Part 1: Constitutions and global military conjunctures
Over a longer historical period, many Latin American constitutions were created in clusters, and formed parts of global constitutional waves, possessing identifiable global features. From the outset, constitutions established in Latin America were not entirely symmetrical with those put in place in Europe, and at different junctures, they displayed salient differences. For example, many constitutions created following the independence period in Latin America were more democratic than those constitutions (limited in number) that persisted in Europe after 1815. The link between constitutionalism and democracy, which later acquired sine qua non status in constitutional theory, was originally more pronounced in Latin America than in Europe. This remained the case at least up to 1860s and 1870s, when some European constitutions began to endorse universal suffrage (for men). Generally, however, we can identify five primary waves of constitution-making.[1] These five waves typically engaged similar actors in constitution-making, they created constitutions with some common functions, and––above all––they reflected parallel reactions, inside national societies, to changes outside these societies, especially in the domain of national security.
The first constitutional wave was the period of revolutionary constitution-making. This wave began in the British colonies in the North Atlantic (later USA), and it eventually included the revolutionary constitutions in France (1791, 1793, 1795), the 1812 constitution of Spain, and independence constitutions in much of Latin America, ending with the part-monarchical and part-revolutionary constitution of Brazil (1824). The second constitutional wave had a more cautious emphasis, beginning after 1848 in Europe, and gathering pace in the 1860s and 1870s. This wave typically gave rise to states with large electoral franchises, with some element of democracy becoming a common feature of constitutional rule. However, it created many polities with constrained legislatures, such that the democratic implications of deepening enfranchisement were counterbalanced by restrictions placed on the powers of elected officials. In Europe, this wave included constitutions in Germany, Austria, Italy, France, the Ottoman Empire, Spain, Greece, Serbia, and pre-independence Bulgaria. Many Latin American constitutions (e.g. Colombia 1886, Brazil 1891) can be aligned to this model. A third constitutional wave occurred in Europe around the end of World War I. In Latin America, where only Brazil was actively engaged in the war, this wave had a weaker effect, but it brought constitutional change in different states. Long-term effects of the war shaped Brazilian constitutional reforms in 1926, and the constitutional coup from 1930-34. In some respects, the 1917 constitution of Mexico also belongs to this wave, although it can be linked to a sub-cluster of constitutions established in the wake of the Russo-Japanese war, in Russia (1906), Iran (1906-7), Turkey (restored 1908), and China (1912).[2] The fourth constitutional wave included a group of constitutions created after 1945, for example, those in Japan, Italy, France, West Germany, and India, as well as Argentina and Brazil. In the 1980s and 1990s, many states in Europe, Latin America, and Africa obtained new constitutions, forming a fifth wave. At this time, Latin American constitutions were established in settings very similar to those that shaped constitutional formation in other parts of the world. Most constitutions were created following the collapse of authoritarian regimes, and, in this setting, international organizations with norm-setting powers often played an important role in constitutional change. This was clear in the Chilean constitutional reforms of 1989. Yet the role of international law remained high, even in constitutions, which deviated from Western patterns of norm formation, such as the 2009 constitution of Bolivia (see Art 256).
Individual constitutions in these waves displayed many variations. However, some common features can be identified in each period, and each constitutional wave reflected a set of overlapping structures. To speak at a level of causal abstraction, it is possible to see constitutions at different times and in different global locations as part of an evolving world constitutional system, reacting––divergently––to a global constitutional conjuncture.
First, each wave of constitution-making reflected, in different ways, the reconstruction of inter-imperial relations at the global level. This became less manifest from the 1980s, although post-imperial tensions had hardly disappeared at this point. Before the 1980s, constitutions were commonly designed as states produced new internal mechanisms to manage their positions in the international system of competition, largely defined by imperial restructuring. In Latin America, this was initially reflected in the fact that many constitutions imposed patterns of nation formation on territories forced towards convergence by external imperialist pressures. Moreover, many constitutions were partly focused on problems of citizenship construction persisting from the imperial period, and they brought boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in post-imperial polities to the surface of societal contestation. Moreover, different constitutions were designed to intensify the distinct national quality of territorial occupancy, allowing contests over land ownership and inter-regional conflicts to acquire prominence.
