The patrimonialization of state coercion, exemplified by subnational alliances between armed non-state actors and regional political families in such places as Colombia’s Caribbean Coast, compels us to reconsider several aspects of theories of the state and social action. Conveniently, it brings together the theory of oligarchic modes of rule and Weber’s conceptualization of the state (including its patrimonial variation).
Jeffrey Winters, in his already classic study of Oligarchy, observes that his “perspective [is] influenced as much by Marx’s historical materialism as by Weber’s emphasis on the locus of the means of coercion in his classic definition of the modern state” (2011: 9). I entirely agree that oligarchic theory, as a theory of minority rule, must incorporate the definitional trait of extremely concentrated wealth to be intelligibly differentiated from other forms of minority rule—above all elite theory. The materialist turn in Winters’ theory is therefore entirely prudent! Moreover, it not only provides an opportunity to connect Weber with Marx, but also Weber with oligarchic theory and how relations of domination within the state itself facilitate forms of rule that blur the distinction between the private and public exercise of power.
Oligarchy is a system of political wealth defense, in which individuals and groups tied to individuals (e.g., families and family firms) with highly concentrated wealth use that wealth—a self-reproducing source of power—to defend it politically. Variation arises from the nature of threats to that wealth—vertically (lower income people) or horizontally (other oligarchs)—resulting in a two-factor matrix, contingent on the degree of involvement in coercion on the one axis (e.g., warlords and plutocrats, respectively), and the degree of fragmentation on the other (e.g., mafia groups unified in a common league or in open confrontation with each other). Thus, the specific forms of oligarchy vary depending on the sources of wealth, the extent of involvement in governance and coercion, the degree of factionalism among elites, and the constraints imposed upon them.
The argument here is that Max Weber's famous definition of the state as the successful monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force requires more contemplative work (1946). Specifically, oligarchy as a mode of political rule is predicated on extreme inequality and the extent to which economic elites are able to translate the resulting economic power into control over the means of coercion. The latter is the patrimonialization of state coercion, and it can take several routes—even within one nation-state.
The corollary of several paths to influencing or controlling coercion within one nation-state is that statehood itself must incorporate a more fluid conceptualization of coercive relations that diverges from its functional monopolization. Again, Colombia exemplifies this point: territoriality, with the exception of Panama’s secession, did not alter much in the 200 years post independence, but its internal relations of coercion did fluctuate. It is, of course, thanks to the wealth of Weber’s writings that we can further our understanding of state coercion—and its variations—by exploring the various conceptualizations of social action; specifically ,social political action as such, and how it differentiates from politically oriented social action. Both align well with Winters’ conceptualizations of warring and civil oligarchy, respectively. To remind the reader, for Weber, social action is action with meaning directed toward other social actors (who also act with purposive intention; see below).
One of the fundamental presuppositions of Mazzuca’s work on Latecomer State Formation in Latin America (2021) is that the process of state formation was concluded relatively early, but state building has remained an ongoing challenge. Contrary to the European experience, state formation and building were chronologically separate processes, and therefore also conceptually decoupled experiences. It is this empirical fact that enables Mazzuca to produce the three-tiered model of latecomer state formation (port–, party–, and lord-driven state formation), in which polity makers responded to market rather than war incentives (1-4).
It is safe to say that the bifurcation of creating the nation-state in Latin America into state formation and building has had long-term consequences for the ability of elites to construct state capacity—a historical truth that, again, does not merely apply to Colombia, but most of the continent’s countries. It is therefore important to stress for the conceptual discussion to follow that Weber's emphasis on coercion cannot be a point of critique when considering cases, where the monopoly of violence has always been fragile (at best), or homicide rates have remained spectacularly high for decades. That is, the lack of a monopoly of coercion does not make Weber’s theory irrelevant. Rather, in the terminology of Weber’s ideal-type definition of the state, which in its core combines three elements—territoriality, coercion, legitimacy—the former, territoriality, has effectively been a ceteris paribus assumption since the 1850s for all of Latin America. Coercion, though, was not merely in flux, but also relational in nature (and the legitimacy of those coercive relations equally fluid). It is this empirical reality that has transcended historical andcontemporary Latin American political affairs, making the need evident for a more fine-grainedanalytical tool to explore social relations and complex political realities unfolding at thesubnational level, embedded in coercive structures.
In order to illustrate the validity of these contentions in contemporary political affairs in Latin America, it makes sense to explore empirical cases, such as Colombia and its history of endemic violence. Even during periods of democratic strengthening, the state experienced a contraction of its capacities as violence persisted, and non-state armed actors (ANSAs) became deeply embedded in parts of the country. This occurred, for example, after the implementation of the astonishingly democratic Constitution of 1991. Consequently, Colombia's democracy is often described as "besieged" or "threatened," with different types of actors populating an institutional and extra-institutional playing field (Bejarano & Pizzaro 2005).
