the high rates of black male deaths, often perpetrated by the military police, have become significant enough to regard as genocide. Prisons throughout the country are overcrowded, as the Brazilian state has been investing heavily in the prison industrial complex and the mass incarceration of blacks as a solution to keep the good (read white) citizens of this country safe. Meanwhile, the recent trends of violent mob attacks on men and women (who are judged and lynched, instantly sentenced to death in the streets) have been rationalized by "specialists" as a collective manifestation of the population's frustration with the judicial system, which is supposedly slow and inefficient in punishing criminals. In the last two years, the Military Police killed 597 people in

Bahia, most of these deaths taking place in the extremely poor neighborhoods of Salvador.¹ And killings by the police are not the only factor of victimizations. According to Unesco's Map of Violence, Bahia is one of the leading states in violent death of black young men. In the last ten years, from 2002 to 2012, at least 25,000 people, mostly black young men, were killed in the city. In 2002, the homicide rate among blacks was 12.5 per 100,000 inhabitants. Among whites the rate was 4.5 per 100,000 inhabitants in Bahia, that is, the chances for a black to be a murder victim were 2.7 times higher than for a white.² Among black youth (15–24 years) the murder rate rises to 23 per 100,000. Among young whites the rate is 6.3 per 100,000. Violence is a leading cause of death among adolescents. In Salvador, between 2000 and 2004, of the total of 2,409 people murdered in Salvador, 2,076 were black or brown, 20 were of another color, and 313 were not identified.³ The spatial distribution of violent deaths in Salvador reveals a pattern that strongly correlates poverty, race, and homicidal violence. With no exception, the top five most violent neighborhoods in the last four years are predominantly black and poor districts of the south side of the city.

The population in these areas is an average of 90 percent black, 7 percent white, and 3 percent other or unidentified. What this data suggests is that, although Salvador is portrayed as a violent city in which anyone would be in danger, it is the black body that poses a permanent threat to the harmony of the city. Racial geographies are created and delineated by socioeconomic disparities as much as by racialized police terror, which means the police inscribe racial meanings in the space and by doing so create “black” spaces. After all, “police brutality is the concrete result of how race and urban space are crystallized

in the dominant representation.”⁴ The racialization of urban space is fed by the racialization of fear in the city. In such geographies, state authorities argue that the police deploy a tough approach on crime because in these areas “criminality is more intense.” That is a justification that cancels the fact that the police finds more “crimes” in black spaces because the police “looks for” more crime in black spaces. Police practices are also informed/energized by corporate news. News media is particularly efficient in making a cognitive transaction between blackness, criminality, and violence and some particular geographies of Salvador. For many years I have had the daily habit of standing in front of newspaper stands to read the headlines of all the newspapers and purchase some, but mostly analyze which racial groups are portrayed where, and what their portrayal is associated with.

A quick look at the front-page news and images of Salvador's cheap local tabloids is enough to illustrate the cognitive association between blackness and violence in the news. On that particular day, the cover featured several black women. The headlines read “Contabilidade do mal: Mulherada boa de número” (Evil accounting: A bunch of women [who are] good with numbers). I looked at the faces of those five black middle-aged women whose mug shots were shown as evidence of a drug bust in the low-income community in Camaçari and Dias D'Ávila, in the outskirts of Salvador. The language used to describe their circumstances carried a mocking tone, explaining their roles in the drug gang as those who looked after the weapons and were in charge of the finances. The cover featured a particularly demeaning pun, which stated that after the drug bust they now would “have accounting over the time wasted behind bars.”

In fact, I had already seen a live TV broadcast of the moment these women were arrested along their male counterparts the night before. The TV host was particularly scornful in his narrative of the reasons why those women had been arrested. “What a shame!” he uttered. “Look at them, you could never tell that behind that innocent housewife façade there were drug dealers!” The mockery and condemnation of their “misconduct” continued for a several minutes. Black criminalization has become part of everyday life in Brazilian media. These TV hosts become those who provide a racist and twisted analysis of black poverty in the country, condoning police brutality against the so-called criminals. They even encouraged the populace to take measures in their own hands by punishing with severe beatings those who are caught “red-handed” engaging in illicit activities. Does the opening epigraph still hold any strength at this point? What does the portrayal of Salvador as a racial utopia conceal/reveal about the city's regime of racial domination?

Very often, the local tabloid *Massa, feito do seu jeito* (*Massa, crafted your way*)⁵ features black men and women and their involvement with the underground economy of illegal substances and violence. Black people are portrayed bleeding, handcuffed, and being arrested, and their mug shots abound. The front page is crowded with images and big colorful captions to attract the reader's attention. Racialized narratives about the city's geography are cover stories in these tabloids, in which low-income black communities are always associated with criminality, rampant violence, immorality, unlawfulness, gang warfare, drug dealers, crack heads, and all sorts of condemnable behaviors. Ultimately, these pathologized scripts serve to justify or endorse violent

police incursions that often result in black people, particularly young black males, being summarily executed. For young black males, the stereotypes about black criminality have particularly deadly consequences, and my ethnographic data evinces the anxiety of simply exercising the right to exist while black in the “world of carnival.” Scholar Patricia Hill Collins has shown how black bodies (and particularly black women’s bodies) are caged into a signifying system of representation in which they are always/already criminal. These “controlling images,” she argues, justify political domination at large and help to consolidate the ideas that black women are bad mothers and promiscuous and that black men are natural-born criminals.⁶ In Salvador, this racialized regime of representations feeds and gives justification to the genocidal erasure of black bodies from the city.

Yet, in the face of disheartening state inflicted symbolic and physical violence, we resist. I had the opportunity of participating in a meeting organized by several black organizations that joined forces to demand that the police officers involved in the Cabula Massacre be charged for those cold-blooded executions. A young black woman drew my attention when she provided incisive comments when confronting the police high commander in chief in a room full of police officers and black protesters. Amid the chaos and the tense environment filled by many conflicting voices and interests, Leila shouted at the officers, asking an apparently naïve yet incisive question: “Do you know the names of the dead?” She was referring to the 12 young men assassinated by the police days before. Leila’s question held not only an interpellation of a racist state apparatus and its deadly police forces, but also an assertion that those patterns of rendering blacks nameless, and black

death a mundane occurrence, were too familiar to her and to us black protesters. In other words, it was an excruciatingly painful assertion of black intimacy with death. Leila’s assertiveness brings forth the too familiar face of black suffering and white terror, an urgent matter that is at the core of black protests in Salvador. Her challenging utterance points out to the frustrations of black organizations in efforts to make their voices and demands heard. That means that in order to understand contemporary black social movements in Salvador, one has to understand what kind of forces blacks are responding to and what kind of movement is possible in the face of the constrained terrains of black resistance.

Notes

I would like to express my gratitude to LASA-Ford Special Projects, whose support was crucial in gathering activists and scholars from the Americas who are engaged in the critical dialogue and interventions against racialized police brutality.

¹ Secretaria de Segurança da Bahia, Estatísticas. Available at: http://www.ssp.ba.gov.br/arquivos/File/Estatistica_2015/01ESTADOMU_NICIPIO2015.pdf (accessed March 12, 2017).

² Unesco, Mapa da Violência, Brasília, 2003.

³ Secretaria de Segurança da Bahia, Estatísticas. Available at: http://www.ssp.ba.gov.br/arquivos/File/Estatistica_2015/01ESTADOMU_NICIPIO2015.pdf (accessed March 12, 2017).

⁴ João H. Costa Vargas, “Apartheid brasileiro: Raça e segregação residencial no Rio de Janeiro,” *Revista de Antropologia* 48, no. 1 (2005): 35.

⁵ *Massa* – “cool,” also meaning made for the masses.

⁶ Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Sexual Politics: African Americans, Gender, and the New Racism* (New York: Routledge, 2004). ■

La lucha mapuche por la vida frente a un nuevo proyecto racial global

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“Ya no es posible soportar más tiempo la cruel tiranía que sobre nosotros pesa”, afirmaba en 1896 el *logko* (líder) mapuche Esteban Romero en una carta dirigida a Federico Errázuriz, entonces presidente de la República de Chile (Romero 1896). La misiva escrita en los años posteriores al término de las campañas de invasión militar impulsadas por los estados chileno y argentino, no sólo aludía al hambre, los castigos y abusos que vivieron nuestras familias en ese periodo histórico traumático, también las palabras del *logko* Romero fueron reveladoras de las consecuencias históricas de larga duración que ha producido la ocupación colonial del Wallmapu (país mapuche).

Tematizadas grotescamente como “Pacificación de la Araucanía” y “Conquista del Desierto”, ambas campañas militares forjaron una relación colonial que perdura hasta nuestros días. Pues mediante la expropiación de nuestra soberanía política y la imposición de la soberanía estatal y del capital, la continuidad colonial ha tenido como expresiones estructurales el despojo de gran parte del territorio controlado por nuestro pueblo hasta mediados del siglo XIX; su ocupación progresiva con colonos chilenos, europeos y actualmente también por empresas nacionales y transnacionales; la expropiación de nuestros recursos naturales; la subordinación racial de la población, su empobrecimiento y disgregación demográfica a raíz de la reducción y los desplazamientos forzados. Así como el despliegue de un conjunto de “espacios civilizatorios” (misiones, escuelas, fundos, ejército, policía) destinados a “regenerar” a los sobrevivientes del genocidio, para su transformación en sirvientes dóciles del nuevo orden colonial (Nahuelpan 2012).

Actualmente en el contexto chileno las condiciones históricas y estructurales

de la dominación colonial no se han modificado sustancialmente, aunque si se han vuelto más complejas. El tenue giro hacia el multiculturalismo que tuvo como hito a la Ley Indígena 19.253 promulgada en el año 1993, la creación de la Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena (CONADI), la implementación de programas centrados en el reconocimiento de la diferencia cultural (Orígenes, Chile Indígena) y la ratificación del Convenio 169 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT), evidenciaron desde sus inicios sus límites y contradicciones. Entrelazado con las alabanzas a la diversidad cultural, con los discursos culturalistas que promueven el diálogo y respeto “intercultural” o “la identidad” de los pueblos indígenas, los consecutivos gobiernos postdictatoriales (Patricio Aylwin, Eduardo Frei, Ricardo Lagos, Michelle Bachelet, Sebastián Piñera, Michelle Bachelet) dieron continuidad al histórico patrón extractivo y primario-exportador de la economía chilena, profundizando el saqueo, la contaminación y la destrucción ecológica del territorio histórico mapuche. De esta forma los capitales nacionales y transnacionales vinculados a la industria del monocultivo forestal, al rubro hidroeléctrico y energético, acuícola, minero, turístico, entre otros, han empalmado sus intereses con los de aquellos viejos actores latifundistas que se benefician del colonialismo republicano, sin diferir sustancialmente en sus lógicas de desposesión, mercantilización, racialización y destrucción de alternativas de vida.

No obstante la continuidad del estado de ocupación colonial en Wallmapu, las organizaciones mapuche han elaborado diferentes estrategias de lucha por recuperar nuestra soberanía que se encuentra históricamente suspendida. Estas estrategias, dependiendo de los actores en juego, se conjugan, difieren o convergen en

su trato con el estado y el gran capital. En lo que concierne al movimiento mapuche rupturista (Pairican 2014) podemos encontrar su sustento en al menos cinco principios. Primero, la recuperación del territorio y las fuentes de conocimiento, arrebatado y despojado desde la “Pacificación de la Araucanía”. Segundo, la recuperación de la sustentabilidad económica y el mejoramiento de las condiciones de vida material de las comunidades, a través de formas de producción autónomas y colectivas. Tercero, la ruptura con la visión mercantil y usufructuaria de la tierra, retomando principios y lógicas relacionadas al respeto, coexistencia e interdependencia entre vidas humanas y no humanas. Cuarto, el freno al proyecto neoliberal y el capitalismo extractivo, en tanto fuerzas destructoras de las formas de vida y la propia sobrevivencia de las personas. Quinto, la interrogación y ruptura de las jerarquías raciales y patriarcales que se han conformado históricamente y que se reactualizan en el actual contexto. Todos estos principios se vienen desplegando en el marco de formas de movilización autónomas y comunitarias, no exentas de contradicciones en su desarrollo al margen o fuera del campo de acción estatal.

Frente a este panorama, tanto el estado como los grupos de poder regionales, nacionales y transnacionales no se han mantenido inmovilizados. Por el contrario, han elaborado diversas estrategias de contención y contrainsurgencia. El aparato estatal mientras continúa desplegando tibias respuestas en materia indígena, también ha enfocado su acción en debilitar o desarticular aquellas expresiones del movimiento que interrogan el colonialismo histórico y buscan dismantelar las jerarquías raciales que el proyecto neoliberal reproduce y reactualiza: ataque y violencia focalizada

hacia niños y niñas, jóvenes, mujeres y ancianos; criminalización y militarización de comunidades en resistencia, así como el encarcelamiento de autoridades espirituales; descabezamiento de líderes; la búsqueda de adherencia en las comunidades, mediante programas orientados al “desarrollo con identidad”; el sabotaje a las economías de resistencia y a las formas de producción autónomas, entre otras.

Por su parte, las elites económicas trazan su ofensiva concitando un discurso anti-mapuche a través de los medios de comunicación oficiales, oponiéndose a las políticas neoindigenistas de reconocimiento ténue, justificando la acción de grupos paramilitares conformados por sectores latifundistas o presionando para que se decreten estados de excepción en lo que denominan como “zona roja del conflicto”. En este último caso, se trata de acciones y discursos que buscan crear un manto de legalidad e impunidad al estado de excepción de facto que ya se vive en comunidades que impulsan procesos de recuperación territorial.