Second, each wave of constitution-making was based on a formal endeavour to configure the nexus between the state and the military. Globally, most constitutions (before the 1980s) cemented a contract between government and society about the provision of national military force, and most constitutions imposed a legal order on (and for) the military. This happened differently in different contexts. In Latin American societies, the reliance of the government on national armies was weaker than in Europe. However, most states devised constitutions that allowed governments to extract military capacity from citizens in order to stabilize their sovereignty in external military environments. This assumed particular importance after decolonization, as states were required to build up military systems, and constitutional agreements served to sustain (notionally) the government’s monopoly of political violence. Evidence of this can be found in Colombia, where early constitutions accorded citizenship privileges to military personnel.[3] In many contexts, the military played a fundamental role in defining national citizenship to support emerging central governments. For instance, the consolidation of citizenship in Brazil, including the allocation of citizenship rights to B lack citizens, is inexplicable without the partial mobilization of the population in the Paraguayan War. In much of the world, the immediate impact of military agents on constitutional law was weakened in the 1980s. Yet, in Latin America, many transitions at this time were forged against a military backdrop, and subsequent constitutional systems depended on the definition of a constitutional role for the military. In most cases, this took place in an international setting that favored the constitutional subordination of domestic military personnel. To achieve this, some states obtained constitutions under which judicial bodies declared that previous military governments had acted as belligerent organizations towards their own people.
In each wave, constitutions developed as the internal (national) part of the international security system (world system). Each wave was marked by the varying adaptation of states to external security pressures––usually originating in imperialism––and the need to manage national security was commonly inscribed in the deep grammar of citizenship. These waves cannot easily be captured through conventional distinctions between different types of constitution––for instance, between republican, monarchical, and liberal constitutions. Virtually all constitutions were defined by the fact that they allowed states to adapt to changing security environments, and internal variations in constitutional systems were typically secondary articulations of this macro-sociological pattern. In fact, many constitutions (e.g. USA 1789; France 1791-5; Brazil 1824; Germany 1849, 1871; France post-1875) contained both republican and imperial elements. Vital to note, however, is that, contrary to much analysis, militarism did not uniformly place downward pressure on rights established in national constitutions. To be clear, military violence often weakened constitutional rights during actual conflict. Yet, most constitutions established sets of rights for their citizens as a way of integrating society in the face of military pressure. Few constitutional rights came into being that did not support the adaptation of states to risks in the international domain.[4] Moreover, external military pressures usually led states, over time, to integrate their citizens in intensified fashion, so that, incrementally, states solidified distinct layers of constitutional rights––procedural, political and social––to cement vertical bonds of citizenship.[5]
Part 2: The contemporary military conjuncture
Today, we see the emergence of a new constitutional conjuncture, as, arguably, a sixth wave of constitution-making is beginning to take shape. In this conjuncture, the deep link between military tension, constitutional citizenship formation, and (post-)imperial transformation is becoming palpable again, albeit in new forms.
This new conjuncture has been partly defined by the aggressive posture of the Russian government towards former Soviet Republics and satellites in Central Asia and Eastern Europe. In parallel, this new conjuncture is determined by the fact that many features of the international order that took shape after 1945, and that supported democratizing tendencies in constitutional law, have been reconfigured. This began with the partial discrediting of the international legal order linked to the United Nations (UN) in concerted military engagements beginning around 2000, culminating most notably in the Iraq War (2003) and UN-authorized intervention in Libya (2011). However, recently, the basic contours of the international order that accompanied most democratic constitution-making since 1945 have been challenged. This is strikingly perceptible in foreign policy directives issued in Washington since early 2025, which have both upended core pillars of the post-1945 security system and reinforced precedents for tolerance of extreme military repression and incursion on sovereign territories.