Zoomed into that black-box, explanations often purport a providential aura of a vacuum enveloping the political and geographical space that constitutes the extra-institutional playing field, which is then subsequently filled by non-state armed actors. The state is said to have left the space abandoned for historical or geographical reasons, and the ANSA takes over its functions in its place—akin to discovering a carte blanche. Yet, recent scholarship challenges the notion that the presence of ANSAs simply equates to the "absence" of the state. Instead, it suggests that ANSAs have engaged in numerous contentious relations with the state, including disputation, usurpation, and coexistence (Gutiérrez 2022), contending "over the form and content of statehood itself" (Ballve 2020). This local turn in conflict studies views local non-state order not as separate from, but part of, a larger space where political and coercive patterns interact. Importantly, it has been shown that non-state armed power is intensely local and dependent on territorial control, often threatened by other armed competitors (Gutiérrez & Ciro 2022). It is precisely those characteristics that match Winters’ definition of warring oligarchs, whose wealth is coterminous with their ability to exercise territorial control (local coercion).
Placing these findings in relation to Weber’s famous definition, we are left with the undoubtedly important insight that ANSA presence demonstrates, beyond reasonable doubt, that a truly successful monopolization of violence does not exist. At the same time, the demand to move beyond this ideal-type definition and clarify the structural and political implications of sub-national variations of coercive relations remains, not least, because it brings Weber’s theory of the state closer to Winters’ theory of oligarchy. If, as conflict research of ANSAs in Colombia (and Latin America) suggests, ANSA presence and apparent state absenteeism are not exogenous to dynamics of state-building but reflect the heterogeneity of coercion across a state's territory, then it is prudent to view the state itself as an arena of social relations, including relations of domination.
Incidentally, Weber’s interpretive sociology helps us to spin that thought further. To briefly recall, the core building block is comprised in Weber’s theory of social action—in Habermas’s words his theory of rationality in society (Habermas 1985: 48-57). According to Weber, “sociology is concerned with the interpretive understanding of social action,” and seeks to provide, as a “science, causal explanation of its course and consequences” (1968: 4). It becomes social science for two specific reasons: 1) the subjective meaning agents attach to their behavior; and 2) when that meaning takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course. Weber was quite clear about the importance of interpretive subjectivity for questions of violence and coercion; we only need to recall the attribute “legitimate,” which designates the coercion peculiar to the state; it is not merely the monopolization of violence, but also legal (Ahmed 2022).
The conflict process literature has documented an immense variety of forms of criminal and non-state governance, ranging from the bridging of low levels of trust (Gambetta 1993) to rebel governance (Arjona 2016) and the generic usurpation of state functions (Ballve 2020). It has become clear that armed non-state actors organize social life in communities (Boesten 2021). To illustrate how Weber’s theory of social action fits into this spectrum of criminal governance, it is worth recalling the Colombian case again, and appreciating the difference between narcos puros and those armed actors that match Winters’ definition of warring oligarchs. In Colombia’s peripheral zones, local drug merchants and even larger narco-traffickers do not enforce the rules of the illegal economies. Despite often being very violent, they are rule takers of those armed non-state actors that create the "legality" of the illegal economy itself through their coercive capacities. They create certainty within the illicit economy. For example, the FARC-EP taxed narcos per kilogram of coca paste transported through their territory and also regulated prices for the trade of kilos passed-on to other merchants. They act as regulators of the illicit economy, providing "contractual certainty" through coercive force. The various paramilitary groups in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta tax illicit as well as licit merchants (including street vendors and tourism businesses; cf. Boesten and Llanos 2025). These groups are engaged in political action, but one that must be distinguished from the “everyday usage [applied to the] term ‘political’” (Weber 1968: 64). Rather they are engaging in political action as such, which can be defined as consisting in the action by a group to establish rules and codes of conduct that are backed by the explicit or implicit threat of force.
This usurpation of state coercion (and accompanying functions) is a phenomenon that can be observed in cases in Latin America beyond Colombia. It is true that the longevity of its conflict has produced particularly profound non-state governance structures. Nevertheless, criminal governance is an enduring experience in Brazil’s favelas, in the informal settlements in Central America’s urban hubs, and artisanal mining in Peru (Zarai & Arce 2024).