En este escenario, las expresiones de lucha del movimiento mapuche rupturista no solo cuestionan el colonialismo histórico y el racismo estructural que subyace al despojo territorial, la violencia policial y la criminalización, sino que parecen apuntar a un horizonte alternativo o al menos distinto al actual proyecto racial global. Esto como respuesta a la opresión histórica, pero también como una forma de hacer frente a la destrucción ecológica, la mercantilización de la vida y el nuevo ciclo de deshumanización que viven pueblos indígenas y afrodescendientes. En efecto, aunque la invasión neoliberal ha traído consigo la reformulación de las formas de despojo, racismo y muerte tanto de vidas humanas como no humanas, acentuando

la crisis y destrucción ecológica, también ha dado fundamentos globales a la lucha por la tierra y la preservación de la vida, generando condiciones para el empalme y diálogo con otros movimientos de la sociedad chilena, de Abya Yala y del globo, a la vez que abriendo senderos para una alianza estratégica y el caminar hacia proyectos alternos de vida en común.

Hace algunos años frente a la representación dominante que construía al mapuche como “terrorista”, el poeta Elicura Chihuailaf (2008) sostenía que “nuestra lucha es una lucha por la ternura”. Hoy en día, en tiempos de un nuevo proyecto racial global caracterizado por la reemergencia del ultranacionalismo blanco, la profundización del saqueo y violencia sobre la tierra, de una crisis ecológica sin precedentes y de un nuevo ciclo de odio racial y deshumanización de las vidas indígenas y afrodescendientes, podemos decir que la lucha mapuche y la de nuestros pueblos hermanos no solamente es por la ternura, la autonomía y la autodeterminación, sino ante todo por la vida.

Chumgechi üzejefeli rume,
Chumgechi bagümjefeli rume
Ahtü reke wiño xipaxipagetuan.
Zoy pepiluway ñi piuke, ñi zoy gülam
ñi mogen

Tayu mogen, ta iñ mogen

—Mapuche ülkantun

Aun si me odias de muchas maneras
Aun si me matas de muchas formas.
Al igual que el sol volveré a salir día a día.
Y estará cada vez más preparado mi
corazón para
fecundar mi vida.
Nuestra vida (la de los dos), la de nuestras
vidas.

—Canto Mapuche

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Immigration under the Trump Administration

Beyond the Wall: A Human Rights Perspective on Family and Child Migration from Central America, through Mexico, and across the U.S. Border, and the U.S. Government Response

by MAUREEN MEYER, ADAM ISACSON, and ADRIANA BELTRÁN | WOLA | www.wola.org

The election of Donald Trump has raised innumerable questions about the future of U.S. foreign policy, and Latin America is no exception. President Trump has shown few signs that he will prioritize the United States' relationship with its neighbors in the hemisphere. His approach toward Mexico has been confrontational, threatening the past two decades of improved relations and cooperation between the two countries. Beyond Mexico—where the approach has been driven by domestic economic concerns and anti-immigrant sentiment—detailed indications of a Trump foreign policy toward Latin America have been limited. We have seen few, if any, specifics on drug policy, Colombia's efforts to implement an ambitious peace accord, relations with Cuba, or the situation in Venezuela.

It is the administration's approach to an ostensibly domestic issue—immigration policy—that has the clearest potential to impact dynamics in this hemisphere. On November 9, 2016, millions of people who came to the United States fleeing violence and seeking economic opportunities awoke with a newfound sense of unease that has only worsened as President Trump has followed through on many of his campaign promises to toughen immigration enforcement. Undocumented migrants who have lived in the United States for decades, including many families with mixed immigration status, as well as recent arrivals from Central America—

who account for the largest share of undocumented migration in recent years—are now living in fear.

In mid-2014, Americans were shocked by images of tens of thousands of Central American families—and children traveling alone—crossing Mexico and arriving at the United States border. Border Patrol facilities lacked the capacity to address the humanitarian situation, and the issue generated enormous debate and controversy over the conditions under which migrants were being detained, whether migrants could seek protection in the United States after fleeing violence in their home communities, and over what conditions in Central America were driving this upsurge in migration.

While the issue faded from the headlines, the number of Central American migrants arriving at the U.S. border is again approaching the levels seen in 2014. Although the overall number of migrants apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border has [dropped to early-1970s levels](#), the migration of Central American children and families to the United States—including potential asylum seekers—has remained high, demonstrating that the insecurity many of these individuals face at home has not abated.¹

The Trump administration's push on border security and immigration

enforcement has brought this issue back into the spotlight. However, the president's proposed border buildup is not the answer. Instead, addressing this human rights crisis requires a humanitarian approach that takes an honest look at the factors behind these migration trends, the security reality at the border, and the U.S. response.

This article looks at the latest data on Central American migration, at why children and families are migrating in such large numbers, at the problems and abuse they encounter on their journey through Mexico, and at the treatment they receive in the United States. Each section contains a series of policy recommendations developed by the staff of WOLA, the Washington Office on Latin America, for managing migration in a more humane way, and for addressing the underlying issues that are driving migration from Central America.

More than that, WOLA seeks to affirm the humanity of Central American children and families and other migrants arriving at the U.S. border. Above all, they are human beings facing dangerous situations at home and in their journey, and their situation should command dignity and our compassion.

Migration Patterns in 2016: A Look at the Numbers


The numbers of unaccompanied Central American children and families detained at the U.S. border peaked in June 2014, then fell. But predictably, the numbers are rising again. Between October 2016 and January 2017, Border Patrol [apprehended](#) 21,621 unaccompanied Central American children and 51,410 members of Central American family units (meaning the number of children, parents, or legal

Figure 1

Unaccompanied Children and Family Unit Members Apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico Border

October 2009-January 2017

Unaccompanied Children Family Unit Members



Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, <http://bit.ly/1Yik7t0>

guardians apprehended together).² This was the largest four-month total since the 2014 crisis subsided. In fiscal year 2014 (October 2013–September 2014), Border Patrol apprehended what was at the time a record 113,039 children and family unit members from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (about one in every 270 citizens of those countries), over the course of the year. The total for fiscal 2016 reached 117,300—which exceeds fiscal 2015 by 54,550 people and the former 2014 record by 4,261. Two out of every seven migrants apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border in 2016 were children or families from El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras. Most of the rest were either Mexicans—who made up less than half of all apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border—or adult Central Americans. This does not mean that a new crisis is upon us. Instead, what we are experiencing now is, to use a tired phrase, “the new normal.” [See Figure 1]

The number of children and family members (including from Mexico) encountered at the border in September 2016—the heaviest month of fiscal year 2016—was high, and the numbers grew in the first months of fiscal 2017. What was different was that September’s arrivals did not overwhelm U.S. authorities’ capacities: in contrast to the summer of 2014 there was no footage of children crowding the loading dock at the McAllen, Texas, Border Patrol station, because all were processed and handed over to the Department of Health and Human Services in an orderly manner. [See Figure 2]


Nor is the current increase a sudden or dramatic “wave.” What we have seen for nearly a year and a half is a steady rise: many months of gradual increases in arrivals. While the overall migrant population is smaller, it has rapidly become less Mexican, with fewer men and adults.

Figure 2

U.S. Apprehensions of Unaccompanied Minors and Family Unit Members from Northern Triangle Countries

October 2014-January 2017

Unaccompanied Minors Family Unit Members



Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, <http://bit.ly/1Yik7t0>

Migrants apprehended at the border now increasingly include unaccompanied children and families, the majority from Central America, and who are more motivated by fear of violence than by hope of economic opportunity.

Mexico's Crackdown

In the months immediately following the July 2014 migrant surge, new arrivals of Central Americans plummeted. Much of the drop can be attributed to a U.S.-backed [crackdown](#) by Mexican immigration and police authorities in the country's south, near the border with Guatemala.³ Mexico's "Southern Border Plan," discussed further in section three, curtailed travel atop cargo trains and appeared to disrupt migrant smugglers' operations for months. Mexico's apprehensions of migrants from Central America more than doubled between 2013 and 2015, to heights not seen since the mid-2000s.

Mexico's crackdown after the summer of 2014 drew [criticism](#) from WOLA and other human rights advocates because of documented abuses and the failure to address the protection concerns of children and families who could qualify for asylum or refugee status.⁴ Moreover, the decline in Central American migrants reaching the United States that followed seems to have been temporary.

Migration Increases Again

U.S. apprehensions of children and family members from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras began to increase again in early 2015. Steady monthly growth continued virtually unbroken throughout the year, defying a predicted decrease in

migration in autumn and winter months. December 2015 ended up being the third-highest month on record at the time. Then, for reasons we haven't been able to determine, child and family migration dipped sharply in January and February 2016, only to resume steady increases from March through December—reaching levels exceeding the late 2015 “mini-surge.” Citizens of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras continue to leave their home countries, and in higher numbers than at the height of the 2014 “crisis.” [See Figure 3]

Has Mexico Backed Down?

Some press coverage has [insinuated](#) that the rise in Central American migration to the United States was caused by a slackening of Mexico's crackdown on Central American migrants in its territory.⁵ The numbers at

Mexico's southern border do not support this. While Mexico's apprehensions of Central American migrants dropped by 12 percent between October 2014–September 2015 and October 2015–September 2016, this is a relatively slight decrease. The 153,295 Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans detained at Mexico's southern border in fiscal year 2016 are, in fact, the second most that Mexico has captured in the past nine years' October–September periods. It is clear that Mexico's southern border crackdown is largely still in force. [See Figure 4]

Why Are the Numbers Creeping Back Up?


There are several reasons for the increases in arrivals and detentions of “other than Mexicans” at the U.S.-Mexican border. One key reason is the adaptability of

Figure 3

Migrant Apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico Border

Fiscal Years (FY) 2000–2016

■ Mexican ■ Central American & Other Non-Mexican Citizens




Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, <http://bit.ly/1Yik7t0>

Figure 4

Central Americans Apprehended by Authorities in the U.S. and Mexico

Fiscal Years (FY) 2013–2016

■ Apprehensions of “Other than Mexican” Citizens by U.S. Border Patrol
■ Detentions of Central Americans by Mexico’s National Migration Institute



Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, <http://bit.ly/1Yik7t0>; Mexican National Migration Institute, <http://bit.ly/1MphFr5>


migrant smugglers operating in southern Mexico. By seeking new routes, or by corrupting Mexican migration and law-enforcement personnel along the way, smuggling networks have adjusted to the tightened enforcement measures within the “Southern Border Plan.” Experts and migrant rights advocates interviewed by WOLA indicate that this adjustment has come at a cost: migrant smugglers’ fees have increased, with reports of US\$10,000 for passage from Central America to U.S. territory becoming more common. The increase is probably the result of steeper bribes and greater travel costs along more complex routes. While solid evidence for this is lacking, anecdotal reports and the gradual nature of increased migrant apprehensions point to smugglers’ steady adaptation inside Mexico.

Figure 5

Apprehensions of Unaccompanied Children from Northern Triangle Countries

In the United States and Mexico, Fiscal Years (FY) 2010–2016

■ Salvadorans (MX) ■ Salvadorans (U.S.) ■ Guatemalans (MX) ■ Guatemalans (U.S.) ■ Hondurans (MX) ■ Hondurans (U.S.)



Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, <http://bit.ly/1Yik7t0>; Mexican National Migration Institute, <http://bit.ly/1MphFr5>

In addition, the figures reflect the fact that Mexican migration authorities working near the Central America border were dealing not only with continuing flows of Central Americans, but with a sharp increase in migrants from Cuba who, until a mid-January 2017 change in the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act, were welcomed by U.S. authorities if they could make it to a U.S.-Mexico border crossing. (Cuban migrants are not reflected in Border Patrol’s apprehension statistics, as current law does not consider them to be “undocumented aliens.”) With the January policy change, Cubans are no longer granted immediate admission into the United States. Preliminary data points to a more than three-quarters drop in Cuban arrivals since the end of the so-called “wet foot, dry foot” policy. [See Figure 5]

A third, and most fundamental, reason is that the factors driving so many Central Americans to leave their countries—often urgently—remain in place and unchanged. Chronic poverty has been driving a steady

number of Central American citizens to leave their countries in search of opportunity or survival for many years. But a large proportion of recent migrants are fleeing, at least in part, from a region that now has higher levels of violence than any other region in the world not in a state of war.

Working with government officials and civil societies throughout the region, we must address these intractable challenges of violence and organized crime that lead so many people, especially children and families, to leave their homes. There is no short-term fix, though; the “surge” in the last two years, even after new investment in border security and immigration enforcement, shows that [border buildups](#) and [migration crackdowns](#) will not make the problem of Central American child and family migration go away.⁶ We must address the root causes.

The New Administration and Immigration Enforcement

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has started to put the wheels in motion on President Trump’s executive orders on immigration—and they will put the lives of thousands of Central American children and families in danger.

On February 21, the White House announced [new guidelines](#) for immigration policies that were first issued by Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly the day prior. The memos lay out instructions for how U.S. law enforcement agencies should implement the forceful executive orders that President Trump signed on January 25 on immigration enforcement within the United States and at the border.⁷

The guidelines specifically call for parents of unaccompanied minors to be prosecuted for human smuggling or trafficking. This will deal a blow to thousands of families across country, threatening parents who were attempting to unify their families and save their children’s lives.