These developments have shaped understandings of national sovereignty in many polities, and many states have started to redesign their constitutional systems because of uncertainties in the international security landscape. In some cases, governments approach their citizens as agents exposed to violence and require the mobilization of violence to support their sovereignty. In other cases, governments reposition themselves in the global security system, so that security has less immediate and less predictable results. Accordingly, the concept of security often enters constitutional law as a multivalent term: it acquires different meanings in different settings and it shapes the content of constitutional law in context-dependent ways. Yet, as in previous constitutional waves, this new conjuncture does not invariably induce reduced protection for international norms and/or basic rights. It may weaken procedural protections that frame the power of national governments. But it may elevate the constitutional authority of norms defined at the international level, as states may align domestic law to international norms to appeal to potential allies, to alter their membership in existing security communities, or to reinforce regional leadership claims. Furthermore, this environment may force states to integrate their citizens in new ways, either coercively or through rights-based transactions. As in previous waves, the altering articulation between states and the global security system may mean that citizens obtain new sets of constitutional rights. In broad terms, however, contemporary constitutions can be classified in terms of how they transmit changing security pressures into constructions of citizenship; in some cases, this takes an authoritarian form and, in other cases, a rights-generative form.
First, some states have reacted to these pressures simply by creating entirely new or substantially rewritten constitutions involving or following changes in government. For instance, recent changes in international security regimes have been partly responsible for the promulgation of new constitutions, or the implementation of far-reaching constitutional reforms, in Central Asia––in Kyrgyzstan (2021), Kazakhstan (2022), and Uzbekistan (2023). Two of these constitutions have increased the rights that can be accessed by citizens. Second, some states have responded to this context by conducting or planning constitutional reforms without changing government. This is the case in Turkey, whose constitution was substantially reformed in 2017, and in India, where, since 2014, Modi’s government has effected substantial changes in constitutional practice, including measures to weaken the judiciary and to strengthen the executive. In both states, the redirection of constitutional law serves to solidify governmental authority internally. However, it is affected by international security designs, and it reflects strategic choices about the regional position of the state. Lastly, in parallel, many states that have not (yet) promoted constitutional adjustment in the textual dimension of public law have initiated alterations in constitutional practice and rhetoric, which respond to changes in the international security system. This is most evident in countries close to centers of military conflict. In Germany, constitutional principles regarding public debt have been revised, and historical presumptions regarding Germany’s external obligations are being reconsidered, mainly because of security pressures. Poland is in the process of accelerated military reinforcement (it now has the largest army in Europe), and its military strength has grown rapidly under governments of different constitutional hues.
Reactions to these pressures in Latin America are partly shaped by the fact that polities in the region are historically far removed from the most volatile inter-state conflict zones. However, some factors resulting from the altered war/law nexus have begun to influence constitutional structures in Latin America. On one hand, alterations in the international security system have become manifest through the changing role of the USA. The weakening of the USA as a security guarantor in Europe has created the demand for a European security system, which European states will have to negotiate by constitutional means. In Latin America, this outcome is less manifest, and the reduction of the US military presence is improbable. Recent changes in the USA have brought the militarization of border relations with Mexico and militarized tension with Venezuela, resulting in de facto US military occupation of the latter in early 2026. On the other hand, as in Europe, the erosion of the international order means that some states have begun to re-situate themselves in the global system, and this will also require constitutional negotiation. In some cases, this is likely to accentuate fissures between domestic constitutional groups, as the articulation of intra-societal conflict over the terms of national citizenship will be closely linked to antagonisms in the international security system. As in previous periods, this articulation may have military results. In addition, one outcome of global security restructuring is that, internally, the USA is assuming militarized constitutional features. This is not immediately the result of factual security shifts outside the USA, but it fits a pattern of internal militarization that often typifies constitutional government in periods of changing security imperatives. Globally, one probable result of this is that some states will experience internal factionalization between groups with rival external security commitments (i.e. divergent approaches to the USA), and some groups––whether in or outside government––will opt for internal militarization as a sign of their external orientation. This is likely to find expression in the constitutional domain, especially in Latin America.