In order to appreciate how the patrimonialization of state coercion falls into this discussion, it is again worthwhile to explore Weber’s sociological theory; more precisely, to consider the changes that he assigned to the rationalization of state bureaucracy. The legal-rational state rests on bureaucracy rather than spoils, using law to structure state-society relations. This provides three forms of defense for citizens against the abuses of power, whether by other citizens (including wealthy oligarchs) or the state (including oligarchic states): 1) the rule of law to uphold private and public rights; 2) representation to issue preferences; 3) horizontal accountability to provide checks on encroachment and corruption. Under ideal conditions, all three elements can attenuate oligarchic tendencies, but horizontal accountability, combined with the civic virtue of citizens and rulers, appropriate constitutional order (Putnam et. al 1994), which is the main bulwark against the corruption of the republic. This is important to remember because a democratic regime itself is in tension with, but not strictly incompatible with, oligarchy.
Weber defines the patrimonial state as one with little to no differentiation between the private and public exercise of power. As he says, the patrimonial state is one, in which “the prince organizes his political power over extra-patrimonial areas and political subjects—which is not discretionary and not enforced by physical coercion—just like the exercise of his patriarchal power” (Weber 1968: 1022). Accordingly, patrimonialism has its root in the patriarchal domination, and is essentially “based not on the official’s commitment to an impersonal purpose and not on obedience to abstract norms, but on a strictly personal loyalty. …Patriarchal domination [grows] out of the master’s authority over his household” (Weber 1968: 1013).
Thus, even though norms in a rational and patrimonial bureaucracy are both oriented toward stability and possess an “everyday character,” “under patriarchal domination the legitimacy of the master’s order is guaranteed by personal subjection, and only fact and the limits of his power of control are derived from ‘norms’ [that are] sanctified by tradition” (1007). Thus, the patrimonial state is closely tied to habitus, tradition, and patriarchal domination. My argument here is that oligarchy is a persistent—indeed, endogenous—feature of patrimonial states.
In order to illustrate the bond between oligarchic modes of rule and the patrimonial state, recall the infamous parapolítica scandal in Colombia, which revealed mutually beneficial alliances between politicians and armed actors. Paramilitary leaders (i.e. warring oligarchs) could mobilize votes for politicians in local elections (at least up to the level of Congressional elections), whose legislative action aligned very closely with the interests of paramilitaries. Legal politicians, conventionally coming from a limited number of “political families” (and therefore corresponding to Winters’ definition of civil oligarchs), benefited greatly from dominating most municipal, regional, and congressional public offices. They reaped the benefits in the form of preferential access to public contracts, ranging from infrastructure projects to public relations campaigns (Boesten et. al., forthcoming). Ultimately, the patrimonialization of coercion is indirect through informal relations with non-state armed actors, but the patrimonialization of public offices is very much direct, as the spoils essentially remain with those political families.
The patrimonialization of state coercion by legal elites in Colombia’s periphery—civil oligarchs in Winters’ conceptualization—also aligns with a type of social action Weber defines in Economy and Society. He writes that “social action, especially organized action, will be spoken of as 'politically oriented' if it aims at exerting influence on the government of a political organization; especially at the appropriation, expropriation, redistribution or allocation of the powers of government.” (Weber: 54). Recall that Winters’ theory differentiated between types of oligarchic modes of rule on the basis of involvement in coercion, governance, and fractionalization. The aforementioned political families do not exercise that coercion directly, but they very much affect the appropriation, expropriation, redistribution, or allocation of the powers of government at the local level, and they do so to the benefit of their own wealth and social positions. Thus, they are civil oligarchs engaging in politically oriented action. The informal concoction with warring oligarchs allows them to patrimonialize state coercion (at least regionally) to mobilize votes and guarantee access to public contracts. It is a private exercise of political power, creating a “turbulent equilibrium” amongst contending civil oligarchs. They can, and do, contend within the relatively democratic political order.
It is somewhat fitting and ironic that oligarchic theory in Germany is subsumed under the name Aristotelian Staatslehre, a Weberian phrase if there ever was one. It conveniently connects the author of the original theory of oligarchy with the author of the theory of the modern state. Ostensibly, that is the point that I try to make here: there should be a continuous conversation between oligarchic theory and Weberian contentions of the state and social action.
The conceptual discussion here, empirically informed, requires more research: there appears to be a correlation between the presence of oligarchic modes of rule and low state capacity, but it remains an underspecified correlation. What comes first: oligarchy or low state capacity? The same lack of specificity applies for apparent correlations between oligarchy and republican features of the political system, such as precarious representation, uneven rule of law, and feeble separation of powers. It is my contention that said further research provides more and new epistemological tools for disaggregating why the monopoly of violence is ineffective in any given region of a specific country. It can incorporate relational aspects to outline the dimensions of coercion within the territoriality of a nation-state. That heterogeneity of coercion, the resulting interaction between state institutions and non-state actors, as well as the question of statehood, all align with the renewed focus on the concept of the “polity." What is more, asking such questions, rather than presuming stateness as a given (Foweraker’s 2017 critique), allows us to explore additional categories of social action occurring in (coercively) contentious spaces.