Less tangibly, these new guidelines also signal to immigration and border agents to be even more hesitant in determining who has established enough “credible fear” to gain asylum. There were already a number of hurdles for migrants to get asylum status, and with these latest memos, it will likely be much more difficult.

The Trump administration’s executive order “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” (first ordered January 27 and revised March 6) halted the Central American Minors (CAM) Refugee/Parole Program, set up in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to allow children who have a parent legally present in the United States to apply for U.S. refugee status or parole. The purpose of the program is to provide protection to children who are fleeing their country due to violence and provide them with a way to safely travel to the United States instead of taking the dangerous journey north to the border. While limited in scope, the program has offered qualifying children an important chance to seek safety and protection in the United States. Its suspension, along with the overall limit in the number of refugees the United States will accept this year, leaves many children caught between two terrible scenarios: staying and risking their life, or making the dangerous journey through Mexico in an attempt to seek safety.


What Conditions Are People Fleeing in Central America?

Being denied refugee status, unable to apply for it, or being deported can be a death sentence, as one of the key factors driving large numbers of Central Americans to leave their communities is violence. The countries of the Northern Triangle continue to be plagued by endemic levels of crime and violence that have made many communities extremely dangerous, especially for children and young adults.

In 2015, El Salvador’s murder rate increased dramatically, reaching a level of violence not seen since the end of the country’s civil war. The 70 percent increase in the homicide rate over 2014 followed the unraveling of a truce between rival gangs and an aggressive crackdown by security forces that has spurred concerns about [extrajudicial executions](#) and other human rights abuses.⁸ While the murder rate decreased significantly after March 2016, in what government officials have [attributed to](#) their security strategy and “extraordinary measures” against the gangs (and which gang leaders have attributed to an inter-gang pact to curb killings) the National Civilian Police (Policía Nacional Civil, PNC) still [registered 5,728 murders](#) in the country in 2016, making it the second consecutive year with over 5,000 recorded murders in El Salvador’s recent history.⁹

In neighboring Guatemala and Honduras, homicide levels have decreased overall, yet both remain among the world’s most violent countries not at war. While this is not to say that every neighborhood throughout the region is comparable to a war zone, there are many communities, both urban and rural, where the fear and threat of violence is extremely grave.

Figure 6



Homicide statistics are just one measure of the pervasive violence impacting many marginalized communities in the three countries. Extortion is widespread, with small businesses, the public transportation sector, and poor neighborhoods being the most heavily hit. It has been estimated that Salvadorans pay more than [US\\$390 million a year](#) in extortion fees, while Hondurans pay around \$200 million and Guatemalans an estimated \$61 million. Failure to pay can result in harassment, violence, or death.¹⁰ [See Figure 6]

Family and domestic violence is also a factor in the decision to migrate for many women and children. El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala are some of the most dangerous countries to be a woman, with female homicide rates [among the highest in the world](#).¹¹ Guatemala's Public Prosecutor's Office (*Ministerio Público*) reported receiving over [50,000 cases](#) of violence against women in 2013, of which only 983—about 2 percent—culminated with a prison sentence for the aggressor.¹² In more than 76 percent of cases received by the police in the same year, the perpetrator was reported to be either living with (29.5 percent), the husband of (29 percent), or the ex-partner of (18 percent)

the female victim. The situation of domestic violence is similar throughout region.

In Honduras, [471 women](#) were killed in 2015—one every 16 hours.¹³ And in El Salvador, there have been nearly [1,100 cases](#) of domestic violence and over [2,600 cases](#) of sexual violence in 2016.¹⁴ With the constant threat of violence and abuse in the Northern Triangle, many women and children [choose to venture north](#) in search of safety.¹⁵

Understanding the Roots of Violence and Insecurity

Violence and insecurity in the Northern Triangle comes from many sources. In recent years, Central America has become one of the main transshipment routes for illicit drugs making their way to the United States. Local “*transportistas*,”—drug-smuggling operations doing the bidding of transnational drug trafficking cartels—contribute to violence in rural areas, particularly in border areas, and are responsible for a significant share of the rampant levels of corruption and the erosion of the justice and security systems.

Violence and insecurity are also a consequence of the proliferation of local street gangs or *maras* that impact every aspect of life in the neighborhoods and communities they control. While many well-to-do neighborhoods remain safe, in many poorer communities, gangs enforce curfews, control entry into their neighborhoods, and impose their own rules. Children and young men are often threatened or pressured to join the gangs, while young women in some communities experience sexual assault or abuse at the hands of gang members, forcing many to drop out of school or relocate.

Children and families are not just seeking refuge across borders, as evidenced by the numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the region. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, an estimated [714,000 people](#) from the Northern Triangle were internally displaced as a result of conflict and violence, as of the end of 2015. In El Salvador, the organization reports that [289,000 people](#)—nearly five percent of the population—are internally displaced due to violence.¹⁶

A Lack of Economic Opportunity

Compounding the problem of violence in these countries is the lack of economic security. It is estimated that [60 percent](#) of those living in rural areas in the Northern Triangle live in poverty.¹⁷ For the past few years, the region has been experiencing the most severe drought in decades, which has threatened the livelihoods of [over 2.8 million people](#) in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.¹⁸ This drought has been especially devastating in rural communities, and for subsistence farmers and day laborers. The lack of adequate rainfall in the so-called “dry corridor” has resulted in significant crop failures and loss

of income. It has exacerbated economic and food insecurity in already vulnerable populations.

In addition, more than [one million people](#) in the Northern Triangle countries are neither in school nor employed.¹⁹ Commonly referred to as “ninis,” there are 350,000 in Guatemala and 240,000 in El Salvador. Honduras has the highest rate of ninis in Latin America, with 27.5 percent of young people out of school and without employment. The inability to find a job, advance through education, or support themselves through self-employment or farming compels many young Central Americans to leave their homes and communities.

Weak Democratic Institutions

These problems fester because the governments of the Northern Triangle countries have been unable to effectively address the problems of rampant crime and violence, or to pursue economic strategies that would generate stable jobs and opportunities. A major part of this problem has been weak, corrupt, and underfunded state institutions. Many victims of violence often find no protection from the authorities. The majority of police forces are underfunded, plagued by poor leadership, and sometimes complicit in criminal activity. Efforts to purge and reform the civilian police forces have made limited progress, enabling the infiltration and co-optation by criminal groups.

Among the Northern Triangle countries as a whole, the statistics on prosecutions are appalling. Salvadoran daily *La Prensa Gráfica* reported in 2014 that throughout the Northern Triangle, impunity rates for homicides reached approximately [95 percent](#) on average (95 percent in El

Salvador, 93 percent in Guatemala, and 97 percent in Honduras).²⁰ This means that 19 out of every 20 murders remain unsolved, and that the chances of being caught, prosecuted, and convicted for committing a murder are practically nil. The [2015 Global Impunity Index](#) ranked El Salvador as the country with the eighth highest rate of impunity in the world, while Honduras was ranked seventh.²¹

Addressing the Problem

There is no magic solution to the endemic violence, poor governance, and poverty in the Northern Triangle. These are difficult problems that will require a comprehensive, long-term strategy. Unless these factors are addressed, families and children will continue to flee their communities. While tougher border enforcement might shift migrant routes, or increase the costs of migration, it will do nothing to address the drivers of migration, and very little to control irregular migration. The United States and other donors need to work with Central American governments, where they are willing, to address the root causes that are driving migration. This means:

- **Expanding evidenced-based, community-level programs to reduce youth crime and violence, reintegrate youth seeking to leave the influence of street gangs and criminal groups, and protect children who have suffered violence.** Evidence suggests that investing in prevention initiatives that bring together local community groups, churches, police, social services, and government agencies can make a difference in reducing youth violence and victimization.
- **Supporting robust programs to enhance transparency and accountability and address the deep-seated corruption that**

hinders citizens’ access to basic services, weakens state institutions, and erodes the foundations of democracy. International and independent anti-impunity and anti-corruption commissions, such as the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala, CICIG) and the Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (Misión de Apoyo contra la Corrupción y la Impunidad en Honduras, MACCIH), can play a crucial role in tackling corruption and organized crime and building domestic investigative capacities.

- **Focusing security-related funding on strengthening civilian law enforcement and justice institutions and making these institutions more accountable and transparent, rather than on expanding militarized approaches to security.** Programming should be directed toward bolstering policing capacity overall (such as strengthening internal and external control mechanisms, improving police investigation techniques, improving recruitment and training, etc.), rather than targeting resources to militaries or to specialized vetted units and other programs that may achieve short term objectives but have little impact on improving broader law enforcement institutions. Attention should also be given to strengthening the independence and capabilities of prosecutors and judges. Indicators of success should include measures of progress on these institutional issues.
- **Targeting development assistance to support evidenced-based job training, job creation and education programs that focus on at-risk youth in targeted communities.** Support should also be provided over a sustained period

to small-scale agriculture, including marketing and technical assistance, to improve rural communities' ability to provide livelihoods for their citizens.

- **Ensuring that local communities and civil society organizations are systematically consulted and involved in the design and evaluation of programs.** The meaningful participation of local groups can help make sure that donor efforts are having a sustainable impact in the communities at risk of violence and out-migration, and can strengthen democratic and participatory structures.

The Need for Commitment on the Ground

At the same time, addressing the root causes of migration requires the Central American governments to do their part. Governments and elites in Central America have historically been reluctant to seriously fight impunity, strengthen the rule of law, or invest in communities. But their commitment is critical. Without government buy-in, donor-funded reform and development efforts will have no lasting impact. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras must demonstrate a sound commitment to supporting reforms to strengthen public institutions, tackle corruption, and protect human rights. They must also increasingly assume the financial burden that is needed to transform their countries through fiscal reforms, improving tax collection, and insisting that their elites pay their fair share.

The problems are daunting and will not be resolved overnight. But where commitment and political will do exist, change can happen. In Guatemala, for example, the appointment of a courageous and effective advocate as attorney general led not only to prosecutions in high-profile

human rights and organized crime-related cases, but to internal reforms that improved management, made prosecutors' caseloads more manageable, and led to a doubling in homicide conviction rates in the department of Guatemala. The continuation of reform efforts by her successor has resulted in unprecedented results in the fight against corruption and impunity in the country.

The US\$750 million in assistance appropriated by the U.S. Congress for Central America for fiscal year 2016 is a positive step forward. The aid package more than doubled the previous level of assistance to the region, while expanding the U.S. agenda from a narrow, security-oriented approach to one that, in principle, seeks to strengthen institutions and invest in economic development.

Notably, the package also included a [series of strong conditions](#) on combating corruption, increasing transparency and accountability, strengthening public institutions, and protecting human rights.²² Ensuring that assistance is strategically targeted, wisely invested, and properly implemented will determine whether the new strategy is effective in addressing the dire conditions in the countries of the Northern Triangle. Better information on the specific objectives, aid levels, and programs in each country, as well as progress indicators being used and how outcomes are being defined, will allow for greater ability to assess whether or not U.S. assistance is achieving the desired results. In addition, ensuring that the conditions placed on the funds are being met will help gauge the commitment of the Central American governments. The aid did not begin to make its way to the region until late 2016.

The Obama administration included about [US\\$743.6 million](#) in foreign assistance to the region in its fiscal year 2017 budget request. Last year, with bipartisan support, the House and Senate sought to move the administration's request forward without drastically decreasing funding levels and while maintaining the series of conditions.²³ The House bill would have provided up to \$750 million to continue implementing the Central America strategy and conditioned all aid to the governments of the Northern Triangle. The Senate bill would have allocated roughly \$651 million and maintained the requirements enacted in FY2016. The foreign assistance bill, however, was never approved. In December 2016, President Obama signed into law a continuing resolution that provides funding to Central America at roughly the 2016 level until April 28, 2017. The assistance is conditioned on the same requirements.

It remains to be seen what the Trump administration will request, and Congress approve, in assistance to the region for the remainder of fiscal year 2017. Actions during the president's first 100 days have raised concerns that future assistance to Central America could revert to the security-centric approaches of the past. The [executive order](#) signed February 9, 2016, called for "increased security sector assistance to foreign partners by the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security" to combat transnational criminal organizations.²⁴ Trump's proposed [\\$54 billion increase](#) in military spending—and equal decrease in nonmilitary spending, including foreign aid—could also have implications for what a future aid package would look like.²⁵

There is no silver bullet to improving citizen security in the region; however, recent years have seen a renewed effort to tackle these complex issues. A continued

effort to strengthen state institutions and help respond to the problems of violence and lack of opportunity has the potential, over time, to reduce the factors that are driving widespread migration from Central America.

Migrants in Transit Face Crimes and Human Rights Abuses; Mexican Government Prioritizes Detention and Deportation over Protection

Over the last decade, the journey from Central America through Mexico has become increasingly dangerous. Although migrants have long been subject to petty corruption and abuse in Mexico, the expansion of organized criminal groups in the country has resulted in criminal networks increasingly engaging in extortion, kidnapping, and other crimes in the territories where they exercise control; migrants have become a lucrative source of income in this context. Many migrants have to pay to pass through [cartel-controlled territory](#), a situation particularly prevalent at the U.S.-Mexico border.²⁶ During their journey, [migrants are frequently victims](#) of kidnappings and ransom demands, human trafficking, sexual assault, robbery, and even murder.²⁷ Members of both local and federal agencies are involved in these crimes, including the Federal Police and the National Migration Institute (Instituto Nacional de Migración, INM), the lead agencies involved in Mexico's migration enforcement efforts.