Across different cases, the nexus of security and constitutional law is acquiring renewed prominence. It is not yet possible to see how these developments will define constitutional law. To date, there is no evidence that increased insecurity leads inevitably to authoritarianism. In each case, however, the rights fabric of citizenship established in constitutional law needs to be interpreted as a complex sociological text, in which external and internal factors converge in new ways to shape the future of democracy.
Part 3: The international security conjuncture in Latin America
Different constitutions in South America can be positioned against this global constitutional background, and constitutional futures in the region cannot be envisioned or explained without consideration of this context.[6] However, new security alignments may have paradoxical constitutional results, with security figuring as a multidirectional term, sometimes challenging and sometimes intensifying rights protections.
In some cases, the changing security environment is likely to gain impact in strictly military policy domains, so that military policies may shape the constitutional form of democracy. Colombia stands out in this regard. The 2016 peace agreements, ending the long-standing civil conflict, have been strained––in part––because of international policies in Washington. This means that the terms of the Havana Accords, which have de facto constitutional rank, cannot easily be fulfilled. The Constitutional Court has already declared (Decision SU020-22) that there exists an unconstitutional state of affairs in this regard, as basic rights delineated in the Accords cannot be protected. Recently, cuts to US development programs have further unsettled premises for pacification. The recent removal of Colombia from the list of US allies, flanked by military attacks on putative narcotics traders in the Caribbean, has created a constitutional climate in which internal and external hostilities are at risk of converging. However, such security challenges are not inherently constitutionally restrictive, and they may prove dialectically rights-generative. For example, the Decision mentioned above took steps to reinforce protective measures for basic rights, establishing heightened protection for jus post bellum. This involved the extended application of international humanitarian law in Colombian society, creating elevated obligations to protect public-law rights for public and private bodies.[7]
In some cases, external security fissures shape the structure of constitutions in ways that have little to do with strictly defined military conflicts. One important example is Brazil. Here, the changing global security system creates manifest challenges, as the Washington-based regime has expressed explicit threats to Brazil’s sovereign jurisdiction, including external interference in the indictment of ex-President Bolsonaro for military conspiracy against the constitution.[8] At one level, this security system has elicited a reaction from President Lula, displaying a powerful commitment to the protection of national sovereignty, even implying a bid for symbolic leadership outside the security bloc led by the USA. Lula has long endorsed policies to locate Brazil in a multi-polar security system, in which the importance of Washington is reduced. At the same time, this conjuncture has exacerbated intra-societal polarization. Internal groups with opposed security objectives and distinct understandings of Brazil’s position in the global security system favor rival internal visions of constitutional law and constitutional rights, and hostility between them shapes the construction of national citizenship and democracy. As is well known, Bolsonaro, closely tied to the USA, advocated the repressive militarization of citizenship. This was backed by (pseudo)religious rhetoric and hostility to rights-based minorities and groups defined by sexuality, and it was linked to a harsh campaign against social rights.
In this context, the recent redrawing of the global security architecture created a two-cornered constitutional conjuncture in Brazil, in which internal and external factors shape constitutional form in overlapping ways. Externally, state policy reflects the constitutional imperative to defend national sovereignty. This is linked to heightened insistence on the status of international law and the rejection of US-sponsored military repression. To date, this has proved an important source of legitimacy for the President, and, as a result, the internal orientation of the constitution is––currently––proportioned to this external imperative. The President promotes citizenship constructs aligned to groups that reject the global role of the USA, and these constructs tend to reinforce rights for pluralistic legal subjects in society (related to gender, ethnicity, and sexuality). This tendency cannot be observed without qualification. Yet what appears to be emerging in Brazil is a rights-generative constitutional constellation, in which external security pressures lead to increased citizens’ rights.
These are two of many current constitutional scenarios in Latin America. Of course, these conditions may be transformed or repressively curtailed by future governments. However, they speak of a sixth wave of constitution-making in the world system, which palpably affects Latin America. In this wave, security is both a dominant and a paradoxical determinant of constitutional form.