The Impact of Mexico's Southern Border Program

Although the Mexican government has pursued a restrictive migration policy for several years, since July 2014—at the urging of the United States—the

government of Mexico has intensified its enforcement activities through the Southern Border Program (Programa Frontera Sur). The [government says](#) that this program aims to “protect and safeguard the human rights of migrants who enter and travel through Mexico, as well as to establish order at international crossings in order to increase development and security in the region.”²⁸

On the ground, the Southern Border Program has meant the deployment of additional INM agents to southern Mexico; the participation of federal, state, and municipal police forces in migration enforcement; an increase in raids on areas where migrants are known to stay and travel; efforts to prohibit migrants from riding on the train; and increased security checkpoints, particularly in the southern states. As WOLA noted in its November 2015 [border report](#), far from deterring migrants from making the journey north, Mexico's migration crackdown has resulted in changes in how migrants are traveling.²⁹ With decreased possibilities of boarding the train, migrants and smugglers are now relying on different and dangerous routes and modes of transportation, including by foot, vehicle, and boat. These routes expose migrants to new vulnerabilities given their isolation and difficulty. In July 2016, three Salvadoran children [drowned](#) off the coast of Chiapas when the boat they were traveling in sank due to heavy rains.³⁰

Increased enforcement has also resulted in a rise in crimes and human rights violations against migrants. The [migrant shelter](#) in Saltillo, Frontera con Justicia, in the northern state of Coahuila, documented more crimes against migrants, including kidnapping, extortion, robbery, and other abuses, in the first seven months of 2016 than in all of 2015.³¹ The shelter [La 72](#) in Tenosique, Tabasco, in southern Mexico

denounced eight cases of mass kidnappings in 2016 and alleged that agents from Mexico's Federal Police participated in some of the events.³² Mexico's [National Human Rights Commission](#) (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, CNDH) saw a 53 percent increase in complaints of human rights violations perpetrated by INM agents in 2015 as compared to 2014.³³ In October 2016, the Commission released a report on the [grossly inadequate conditions](#) within several migrant detention centers in Mexico.³⁴ It also released a report on the situation of [migrant children](#) in Mexico, highlighting that the Commission had received 881 complaints of human rights violations against migrant children in the past six years.³⁵

Increased Enforcement, but Concerns over Protection Screenings Persist

While Mexico has increased the detention and deportation of migrants and potential refugees, these enforcement efforts have not been paired with sufficient efforts to screen people for protection concerns. Mexico's 2011 [Law on Refugees, Complementary Protections, and Political Asylum](#) includes a broad refugee definition that grants asylum to individuals persecuted or who have fear of persecution due to race, gender, religion, nationality, or belonging to a specific political or social group. It also recognizes a right to asylum based on “generalized violence; foreign aggression; internal conflicts; massive violation of human rights; and other circumstances leading to a serious disturbance of public order.”³⁶

These latter categories in particular could be applied to individuals fleeing violence in Central America. Nonetheless, the number of people recognized as refugees or qualifying for some form of protection

in Mexico is remains low when compared with the total number of apprehensions. In 2015, [Mexico apprehended](#) 190,366 foreigners, including 171,934 Central Americans.³⁷ In that same year, only 3,423 people requested protection in Mexico and of these, only 32 percent were granted refugee status or complementary protection by Mexico's Commission to Assist Migrants (Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados, COMAR). Another 1,375 migrants who were victims of crime in Mexico were granted a [humanitarian visa](#).³⁸ In 2016, 8,781 people requested asylum, a significant increase over 2015, and of these, about 37 percent received asylum (2,722) or complementary protection (560).

In its 2013 report on the situation of migrants in Mexico, the [Inter-American Commission on Human Rights](#) (IACHR) noted that 68 percent of individuals in the Siglo XXI Migration Station in Tapachula (a migrant detention center) were unaware of their right to seek protection.³⁹ Although the UNHCR and civil society organizations have expanded the amount of information available to individuals on the migrant route and in detention centers, and there are more organizations supporting refugee claims, many problems remain. There are still few pro bono immigration lawyers in Mexico, and the geographic area of those that exist is limited. Civil society organizations that are involved in representing refugees often have difficulty entering migrant detention centers. Potential refugees who are detained and decide to request asylum will likely [remain in detention](#) while their claim is being processed; a procedure that is supposed to take up to 45 business days but which can be extended for multiple reasons.⁴⁰ The prison-like and often overcrowded conditions in the centers, along with reports of abuse, poor food,

lack of adequate medical care, among other problems, cause many potential refugees to drop their claims and be deported. In 2016, 26 percent of individuals who began an asylum request abandoned the process or dropped the claim.

Apart from disincentives to requesting protection in Mexico, COMAR only recently [signed an agreement](#) with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to increase its staffing beyond the 15 agents it had to handle cases, adding 29 additional staff members to its offices in Mexico City, Tabasco, Chiapas and Veracruz.⁴¹ The impact of this additional staffing will be measurable in the coming months. While UNHCR support is important, it should be noted that in spite of the increase in apprehensions in Mexico, [COMAR's budget](#) grew by only five percent between 2014 and 2015, when it was a mere 27 million pesos (about than US\$1.3 million).⁴² The [proposed budget](#) for COMAR for 2017 drops to 25.4 million pesos.⁴³

Addressing the Impact of Migration and Detention

Although the future of U.S.-Mexico cooperation is uncertain, both governments will continue to address Central American migration, either together or unilaterally. As they do so, they should consider the following actions to prioritize the protection of migrants in Mexico:

- **The Mexican government should increase its efforts to investigate and prosecute public officials and criminal networks that prey on children and other migrants crossing Mexico.** This includes establishing an internal affairs unit within the INM to investigate allegations of abuse and corruption,

providing state-level special prosecutors for crimes against migrants with the resources necessary to carry out effective investigations, and providing incentives for migrants to report crimes. Through current U.S. assistance to Mexico, the United States should discuss with the Mexican government ways to support increased accountability of INM agents and to strengthen the capacity of prosecutors charged with investigating crimes against migrants.

- **In December 2015, the Mexican government formally established the [Crime Investigation Unit for Migrants and the Mechanism for Foreign Support for Search and Investigation](#) (Unidad de Investigación de Delitos para Personas Migrantes y el Mecanismo de Apoyo Exterior Mexicano de Búsqueda e Investigación).**⁴⁴ As WOLA highlighted in a recent report, these bodies represent important opportunities for migrants and their families to access justice for crimes that were committed against them in Mexico. The Mexican government should ensure that they have adequate funds and staffing. As part of this new Foreign Support Mechanism, victims who have left Mexico and wish to report crimes now have the opportunity to do so, and the Mexican government has more tools to expand cooperation with U.S. and Central American authorities for cases involving transnational crimes against migrants.
- **The Mexican government should strengthen its capacity to provide effective access to asylum, as guaranteed by Mexican law.** Although important steps are being taken to strengthen COMAR, the Mexican government should work to ensure that INM agents are effectively screening apprehended migrants for protection concerns before

deportation can take place. At the last [presidents' meeting](#), the U.S. and Mexican governments announced plans to develop a training program for INM agents that will include increasing agents' capacity to identify and interview vulnerable populations.⁴⁵ The U.S. government can further assist in protecting migrants in Mexico by working with and granting additional support to the UNHCR.

What Happens to Children and Families When They Arrive in the United States?

When an unaccompanied child or migrant family turn themselves in or are detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials at the U.S.-Mexico border, they often find themselves facing what can seem like a vast, intimidating bureaucracy. The various processing procedures before them can be confusing, and they often lack clear access to information about their obligations as well as their right to seek protection. Changes enacted during the first few weeks of the Trump administration present significant challenges for individuals hoping to cross the U.S.-Mexico border and seek protection in the United States.

For children, the process differs depending on their country of origin. [As WOLA has noted](#), for unaccompanied Mexican migrant children CBP agents make the first determination about any possible needs for protection and decide to either send them home, or, in the minority of cases, refer them to the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), a branch of the Department of Health and Human Services.⁴⁶ Children from noncontiguous countries like those of Central America are processed by CBP and then automatically sent to the ORR. At ORR facilities, these children receive care and some legal advice and are later placed

with a family member or sponsor already in the United States, with whom they live while awaiting their immigration hearing.

U.S. immigration enforcement policies that prioritize detention and removal over protection and due process will make it increasingly difficult for asylum seekers from Central America and elsewhere to receive the safety they need in the United States. Of particular concern is the component of Trump's executive order on border security and immigration enforcement that calls for the detention of any individual who is apprehended for violating immigration law while they await the outcome of their removal proceedings. Secretary Kelly's memorandum to implement this order states that migrants that have established "credible fear" of persecution or torture can be released from custody, provided that they prove they do not present a security risk or risk of escaping, and that they comply with other conditions of release. However, it is clear that this measure is only temporary until there are "appropriate processing and detention facilities."

As [WOLA](#) has highlighted previously, indefinitely detaining asylum seekers, many of whom are victims of horrific violence, and holding them in prison-like conditions further traumatizes them and limits their access to legal counsel.⁴⁷ A 2015 [study](#) showed that without legal representation, only 1.5 percent of women with children who had passed their credible fear interviews were given asylum in the United States.⁴⁸

Prolonged detention also has particularly acute impacts on children and there are legal limits on how long children and their parents can be detained. In July and August 2015, District Judge Dolly Gee ruled that the family detention policy violated the

1997 Flores Agreement, which says that U.S. authorities should hold undocumented children in the least restrictive setting possible and favor releasing them. Judge Dee's ruling stipulated that the parents of children should be released as well, unless they present a flight risk or danger to the community and indicated that in individual cases in 'emergency' situations, that a family could only be held for 20 days. On September 30, 2016, the [Advisory Committee on Family Residential Centers](#) created by DHS in 2015 also recommended that the department discontinue the use of family detention and that enforcement efforts should operate under the "presumption that detention is generally neither appropriate nor necessary for families."⁴⁹

Increased difficulties in gaining access to protection in the United States, and the possibility of lengthy detention, may result in potential asylum seekers, including women and children, attempting to avoid Border Patrol detection by crossing through remote areas of the border that have harsh terrain, a decision that has [cost the lives](#) of thousands of border crossers in the past decade.⁵⁰

A Climate of Fear in the United States

Meanwhile, millions of families and children who have entered into the United States in recent years are living in fear. The [Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States](#),⁵¹ executive order will likely dramatically increase deportations to the region. The order calls for the hiring of an additional 10,000 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents, a change in the categories of immigrants who are considered priorities for deportation with such broad wording that it gives ICE agents the power to deem

any undocumented person a priority, the canceling of federal funds to sanctuary cities, and the reestablishment of the [Secure Communities](#) program and the promotion of other agreements to increase state and local law enforcement collaboration with DHS to identify undocumented migrants who then may be deported.⁵² Indeed, the [memorandum](#) to accompany this executive order explicitly states that “criminal aliens are a priority for removal.”⁵³

In recent weeks there have been reports of increased raids by ICE on areas with a high concentration of undocumented migrants. This increased enforcement will tear apart many families of mixed immigration status, and will likely present due process concerns due to the expedited removal proceedings for many individuals detained for violating immigration law. It has already created a climate of fear within immigrant communities, including children who are afraid to go to school because they think they will be detained or that they will come back to an empty house because their parents have been taken.

Given the mass deportations that occurred during the Obama administration, the Mexican government has increased its efforts to provide information and services to its citizens in the United States and to receive deported migrants at the border. In 2014 it was estimated that there were [5.8 million unauthorized immigrants in the United States who were Mexican](#), 52 percent of the total.⁵⁴ While the number of unauthorized Mexicans in the United States has dropped significantly in recent years, a large wave of deportees would undoubtedly strain government and civil society services. As WOLA has [reported](#) previously, those migrants, especially Mexicans who have spent many years in the United States and have no ties to their communities of origin, are also at great risk of being targeted by

criminal groups for robbery, extortion, and kidnapping, when deported to their countries of origin.⁵⁵

If there is a significant increase in Mexican deportations, it will be important that DHS work with Mexican authorities to respect the [local repatriation arrangements](#) (LRAs) that were agreed upon by both governments in February 2016.⁵⁶ The new arrangements curtail the practice of night deportations, require U.S. agencies to “take all feasible steps to ensure that property, valuables, and money” confiscated from detained migrants are returned prior to repatriation, and affirm both countries’ commitment to protecting unaccompanied migrant children. The LRAs are important to ensure a safe and orderly repatriation process.

Central American families are also at risk. Apart from the challenges facing recent border crossers who are seeking protection in the U.S., increased enforcement and raids will likely sweep up many migrant families and return them to their home countries which have become some of the most violent in the world in the past decade. The Trump administration’s new policies will put deported Central American children and their families’ lives in danger and create even more instability in an already volatile region, while doing nothing to keep people in the United States safe.

Charting a Path Forward

This article has looked at migration flows, the conditions driving migration from Central America, the treatment of migrants in transit in Mexico, and the treatment migrants receive when they arrive at the U.S. border. It has argued that while irregular migration from Mexico has dropped dramatically, migration

from the Northern Triangle of Central America, especially migration by children and families, has risen. That migration is driven by insecurity, lack of opportunity, and weak institutions in the region that are unable to effectively address these problems. That migration is likely to continue as long as those conditions persist. Increased border security in the United States, and in southern Mexico, may shift routes and raise the cost of migration, but migrants will seek new routes and continue to flee from violent and difficult conditions in their home countries. WOLA has recommended a set of long-term steps that will help improve conditions in the region, and recommended measures, by both the United States and Mexico, to recognize that many migrants have legitimate claims to protection, and that all migrants need to be treated humanely.

Unfortunately, the first few weeks of the Trump presidency have demonstrated that the new administration has every intention of putting into policy his heated campaign rhetoric on border security and immigration enforcement. These policies represent a fundamental threat to human rights, international law, and U.S. democratic values. Far from meeting their intended security objectives, the administration’s proposals risk creating situations that could generate instability in the region and a climate of fear that threatens safety and civil liberties in the United States.

Thoughtful policy makers should reject the Trump approach and instead pursue the kinds of alternative suggested in this article. Members of Congress, and the U.S. public, as well as governments in Mexico and Central America and civil society groups there, should call for approaches that are more effective and more humane.

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Central Americans under Trump: Uncertainty on Both Sides of the Border

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Since Donald Trump took office on January 20, 2017, immigrant communities have been under the threat of his campaign promises to deport more immigrants and build a wall at the U.S.-Mexico border. Central Americans, one of the fastest-growing populations of immigrants in the United States, are rightfully worried. There are 3.2 million Central Americans residing in the United States, the majority from the Northern Triangle: Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. They account for 7 percent of the U.S. immigrant population of 41.3 million.¹ Executive orders have spread terror and panic among immigrant communities as this administration has ramped up the detention and expulsion of about over 700 immigrants in the past weeks, including Muslim immigrants, many of whom boast proper documentation. For youth, women, children, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex immigrants from Central America, the new enforcement policies and practices curb their hopes of safety, education, and health care. This contradictory yet clear triumph of right-wing protectionist politics unjustly and irresponsibly blames Central American populations for their forced migration and their conditions of poverty and internal strife. They assume no responsibility for the State Department’s role in the disturbances of democracy, the instigation of coups, and the destabilizing of the labor force and labor protections by promoting and imposing neoliberal and neoconservative policies on countries the United States has deemed less fortunate than itself.

This new era of restrictions in the United States is also reminiscent of the 1980s under President Ronald Reagan, when Central Americans were unwelcome in the United States. Then, Central Americans sought sanctuary in churches and among comrades, who hid them along with their children, memories, experiences, and their

lost loved ones. The concept of sanctuary, mostly associated with the religious groups that provided refuge to undocumented immigrants, speaks also of safe passage and harkens back to the time of the Underground Railroad run by pioneering feminist Harriet Tubman, as she helped slaves from the U.S. south find safe passage north. Then, as now, there were politicians who did not see black workers as humans, or as individuals entitled to rights, wages, and health care, let alone own their own land and homes. A sanctuary is a space of nonviolent resistance that refuses the unilateral obliteration of a group and is reminiscent of the U.S. civil rights movement, when black power organizers sought a seat in the front of the bus or at the lunch counter. The bold claim here is that those seeking sanctuary are actors in their own history and important contributors to U.S. society, not just because they pay taxes or are law-abiding neighbors, but also because their histories and lives form the rich texture of this society. The United States is not a black-and-white country; it is filled with hard-working people of all races, ethnicities, classes, and religious backgrounds, forming a cacophony of diverse voices and projects of nation that challenge every institution, academic or otherwise, to be bold and inclusive, to be just and fair. To deport 11 million immigrants, disassemble the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, and destroy the fabric of safety net protections, such as health care, reproductive justice, and transgender rights, is to break down the country as well as to erase the very things that has made it great—its racial, ethnic, and gender diversity; migration; and cultural plurality.

Trump’s immigration policies demonstrate willful historical amnesia regarding the United States’ role in destabilizing the Central American region. Worse still, they

criminalize Central American families, women, and children fleeing from violent social environments that U.S. military aid helped to create.² For so many still in Central America, the United States has imposed neocolonial relationships economically and politically, supporting authoritarian regimes over the will of the people and voters, as in the cases of Honduras and Guatemala. The Northern Triangle's long history with heavy-handed U.S. politics of capital and diplomacy are coming to a head today, deployed upon the bodies of the most vulnerable actors: women and children; indigenous, Afro-descendants, and Garifunas; and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, transvestite, and intersex communities.

Since his presidential campaign, Donald Trump has offered a decontextualized, dramatized vision of individual immigrants as dangerous criminals. He subtracts the historical context, as well as any notion of these individuals as human beings with social ties and with social value. With his most recent initiatives to curb immigration, Trump furthers this public rhetoric of decontextualizing migration and demonizing immigrants. His immigration plan, released by the Department of Homeland Security in late February, includes publicity campaigns against immigrants, in addition to ramping up nationwide security culture. He plans to "publicize crimes by undocumented immigrants; strip such immigrants of privacy protections; enlist local police officers as enforcers; erect new detention facilities; discourage asylum seekers; and, ultimately, speed up deportations."³ The administration's media smear campaign against undocumented immigrants will instill fear and hate in an already divided society. What purpose could it serve other than to engage citizens in policing

and reporting those suspected to be undocumented immigrants?

An unnerving aspect of this plan is the resurrection of the 287(g) Program, or the Delegation of Immigration Authority Section of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which forces local officials to report to immigration enforcement, encouraging a climate of persecution across the nation. According to the *New York Times*, former president Obama's program of expedited removal "was used only when an immigrant was arrested within 100 miles of the border and had been in the country no more than 14 days."⁴ Trump, however, is forcing local authorities to deliver immigrants for reasons of minor and arbitrary offences, even if they have been in the country for more than two years.⁵ In addition, Trump has ordered the Department of Homeland Security to hire 10,000 new immigration and customs agents and expand the number of detention facilities. Though immigrants' rights organizations and lawyers across the country are contesting these draconian initiatives, the already bloated state security apparatus continues to grow.

The contradictions abound in tandem with this severe crackdown on migration in Central America and Mexico and on immigrants in the United States, as the Trump administration uses foreign policy and diplomatic negotiation like a double-edged sword for opening Central America to foreign investment by transnational corporations. These policies tie in with the Alliance for Prosperity Plan, initiated by former president Obama and drafted by the presidents of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in 2014. Facilitated by the Inter-American Development Bank, the Alliance for Prosperity Plan's main policy goals include "promoting strategic sectors and attracting investment . . . modernizing

and expanding infrastructure, [and] boosting programs to prevent violence," thus seeking to reduce out-migration from the region.⁶ Given the history of government use of state-sponsored violence and *mano dura* policies against their own populations in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, however, this initiative will only exacerbate a macabre security system and police force against would-be migrants. The Alliance for Prosperity would most likely increase economic disparity without a sincere and thorough plan for education and reintegration of immigrants, including those deported.

At the same time, the Alliance for Prosperity Plan replicates U.S. foreign policy aimed at opening new markets for foreign investment. Indeed, the rise of parallel states and paramilitary groups go hand-in-hand with hypercapitalism in Mexico and Central America. It will be a vehicle to ensure new markets, new territories, and resource grabbing. Investments in hydroelectric plants, dams, and ecotourism projects are destroying indigenous communities, traditions, and cultural heritage, and contracts are often secured through murder and chaos wrought by paramilitary groups. Neo-interventionist U.S. foreign policy takes the form of "drug war capitalism," to use Dawn Paley's term, repeating in Central America the same strategies of militarization as practiced in Colombia, thus allowing for the opening of the country to increased transnational investment. As Paley explains, "The war on drugs is a long-term fix to capitalism's woes, combining terror with policymaking in a seasoned neoliberal mix, cracking open social worlds and territories once unavailable to globalized capitalism."⁷ Drug war policies are affecting Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Salvadorans profoundly, exacerbating the

number of military grade arms, money laundering and cash surpluses, as well as the plethora of paramilitary groups and extrajudicial security forces run by powerful capitalist elites.⁸ The increase in armaments and violence has only served to further criminalize indigenous and black activists and human rights defenders, who continue to struggle for human rights and land rights.⁹

Central Americans in the Northern Triangle are facing the worst violence ever recorded in history. According to the U.S. Department of State's Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), in 2016 "Guatemala has one of the highest violent crime rates in Central America and is rated in the top 25 most dangerous places to live in the world. Violent crime is attributed to endemic poverty, an abundance of weapons, a legacy of societal violence, and overwhelmed and inactive law enforcement and judicial systems."¹⁰ This description could easily be applied to any of the three countries, which suffer from this multilayered threat of poverty, militarization, and impunity. Homicide rates in these countries make them some of the most violent in the entire world. Honduras reported a homicide rate of 74.6 per 100,000 people in 2014, while El Salvador reported a rate of 64.2 per 100,000 for the same year.¹¹ As we explore below, violent death reigns in these countries, due in large part to the legacy of the civil wars of the 1970s through 1990s. These were waged under a Cold War binary logic: social movements and armed guerrillas, labeled as communists, fighting against highly equipped government counterinsurgency forces. During these turbulent years, the United States aid and training to the militaries of the Northern Triangle encouraged two phenomena: (1) an influx of weapons technology, which resulted in a surplus of arms and increased

repressive capabilities on the part of these armies; and (2) an evolution in the organizational sophistication of armed groups, whose shifting alliances after the signing of the peace treaties—between the state, drug traffickers, private security, and the like—have forged a highly militarized but amorphous scenario of paramilitary violence.

The pacification and demobilization processes from the civil wars of the 1980s in these countries have been incomplete, due to the extreme repression and militarization of the Cold War period and the quick transition into exploitative neoliberal economic practices. There is extreme social fragmentation in the region, which can best be seen in the appearance of street gangs, the growing influence of paramilitary groups like the Zetas, and the continued persecution of journalists, activists, Human Rights workers, and judicial figures who attempt to address corruption and impunity. In the section that follows, we discuss the particular features of this persecution and the groups that have most often been targeted.

Today, much as in the environment of the civil wars, violent repression falls heavily on activists and social organizers. According to a Global Witness report, Honduras is the most dangerous for environmental activism, where there have been over 120 murders of human rights defenders who work to protect the environment since 2010. One of them was Berta Cáceres of the Civic Council of Popular and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras (COPINH).¹² The report also listed the collusion of big business owners in Honduras, whose transnational companies act against indigenous communities and campesinos attempting to protect the water sources and the forests. The Honduran

government, backed by transnational companies, has been blatantly ignoring ILO Convention 169, which stipulates that governments should consult and gain approval from indigenous communities before developing or exploiting their land.¹³ The results are disastrous for local indigenous communities, such as the Garifuna communities currently being displaced from their ancestral lands for the purposes of ecotourism development. Like Honduras, Guatemala has continued to criminalize and assassinate indigenous activists. It is the second Central American country with the highest murder rates of indigenous, LGBTTI, and women activists in the isthmus.

Since 2011, the most violent year in Honduras according to the Violence Observatory at UNAH, there has been an increase in migration to the United States of women and children, unaccompanied children, and LGBTTI people, the most vulnerable sectors of a society turning more violent by the moment. By 2014, hundreds of mostly Honduran, Guatemalan, and Salvadoran unaccompanied children, mothers, and families with small kids were at our borders, escaping the threat of violence, militarization, displacement, and lack of jobs. Despite this egregious situation, the U.S. government continues to fund a government that has unapologetically disregarded the life of human rights observers, where murders go unpunished.

Women, including transgender women, and children in the region are extremely vulnerable to violent death. Cases of gender violence reveal twisted new strands of brutality and misogyny, including torture and dismemberment and public dumping of the bodies. Particularly, femicide/feminicide, as expressed in contemporary Central America, represents

the ultimate expression of disdain for women, aggravated under conditions of militarization, extreme inequality, and economic disparity. *Femicide* refers not only to the fact that the victim of homicide is a woman, but rather that they are killed because they are women and perceived to be at the bottom of a gender-based power structure. Femicide as gender violence is both public and private, indicating the complicity of the state and of individual perpetrators.¹⁴ The Northern Triangle demonstrates alarmingly growing rates of femicide. The cases of femicide in Guatemala have reached more than 6,000. Women are often killed ritualistically and tortured or mutilated. In Guatemala the numbers continue to grow with an average of one to two women murdered daily; it is the country with the third highest femicide rate in Latin America, with only El Salvador and Jamaica surpassing it. The Guatemalan Prosecutor's Office reported 262 femicide cases between April 2015 and March 2016. Yet National Forensic Science notes that cases are much higher than the government figure, citing a total of 766 feminicides in 2015 alone. The level of impunity is a contributor in the rise of femicide in Guatemala. The Prosecutor's Office reported that between 2015 and 2016 there were only 74 prosecutions. Although Guatemala passed the Law against Femicide and other Forms of Violence against Women in 2008, institutional inertia and constraints, as well as the amorphous and all-encompassing nature of gang violence, have made it extremely difficult to prosecute these crimes. Similarly, in Honduras, according to Centro de Derechos de la Mujer, femicides are skyrocketing. During the first six months of 2015 there were 438 murders of women, 189 of which are violent deaths; 40.6 percent were attributed to sexual violence.¹⁵ While not considered femicide in the regular context of reporting,

LGBTTI murders exhibit the same level of brutality and degradation as those of cisgender women in Honduras. From 2009 to the present there have been over 222 murders of LGBTTI people; the majority are transgender women. Of 37 cases of LGBTTI murders only 3 cases have been pursued for prosecution.¹⁶

Honduras is also a dangerous place for children. In 2013 there were 900 murders and executions of children under 23 years old in the country. The United States deported 7,109 children back to Honduras in 2015, making up 10 percent of all deportations (a total of 67,734 deportees). Of the unaccompanied minors apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border between October 2014 and November 2015, 7,083 were Honduran. Of the women and children detained at the U.S.-Mexico border, 13,874 were from Honduras.¹⁷

It cannot be stressed enough that the extreme vulnerability of Central Americans in their home countries is a direct result of the political violence of the armed conflicts of the 1970–1980s. The military repression has morphed into criminal violence. As U.S. foreign policy rhetoric so readily disguises, U.S. military aid and intelligence assistance to authoritarian, military governments in that period makes the United States complicit in the criminal violence affecting Central America today.

The devastating impact of the civil wars in Guatemala and El Salvador appear today as a violent legacy of scars that refuse to heal. There were 80,000 murdered in El Salvador during the armed conflict and not one general or military commander has been brought to justice. There were over 200,000 murdered during the conflict in Guatemala. The UN-sponsored Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) stated

that the state was responsible for 93 percent of the human rights violations committed during the civil war. It also left 40,000 widows, and approximately 50,000 were forcefully disappeared. Similarly, over 450 Maya villages were obliterated and 1.5 million Guatemalans were forcefully displaced. According to the report, 83 percent of those killed or forcefully disappeared were Maya. For this reason the report, as well as many Latin American scholars, have noted that the Guatemalan armed conflict was also a genocide, since the state apparatus systematically aimed at eliminating Maya communities. The genocide was orchestrated by the U.S.-backed Guatemalan army influenced by over 55 U.S. officers providing training on strategy and tactics during combat.

The violence in both those countries led people to flee, many to the United States and Mexico, in record numbers. While the peace accords in Guatemala were signed in 1996, Central America continued to see growing inequality and joblessness during the transition governments. Now, Central America serves as a corridor for the passage of drugs moving from South America to the United States. The bountiful profit to be made from complicity or involvement with this trade has ensnared ex-soldiers, government officials, and businesspeople alike. Participation in the drug trade is one axis of the multiple and diffuse modes of participation in criminal organizations that function as parallel states in countries like Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.

Another potent example of criminal networks is the exploitation of the *maras* by narcotraffickers and ex-soldiers. The *maras* are street gangs that were imported from Los Angeles in the mid-1990s, when the United States deported thousands of incarcerated Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran immigrant youth, many of

whom had no recollection of their home countries or social networks to receive them. Once deported, members of the Mara Salvatrucha and the 18th Street gangs from Los Angeles, many of them working class, joined with or recruited local young people to form the Central American versions of these gangs.¹⁸ Extortion constitutes the main source of income of the gangs, particularly targeting the transport sector as well as neighborhood businesses. In fact, cases of extortion involving minors has risen 120 percent in El Salvador.¹⁹ Wolf explains that the Salvadoran government's preferred method for dealing with gangs is suppression and incarceration, completely omitting prevention and rehabilitation programs.²⁰ Worsening the severity of armed violence, police have been implicated in extrajudicial assassinations not only of gang members but also of unarmed bystanders, as in the 2015 San Blas massacre, according to reporters from *El Faro*, an online investigative journalism newspaper based in El Salvador, who exposed the massacre.²¹

Ravaging the newest generation, much in the same way the civil wars did, criminal violence disproportionately targets young people in the gang-dominated countries of the Northern Triangle today. The recruitment tactics of the gangs often force these adolescents and teenagers to migrate, given that they must join a gang or else be constantly harassed and most likely killed. The targeting of young people for gang recruitment in part explains the massive surge of child migration witnessed in the United States since 2013. By the end of 2014, an influx of 40,000 unaccompanied Central American minors had flocked to the U.S.-Mexico border.²² And as they travel northward, these unaccompanied minors become particularly vulnerable to the plethora of dangers faced along the migrant trail: sexual assault, kidnapping,

being trafficked or picked up by migration officials and deported, or being maimed or killed riding the infamous northbound Mexican trains known collectively as La Bestia.

The current conditions facing Central American migrants constitute a grave humanitarian crisis. To name perhaps the most dire example, Central American migrants traveling through Mexico, who face countless dangers on the road, must also contend with the threat of kidnapping. These migrants make easy targets and are often converted into merchandise, as armed groups like the Zetas kidnap and traffic them with impunity.²³ The Zetas and other armed groups profit by extorting the families of the kidnapped, often demanding payments over and over again and then refusing to comply with their side of the bargain to safely return loved ones. Due to their almost complete lack of recourse to institutional support, the disappeared, kidnapped, and trafficked effectively vanish from the public eye, left to unspeakable fates at the hands of these armed groups. Based on a report by the National Commission for Human Rights in Mexico, activists claim that the number of disappeared noncitizen migrants in Mexico from 2006 to 2011 could be between 70,000 and 120,000.²⁴

Trump's promises of building a wall between the United States and Mexico will affect Central Americans the most, as in recent years the majority of those apprehended at the border are Central American youth, women, and children.²⁵ As we've argued, the displacement of these most vulnerable populations can in fact be traced back to the United States' continued support to authoritarian regimes, such as Honduras' nationalist president Juan Orlando Hernandez, and the Guatemalan president Jimmy Morales, both candidates

those countries' populations did not support. U.S. meddling with the elections in both those countries, against the voters' wishes, has led to an uptick in migration at rates never seen before. Women, children, and youth are the future of any nation, but they are fleeing Central America in droves due to government corruption. What will become of these nations without their future generations?

The Central American Section of the Latin American Studies Association strongly upholds the need for sanctuary spaces: not just symbolic but physical and material spaces to house and sustain communities, in churches, schools, cities, local establishments, hospitals, neighborhoods, and universities. We believe this new underground railroad of sanctuary will provide safe passage to a possibility of a new life, securing human rights for a new generation of Central Americans that deserve to live and thrive where they find themselves.

We call for the inclusion of all immigrants to be provided sanctuary no matter their status, including noncitizens disproportionately impacted at the intersection of the criminal justice system and immigration enforcement.

We oppose the federal government's bigotry and targeting of Latino/Latina, Central American, and Mexican communities via executive orders, in Congress's policies and in local and state laws, and in speeches coming from President Trump's ultra-right-wing cabinet.

We affirm and support DACA and other programs for 700,000 undocumented students (75,000 of whom are members of the LGBTQ community) and their families, many of whom are Central Americans and Mexican.

We oppose the expansion of federal collaboration among law enforcement agencies locally and nationally, as well as the expansion of the Border Patrol. We oppose the expansion of 287(g) and “Secure Communities” programs, or any other program that jeopardizes the safety and integrity of our local U.S. neighborhoods and our neighbors.

We call on our U.S. government for the expansion of refugee status for the over 68,000 Central American children, youth, women, and LGBTTI people at the U.S.-Mexico border, and those currently in deportation proceedings and/or fighting for asylum.²⁶ Currently, Central Americans apprehended at the borders are on expedited removal, even before the merits of their asylum cases are heard, and before they can be considered for refugee status eligibility. We call on our government to extend refugee status to Central Americans from the Northern Triangle.

We call for Central American governments that collaborate with the United States to demand protection for their citizens in Mexico and the United States and to advocate for changes in immigration policies to benefit Central American immigrants. We call on Central American nations to renounce their complicity with these inhumane U.S. policies, complicity that they demonstrate via their acceptance of financial and security funding, while their citizens are being exploited and maimed at hands of U.S. policy.

We call for Central American nations to pursue ending violence in their nations, to prosecute and bring to trial violent perpetrators of femicide and violence against women, children, and LGBTTI communities. Prosecution of crimes can send a strong message to stem violence

and discrimination against vulnerable populations.

We call on Central American nations to develop politics of inclusion for LGBTTI and working-class youth communities. We urge governments to train their police, military, and traffic police on hate crimes and gender violence and develop protection mechanisms for reporting and prosecution.

We call on Central American nations to end the exploitation of natural resources, rivers, forests, and beach waterfronts for the expansion of hydroelectric plants and ecotourism, because it is displacing people from their land and livelihood.

Lastly, we call on the U.S. and Central American governments to respect the sovereignty of indigenous peoples in our continent and their right to land, language, culture, and self-determination.

Notes

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¹ See Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, “Central American Immigrants in the United States,” Migration Policy Institute, September 2, 2015, <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-american-immigrants-united-states>.

² See “DHS Chief Proposes Prosecuting Parents of Children Smuggled into U.S.,” McClatchy, February 18, 2017, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/white-house/article133594864.html>.

³ Michael D. Shear and Ron Nixon, “New Trump Deportation Rules Allow Far More Expulsions,” *New York Times*, February 21, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/21/us/politics/dhs-immigration-trump.html>.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ “Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle: A Road Map,” September 2014. See <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=39224238>.

⁷ Dawn Paley, *Drug War Capitalism* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2014), 16. See also Jasmin Hristov, *Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009).

⁸ Global Witness Report, January 2017. See <https://www.globalwitness.org/en/countries/honduras/>.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ These statistics come from the Guatemalan National Police Civil (PNC). Yet, the PNC does not count homicides if the victim left the crime scene alive. “Guatemala 2016 Crime & Safety Report,” United States Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, <https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=19279>.

¹¹ Kuang Keng Kuek Ser, “Map: Here Are Countries with the World’s Highest Murder Rates,” PRI, June 27, 2016, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-06-27/map-here-are-countries-worlds-highest-murder-rates>.

¹² Global Witness Report, January 2017.

¹³ Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), International Labour Organization Convention. http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C169.

¹⁴ Cynthia Bejarano and Rosa Linda Fregoso, eds., *Terrorizing Women: Feminicide in the Americas* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 5.

¹⁵ Centro de Derechos de La Mujer, Honduras. See <http://www.derechosdelamujer.org/observatorio.html>.

¹⁶ CATRACHAS, Honduras. See <http://www.cattrachas.org/>.

¹⁷ Casa Alianza, Honduras, “Informes Mensuales-Observatorio de Derechos de los Niños, Niñas y Jóvenes en Honduras,” http://www.casa-alianza.org.hn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=143&Itemid=83

¹⁸ Sonja Wolf, *Mano Dura: The Politics of Gang Control in El Salvador* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2017), 10.

¹⁹ “Dos menores de edad son asesinados cada tres días en el país,” *La Prensa Gráfica* (El Salvador), January 30, 2017, <http://www.laprensagrafica.com/2017/01/30/dos-menores-de-edad-son-asesinados-cada-tres-dias-en-el-pais>.

²⁰ Wolf, *Mano Dura*, 3, 49.

²¹ Óscar Martínez and Roberto Valencia, “PDDH concluye que policía y militares cometieron ejecuciones extralegales,” *El Faro*, April 25, 2016. http://www.elfaro.net/es/201604/el_salvador/18494/PDDH-concluye-que-Polic%C3%ADa-y-militares-cometieron-ejecuciones-extralegales.htm.

²² Mercedes García, “Alliance for Prosperity Plan in the Northern Triangle: Not a Likely Final Solution for the Central American Migration Crisis,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, March 3, 2016, http://www.coha.org/alliance-for-prosperity-plan-in-the-northern-triangle-not-a-likely-final-solution-for-the-central-american-migration-crisis/#_ftnref1.

²³ Óscar Martínez, *The Beast: Riding the Rails and Dodging Narcos on the Migrant Trail* (New York: Verso, 2014), 92–93.

²⁴ “Comunicado de prensa(cencos): Caravana de Madres Centroamericanas,” Movimiento Migrante Mesoamericano, December 8, 2015, <https://movimientomigrantemesoamericano.org/2015/12/08/comunicado-de-prensacencos-caravana-de-madres-centroamericanas/>.

²⁵ Molly Hennessy-Fiske and Cindy Carcamo, “In Texas’ Rio Grande Valley, a Seemingly Endless Surge of Immigrants,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 13, 2014. <http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-texas-border-chaos-20140614-story.html>.

²⁶ Haeyoun Park, “Children at the Border,” *New York Times*, October 21, 2014. <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/15/us/questions-about-the-border-kids.html>. ■

On Values and Action: A statement by SSRC President Ira Katznelson

by IRA KATZNELSON | Social Science Research Council | katznelson@ssrc.org

On January 23, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) gathered with the executive directors of the social science associations with whom the organization has had a relationship since the Council's founding in 1923 as the globe's first national social science institution. Convening in Washington, DC, at the headquarters of the American Political Science Association, and joined by the director of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, this was a long-scheduled meeting in a regular series convened by the SSRC that considers shared issues such as the transparency of research, forms of publication, and the voice of social science. Taking place in the immediate aftermath of the inauguration, massive protests, and the "alternative facts" controversy, much of the conversation focused on our role as guardians of scholarship and on effective means of engagement beyond the academy.

None of these organizations is partisan; certainly not the SSRC. Each, however, not least the SSRC, is committed to a series of central tenets. These include standards of inquiry and evidence, international collaboration, and values underpinning constitutional democracies devoted to the rule of law, individual rights, and the absence of religious tests for membership. Within this frame, the leaders of the learned societies and Council staff discussed the roles we should play when our essential obligations to scholarship and public affairs come under challenge.

By the end of last week, the dimensions of this question had grown. For the Council, the implications of President Trump's Executive Order on Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements hit home when a doctoral scholar at Stanford University, twice selected as an SSRC Fellow (awarded Council fellowships for dissertation preparation and field work

in her native Sudan), and the holder of a green card, was detained and handcuffed last Friday night at Kennedy Airport before her release. As the Association of American Universities and the presidents of many campuses, including Columbia, Johns Hopkins, the New School, and Stanford, have underscored, this approach to national security contravenes values democratic societies and the scholarly world hold dear.

The Council welcomes these statements and aligns with them. But remonstrations must be accompanied by concrete behavior. Within the framework of our organizational character, how should the SSRC act? For which activities should we enhance our resolve?

I believe the answer lies less with responses to day-to-day events and provocations than with intensifying each of the institution's primary purposes:

First is deepening the craft of social science. If we are to advance the abilities of scholars to deploy rigorous inquiry, cross intellectual frontiers, and advance human understanding, we must resist restrictions on the movement of colleagues and students across borders, and act to safeguard ever more vigorously the institutions and norms that advance reliability and protect the integrity of social research. These valuable bodies include the national statistical system, the National Science Foundation, the National Endowments for the Arts and the Humanities, and other federal agencies undergirding our system of open, standards-based social knowledge, the foundation of democratic reason.

Second is the long-standing practice to summon national and international scholarship in the academy to serve civic

purposes. Especially in troubled times, the SSRC should ask how to best strengthen Council programs on peace building, the environment, patterns of racial inequality, digital culture, the place of religion in the public sphere, and other vexing subjects, and we must assiduously intensify our work under the program "Anxieties of Democracy." That program, which first took shape four years ago, is motivated by concern for how the core institutions of established democracies—elections, political parties, interest groups, social movements, and legislatures—address large problems in the public interest. The recent addition of a media project to its existing working groups on participation, institutions, climate, social policy, and national security is particularly timely.

Third is our focus on building the capacities of individual scholars and institutions in the United States and abroad to practice social science effectively. The Council has an array of fellowships and projects whose aim is to strengthen and democratize higher education, including efforts not only to educate better scholars, but to help scholars become better educators and thus pass to new generations both their craft and a deeper understanding of their commitments.

These pursuits offer both means and inspiration that we must seize in efforts to protect and enhance conditions for effective scholarship.

Fourth is the imperative of communication. The Council's voice in each of these respects must become more expansive and more vibrant.

Now in its tenth decade, the SSRC has witnessed fear-inducing economic hardship, global warfare, political despotism, and depredations based on race, class, and

Cómo entender el diálogo de saberes

por MAURICIO ARCHILA, LASA2017 program co-chair | Universidad Nacional de Colombia
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religion. Working across lines of party, demography, and geography, I am confident that we can augment our efforts to shield and deploy social science to prevent cruelty and imagine decent alternatives.

January 31, 2017

Note

This statement first appeared on the website of the Social Science Research Council, <http://www.ssrc.org/pages/on-values-and-action-a-statement-by-ssrc-president-ira-katznelson/>. ■

El “diálogo de saberes” no solo es el tema central de nuestro próximo congreso de Lima sino que se suele invocar como propuesta ante cualquier encuentro de culturas o disciplinas distintas o cuando hay procesos que implican participación ciudadana. Y lo hacen tanto las comunidades subalternas y los académicos como no pocos organismos estatales y transnacionales. Por eso conviene preguntarse en qué consiste y para qué puede servir.¹

Se suele reconocer que la Investigación Acción Participativa (IAP) de los años 60 y 70 –surgida en nuestro continente pero con aportes de otras partes del mundo– fue pionera en proponer un diálogo de saberes, en ese momento referido al encuentro entre un mundo académico en crisis y unos actores sociales que surgían con fuerza a nivel global, pero especialmente en los países en proceso de descolonización. La IAP tuvo indudables méritos como el cuestionamiento al positivismo en las ciencias sociales, a la ruptura entre objeto y sujeto, a la separación entre teoría y práctica y al vanguardismo de los ilustrados, incluidas las izquierdas. Otro aporte fue pluralizar la reconstrucción del pasado introduciéndole más voces, con lo que se alteraba la narrativa tradicional occidental en la que hablaba solo el saber experto. En esto la IAP anticipó posturas poscoloniales de reconocimiento y activa participación del subalterno. E incluso avanzó en la formulación de un nuevo paradigma en las ciencias sociales y en la pedagogía, al que luego se le sumará la articulación entre razón y sentimiento.

Pero la IAP no era un método uniforme y universal, sino que se adaptaba a los contextos locales y regionales. Es cierto que fue más militante y activista en sus primeras fases, pero fue más compleja y más participativa en su procedimiento

de lo que comúnmente se asume al ver solo sus resultados. En pocas palabras, era una forma de diálogo de saberes muy imaginativa y rica que va a tener muchas continuidades con propuestas construidas posteriormente. Con todo tenía rasgos de mesianismo pues el investigador externo terminaba siendo el protagonista que hablaba por las comunidades. Y en algunos casos pudo esencializar al pueblo como si éste fuera homogéneo, puro e incontaminado. Por esas vías se negaba la pretensión metodológica de respetar la diferencia y de hacer un diálogo de saberes verdaderamente horizontal.

Recientes reflexiones sobre las relaciones entre conocimiento y poder, así como sobre la proyección ética y política de la labor investigativa indican que, si bien se reconoce que el investigador externo tiene intereses emancipadores al impulsar el cambio social, no impone un modelo de sociedad, sino que debe acompañar a los subalternos en su búsqueda liberadora. Y esto lo hacen ellos a partir de conocimientos propios y con visibilidad creciente de investigadores surgidos de sus entrañas. Por eso hoy se habla de investigaciones colaborativas, que si bien no suprimen totalmente la asimetría de poder en el conocimiento, sí impulsan el diálogo de saberes en forma más radical, pues no se parte de que el académico posea la verdad, como tampoco el subalterno. Son encuentros de iguales pero distintos. Los intelectuales que surgen de las comunidades étnicas y de los movimientos sociales también poseen recursos cognitivos, aunque diferentes de los académicos, así se hayan formado en instituciones universitarias. Y los intelectuales académicos, que son también actores de los procesos emancipadores, igualmente cuentan con registros reflexivos de su experiencia.

Por eso estamos ante formas nuevas de intercambio de saberes que afianzan la diferencia, ya no entre los que conocen y los que no, sino entre distintos saberes sin que *per se* uno sea superior al otro. Por supuesto que en el mundo actual no hay total simetría, pues todavía las sociedades occidentales –construidas sobre experiencias imperiales de colonialidad y modernidad capitalistas– otorgan poder al académico y lo legitiman como el que sabe acertadamente, naturalizando dichas diferencias. Pero eso se está rompiendo y no solo por el agotamiento de las ciencias sociales convencionales, sino principalmente por la irrupción de nuevas formas de organización y movilización social. El subalterno ya no es un mero informante, debe ser co-investigador de su propia realidad. Aquí cobran importancia no solo las metodologías colaborativas sino la investigación crítica de todas las formas coloniales de conocimiento. Para decirlo en pocas palabras, no basta con tener claro el propósito emancipador e incluir a los intelectuales subalternos en los proyectos de investigación, hay que descolonizar la búsqueda de conocimiento comenzando por la metodología.

Ahora bien los nuevos acercamientos al diálogo de saberes no se limitan a la interacción discursiva entre diferentes culturas, y menos a la que se da entre los intelectuales y los movimientos sociales. Es también un diálogo de prácticas como lo muestran los pueblos indígenas y afrodescendientes en sus experiencias cotidianas de entrar en contacto con la sociedad dominante para acceder a los mercados, ingresar a las escuelas –así sean bilingües–, acudir a los centros médicos, sintonizar un televisor u oír un sermón religioso. Esto para no hablar del choque cultural que están produciendo los megaproyectos y actividades extractivas mineras y agropecuarias que se reviven en

los últimos tiempos en América Latina. Pero también es un diálogo entre culturas subalternas que tampoco está exento de conflictos como a diario se ve entre campesinos blancos o mestizos, indígenas y afrodescendientes. E incluso implica diálogos dentro de las propias comunidades por las asimetrías que se dan en su seno no solo entre bases y autoridades tradicionales –por más legítimas que sean y por más que prediquen que “gobiernan obedeciendo”–, sino también entre generaciones y géneros. Así se ponen en verdadero diálogo distintos saberes en forma más horizontal, simétrica, solidaria y crítica no solo del conocimiento hegemónico sino del propio.

LASA no ha estado ausente de esta trayectoria y por fortuna para este congreso vuelve a contar no solo con una línea temática sobre Otros Saberes sino que tendrá también una sección que revive la exitosa iniciativa de hace unos años. Bienvenidos, por tanto, al debate sobre el diálogo de saberes en Lima 2017.

Nota

- ¹ Para una reflexión más amplia sobre el tema ver Mauricio Archila y otros, “*Hasta cuando soñemos*”: *Extractivismo e interculturalidad en el sur de La Guajira* (Bogotá: Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular, CINEP, 2015). ■

Festival de cine – LASA2017

por ANA LAURA LUSNICH y ANDREA CUARTEROLO, LASA2017 Film Festival directors

Con nueva dirección y equipo de trabajo, la edición 2017 del LASA Film Festival ofrece una variada y completa programación destinada a visualizar y debatir las diferentes realidades latinoamericanas abordadas por el cine contemporáneo, a exhibir realizaciones históricas recuperadas y a difundir producciones regionales de carácter alternativo o emergente.

En esta oportunidad se han seleccionado 19 películas de corto y largometraje, realizadas o coproducidas en América Latina. Los films elegidos se caracterizan por abordar tópicos y conflictos de vigente actualidad en la región (como la violencia y el terrorismo de Estado, la tortura y la desaparición de personas, el exilio agravado por la persecución política o por las desventajas económicas de los países) así como otras temáticas contemporáneas que incluyen la diversidad sexual y de género, la vida trashumante y solitaria en las calles de las grandes ciudades o la desventura de la naturaleza frente a proyectos de industrialización. El punto de encuentro entre los films radica en su potencia expresiva, destacándose sobre todo el manejo y la reutilización de materiales de archivo que se entremezclan, en muchos casos, con una fuerte carga de subjetividad y emotividad. Es en este sentido que se distingue el largometraje premiado, *Allende mi abuelo Allende* de Marcia Tambutti Allende, donde el horizonte histórico la dictadura chilena encuentra en la biografía de Salvador Allende y en el acervo de imágenes y videos de su familia, una dimensión íntima y cargada de afectuosidad. Otros films instalan, por su parte, nuevas formas cinematográficas, creativas y libres, para abordar temas como la desaparición de personas, la escenificación de la sexualidad o la relación del hombre con su entorno. Entre ellos se destaca el cortometraje premiado, *Puntos suspensivos* de Paola Ovalle y Alfonso Díaz

Tovar, collage experimental de imágenes animadas que se centra en la problemática de los desaparecidos en México desde un enfoque a la vez universal y particular.

Esta edición incluye asimismo cinco sesiones especiales, que dan cuenta del interés depositado en el festival por realizadores y académicos. Una de estas sesiones se encuentra patrocinada y organizada por la sección de Cultura Visual de LASA y exhibirá el film *Películas escondidas. Un viaje entre el exilio y la memoria* de Claudia Sandberg y Alejandro Areal Vélez. Otra, con curaduría de las investigadoras Lina X. Aguirre y Cecilia Traslaviña, está dedicada a difundir las más recientes tendencias en la animación experimental latinoamericana contemporánea. Contamos por otro lado, con dos films invitados: *Columns quebradas*, reciente producción del reconocido director Mario Handler, que ofrece una singular visión de la clase trabajadora uruguaya en sus facetas pública y privada; y *Videofilia*, el polémico film peruano de Juan Daniel Molero que instaura nuevas reglas en lo que se refiere a la construcción de las imágenes y a la lectura de la actualidad de su país. Finalmente, desde este año el festival incorpora la sección Rescates, segmento dedicado a rescatar y difundir producciones históricas latinoamericanas significativas y poco conocidas en la región. En esta ocasión, se presentarán *El bolillo fatal o El emblema de la muerte* (Luis del Castillo) y *Wara Wara* (José María Velasco Maidana), dos films silentes bolivianos recientemente rescatados por la Cinemateca Boliviana, que vuelven a verse después de más de 80 años de permanecer en el olvido.

Esperamos que disfruten de esta variada y sugestiva programación. El mismo se realizará en el Auditorio de Derecho, Facultad de Derecho de la PUCP. ■

LASA2017 Local Logistics

Registration

As in the past, all LASA Congress participants and attendees must be registered; no exceptions can be made. The deadline for congress participants to pre-register was March 14, 2017 (5:00 pm EDT).

Registration and check-in areas will be located at the Pontificia Universidad Católica (PUCP). The main registration area will be near the Complejo de Innovación, for participants arriving via the LASA-provided shuttles, and a second registration area will be near the Puerta Principal, for all those arriving independently. Security at the PUCP is a priority and for this reason, all participants must have a photo ID and proof of congress registration in order to enter the campus. Participants are encouraged to check in for the congress starting on Friday, April 28, from 1:30 pm to 7:30 pm at the designated locations.

Registration and check-in hours:

Friday, April 28, 1:30 pm – 7:30 pm at the designated locations around Lima

Saturday, April 29, 7:00 am – 8:00 pm

Sunday, April 30, 7:00 am – 6:30 pm

Monday, May 1, 7:30 am – 1:00 pm

Check-In

Registered US participants will receive their name badges and *constancias* via certified mail, and their program books (if preordered) at the PUCP registration areas. All other participants will receive their name badge, preordered program book, *constancia*, and other information at the time of check-in. Printed program books are only available if ordered and paid for at the time of registration. Otherwise, the program book will only be available online and in our exclusive application.

Participants are urged to give themselves ample time to check in before their scheduled sessions.

People who attend the Welcome Ceremony and Reception on Friday night will be required to wear their badges.

All attendees and participants entering the PUCP campus must have a photo ID and proof of congress registration.

Individuals planning on attending Saturday morning sessions should consider checking in from 1:30 pm to 7:30 pm on Friday, April 28 if at all possible.

On-Site Registration

On-site registration will be limited due to security reasons. Only individuals with evidence of academic affiliation and a photo ID will be allowed to register on-site, after having met the security criteria of the PUCP. Individuals registering on-site should proceed to the on-site registration area to pay the required fees and receive their materials. MasterCard, American Express, and Visa credit cards are the only acceptable forms of payment.

Congress Sessions and Proceedings

Sessions will be held at the Pontificia Universidad Católica. Congress papers received by the Secretariat by the April 7 deadline were posted to the LASA website before the start of the meeting.

- **Pre-conference Sessions** will be held in Pabellón N
- **Sessions** will be held in Pabellón A and Pabellón H
- **The Book Exhibit and Book Presentations** will be located in the Esplanada del Aulario (across from Pabellón A)
- **The Film Festival** will be located at the Auditorio de la Facultad de Derecho
- **The Welcome Ceremony** will be held at the Museo de Arte de Lima
- **The Gran Baile** will be held at the Westin Lima Hotel & Convention Center
- **Section and Non LASA** receptions will be held at the Westin Lima Hotel & Convention Center
- **The Graduate Breakfast** will take place at the Westin Lima Hotel & Convention Center

Contracted Hotels

JW Marriott Hotel Lima (12 kms from the PUCP)
Malecon De La Reserva 615,
Miraflores, Lima

The Westin Lima Hotel & Convention Center (11 kms from the PUCP)
Las Begonias 450, San Isidro, Lima

Sheraton Lima Hotel (7 kms from the PUCP)
Avenida Paseo de la República 170,
Distrito de Lima 15001, Peru

Ibis Larco Miraflores (12 kms from the PUCP)
Avenida Larco 1140 Miraflores, Lima,
Lima 18

Meliá Lima (5 kms from the PUCP)
Avenida Salaverry 2599, San Isidro
15076, Peru

Hotel los Tallanes (8.5 kms from the PUCP)
Av Jorge Basadre 325, San Isidro
15073, Peru

Transportation from the Airport to Hotels

Jorge Chávez International Airport is Peru's main airport. It is located in the Constitutional Province of Callao. Road access to the airport is via Elmer Faucett Av. This is approximately 9 km from the PUCP, 21 km from the JW Marriott, 17 km from the Westin Lima Hotel and 12 km from the Sheraton Lima.

Upon arriving to the airport, it is possible to rent a car or take a certified taxi.

Travel in and around Lima

EasyTaxi, Satelital and Uber are all used in Peru, but depend on phone or data service.

Taxis (at taxi stands) There are no metered taxis in Lima. Please negotiate fares before getting into a taxi. Registered taxis are identifiable by the license number painted on the side and an authorization sticker on the windshield.

Buses Lima offers bus service through various routes. Fares are affordable and paid in cash.

El Metro The city has a service of a rapid transit system called the Metropolitano. "El Metro" has a dedicated lane that runs from the south of the city, through the center then up north. At times it will only stop at certain platforms. Payment is made using an "e-card" which can be purchased or recharged at vending machines on the platforms.

Shuttle between Hotels and PUCP LASA will be providing a shuttle between the official LASA hotels and the PUCP. Only individuals with the LASA name badge will be permitted to board the buses. The times and routes will be made available closer to the congress. Please be prepared to have alternative transportation in case of exceptional needs.

Audio/Visual Equipment

LASA will provide an LCD projector, a screen, and the proper connections for a laptop in each meeting room. **Each panel will be responsible for bringing a laptop for their presentation.** Separate audio and video equipment will not be provided. Any video presentations should be recorded on DVD or any other media so they may

be viewed via the laptop. Presenters will be required to provide their own speakers if needed. AV staff will be available if participants experience any problems with the equipment.

Child Care

LASA will subsidize the cost of child care for accepted participants who bring their children to Lima. LASA will provide reimbursements at the rate of US\$10.00 per hour for one child and US\$15.00 for two or more children, for a maximum of 10 hours.

LASA's maximum responsibility per family will be \$100.00 for one child and \$150.00 for two or more children. A parent who bills LASA for child care must be a 2017 member of the Association and a registered attendee of LASA2017. To receive reimbursement, the parent must submit the original bill from the caregiver, with the name(s) of the child(ren) and the dates of the service, to the LASA Secretariat on or before July 15, 2017. **The caregiver must be an official child care service. Family members will not be reimbursed for child care.*

Constancias

Constancias for LASA2017 will be provided either via certified mail or during check-in at the designated locations and the PUCP. ■

LASA2017 Exhibitors

The Book Exhibit will be located in the Esplanada del Aulario by the Camino Inca of the Pontificia Universidad Católica. The Exhibit hours will be: Saturday, April 29, from 9:30 am to 6:00 pm; Sunday, April 30, from 9:30 am to 6:00 pm, and Monday, May 1, from 9:30 am to 4:00 pm. Admission to the Book Exhibit is free for registered attendees.

ORGANIZATION	BOOTH #
Callao Government	128
Cambridge University Press	131
Centro ABYA-YALA	101
Centro de Estudios Literarios Antonio Cornejo Polar (CELACP)	125
Centro de Estudios y Publicaciones CEP & Editorial CEDET	124
CIDE AC	110
CIESAS	118
Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO)	142-147
Digitalia	121
Duke University Press	134
EcoAméricas	140
Ediciones Metales Pesados	112
Editorial Cuarto Propio	119
Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO)	136
Iberoamericana - Librería Sur	126 - 127
Institute of Latin American Studies	100
Instituto de Estudios Peruanos	103
Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos	120
Instituto Internacional de Literatura Iberoamericana (IILI)	133
Instituto Mora	109
James Weldon Johnson Institute, Emory University & Extramuros Facsímiles	113
Latin American Perspectives	139
Latin American Studies Association (LASA)	123

ORGANIZATION	BOOTH #
Peter Lang Publishing	114
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú	104 - 105
Project MUSE	138
Routledge	107 - 108
Rutgers University Press	111
Siglo del Hombre & Editoriales Académicas y Universitarias de Colombia	129
Springer Nature DBA: Palgrave	102
Springer SBM BV	115
The School for Field Studies	130
Universidad del Pacífico	106
University of Texas Press	137
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)	122
Yolanda Carlessi	132

LASA Combined Book Display (booth # 141)

Louisiana State University Press	141
Mary Beth Tierney-Tello	141
Mirian Melton-Villanueva	141
University of Michigan Press	141

Proposed Changes to the LASA Constitution and Bylaws

The Executive Council of LASA, at its most recent meeting, approved the following proposed changes in the Constitution and Bylaws of the Association to accomplish the following:

1. Allow student memberships a maximum of 7 years (instead of 5)
2. Add a permanent student seat to the Executive Council
3. Add ex officio members to represent the Latin American Research Commons (LARC) initiative
4. Add ex officio members to oversee the implementation of the LASA Strategic Plan

Objections can be directed to LASA Executive Director, LASA, 416 Bellefield Hall, 315 S. Bellefield Ave., Pittsburgh, PA 15213, or lasa@pitt.edu. The cutoff date for receipt of objections to the below proposed changes is July 21, 2017.

Constitution

Article III. Membership

No one may hold student membership for more than *seven* years.

Article V. Executive Council, Item 1a

The Executive Council shall consist of: *eleven* voting members (the Immediate Past President, President, Vice President, Treasurer, *a Graduate Student*, and six elected members), and the following ex officio members with voice but no vote: the LASA Executive Director, the Editor of the *Latin American Research Review*, the current Congress Program Chair(s), *the Editor(s) of the Latin American Research Commons (LARC), and the Strategic Plan Oversight Committee.*

Article V. Executive Council, Item 1c

The terms of the Graduate Student shall be for two years. One shall be elected every two years by electronic ballot as prescribed in the Bylaws.

Article IX. Latin America Research Commons

LASA's online publication platform is the Latin America Research Commons (LARC). Editor(s) of LARC shall be appointed by the Ways and Means Committee and their appointments ratified by the Executive Council.

Article X. Strategic Plan Oversight Committee

The Strategic Plan Oversight Committee is appointed by the Ways and Means Committee. It consists of a maximum of three members who are involved in the development and implementation of the strategic plan and who serve for the duration of the current strategic plan (5 years).

Bylaws

Article I. Nominations, New Item 5

Candidates for the Graduate Student position shall be nominated according to the following procedures:

- a. The Nominations Committee shall nominate at least two candidates each election (to take place every two years);*
- b. The Executive Director shall enter on an official ballot the names of the two candidates proposed by the Nominations Committee and the names of all candidates proposed by write-in petition.*

Article II. Elections, Item 1

1. The Vice President and the members of the Executive Council shall be elected by electronic ballot sent once a year by the Executive Director (*and every two years for the Graduate Student position*) to all members in good standing.

Article VII. Dues

When the Council sets a special rate for student members, whose status is certified by their principal faculty advisers, such special rate shall be applicable to a member for a maximum of *seven* years. ■

NEWS FROM LASA

Statement on the Situation in Venezuela

The Latin American Studies Association (LASA) expresses deep concern about the ongoing situation in Venezuela. The decision of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice to deprive the National Assembly of its legislative functions represented a decisive step towards authoritarian rule. The attempt to dissolve the National Assembly suppressed the constitutional tenet of separation of powers and the will of the Venezuelan people, expressed in the legislative elections of December 2015. With almost half of its members in Latin America, LASA is an international organization that affirms in the strongest terms possible the principles of academic freedom and the protection of human rights. LASA calls upon the Venezuelan government to respect the Bolivarian Constitution, respect the legislative functions of the National Assembly, and release all political prisoners.

Joanne Rappaport, LASA President, Georgetown University

Gil Joseph, LASA Immediate Past President, Yale University

Aldo Panfichi, Vice President / President Elect, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú

Patricia Tovar, Treasurer, John Jay College

Evelina Dagnino, Executive Council Member, Universidade Estadual de Campinas

Robin Derby, Executive Council Member, University of California, Los Angeles

Maria Helena Machado, Executive Council Member, Universidade de São Paulo

Claudia Ferman, Executive Council Member, University of Richmond

Daniela Spenser, Executive Council Member, CIESAS / Mexico City


Catalina Romero, Ex Officio Member, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú

Timothy Power, Ex Officio Member, University of Oxford

Florencia Garramuño, Ex Officio Member, Universidad de San Andrés

Philip Oxhorn, Ex Officio Member, McGill University

Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Ex Officio Member, University of Pittsburgh



Petition to US Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittees in Support of NEA, NEH and CPB

The Executive Council, past presidents, and members of the Latin American Studies Association appeal to the United States Congress to continue full funding to the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB). Founded fifty years ago, the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) is the largest professional Association in the world for individuals and institutions engaged in the study of Latin America. With over 12,000 members, nearly 60 percent of whom reside outside the United States, LASA is the one association that brings together experts on Latin America from all disciplines and diverse occupational endeavors, across the globe. Our mission is to foster intellectual discussion, research, and teaching on Latin America, the Caribbean, and its people throughout the Americas; to promote the interests of its diverse membership; and to encourage civic engagement through network building and public debate.

The total defunding of NEH, NEA, and CPB proposed in the 2018 federal budget represents an abandonment of the role that creative production and scholarship in the arts and humanities has played historically in United States, as well as obscures the positive image that the U.S. projects in the international arena. NEA has supported the work of numerous Latino artists, authors, musicians, and filmmakers in the United States. NEH has facilitated the research of countless Latin Americanist historians, literary scholars, and anthropologists, work that has not only entered the core of university curricula in the U.S., but has influenced the development of these disciplines in Latin America. The support of these institutions has been instrumental in disseminating the results of scholarly research and artistic production to a broader audience. Henry Louis Gates' pathbreaking four-part television series, "Black in Latin America," was funded in

part by CPB. NEH's "Latino Americans: 500 Years of History" supported over 200 institutions, including libraries, historical societies, museums, and civic associations, to organize festivals, collect oral histories, and conduct discussion groups about Latino history and culture during 2015-2016.

Funding of NEH, NEA, and CPB, whose budgets total less than \$800 million, comprises only a tiny fraction of the billions of dollars included in the annual budget of the United States. Nevertheless, the three institutions make immeasurable contributions to schools, universities, libraries, museums, and theaters across the United States, immensely enriching the lives of Americans and sharing the creative potential of the U.S. with artists, musicians, scholars, writers, and the general public of countries throughout the world.

We petition you to continue to fully fund the NEH, NEA, and CPB, ensuring that the United States remains a beacon for creativity and the production of knowledge.

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Marysa Navarro Aranguren, Dartmouth College and Harvard University

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Maria Herminia Tavares de Almeida, Universidade de São Paulo

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Gilbert Joseph, Immediate Past President, Yale University

Aldo Panfichi, Vice President / President Elect, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú

Patricia Tovar, Treasurer, John Jay College

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






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Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Latin American Research Review Editor-in-Chief, University of Pittsburgh ■

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